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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Kingdom of God is
Within You; What is Art?
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Title: The Kingdom of God is Within You; What is Art?
Author: graf Leo Tolstoy
Translator: Aline Delano
Release date: August 7, 2013 [eBook #43409]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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Credits: Produced by David Edwards and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE KINGDOM
OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU; WHAT IS ART? ***
Within You; What is Art?
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: The Kingdom of God is Within You; What is Art?
Author: graf Leo Tolstoy
Translator: Aline Delano
Release date: August 7, 2013 [eBook #43409]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43409
Credits: Produced by David Edwards and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE KINGDOM
OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU; WHAT IS ART? ***
Page 4
LYOF N. TOLSTOÏ
XIX
THE KINGDOM OF GOD
IS WITHIN YOU
WHAT IS ART?
XIX
THE KINGDOM OF GOD
IS WITHIN YOU
WHAT IS ART?
Page 5
COUNT TOLSTOÏ PLOWING
From the Painting by Repin
THE NOVELS AND OTHER WORKS OF
LYOF N. TOLSTOÏ
THE KINGDOM OF
GOD IS WITHIN YOU
From the Painting by Repin
THE NOVELS AND OTHER WORKS OF
LYOF N. TOLSTOÏ
THE KINGDOM OF
GOD IS WITHIN YOU
Page 6
——
WHAT IS ART?
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1902
Copyright, 1899,
By THOMAS V. CROWELL & CO.
WHAT IS ART?
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1902
Copyright, 1899,
By THOMAS V. CROWELL & CO.
Page 7
INTRODUCTION
The present volume contains two contrasting treatises. The first is religious,
and shows in Count Tolstoï's earnest and eloquent manner the meaning of
Christ's words which he takes for his text,—"The Kingdom of God is within
you." The outward forms of religion, however helpful they may be to some
souls, are not essential; the superstitions with which Faith sometimes
clothes or masks herself may or may not be uplifting; but the foundation of
Christianity is the truth contained in Christ's words, his simple, plain,
undogmatic commands and prohibitions.
One word sums it all up, and that word is Love. If the world should take
love for its guiding star, it is evident that all the evils of the world would
cease,—wars, crimes, poverty, ambitions; the millennium would come!
Count Tolstoï shows how that blessed period may begin in every man. The
translation of this beautiful and inspiring book has been made by Mrs. Aline
Delano of Boston.
In answering the question, "What is Art?" Count Tolstoï analyzes and tests
the various definitions given by other writers. He shows up with merciless
severity what he considers the fallacy in the popular delusion that the fetish
of Art pardons bestiality, obscenity, and whatever conduces to stimulating
the passions. The work is strongly controversial, and attacks unsparingly
many of the popular notions of the day, as, for instance, that "Art is the
manifestation of some mysterious idea of God," or "the expression of man's
emotions by external signs," or the production of pleasing objects. He
believes that art has a loftier function, and he proceeds elaborately to argue
in favor of this universal activity, which should be to effect a union among
men so that they may have the same noble feelings and progress together
toward universal and individual well-being. "Art for art's sake" is
meaningless to him. It is interesting to notice that the most original and
independent of the French critics has recently taken practically the same
ground in a lecture, in which he asserts that it is the critic's business to test
art and literature, and that art has a most intimate relation with morality.
The present volume contains two contrasting treatises. The first is religious,
and shows in Count Tolstoï's earnest and eloquent manner the meaning of
Christ's words which he takes for his text,—"The Kingdom of God is within
you." The outward forms of religion, however helpful they may be to some
souls, are not essential; the superstitions with which Faith sometimes
clothes or masks herself may or may not be uplifting; but the foundation of
Christianity is the truth contained in Christ's words, his simple, plain,
undogmatic commands and prohibitions.
One word sums it all up, and that word is Love. If the world should take
love for its guiding star, it is evident that all the evils of the world would
cease,—wars, crimes, poverty, ambitions; the millennium would come!
Count Tolstoï shows how that blessed period may begin in every man. The
translation of this beautiful and inspiring book has been made by Mrs. Aline
Delano of Boston.
In answering the question, "What is Art?" Count Tolstoï analyzes and tests
the various definitions given by other writers. He shows up with merciless
severity what he considers the fallacy in the popular delusion that the fetish
of Art pardons bestiality, obscenity, and whatever conduces to stimulating
the passions. The work is strongly controversial, and attacks unsparingly
many of the popular notions of the day, as, for instance, that "Art is the
manifestation of some mysterious idea of God," or "the expression of man's
emotions by external signs," or the production of pleasing objects. He
believes that art has a loftier function, and he proceeds elaborately to argue
in favor of this universal activity, which should be to effect a union among
men so that they may have the same noble feelings and progress together
toward universal and individual well-being. "Art for art's sake" is
meaningless to him. It is interesting to notice that the most original and
independent of the French critics has recently taken practically the same
ground in a lecture, in which he asserts that it is the critic's business to test
art and literature, and that art has a most intimate relation with morality.
Page 8
Much of the book is racy and amusing; much of it is abstruse, and requires
close attention. But whether one follows the author in his individual
opinions or not, it cannot be denied that the general tone of the treatise is
helpful and uplifting, and that it is based on sound common sense. Mr.
Aylmer Maude of England is the translator of this work, and has had the
benefit of Count Tolstoï's own suggestions in regard to certain points. As
the special preface explains, the translation accurately represents the
author's views, while the edition published in Russia was in many ways
garbled and distorted. The translators of both treatises have seized the
opportunity of carefully revising their work.
close attention. But whether one follows the author in his individual
opinions or not, it cannot be denied that the general tone of the treatise is
helpful and uplifting, and that it is based on sound common sense. Mr.
Aylmer Maude of England is the translator of this work, and has had the
benefit of Count Tolstoï's own suggestions in regard to certain points. As
the special preface explains, the translation accurately represents the
author's views, while the edition published in Russia was in many ways
garbled and distorted. The translators of both treatises have seized the
opportunity of carefully revising their work.
Page 9
CONTENTS
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU
PAGE
Introductory 1
CHAPTER I
Doctrine of non-resistance to evil, from the origin of Christianity, has been, and still is,
professed by the minority of men 3
CHAPTER II
Opinions of believers and unbelievers in regard to non-resistance 30
CHAPTER III
Misconception of Christianity by non-believers 47
CHAPTER IV
Misconception of Christianity by scientists 79
CHAPTER V
Contradiction of our life and Christian consciousness 100
CHAPTER VI
Attitude of men of the present day toward war 122
CHAPTER VII
Significance of the military conscription 152
CHAPTER VIII
Certainty of the acceptance of the Christian doctrine of non-resistance to evil by violence by
the men of our world 171
CHAPTER IX
The acceptance of the Christian life-conception delivers men from the miseries of our pagan
life 194
CHAPTER X
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU
PAGE
Introductory 1
CHAPTER I
Doctrine of non-resistance to evil, from the origin of Christianity, has been, and still is,
professed by the minority of men 3
CHAPTER II
Opinions of believers and unbelievers in regard to non-resistance 30
CHAPTER III
Misconception of Christianity by non-believers 47
CHAPTER IV
Misconception of Christianity by scientists 79
CHAPTER V
Contradiction of our life and Christian consciousness 100
CHAPTER VI
Attitude of men of the present day toward war 122
CHAPTER VII
Significance of the military conscription 152
CHAPTER VIII
Certainty of the acceptance of the Christian doctrine of non-resistance to evil by violence by
the men of our world 171
CHAPTER IX
The acceptance of the Christian life-conception delivers men from the miseries of our pagan
life 194
CHAPTER X
Page 10
Uselessness of violence for the destruction of evil—The moral advance of mankind is
accomplished, not only through the knowledge of truth, but also through the 218
establishment of public opinion
CHAPTER XI
Christian public opinion already arises in our society, and will inevitably destroy the system
of violence of our life—When this will come about 242
CHAPTER XII
Conclusion: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand!" 254
———
WHAT IS ART?
Translator's Preface 339
Author's Preface 341
CHAPTER I
Time and labor spent on art—Lives stunted in its service—Morality sacrificed to and anger
justified by art—The rehearsal of an opera described 345
CHAPTER II
Does art compensate for so much evil?—What is art?—Confusion of opinions—Is it "that
which produces beauty"?—The word "beauty" in Russian—Chaos in æsthetics 351
CHAPTER III
Summary of various æsthetic theories and definitions, from Baumgarten to to-day 360
CHAPTER IV
Definitions of art founded on beauty—Taste not definable—A clear definition needed to
enable us to recognize works of art 376
CHAPTER V
Definitions not founded on beauty—Tolstoï's definition—The extent and necessity of art—
How people in the past have distinguished good from bad in art 383
CHAPTER VI
How art for pleasure has come into esteem—Religions indicate what is considered good and
bad—Church Christianity—The Renaissance—Skepticism of the upper classes—They 389
confound beauty with goodness
CHAPTER VII
An æsthetic theory framed to suit this view of life 396
accomplished, not only through the knowledge of truth, but also through the 218
establishment of public opinion
CHAPTER XI
Christian public opinion already arises in our society, and will inevitably destroy the system
of violence of our life—When this will come about 242
CHAPTER XII
Conclusion: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand!" 254
———
WHAT IS ART?
Translator's Preface 339
Author's Preface 341
CHAPTER I
Time and labor spent on art—Lives stunted in its service—Morality sacrificed to and anger
justified by art—The rehearsal of an opera described 345
CHAPTER II
Does art compensate for so much evil?—What is art?—Confusion of opinions—Is it "that
which produces beauty"?—The word "beauty" in Russian—Chaos in æsthetics 351
CHAPTER III
Summary of various æsthetic theories and definitions, from Baumgarten to to-day 360
CHAPTER IV
Definitions of art founded on beauty—Taste not definable—A clear definition needed to
enable us to recognize works of art 376
CHAPTER V
Definitions not founded on beauty—Tolstoï's definition—The extent and necessity of art—
How people in the past have distinguished good from bad in art 383
CHAPTER VI
How art for pleasure has come into esteem—Religions indicate what is considered good and
bad—Church Christianity—The Renaissance—Skepticism of the upper classes—They 389
confound beauty with goodness
CHAPTER VII
An æsthetic theory framed to suit this view of life 396
Page 11
CHAPTER VIII
Who have adopted it?—Real art needful for all men—Our art too expensive, too
unintelligible, and too harmful for the masses—The theory of "the elect" in art 401
CHAPTER IX
Perversion of our art—It has lost its natural subject-matter—Has no flow of fresh feeling—
Transmits chiefly three base emotions 406
CHAPTER X
Loss of comprehensibility—Decadent art—Recent French art—Have we a right to say it is
bad and that what we like is good art?—The highest art has always been comprehensible 412
to normal people—What fails to infect normal people is not art
CHAPTER XI
Counterfeits of art produced by: Borrowing; Imitating; Striking; Interesting—Qualifications
needful for production of real works of art, and those sufficient for production of 436
counterfeits
CHAPTER XII
Causes of production of counterfeits—Professionalism—Criticism—Schools of art 446
CHAPTER XIII
Wagner's "Nibelung's Ring" a type of counterfeit art—Its success, and the reasons thereof 455
CHAPTER XIV
Truths fatal to preconceived views are not readily recognized—Proportion of works of art to
counterfeits—Perversion of taste and incapacity to recognize art—Examples 468
CHAPTER XV
The quality of art, considered apart from its subject-matter—The sign of art:
Infectiousness—Incomprehensible to those whose taste is perverted—Conditions of 476
infection: Individuality; Clearness; Sincerity
CHAPTER XVI
The quality of art, considered according to its subject-matter—The better the feeling
the better the art—The cultured crowd—The religious perception of our age—The new
ideals put fresh demands to art—Art unites—Religious art—Universal art—Both 479
coöperate to one result—The new appraisement of art—Bad art—Examples of art—How
to test a work claiming to be art
CHAPTER XVII
Results of absence of true art—Results of perversion of art: Labor and lives spent on what is
useless and harmful—The abnormal life of the rich—Perplexity of children and plain
folk—Confusion of right and wrong—Nietzsche and Redbeard—Superstition, Patriotism, 497
and Sensuality
Who have adopted it?—Real art needful for all men—Our art too expensive, too
unintelligible, and too harmful for the masses—The theory of "the elect" in art 401
CHAPTER IX
Perversion of our art—It has lost its natural subject-matter—Has no flow of fresh feeling—
Transmits chiefly three base emotions 406
CHAPTER X
Loss of comprehensibility—Decadent art—Recent French art—Have we a right to say it is
bad and that what we like is good art?—The highest art has always been comprehensible 412
to normal people—What fails to infect normal people is not art
CHAPTER XI
Counterfeits of art produced by: Borrowing; Imitating; Striking; Interesting—Qualifications
needful for production of real works of art, and those sufficient for production of 436
counterfeits
CHAPTER XII
Causes of production of counterfeits—Professionalism—Criticism—Schools of art 446
CHAPTER XIII
Wagner's "Nibelung's Ring" a type of counterfeit art—Its success, and the reasons thereof 455
CHAPTER XIV
Truths fatal to preconceived views are not readily recognized—Proportion of works of art to
counterfeits—Perversion of taste and incapacity to recognize art—Examples 468
CHAPTER XV
The quality of art, considered apart from its subject-matter—The sign of art:
Infectiousness—Incomprehensible to those whose taste is perverted—Conditions of 476
infection: Individuality; Clearness; Sincerity
CHAPTER XVI
The quality of art, considered according to its subject-matter—The better the feeling
the better the art—The cultured crowd—The religious perception of our age—The new
ideals put fresh demands to art—Art unites—Religious art—Universal art—Both 479
coöperate to one result—The new appraisement of art—Bad art—Examples of art—How
to test a work claiming to be art
CHAPTER XVII
Results of absence of true art—Results of perversion of art: Labor and lives spent on what is
useless and harmful—The abnormal life of the rich—Perplexity of children and plain
folk—Confusion of right and wrong—Nietzsche and Redbeard—Superstition, Patriotism, 497
and Sensuality
Page 12
CHAPTER XVIII
The purpose of human life is the brotherly union of man—Art must be guided by this
perception 507
CHAPTER XIX
The art of the future not a possession of a select minority, but a means toward perfection and
unity 510
CHAPTER XX
The connection between science and art—The mendacious sciences; the trivial sciences—
Science should deal with the great problems of human life, and serve as a basis for art 517
APPENDICES
Appendix I 528
Appendix II 530
Appendix III 537
Appendix IV 542
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS
WITHIN YOU
OR,
CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTICAL DOCTRINE,
BUT AS A NEW-LIFE CONCEPTION
The purpose of human life is the brotherly union of man—Art must be guided by this
perception 507
CHAPTER XIX
The art of the future not a possession of a select minority, but a means toward perfection and
unity 510
CHAPTER XX
The connection between science and art—The mendacious sciences; the trivial sciences—
Science should deal with the great problems of human life, and serve as a basis for art 517
APPENDICES
Appendix I 528
Appendix II 530
Appendix III 537
Appendix IV 542
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS
WITHIN YOU
OR,
CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTICAL DOCTRINE,
BUT AS A NEW-LIFE CONCEPTION
Page 13
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
In this book I have endeavored to show that our modern Christianity has
been tried and found wanting, that the armed camp of Europe is not
Christian, but Pagan, as is latter-day religion, of which the present state of
affairs is the outcome. The book contains three principal ideas,—the first,
that Christianity is not only the worship of God and a doctrine of salvation,
but is, above all things, a new conception of life, which is changing the
whole fabric of human society; the second, that from the first appearance of
Christianity there entered into it two opposite currents,—the one
establishing the true and new conception of life, which it gave to humanity,
and the other perverting the true Christian doctrine and converting it into a
Pagan religion, and that this contradiction has attained in our days the
highest degree of tension which now expresses itself in universal
armaments, and on the Continent in general conscription; and the third, that
this contradiction, which is masked by hypocrisy, can only be solved by an
effort of sincerity on the part of every individual endeavoring to conform
the acts of his life,—independent of what are regarded as the exigencies of
family, society, and the State,—with those moral principles which he
considers to be true.
The above is an extract (slightly adapted) from an article on Count Tolstoï
which appeared in the London Daily Chronicle of 26th December,1893.
Sent by Miss Tatiana Tolstoï, on behalf of her father, to the publishers of
this edition of his work, it is inserted here as a Preface at the suggestion of
Count Tolstoï.
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS
WITHIN YOU;
In this book I have endeavored to show that our modern Christianity has
been tried and found wanting, that the armed camp of Europe is not
Christian, but Pagan, as is latter-day religion, of which the present state of
affairs is the outcome. The book contains three principal ideas,—the first,
that Christianity is not only the worship of God and a doctrine of salvation,
but is, above all things, a new conception of life, which is changing the
whole fabric of human society; the second, that from the first appearance of
Christianity there entered into it two opposite currents,—the one
establishing the true and new conception of life, which it gave to humanity,
and the other perverting the true Christian doctrine and converting it into a
Pagan religion, and that this contradiction has attained in our days the
highest degree of tension which now expresses itself in universal
armaments, and on the Continent in general conscription; and the third, that
this contradiction, which is masked by hypocrisy, can only be solved by an
effort of sincerity on the part of every individual endeavoring to conform
the acts of his life,—independent of what are regarded as the exigencies of
family, society, and the State,—with those moral principles which he
considers to be true.
The above is an extract (slightly adapted) from an article on Count Tolstoï
which appeared in the London Daily Chronicle of 26th December,1893.
Sent by Miss Tatiana Tolstoï, on behalf of her father, to the publishers of
this edition of his work, it is inserted here as a Preface at the suggestion of
Count Tolstoï.
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS
WITHIN YOU;
Page 14
OR,
CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTICAL DOCTRINE,
BUT AS A NEW LIFE-CONCEPTION
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."—
John viii. 32.
"And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the
soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in
hell."—Matthew x. 28.
"Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men."—I
Corinthians vii. 23.
CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTICAL DOCTRINE,
BUT AS A NEW LIFE-CONCEPTION
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."—
John viii. 32.
"And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the
soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in
hell."—Matthew x. 28.
"Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men."—I
Corinthians vii. 23.
Page 15
INTRODUCTORY
In 1884 I wrote a book entitled "My Religion," wherein I formulated my
creed.
While affirming my faith in the doctrine taught by Christ, I could not refrain
from manifesting at the same time the reason why I look upon the
ecclesiastical doctrine commonly called Christianity as erroneous, and to
me incredible.
Among the many deviations of the latter from the doctrine of Christ, I
called attention to the principal one; namely—the evasion of the
commandment that forbids man to resist evil by violence, as a striking
example of the perversion of the doctrine of Christ by ecclesiastical
interpretation.
I knew but little, no more than other men, of what had been taught or
written on the subject of non-resistance in former times. I was familiar with
the opinions of the Fathers of the Church, Origen, Tertullian, and others;
and I also knew of the existence of certain sects called Mennonites,
Herrnhuters, and Quakers, all of which forbid Christians the use of arms,
and will not submit to conscription, but I never knew the arguments by
which these sects sought to maintain their views.
My book, as I had anticipated, was prohibited by the Russian censors, but
partly in consequence of my reputation as a writer, partly because it excited
curiosity, it had a circulation in manuscript, and while, on the one hand, it
called forth from those persons who sympathized with my ideas,
information concerning works written on the same subject, on the other, it
excited criticisms on the opinions therein maintained.
These two results, together with the historical events of recent years, made
many things clear to me, and led me to many new deductions and
conclusions which I now desire to set forth.
I shall speak in the first place of the information I received in regard to the
history of this matter of non-resistance to evil; and in the second place, of
the arguments upon the subject offered by religious critics, that is, by critics
In 1884 I wrote a book entitled "My Religion," wherein I formulated my
creed.
While affirming my faith in the doctrine taught by Christ, I could not refrain
from manifesting at the same time the reason why I look upon the
ecclesiastical doctrine commonly called Christianity as erroneous, and to
me incredible.
Among the many deviations of the latter from the doctrine of Christ, I
called attention to the principal one; namely—the evasion of the
commandment that forbids man to resist evil by violence, as a striking
example of the perversion of the doctrine of Christ by ecclesiastical
interpretation.
I knew but little, no more than other men, of what had been taught or
written on the subject of non-resistance in former times. I was familiar with
the opinions of the Fathers of the Church, Origen, Tertullian, and others;
and I also knew of the existence of certain sects called Mennonites,
Herrnhuters, and Quakers, all of which forbid Christians the use of arms,
and will not submit to conscription, but I never knew the arguments by
which these sects sought to maintain their views.
My book, as I had anticipated, was prohibited by the Russian censors, but
partly in consequence of my reputation as a writer, partly because it excited
curiosity, it had a circulation in manuscript, and while, on the one hand, it
called forth from those persons who sympathized with my ideas,
information concerning works written on the same subject, on the other, it
excited criticisms on the opinions therein maintained.
These two results, together with the historical events of recent years, made
many things clear to me, and led me to many new deductions and
conclusions which I now desire to set forth.
I shall speak in the first place of the information I received in regard to the
history of this matter of non-resistance to evil; and in the second place, of
the arguments upon the subject offered by religious critics, that is, by critics
Page 16
who profess the religion of Christ, as well as those of secular critics, that is
to say, of men who make no such profession; and finally, the conclusions
which I drew from the arguments of both parties, as well as from the
historical events of later years.
to say, of men who make no such profession; and finally, the conclusions
which I drew from the arguments of both parties, as well as from the
historical events of later years.
Page 17
CHAPTER I
DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE TO EVIL FROM THE
ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY, HAS BEEN, AND STILL IS,
PROFESSED BY THE MINORITY OF MEN
Concerning the book "My Religion"—Information called forth by this book—Letters of
Quakers—Professions of Garrison—Adin Ballou, his works and Catechism—"The Net of
Faith" of Helchitsky—Relations of men toward works that explain the teachings of Christ
—The book of Dymond "On War"—Assertion of Non-resistance by Musser—Relations
of government in 1818 toward those who refuse to join the military service—General
inimical attitude of governments and liberal men toward those who refused to take part in
the violence of governments and their conscious effort to conceal and ignore these
demonstrations of Christian Non-resistance.
Among the early responses called forth by my book were letters from
American Quakers. In these letters, while expressing their sympathy with
my ideas in regard to the unlawfulness of violence and war where
Christians are concerned, the Quakers made known to me many details in
relation to their sect, which for more than two hundred years has professed
the doctrine of Christ in the matter of non-resistance, and which never has,
nor does it now use weapons for self-defense. Together with the letters, the
Quakers sent me many of their pamphlets, periodicals, and books. From
these publications I learned that already, many years ago, they had
demonstrated the Christian's duty of keeping the commandment of non-
resistance to evil by violence, and the error of the church which
countenances wars and executions.
Having shown by a succession of arguments and texts that war—the
slaughter and mutilation of men—is inconsistent with a religion founded on
peace and good-will to men, the Quakers go on to assert that nothing is so
conducive to the defamation of Christ's truth in the eyes of the heathen, or
so successful in arresting the spread of Christianity throughout the world, as
the refusal to obey this commandment, made by men who call themselves
Christians, and by the sanction thus given to war and violence. The doctrine
of Christ, which has entered into the consciousness of men, not by force or
by the sword, as they say, but by non-resistance to evil, by humility,
DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE TO EVIL FROM THE
ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY, HAS BEEN, AND STILL IS,
PROFESSED BY THE MINORITY OF MEN
Concerning the book "My Religion"—Information called forth by this book—Letters of
Quakers—Professions of Garrison—Adin Ballou, his works and Catechism—"The Net of
Faith" of Helchitsky—Relations of men toward works that explain the teachings of Christ
—The book of Dymond "On War"—Assertion of Non-resistance by Musser—Relations
of government in 1818 toward those who refuse to join the military service—General
inimical attitude of governments and liberal men toward those who refused to take part in
the violence of governments and their conscious effort to conceal and ignore these
demonstrations of Christian Non-resistance.
Among the early responses called forth by my book were letters from
American Quakers. In these letters, while expressing their sympathy with
my ideas in regard to the unlawfulness of violence and war where
Christians are concerned, the Quakers made known to me many details in
relation to their sect, which for more than two hundred years has professed
the doctrine of Christ in the matter of non-resistance, and which never has,
nor does it now use weapons for self-defense. Together with the letters, the
Quakers sent me many of their pamphlets, periodicals, and books. From
these publications I learned that already, many years ago, they had
demonstrated the Christian's duty of keeping the commandment of non-
resistance to evil by violence, and the error of the church which
countenances wars and executions.
Having shown by a succession of arguments and texts that war—the
slaughter and mutilation of men—is inconsistent with a religion founded on
peace and good-will to men, the Quakers go on to assert that nothing is so
conducive to the defamation of Christ's truth in the eyes of the heathen, or
so successful in arresting the spread of Christianity throughout the world, as
the refusal to obey this commandment, made by men who call themselves
Christians, and by the sanction thus given to war and violence. The doctrine
of Christ, which has entered into the consciousness of men, not by force or
by the sword, as they say, but by non-resistance to evil, by humility,
Page 18
meekness, and the love of peace, can only be propagated among men by the
example of peace, love, and concord given by its followers.
A Christian, according to the teaching of the Lord, should be guided in his
relations toward men only by the love of peace, and therefore there should
be no authority having power to compel a Christian to act in a manner
contrary to God's law, and contrary to his chief duty toward his fellow-men.
The requirements of the civil law, they say, may oblige men, who, to win
some worldly advantages, seek to conciliate that which is irreconcilable, to
violate the law of God; but for a Christian, who firmly believes that his
salvation depends upon following the teaching of Christ, this law can have
no meaning.
My acquaintance with the activity of the Quakers and with their
publications, with Fox, Paine, and particularly with a work published by
Dymond in 1827, proved to me not only that men have long since
recognized the impossibility of harmonizing Christianity and war, but that
this incompatibility has been proved so clearly and irrefragably, that one
can only wonder how it is possible for this incongruous union of
Christianity with violence—a doctrine which is still taught by the church—
to remain in force.
Besides the information obtained from the Quakers, I also received from
America about the same time advices on the subject from another and
hitherto unknown source. The son of William Lloyd Garrison, the famous
anti-slavery champion, wrote to me that, having read my book, wherein he
had found ideas similar to those expressed by his father in 1838, and taking
it for granted that I should be interested to know that fact, he sent me a book
written by Mr. Garrison some fifty years ago, entitled "Non-resistance."
This avowal of principle took place under the following circumstances:—In
1838, on the occasion of a meeting of the Society for the Promotion of
Peace, William Lloyd Garrison, while discussing means for the suppression
of war, arrived at the conclusion that the establishment of universal peace
can have no solid foundation save in the literal obedience to the
commandment of non-resistance by violence (Matthew v. 39), as
understood by the Quakers, with whom Garrison was on friendly terms.
Having arrived at this conclusion, he wrote, offering to the Society the
example of peace, love, and concord given by its followers.
A Christian, according to the teaching of the Lord, should be guided in his
relations toward men only by the love of peace, and therefore there should
be no authority having power to compel a Christian to act in a manner
contrary to God's law, and contrary to his chief duty toward his fellow-men.
The requirements of the civil law, they say, may oblige men, who, to win
some worldly advantages, seek to conciliate that which is irreconcilable, to
violate the law of God; but for a Christian, who firmly believes that his
salvation depends upon following the teaching of Christ, this law can have
no meaning.
My acquaintance with the activity of the Quakers and with their
publications, with Fox, Paine, and particularly with a work published by
Dymond in 1827, proved to me not only that men have long since
recognized the impossibility of harmonizing Christianity and war, but that
this incompatibility has been proved so clearly and irrefragably, that one
can only wonder how it is possible for this incongruous union of
Christianity with violence—a doctrine which is still taught by the church—
to remain in force.
Besides the information obtained from the Quakers, I also received from
America about the same time advices on the subject from another and
hitherto unknown source. The son of William Lloyd Garrison, the famous
anti-slavery champion, wrote to me that, having read my book, wherein he
had found ideas similar to those expressed by his father in 1838, and taking
it for granted that I should be interested to know that fact, he sent me a book
written by Mr. Garrison some fifty years ago, entitled "Non-resistance."
This avowal of principle took place under the following circumstances:—In
1838, on the occasion of a meeting of the Society for the Promotion of
Peace, William Lloyd Garrison, while discussing means for the suppression
of war, arrived at the conclusion that the establishment of universal peace
can have no solid foundation save in the literal obedience to the
commandment of non-resistance by violence (Matthew v. 39), as
understood by the Quakers, with whom Garrison was on friendly terms.
Having arrived at this conclusion, he wrote, offering to the Society the
Page 19
following proclamation, which at that time, in 1838, was signed by many of
its members:—
"Declaration of Sentiments adopted by the Peace Convention, held in Boston, September 18,
19, and 20, 1838:—
"Assembled in Convention, from various sections of the American
Union, for the promotion of Peace on earth and Good-will among men,
We, the undersigned, regard it as due to ourselves, to the cause which
we love, to the country in which we live, and to the world, to publish a
Declaration, expressive of the principles we cherish, the purposes we
aim to accomplish, and the measures we shall adopt to carry forward
the work of peaceful, universal reformation.
"We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government; neither
can we oppose any such government by a resort to physical force. We
recognize but one King and Lawgiver, one Judge and Ruler of
mankind. We are bound by the laws of a Kingdom which is not of this
world; the subjects of which are forbidden to fight; in which Mercy
and Truth are met together, and Righteousness and Peace have kissed
each other; which has no state lines, no national partitions, no
geographical boundaries; in which there is no distinction of rank or
division of caste, or inequality of sex; the officers of which are Peace,
its exactors Righteousness, its walls Salvation, and its gates Praise; and
which is destined to break in pieces and consume all other kingdoms.
Our country is the world, our countrymen are all mankind. We love the
land of our nativity only as we love all other lands. The interests,
rights, liberties of American citizens are no more dear to us than are
those of the whole human race. Hence, we can allow no appeal to
patriotism to revenge any national insult or injury; the Principle of
Peace, under whose stainless banner we rally, came not to destroy, but
to save, even the worst of enemies. He has left us an example, that we
should follow His steps. God commendeth his love toward us, in that
while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.
"We conceive that if a nation has no right to defend itself against
foreign enemies, or to punish its invaders, no individual possesses that
right in his own case. The unit cannot be of greater importance than the
aggregate. If one man may take life, to obtain or defend his rights, the
its members:—
"Declaration of Sentiments adopted by the Peace Convention, held in Boston, September 18,
19, and 20, 1838:—
"Assembled in Convention, from various sections of the American
Union, for the promotion of Peace on earth and Good-will among men,
We, the undersigned, regard it as due to ourselves, to the cause which
we love, to the country in which we live, and to the world, to publish a
Declaration, expressive of the principles we cherish, the purposes we
aim to accomplish, and the measures we shall adopt to carry forward
the work of peaceful, universal reformation.
"We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government; neither
can we oppose any such government by a resort to physical force. We
recognize but one King and Lawgiver, one Judge and Ruler of
mankind. We are bound by the laws of a Kingdom which is not of this
world; the subjects of which are forbidden to fight; in which Mercy
and Truth are met together, and Righteousness and Peace have kissed
each other; which has no state lines, no national partitions, no
geographical boundaries; in which there is no distinction of rank or
division of caste, or inequality of sex; the officers of which are Peace,
its exactors Righteousness, its walls Salvation, and its gates Praise; and
which is destined to break in pieces and consume all other kingdoms.
Our country is the world, our countrymen are all mankind. We love the
land of our nativity only as we love all other lands. The interests,
rights, liberties of American citizens are no more dear to us than are
those of the whole human race. Hence, we can allow no appeal to
patriotism to revenge any national insult or injury; the Principle of
Peace, under whose stainless banner we rally, came not to destroy, but
to save, even the worst of enemies. He has left us an example, that we
should follow His steps. God commendeth his love toward us, in that
while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.
"We conceive that if a nation has no right to defend itself against
foreign enemies, or to punish its invaders, no individual possesses that
right in his own case. The unit cannot be of greater importance than the
aggregate. If one man may take life, to obtain or defend his rights, the
Page 20
same license must necessarily be granted to communities, states, and
nations. If he may use a dagger or a pistol, they may employ cannon,
bombshells, land and naval forces. The means of self-preservation
must be in proportion to the magnitude of interests at stake, and the
number of lives exposed to destruction. But if a rapacious and
bloodthirsty soldiery, thronging these shores from abroad, with intent
to commit rapine and destroy life, may not be resisted by the people or
magistracy, then ought no resistance to be offered to domestic troubles
of the public peace or of private security. No obligation can rest upon
Americans to regard foreigners as more sacred in their persons than
themselves, or to give them a monopoly of wrong-doing with
impunity.
"The dogma, that all the governments of the world are approvingly
ordained of God, and that the powers that be in the United States, in
Russia, in Turkey, are in accordance with His will, is not less absurd
than impious. It makes the impartial Author of human freedom and
equality unequal and tyrannical. It cannot be affirmed that the powers
that be, in any nation, are actuated by the spirit or guided by the
example of Christ, in the treatment of enemies; therefore, they cannot
be agreeable to the will of God; and therefore their overthrow, by a
spiritual regeneration of their subjects, is inevitable.
"We register our testimony not only against all wars, whether offensive
or defensive, but all preparations for war; against every naval ship,
every arsenal, every fortification; against the militia system and a
standing army; against all military chieftains and soldiers; against all
monuments commemorative of victory over a fallen foe, all trophies
won in battle, all celebrations in honor of military or naval exploits;
against all appropriations for the defense of a nation by force and
army, on the part of any legislative body; against every edict of
government requiring of its subjects military service. Hence we deem
it unlawful to bear arms, or to hold a military office.
"As every human government is upheld by physical strength, and its
laws are enforced virtually at the point of the bayonet, we cannot hold
any office which imposes upon its incumbent the obligation to compel
men to do right, on pain of imprisonment or death. We therefore
voluntarily exclude ourselves from every legislative and judicial body,
nations. If he may use a dagger or a pistol, they may employ cannon,
bombshells, land and naval forces. The means of self-preservation
must be in proportion to the magnitude of interests at stake, and the
number of lives exposed to destruction. But if a rapacious and
bloodthirsty soldiery, thronging these shores from abroad, with intent
to commit rapine and destroy life, may not be resisted by the people or
magistracy, then ought no resistance to be offered to domestic troubles
of the public peace or of private security. No obligation can rest upon
Americans to regard foreigners as more sacred in their persons than
themselves, or to give them a monopoly of wrong-doing with
impunity.
"The dogma, that all the governments of the world are approvingly
ordained of God, and that the powers that be in the United States, in
Russia, in Turkey, are in accordance with His will, is not less absurd
than impious. It makes the impartial Author of human freedom and
equality unequal and tyrannical. It cannot be affirmed that the powers
that be, in any nation, are actuated by the spirit or guided by the
example of Christ, in the treatment of enemies; therefore, they cannot
be agreeable to the will of God; and therefore their overthrow, by a
spiritual regeneration of their subjects, is inevitable.
"We register our testimony not only against all wars, whether offensive
or defensive, but all preparations for war; against every naval ship,
every arsenal, every fortification; against the militia system and a
standing army; against all military chieftains and soldiers; against all
monuments commemorative of victory over a fallen foe, all trophies
won in battle, all celebrations in honor of military or naval exploits;
against all appropriations for the defense of a nation by force and
army, on the part of any legislative body; against every edict of
government requiring of its subjects military service. Hence we deem
it unlawful to bear arms, or to hold a military office.
"As every human government is upheld by physical strength, and its
laws are enforced virtually at the point of the bayonet, we cannot hold
any office which imposes upon its incumbent the obligation to compel
men to do right, on pain of imprisonment or death. We therefore
voluntarily exclude ourselves from every legislative and judicial body,
Page 21
and repudiate all human politics, worldly honors, and stations of
authority. If we cannot occupy a seat in the legislature or on the bench,
neither can we elect others to act as our substitutes in any such
capacity.
"It follows that we cannot sue any man at law, to compel him by force
to restore anything which he may have wrongfully taken from us or
others; but if he has seized our coat, we shall surrender up our cloak,
rather than subject him to punishment.
"We believe that the penal code of the old covenant, 'An eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth,' has been abrogated by Jesus Christ; and
that under the new covenant, the forgiveness instead of the punishment
of enemies has been enjoined upon all His disciples, in all cases
whatsoever. To extort money from enemies, or set them upon a pillory,
or cast them into prison, or hang them upon gallows, is obviously not
to forgive, but to take retribution. 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,
saith the Lord.'
"The history of mankind is crowded with evidences proving that
physical coercion is not adapted to moral regeneration; that the sinful
disposition of men can be subdued only by love; that evil can be
exterminated from the earth only by goodness; that it is not safe to rely
upon an arm of flesh, upon man whose breath is in his nostrils, to
preserve us from harm; that there is great security in being gentle,
harmless, long-suffering, and abundant in mercy; that it is only the
meek who shall inherit the earth, for the violent who resort to the
sword are destined to perish with the sword. Hence, as a measure of
sound policy—of safety to property, life, and liberty—of public
quietude and private enjoyment—as well as on the ground of
allegiance to Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, we cordially
adopt the non-resistance principle; being confident that it provides for
all possible consequences, will insure all things needful to us, is armed
with omnipotent power, and must ultimately triumph over every
assailing force.
"We advocate no jacobinical doctrine. The spirit of jacobinism is the
spirit of retaliation, violence, and murder. It neither fears God nor
regards man. We would be filled with the spirit of Jesus Christ. If we
authority. If we cannot occupy a seat in the legislature or on the bench,
neither can we elect others to act as our substitutes in any such
capacity.
"It follows that we cannot sue any man at law, to compel him by force
to restore anything which he may have wrongfully taken from us or
others; but if he has seized our coat, we shall surrender up our cloak,
rather than subject him to punishment.
"We believe that the penal code of the old covenant, 'An eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth,' has been abrogated by Jesus Christ; and
that under the new covenant, the forgiveness instead of the punishment
of enemies has been enjoined upon all His disciples, in all cases
whatsoever. To extort money from enemies, or set them upon a pillory,
or cast them into prison, or hang them upon gallows, is obviously not
to forgive, but to take retribution. 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,
saith the Lord.'
"The history of mankind is crowded with evidences proving that
physical coercion is not adapted to moral regeneration; that the sinful
disposition of men can be subdued only by love; that evil can be
exterminated from the earth only by goodness; that it is not safe to rely
upon an arm of flesh, upon man whose breath is in his nostrils, to
preserve us from harm; that there is great security in being gentle,
harmless, long-suffering, and abundant in mercy; that it is only the
meek who shall inherit the earth, for the violent who resort to the
sword are destined to perish with the sword. Hence, as a measure of
sound policy—of safety to property, life, and liberty—of public
quietude and private enjoyment—as well as on the ground of
allegiance to Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, we cordially
adopt the non-resistance principle; being confident that it provides for
all possible consequences, will insure all things needful to us, is armed
with omnipotent power, and must ultimately triumph over every
assailing force.
"We advocate no jacobinical doctrine. The spirit of jacobinism is the
spirit of retaliation, violence, and murder. It neither fears God nor
regards man. We would be filled with the spirit of Jesus Christ. If we
Page 22
abide by our principles, it is impossible for us to be disorderly, or plot
treason, or participate in any evil work; we shall submit to every
ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake; obey all the requirements of
government, except such as we deem contrary to the commands of the
gospel; and in no case resist the operation of law, except by meekly
submitting to the penalty of disobedience.
"But while we shall adhere to the doctrine of non-resistance and
passive submission, we purpose, in a moral and spiritual sense, to
speak and act boldly in the cause of God; to assail iniquity in high
places and in low places; to apply our principles to all existing civil,
political, legal, and ecclesiastical institutions; and to hasten the time
when the kingdoms of this world will have become the kingdoms of
our Lord and of His Christ, and He shall reign forever.
"It appears to us a self-evident truth, that, whatever the gospel is
designed to destroy at any period of the world, being contrary to it,
ought now to be abandoned. If, then, the time is predicted when
swords shall be beaten into plowshares, and spears into pruning-hooks,
and men shall not learn the art of war any more, it follows that all who
manufacture, sell, or wield those deadly weapons do thus array
themselves against the peaceful dominion of the Son of God on earth.
"Having thus briefly stated our principles and purposes, we proceed to
specify the measures we propose to adopt in carrying our object into
effect.
"We expect to prevail through the foolishness of preaching,—striving
to commend ourselves unto every man's conscience, in the sight of
God. From the press we shall promulgate our sentiments as widely as
practicable. We shall endeavor to secure the coöperation of all persons,
of whatever name or sect. The triumphant progress of the cause of
Temperance and of Abolition in our land, through the instrumentality
of benevolent and voluntary associations, encourages us to combine
our own means and efforts for the promotion of a still greater cause.
Hence, we shall employ lecturers, circulate tracts and publications,
form societies, and petition our state and national governments, in
relation to the subject of Universal Peace. It will be our leading object
to devise ways and means for effecting a radical change in the views,
treason, or participate in any evil work; we shall submit to every
ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake; obey all the requirements of
government, except such as we deem contrary to the commands of the
gospel; and in no case resist the operation of law, except by meekly
submitting to the penalty of disobedience.
"But while we shall adhere to the doctrine of non-resistance and
passive submission, we purpose, in a moral and spiritual sense, to
speak and act boldly in the cause of God; to assail iniquity in high
places and in low places; to apply our principles to all existing civil,
political, legal, and ecclesiastical institutions; and to hasten the time
when the kingdoms of this world will have become the kingdoms of
our Lord and of His Christ, and He shall reign forever.
"It appears to us a self-evident truth, that, whatever the gospel is
designed to destroy at any period of the world, being contrary to it,
ought now to be abandoned. If, then, the time is predicted when
swords shall be beaten into plowshares, and spears into pruning-hooks,
and men shall not learn the art of war any more, it follows that all who
manufacture, sell, or wield those deadly weapons do thus array
themselves against the peaceful dominion of the Son of God on earth.
"Having thus briefly stated our principles and purposes, we proceed to
specify the measures we propose to adopt in carrying our object into
effect.
"We expect to prevail through the foolishness of preaching,—striving
to commend ourselves unto every man's conscience, in the sight of
God. From the press we shall promulgate our sentiments as widely as
practicable. We shall endeavor to secure the coöperation of all persons,
of whatever name or sect. The triumphant progress of the cause of
Temperance and of Abolition in our land, through the instrumentality
of benevolent and voluntary associations, encourages us to combine
our own means and efforts for the promotion of a still greater cause.
Hence, we shall employ lecturers, circulate tracts and publications,
form societies, and petition our state and national governments, in
relation to the subject of Universal Peace. It will be our leading object
to devise ways and means for effecting a radical change in the views,
Page 23
feelings, and practices of society, respecting the sinfulness of war and
the treatment of enemies.
"In entering upon the great work before us, we are not unmindful that,
in its prosecution, we may be called to test our sincerity even as in a
fiery ordeal. It may subject us to insult, outrage, suffering, yea, even
death itself. We anticipate no small amount of misconception,
misrepresentation, calumny. Tumults may arise against us. The
ungodly and violent, the proud and pharisaical, the ambitious and
tyrannical, principalities and powers, and spiritual wickedness in high
places, may contrive to crush us. So they treated the Messiah, whose
example we are humbly striving to imitate. If we suffer with Him we
know that we shall reign with Him. We shall not be afraid of their
terror, neither be troubled. Our confidence is in the Lord Almighty, not
in man. Having withdrawn from human protection, what can sustain us
but that faith which overcomes the world? We shall not think it strange
concerning the fiery trial which is to try us, as though some strange
thing had happened unto us; but rejoice, inasmuch as we are partakers
of Christ's sufferings. Wherefore, we commit the keeping of our souls
to God, in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator. For every one that
forsakes house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or
children, or lands, for Christ's sake, shall receive a hundredfold, and
shall inherit everlasting life.
"Firmly relying upon the certain and universal triumph of the
sentiments contained in this declaration, however formidable may be
the opposition arrayed against them—in solemn testimony of our faith
in their divine origin—we hereby affix our signatures to it,
commending it to the reason and conscience of mankind, giving
ourselves no anxiety as to what may befall us, and resolving in the
strength of the Lord God calmly and meekly to abide the issue."
Later on, Garrison founded a Non-resistance Society and started a
periodical entitled The Non-resistant, wherein the full significance and
consequences of the doctrine were plainly set forth, as has been stated in the
proclamation. I gained, subsequently, further information concerning the
fate of this society and the periodical from a biography of William Lloyd
Garrison, written by his sons.
the treatment of enemies.
"In entering upon the great work before us, we are not unmindful that,
in its prosecution, we may be called to test our sincerity even as in a
fiery ordeal. It may subject us to insult, outrage, suffering, yea, even
death itself. We anticipate no small amount of misconception,
misrepresentation, calumny. Tumults may arise against us. The
ungodly and violent, the proud and pharisaical, the ambitious and
tyrannical, principalities and powers, and spiritual wickedness in high
places, may contrive to crush us. So they treated the Messiah, whose
example we are humbly striving to imitate. If we suffer with Him we
know that we shall reign with Him. We shall not be afraid of their
terror, neither be troubled. Our confidence is in the Lord Almighty, not
in man. Having withdrawn from human protection, what can sustain us
but that faith which overcomes the world? We shall not think it strange
concerning the fiery trial which is to try us, as though some strange
thing had happened unto us; but rejoice, inasmuch as we are partakers
of Christ's sufferings. Wherefore, we commit the keeping of our souls
to God, in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator. For every one that
forsakes house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or
children, or lands, for Christ's sake, shall receive a hundredfold, and
shall inherit everlasting life.
"Firmly relying upon the certain and universal triumph of the
sentiments contained in this declaration, however formidable may be
the opposition arrayed against them—in solemn testimony of our faith
in their divine origin—we hereby affix our signatures to it,
commending it to the reason and conscience of mankind, giving
ourselves no anxiety as to what may befall us, and resolving in the
strength of the Lord God calmly and meekly to abide the issue."
Later on, Garrison founded a Non-resistance Society and started a
periodical entitled The Non-resistant, wherein the full significance and
consequences of the doctrine were plainly set forth, as has been stated in the
proclamation. I gained, subsequently, further information concerning the
fate of this society and the periodical from a biography of William Lloyd
Garrison, written by his sons.
Page 24
Neither the periodical nor the society enjoyed a long life. The majority of
Garrison's associates in the work of liberating the slaves, apprehensive lest
the too radical views expressed in the The Non-resistant might alienate men
from the practical business of the abolition of slavery, renounced the
doctrine of non-resistance as expressed in the declaration, and both
periodical and society passed out of existence.
One would suppose that this declaration of Garrison, formulating, as it did,
an important profession of faith in terms both energetic and eloquent, would
have made a deeper impression on men, and have become a subject for
universal consideration. On the contrary, not only is it unknown in Europe,
but even among those Americans who honor the memory of Garrison there
are but few who are familiar with this.
A similar fate befell another American champion of the same doctrine, Adin
Ballou, who died recently, and who for fifty years had preached in favor of
non-resistance to evil. How little is known in regard to the question of non-
resistance may be gathered from the fact that the younger Garrison (who
has written an excellent biography of his father in four large volumes), in
answer to my inquiry whether any society for the defense of the principles
of non-resistance was yet alive and possessed adherents, wrote me that, so
far as he knew, the society had dissolved and its members were no longer
interested, while at this very time Adin Ballou, who had shared Garrison's
labors, and who had devoted fifty years of his life to the teaching of the
doctrine of non-resistance, both by pen and by tongue, was still living in
Hopedale, Massachusetts. Afterward I received a letter from Wilson, a
disciple and co-worker of Ballou, and subsequently I entered into
correspondence with Ballou himself. I wrote to him, and he sent me his
works, from one of which I made the following extract:—"Jesus Christ is
my Lord and Master," says Ballou in one of his articles, written to show the
inconsistency of Christians who believe in the right of defensive and
offensive warfare. "I have covenanted to forsake all and follow Him,
through good and evil report, until death. But I am nevertheless a
Democratic Republican citizen of the United States, implicitly sworn to
bear true allegiance to my country, and to support its Constitution, if need
be, with my life. Jesus Christ requires me to do unto others as I would that
others should do unto me. The Constitution of the United States requires me
to do unto twenty-seven hundred thousand slaves" (they had slaves then;
Garrison's associates in the work of liberating the slaves, apprehensive lest
the too radical views expressed in the The Non-resistant might alienate men
from the practical business of the abolition of slavery, renounced the
doctrine of non-resistance as expressed in the declaration, and both
periodical and society passed out of existence.
One would suppose that this declaration of Garrison, formulating, as it did,
an important profession of faith in terms both energetic and eloquent, would
have made a deeper impression on men, and have become a subject for
universal consideration. On the contrary, not only is it unknown in Europe,
but even among those Americans who honor the memory of Garrison there
are but few who are familiar with this.
A similar fate befell another American champion of the same doctrine, Adin
Ballou, who died recently, and who for fifty years had preached in favor of
non-resistance to evil. How little is known in regard to the question of non-
resistance may be gathered from the fact that the younger Garrison (who
has written an excellent biography of his father in four large volumes), in
answer to my inquiry whether any society for the defense of the principles
of non-resistance was yet alive and possessed adherents, wrote me that, so
far as he knew, the society had dissolved and its members were no longer
interested, while at this very time Adin Ballou, who had shared Garrison's
labors, and who had devoted fifty years of his life to the teaching of the
doctrine of non-resistance, both by pen and by tongue, was still living in
Hopedale, Massachusetts. Afterward I received a letter from Wilson, a
disciple and co-worker of Ballou, and subsequently I entered into
correspondence with Ballou himself. I wrote to him, and he sent me his
works, from one of which I made the following extract:—"Jesus Christ is
my Lord and Master," says Ballou in one of his articles, written to show the
inconsistency of Christians who believe in the right of defensive and
offensive warfare. "I have covenanted to forsake all and follow Him,
through good and evil report, until death. But I am nevertheless a
Democratic Republican citizen of the United States, implicitly sworn to
bear true allegiance to my country, and to support its Constitution, if need
be, with my life. Jesus Christ requires me to do unto others as I would that
others should do unto me. The Constitution of the United States requires me
to do unto twenty-seven hundred thousand slaves" (they had slaves then;
Page 25
now they could easily be replaced by workmen) "the very contrary of what
I would have them do unto me—viz., assist to keep in a grievous
bondage.... But I am quite easy. I vote on. I help govern on. I am willing to
hold any office I may be elected to under the Constitution. And I am still a
Christian. I profess on. I find difficulty in keeping covenant both with
Christ and the Constitution.
"Jesus Christ forbids me to resist evil-doers by taking 'eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, blood and life for life.' My government requires the very reverse, and
depends, for its own self-preservation, on the halter, the musket, and the
sword, seasonably employed against its domestic and foreign enemies.
"In the maintenance and use of this expensive life-destroying apparatus we
can exemplify the virtues of forgiving our injuries, loving our enemies,
blessing them that curse us, and doing good to those that hate us. For this
reason we have regular Christian chaplains to pray for us and call down the
smiles of God on our holy murders.
"I see it all" (that is, the contradiction between profession and life), "and yet
I insist that I am as good a Christian as ever. I fellowship all; I vote on; I
help govern on; I profess on; and I glory in being at once a devoted
Christian and a no less devoted adherent to the existing government. I will
not give in to those miserable non-resistant notions. I will not throw away
my political influence, and leave unprincipled men to carry on government
alone.
"The Constitution says—'Congress shall have power to declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal,' and I agree to this, I indorse it. I swear to
help carry it through. I vote for men to hold office who are sworn to support
all this. What, then, am I less a Christian? Is not war a Christian service? Is
it not perfectly Christian to murder hundreds of thousands of fellow human
beings; to ravish defenseless females, sack and burn cities, and enact all the
other cruelties of war? Out upon these new-fangled scruples! This is the
very way to forgive injuries, and love our enemies! If we only do it all in
true love nothing can be more Christian than wholesale murder!"
In another pamphlet, entitled "How many does it take?" he says—"One man
must not kill. If he does, it is murder; two, ten, one hundred men, acting on
their responsibility, must not kill. If they do, it is still murder. But a state or
nation may kill as many as they please, and it is no murder. It is just,
I would have them do unto me—viz., assist to keep in a grievous
bondage.... But I am quite easy. I vote on. I help govern on. I am willing to
hold any office I may be elected to under the Constitution. And I am still a
Christian. I profess on. I find difficulty in keeping covenant both with
Christ and the Constitution.
"Jesus Christ forbids me to resist evil-doers by taking 'eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, blood and life for life.' My government requires the very reverse, and
depends, for its own self-preservation, on the halter, the musket, and the
sword, seasonably employed against its domestic and foreign enemies.
"In the maintenance and use of this expensive life-destroying apparatus we
can exemplify the virtues of forgiving our injuries, loving our enemies,
blessing them that curse us, and doing good to those that hate us. For this
reason we have regular Christian chaplains to pray for us and call down the
smiles of God on our holy murders.
"I see it all" (that is, the contradiction between profession and life), "and yet
I insist that I am as good a Christian as ever. I fellowship all; I vote on; I
help govern on; I profess on; and I glory in being at once a devoted
Christian and a no less devoted adherent to the existing government. I will
not give in to those miserable non-resistant notions. I will not throw away
my political influence, and leave unprincipled men to carry on government
alone.
"The Constitution says—'Congress shall have power to declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal,' and I agree to this, I indorse it. I swear to
help carry it through. I vote for men to hold office who are sworn to support
all this. What, then, am I less a Christian? Is not war a Christian service? Is
it not perfectly Christian to murder hundreds of thousands of fellow human
beings; to ravish defenseless females, sack and burn cities, and enact all the
other cruelties of war? Out upon these new-fangled scruples! This is the
very way to forgive injuries, and love our enemies! If we only do it all in
true love nothing can be more Christian than wholesale murder!"
In another pamphlet, entitled "How many does it take?" he says—"One man
must not kill. If he does, it is murder; two, ten, one hundred men, acting on
their responsibility, must not kill. If they do, it is still murder. But a state or
nation may kill as many as they please, and it is no murder. It is just,
Page 26
necessary, commendable, and right. Only get people enough to agree to it,
and the butchery of myriads of human beings is perfectly innocent. But how
many does it take? This is the question. Just so with theft, robbery, burglary,
and all other crimes. Man-stealing is a great crime in one man, or a very
few men only. But a whole nation can commit it, and the act becomes not
only innocent, but highly honorable."
The following is, in substance, a catechism of Ballou, compiled for the use
of his congregation:—
THE CATECHISM OF NON-RESISTANCE.[1]
Q. Whence comes the word non-resistance?
A. From the utterance: "But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil."—
Matthew v. 39.
Q. What does this word denote?
A. It denotes a lofty Christian virtue, commanded by Christ.
Q. Are we to understand the word non-resistance in its broad sense, that is,
as meaning that one should offer no resistance to evil whatsoever?
A. No; it should be understood literally as Christ taught it—that is, not to
return evil for evil. Evil should be resisted by all lawful means, but not by
evil.
Q. From what does it appear that Christ gave that meaning to non-
resistance?
A. From the words which he used on that occasion. He said: "Ye have heard
that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say
unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right
cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law,
and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also."
Q. Whom did he mean by the words: "Ye have heard that it hath been said"?
A. The patriarchs and the prophets, and that which they spoke and which is
contained in the Old Testament, that the Jews generally call the Law and
Prophets.
Q. To what laws did Christ allude in the words: "Ye have heard"?
and the butchery of myriads of human beings is perfectly innocent. But how
many does it take? This is the question. Just so with theft, robbery, burglary,
and all other crimes. Man-stealing is a great crime in one man, or a very
few men only. But a whole nation can commit it, and the act becomes not
only innocent, but highly honorable."
The following is, in substance, a catechism of Ballou, compiled for the use
of his congregation:—
THE CATECHISM OF NON-RESISTANCE.[1]
Q. Whence comes the word non-resistance?
A. From the utterance: "But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil."—
Matthew v. 39.
Q. What does this word denote?
A. It denotes a lofty Christian virtue, commanded by Christ.
Q. Are we to understand the word non-resistance in its broad sense, that is,
as meaning that one should offer no resistance to evil whatsoever?
A. No; it should be understood literally as Christ taught it—that is, not to
return evil for evil. Evil should be resisted by all lawful means, but not by
evil.
Q. From what does it appear that Christ gave that meaning to non-
resistance?
A. From the words which he used on that occasion. He said: "Ye have heard
that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say
unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right
cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law,
and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also."
Q. Whom did he mean by the words: "Ye have heard that it hath been said"?
A. The patriarchs and the prophets, and that which they spoke and which is
contained in the Old Testament, that the Jews generally call the Law and
Prophets.
Q. To what laws did Christ allude in the words: "Ye have heard"?
Page 27
A. To those in which Noah, Moses, and other prophets grant the use of
personal violence against those who commit it, for the purpose of punishing
and destroying evil deeds.
Q. Mention such commandments.
A. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."—
Genesis ix. 6.
"He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death. And if
any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound,
stripe for stripe."—Exodus xxi. 12, 23, 24, 25.
"And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death. And if a man
cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him;
breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth."—Leviticus xxiv. 17, 19, 20.
"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition: and, behold, if the witness
be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother; then shall
ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his brother. And thine
eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand
for hand, foot for foot."—Deuteronomy xix. 18, 19, 21.
These are the injunctions of which Jesus speaks.
Noah, Moses, and the prophets taught that he who murders, mutilates, or
tortures his neighbor doeth evil. In order to combat and destroy this evil, the
evil-doer must be chastised by death, mutilation, or some personal torture.
Transgressions are to be avenged by transgressions, murder by murder,
torture by torture, evil by evil. Thus taught Noah, Moses, and the prophets.
But Christ forbids all this. The gospel says: "I say unto you, resist ye not
evil, avenge not one transgression by another, but rather bear a repetition of
the offense from the evil-doer." That which has been allowed is now
forbidden. Having understood what resistance we have been taught, we
know exactly what Christ meant by non-resistance.
Q. Did the teaching of the Ancients admit of resisting transgression by
transgression?
A. Yes; but Christ forbade it. A Christian has no right in any case to take the
life of, or to offend against, the evil-doer.
personal violence against those who commit it, for the purpose of punishing
and destroying evil deeds.
Q. Mention such commandments.
A. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."—
Genesis ix. 6.
"He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death. And if
any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound,
stripe for stripe."—Exodus xxi. 12, 23, 24, 25.
"And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death. And if a man
cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him;
breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth."—Leviticus xxiv. 17, 19, 20.
"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition: and, behold, if the witness
be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother; then shall
ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his brother. And thine
eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand
for hand, foot for foot."—Deuteronomy xix. 18, 19, 21.
These are the injunctions of which Jesus speaks.
Noah, Moses, and the prophets taught that he who murders, mutilates, or
tortures his neighbor doeth evil. In order to combat and destroy this evil, the
evil-doer must be chastised by death, mutilation, or some personal torture.
Transgressions are to be avenged by transgressions, murder by murder,
torture by torture, evil by evil. Thus taught Noah, Moses, and the prophets.
But Christ forbids all this. The gospel says: "I say unto you, resist ye not
evil, avenge not one transgression by another, but rather bear a repetition of
the offense from the evil-doer." That which has been allowed is now
forbidden. Having understood what resistance we have been taught, we
know exactly what Christ meant by non-resistance.
Q. Did the teaching of the Ancients admit of resisting transgression by
transgression?
A. Yes; but Christ forbade it. A Christian has no right in any case to take the
life of, or to offend against, the evil-doer.
Page 28
Q. May he not kill or wound another in self-defense?
A. No.
Q. May he enter a complaint to the magistrates for the purpose of chastising
the offender?
A. No. For that which he does through others, he practically does himself.
Q. May he fight in the army against foreign or domestic enemies?
A. Certainly not. He can take no part in war, or in the preparation therefor.
He cannot make use of weapons. He cannot resist one transgression by
another, whether he is alone or in company, either personally or through
other agents.
Q. May he voluntarily select or drill soldiers for the government?
A. He cannot do this, if he wishes to be faithful to the law of Christ.
Q. May he voluntarily contribute money to assist a government which is
supported by military power, executions, and violence in general?
A. No; unless the money is to be used for some special purpose, justifiable
in itself, where the object and the means employed are good.
Q. May he pay taxes to such a government?
A. No; he should not pay taxes on his own accord, but he should not resist
the levying of a tax. A tax imposed by the government is levied
independently of the will of the citizens. It may not be resisted without
recourse to violence, and a Christian should not use violence; therefore he
must deliver his property to the forced damage caused by authorities.
Q. May a Christian vote at elections and take part in courts of law or in the
government?
A. No. To take a part in elections, courts of law, or in the administration of
government is the same thing as a participation in the violence of the
government.
Q. What is the chief significance of the doctrine of non-resistance?
A. To show that it is possible to extirpate evil from one's own heart, as well
as from that of one's neighbor. This doctrine forbids men to do that which
A. No.
Q. May he enter a complaint to the magistrates for the purpose of chastising
the offender?
A. No. For that which he does through others, he practically does himself.
Q. May he fight in the army against foreign or domestic enemies?
A. Certainly not. He can take no part in war, or in the preparation therefor.
He cannot make use of weapons. He cannot resist one transgression by
another, whether he is alone or in company, either personally or through
other agents.
Q. May he voluntarily select or drill soldiers for the government?
A. He cannot do this, if he wishes to be faithful to the law of Christ.
Q. May he voluntarily contribute money to assist a government which is
supported by military power, executions, and violence in general?
A. No; unless the money is to be used for some special purpose, justifiable
in itself, where the object and the means employed are good.
Q. May he pay taxes to such a government?
A. No; he should not pay taxes on his own accord, but he should not resist
the levying of a tax. A tax imposed by the government is levied
independently of the will of the citizens. It may not be resisted without
recourse to violence, and a Christian should not use violence; therefore he
must deliver his property to the forced damage caused by authorities.
Q. May a Christian vote at elections and take part in courts of law or in the
government?
A. No. To take a part in elections, courts of law, or in the administration of
government is the same thing as a participation in the violence of the
government.
Q. What is the chief significance of the doctrine of non-resistance?
A. To show that it is possible to extirpate evil from one's own heart, as well
as from that of one's neighbor. This doctrine forbids men to do that which
Page 29
perpetuates and multiplies evil in this world. He who attacks another, and
does him an injury, excites a feeling of hatred, the worst of all evil. To
offend our neighbor because he has offended us, with ostensible motive of
self-defense, means but to repeat the evil act against him as well as against
ourselves,—it means to beget, or at least to let loose, or to encourage the
Evil Spirit whom we wish to expel. Satan cannot be driven out by Satan,
falsehood cannot be purged by falsehood, nor can evil be conquered by evil.
True non-resistance is the only real method of resisting evil. It crushes the
serpent's head. It destroys and exterminates all evil feeling.
Q. But admitting that the idea of the doctrine is correct, is it practicable?
A. As practicable as any virtue commanded by the law of God. Good deeds
cannot be performed under all circumstances without self-sacrifice,
privations, suffering, and, in extreme cases, without the loss of life itself.
But he who prizes life more than the fulfilment of God's will is already dead
to the only true life. Such a man, in trying to save his life, will lose it.
Furthermore, wherever non-resistance costs the sacrifice of one's life, or of
some essential advantage of life, resistance costs thousands of such
sacrifices.
Non-resistance preserves; resistance destroys.
It is much safer to act justly than unjustly; to endure an offense rather than
resist it by violence; safer even in regard to the present life. If all men
refused to resist evil, the world would be a happy one.
Q. But if only a few were to act thus, what would become of them?
A. Even if but one man were to act thus, and the others should agree to
crucify him, would it not be more glorious for him to die in the glory of
non-resisting love, praying for his enemies, than live wearing the crown of
Cæsar, besprinkled with the blood of the murdered? But whether it be one
man or thousands of men who are firmly determined not to resist evil by
evil, still, whether in the midst of civilized or uncivilized neighbors, men
who do not rely on violence are safer than those who do. A robber, a
murderer, a villain, will be less likely to harm them if he finds them offering
no armed resistance. "All they that take the sword shall perish with the
sword," and he who seeks peace, who acts like a friend, who is inoffensive,
does him an injury, excites a feeling of hatred, the worst of all evil. To
offend our neighbor because he has offended us, with ostensible motive of
self-defense, means but to repeat the evil act against him as well as against
ourselves,—it means to beget, or at least to let loose, or to encourage the
Evil Spirit whom we wish to expel. Satan cannot be driven out by Satan,
falsehood cannot be purged by falsehood, nor can evil be conquered by evil.
True non-resistance is the only real method of resisting evil. It crushes the
serpent's head. It destroys and exterminates all evil feeling.
Q. But admitting that the idea of the doctrine is correct, is it practicable?
A. As practicable as any virtue commanded by the law of God. Good deeds
cannot be performed under all circumstances without self-sacrifice,
privations, suffering, and, in extreme cases, without the loss of life itself.
But he who prizes life more than the fulfilment of God's will is already dead
to the only true life. Such a man, in trying to save his life, will lose it.
Furthermore, wherever non-resistance costs the sacrifice of one's life, or of
some essential advantage of life, resistance costs thousands of such
sacrifices.
Non-resistance preserves; resistance destroys.
It is much safer to act justly than unjustly; to endure an offense rather than
resist it by violence; safer even in regard to the present life. If all men
refused to resist evil, the world would be a happy one.
Q. But if only a few were to act thus, what would become of them?
A. Even if but one man were to act thus, and the others should agree to
crucify him, would it not be more glorious for him to die in the glory of
non-resisting love, praying for his enemies, than live wearing the crown of
Cæsar, besprinkled with the blood of the murdered? But whether it be one
man or thousands of men who are firmly determined not to resist evil by
evil, still, whether in the midst of civilized or uncivilized neighbors, men
who do not rely on violence are safer than those who do. A robber, a
murderer, a villain, will be less likely to harm them if he finds them offering
no armed resistance. "All they that take the sword shall perish with the
sword," and he who seeks peace, who acts like a friend, who is inoffensive,
Page 30
who forgives and forgets injuries, generally enjoys peace, or if he dies, he
dies a blessed death.
Hence, if all were to follow the commandment of non-resistance, there
would manifestly be neither offense nor evil-doing. If even the majority
were composed of such men they would establish the rule of love and good-
will even toward the offenders, by not resisting evil by evil nor using
violence. Even if such men formed a numerous minority, they would have
such an improving moral influence over society that every severe
punishment would be revoked, and violence and enmity would be replaced
by peace and good-will. If they formed but a small minority, they would
rarely experience anything worse than the contempt of the world, while the
world, without preserving it or feeling grateful therefor, would become
better and wiser from its latent influence. And if, in the most extreme cases,
certain members of the minority might be persecuted unto death, these men,
thus dying for the truth, would have left their doctrine already sanctified by
the blood of martyrdom.
Peace be with all ye who seek peace; and may the all-conquering love be
the imperishable inheritance of every soul who submits of its own accord to
the law of Christ.
Resist not evil by violence.—Adin Ballou.
For fifty years Ballou wrote and published books chiefly on the subject of
non-resistance. In these writings, remarkable for their eloquence and
simplicity of style, the question is considered in all its aspects. He proved it
to be the duty of every Christian who professes to believe that the Bible is a
revelation from God, to obey this commandment. He enumerates the
arguments against the commandment of non-resistance, drawn from the Old
as well as the New Testament, the expulsion from the Temple, among
others, and answers each one in turn. Setting the Bible aside, he points out
the practical good sense on which this principle is founded, sums up the
arguments against it, and refutes them. For instance, in one chapter of his
work he treats of non-resistance to evil in exceptional cases, and affirms
that granting the truth of the supposition that there are cases to which the
dies a blessed death.
Hence, if all were to follow the commandment of non-resistance, there
would manifestly be neither offense nor evil-doing. If even the majority
were composed of such men they would establish the rule of love and good-
will even toward the offenders, by not resisting evil by evil nor using
violence. Even if such men formed a numerous minority, they would have
such an improving moral influence over society that every severe
punishment would be revoked, and violence and enmity would be replaced
by peace and good-will. If they formed but a small minority, they would
rarely experience anything worse than the contempt of the world, while the
world, without preserving it or feeling grateful therefor, would become
better and wiser from its latent influence. And if, in the most extreme cases,
certain members of the minority might be persecuted unto death, these men,
thus dying for the truth, would have left their doctrine already sanctified by
the blood of martyrdom.
Peace be with all ye who seek peace; and may the all-conquering love be
the imperishable inheritance of every soul who submits of its own accord to
the law of Christ.
Resist not evil by violence.—Adin Ballou.
For fifty years Ballou wrote and published books chiefly on the subject of
non-resistance. In these writings, remarkable for their eloquence and
simplicity of style, the question is considered in all its aspects. He proved it
to be the duty of every Christian who professes to believe that the Bible is a
revelation from God, to obey this commandment. He enumerates the
arguments against the commandment of non-resistance, drawn from the Old
as well as the New Testament, the expulsion from the Temple, among
others, and answers each one in turn. Setting the Bible aside, he points out
the practical good sense on which this principle is founded, sums up the
arguments against it, and refutes them. For instance, in one chapter of his
work he treats of non-resistance to evil in exceptional cases, and affirms
that granting the truth of the supposition that there are cases to which the
Page 31
rule of non-resistance cannot be applied, that would prove that the rule in
general is inconsistent. Citing such exceptional cases, he proves that these
are the very occasions when the application of this rule is both wise and
necessary. The question has been viewed from every side, and no argument,
whether of opponent or sympathizer, has been neglected or left unanswered.
I mention this in order to call attention to the deep interest which works of
this class ought to excite in men who profess Christianity; and it would
seem therefore that Ballou's zeal should have been recognized, and the
ideas he expressed either accepted or disproved. But such was not the case.
The life-work of Garrison, the father, his founding the society of the Non-
resistant, and his declaration, convinced me, more even than my intercourse
with the Quakers, that the divergence of the Christianity of the State from
Christ's law of non-resistance by violence has been long since noticed and
pointed out, and men have labored and still do labor to counteract it. Thus
Ballou's earnestness has fortified my opinion. But the fate of Garrison, and
particularly that of Ballou, almost unknown, notwithstanding fifty years of
active and persistent work in one direction, has confirmed me in the belief
that there exists a certain inexpressed but fixed determination to oppose all
such attempts by a wall of silence.
In August of 1890 Ballou died, and his obituary appeared in the American
Religio-Philosophical Journal of August 23d.
From this obituary we learn that Ballou was the spiritual leader of a
community, that he had preached from 8000 to 9000 sermons, married 1000
couples, and written 500 articles, but in regard to the object of his life's
devotion not a word is said; the word "non-resistance" is never mentioned.
All the exhortations of the Quakers for 200 years, all the efforts of Garrison,
the father, the foundation of his society, his periodical, and his declarations,
as well as the life-work of Ballou, are the same as if they had never existed.
Another striking example of the obscurity into which a work written for the
purpose of explaining the principle of non-resistance, and to denounce those
who refuse to recognize this commandment, may fall, is the fate of a book
by the Czech Helchitsky, which has only recently been discovered, and
which up to the present time has never been printed.
general is inconsistent. Citing such exceptional cases, he proves that these
are the very occasions when the application of this rule is both wise and
necessary. The question has been viewed from every side, and no argument,
whether of opponent or sympathizer, has been neglected or left unanswered.
I mention this in order to call attention to the deep interest which works of
this class ought to excite in men who profess Christianity; and it would
seem therefore that Ballou's zeal should have been recognized, and the
ideas he expressed either accepted or disproved. But such was not the case.
The life-work of Garrison, the father, his founding the society of the Non-
resistant, and his declaration, convinced me, more even than my intercourse
with the Quakers, that the divergence of the Christianity of the State from
Christ's law of non-resistance by violence has been long since noticed and
pointed out, and men have labored and still do labor to counteract it. Thus
Ballou's earnestness has fortified my opinion. But the fate of Garrison, and
particularly that of Ballou, almost unknown, notwithstanding fifty years of
active and persistent work in one direction, has confirmed me in the belief
that there exists a certain inexpressed but fixed determination to oppose all
such attempts by a wall of silence.
In August of 1890 Ballou died, and his obituary appeared in the American
Religio-Philosophical Journal of August 23d.
From this obituary we learn that Ballou was the spiritual leader of a
community, that he had preached from 8000 to 9000 sermons, married 1000
couples, and written 500 articles, but in regard to the object of his life's
devotion not a word is said; the word "non-resistance" is never mentioned.
All the exhortations of the Quakers for 200 years, all the efforts of Garrison,
the father, the foundation of his society, his periodical, and his declarations,
as well as the life-work of Ballou, are the same as if they had never existed.
Another striking example of the obscurity into which a work written for the
purpose of explaining the principle of non-resistance, and to denounce those
who refuse to recognize this commandment, may fall, is the fate of a book
by the Czech Helchitsky, which has only recently been discovered, and
which up to the present time has never been printed.
Page 32
Shortly after the publication of my book in German, I received a letter from
a professor of the Prague University, who wrote to tell me of a book which
had never been printed, a work written in the fifteenth century by the Czech
Helchitsky, and entitled "The Net of Faith." In this work, written four
centuries ago, Helchitsky, as the professor tells me, has expressed exactly
the same opinion in regard to true and false Christianity that I did in my
work entitled "My Religion." The professor wrote that the work of
Helchitsky was to appear in print for the first time in the Czech language in
one of the publications of the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. As I was
unable to obtain the book, I endeavored to ascertain all that was known of
Helchitsky himself, and this knowledge I gained from a German book sent
to me by the same professor in Prague. Besides that I learned something
from Pipin's "History of Czech Literature." Pipin says:—
"'The Net of Faith' is the doctrine of Christ, wherewith man is to be
raised from the gloomy depths of the social sea of iniquity. True faith
is to believe the words of God; but we are living in times when men
call the true faith heresy; hence it is upon our own reason that we must
rely to discover the truth if we possess it not. Darkness has concealed
it from men, and they no longer recognize the true law of Christ.
"As an illustration of the law, Helchitsky cites the original social
organization of Christian society, which is considered by the Church of
Rome of the present time as rank heresy.
"This primitive church was his own ideal of a social order founded
upon equality, liberty, and fraternity. Christianity, according to
Helchitsky, still preserves this foundation, and has but to return to its
pure teaching to render any other social order, whose existence
requires the authority of pope or king, quite superfluous. The law of
love will suffice for all....
"Historically, Helchitsky assigns the decadence of Christianity to the
time of Constantine the Great, whom the Pope Silvester received into
the Church in spite of his pagan life and morals. Constantine, in return,
rewarded the Pope by endowing him with riches and temporal power.
Since then these two forces have played into each other's hands,
seeking only outward glory. Doctors, men of learning, and the clergy,
caring only to maintain their influence over the world, excited the
a professor of the Prague University, who wrote to tell me of a book which
had never been printed, a work written in the fifteenth century by the Czech
Helchitsky, and entitled "The Net of Faith." In this work, written four
centuries ago, Helchitsky, as the professor tells me, has expressed exactly
the same opinion in regard to true and false Christianity that I did in my
work entitled "My Religion." The professor wrote that the work of
Helchitsky was to appear in print for the first time in the Czech language in
one of the publications of the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. As I was
unable to obtain the book, I endeavored to ascertain all that was known of
Helchitsky himself, and this knowledge I gained from a German book sent
to me by the same professor in Prague. Besides that I learned something
from Pipin's "History of Czech Literature." Pipin says:—
"'The Net of Faith' is the doctrine of Christ, wherewith man is to be
raised from the gloomy depths of the social sea of iniquity. True faith
is to believe the words of God; but we are living in times when men
call the true faith heresy; hence it is upon our own reason that we must
rely to discover the truth if we possess it not. Darkness has concealed
it from men, and they no longer recognize the true law of Christ.
"As an illustration of the law, Helchitsky cites the original social
organization of Christian society, which is considered by the Church of
Rome of the present time as rank heresy.
"This primitive church was his own ideal of a social order founded
upon equality, liberty, and fraternity. Christianity, according to
Helchitsky, still preserves this foundation, and has but to return to its
pure teaching to render any other social order, whose existence
requires the authority of pope or king, quite superfluous. The law of
love will suffice for all....
"Historically, Helchitsky assigns the decadence of Christianity to the
time of Constantine the Great, whom the Pope Silvester received into
the Church in spite of his pagan life and morals. Constantine, in return,
rewarded the Pope by endowing him with riches and temporal power.
Since then these two forces have played into each other's hands,
seeking only outward glory. Doctors, men of learning, and the clergy,
caring only to maintain their influence over the world, excited the
Page 33
nations one against the other, encouraging the crimes of murder and
rapine, and thus destroying Christianity, both in faith and practice.
Helchitsky totally denies the right of man to wage war or to exact the
penalty of death. According to him, every soldier, even if he be a
'knight,' is only a transgressor, a criminal, and a murderer."
All this, with the addition of some biographical details and extracts from the
correspondence of Helchitsky, is related in the German book.
Having thus become acquainted with the essence of Helchitsky's teachings,
I waited with still greater impatience the appearance of "The Net of Faith"
in the Academy's periodical. But one, two, three years passed, and the book
was not forthcoming. It was only in 1888 that I learned that the printing had
been suspended. I obtained the proof-sheets of what had been printed, and
read them. In many respects it was a wonderful book.
Its contents have been accurately summarized by Pipin. Helchitsky's
principal idea is that Christianity, in league with sovereignty during the
reign of Constantine the Great, and continuing to develop under these
conditions, became corrupted, and ceased to be Christianity. He called his
book "The Net of Faith" because he had chosen for his motto that verse
from the New Testament which speaks of the disciples as fishers of men. He
carries on the simile thus: "Through His disciples, Christ caught the world
in the net of His faith, but the larger fishes, breaking the net, escaped; then
others followed through these same holes made by the large fishes, and the
net was left almost empty." By the big fish he means the popes, emperors,
and sovereigns who, without giving up their authority, accepted
Christianity, not in its reality, but in its semblance.
Helchitsky teaches the same doctrine that is now taught by the non-resistant
Mennonites and Quakers, and in former times by the Bogomiles, the
Paulicians, and other sects. He teaches that Christianity, requiring, as it does
from its followers, humility, gentleness, a forgiving spirit, the turning of the
other cheek when one is struck, and the love of one's enemies, is not
compatible with that violence which is an essential element of authority. A
Christian, according to Helchitsky, should not only refuse to be a
commander or a soldier, but he should take no part in government, neither
should he become a tradesman, nor even a landowner. He might be an
artisan or a farmer. This book is among the few which have been saved
rapine, and thus destroying Christianity, both in faith and practice.
Helchitsky totally denies the right of man to wage war or to exact the
penalty of death. According to him, every soldier, even if he be a
'knight,' is only a transgressor, a criminal, and a murderer."
All this, with the addition of some biographical details and extracts from the
correspondence of Helchitsky, is related in the German book.
Having thus become acquainted with the essence of Helchitsky's teachings,
I waited with still greater impatience the appearance of "The Net of Faith"
in the Academy's periodical. But one, two, three years passed, and the book
was not forthcoming. It was only in 1888 that I learned that the printing had
been suspended. I obtained the proof-sheets of what had been printed, and
read them. In many respects it was a wonderful book.
Its contents have been accurately summarized by Pipin. Helchitsky's
principal idea is that Christianity, in league with sovereignty during the
reign of Constantine the Great, and continuing to develop under these
conditions, became corrupted, and ceased to be Christianity. He called his
book "The Net of Faith" because he had chosen for his motto that verse
from the New Testament which speaks of the disciples as fishers of men. He
carries on the simile thus: "Through His disciples, Christ caught the world
in the net of His faith, but the larger fishes, breaking the net, escaped; then
others followed through these same holes made by the large fishes, and the
net was left almost empty." By the big fish he means the popes, emperors,
and sovereigns who, without giving up their authority, accepted
Christianity, not in its reality, but in its semblance.
Helchitsky teaches the same doctrine that is now taught by the non-resistant
Mennonites and Quakers, and in former times by the Bogomiles, the
Paulicians, and other sects. He teaches that Christianity, requiring, as it does
from its followers, humility, gentleness, a forgiving spirit, the turning of the
other cheek when one is struck, and the love of one's enemies, is not
compatible with that violence which is an essential element of authority. A
Christian, according to Helchitsky, should not only refuse to be a
commander or a soldier, but he should take no part in government, neither
should he become a tradesman, nor even a landowner. He might be an
artisan or a farmer. This book is among the few which have been saved
Page 34
from the flame into which books denouncing official Christianity were
commonly cast. As all such so-called heretical works were usually burned
with their authors, very few of those which denounce official Christianity
have been preserved—and for this reason the book of which we speak has a
special interest.
But apart from its interest, concerning which there may be differences of
opinion, it is one of the most remarkable results of human thought, both on
account of its profundity and the wonderful power and beauty of its
language, not to mention its antiquity. And yet this book has remained
unprinted for centuries, and continues to be unknown except to a few
specialists. (See Note, end of Chapter.)
One would think that works like these of the Quakers, of Garrison, of
Ballou, and of Helchitsky,—which affirm and prove by the authority of the
Bible that the world misinterprets the teaching of Christ,—would arouse an
interest, would make a sensation, would give rise to discussions between
the clergy and their flocks.
One might suppose that works which deal with the very essence of the
Christian doctrine would be reviewed, and either acknowledged to be just,
or else refuted and condemned.
Not at all. Every one of these works suffers the same fate. Men of widely
differing opinions, believers, and, what is still more surprising, unbelieving
liberals, as though by common consent, preserve an obstinate silence in
regard to them. Thus every attempt to explain the true meaning of Christ's
doctrine goes for nothing.
And more astonishing still is the ignorance concerning two works whose
existence was made known to me after the publication of my own book.
One is a work by Dymond, "On War," printed for the first time in London in
1824, and the other by Daniel Musser, entitled "Non-resistance Asserted,"
was written in 1864.
The ignorance in regard to these books is amazing; the more so, that apart
from their merit, both treat, not so much of the theory as of its practical
application to life; of the relations of Christianity to military service, which
is particularly interesting in view of the system of conscription. It may be
asked, perhaps, what action is befitting for a subject who believes that war
commonly cast. As all such so-called heretical works were usually burned
with their authors, very few of those which denounce official Christianity
have been preserved—and for this reason the book of which we speak has a
special interest.
But apart from its interest, concerning which there may be differences of
opinion, it is one of the most remarkable results of human thought, both on
account of its profundity and the wonderful power and beauty of its
language, not to mention its antiquity. And yet this book has remained
unprinted for centuries, and continues to be unknown except to a few
specialists. (See Note, end of Chapter.)
One would think that works like these of the Quakers, of Garrison, of
Ballou, and of Helchitsky,—which affirm and prove by the authority of the
Bible that the world misinterprets the teaching of Christ,—would arouse an
interest, would make a sensation, would give rise to discussions between
the clergy and their flocks.
One might suppose that works which deal with the very essence of the
Christian doctrine would be reviewed, and either acknowledged to be just,
or else refuted and condemned.
Not at all. Every one of these works suffers the same fate. Men of widely
differing opinions, believers, and, what is still more surprising, unbelieving
liberals, as though by common consent, preserve an obstinate silence in
regard to them. Thus every attempt to explain the true meaning of Christ's
doctrine goes for nothing.
And more astonishing still is the ignorance concerning two works whose
existence was made known to me after the publication of my own book.
One is a work by Dymond, "On War," printed for the first time in London in
1824, and the other by Daniel Musser, entitled "Non-resistance Asserted,"
was written in 1864.
The ignorance in regard to these books is amazing; the more so, that apart
from their merit, both treat, not so much of the theory as of its practical
application to life; of the relations of Christianity to military service, which
is particularly interesting in view of the system of conscription. It may be
asked, perhaps, what action is befitting for a subject who believes that war
Page 35
is incompatible with religion when his government calls upon him for
military service?
One would take this to be a vital question, whose answer, in view of our
present system of conscription, becomes one of serious importance. All
men, or the majority of mankind, are Christians, and every male is required
to do military duty. How man, in his Christian character, is to meet this
demand, Dymond gives the following reply:—
"It is his duty, mildly and temperately, yet firmly, to refuse to serve.
"There are some persons who, without any determinate process of
reasoning, appear to conclude that responsibility for national measures
attaches solely to those who direct them; that it is the business of
governments to consider what is good for the community, and that, in these
cases, the duty of the subject is merged in the will of the sovereign.
Considerations like these are, I believe, often voluntarily permitted to
become opiates of the conscience. I have no part, it is said, in the councils
of the government, and am not, therefore, responsible for its crimes. We are,
indeed, not responsible for the crimes of our rulers, but we are responsible
for our own; and the crimes of our rulers are our own, if, whilst we believe
them to be crimes, we promote them by our coöperation....
"Those who suppose that obedience in all things is required, or that
responsibility in political affairs is transferred from the subject to the
sovereign, reduce themselves to a great dilemma. It is to say that we must
resign our conduct and our consciences to the will of others, and act
wickedly, or well, as their good or evil may preponderate, without merit for
virtue or responsibility for crime."
It is worthy of notice that the same is expressed in a maxim to soldiers,
which they are required to memorize. Dymond says that only a commander
answers for the consequences of his order. But this is unjust. A man cannot
remove the responsibility for his actions from himself. And this is evident
from the following: "If your superior orders you to kill your child, your
neighbor, your father, or your mother, will you obey? If you will not, there
is an end of the argument; for if you may reject his authority in one
instance, where is the limit to rejection? There is no rational limit but that
which is assigned by Christianity, and that is both rational and practicable....
military service?
One would take this to be a vital question, whose answer, in view of our
present system of conscription, becomes one of serious importance. All
men, or the majority of mankind, are Christians, and every male is required
to do military duty. How man, in his Christian character, is to meet this
demand, Dymond gives the following reply:—
"It is his duty, mildly and temperately, yet firmly, to refuse to serve.
"There are some persons who, without any determinate process of
reasoning, appear to conclude that responsibility for national measures
attaches solely to those who direct them; that it is the business of
governments to consider what is good for the community, and that, in these
cases, the duty of the subject is merged in the will of the sovereign.
Considerations like these are, I believe, often voluntarily permitted to
become opiates of the conscience. I have no part, it is said, in the councils
of the government, and am not, therefore, responsible for its crimes. We are,
indeed, not responsible for the crimes of our rulers, but we are responsible
for our own; and the crimes of our rulers are our own, if, whilst we believe
them to be crimes, we promote them by our coöperation....
"Those who suppose that obedience in all things is required, or that
responsibility in political affairs is transferred from the subject to the
sovereign, reduce themselves to a great dilemma. It is to say that we must
resign our conduct and our consciences to the will of others, and act
wickedly, or well, as their good or evil may preponderate, without merit for
virtue or responsibility for crime."
It is worthy of notice that the same is expressed in a maxim to soldiers,
which they are required to memorize. Dymond says that only a commander
answers for the consequences of his order. But this is unjust. A man cannot
remove the responsibility for his actions from himself. And this is evident
from the following: "If your superior orders you to kill your child, your
neighbor, your father, or your mother, will you obey? If you will not, there
is an end of the argument; for if you may reject his authority in one
instance, where is the limit to rejection? There is no rational limit but that
which is assigned by Christianity, and that is both rational and practicable....
Page 36
"We think, then, that it is the business of every man who believes that war is
inconsistent with our religion, respectfully, but steadfastly, to refuse to
engage in it. Let such as these remember that an honorable and an awful
duty is laid upon them. It is upon their fidelity, so far as human agency is
concerned, that the cause of peace is suspended. Let them, then, be willing
to avow their opinions and to defend them. Neither let them be contented
with words, if more than words, if suffering also, is required. It is only by
the unyielding fidelity of virtue that corruption can be extirpated. If you
believe that Jesus Christ has prohibited slaughter, let not the opinions or the
commands of a world induce you to join in it. By this 'steady and
determinate pursuit of virtue,' the benediction which attaches to those who
hear the sayings of God, and do them, will rest upon you, and the time will
come when even the world will honor you as contributors to the work of
human reformation."
Musser's work, entitled "Non-resistance Asserted; or, Kingdom of Christ
and Kingdom of this World Separated," was published in 1864.
This book deals with the same question, drawing its illustrations from the
drafting of the United States citizens during the time of the Civil War. In
setting forth the reasons why men should have the right to decline military
service, his arguments are no less applicable to the present time. In his
Introduction the author says: "It is well known that there are great numbers
of people in the United States who profess to be conscientiously opposed to
war. They are mostly called non-resistants, or defenseless Christians, and
refuse to defend their country, or take up arms at the call of the government
and go forth to battle against its enemies. Hitherto this conscientious
scruple has been respected by the government in this country; and those
claiming it have been relieved or excused from this service.
"Since the commencement of the present civil war in the United States the
public mind has been unusually agitated on this subject. It is not
unreasonable that such persons as feel it to be their duty to go forth and
endure the hardships of camp life, and imperil health, life, and limb in
defense of their country and government, should feel some jealousy of
those who have, with themselves, long enjoyed the protection and benefits
of the government, and yet, in the hour of its need, refuse to share the
burden of its defense and protection. Neither is it strange that such a
position should be looked upon as most unreasonable and monstrous, and
inconsistent with our religion, respectfully, but steadfastly, to refuse to
engage in it. Let such as these remember that an honorable and an awful
duty is laid upon them. It is upon their fidelity, so far as human agency is
concerned, that the cause of peace is suspended. Let them, then, be willing
to avow their opinions and to defend them. Neither let them be contented
with words, if more than words, if suffering also, is required. It is only by
the unyielding fidelity of virtue that corruption can be extirpated. If you
believe that Jesus Christ has prohibited slaughter, let not the opinions or the
commands of a world induce you to join in it. By this 'steady and
determinate pursuit of virtue,' the benediction which attaches to those who
hear the sayings of God, and do them, will rest upon you, and the time will
come when even the world will honor you as contributors to the work of
human reformation."
Musser's work, entitled "Non-resistance Asserted; or, Kingdom of Christ
and Kingdom of this World Separated," was published in 1864.
This book deals with the same question, drawing its illustrations from the
drafting of the United States citizens during the time of the Civil War. In
setting forth the reasons why men should have the right to decline military
service, his arguments are no less applicable to the present time. In his
Introduction the author says: "It is well known that there are great numbers
of people in the United States who profess to be conscientiously opposed to
war. They are mostly called non-resistants, or defenseless Christians, and
refuse to defend their country, or take up arms at the call of the government
and go forth to battle against its enemies. Hitherto this conscientious
scruple has been respected by the government in this country; and those
claiming it have been relieved or excused from this service.
"Since the commencement of the present civil war in the United States the
public mind has been unusually agitated on this subject. It is not
unreasonable that such persons as feel it to be their duty to go forth and
endure the hardships of camp life, and imperil health, life, and limb in
defense of their country and government, should feel some jealousy of
those who have, with themselves, long enjoyed the protection and benefits
of the government, and yet, in the hour of its need, refuse to share the
burden of its defense and protection. Neither is it strange that such a
position should be looked upon as most unreasonable and monstrous, and
Page 37
those who hold it be regarded with some suspicion. "Many able speakers
and writers," says the author, "have raised their voices and pens to refute the
idea of non-resistance, as both unreasonable and unscriptural. This is not to
be wondered at, seeing that those who profess the principle and do not
possess it, or correctly understand it, act inconsistently, and thereby bring
the profession into disrepute and contempt. However much misapplication
or abuse of a principle may prejudice the minds of those who are
unacquainted with a subject, it is yet no argument against its truth."
The author at first proves it to be the duty of each Christian to obey the rule
of non-resistance. He says that the rule is perfectly explicit, and that it has
been given by Christ to all Christianity without any possibility of being
misinterpreted. "Judge for yourselves, whether it is right or wrong to obey
man more than you do the Lord," said both Peter and John; and in exactly
the same way every man who wishes to be a Christian should regard the
requirement of his nation to be a soldier, remembering that Christ has told
him, "Do not resist evil."
This, in the opinion of Musser, decides the question of principle. Another
point, as to the right of declining military duty while one enjoys the
advantages accruing through violence, the author considers in detail, and
arrives at the conclusion that should a Christian who follows the teaching of
Christ refuse to go to the war, he must also decline to take any position
under the government or any part in the elections, neither must he have
recourse to any officer of the law for his own personal advantage. Our
author goes on to consider the relation between the Old and New
Testaments, and the significance of government for non-Christians;
arguments against the doctrine of non-resistance are enumerated and
refuted. The author closes his book with the following words:—"Christians
need no governments: for they ought not to obey it in those matters wherein
Christ's teaching is set at naught, and still less should they take an active
part in it. Christ has chosen His disciples out of the world. They have no
promise of temporal good or happiness, but the contrary. Their promise is in
the world to come. The spirit which they possess renders them happy and
contented in any sphere of life. So long as the world tolerates them, they are
contented; but if it will not let them dwell in peace, they flee to another city
or place; and so they are true pilgrims and strangers on earth, having no
and writers," says the author, "have raised their voices and pens to refute the
idea of non-resistance, as both unreasonable and unscriptural. This is not to
be wondered at, seeing that those who profess the principle and do not
possess it, or correctly understand it, act inconsistently, and thereby bring
the profession into disrepute and contempt. However much misapplication
or abuse of a principle may prejudice the minds of those who are
unacquainted with a subject, it is yet no argument against its truth."
The author at first proves it to be the duty of each Christian to obey the rule
of non-resistance. He says that the rule is perfectly explicit, and that it has
been given by Christ to all Christianity without any possibility of being
misinterpreted. "Judge for yourselves, whether it is right or wrong to obey
man more than you do the Lord," said both Peter and John; and in exactly
the same way every man who wishes to be a Christian should regard the
requirement of his nation to be a soldier, remembering that Christ has told
him, "Do not resist evil."
This, in the opinion of Musser, decides the question of principle. Another
point, as to the right of declining military duty while one enjoys the
advantages accruing through violence, the author considers in detail, and
arrives at the conclusion that should a Christian who follows the teaching of
Christ refuse to go to the war, he must also decline to take any position
under the government or any part in the elections, neither must he have
recourse to any officer of the law for his own personal advantage. Our
author goes on to consider the relation between the Old and New
Testaments, and the significance of government for non-Christians;
arguments against the doctrine of non-resistance are enumerated and
refuted. The author closes his book with the following words:—"Christians
need no governments: for they ought not to obey it in those matters wherein
Christ's teaching is set at naught, and still less should they take an active
part in it. Christ has chosen His disciples out of the world. They have no
promise of temporal good or happiness, but the contrary. Their promise is in
the world to come. The spirit which they possess renders them happy and
contented in any sphere of life. So long as the world tolerates them, they are
contented; but if it will not let them dwell in peace, they flee to another city
or place; and so they are true pilgrims and strangers on earth, having no
Page 38
certain abiding place.... They are well contented that the dead may bury
their dead, if they are only permitted to follow Christ."
Without deciding upon the merits of this definition of a Christian's duty in
regard to war, which we find set down in these two works, we cannot fail to
see the urgent need for a decision in regard to the question itself.
There are men—hundreds of thousands of Quakers, Mennonites, our own
Duhobortzi, Molokani, men who belong to no sect whatsoever—who
believe that violence and therefore military service is incompatible with
Christianity; every year, for instance, we see in Russia a number of men
refusing to obey the conscription because of their religious opinions. And
how does the government deal with them? Does it release them? Oh, no!...
Does it use force, and in case of disobedience punish them? Not exactly....
In 1818, government managed the affair in this wise.
The following is an extract, hardly known to any one in Russia, from a
letter of Muraviev-Karsky, which was prohibited by the Russian censor:—
"Tiflis, October 2d, 1818.
"This morning the commander of the fortress told me that five
peasants belonging to the landowners of the government of Tambov
had been recently sent into the province of Grusia. These men were
intended to serve as soldiers, but they refused to obey. They were
flogged several times and made to run the gantlet, but they were ready
to give themselves up to the most cruel tortures, yea, even to death
itself, to escape military service. 'Let us go our way and harm us not;
we do no harm ourselves. All men are equal. The sovereign is a man
like one of us, why should we pay him taxes, and wherefore should we
risk our lives to kill in battle those who have never done us any harm?
Draw and quarter us, if you will, and we shall never change our minds;
we will never wear the uniform, nor mess at the soldier's table. Some
pitying soul may give us alms but from the government we neither
have had nor will have anything whatsoever.' Such are the words of
these peasants, who assure us that there are many men in Russia like
themselves. Four times they were brought before the Committee of
Ministers, and it was finally decided that a report be made to the Czar,
who ordered them to be sent to Grusia for discipline, and desired the
their dead, if they are only permitted to follow Christ."
Without deciding upon the merits of this definition of a Christian's duty in
regard to war, which we find set down in these two works, we cannot fail to
see the urgent need for a decision in regard to the question itself.
There are men—hundreds of thousands of Quakers, Mennonites, our own
Duhobortzi, Molokani, men who belong to no sect whatsoever—who
believe that violence and therefore military service is incompatible with
Christianity; every year, for instance, we see in Russia a number of men
refusing to obey the conscription because of their religious opinions. And
how does the government deal with them? Does it release them? Oh, no!...
Does it use force, and in case of disobedience punish them? Not exactly....
In 1818, government managed the affair in this wise.
The following is an extract, hardly known to any one in Russia, from a
letter of Muraviev-Karsky, which was prohibited by the Russian censor:—
"Tiflis, October 2d, 1818.
"This morning the commander of the fortress told me that five
peasants belonging to the landowners of the government of Tambov
had been recently sent into the province of Grusia. These men were
intended to serve as soldiers, but they refused to obey. They were
flogged several times and made to run the gantlet, but they were ready
to give themselves up to the most cruel tortures, yea, even to death
itself, to escape military service. 'Let us go our way and harm us not;
we do no harm ourselves. All men are equal. The sovereign is a man
like one of us, why should we pay him taxes, and wherefore should we
risk our lives to kill in battle those who have never done us any harm?
Draw and quarter us, if you will, and we shall never change our minds;
we will never wear the uniform, nor mess at the soldier's table. Some
pitying soul may give us alms but from the government we neither
have had nor will have anything whatsoever.' Such are the words of
these peasants, who assure us that there are many men in Russia like
themselves. Four times they were brought before the Committee of
Ministers, and it was finally decided that a report be made to the Czar,
who ordered them to be sent to Grusia for discipline, and desired the
Page 39
Commander-in-Chief to forward a monthly report of the progress
made in bringing these peasants to a proper frame of mind."
The final result of this discipline is not known, for the matter was kept a
profound secret, and the episode may never have been made public.
This was the conduct of the government seventy-five years ago in the
greater number of cases, always carefully hiding the truth from the people;
and it pursues the same policy at the present day, except in regard to the
German Mennonites, who live in the government of Kherson, and who in
lieu of military duty serve a corresponding term as foresters,—the justice of
their refusal to obey the conscription being recognized.
But they are the sole exception; all others who, from religious scruples,
refuse to perform military duty are treated in the manner just described.
At first the government employs all the methods of coercion now in use to
discipline and convert the rebels, while at the same time the most profound
secrecy envelops all these proceedings. I know of a process which was
begun in 1884 against a man who had declined to serve,—a long-drawn-out
trial which was guarded by the Ministry as a great secret.
The first step is usually to send the accused to the priests, and, be it said to
their shame, they always try to win over the insubordinate. But as the
influence exercised in the name of Christ is generally unsuccessful, the
delinquent is sent from the clergy to the gendarmes, who, finding in him no
political offense, send him back; whereupon he is despatched to the
scientists, the doctors, and thence into the insane hospital. While he is thus
sent to and fro, the delinquent, deprived of his liberty like a condemned
convict, is made to endure every kind of indignity and suffering. Four such
cases have come to my knowledge. The doctors generally release the man
from the insane hospital, and then every underhanded and crafty device is
employed to delay the accused, because his release might encourage others
to follow his example. He is not allowed to remain among the soldiers lest
they discover from him that conscription is not, as they are taught to
believe, in accordance with the law of God, but opposed to it. The most
satisfactory arrangement for a government would be either to execute the
delinquent, or beat him with rods until he died, as was done in former times.
But it is awkward to condemn a man to public execution because he is true
made in bringing these peasants to a proper frame of mind."
The final result of this discipline is not known, for the matter was kept a
profound secret, and the episode may never have been made public.
This was the conduct of the government seventy-five years ago in the
greater number of cases, always carefully hiding the truth from the people;
and it pursues the same policy at the present day, except in regard to the
German Mennonites, who live in the government of Kherson, and who in
lieu of military duty serve a corresponding term as foresters,—the justice of
their refusal to obey the conscription being recognized.
But they are the sole exception; all others who, from religious scruples,
refuse to perform military duty are treated in the manner just described.
At first the government employs all the methods of coercion now in use to
discipline and convert the rebels, while at the same time the most profound
secrecy envelops all these proceedings. I know of a process which was
begun in 1884 against a man who had declined to serve,—a long-drawn-out
trial which was guarded by the Ministry as a great secret.
The first step is usually to send the accused to the priests, and, be it said to
their shame, they always try to win over the insubordinate. But as the
influence exercised in the name of Christ is generally unsuccessful, the
delinquent is sent from the clergy to the gendarmes, who, finding in him no
political offense, send him back; whereupon he is despatched to the
scientists, the doctors, and thence into the insane hospital. While he is thus
sent to and fro, the delinquent, deprived of his liberty like a condemned
convict, is made to endure every kind of indignity and suffering. Four such
cases have come to my knowledge. The doctors generally release the man
from the insane hospital, and then every underhanded and crafty device is
employed to delay the accused, because his release might encourage others
to follow his example. He is not allowed to remain among the soldiers lest
they discover from him that conscription is not, as they are taught to
believe, in accordance with the law of God, but opposed to it. The most
satisfactory arrangement for a government would be either to execute the
delinquent, or beat him with rods until he died, as was done in former times.
But it is awkward to condemn a man to public execution because he is true
Page 40
to the doctrine which we all profess to believe. Nor is it possible to take no
notice of a man when he refuses to obey. So the government either tortures
the man in order to compel him to deny Christ, or tries to rid itself of him
by some means which will hide both the man and the crime from the eyes
of the world, rather than resort to public execution. All sorts of cunning
manœuvers and tricks are employed to torment the man. He is either
banished to some remote province, or exasperated to disobedience and then
imprisoned, or sent to the reform battalion, where he may be subjected to
torture without publicity or restriction; or he is pronounced insane and
locked up in the insane asylum. For instance, one was exiled to Tashkent;
that is to say, a pretense was made of transferring him thither. Another was
sent to Omsk, a third was court-martialed for disobedience and imprisoned,
and a fourth was put into a house for the insane. The same thing is repeated
on every side. Not only the government, but the majority of liberal free-
thinkers, as though by preconcerted agreement, carefully avoid alluding to
what has been said, written, or done in this matter of denouncing the
inconsistency of violence, as embodied in its most shocking, crude, and
striking form, in the person of a soldier,—this readiness to commit murder,
—not only with the precepts of Christianity, but with the dictates of mere
humanity, which the world professes to obey.
Hence all the information that I have gathered concerning what has been
accomplished, and what is still going on in this work of explaining the
doctrine of Christ and the light in which it is regarded by the ruling powers
of Europe and America, has confirmed me in the conviction that a spirit
inimical to true Christianity dwells in these authorities, exhibited chiefly by
the conspiracy of silence with which they enshroud any manifestation of it.
NOTE
"The publication of this book ('The Net of Faith') was ended
[completed] by the Academy in the last months of the present year
(1893)."—Note received by the Publisher from Count Tolstoï while this
work was going to press.
notice of a man when he refuses to obey. So the government either tortures
the man in order to compel him to deny Christ, or tries to rid itself of him
by some means which will hide both the man and the crime from the eyes
of the world, rather than resort to public execution. All sorts of cunning
manœuvers and tricks are employed to torment the man. He is either
banished to some remote province, or exasperated to disobedience and then
imprisoned, or sent to the reform battalion, where he may be subjected to
torture without publicity or restriction; or he is pronounced insane and
locked up in the insane asylum. For instance, one was exiled to Tashkent;
that is to say, a pretense was made of transferring him thither. Another was
sent to Omsk, a third was court-martialed for disobedience and imprisoned,
and a fourth was put into a house for the insane. The same thing is repeated
on every side. Not only the government, but the majority of liberal free-
thinkers, as though by preconcerted agreement, carefully avoid alluding to
what has been said, written, or done in this matter of denouncing the
inconsistency of violence, as embodied in its most shocking, crude, and
striking form, in the person of a soldier,—this readiness to commit murder,
—not only with the precepts of Christianity, but with the dictates of mere
humanity, which the world professes to obey.
Hence all the information that I have gathered concerning what has been
accomplished, and what is still going on in this work of explaining the
doctrine of Christ and the light in which it is regarded by the ruling powers
of Europe and America, has confirmed me in the conviction that a spirit
inimical to true Christianity dwells in these authorities, exhibited chiefly by
the conspiracy of silence with which they enshroud any manifestation of it.
NOTE
"The publication of this book ('The Net of Faith') was ended
[completed] by the Academy in the last months of the present year
(1893)."—Note received by the Publisher from Count Tolstoï while this
work was going to press.
Page 41
Page 42
CHAPTER II
OPINIONS OF BELIEVERS AND UNBELIEVERS IN
REGARD TO NON-RESISTANCE
The fate of the book, "My Religion"—The evasive answers of religious critics to the questions
propounded in that book—1st answer, Violence does not contradict Christianity—2d
answer, Necessity of violence for the purpose of repressing evil-doers—3d answer,
Necessity of violence for the defense of one's neighbor—4th answer, The violation of the
commandment of Non-resistance regarded as a weakness—5th answer, Evasion of the
answer by a pretense that this matter has long since been decided—The cloak of church
authority, antiquity, the holiness of religious men, explain for many the contradictions
between violence and Christianity, in theory as well as in life—Usual attitude of the
clergy and authorities in regard to the profession of true Christianity—General character
of Russian secular writers—Foreign secular critics—Incorrectness of the opinions of the
former and the latter caused by a failure to understand the true meaning of the doctrine of
Christ.
All the criticisms of the statements contained in my own book have given
me a similar impression of a wish to ignore the subject.
As I had anticipated, no sooner was the book published than it was
prohibited, and should, according to law, have been burned. But instead of
being consumed by the flames, every copy was taken by the government
officials and circulated in large numbers, both in manuscript and in the
lithographed sheets, as well as in translations which were published abroad.
It was not long before criticisms began to appear, not only from the clergy,
but from the secular world, which the government, so far from forbidding,
took pains to encourage. Hence the very refutation of the book, the
existence of which they assumed to be unknown, was made the theme of
theological controversy.
These criticisms, both foreign and domestic, may be divided into two
classes, religious and secular; the former by persons who consider
themselves believers, and the latter by free-thinkers. I shall begin by
considering the former. In my book I accuse the clergy of inculcating
doctrines contrary to the commandments of Christ, plainly and clearly
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, and particularly in regard to the
OPINIONS OF BELIEVERS AND UNBELIEVERS IN
REGARD TO NON-RESISTANCE
The fate of the book, "My Religion"—The evasive answers of religious critics to the questions
propounded in that book—1st answer, Violence does not contradict Christianity—2d
answer, Necessity of violence for the purpose of repressing evil-doers—3d answer,
Necessity of violence for the defense of one's neighbor—4th answer, The violation of the
commandment of Non-resistance regarded as a weakness—5th answer, Evasion of the
answer by a pretense that this matter has long since been decided—The cloak of church
authority, antiquity, the holiness of religious men, explain for many the contradictions
between violence and Christianity, in theory as well as in life—Usual attitude of the
clergy and authorities in regard to the profession of true Christianity—General character
of Russian secular writers—Foreign secular critics—Incorrectness of the opinions of the
former and the latter caused by a failure to understand the true meaning of the doctrine of
Christ.
All the criticisms of the statements contained in my own book have given
me a similar impression of a wish to ignore the subject.
As I had anticipated, no sooner was the book published than it was
prohibited, and should, according to law, have been burned. But instead of
being consumed by the flames, every copy was taken by the government
officials and circulated in large numbers, both in manuscript and in the
lithographed sheets, as well as in translations which were published abroad.
It was not long before criticisms began to appear, not only from the clergy,
but from the secular world, which the government, so far from forbidding,
took pains to encourage. Hence the very refutation of the book, the
existence of which they assumed to be unknown, was made the theme of
theological controversy.
These criticisms, both foreign and domestic, may be divided into two
classes, religious and secular; the former by persons who consider
themselves believers, and the latter by free-thinkers. I shall begin by
considering the former. In my book I accuse the clergy of inculcating
doctrines contrary to the commandments of Christ, plainly and clearly
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, and particularly in regard to the
Page 43
commandment of non-resistance to evil, thereby depriving the doctrine of
Christ of all its significance. Do the ministers of the gospel believe the
Sermon on the Mount, including the commandment of non-resistance, to be
of divine origin? Having felt themselves obliged to review my book, it
would seem as if they must first of all answer the principal charge, and
declare at once whether they do or do not consider the Sermon on the
Mount and the commandment of non-resistance obligatory upon a
Christian. Instead of making the usual reply, couched in words such as,
"Though one cannot deny, neither can one affirm, the more so as," etc., let
them give a categorical answer to my question: Did Christ practically
require his disciples to do that which he taught in the Sermon on the Mount,
and therefore may a Christian appeal to a legal tribunal, either for defense
or prosecution, and still remain a Christian? May he consistently take a part
in a government which is the instrument of violence? And that most
important question, which, since the introduction of the general
conscription, concerns us all: May a Christian remain a Christian and still
disobey the direct command of Christ; may he promise to conduct himself
in a manner directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ, by entering into
military service and putting himself in training to be a murderer?
The questions are put plainly and directly, and would seem to call for plain
and direct answers. But no; my book has been received just as all previous
denunciations have been, those denunciations of the clergy who have
deviated from the law of Christ, with which history abounds since the time
of Constantine the Great. Many words have been expended in noting the
errors of my interpretation of this or that passage of the Scriptures, of how
wrong I am in referring to the Trinity, the Redemption, and the Immortality
of the soul, but never a word of that vital question: How are we to reconcile
those lessons of forgiveness, humility, patience, and love toward all
mankind, our neighbors as well as our enemies, taught us by the Teacher,
which dwell in the heart of each of us, with the necessities caused by
military aggressions against our own countrymen as well as against
foreigners? All that deserves the name of a response to these questions may
be summed up under five headings. I have endeavored to bring together in
this book not only the criticisms upon my book, but everything that has ever
been written on this subject.
Christ of all its significance. Do the ministers of the gospel believe the
Sermon on the Mount, including the commandment of non-resistance, to be
of divine origin? Having felt themselves obliged to review my book, it
would seem as if they must first of all answer the principal charge, and
declare at once whether they do or do not consider the Sermon on the
Mount and the commandment of non-resistance obligatory upon a
Christian. Instead of making the usual reply, couched in words such as,
"Though one cannot deny, neither can one affirm, the more so as," etc., let
them give a categorical answer to my question: Did Christ practically
require his disciples to do that which he taught in the Sermon on the Mount,
and therefore may a Christian appeal to a legal tribunal, either for defense
or prosecution, and still remain a Christian? May he consistently take a part
in a government which is the instrument of violence? And that most
important question, which, since the introduction of the general
conscription, concerns us all: May a Christian remain a Christian and still
disobey the direct command of Christ; may he promise to conduct himself
in a manner directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ, by entering into
military service and putting himself in training to be a murderer?
The questions are put plainly and directly, and would seem to call for plain
and direct answers. But no; my book has been received just as all previous
denunciations have been, those denunciations of the clergy who have
deviated from the law of Christ, with which history abounds since the time
of Constantine the Great. Many words have been expended in noting the
errors of my interpretation of this or that passage of the Scriptures, of how
wrong I am in referring to the Trinity, the Redemption, and the Immortality
of the soul, but never a word of that vital question: How are we to reconcile
those lessons of forgiveness, humility, patience, and love toward all
mankind, our neighbors as well as our enemies, taught us by the Teacher,
which dwell in the heart of each of us, with the necessities caused by
military aggressions against our own countrymen as well as against
foreigners? All that deserves the name of a response to these questions may
be summed up under five headings. I have endeavored to bring together in
this book not only the criticisms upon my book, but everything that has ever
been written on this subject.
Page 44
The first criticisms with which I deal come mostly from men of high
position, either in Church or State, who feel quite sure that no one will
venture to combat their assertions; should any one make the attempt, they
would never hear the arguments. These men, intoxicated for the most part
by their authority, have forgotten that there is a Christianity in whose name
they hold their places. They condemn as sectarian all that which is truly
Christ-like in Christianity, while on the other hand, every text in both Old
and New Testaments which can be wrested from its meaning so as to justify
an anti-Christian or pagan sentiment—upon these they establish the
foundation of Christianity. In order to confirm their statement that
Christianity is not opposed to violence, these men generally quote, with the
greatest assurance, equivocal passages from the Old and New Testaments,
interpreting them in the most anti-Christian spirit—the death of Ananias
and Sapphira, the execution of Simon the Sorcerer, etc. All of Christ's
words that can possibly be misinterpreted are quoted in vindication of
cruelty—the expulsion from the Temple, the words "... it shall be more
tolerable in that day for Sodom than for that city" (Luke x. 12), and other
passages. According to these men, a Christian is not at all obliged to be
guided by the spirit of humility, forgiveness, and love of his enemies. It is
useless to try to refute such a doctrine, because men who affirm it refute
themselves, or rather they turn away from Christ Himself, to invent an ideal
and a form of religion all their own, forgetful of Him in whose name both
the Church and the offices they hold exist. If men but knew that the Church
preaches an unforgiving, murder-loving, and belligerent Christ, they would
not believe in that Church, and its doctrines would be defended by none.
The second method, somewhat more awkward, consists in affirming that
though Christ did, in point of fact, teach us to turn the other cheek, and to
share our cloak, and that these are indeed lofty moral laws, still ... the world
abounds in evil-doers, and if these wretches are not subdued by force, the
righteous will perish and the world will be destroyed. I met with this
argument for the first time in St. John Chrysostom, and have called
attention to its unfairness in my book entitled "My Religion."
This argument is groundless, because if we allow ourselves to look upon
our fellow-men as evil-doers, outcasts (Raka), we sap the very foundations
of the Christian doctrine, which teaches us that we, the children of the
Heavenly Father, are brothers, and equal one to the other. In the second
position, either in Church or State, who feel quite sure that no one will
venture to combat their assertions; should any one make the attempt, they
would never hear the arguments. These men, intoxicated for the most part
by their authority, have forgotten that there is a Christianity in whose name
they hold their places. They condemn as sectarian all that which is truly
Christ-like in Christianity, while on the other hand, every text in both Old
and New Testaments which can be wrested from its meaning so as to justify
an anti-Christian or pagan sentiment—upon these they establish the
foundation of Christianity. In order to confirm their statement that
Christianity is not opposed to violence, these men generally quote, with the
greatest assurance, equivocal passages from the Old and New Testaments,
interpreting them in the most anti-Christian spirit—the death of Ananias
and Sapphira, the execution of Simon the Sorcerer, etc. All of Christ's
words that can possibly be misinterpreted are quoted in vindication of
cruelty—the expulsion from the Temple, the words "... it shall be more
tolerable in that day for Sodom than for that city" (Luke x. 12), and other
passages. According to these men, a Christian is not at all obliged to be
guided by the spirit of humility, forgiveness, and love of his enemies. It is
useless to try to refute such a doctrine, because men who affirm it refute
themselves, or rather they turn away from Christ Himself, to invent an ideal
and a form of religion all their own, forgetful of Him in whose name both
the Church and the offices they hold exist. If men but knew that the Church
preaches an unforgiving, murder-loving, and belligerent Christ, they would
not believe in that Church, and its doctrines would be defended by none.
The second method, somewhat more awkward, consists in affirming that
though Christ did, in point of fact, teach us to turn the other cheek, and to
share our cloak, and that these are indeed lofty moral laws, still ... the world
abounds in evil-doers, and if these wretches are not subdued by force, the
righteous will perish and the world will be destroyed. I met with this
argument for the first time in St. John Chrysostom, and have called
attention to its unfairness in my book entitled "My Religion."
This argument is groundless, because if we allow ourselves to look upon
our fellow-men as evil-doers, outcasts (Raka), we sap the very foundations
of the Christian doctrine, which teaches us that we, the children of the
Heavenly Father, are brothers, and equal one to the other. In the second
Page 45
place, if the same Father had permitted us to use violence toward wrong-
doers, as there is no infallible rule for distinguishing the good from the evil,
every individual or every community might class its neighbors under the
head of evil-doers, which is practically the case at the present time. In the
third place, if it were possible to distinguish the righteous from the
unrighteous, even then it would not be expedient in a Christian community
to put to death, to cripple, or to imprison the evil-doers, as in such a
community there would be no one to execute these sentences, since every
man in his quality of Christian is forbidden to do violence to a malefactor.
The third mode of reply, more ingenious than the preceding ones, consists
in affirming that while to obey the commandment of non-resistance is every
Christian's duty, when the injury is a personal one, it ceases to be obligatory
when harm is done to one's neighbor, and that in such an emergency a
Christian is bound to break the commandment and use force against the
evil-doer. This assertion is purely arbitrary, and one finds no justification
for it throughout the whole body of the doctrine of Christ.
Such an interpretation is not only a narrow one, but actually amounts to a
direct negation. If every man has the right to employ violence whenever his
neighbor is threatened with danger, then the question becomes reduced to
this: How may one define what is called danger to one's neighbor? If,
however, my private judgment is to be arbiter in this matter, then any
violence which I might commit on any occasion whatever could be excused
by the declaration that my neighbor was in danger. Magicians have been
burned, aristocrats and Girondists put to death, because the men in power
considered them dangerous.
If this important condition, which destroys the significance of the
commandment, ever entered into the thought of Christ, it would have been
formulated somewhere. Not only is no such exception to the commandment
to be found throughout the Teacher's life and lessons, but there is on the
other hand a warning against an interpretation so false and misleading.
The error and the impracticability of such a definition is vividly illustrated
in the Bible story of Caiaphas, who made use of this very same
interpretation. He admitted that it was not well to put to death the innocent
Jesus, but at the same time he perceived the existence of a danger, not for
doers, as there is no infallible rule for distinguishing the good from the evil,
every individual or every community might class its neighbors under the
head of evil-doers, which is practically the case at the present time. In the
third place, if it were possible to distinguish the righteous from the
unrighteous, even then it would not be expedient in a Christian community
to put to death, to cripple, or to imprison the evil-doers, as in such a
community there would be no one to execute these sentences, since every
man in his quality of Christian is forbidden to do violence to a malefactor.
The third mode of reply, more ingenious than the preceding ones, consists
in affirming that while to obey the commandment of non-resistance is every
Christian's duty, when the injury is a personal one, it ceases to be obligatory
when harm is done to one's neighbor, and that in such an emergency a
Christian is bound to break the commandment and use force against the
evil-doer. This assertion is purely arbitrary, and one finds no justification
for it throughout the whole body of the doctrine of Christ.
Such an interpretation is not only a narrow one, but actually amounts to a
direct negation. If every man has the right to employ violence whenever his
neighbor is threatened with danger, then the question becomes reduced to
this: How may one define what is called danger to one's neighbor? If,
however, my private judgment is to be arbiter in this matter, then any
violence which I might commit on any occasion whatever could be excused
by the declaration that my neighbor was in danger. Magicians have been
burned, aristocrats and Girondists put to death, because the men in power
considered them dangerous.
If this important condition, which destroys the significance of the
commandment, ever entered into the thought of Christ, it would have been
formulated somewhere. Not only is no such exception to the commandment
to be found throughout the Teacher's life and lessons, but there is on the
other hand a warning against an interpretation so false and misleading.
The error and the impracticability of such a definition is vividly illustrated
in the Bible story of Caiaphas, who made use of this very same
interpretation. He admitted that it was not well to put to death the innocent
Jesus, but at the same time he perceived the existence of a danger, not for
Page 46
himself, but for all the people, and therefore declared it better for one man
to die, rather than that a whole nation should perish.
And we have a still more explicit proof of the fallacy of this interpretation
in the words addressed to Peter, when he tried to revenge by violence the
attack upon Jesus (Matthew xxvi. 51). Peter was defending not himself, but
his beloved and divine Master, and Christ distinctly forbade him, saying,
"For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matthew
xxvi. 52). One can never justify an act of violence against one's fellow-man
by claiming to have done it in defense of another who was enduring some
wrong, because in committing an act of violence, it is impossible to
compare the one wrong with the other, and to say which is the greater, that
which one is about to commit, or the wrong done against one's neighbor.
We release society from the presence of a criminal by putting him to death,
but we cannot possibly know that the former might not have so changed by
the morrow as to render the execution a useless cruelty. We imprison
another, we believe him a dangerous man; but no later than next day this
very man may have ceased to be dangerous, and his imprisonment has
become unnecessary. I see a robber, a man known to me, pursuing a girl; I
hold a gun in my hand; I wound or perhaps kill the robber, and save the girl.
The fact that I have either wounded or killed the robber remains, but I know
not what might have happened had I not done so. And what a vast amount
of harm must and does accrue from the assurance that a man feels of his
right to provide against a possible calamity. Ninety-nine parts of the world's
iniquity, from the Inquisition to the bomb-throwing of the present day, and
the execution of tens of thousands of political criminals, so called, result
from this very assurance.
The fourth and still more ingenious reply to this question of the Christian's
responsibility in regard to the commandment of Christ concerning non-
resistance to evil by violence, consists in asserting that this commandment
is not denied, but acknowledged, like all the others; it is only the special
significance attributed to it by sectarians that is denied. Our critics declare
that the views of Garrison, Ballou, and Dymond, as well as those professed
by the Quakers, the Shakers, the Mennonites, the Moravians, the
Waldenses, Albigenses, Bogomiles, and Paulicians, are those of bigoted
sectarians. This commandment, they say, has the importance, no more and
no less, of all the others; and one who through weakness has transgressed
to die, rather than that a whole nation should perish.
And we have a still more explicit proof of the fallacy of this interpretation
in the words addressed to Peter, when he tried to revenge by violence the
attack upon Jesus (Matthew xxvi. 51). Peter was defending not himself, but
his beloved and divine Master, and Christ distinctly forbade him, saying,
"For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matthew
xxvi. 52). One can never justify an act of violence against one's fellow-man
by claiming to have done it in defense of another who was enduring some
wrong, because in committing an act of violence, it is impossible to
compare the one wrong with the other, and to say which is the greater, that
which one is about to commit, or the wrong done against one's neighbor.
We release society from the presence of a criminal by putting him to death,
but we cannot possibly know that the former might not have so changed by
the morrow as to render the execution a useless cruelty. We imprison
another, we believe him a dangerous man; but no later than next day this
very man may have ceased to be dangerous, and his imprisonment has
become unnecessary. I see a robber, a man known to me, pursuing a girl; I
hold a gun in my hand; I wound or perhaps kill the robber, and save the girl.
The fact that I have either wounded or killed the robber remains, but I know
not what might have happened had I not done so. And what a vast amount
of harm must and does accrue from the assurance that a man feels of his
right to provide against a possible calamity. Ninety-nine parts of the world's
iniquity, from the Inquisition to the bomb-throwing of the present day, and
the execution of tens of thousands of political criminals, so called, result
from this very assurance.
The fourth and still more ingenious reply to this question of the Christian's
responsibility in regard to the commandment of Christ concerning non-
resistance to evil by violence, consists in asserting that this commandment
is not denied, but acknowledged, like all the others; it is only the special
significance attributed to it by sectarians that is denied. Our critics declare
that the views of Garrison, Ballou, and Dymond, as well as those professed
by the Quakers, the Shakers, the Mennonites, the Moravians, the
Waldenses, Albigenses, Bogomiles, and Paulicians, are those of bigoted
sectarians. This commandment, they say, has the importance, no more and
no less, of all the others; and one who through weakness has transgressed
Page 47
against any of the commandments, whether that of non-resistance or
another, does not for that cause cease to be a Christian, provided his creed
be true.
This is a very cunning and persuasive subterfuge, especially for those who
are willing to be deceived, reducing the direct negation of the
commandment to its accidental infraction. One has, however, but to
compare the attitude of the clergy toward this or any of the other
commandments which they do acknowledge, to be convinced that it is quite
different from their attitude toward this one.
The commandment against fornication they acknowledge without
reservation, and in no case will they ever admit that this sin is not an evil.
There are no circumstances mentioned by the clergy when the
commandment against fornication may be broken, and they always insist
that the occasions for this sin must be avoided. But in regard to non-
resistance it is a very different matter. Every clergyman believes that there
are circumstances wherein this commandment may be held in abeyance,
and they preach accordingly. So far from teaching their parishioners to
avoid the temptations to this sin, chief among which is the oath of
allegiance, they take the oath themselves. Clergymen have never been
known to advocate the breaking of any other commandment; but in regard
to the doctrine of non-resistance, they distinctly teach that this prohibition
must not be taken too literally, that so far from always obeying this
commandment, one should on occasion follow the opposite course—that is,
one should sit in judgment, should go to war, and should execute criminals.
Thus in most of the cases where non-resistance to evil by violence is in
question, the preachers will be found to advocate disobedience. Obedience
to this commandment, they say, is difficult, and can only be practicable in a
state of society whose members are perfect. But how is it to become less
difficult, when its infraction is not only condoned, but directly encouraged,
when legal tribunals, prisons, the implements of warfare, the cannon and
muskets, armies and battles, receive the blessing of the Church? Therefore
this reply is not true. Evidently the statement that this commandment is
acknowledged by the clergy to be of equal validity with the other
commandments cannot be true.
Clergymen do not really acknowledge it, yet, unwilling to admit this fact,
they try by evasion to conceal their non-acknowledgment.
another, does not for that cause cease to be a Christian, provided his creed
be true.
This is a very cunning and persuasive subterfuge, especially for those who
are willing to be deceived, reducing the direct negation of the
commandment to its accidental infraction. One has, however, but to
compare the attitude of the clergy toward this or any of the other
commandments which they do acknowledge, to be convinced that it is quite
different from their attitude toward this one.
The commandment against fornication they acknowledge without
reservation, and in no case will they ever admit that this sin is not an evil.
There are no circumstances mentioned by the clergy when the
commandment against fornication may be broken, and they always insist
that the occasions for this sin must be avoided. But in regard to non-
resistance it is a very different matter. Every clergyman believes that there
are circumstances wherein this commandment may be held in abeyance,
and they preach accordingly. So far from teaching their parishioners to
avoid the temptations to this sin, chief among which is the oath of
allegiance, they take the oath themselves. Clergymen have never been
known to advocate the breaking of any other commandment; but in regard
to the doctrine of non-resistance, they distinctly teach that this prohibition
must not be taken too literally, that so far from always obeying this
commandment, one should on occasion follow the opposite course—that is,
one should sit in judgment, should go to war, and should execute criminals.
Thus in most of the cases where non-resistance to evil by violence is in
question, the preachers will be found to advocate disobedience. Obedience
to this commandment, they say, is difficult, and can only be practicable in a
state of society whose members are perfect. But how is it to become less
difficult, when its infraction is not only condoned, but directly encouraged,
when legal tribunals, prisons, the implements of warfare, the cannon and
muskets, armies and battles, receive the blessing of the Church? Therefore
this reply is not true. Evidently the statement that this commandment is
acknowledged by the clergy to be of equal validity with the other
commandments cannot be true.
Clergymen do not really acknowledge it, yet, unwilling to admit this fact,
they try by evasion to conceal their non-acknowledgment.
Page 48
Such is the fourth method of answering.
The fifth, more ingenious than its predecessor, is the popular one of all. It
consists in quietly evading reply, pretending that the question was solved
ages ago, in a cogent and satisfactory manner, and that it would be a waste
of words to reopen the subject. This method is employed by all the more
cultured authors, who, if they made answer at all, would feel themselves
bound to be logical. Realizing that the inconsistency between that doctrine
of Christ, of which we make a verbal profession, and the scheme of our
daily lives, is not to be solved by words, and that the more it is talked the
more glaring this inconsistency becomes, they evade it with more or less
circumspection, pretending that the question of union between Christianity
and the law of violence has either been already solved, or else that it cannot
be solved at all.[2]
Most of my clerical critics have made use of this method. I might quote
scores of criticisms of this class, wherein everything is discussed except the
vital principle of the book. As a characteristic specimen of these criticisms I
will quote from an article by that well-known and scholarly Englishman,
the writer and preacher, Canon Farrar, who, like so many other learned
theologians, is an expert in the art of silently ignoring and evading a
statement. The article appeared in an American magazine, The Forum, for
October, 1888.
After briefly but conscientiously setting forth the subject-matter of my
book, Farrar says:—"After repeated search the central principle of all
Christ's teaching seemed to him [Tolstoï] to be, 'Resist not evil' or 'him that
is evil.' He came to the conclusion that a coarse deceit had been palmed
upon the world when these words were held by civil society to be
compatible with war, courts of justice, capital punishment, divorce, oaths,
national prejudice, and indeed with most of the institutions of civil and
social life. He now believes that the Kingdom of God would come if all
men kept these five commandments, which he holds to be the pith of all
Christ's teaching—viz.: 1. Live in peace with all men. 2. Be pure. 3. Take
no oaths. 4. Never resist evil. 5. Renounce national distinctions.... Most of
the Bible does not seem to him to reflect the spirit of Christ at all, though it
has been brought into artificial and unwarrantable connection with it. Hence
he rejects the chief doctrines of the Church: that of the Atonement by blood,
that of the Trinity, that of the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles
The fifth, more ingenious than its predecessor, is the popular one of all. It
consists in quietly evading reply, pretending that the question was solved
ages ago, in a cogent and satisfactory manner, and that it would be a waste
of words to reopen the subject. This method is employed by all the more
cultured authors, who, if they made answer at all, would feel themselves
bound to be logical. Realizing that the inconsistency between that doctrine
of Christ, of which we make a verbal profession, and the scheme of our
daily lives, is not to be solved by words, and that the more it is talked the
more glaring this inconsistency becomes, they evade it with more or less
circumspection, pretending that the question of union between Christianity
and the law of violence has either been already solved, or else that it cannot
be solved at all.[2]
Most of my clerical critics have made use of this method. I might quote
scores of criticisms of this class, wherein everything is discussed except the
vital principle of the book. As a characteristic specimen of these criticisms I
will quote from an article by that well-known and scholarly Englishman,
the writer and preacher, Canon Farrar, who, like so many other learned
theologians, is an expert in the art of silently ignoring and evading a
statement. The article appeared in an American magazine, The Forum, for
October, 1888.
After briefly but conscientiously setting forth the subject-matter of my
book, Farrar says:—"After repeated search the central principle of all
Christ's teaching seemed to him [Tolstoï] to be, 'Resist not evil' or 'him that
is evil.' He came to the conclusion that a coarse deceit had been palmed
upon the world when these words were held by civil society to be
compatible with war, courts of justice, capital punishment, divorce, oaths,
national prejudice, and indeed with most of the institutions of civil and
social life. He now believes that the Kingdom of God would come if all
men kept these five commandments, which he holds to be the pith of all
Christ's teaching—viz.: 1. Live in peace with all men. 2. Be pure. 3. Take
no oaths. 4. Never resist evil. 5. Renounce national distinctions.... Most of
the Bible does not seem to him to reflect the spirit of Christ at all, though it
has been brought into artificial and unwarrantable connection with it. Hence
he rejects the chief doctrines of the Church: that of the Atonement by blood,
that of the Trinity, that of the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles
Page 49
and the transmission to the priesthood by laying on of hands, that of the
need of the seven sacraments for salvation. He sets aside the authority of
Paul, of councils, of fathers, popes, or patriarchs, and believes himself to be
the immediate disciple of Christ alone.... But we are compelled to ask, Is
this interpretation of Christ a true one? Are all men bound, or is any man
bound, to act as this great writer has done?"
One might naturally expect that this vital question, which alone could
induce a man to write a dissertation on the book, would be answered either
by admitting that my interpretation of the doctrine of Christ is correct and
should be accepted, or declaring that it is erroneous, proving his point, and
offering a more correct interpretation of the words which I have
misconstrued. But no; Farrar merely expresses his belief that "though
actuated by the noblest sincerity, Count Tolstoï has been misled by partial
and one-sided interpretations of the meaning of the gospel and the mind and
will of Christ." In what this error consists he does not explain, but says: "To
enter into the proof of this is impossible in this article, for I have already
exceeded the space at my command." And concludes with equanimity:
"Meanwhile the reader who feels troubled lest it should be his duty also to
forsake all the conditions of his life, and to take up the position and work of
a common laborer, may rest for the present on the principle, 'Securus judicat
orbis terrarum.' With few and rare exceptions the whole of Christendom,
from the days of the Apostles down to our own, has come to the firm
conclusion that it was the object of Christ to lay down great eternal
principles, but not to disturb the bases and revolutionize the institutions as
well as all inevitable conditions. Were it my object to prove how untenable
is the doctrine of communism, based by Count Tolstoï upon the divine
paradoxes, which can be interpreted on only historical principles in
accordance with the whole method of the teaching of Jesus, it would require
an ampler canvas than I have here at my disposal." What a pity that he has
no space! And, wonderful to relate, no one for fifteen centuries ever had the
space to prove that the Christ whom we profess said one thing and meant
another. And of course they could prove it if they would! But it is not worth
while to prove what everybody knows to be true. It is enough to say:
"Securus judicat orbis terrarum."
The criticisms of all educated believers are very much alike, because
realizing as they must the danger of their position, they feel that their only
need of the seven sacraments for salvation. He sets aside the authority of
Paul, of councils, of fathers, popes, or patriarchs, and believes himself to be
the immediate disciple of Christ alone.... But we are compelled to ask, Is
this interpretation of Christ a true one? Are all men bound, or is any man
bound, to act as this great writer has done?"
One might naturally expect that this vital question, which alone could
induce a man to write a dissertation on the book, would be answered either
by admitting that my interpretation of the doctrine of Christ is correct and
should be accepted, or declaring that it is erroneous, proving his point, and
offering a more correct interpretation of the words which I have
misconstrued. But no; Farrar merely expresses his belief that "though
actuated by the noblest sincerity, Count Tolstoï has been misled by partial
and one-sided interpretations of the meaning of the gospel and the mind and
will of Christ." In what this error consists he does not explain, but says: "To
enter into the proof of this is impossible in this article, for I have already
exceeded the space at my command." And concludes with equanimity:
"Meanwhile the reader who feels troubled lest it should be his duty also to
forsake all the conditions of his life, and to take up the position and work of
a common laborer, may rest for the present on the principle, 'Securus judicat
orbis terrarum.' With few and rare exceptions the whole of Christendom,
from the days of the Apostles down to our own, has come to the firm
conclusion that it was the object of Christ to lay down great eternal
principles, but not to disturb the bases and revolutionize the institutions as
well as all inevitable conditions. Were it my object to prove how untenable
is the doctrine of communism, based by Count Tolstoï upon the divine
paradoxes, which can be interpreted on only historical principles in
accordance with the whole method of the teaching of Jesus, it would require
an ampler canvas than I have here at my disposal." What a pity that he has
no space! And, wonderful to relate, no one for fifteen centuries ever had the
space to prove that the Christ whom we profess said one thing and meant
another. And of course they could prove it if they would! But it is not worth
while to prove what everybody knows to be true. It is enough to say:
"Securus judicat orbis terrarum."
The criticisms of all educated believers are very much alike, because
realizing as they must the danger of their position, they feel that their only
Page 50
safeguard lies in the hope that by sheltering themselves behind the authority
and holiness of the Church, they may succeed in intimidating their readers,
or diverting them from any idea of reading the Bible for themselves or
using their own reason to solve this question. And this is a method that
succeeds. To whom would it ever occur, indeed, that all these assurances,
repeated with so much solemnity, century after century, by archdeacons,
bishops, and archbishops, synods and popes, are a base falsehood, a
calumny against the character of Christ, uttered for the purpose of assuring
to themselves the money they require to lead a life of ease at the expense of
others,—a falsehood and a calumny so palpable, particularly now, that the
only chance of perpetuating this falsehood lies in holding the people in awe
by their arrogance and audacity?
The very same thing has been going on of late years in the Bureau of
military conscription. A number of aged officials, decorated and self-
important, are at a table, a full-lengthed portrait of the Emperor with the
mirror of justice before them, and, while leisurely chatting with each other,
they write, call out the names, and give their orders. Here also, with a cross
upon his breast, his hair blowing over his stole, a genial and venerable-
looking priest dressed in a silk robe sits before a pulpit on which is placed a
golden cross and a Bible with gilt clasps.
Ivan Petrov is called. An untidy, poorly clad youth, with a frightened
expression, twitching muscles, and gleaming eyes that have a wandering
look, steps forward, and in a hesitating, broken voice almost whispers: "I ...
according to law ... as a Christian ... I ... I cannot...." "What is he
muttering?" asks the chairman, impatiently, squinting and making an effort
to hear, as he raises his head from the book. "Speak louder!" exclaims the
colonel with the glittering shoulder-straps. "As a Christian ... I ... I...." And
at last it becomes plain that the youth refuses to enter the military service
because he is a Christian. "Don't talk nonsense! Measure him! Doctor, be
kind enough to look at the measure. Will he do?" "He will do." "Holy
Father, let him take the oath."
Not only is there no uneasiness on the part of the officers, but no one pays
the least attention to the muttering of this frightened, pitiable youth. "They
always mutter, and we are in a hurry; we have still so many more to
receive."
and holiness of the Church, they may succeed in intimidating their readers,
or diverting them from any idea of reading the Bible for themselves or
using their own reason to solve this question. And this is a method that
succeeds. To whom would it ever occur, indeed, that all these assurances,
repeated with so much solemnity, century after century, by archdeacons,
bishops, and archbishops, synods and popes, are a base falsehood, a
calumny against the character of Christ, uttered for the purpose of assuring
to themselves the money they require to lead a life of ease at the expense of
others,—a falsehood and a calumny so palpable, particularly now, that the
only chance of perpetuating this falsehood lies in holding the people in awe
by their arrogance and audacity?
The very same thing has been going on of late years in the Bureau of
military conscription. A number of aged officials, decorated and self-
important, are at a table, a full-lengthed portrait of the Emperor with the
mirror of justice before them, and, while leisurely chatting with each other,
they write, call out the names, and give their orders. Here also, with a cross
upon his breast, his hair blowing over his stole, a genial and venerable-
looking priest dressed in a silk robe sits before a pulpit on which is placed a
golden cross and a Bible with gilt clasps.
Ivan Petrov is called. An untidy, poorly clad youth, with a frightened
expression, twitching muscles, and gleaming eyes that have a wandering
look, steps forward, and in a hesitating, broken voice almost whispers: "I ...
according to law ... as a Christian ... I ... I cannot...." "What is he
muttering?" asks the chairman, impatiently, squinting and making an effort
to hear, as he raises his head from the book. "Speak louder!" exclaims the
colonel with the glittering shoulder-straps. "As a Christian ... I ... I...." And
at last it becomes plain that the youth refuses to enter the military service
because he is a Christian. "Don't talk nonsense! Measure him! Doctor, be
kind enough to look at the measure. Will he do?" "He will do." "Holy
Father, let him take the oath."
Not only is there no uneasiness on the part of the officers, but no one pays
the least attention to the muttering of this frightened, pitiable youth. "They
always mutter, and we are in a hurry; we have still so many more to
receive."
Page 51
The recruit tries to speak again. "This is against the law of Christ!" "Move
on! move on! We know what is lawful and what is not! Move on! Father,
make him understand! Next! Vassili Nikitin!"
Then the trembling youth is led away. Now which of all these men, the
soldiers, Vassili Nikitin, the new man on the list, or any other witness of the
scene,—which of these would ever dream that the unintelligible, broken
utterances of the youth, silenced forthwith by the magistrates, embodied the
real truth, while the loud, arrogant speeches of the officials, of the priest,
uttered with authority, were actually false?
The same impression is made not only by Farrar's essay, but by all those
grandiloquent sermons, reviews, and other publications which spring into
existence on every side wherever truth is found combating the arrogance of
falsehood. At once these orators and writers, subtle or bombastic, begin by
dwelling upon points closely allied to the vital question, while preserving
an artful silence on the question itself.
And this is the fifth and most efficacious method of accounting for the
inconsistent attitude of ecclesiastical Christianity, which, while professing
Christ, with its own life denies, and teaches others to deny, this doctrine in
the practice of daily life. They who employ the first method of justification
by boldly and distinctly affirming that Christ sanctioned violence, meaning
wars and murders, put themselves beyond the pale of Christ's teaching;
while they who defend themselves according to the second, third, and
fourth methods soon become entangled, and are easily convicted of
falsehood; but the fifth class, they who condescend not to reason, use their
dignity for a screen, and insist that all these questions were settled ages ago,
and need no reconsideration; they, apparently invulnerable, will maintain an
undisputed authority, and men will repose under the hypnotic suggestion of
Church and State, nor seek to throw off the yoke.
Such were the views of the clergy, of the professors of Christianity, in
regard to my book, nor could anything different have been expected: they
are in bonds to their inconsistent position, believers in the divinity of the
Teacher, and yet discrediting His plainest words,—an inconsistency which
they are bound to reconcile in some way. Hence it is not to be supposed that
they would give unbiased opinions in regard to the essential question of that
change which must take place in the life of one who makes a practical
on! move on! We know what is lawful and what is not! Move on! Father,
make him understand! Next! Vassili Nikitin!"
Then the trembling youth is led away. Now which of all these men, the
soldiers, Vassili Nikitin, the new man on the list, or any other witness of the
scene,—which of these would ever dream that the unintelligible, broken
utterances of the youth, silenced forthwith by the magistrates, embodied the
real truth, while the loud, arrogant speeches of the officials, of the priest,
uttered with authority, were actually false?
The same impression is made not only by Farrar's essay, but by all those
grandiloquent sermons, reviews, and other publications which spring into
existence on every side wherever truth is found combating the arrogance of
falsehood. At once these orators and writers, subtle or bombastic, begin by
dwelling upon points closely allied to the vital question, while preserving
an artful silence on the question itself.
And this is the fifth and most efficacious method of accounting for the
inconsistent attitude of ecclesiastical Christianity, which, while professing
Christ, with its own life denies, and teaches others to deny, this doctrine in
the practice of daily life. They who employ the first method of justification
by boldly and distinctly affirming that Christ sanctioned violence, meaning
wars and murders, put themselves beyond the pale of Christ's teaching;
while they who defend themselves according to the second, third, and
fourth methods soon become entangled, and are easily convicted of
falsehood; but the fifth class, they who condescend not to reason, use their
dignity for a screen, and insist that all these questions were settled ages ago,
and need no reconsideration; they, apparently invulnerable, will maintain an
undisputed authority, and men will repose under the hypnotic suggestion of
Church and State, nor seek to throw off the yoke.
Such were the views of the clergy, of the professors of Christianity, in
regard to my book, nor could anything different have been expected: they
are in bonds to their inconsistent position, believers in the divinity of the
Teacher, and yet discrediting His plainest words,—an inconsistency which
they are bound to reconcile in some way. Hence it is not to be supposed that
they would give unbiased opinions in regard to the essential question of that
change which must take place in the life of one who makes a practical
Page 52
application of the doctrine of Christ to the existing order. From secular
critics and free-thinkers, who acknowledge no obligation to the doctrine of
Christ, and who might be expected to judge them without prejudice, I had
prepared myself for criticisms such as these. I thought that the Liberals
would look upon Christ not only as the founder of a religion involving
personal salvation (as understood by the ecclesiastics and their followers),
but, to use their own expression, as upon a reformer who tears down the old
foundations to make way for new ones, and whose reformation is not even
yet complete.
To set forth that conception of Christ and his doctrine has been the object of
my book. But to my surprise not one out of the many criticisms, Russian or
foreign, that have appeared, has accepted my view, or even discussed it
from my standpoint, which is, that the teaching of Christ is a philosophical,
moral, and social doctrine. (I use the phraseology of the scientists.) The
Russian secular critics, conceiving the sum and substance of my book to be
a plea in favor of resistance to evil, and taking it for granted (probably for
the sake of argument) that the doctrine forbade any struggle whatsoever
against the wrong, made a virulent, and for several years, most successful
attack upon this doctrine, proving that the teaching of Christ must be false,
since it forbids any effort to overcome evil. Their refutations of this so-
called false doctrine had all the more chance of success, because the
censorship had prohibited, not only the book itself, but also all articles in its
defense, and consequently they knew beforehand that their arguments could
not be assailed.
It is worthy of note that here in Russia, where not a word against the Holy
Scriptures is allowed by the censor, for several years in succession the
distinct and unmistakable commandment of Christ (Matthew v. 39) was
criticized, distorted, condemned, and mocked at in all the leading
periodicals.
The Russian secular critics, apparently ignorant of all that had been said and
done in regard to non-resistance to evil, seemed to think that I had invented
the principle myself, and attacked it as if it were my idea, first distorting
and then refuting it with great ardor, bringing forward time-worn arguments
that had been analyzed and refuted over and over again, showing that the
oppressed and downtrodden should be defended by violence, and declaring
the doctrine of Christ concerning non-resistance to be immoral.
critics and free-thinkers, who acknowledge no obligation to the doctrine of
Christ, and who might be expected to judge them without prejudice, I had
prepared myself for criticisms such as these. I thought that the Liberals
would look upon Christ not only as the founder of a religion involving
personal salvation (as understood by the ecclesiastics and their followers),
but, to use their own expression, as upon a reformer who tears down the old
foundations to make way for new ones, and whose reformation is not even
yet complete.
To set forth that conception of Christ and his doctrine has been the object of
my book. But to my surprise not one out of the many criticisms, Russian or
foreign, that have appeared, has accepted my view, or even discussed it
from my standpoint, which is, that the teaching of Christ is a philosophical,
moral, and social doctrine. (I use the phraseology of the scientists.) The
Russian secular critics, conceiving the sum and substance of my book to be
a plea in favor of resistance to evil, and taking it for granted (probably for
the sake of argument) that the doctrine forbade any struggle whatsoever
against the wrong, made a virulent, and for several years, most successful
attack upon this doctrine, proving that the teaching of Christ must be false,
since it forbids any effort to overcome evil. Their refutations of this so-
called false doctrine had all the more chance of success, because the
censorship had prohibited, not only the book itself, but also all articles in its
defense, and consequently they knew beforehand that their arguments could
not be assailed.
It is worthy of note that here in Russia, where not a word against the Holy
Scriptures is allowed by the censor, for several years in succession the
distinct and unmistakable commandment of Christ (Matthew v. 39) was
criticized, distorted, condemned, and mocked at in all the leading
periodicals.
The Russian secular critics, apparently ignorant of all that had been said and
done in regard to non-resistance to evil, seemed to think that I had invented
the principle myself, and attacked it as if it were my idea, first distorting
and then refuting it with great ardor, bringing forward time-worn arguments
that had been analyzed and refuted over and over again, showing that the
oppressed and downtrodden should be defended by violence, and declaring
the doctrine of Christ concerning non-resistance to be immoral.
Page 53
All the significance that the Russian critics saw in Christ's preaching was,
that it seemed expressly intended to hamper them in their struggles against
what they believe to be an evil in the present day. Thus it came about that
the principle of non-resistance to evil by violence was attacked from two
opposite camps; the Conservatives, because this principle interfered with
them in their efforts to suppress sedition, and as opposed to all persecution,
as well as to the punishment of death; the Revolutionists, because this
principle forbade them to resist the oppression of the Conservatives, or to
attempt their overthrow. The Conservatives were indignant that the doctrine
of non-resistance to evil by violence should thwart an energetic suppression
of revolutionary elements, which might imperil the welfare of a nation; the
Revolutionists in the like manner were indignant because this same doctrine
averted the downfall of the Conservatives, who, in their opinion, imperil the
welfare of the people. It is a circumstance worthy of notice that the
Revolutionists should attack the principle of non-resistance to evil by
violence; for of all the doctrines dreaded by despotism, and dangerous to its
existence, this is the chief one. Since the creation of the world the opposite
principle of resistance by violence has been the corner-stone of every
despotic institution, from the Inquisition to the fortress of Schlüsselburg.
Moreover, the Russian critics declared that the progress of civilization itself
would be checked were this commandment of non-resistance applied to
everyday life, by which they mean the civilization of Europe, which is,
according to them, the model for all mankind.
Such was the substance of Russian criticism.
Foreign critics start from the same premises, but their deductions differ
somewhat from those of the Russian critics; not only are they less captious
and more cultivated, but their modes of analysis are not the same.
In discussing my book, and more particularly the gospel doctrine as it is
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, the foreign critics affirmed that the
latter could not really be called Christian doctrine (they believe that the
Christian doctrine is embodied in Catholicism or Protestantism), and that
the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount are only a series of the delightful
but unpractical visions of the "charmant docteur," as Renan says, suited to
the artless, half-civilized Galileans who lived 1800 years ago, or to the
Russian and semi-barbarous peasants, to Sutaev and Bondarev, and to the
that it seemed expressly intended to hamper them in their struggles against
what they believe to be an evil in the present day. Thus it came about that
the principle of non-resistance to evil by violence was attacked from two
opposite camps; the Conservatives, because this principle interfered with
them in their efforts to suppress sedition, and as opposed to all persecution,
as well as to the punishment of death; the Revolutionists, because this
principle forbade them to resist the oppression of the Conservatives, or to
attempt their overthrow. The Conservatives were indignant that the doctrine
of non-resistance to evil by violence should thwart an energetic suppression
of revolutionary elements, which might imperil the welfare of a nation; the
Revolutionists in the like manner were indignant because this same doctrine
averted the downfall of the Conservatives, who, in their opinion, imperil the
welfare of the people. It is a circumstance worthy of notice that the
Revolutionists should attack the principle of non-resistance to evil by
violence; for of all the doctrines dreaded by despotism, and dangerous to its
existence, this is the chief one. Since the creation of the world the opposite
principle of resistance by violence has been the corner-stone of every
despotic institution, from the Inquisition to the fortress of Schlüsselburg.
Moreover, the Russian critics declared that the progress of civilization itself
would be checked were this commandment of non-resistance applied to
everyday life, by which they mean the civilization of Europe, which is,
according to them, the model for all mankind.
Such was the substance of Russian criticism.
Foreign critics start from the same premises, but their deductions differ
somewhat from those of the Russian critics; not only are they less captious
and more cultivated, but their modes of analysis are not the same.
In discussing my book, and more particularly the gospel doctrine as it is
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, the foreign critics affirmed that the
latter could not really be called Christian doctrine (they believe that the
Christian doctrine is embodied in Catholicism or Protestantism), and that
the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount are only a series of the delightful
but unpractical visions of the "charmant docteur," as Renan says, suited to
the artless, half-civilized Galileans who lived 1800 years ago, or to the
Russian and semi-barbarous peasants, to Sutaev and Bondarev, and to the
Page 54
Russian mystic Tolstoï, but which are by no means adapted to the lofty
plane of European culture. The foreign secular critics, in a courteous way,
in order not to wound my feelings, have endeavored to show that my belief
that mankind may be guided by so simple a doctrine as the Sermon on the
Mount arises partly from my limited knowledge of history and ignorance of
the many vain attempts to carry out in daily life the principles of the
Sermon on the Mount, which history tells us have always proved an utter
failure, and partly from my misconception of the significance of our
modern civilization, with its Krupp guns, its smokeless powder, its African
colonization, its Home Rule, its parliaments, journalism, strikes, and
constitutions, not to mention the Eiffel Tower,—on which the entire
population of Europe is at present reposing.
Thus wrote Vogüé, thus wrote Leroy-Beaulieu, Matthew Arnold, the
American writer Talmage, who is also a popular preacher, the free-thinker
Ingersoll, and others.
"The teaching of Christ is no longer practicable, because it does not suit our
industrial times," Ingersoll ingenuously remarks, and thereby he no doubt
gives utterance to the views which this cultured generation holds in regard
to the doctrine of Christ. The doctrine has no affinity with the industrialism
of the present age, as though industrialism were a sacred institution which
can suffer no change. A drunkard might thus reply to one who calls upon
him to be sober, that a man in liquor finds such advice absurd.
The arguments of all secular writers, Russian as well as foreign, however
varied in form or expression, are substantially alike; they all agree in
misapprehending the doctrine of Christ, with its outcome of non-resistance,
and in affirming that it is not expedient because it implies a need of a
change of life.
The doctrine of life is inexpedient, because if we lived up to it our lives
could not go on as they have done hitherto; in other words, if we were to
begin to live like righteous men, as Christ bids us, we must abandon the
wicked ways to which we have grown accustomed. So far from discussing
the question of non-resistance of evil by violence, the very mention of the
fact that the precepts of Christ include such a command is considered as
sufficient proof of the inexpediency of the whole doctrine.
plane of European culture. The foreign secular critics, in a courteous way,
in order not to wound my feelings, have endeavored to show that my belief
that mankind may be guided by so simple a doctrine as the Sermon on the
Mount arises partly from my limited knowledge of history and ignorance of
the many vain attempts to carry out in daily life the principles of the
Sermon on the Mount, which history tells us have always proved an utter
failure, and partly from my misconception of the significance of our
modern civilization, with its Krupp guns, its smokeless powder, its African
colonization, its Home Rule, its parliaments, journalism, strikes, and
constitutions, not to mention the Eiffel Tower,—on which the entire
population of Europe is at present reposing.
Thus wrote Vogüé, thus wrote Leroy-Beaulieu, Matthew Arnold, the
American writer Talmage, who is also a popular preacher, the free-thinker
Ingersoll, and others.
"The teaching of Christ is no longer practicable, because it does not suit our
industrial times," Ingersoll ingenuously remarks, and thereby he no doubt
gives utterance to the views which this cultured generation holds in regard
to the doctrine of Christ. The doctrine has no affinity with the industrialism
of the present age, as though industrialism were a sacred institution which
can suffer no change. A drunkard might thus reply to one who calls upon
him to be sober, that a man in liquor finds such advice absurd.
The arguments of all secular writers, Russian as well as foreign, however
varied in form or expression, are substantially alike; they all agree in
misapprehending the doctrine of Christ, with its outcome of non-resistance,
and in affirming that it is not expedient because it implies a need of a
change of life.
The doctrine of life is inexpedient, because if we lived up to it our lives
could not go on as they have done hitherto; in other words, if we were to
begin to live like righteous men, as Christ bids us, we must abandon the
wicked ways to which we have grown accustomed. So far from discussing
the question of non-resistance of evil by violence, the very mention of the
fact that the precepts of Christ include such a command is considered as
sufficient proof of the inexpediency of the whole doctrine.
Page 55
And yet it would seem necessary to offer some solution of this question, as
it lies at the root of all that most interests us.
The question is how to settle these differences among men, when the very
action that is considered evil by one man is considered good by another. It
is no answer to say that I think an action evil although my adversary may
consider it a good one. There are but two ways of solving the difficulty. One
is to find a positive and indisputable standard of evil, and the other is to
obey the command, resist not evil by violence.
Men have tried to achieve the former from the earliest historical ages, and
we all know with what unsuccessful results.
The second solution—that is, the non-resistance of what we must consider
evil until we have found a universal standard: that solution has been
suggested by Christ himself.
It might be thought that the solution suggested by Christ was the wrong
one, and a better one might be substituted after the standard had been found
which is to define evil once and for all. One might not know of the
existence of such a question, as is the case with the barbarous races, but no
one can be permitted to pretend, like the learned critics of the Christian
doctrine, that no such question does exist, or that the recognition of the right
of certain individuals or groups of individuals, and still less of one's own
right, to define evil, and to resist it by violence, decides the question,
because we all know that such a recognition does not decide it at all, for
there are always persons who will refuse to admit that such a prerogative
can exist.
And yet this very acknowledgment, that anything that seems evil to us is
evil, or else an utter misconception of the question, affords a basis for the
conclusions of secular critics concerning the doctrine of Christ; hence not
only the utterances of the clerical, but also those of the secular critics in
regard to my book, have made it evident to me that most men totally fail to
comprehend either the doctrine of Christ, or the questions which it is
intended to decide.
it lies at the root of all that most interests us.
The question is how to settle these differences among men, when the very
action that is considered evil by one man is considered good by another. It
is no answer to say that I think an action evil although my adversary may
consider it a good one. There are but two ways of solving the difficulty. One
is to find a positive and indisputable standard of evil, and the other is to
obey the command, resist not evil by violence.
Men have tried to achieve the former from the earliest historical ages, and
we all know with what unsuccessful results.
The second solution—that is, the non-resistance of what we must consider
evil until we have found a universal standard: that solution has been
suggested by Christ himself.
It might be thought that the solution suggested by Christ was the wrong
one, and a better one might be substituted after the standard had been found
which is to define evil once and for all. One might not know of the
existence of such a question, as is the case with the barbarous races, but no
one can be permitted to pretend, like the learned critics of the Christian
doctrine, that no such question does exist, or that the recognition of the right
of certain individuals or groups of individuals, and still less of one's own
right, to define evil, and to resist it by violence, decides the question,
because we all know that such a recognition does not decide it at all, for
there are always persons who will refuse to admit that such a prerogative
can exist.
And yet this very acknowledgment, that anything that seems evil to us is
evil, or else an utter misconception of the question, affords a basis for the
conclusions of secular critics concerning the doctrine of Christ; hence not
only the utterances of the clerical, but also those of the secular critics in
regard to my book, have made it evident to me that most men totally fail to
comprehend either the doctrine of Christ, or the questions which it is
intended to decide.
Page 56
CHAPTER III
MISCONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY BY NON-
BELIEVERS
The meaning of the Christian doctrine, which is clear for the minority, has become
unintelligible for the majority of men—The cause of it is the false conception of
Christianity and the misguided assurance of believers, as well as of unbelievers, that they
apprehend it—The apprehension of Christianity for believers is concealed by the Church
—The apprehension of Christianity—Its essence and its unlikeness to the pagan doctrines
—Misunderstood at first, it has grown clear to those who embrace it owing to its
correspondence with the truth—Contemporaneously with it arose the assertion that the
true meaning of the doctrine was understood, and had been confirmed by miraculous
transmission—The Council of Disciples according to the Acts—Authoritative and
miraculous assertion of the true conception of Christ's doctrine has found its logical
conclusion in the acknowledgment of the Credo and the Church—The Church could not
have been established by Christ—Definition of Churches according to the Catechism—
There are various Churches, ever antagonistic to one another—Where is heresy?—The
work of Mr. Arnold concerning heresies—Heresies are the sign of activity in the
Churches—Churches always divide mankind, and are ever inimical to Christianity—In
what the activity of the Russian Church consists—Matthew xxiv. 23—The Sermon on the
Mount, or the Credo—The Orthodox Church conceals from the people the true meaning
of Christianity—The same is done by other Churches—All the contemporary external
conditions are such that they destroy the doctrine of the Church, and therefore Churches
use all their efforts to defend it.
The knowledge which I obtained after the publication of my book in regard
to the views which the minority of mankind have held, and still hold,
concerning the doctrine of Christ in its simplicity and real significance, as
well as the criticisms of clerical and secular writers, who deny the
possibility of apprehending it in its actual meaning, have convinced me that
while the minority has not only always possessed a true conception of this
doctrine, and that this conception has grown steadily more and more clear,
for the majority, on the other hand, its sense has become more and more
vague, reaching at last such a degree of obscurity that men fail to
understand the simplest commands expressed in the Bible, even when
couched in the plainest possible language.
The inability that prevails at the present time to comprehend the doctrine of
Christ in its true, simple, and actual meaning, when its light has penetrated
MISCONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY BY NON-
BELIEVERS
The meaning of the Christian doctrine, which is clear for the minority, has become
unintelligible for the majority of men—The cause of it is the false conception of
Christianity and the misguided assurance of believers, as well as of unbelievers, that they
apprehend it—The apprehension of Christianity for believers is concealed by the Church
—The apprehension of Christianity—Its essence and its unlikeness to the pagan doctrines
—Misunderstood at first, it has grown clear to those who embrace it owing to its
correspondence with the truth—Contemporaneously with it arose the assertion that the
true meaning of the doctrine was understood, and had been confirmed by miraculous
transmission—The Council of Disciples according to the Acts—Authoritative and
miraculous assertion of the true conception of Christ's doctrine has found its logical
conclusion in the acknowledgment of the Credo and the Church—The Church could not
have been established by Christ—Definition of Churches according to the Catechism—
There are various Churches, ever antagonistic to one another—Where is heresy?—The
work of Mr. Arnold concerning heresies—Heresies are the sign of activity in the
Churches—Churches always divide mankind, and are ever inimical to Christianity—In
what the activity of the Russian Church consists—Matthew xxiv. 23—The Sermon on the
Mount, or the Credo—The Orthodox Church conceals from the people the true meaning
of Christianity—The same is done by other Churches—All the contemporary external
conditions are such that they destroy the doctrine of the Church, and therefore Churches
use all their efforts to defend it.
The knowledge which I obtained after the publication of my book in regard
to the views which the minority of mankind have held, and still hold,
concerning the doctrine of Christ in its simplicity and real significance, as
well as the criticisms of clerical and secular writers, who deny the
possibility of apprehending it in its actual meaning, have convinced me that
while the minority has not only always possessed a true conception of this
doctrine, and that this conception has grown steadily more and more clear,
for the majority, on the other hand, its sense has become more and more
vague, reaching at last such a degree of obscurity that men fail to
understand the simplest commands expressed in the Bible, even when
couched in the plainest possible language.
The inability that prevails at the present time to comprehend the doctrine of
Christ in its true, simple, and actual meaning, when its light has penetrated
Page 57
into the remotest recesses of the human understanding, when, as Christ said,
they proclaim from the roofs that which He whispered in the ear; when this
doctrine penetrates every phase of human life, domestic, economical, civil,
politic, and international,—this failure to apprehend it would be
inexplicable, if one had not discovered the reasons for it.
One of the reasons is, that believers as well as unbelievers are perfectly sure
that they long ago understood the doctrine of Christ so completely,
unquestionably, and finally, that it can have no other meaning but the one
which they attribute to it. That is because the tradition of this false
conception has been handed down for ages,—and therefore its
misconception.
The most powerful stream of water cannot add one single drop to a vessel
that is already full.
One might succeed in explaining to the dullest of men the most difficult of
problems, if he had no previous conception in regard to them; but it is
impossible to explain to the cleverest man even the simplest matters, if he is
perfectly sure that he knows everything about it.
The Christian doctrine appears to men of the present times to be a doctrine
of that kind, known for ages, and never to be questioned in its most trivial
details, and which is susceptible of no other interpretation.
At the present time Christianity is conceived by those who profess the
doctrines of the Church as a supernatural, miraculous revelation of all that
is expressed in the Credo; while unbelievers look upon it as an affair of the
past, a manifestation of the demand of humanity for a belief in the
supernatural, as an historical fact, which has found its fullest expression in
Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism, and which has for us no vital
meaning. For the believers the real significance of the doctrine is concealed
by the Church; for the unbelievers it is hidden by science.
Let us begin by considering the former.
Eighteen hundred years ago, in the pagan world of Rome, there appeared a
strange and novel doctrine, unlike any of its predecessors, which was
ascribed to the man Christ.
It was a doctrine wholly new in form as well as in substance, both for the
Hebrew world, from whose midst it had sprung, as well as for the Roman
they proclaim from the roofs that which He whispered in the ear; when this
doctrine penetrates every phase of human life, domestic, economical, civil,
politic, and international,—this failure to apprehend it would be
inexplicable, if one had not discovered the reasons for it.
One of the reasons is, that believers as well as unbelievers are perfectly sure
that they long ago understood the doctrine of Christ so completely,
unquestionably, and finally, that it can have no other meaning but the one
which they attribute to it. That is because the tradition of this false
conception has been handed down for ages,—and therefore its
misconception.
The most powerful stream of water cannot add one single drop to a vessel
that is already full.
One might succeed in explaining to the dullest of men the most difficult of
problems, if he had no previous conception in regard to them; but it is
impossible to explain to the cleverest man even the simplest matters, if he is
perfectly sure that he knows everything about it.
The Christian doctrine appears to men of the present times to be a doctrine
of that kind, known for ages, and never to be questioned in its most trivial
details, and which is susceptible of no other interpretation.
At the present time Christianity is conceived by those who profess the
doctrines of the Church as a supernatural, miraculous revelation of all that
is expressed in the Credo; while unbelievers look upon it as an affair of the
past, a manifestation of the demand of humanity for a belief in the
supernatural, as an historical fact, which has found its fullest expression in
Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism, and which has for us no vital
meaning. For the believers the real significance of the doctrine is concealed
by the Church; for the unbelievers it is hidden by science.
Let us begin by considering the former.
Eighteen hundred years ago, in the pagan world of Rome, there appeared a
strange and novel doctrine, unlike any of its predecessors, which was
ascribed to the man Christ.
It was a doctrine wholly new in form as well as in substance, both for the
Hebrew world, from whose midst it had sprung, as well as for the Roman
Page 58
world, in whose midst it was preached and promulgated.
Among the accurately defined religious precepts of the Jews, where,
according to Isaiah, there was precept upon precept, and among the highly
perfected Roman legislative assemblies, there appeared a doctrine that not
only repudiated all deities, all fear of them, all augury and all faith in it, but
also denied the necessity for any human institutions whatsoever. Instead of
the precepts and creeds of former times, this doctrine presented only an
image of interior perfection, truth, and love in the person of Christ, and the
attainment of this interior perfection possible for men, and, as a
consequence, of the outward perfection foretold by the prophets: the
coming of the Kingdom of God, when all enmity shall cease, when every
man will hear the word of the Lord and be united with another in brotherly
love, and when the lion and the lamb shall lie down together. Instead of
threats of punishment for the non-observance of the commandments of the
old laws, religious no less than secular, instead of tempting men by promise
of rewards to observe these laws, this doctrine attracted mankind only by
proclaiming itself to be the truth.
"If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of
God, or whether I speak of myself."—John vii. 17.
"Which of you convinceth me of sin? And if I say the truth, why do ye not
believe me?"—John viii. 46.
"But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth...."—John
viii. 40.
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."—John
viii. 32.
God must be worshiped in truth. All the doctrine will be made plain by the
Spirit of Truth. Do as I command you, and you will know whether what I
say is the truth.
No evidence was brought to prove the doctrine, except the truth and its
harmony therewith. The whole substance consisted in learning the truth and
in following its guidance, drawing nearer and nearer to it in the affairs of
everyday life.
According to this doctrine, there is no mode of action that can justify a man
or make him righteous; as regards interior perfection we have only the
Among the accurately defined religious precepts of the Jews, where,
according to Isaiah, there was precept upon precept, and among the highly
perfected Roman legislative assemblies, there appeared a doctrine that not
only repudiated all deities, all fear of them, all augury and all faith in it, but
also denied the necessity for any human institutions whatsoever. Instead of
the precepts and creeds of former times, this doctrine presented only an
image of interior perfection, truth, and love in the person of Christ, and the
attainment of this interior perfection possible for men, and, as a
consequence, of the outward perfection foretold by the prophets: the
coming of the Kingdom of God, when all enmity shall cease, when every
man will hear the word of the Lord and be united with another in brotherly
love, and when the lion and the lamb shall lie down together. Instead of
threats of punishment for the non-observance of the commandments of the
old laws, religious no less than secular, instead of tempting men by promise
of rewards to observe these laws, this doctrine attracted mankind only by
proclaiming itself to be the truth.
"If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of
God, or whether I speak of myself."—John vii. 17.
"Which of you convinceth me of sin? And if I say the truth, why do ye not
believe me?"—John viii. 46.
"But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth...."—John
viii. 40.
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."—John
viii. 32.
God must be worshiped in truth. All the doctrine will be made plain by the
Spirit of Truth. Do as I command you, and you will know whether what I
say is the truth.
No evidence was brought to prove the doctrine, except the truth and its
harmony therewith. The whole substance consisted in learning the truth and
in following its guidance, drawing nearer and nearer to it in the affairs of
everyday life.
According to this doctrine, there is no mode of action that can justify a man
or make him righteous; as regards interior perfection we have only the
Page 59
image of truth, in the person of Christ, to win our hearts, and outward
perfection is expressed by a realization of the Kingdom of God. In order to
fulfil the doctrine it needs but to take Christ for our model, and to advance
in the direction of interior perfection by the road which has been pointed
out to us, as well as in that of exterior perfection, which is the establishment
of the Kingdom of God. The degree of human happiness, whether it be
more or less, depends, according to this doctrine, not on the degree of
perfection at which it arrives, but on the comparative rate of progress
toward that perfection.
The advance toward perfection of Zacchæus the publican, of the adulteress,
of the thief on the cross, is, according to this doctrine, better than the
stagnation of the righteous Pharisee. The shepherd rejoices more over the
one sheep which was lost and is found than over the ninety and nine which
are in the fold. The prodigal returned, the piece of money which was lost
and is found, is more precious unto God than that which was never lost.
According to this doctrine, each state is but a step on the road toward the
unattainable interior and exterior perfection, and therefore it has no
significance in itself. The progress of this movement toward perfection is its
merit; the least cessation of this movement means the cessation of good
works.
"Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth," and "No man,
having put his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of
God." "Rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice,
because your names are written in heaven." "Be ye therefore perfect, even
as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." "Seek ye first the kingdom of
God and his righteousness."
The fulfilment of the doctrine lies in a continual progress toward the
attainment of a higher truth, and in the growing realization of that truth
within one's self, by means of an ever increasing love; as well as in a more
and more keen realization of the Kingdom of God in the world around us. It
is evident that the doctrine that appeared in the midst of the Hebrew and
pagan world could not be accepted by the majority of men, who lived a life
so totally unlike the one prescribed by this new doctrine; and even those
who did accept it could not comprehend its full meaning, because of its
contradiction of all former ideas.
perfection is expressed by a realization of the Kingdom of God. In order to
fulfil the doctrine it needs but to take Christ for our model, and to advance
in the direction of interior perfection by the road which has been pointed
out to us, as well as in that of exterior perfection, which is the establishment
of the Kingdom of God. The degree of human happiness, whether it be
more or less, depends, according to this doctrine, not on the degree of
perfection at which it arrives, but on the comparative rate of progress
toward that perfection.
The advance toward perfection of Zacchæus the publican, of the adulteress,
of the thief on the cross, is, according to this doctrine, better than the
stagnation of the righteous Pharisee. The shepherd rejoices more over the
one sheep which was lost and is found than over the ninety and nine which
are in the fold. The prodigal returned, the piece of money which was lost
and is found, is more precious unto God than that which was never lost.
According to this doctrine, each state is but a step on the road toward the
unattainable interior and exterior perfection, and therefore it has no
significance in itself. The progress of this movement toward perfection is its
merit; the least cessation of this movement means the cessation of good
works.
"Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth," and "No man,
having put his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of
God." "Rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice,
because your names are written in heaven." "Be ye therefore perfect, even
as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." "Seek ye first the kingdom of
God and his righteousness."
The fulfilment of the doctrine lies in a continual progress toward the
attainment of a higher truth, and in the growing realization of that truth
within one's self, by means of an ever increasing love; as well as in a more
and more keen realization of the Kingdom of God in the world around us. It
is evident that the doctrine that appeared in the midst of the Hebrew and
pagan world could not be accepted by the majority of men, who lived a life
so totally unlike the one prescribed by this new doctrine; and even those
who did accept it could not comprehend its full meaning, because of its
contradiction of all former ideas.
Page 60
It is only through a series of misapprehensions, errors, one-sided
explanations, corrected and supplemented by generations of men, that the
meaning of the Christian doctrine has become more and more plain. The
Christian world-conception and that of the Hebrew and pagan peoples
mutually acted and reacted upon each other, and the Christian principle
being the more vital, it penetrated deeper and deeper into the Hebrew and
pagan principles that had outlived their usefulness, and became more
clearly defined, freeing itself from the spurious admixtures imposed upon it.
Men understood its meaning better and better, and realized it more and
more unmistakably in life.
The older the world grew, the more lucid became its apprehension of
Christianity, as must always be the case with any doctrine relating to human
life.
Successive generations rectified the mistakes of the preceding ones and
approached nearer and nearer to the apprehension of its true meaning. Thus
it was from the very beginning of Christianity. And it was then that certain
men came to the front who affirmed that the only true interpretation was the
one which they themselves proclaimed, adducing the miracles as a proof
thereof.
This was the principal cause of its misapprehension in the first place, and of
its complete perversion in the second.
The doctrine of Christ was supposed to be transmitted to mankind not like
any other truth, but in a peculiar, supernatural manner; hence they propose
to prove its authority, not because it satisfies the demands of reason and of
human nature in general, but because of the miraculous character of its
transmission, which is supposed to be an incontrovertible proof of the
validity of its conception. This idea sprang from a misconception, and the
result was that it became impossible to understand it.
It originated at the very beginning, when the doctrine was so imperfectly
understood and often so erroneously construed; as, for example, in the
Gospels and the Acts. The less men understood it, the more mysterious it
appeared, and the greater need was there for visible proof of its authenticity.
The rule for doing unto others as you would wish them to do unto you,
called for no miraculous proof, neither did it require faith, because the
explanations, corrected and supplemented by generations of men, that the
meaning of the Christian doctrine has become more and more plain. The
Christian world-conception and that of the Hebrew and pagan peoples
mutually acted and reacted upon each other, and the Christian principle
being the more vital, it penetrated deeper and deeper into the Hebrew and
pagan principles that had outlived their usefulness, and became more
clearly defined, freeing itself from the spurious admixtures imposed upon it.
Men understood its meaning better and better, and realized it more and
more unmistakably in life.
The older the world grew, the more lucid became its apprehension of
Christianity, as must always be the case with any doctrine relating to human
life.
Successive generations rectified the mistakes of the preceding ones and
approached nearer and nearer to the apprehension of its true meaning. Thus
it was from the very beginning of Christianity. And it was then that certain
men came to the front who affirmed that the only true interpretation was the
one which they themselves proclaimed, adducing the miracles as a proof
thereof.
This was the principal cause of its misapprehension in the first place, and of
its complete perversion in the second.
The doctrine of Christ was supposed to be transmitted to mankind not like
any other truth, but in a peculiar, supernatural manner; hence they propose
to prove its authority, not because it satisfies the demands of reason and of
human nature in general, but because of the miraculous character of its
transmission, which is supposed to be an incontrovertible proof of the
validity of its conception. This idea sprang from a misconception, and the
result was that it became impossible to understand it.
It originated at the very beginning, when the doctrine was so imperfectly
understood and often so erroneously construed; as, for example, in the
Gospels and the Acts. The less men understood it, the more mysterious it
appeared, and the greater need was there for visible proof of its authenticity.
The rule for doing unto others as you would wish them to do unto you,
called for no miraculous proof, neither did it require faith, because the
Page 61
proposition is convincing in itself, both to reason and to human nature. But
the proposition that Christ was God needed miraculous testimony.
The more mystical grew the apprehension of Christ's teaching, the more the
miraculous element entered into it; and the more miraculous it became, the
farther it was from its original meaning; and the more complicated,
mystical, and remote from its original meaning it came to be, the more
necessary it was to declare its infallibility, and the less intelligible it
became.
From the very beginning of Christianity one could see from the Gospels, the
Acts, and the Epistles how the misapprehension of the doctrine called forth
the necessity of proofs—miraculous and beyond human intelligence.
It dated from the time mentioned in the Acts, when the disciples went up to
Jerusalem to consult with the elders in regard to the question that had arisen
as to whether the uncircumcised and those who abstained not from the meat
offered to idols should be baptized.
The very manner of asking the question showed that those who discussed it
misconceived the doctrine of Christ, who rejected all external rites, such as
the washing of the feet, purification, fasts, and the Sabbath. It is said
distinctly: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but those
things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they
defile the man." And therefore the question in regard to the baptism of those
not circumcised could only arise among men who, loving their Teacher and
with the intuitive perception of the grandeur of his doctrine, could not as yet
comprehend its exact meaning. And so it was.
And in proportion as the members of the assembly failed to comprehend the
doctrine, did they stand in need of an outward affirmation of their
incomplete conception. And in order to decide the question, whose very
proposal proves the misconception of the doctrine, it was that in this
assembly for the first time, according to the description given in the Acts,
were uttered those awful words, productive of so much harm, by which the
truth of certain propositions has been for the first time confirmed: "For it
seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us;" that is to say, it was a
declaration that the truth of what they said was witnessed by a miraculous
participation of the Holy Ghost, that is—of God.
the proposition that Christ was God needed miraculous testimony.
The more mystical grew the apprehension of Christ's teaching, the more the
miraculous element entered into it; and the more miraculous it became, the
farther it was from its original meaning; and the more complicated,
mystical, and remote from its original meaning it came to be, the more
necessary it was to declare its infallibility, and the less intelligible it
became.
From the very beginning of Christianity one could see from the Gospels, the
Acts, and the Epistles how the misapprehension of the doctrine called forth
the necessity of proofs—miraculous and beyond human intelligence.
It dated from the time mentioned in the Acts, when the disciples went up to
Jerusalem to consult with the elders in regard to the question that had arisen
as to whether the uncircumcised and those who abstained not from the meat
offered to idols should be baptized.
The very manner of asking the question showed that those who discussed it
misconceived the doctrine of Christ, who rejected all external rites, such as
the washing of the feet, purification, fasts, and the Sabbath. It is said
distinctly: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but those
things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they
defile the man." And therefore the question in regard to the baptism of those
not circumcised could only arise among men who, loving their Teacher and
with the intuitive perception of the grandeur of his doctrine, could not as yet
comprehend its exact meaning. And so it was.
And in proportion as the members of the assembly failed to comprehend the
doctrine, did they stand in need of an outward affirmation of their
incomplete conception. And in order to decide the question, whose very
proposal proves the misconception of the doctrine, it was that in this
assembly for the first time, according to the description given in the Acts,
were uttered those awful words, productive of so much harm, by which the
truth of certain propositions has been for the first time confirmed: "For it
seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us;" that is to say, it was a
declaration that the truth of what they said was witnessed by a miraculous
participation of the Holy Ghost, that is—of God.
Page 62
But the assertion that the Holy Ghost—that is to say, God—had spoken
through the apostles, in its turn required proof. And therefore it became
necessary to declare that on the fiftieth day the Holy Ghost, in the shape of
fiery tongues, descended on those who had made this assertion. [In the
description the descent of the Holy Ghost precedes the council, but the Acts
were written much later than either.] But the descent of the Holy Ghost
must also be proved, though it would be difficult to say why a fiery tongue
hovering over a man's head should be a proof of the truth of what he says
any more than the miracles, the cures, the resurrections, the martyrdoms,
and all the rest of those persuasive miracles with which the Acts are filled,
and which serve rather to repel than to convince one of the truth of the
Christian dogmas. The results of these methods were such that the more
pains they took to confirm their statements, accumulating stories of
miracles, the more the doctrine itself deviated from its original meaning,
and the less intelligible it became.
Thus it was from the beginning of the Christian era, and thus it continued to
increase, until in its own time it has reached its logical consummation in the
dogma of transubstantiation, the infallibility of the Pope, the bishops, and
Scriptures, which is something utterly incomprehensible and nonsensical,
requiring a blind faith, not in God or Christ, nor even in the doctrine, but a
faith either in one person, as in Catholicism, or in many persons, as in
Orthodoxy, or in a book, as in Protestantism. The more widely spread
Christianity became, and the larger the number of uninstructed men it
received, the less it was understood, the more the infallibility of its
conceptions was insisted upon, and the more slender grew the possibility of
understanding its true meaning. Already, about the time of Constantine, the
entire conception of the doctrine amounted to the résumé formulated by the
temporal power,—the outcome of discussions that took place in the council,
—to the Credo, in which it is said: I believe in this and that, etc., and at the
end, "in the one holy, Apostolic and Œcumenical Church," that is, in the
infallibility of the persons who constitute it; so that it all amounted to this,
that a man believed not in God, nor in Christ, as they revealed themselves
to him, but in that which was believed by the Church.
But the Church is holy, and was founded by Christ. God could not allow
men to interpret His doctrine as they chose, and therefore He established the
Church. All these propositions are so unjust and unfounded, that one is
through the apostles, in its turn required proof. And therefore it became
necessary to declare that on the fiftieth day the Holy Ghost, in the shape of
fiery tongues, descended on those who had made this assertion. [In the
description the descent of the Holy Ghost precedes the council, but the Acts
were written much later than either.] But the descent of the Holy Ghost
must also be proved, though it would be difficult to say why a fiery tongue
hovering over a man's head should be a proof of the truth of what he says
any more than the miracles, the cures, the resurrections, the martyrdoms,
and all the rest of those persuasive miracles with which the Acts are filled,
and which serve rather to repel than to convince one of the truth of the
Christian dogmas. The results of these methods were such that the more
pains they took to confirm their statements, accumulating stories of
miracles, the more the doctrine itself deviated from its original meaning,
and the less intelligible it became.
Thus it was from the beginning of the Christian era, and thus it continued to
increase, until in its own time it has reached its logical consummation in the
dogma of transubstantiation, the infallibility of the Pope, the bishops, and
Scriptures, which is something utterly incomprehensible and nonsensical,
requiring a blind faith, not in God or Christ, nor even in the doctrine, but a
faith either in one person, as in Catholicism, or in many persons, as in
Orthodoxy, or in a book, as in Protestantism. The more widely spread
Christianity became, and the larger the number of uninstructed men it
received, the less it was understood, the more the infallibility of its
conceptions was insisted upon, and the more slender grew the possibility of
understanding its true meaning. Already, about the time of Constantine, the
entire conception of the doctrine amounted to the résumé formulated by the
temporal power,—the outcome of discussions that took place in the council,
—to the Credo, in which it is said: I believe in this and that, etc., and at the
end, "in the one holy, Apostolic and Œcumenical Church," that is, in the
infallibility of the persons who constitute it; so that it all amounted to this,
that a man believed not in God, nor in Christ, as they revealed themselves
to him, but in that which was believed by the Church.
But the Church is holy, and was founded by Christ. God could not allow
men to interpret His doctrine as they chose, and therefore He established the
Church. All these propositions are so unjust and unfounded, that one is
Page 63
actually ashamed to refute them. In no place, and in no manner whatsoever,
save in the assertion of the Church, is it seen that either God or Christ can
ever have founded anything like the Church in its ecclesiastical sense. There
is a distinct and evident warning in the New Testament against the Church,
as an outside authority, in the passage which bids the disciples of Christ call
no man father or master. But nowhere is there a word in regard to the
establishment of what the ecclesiastics call the Church. The word "church"
is used in the New Testament twice, once in speaking of the assembly
which is to decide a dispute; the second time in connection with the obscure
words in regard to the rock, Peter, and the gates of hell. From these two
references, where the word is used only in the sense of an assembly, men
have derived the institution which we recognize at present under the same
of the Church.
But Christ could by no means have founded a church, that is, what we
understand by that word at the present time, because nothing like our
Church, as we know it in these days, with the sacraments, the hierarchy, and
above all the establishment of infallibility, was to be found either in the
words of Christ, or in the ideas of the men of those times.
Because men have called something which has been established since, by
the same word that Christ used in regard to another thing, by no means
gives them a right to assert that Christ founded only one true Church.
Moreover, if Christ had it in his mind to establish a church which was to be
the depository of the whole doctrine and faith, He would surely have
expressed this so plainly and clearly, and would have given, apart from all
stories of miracles which are repeated with every variety of superstition,
such signs as would leave no doubt as to its authenticity; yet this was not
the case, and now, as always, one finds different institutions, each one
calling itself the only true Church.
The Catholic catechism says: "L'Eglise est la société des fidèles établie par
N.-S. Jésus-Christ, répandue sur toute la terre et soumise à l'autorité de
pasteurs légitimes, principalement notre S.-P. le pape,"—meaning by
"pasteurs légitimes,"[3] a human institution made up of a number of men
bound together by a certain organization of which the Pope is the head.
The Orthodox catechism says: "Our Church is a society established on earth
by Jesus Christ, united by the divine doctrine and the sacraments under the
save in the assertion of the Church, is it seen that either God or Christ can
ever have founded anything like the Church in its ecclesiastical sense. There
is a distinct and evident warning in the New Testament against the Church,
as an outside authority, in the passage which bids the disciples of Christ call
no man father or master. But nowhere is there a word in regard to the
establishment of what the ecclesiastics call the Church. The word "church"
is used in the New Testament twice, once in speaking of the assembly
which is to decide a dispute; the second time in connection with the obscure
words in regard to the rock, Peter, and the gates of hell. From these two
references, where the word is used only in the sense of an assembly, men
have derived the institution which we recognize at present under the same
of the Church.
But Christ could by no means have founded a church, that is, what we
understand by that word at the present time, because nothing like our
Church, as we know it in these days, with the sacraments, the hierarchy, and
above all the establishment of infallibility, was to be found either in the
words of Christ, or in the ideas of the men of those times.
Because men have called something which has been established since, by
the same word that Christ used in regard to another thing, by no means
gives them a right to assert that Christ founded only one true Church.
Moreover, if Christ had it in his mind to establish a church which was to be
the depository of the whole doctrine and faith, He would surely have
expressed this so plainly and clearly, and would have given, apart from all
stories of miracles which are repeated with every variety of superstition,
such signs as would leave no doubt as to its authenticity; yet this was not
the case, and now, as always, one finds different institutions, each one
calling itself the only true Church.
The Catholic catechism says: "L'Eglise est la société des fidèles établie par
N.-S. Jésus-Christ, répandue sur toute la terre et soumise à l'autorité de
pasteurs légitimes, principalement notre S.-P. le pape,"—meaning by
"pasteurs légitimes,"[3] a human institution made up of a number of men
bound together by a certain organization of which the Pope is the head.
The Orthodox catechism says: "Our Church is a society established on earth
by Jesus Christ, united by the divine doctrine and the sacraments under the
Page 64
government and direction of a hierarchy established by the Lord,"—those
words, "established by the Lord," signifying a Greek hierarchy, composed
of certain men who are ordained to fill certain places.
The Lutheran catechism says: "Our Church is a holy Christian society of
believers under Christ, our Master, in which the Holy Ghost, by means of
the Bible and the sacraments, offers, communicates, and dispenses the
divine salvation,"—meaning by that, that the Catholic Church is in error,
and has fallen away from grace, and that the genuine tradition has been
preserved in Protestantism.
For Catholics the divine Church is identified with the Pope and the Roman
hierarchy. For the Orthodox it is identified with the institution of the
Eastern and Russian hierarchy.[4] For Lutherans the divine Church signifies
a congregation of men who acknowledge the Bible and the Lutheran
catechism.
When those who belong to any one of the existing churches speak of the
beginnings of Christianity, they generally use the word "church" in the
singular, as though there had never been but one church. This is quite
unfair. The Church, which as an institution declares itself to be the
depository of infallible truth, did not arise until there were already two.
While the faithful still agreed among themselves, the congregation was
united, and there was no occasion for calling itself a church. It was only
when it separated into two hostile parties that each party felt obliged to
assert its possession of the truth by claiming infallibility.
During the course of the controversies between the two parties, while each
one claimed infallibility for itself and declared its opponent heretical, arose
the idea of the one church.
We know that there was a church in the year 51, which granted the
admission of the uncircumcised, and we know it only because there was
another, the Jewish Church, which denied their right to membership.
If at the present time there is a Catholic Church which asserts its
infallibility, it is because there are other churches, namely, the Greek
Orthodox and the Lutheran, each one asserting its own infallibility, and thus
disowning all other churches. Hence the idea of one church is but the
product of the imagination, containing not a shadow of reality.
words, "established by the Lord," signifying a Greek hierarchy, composed
of certain men who are ordained to fill certain places.
The Lutheran catechism says: "Our Church is a holy Christian society of
believers under Christ, our Master, in which the Holy Ghost, by means of
the Bible and the sacraments, offers, communicates, and dispenses the
divine salvation,"—meaning by that, that the Catholic Church is in error,
and has fallen away from grace, and that the genuine tradition has been
preserved in Protestantism.
For Catholics the divine Church is identified with the Pope and the Roman
hierarchy. For the Orthodox it is identified with the institution of the
Eastern and Russian hierarchy.[4] For Lutherans the divine Church signifies
a congregation of men who acknowledge the Bible and the Lutheran
catechism.
When those who belong to any one of the existing churches speak of the
beginnings of Christianity, they generally use the word "church" in the
singular, as though there had never been but one church. This is quite
unfair. The Church, which as an institution declares itself to be the
depository of infallible truth, did not arise until there were already two.
While the faithful still agreed among themselves, the congregation was
united, and there was no occasion for calling itself a church. It was only
when it separated into two hostile parties that each party felt obliged to
assert its possession of the truth by claiming infallibility.
During the course of the controversies between the two parties, while each
one claimed infallibility for itself and declared its opponent heretical, arose
the idea of the one church.
We know that there was a church in the year 51, which granted the
admission of the uncircumcised, and we know it only because there was
another, the Jewish Church, which denied their right to membership.
If at the present time there is a Catholic Church which asserts its
infallibility, it is because there are other churches, namely, the Greek
Orthodox and the Lutheran, each one asserting its own infallibility, and thus
disowning all other churches. Hence the idea of one church is but the
product of the imagination, containing not a shadow of reality.
Page 65
It is an historical fact that there have existed, and still continue to exist,
numerous bodies, each one of whom maintains itself to be the true Church
established by Christ, declaring at the same time that all the others who call
themselves churches are heretical and schismatic.
The catechisms of those churches which possess the greatest number of
communicants, the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the Lutheran, express this in
the plainest language.
The Catholic catechism says: "Quels sont ceux qui sont hors de l'Eglise?
Les infidèles, hérétiques, et schismatiques."[5] By schismatics it means the
so-called Orthodox, and by heretics the Lutherans; so that, according to the
Catholic catechism, the Church is composed only of Catholics.
In the so-called Orthodox catechism it says: "The name Church of Christ
means only the Orthodox Church, which has remained in perfect union with
the universal Church. As to the Roman Church and the Protestant creeds"
(they are not even called a church), "they cannot belong to the one true
Church, for they have separated themselves from it."
According to this definition the Catholics and the Protestants are outside of
the Church, and only the Orthodox are in it.
The Lutheran catechism says: "Die wahre Kirche wird darein erkannt, das
in ihr das Wort Gottes lauter und rein ohne Menschenzusetzung gelehrt und
die Sacramenten treu nach Christ Einsetzung gewartet werden."[6]
According to this definition, those who have added anything whatsoever to
the teaching of Christ and the apostles, as the Catholic and Greek Churches
have done, are outside the Church, and the Lutherans alone are in it.
The Catholics assert that the Holy Ghost dwells perpetually with their
hierarchy; the Orthodox assert that the same Holy Ghost resides also with
them; the Arians claim that the Holy Ghost manifests itself to them (and
they have the same right to assert this as have the prevailing religions of the
present day); all the denominations of Protestants—Lutherans, Reformed
Presbyterians, Methodists, Swedenborgians, and Mormons—assert that the
Holy Ghost manifests itself only with them.
If the Catholics assert that the Holy Ghost during the separation of the Arian
and Greek Churches withdrew from the separating churches and remained
in the one true Church, then the Protestants of any denomination
numerous bodies, each one of whom maintains itself to be the true Church
established by Christ, declaring at the same time that all the others who call
themselves churches are heretical and schismatic.
The catechisms of those churches which possess the greatest number of
communicants, the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the Lutheran, express this in
the plainest language.
The Catholic catechism says: "Quels sont ceux qui sont hors de l'Eglise?
Les infidèles, hérétiques, et schismatiques."[5] By schismatics it means the
so-called Orthodox, and by heretics the Lutherans; so that, according to the
Catholic catechism, the Church is composed only of Catholics.
In the so-called Orthodox catechism it says: "The name Church of Christ
means only the Orthodox Church, which has remained in perfect union with
the universal Church. As to the Roman Church and the Protestant creeds"
(they are not even called a church), "they cannot belong to the one true
Church, for they have separated themselves from it."
According to this definition the Catholics and the Protestants are outside of
the Church, and only the Orthodox are in it.
The Lutheran catechism says: "Die wahre Kirche wird darein erkannt, das
in ihr das Wort Gottes lauter und rein ohne Menschenzusetzung gelehrt und
die Sacramenten treu nach Christ Einsetzung gewartet werden."[6]
According to this definition, those who have added anything whatsoever to
the teaching of Christ and the apostles, as the Catholic and Greek Churches
have done, are outside the Church, and the Lutherans alone are in it.
The Catholics assert that the Holy Ghost dwells perpetually with their
hierarchy; the Orthodox assert that the same Holy Ghost resides also with
them; the Arians claim that the Holy Ghost manifests itself to them (and
they have the same right to assert this as have the prevailing religions of the
present day); all the denominations of Protestants—Lutherans, Reformed
Presbyterians, Methodists, Swedenborgians, and Mormons—assert that the
Holy Ghost manifests itself only with them.
If the Catholics assert that the Holy Ghost during the separation of the Arian
and Greek Churches withdrew from the separating churches and remained
in the one true Church, then the Protestants of any denomination
Page 66
whatsoever may assert with as much right that during the separation of their
Church from the Catholic, the Holy Ghost left the Catholic Church and
entered into their own. And this is exactly what they do say. Every church
professes to derive its creed by an unbroken tradition from Christ and the
apostles. And certainly every Christian creed derived from Christ must have
reached the present generation through tradition of some sort. But this is no
proof that any one of these traditions embodies infallible truth, to the
exclusion of all others.
Every branch proceeds from the root without interruption; but the fact that
each one comes from one root, by no means proves it to be the only branch.
And so it is in regard to the churches. The proofs which each church offers
of its apostolic succession, and the miracles which are to prove its
authenticity, are the same in every case; consequently there is but one exact
definition of what is called a church (not the imaginary church which we
may desire, but the actual church which has really existed). The Church is a
body of men which lays claim to the exclusive possession of the truth. All
these various societies which were afterward transformed by State authority
into powerful organizations have really been the chief obstacles to the
diffusion of true Christianity. It could not be otherwise: for the principal
characteristic which distinguishes the doctrine of Christ from those of
earlier times is that the men who accepted it strove to understand and to
fulfil it more and more perfectly; whereas the doctrine of the Church
affirmed that it was already thoroughly understood and also fulfilled.
However strange this may seem to us, reared as we have been in the false
doctrine of the Church, as if it were a Christian institution, and taught to
despise heresy, it is nevertheless in that which men call heresy that true
progress, that is, true Christianity, was manifested, and it only ceased to be
such when these heresies were checked, and it was, so to speak, stamped
with the immutable imprint of the Church.
What, then, is heresy? Read all the theological works which treat of
heresies, of that subject which above all others calls for an exact definition,
for every theologian speaks of the true doctrine in the midst of the false
ones by which it is surrounded, and nowhere will you find even the shadow
of a definition of heresy.
Church from the Catholic, the Holy Ghost left the Catholic Church and
entered into their own. And this is exactly what they do say. Every church
professes to derive its creed by an unbroken tradition from Christ and the
apostles. And certainly every Christian creed derived from Christ must have
reached the present generation through tradition of some sort. But this is no
proof that any one of these traditions embodies infallible truth, to the
exclusion of all others.
Every branch proceeds from the root without interruption; but the fact that
each one comes from one root, by no means proves it to be the only branch.
And so it is in regard to the churches. The proofs which each church offers
of its apostolic succession, and the miracles which are to prove its
authenticity, are the same in every case; consequently there is but one exact
definition of what is called a church (not the imaginary church which we
may desire, but the actual church which has really existed). The Church is a
body of men which lays claim to the exclusive possession of the truth. All
these various societies which were afterward transformed by State authority
into powerful organizations have really been the chief obstacles to the
diffusion of true Christianity. It could not be otherwise: for the principal
characteristic which distinguishes the doctrine of Christ from those of
earlier times is that the men who accepted it strove to understand and to
fulfil it more and more perfectly; whereas the doctrine of the Church
affirmed that it was already thoroughly understood and also fulfilled.
However strange this may seem to us, reared as we have been in the false
doctrine of the Church, as if it were a Christian institution, and taught to
despise heresy, it is nevertheless in that which men call heresy that true
progress, that is, true Christianity, was manifested, and it only ceased to be
such when these heresies were checked, and it was, so to speak, stamped
with the immutable imprint of the Church.
What, then, is heresy? Read all the theological works which treat of
heresies, of that subject which above all others calls for an exact definition,
for every theologian speaks of the true doctrine in the midst of the false
ones by which it is surrounded, and nowhere will you find even the shadow
of a definition of heresy.
Page 67
As an instance of the complete absence of the definition of what is
understood by the word heresy, we will quote the opinion of a learned
Christian historian, E. de Pressensé in "Histoire du Dogme," with its
epigraph, "Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia" (Paris, 1869). This is what he says in
his preface (p. 4):—
"I know that they dispute our right to qualify thus" (that is, to pronounce
them heretical) "the tendencies which were so actively resisted by the early
Fathers. The very name of heresy seems an attack upon liberty of
conscience and thought. We cannot share these scruples, for they would
simply deprive Christianity of any individual character."
And having said that after Constantine the Church did in fact abuse its
authority to describe the dissenters as heretics and to persecute them, he
says, in speaking of the early ages of Christianity: "The Church is a free
association; there is an advantage to be gained in separating from it. The
controversy against error is based on feelings and ideas; no uniform body of
dogma has as yet been adopted; differences of secondary importance appear
in the East and West with perfect freedom; theology is not limited by
unalterable formulas. If amid these varying opinions a common
groundwork of faith is discerned, have we not the right to see in this, not a
definite system devised and formulated by the representatives of a school,
but faith itself in its most unerring instinct and spontaneous manifestation?
If this very unanimity which is revealed in the essential matters of faith is
found to be antagonistic to certain tendencies, have we not the right to infer
that these tendencies disagreed with the fundamental principles of
Christianity? Will not this supposition become a certainty if we recognize in
the doctrine rejected by the Church the characteristic features of one of the
religions of the past? If we admit that gnosticism or ebionitism are
legitimate forms of Christian thought, we must boldly declare that Christian
thought does not exist, nor does it possess any specific characteristic by
which it may be recognized. We should destroy it even while pretending to
enlarge its limits. In the time of Plato no one would have dared to advocate
a doctrine which would leave no room for the theory of ideas, and he would
have been subjected to the well-deserved ridicule of Greece, if he attempted
to make of Epicurus or of Zeno a disciple of the Academy. Let us then
admit that if there exists a religion or a doctrine called Christianity, it may
have its heresies."
understood by the word heresy, we will quote the opinion of a learned
Christian historian, E. de Pressensé in "Histoire du Dogme," with its
epigraph, "Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia" (Paris, 1869). This is what he says in
his preface (p. 4):—
"I know that they dispute our right to qualify thus" (that is, to pronounce
them heretical) "the tendencies which were so actively resisted by the early
Fathers. The very name of heresy seems an attack upon liberty of
conscience and thought. We cannot share these scruples, for they would
simply deprive Christianity of any individual character."
And having said that after Constantine the Church did in fact abuse its
authority to describe the dissenters as heretics and to persecute them, he
says, in speaking of the early ages of Christianity: "The Church is a free
association; there is an advantage to be gained in separating from it. The
controversy against error is based on feelings and ideas; no uniform body of
dogma has as yet been adopted; differences of secondary importance appear
in the East and West with perfect freedom; theology is not limited by
unalterable formulas. If amid these varying opinions a common
groundwork of faith is discerned, have we not the right to see in this, not a
definite system devised and formulated by the representatives of a school,
but faith itself in its most unerring instinct and spontaneous manifestation?
If this very unanimity which is revealed in the essential matters of faith is
found to be antagonistic to certain tendencies, have we not the right to infer
that these tendencies disagreed with the fundamental principles of
Christianity? Will not this supposition become a certainty if we recognize in
the doctrine rejected by the Church the characteristic features of one of the
religions of the past? If we admit that gnosticism or ebionitism are
legitimate forms of Christian thought, we must boldly declare that Christian
thought does not exist, nor does it possess any specific characteristic by
which it may be recognized. We should destroy it even while pretending to
enlarge its limits. In the time of Plato no one would have dared to advocate
a doctrine which would leave no room for the theory of ideas, and he would
have been subjected to the well-deserved ridicule of Greece, if he attempted
to make of Epicurus or of Zeno a disciple of the Academy. Let us then
admit that if there exists a religion or a doctrine called Christianity, it may
have its heresies."
Page 68
The writer's argument amounts to this, that every opinion which does not
accord with the code of dogmas that we have professed at any given time, is
a heresy. At a certain time and in a certain place men make a certain
profession, but this profession can never be a fixed criterion of the truth. All
is summed up in the "Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia," and Christ is wherever we
are.
Every so-called heresy which claims that what it professes is the actual
truth, may likewise find in the history of the Church a consistent
explanation of the faith it professes, and apply all the arguments to its own
use. Pressensé simply calls his own creed Christian truth, precisely as every
heretical sect has done.
The primary definition of the word heresy (the word ἁίρεσις means a part)
is the name given by a society of men to any opinion contradicting any part
of the doctrine professed by the society. A more specific meaning is an
expression of an opinion which denies the truth of the creed, established
and maintained by the temporal power.
There is a remarkable, although little known, work entitled "Unpartheyische
Kirchen und Ketzer-Historie," 1729, by Gottfried Arnold, which treats of
this subject, and points out the illegality, the perversity, the lack of sense,
and the cruelty of employing the word heresy in the sense of refutation.
This book is an attempt to relate the history of Christianity in the form of a
history of heresies.
In his introduction the author asks a series of questions: (1) Of those who
make heretics (Von denen Ketzermachern selbst); (2) Of those who have
become heretics; (3) Of the subjects of heresy; (4) Of the ways of making
heretics; and (5) Of the aims and consequences of the making of heretics.
To each of these points he adds scores of other questions, giving the
answers from the works of well-known theologians, but principally leaving
it to the reader to draw his own deductions from the contents of the book.
As instances of questions which are to a certain extent their own answers I
will quote the following:—Concerning the 4th question, of the methods for
making heretics, he asks in one of the questions (the 7th): "Does not all
history tend to show us that the greatest makers of heretics, the adepts in the
art, were those very wiseacres from whom the Father concealed his secrets
—that is, the hypocrites, the Pharisees, and the Scribes, or utterly godless
accord with the code of dogmas that we have professed at any given time, is
a heresy. At a certain time and in a certain place men make a certain
profession, but this profession can never be a fixed criterion of the truth. All
is summed up in the "Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia," and Christ is wherever we
are.
Every so-called heresy which claims that what it professes is the actual
truth, may likewise find in the history of the Church a consistent
explanation of the faith it professes, and apply all the arguments to its own
use. Pressensé simply calls his own creed Christian truth, precisely as every
heretical sect has done.
The primary definition of the word heresy (the word ἁίρεσις means a part)
is the name given by a society of men to any opinion contradicting any part
of the doctrine professed by the society. A more specific meaning is an
expression of an opinion which denies the truth of the creed, established
and maintained by the temporal power.
There is a remarkable, although little known, work entitled "Unpartheyische
Kirchen und Ketzer-Historie," 1729, by Gottfried Arnold, which treats of
this subject, and points out the illegality, the perversity, the lack of sense,
and the cruelty of employing the word heresy in the sense of refutation.
This book is an attempt to relate the history of Christianity in the form of a
history of heresies.
In his introduction the author asks a series of questions: (1) Of those who
make heretics (Von denen Ketzermachern selbst); (2) Of those who have
become heretics; (3) Of the subjects of heresy; (4) Of the ways of making
heretics; and (5) Of the aims and consequences of the making of heretics.
To each of these points he adds scores of other questions, giving the
answers from the works of well-known theologians, but principally leaving
it to the reader to draw his own deductions from the contents of the book.
As instances of questions which are to a certain extent their own answers I
will quote the following:—Concerning the 4th question, of the methods for
making heretics, he asks in one of the questions (the 7th): "Does not all
history tend to show us that the greatest makers of heretics, the adepts in the
art, were those very wiseacres from whom the Father concealed his secrets
—that is, the hypocrites, the Pharisees, and the Scribes, or utterly godless
Page 69
and evil-minded men? (Question 20-21) And in the corrupted times of
Christianity did not the hypocrites and envious ones reject the very men,
talented and especially indorsed by the Lord, who would have been highly
esteemed in periods of pure Christianity? (21) And, on the other hand,
would not those men who during the decadence of Christianity rose above
all others, and set themselves up as teachers of the purest Christianity,
would not they, during the times of the apostles of Christ and his disciples,
have been considered as the shameful heretics and anti-Christians?" Among
other things, while expressing the idea that the verbal declaration of the
essence of faith which was required by the Church, the abjuration of which
was regarded as a heresy, could never cover all the ideas and beliefs of the
faithful, and that hence the requirement that faith shall be expressed by a
certain formula of words is the immediate cause of heresy, he says in the
21st question:—
"And supposing that holy acts and thoughts appear to a man so high and so
profound that he finds no adequate words wherewith to convey them,
should he be considered a heretic if he is unable to formulate his
conception? (33) And was not this the reason why there were no heresies in
the early times of Christianity, because Christians judged each other, not by
their words, but by their hearts and by their deeds, enjoying a perfect
freedom of expression, without the fear of being called heretic?" "Was it not
one of the convenient and easiest methods of the Church," he asks in the
31st question, "when the ecclesiastics wished to rid themselves of any one,
or ruin his reputation, to excite suspicion in regard to the doctrine he held,
and by investing him in the garment of heresy, condemn and cast him out?"
"Although it is true that among so-called heretics sins and errors have been
committed, it is no less true, as the numerous examples here quoted bear
testimony" (that is to say, in the history of the Church and of heresies), "that
there has never been a sincere and conscientious man of any importance
whose safety has not been endangered through the envy of the
ecclesiastics."
This was the interpretation of heresy almost 200 years ago, and the same
meaning is attached to it to-day, and so long as the idea of the Church shall
exist it will never change. Where the Church exists there must also exist the
idea of heresy. The Church is a body of men claiming possession of
Christianity did not the hypocrites and envious ones reject the very men,
talented and especially indorsed by the Lord, who would have been highly
esteemed in periods of pure Christianity? (21) And, on the other hand,
would not those men who during the decadence of Christianity rose above
all others, and set themselves up as teachers of the purest Christianity,
would not they, during the times of the apostles of Christ and his disciples,
have been considered as the shameful heretics and anti-Christians?" Among
other things, while expressing the idea that the verbal declaration of the
essence of faith which was required by the Church, the abjuration of which
was regarded as a heresy, could never cover all the ideas and beliefs of the
faithful, and that hence the requirement that faith shall be expressed by a
certain formula of words is the immediate cause of heresy, he says in the
21st question:—
"And supposing that holy acts and thoughts appear to a man so high and so
profound that he finds no adequate words wherewith to convey them,
should he be considered a heretic if he is unable to formulate his
conception? (33) And was not this the reason why there were no heresies in
the early times of Christianity, because Christians judged each other, not by
their words, but by their hearts and by their deeds, enjoying a perfect
freedom of expression, without the fear of being called heretic?" "Was it not
one of the convenient and easiest methods of the Church," he asks in the
31st question, "when the ecclesiastics wished to rid themselves of any one,
or ruin his reputation, to excite suspicion in regard to the doctrine he held,
and by investing him in the garment of heresy, condemn and cast him out?"
"Although it is true that among so-called heretics sins and errors have been
committed, it is no less true, as the numerous examples here quoted bear
testimony" (that is to say, in the history of the Church and of heresies), "that
there has never been a sincere and conscientious man of any importance
whose safety has not been endangered through the envy of the
ecclesiastics."
This was the interpretation of heresy almost 200 years ago, and the same
meaning is attached to it to-day, and so long as the idea of the Church shall
exist it will never change. Where the Church exists there must also exist the
idea of heresy. The Church is a body of men claiming possession of
Page 70
indisputable truth. A heresy is the opinion of men who do not acknowledge
the truth of the Church to be indisputable.
Heresy is the manifestation of a movement in the Church; it is an attempt to
destroy the immutable assertion of the Church, the attempt of a living
apprehension of the doctrine. Each advance that has been made toward the
comprehension and the practice of the doctrine has been accomplished by
heretics: Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, and Luther, Huss, Savonarola,
Helchitsky, and others were all heretics. It could not be otherwise.
A disciple of Christ, who possesses an ever growing sense of the doctrine
and of its progressive fulfilment as it advances toward perfection, cannot,
either for himself or others, affirm, simply because he is a disciple of Christ,
that he understands and practises the doctrine of Christ to its fullest extent;
still less could he affirm this in regard to any body of men. To whatsoever
state of comprehension and perfection he may have arrived, he must always
feel the inadequacy both of his conception and of its application, and must
ever strive for something more satisfactory. And therefore to claim for one's
self, or for any body of men whatsoever, the possession of a complete
apprehension and practice of the doctrine of Christ is in direct contradiction
to the spirit of Christ's doctrine itself.
However strange this statement may appear, every church, as a church, has
always been, and always must be, an institution not only foreign, but
absolutely hostile, to the doctrine of Christ. It is not without reason that
Voltaire called it "l'infâme"; it is not without reason that all so-called
Christian sects believe the Church to be the Scarlet Woman prophesied by
the Revelation; it is not without reason that the history of the Church is the
history of cruelties and horrors.
Churches in themselves are, as some persons believe, institutions based
upon a Christian principle, from which they have deviated to a certain
extent; but considered in the light of churches, of bodies of men claiming
infallibility, they are anti-Christian institutions. Between churches in the
ecclesiastical sense and Christianity, not only is there nothing in common
except the name, but they are two utterly contradictory and hostile
elements. One is pride, violence, self-assertion, inertia, and death. The other
is meekness, repentance, submission, activity, and life.
the truth of the Church to be indisputable.
Heresy is the manifestation of a movement in the Church; it is an attempt to
destroy the immutable assertion of the Church, the attempt of a living
apprehension of the doctrine. Each advance that has been made toward the
comprehension and the practice of the doctrine has been accomplished by
heretics: Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, and Luther, Huss, Savonarola,
Helchitsky, and others were all heretics. It could not be otherwise.
A disciple of Christ, who possesses an ever growing sense of the doctrine
and of its progressive fulfilment as it advances toward perfection, cannot,
either for himself or others, affirm, simply because he is a disciple of Christ,
that he understands and practises the doctrine of Christ to its fullest extent;
still less could he affirm this in regard to any body of men. To whatsoever
state of comprehension and perfection he may have arrived, he must always
feel the inadequacy both of his conception and of its application, and must
ever strive for something more satisfactory. And therefore to claim for one's
self, or for any body of men whatsoever, the possession of a complete
apprehension and practice of the doctrine of Christ is in direct contradiction
to the spirit of Christ's doctrine itself.
However strange this statement may appear, every church, as a church, has
always been, and always must be, an institution not only foreign, but
absolutely hostile, to the doctrine of Christ. It is not without reason that
Voltaire called it "l'infâme"; it is not without reason that all so-called
Christian sects believe the Church to be the Scarlet Woman prophesied by
the Revelation; it is not without reason that the history of the Church is the
history of cruelties and horrors.
Churches in themselves are, as some persons believe, institutions based
upon a Christian principle, from which they have deviated to a certain
extent; but considered in the light of churches, of bodies of men claiming
infallibility, they are anti-Christian institutions. Between churches in the
ecclesiastical sense and Christianity, not only is there nothing in common
except the name, but they are two utterly contradictory and hostile
elements. One is pride, violence, self-assertion, inertia, and death. The other
is meekness, repentance, submission, activity, and life.
Page 71
No man can serve these two masters at the same time; he must choose
either the one or the other.
The servants of the churches of every creed, especially in these modern
times, strive to represent themselves as the partisans of progress in
Christianity; they make concessions, they try to correct the abuses that have
crept into the Church, and protest that it is wrong to deny the principle of
the Christian Church on account of these abuses, because it is only through
the medium of the Church that unity can be obtained, and that the Church is
the only mediator between God and man. All this is untrue. So far from
fostering the spirit of unity, the churches have ever been the fruitful source
of human enmity, of hatred, wars, conflicts, inquisitions, Eves of St.
Bartholomew, and so on; neither do the churches act as the mediators
between God and man,—an office, moreover, quite unnecessary, and
directly forbidden by Christ himself, who has revealed his doctrine unto
each individual; it is but the dead formula, and not the living God, which
the churches offer to man, and which serves rather to increase than diminish
the distance between man and his Creator. The churches, which were
founded upon a misconception, and which preserve this misconception by
their immutability, must of necessity harass and persecute any new
conception, because they know, however they may try to conceal it, that
every advance along the road indicated by Christ is undermining their own
existence.
Whenever one reads or listens to the essays and sermons in which
ecclesiastical writers of modern times belonging to the various creeds
discuss the Christian truths and virtues, when one hears and reads these
artificial arguments, these exhortations, these professions of faith,
elaborated through centuries, that now and then sound sincere, one is almost
ready to doubt if the churches can be inimical to Christianity. "It cannot be
possible that men like John Chrysostom, Fénelon, Butler, and other
Christian preachers, could be inimical to it." One would like to say, "The
churches may have gone astray from Christianity, may have committed
errors, but they cannot have been hostile to it." But one must first see the
fruit before he can know the tree, as Christ has taught, and one sees that
their fruits were evil, that the result of their works has been the distortion of
Christianity; and one cannot help concluding that, however virtuous the
men may have been, the cause of the church in which these men served was
either the one or the other.
The servants of the churches of every creed, especially in these modern
times, strive to represent themselves as the partisans of progress in
Christianity; they make concessions, they try to correct the abuses that have
crept into the Church, and protest that it is wrong to deny the principle of
the Christian Church on account of these abuses, because it is only through
the medium of the Church that unity can be obtained, and that the Church is
the only mediator between God and man. All this is untrue. So far from
fostering the spirit of unity, the churches have ever been the fruitful source
of human enmity, of hatred, wars, conflicts, inquisitions, Eves of St.
Bartholomew, and so on; neither do the churches act as the mediators
between God and man,—an office, moreover, quite unnecessary, and
directly forbidden by Christ himself, who has revealed his doctrine unto
each individual; it is but the dead formula, and not the living God, which
the churches offer to man, and which serves rather to increase than diminish
the distance between man and his Creator. The churches, which were
founded upon a misconception, and which preserve this misconception by
their immutability, must of necessity harass and persecute any new
conception, because they know, however they may try to conceal it, that
every advance along the road indicated by Christ is undermining their own
existence.
Whenever one reads or listens to the essays and sermons in which
ecclesiastical writers of modern times belonging to the various creeds
discuss the Christian truths and virtues, when one hears and reads these
artificial arguments, these exhortations, these professions of faith,
elaborated through centuries, that now and then sound sincere, one is almost
ready to doubt if the churches can be inimical to Christianity. "It cannot be
possible that men like John Chrysostom, Fénelon, Butler, and other
Christian preachers, could be inimical to it." One would like to say, "The
churches may have gone astray from Christianity, may have committed
errors, but they cannot have been hostile to it." But one must first see the
fruit before he can know the tree, as Christ has taught, and one sees that
their fruits were evil, that the result of their works has been the distortion of
Christianity; and one cannot help concluding that, however virtuous the
men may have been, the cause of the church in which these men served was
Page 72
not Christian. The goodness and virtue of certain individuals who served the
churches were peculiar to themselves, and not to the cause which they
served. All these excellent men, like Francis of Assisi and Francis de Sales,
Tichon Zadònsky, Thomas à Kempis, and others, were good men, even
though they served a cause hostile to Christianity; and they would have
been still more charitable and more exemplary had they not yielded
obedience to false doctrines.
But why do we speak of, or sit in judgment on, the past, which may be
falsely represented, and is, in any event, but little known to us? The
churches, with their principles and their works, are not of the past; we have
them with us to-day, and can judge them by their works and by their
influence over men.
What, then, constitutes their power? How do they influence men? What is
their work in the Greek, the Catholic, and in all the Protestant
denominations? and what are the consequences of such work?
The work of our Russian so-called Orthodox Church is visible to all. It is a
factor of primary importance, which can neither be concealed nor disputed.
In what manner is the activity of the Russian Church displayed,—that vast
institution which labors with so much zeal, that institution which numbers
among its servants half a million of men, and costs the people tens of
millions?
The activity of the Church consists in forcing, by every means in its power,
upon the one hundred millions of Russian people, those antiquated, time-
worn beliefs which have lost all significance, and which were formerly
professed by foreigners, with whom we had nothing in common, beliefs in
which nearly every man has lost his faith, even in some cases those very
men whose duty it is to inculcate them.
The endeavor to force upon the people those formulas of the Byzantine
clergy, marvelous to them and senseless to us, concerning the Trinity, the
Virgin, the sacraments, grace, and so forth, embraces one province of the
activity of the Russian Church; another function is the encouragement given
to idolatry, in the literal sense of the word: the veneration of holy relics and
holy images, the sacrifices offered to them in the faith that they will hear
and grant prayers. I will pass over in silence what is written in the
churches were peculiar to themselves, and not to the cause which they
served. All these excellent men, like Francis of Assisi and Francis de Sales,
Tichon Zadònsky, Thomas à Kempis, and others, were good men, even
though they served a cause hostile to Christianity; and they would have
been still more charitable and more exemplary had they not yielded
obedience to false doctrines.
But why do we speak of, or sit in judgment on, the past, which may be
falsely represented, and is, in any event, but little known to us? The
churches, with their principles and their works, are not of the past; we have
them with us to-day, and can judge them by their works and by their
influence over men.
What, then, constitutes their power? How do they influence men? What is
their work in the Greek, the Catholic, and in all the Protestant
denominations? and what are the consequences of such work?
The work of our Russian so-called Orthodox Church is visible to all. It is a
factor of primary importance, which can neither be concealed nor disputed.
In what manner is the activity of the Russian Church displayed,—that vast
institution which labors with so much zeal, that institution which numbers
among its servants half a million of men, and costs the people tens of
millions?
The activity of the Church consists in forcing, by every means in its power,
upon the one hundred millions of Russian people, those antiquated, time-
worn beliefs which have lost all significance, and which were formerly
professed by foreigners, with whom we had nothing in common, beliefs in
which nearly every man has lost his faith, even in some cases those very
men whose duty it is to inculcate them.
The endeavor to force upon the people those formulas of the Byzantine
clergy, marvelous to them and senseless to us, concerning the Trinity, the
Virgin, the sacraments, grace, and so forth, embraces one province of the
activity of the Russian Church; another function is the encouragement given
to idolatry, in the literal sense of the word: the veneration of holy relics and
holy images, the sacrifices offered to them in the faith that they will hear
and grant prayers. I will pass over in silence what is written in the
Page 73
ecclesiastical magazines by the clergy who possess a semblance of learning
and liberality, and will speak only of what is really done by the clergy
throughout the immense extent of Russia, among its one hundred millions
of inhabitants. What is it that is taught to the people with such unremitting
pains and endeavor, and with so much earnestness? What is required of
them for the sake of the so-called Christian religion?
I will start at the beginning, with the birth of the child. When a child is
born, we are taught that a prayer must be read over the mother and child, in
order to purify them, for without that prayer the mother remains unclean.
For that purpose, and facing the ikons of the saints, whom the common
people simply call gods, the priest takes the infant in his arms, reads the
exhortation, and by that means he is supposed to cleanse the mother. Then
the parents are instructed, nay, even ordered, under penalty of punishment
in the event of non-compliance, to christen the child—that is, to let the
priest immerse it three times in the water, while words unintelligible to all
present are read, and still less intelligible ceremonies are performed, such as
the application of oil to different parts of the body, the cutting of the hair,
the blowing and spitting of the sponsors at the imaginary devil. All this is
necessary to cleanse the child, and make a Christian of him. Then the
parents are told that the child must receive the holy sacrament—that is, he
is to swallow, in the form of bread and wine, a particle of the body of
Christ, by which means the child will receive the blessing of Christ, and so
on. Then they are told that as the child grows it must be taught to pray,
which means that he is to stand in front of boards upon which the faces of
Christ, the Virgin, and the saints are painted, bow his head and body, while
with his right hand, his fingers being folded in a peculiar manner, he
touches his forehead, his shoulders, and his stomach, and utters certain
Slavonic words, the commonest of which, those which all children learn,
are the following: "Mother of God, ... Virgin, rejoice," etc. Then the child is
taught that he must repeat this—that is, that he must make the sign of the
cross whenever he sees a church or an ikon. Furthermore, he is taught that
on a holiday (holidays are either the day on which Christ was born,
although no one knows when that took place, or the day of his circumcision,
or that on which the Virgin died, or when the cross or the ikon was brought,
or when some fanatic beheld a vision, etc.) he should array himself in his
best clothes, go to church, buy candles, and set them up before the ikons of
the saints, give to the priest memoranda bearing the names of the dead who
and liberality, and will speak only of what is really done by the clergy
throughout the immense extent of Russia, among its one hundred millions
of inhabitants. What is it that is taught to the people with such unremitting
pains and endeavor, and with so much earnestness? What is required of
them for the sake of the so-called Christian religion?
I will start at the beginning, with the birth of the child. When a child is
born, we are taught that a prayer must be read over the mother and child, in
order to purify them, for without that prayer the mother remains unclean.
For that purpose, and facing the ikons of the saints, whom the common
people simply call gods, the priest takes the infant in his arms, reads the
exhortation, and by that means he is supposed to cleanse the mother. Then
the parents are instructed, nay, even ordered, under penalty of punishment
in the event of non-compliance, to christen the child—that is, to let the
priest immerse it three times in the water, while words unintelligible to all
present are read, and still less intelligible ceremonies are performed, such as
the application of oil to different parts of the body, the cutting of the hair,
the blowing and spitting of the sponsors at the imaginary devil. All this is
necessary to cleanse the child, and make a Christian of him. Then the
parents are told that the child must receive the holy sacrament—that is, he
is to swallow, in the form of bread and wine, a particle of the body of
Christ, by which means the child will receive the blessing of Christ, and so
on. Then they are told that as the child grows it must be taught to pray,
which means that he is to stand in front of boards upon which the faces of
Christ, the Virgin, and the saints are painted, bow his head and body, while
with his right hand, his fingers being folded in a peculiar manner, he
touches his forehead, his shoulders, and his stomach, and utters certain
Slavonic words, the commonest of which, those which all children learn,
are the following: "Mother of God, ... Virgin, rejoice," etc. Then the child is
taught that he must repeat this—that is, that he must make the sign of the
cross whenever he sees a church or an ikon. Furthermore, he is taught that
on a holiday (holidays are either the day on which Christ was born,
although no one knows when that took place, or the day of his circumcision,
or that on which the Virgin died, or when the cross or the ikon was brought,
or when some fanatic beheld a vision, etc.) he should array himself in his
best clothes, go to church, buy candles, and set them up before the ikons of
the saints, give to the priest memoranda bearing the names of the dead who
Page 74
are to be prayed for, receive bread with triangular pieces cut out of it, pray
repeatedly for the health and welfare of the Czar and bishops, as well as for
himself and his own affairs, and then kiss the cross and the hand of the
priest.
Thus is he taught to pray; and besides this, he is also taught that he must
perform his devotions once a year. To perform one's devotions means to go
to church and tell one's sins to the priest, it being assumed that this recital of
one's sins to a stranger will have a purifying effect on a man; then he is to
swallow a spoonful of bread and wine, which will purify him still more.
Moreover, men are told that if a man and woman desire to have their sexual
relation sanctified they must come to church, put crowns of metal upon
their heads, swallow some wine, walk three times round a table,
accompanied by the sound of singing, and this will make their sexual
relation holy and entirely different from any others.
In daily life the observation of the following rules is enjoined: to eat no
meat nor drink no milk on certain days, to say Te Deums and Requiems on
certain other days, to invite the priest to one's house on holidays and present
him with money; to take from the church several times a year boards upon
which are painted the images of the saints, and to carry them on towels
through fields and houses. Before death a man must without fail receive a
spoonful of bread and wine; and if there be time to be anointed with oil, that
is still better, for it insures his welfare in the future life. After his death his
relatives are told that, in order to save his soul, it is well to place in his hand
a printed prayer; it is also a good thing to read a certain book over the dead,
and for his name to be mentioned in church at stated times.
This is what constitutes every man's religious obligation. But if any one
wishes to take a special care of his soul, this creed teaches that the greatest
amount of happiness may be secured in the next world by bequeathing
money for churches and monasteries, thereby obliging the saints to pray for
one. According to this faith it is also well to visit monasteries and kiss the
miraculous ikons and the relics.
These are believed to impart a peculiar holiness, strength, and grace; and to
be near these objects, as one must be in kissing them, placing tapers before
them, crawling under them, and repeating Te Deums before them, greatly
promotes salvation.
repeatedly for the health and welfare of the Czar and bishops, as well as for
himself and his own affairs, and then kiss the cross and the hand of the
priest.
Thus is he taught to pray; and besides this, he is also taught that he must
perform his devotions once a year. To perform one's devotions means to go
to church and tell one's sins to the priest, it being assumed that this recital of
one's sins to a stranger will have a purifying effect on a man; then he is to
swallow a spoonful of bread and wine, which will purify him still more.
Moreover, men are told that if a man and woman desire to have their sexual
relation sanctified they must come to church, put crowns of metal upon
their heads, swallow some wine, walk three times round a table,
accompanied by the sound of singing, and this will make their sexual
relation holy and entirely different from any others.
In daily life the observation of the following rules is enjoined: to eat no
meat nor drink no milk on certain days, to say Te Deums and Requiems on
certain other days, to invite the priest to one's house on holidays and present
him with money; to take from the church several times a year boards upon
which are painted the images of the saints, and to carry them on towels
through fields and houses. Before death a man must without fail receive a
spoonful of bread and wine; and if there be time to be anointed with oil, that
is still better, for it insures his welfare in the future life. After his death his
relatives are told that, in order to save his soul, it is well to place in his hand
a printed prayer; it is also a good thing to read a certain book over the dead,
and for his name to be mentioned in church at stated times.
This is what constitutes every man's religious obligation. But if any one
wishes to take a special care of his soul, this creed teaches that the greatest
amount of happiness may be secured in the next world by bequeathing
money for churches and monasteries, thereby obliging the saints to pray for
one. According to this faith it is also well to visit monasteries and kiss the
miraculous ikons and the relics.
These are believed to impart a peculiar holiness, strength, and grace; and to
be near these objects, as one must be in kissing them, placing tapers before
them, crawling under them, and repeating Te Deums before them, greatly
promotes salvation.
Page 75
And this is the faith called Orthodox, this is the true faith, the one which,
under the garb of a Christian religion, has been energetically taught to the
people for many centuries, and is inculcated at the present time more
vigorously than ever.
Let it not be said that the Orthodox teachers look upon all this as an ancient
form of faith which it was not considered worth while to abolish, and that
the essence of the doctrine abides elsewhere. This is not the truth.
Throughout Russia, and lately with increased energy, the entire Russian
clergy teaches this faith, and this alone. Nothing else is taught. Men may
write about other doctrines and discuss them in the capitals, but among the
hundred million inhabitants this, and only this, is taught. The ecclesiastics
may discuss other doctrines, but only this is what is taught.
All this—the worship of relics and shrines—is included in theology and the
catechism; the people are carefully instructed in all this, theoretically and
practically, by every kind of solemnity, splendor, authority, and violence;
the people are compelled to believe in it all; they are hypnotized, and the
faith is jealously guarded against any attempt to deliver them from these
foolish superstitions.
As I said in my book, I have during the course of many years had frequent
opportunities to remark the ridicule and rude jests that have been applied to
Christ's words and doctrine, and the ecclesiastics not only failed to
condemn it, they even encouraged this scoffing; but let a man venture to say
one disrespectful word of the ugly idol called the Iverskaya,[7] sacrilegiously
carried around Moscow by intoxicated men, and a groan of indignation will
rise from these same Orthodox ecclesiastics. In fact, it is only an external
worship in the form of idolatry that is propagated. And let it not be said that
the one does not exclude the other, that "All therefore whatsoever they bid
you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they
say, and do not" (Matthew xxiii. 3). This is said concerning the Pharisees,
who fulfilled all the outward commands of the law, and therefore the words,
"whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do," refer to acts of
benevolence and charity; whereas the words, "do not ye after their works,
for they say and do not," refer to their observances of the rites and their
indifference to works of charity, and directly contradicts the clerical
interpretation of this passage, which explains it as a commandment which
has to do only with the rites. An external worship is hardly compatible with
under the garb of a Christian religion, has been energetically taught to the
people for many centuries, and is inculcated at the present time more
vigorously than ever.
Let it not be said that the Orthodox teachers look upon all this as an ancient
form of faith which it was not considered worth while to abolish, and that
the essence of the doctrine abides elsewhere. This is not the truth.
Throughout Russia, and lately with increased energy, the entire Russian
clergy teaches this faith, and this alone. Nothing else is taught. Men may
write about other doctrines and discuss them in the capitals, but among the
hundred million inhabitants this, and only this, is taught. The ecclesiastics
may discuss other doctrines, but only this is what is taught.
All this—the worship of relics and shrines—is included in theology and the
catechism; the people are carefully instructed in all this, theoretically and
practically, by every kind of solemnity, splendor, authority, and violence;
the people are compelled to believe in it all; they are hypnotized, and the
faith is jealously guarded against any attempt to deliver them from these
foolish superstitions.
As I said in my book, I have during the course of many years had frequent
opportunities to remark the ridicule and rude jests that have been applied to
Christ's words and doctrine, and the ecclesiastics not only failed to
condemn it, they even encouraged this scoffing; but let a man venture to say
one disrespectful word of the ugly idol called the Iverskaya,[7] sacrilegiously
carried around Moscow by intoxicated men, and a groan of indignation will
rise from these same Orthodox ecclesiastics. In fact, it is only an external
worship in the form of idolatry that is propagated. And let it not be said that
the one does not exclude the other, that "All therefore whatsoever they bid
you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they
say, and do not" (Matthew xxiii. 3). This is said concerning the Pharisees,
who fulfilled all the outward commands of the law, and therefore the words,
"whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do," refer to acts of
benevolence and charity; whereas the words, "do not ye after their works,
for they say and do not," refer to their observances of the rites and their
indifference to works of charity, and directly contradicts the clerical
interpretation of this passage, which explains it as a commandment which
has to do only with the rites. An external worship is hardly compatible with
Page 76
the service of charity and truth; one is apt to exclude the other. It was so
with the Pharisees, and the same may be said of our professing Christians.
If a man is to be saved by redemption, the sacraments, and prayer, good
works are no longer of any value to him. It must be either the Sermon on
the Mount or the Credo. No man can believe in both, and the ecclesiastics
have chosen the latter. The Credo is taught and recited as a prayer in the
churches, while the Sermon on the Mount is excluded even from selections
from the Bible which are read in churches, so that the congregation never
hear it, except on the days when the entire Bible is read. It is inevitable; the
men who can believe that a cruel and unreasonable God had condemned
humanity to eternal death and sacrificed his own Son, and who had destined
a certain portion of mankind to everlasting torture, cannot believe in a God
of love. A man who believes in God, in the Christ who is coming in his
glory to judge and punish the dead and the living, cannot believe in a Christ
who commands us to turn the other cheek to the offender, who forbids us to
sit in judgment, and who bids us to forgive our enemies and to love them. A
man who believes in the inspiration of the Old Testament and in the
holiness of David, who on his deathbed ordered the murder of an old man
who had offended him, and whom he could not kill himself because he was
bound by an oath (1 Kings ii. 8,9), and many other horrors of a similar
character, in which the Old Testament abounds, cannot believe in the moral
law of Christ; a man who believes in the doctrine and sermons of the
Church, wherein the practice of war and the penalty of death are reconciled
with Christianity, cannot believe in the brotherhood of humanity.
But, above all, a man who believes in salvation through faith, in
redemption, and in the sacraments, cannot strive with all his might to live
up to the moral precepts of Christ. A man who has been taught by the
Church the sacrilegious doctrine that he is to be saved through a certain
medium, and not by his own efforts, will surely have recourse to that
medium; he will not trust to his own efforts, on which, he has been assured,
it is sinful to rely. Every Church, with its doctrines of redemption and
salvation, and above all, the Orthodox faith, with its idolatry, excludes the
doctrine of Christ. But it is said, "This has always been the faith of the
people, and that they will continue to hold it is proved by the whole history
of the Russian nation. It would be wrong to deprive them of their
traditions." Herein lies the fallacy. The people, it is true, did once upon a
with the Pharisees, and the same may be said of our professing Christians.
If a man is to be saved by redemption, the sacraments, and prayer, good
works are no longer of any value to him. It must be either the Sermon on
the Mount or the Credo. No man can believe in both, and the ecclesiastics
have chosen the latter. The Credo is taught and recited as a prayer in the
churches, while the Sermon on the Mount is excluded even from selections
from the Bible which are read in churches, so that the congregation never
hear it, except on the days when the entire Bible is read. It is inevitable; the
men who can believe that a cruel and unreasonable God had condemned
humanity to eternal death and sacrificed his own Son, and who had destined
a certain portion of mankind to everlasting torture, cannot believe in a God
of love. A man who believes in God, in the Christ who is coming in his
glory to judge and punish the dead and the living, cannot believe in a Christ
who commands us to turn the other cheek to the offender, who forbids us to
sit in judgment, and who bids us to forgive our enemies and to love them. A
man who believes in the inspiration of the Old Testament and in the
holiness of David, who on his deathbed ordered the murder of an old man
who had offended him, and whom he could not kill himself because he was
bound by an oath (1 Kings ii. 8,9), and many other horrors of a similar
character, in which the Old Testament abounds, cannot believe in the moral
law of Christ; a man who believes in the doctrine and sermons of the
Church, wherein the practice of war and the penalty of death are reconciled
with Christianity, cannot believe in the brotherhood of humanity.
But, above all, a man who believes in salvation through faith, in
redemption, and in the sacraments, cannot strive with all his might to live
up to the moral precepts of Christ. A man who has been taught by the
Church the sacrilegious doctrine that he is to be saved through a certain
medium, and not by his own efforts, will surely have recourse to that
medium; he will not trust to his own efforts, on which, he has been assured,
it is sinful to rely. Every Church, with its doctrines of redemption and
salvation, and above all, the Orthodox faith, with its idolatry, excludes the
doctrine of Christ. But it is said, "This has always been the faith of the
people, and that they will continue to hold it is proved by the whole history
of the Russian nation. It would be wrong to deprive them of their
traditions." Herein lies the fallacy. The people, it is true, did once upon a
Page 77
time profess something like what is at present professed by the Church; but
besides this worship of images and relics, the people had always a profound
moral conception of Christianity never possessed by the Church, and only
met with in her noblest representatives; but the people, in the better class,
and in spite of the obstacles raised by the State and the Church, have long
since abandoned the cruder phase of belief, a fact that is proved by the
rationalistic sects that are beginning to spring up on every side, sects that
Russia is filled with at the present day, and against which the ecclesiastics
wage so hopeless a warfare. The people are beginning to recognize the
moral, vital side of Christianity more and more plainly. And now the
Church appears, failing to give them a moral support, but forcibly teaching
old-time paganism,—the Church, with its immutable formulas, endeavoring
to thrust men back into the gloom from which they are struggling so
earnestly to escape.
The ecclesiastics say: "We are teaching nothing new; it is the same faith
which the people already hold, only we teach it in a more perfect manner."
It is like binding a chicken and trying to put it back into the shell from
which it came. I have often been struck by the spectacle, which would be
simply absurd were not its results so terrible, of men traveling, so to speak,
in a circle, deceived and deceiving, but wholly unable to escape from the
charmed circle.
The first question, the first doubt, that enters the head of every Russian
when he begins to reason, is a suspicion of the miraculous ikons, and
principally of the relics: is it true that they are incorruptible, and that they
perform miracles? Hundreds and thousands of men ask these questions, and
are at a loss for an answer, especially since bishops and metropolitans and
other eminent persons kiss both the relics and the miraculous images. Ask
the bishops and other personages of importance why they do this, and they
will tell you that they do it in order to impress the masses, and the masses
do it because the bishops and other magnates do it.
The activity of the Russian Church, despite the veneer of modernity and the
scientific and spiritual standards which its members have begun to establish
by their essays, their religious reviews, and their sermons, consists not only
in encouraging the people in a coarse and grotesque idolatry, but in
strengthening and promulgating superstition and religious ignorance, and in
besides this worship of images and relics, the people had always a profound
moral conception of Christianity never possessed by the Church, and only
met with in her noblest representatives; but the people, in the better class,
and in spite of the obstacles raised by the State and the Church, have long
since abandoned the cruder phase of belief, a fact that is proved by the
rationalistic sects that are beginning to spring up on every side, sects that
Russia is filled with at the present day, and against which the ecclesiastics
wage so hopeless a warfare. The people are beginning to recognize the
moral, vital side of Christianity more and more plainly. And now the
Church appears, failing to give them a moral support, but forcibly teaching
old-time paganism,—the Church, with its immutable formulas, endeavoring
to thrust men back into the gloom from which they are struggling so
earnestly to escape.
The ecclesiastics say: "We are teaching nothing new; it is the same faith
which the people already hold, only we teach it in a more perfect manner."
It is like binding a chicken and trying to put it back into the shell from
which it came. I have often been struck by the spectacle, which would be
simply absurd were not its results so terrible, of men traveling, so to speak,
in a circle, deceived and deceiving, but wholly unable to escape from the
charmed circle.
The first question, the first doubt, that enters the head of every Russian
when he begins to reason, is a suspicion of the miraculous ikons, and
principally of the relics: is it true that they are incorruptible, and that they
perform miracles? Hundreds and thousands of men ask these questions, and
are at a loss for an answer, especially since bishops and metropolitans and
other eminent persons kiss both the relics and the miraculous images. Ask
the bishops and other personages of importance why they do this, and they
will tell you that they do it in order to impress the masses, and the masses
do it because the bishops and other magnates do it.
The activity of the Russian Church, despite the veneer of modernity and the
scientific and spiritual standards which its members have begun to establish
by their essays, their religious reviews, and their sermons, consists not only
in encouraging the people in a coarse and grotesque idolatry, but in
strengthening and promulgating superstition and religious ignorance, and in
Page 78
endeavoring to destroy the vital conception of Christianity that exists in the
people side by side with this idolatry.
I remember being once in a book-shop of the monastery of Optinæ Desert
while an old peasant was selecting spiritual reading for his educated
grandson. The monk was offering him a description of relics, of holy days,
of miraculous ikons, the Book of Psalms, and the like. I asked the old man
if he had a Bible. "No," he replied. "Give him a Russian Bible," I said to the
monk. "We don't sell that to them," said the monk. This, in short, is the
activity of our Church.
But the European or American reader may say, "That only happens in
barbaric Russia," and the remark will be correct, but only so far as it applies
to the government, which supports the Church to maintain in our land its
stupefying and demoralizing influence.
It is true that there is nowhere in Europe a government so despotic, or that
is in more perfect accord with the established Church. Therefore in Russia
the government authorities play an important part in demoralizing the
people; but it is not true that the Russian Church differs from other churches
in respect to its influence over the people.
Churches are everywhere alike, and if the Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran
have not at their beck so submissive a government as the Russian, we may
be sure that they would not fail to take advantage of it were it within their
reach.
The Church as a church, whether it be Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, or
Presbyterian, or any denomination whatsoever, inasmuch as it is a church,
cannot help striving after the same object as the Russian Church—namely,
to conceal the true meaning of the doctrine of Christ, and to substitute a
meaning of its own, which imposes no obligations, which excludes the
possibility of understanding the true, living doctrine of Christ, and which
above all justifies the existence of a priesthood living at the expense of the
people.
Do we not find Catholicism with its prohibition against reading the Bible,
and with its demand for implicit obedience to the clergy and the infallible
Pope? Wherein does Catholicism differ in its preaching from the Russian
Church? The same external worship, the same relics, miracles, and statues,
people side by side with this idolatry.
I remember being once in a book-shop of the monastery of Optinæ Desert
while an old peasant was selecting spiritual reading for his educated
grandson. The monk was offering him a description of relics, of holy days,
of miraculous ikons, the Book of Psalms, and the like. I asked the old man
if he had a Bible. "No," he replied. "Give him a Russian Bible," I said to the
monk. "We don't sell that to them," said the monk. This, in short, is the
activity of our Church.
But the European or American reader may say, "That only happens in
barbaric Russia," and the remark will be correct, but only so far as it applies
to the government, which supports the Church to maintain in our land its
stupefying and demoralizing influence.
It is true that there is nowhere in Europe a government so despotic, or that
is in more perfect accord with the established Church. Therefore in Russia
the government authorities play an important part in demoralizing the
people; but it is not true that the Russian Church differs from other churches
in respect to its influence over the people.
Churches are everywhere alike, and if the Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran
have not at their beck so submissive a government as the Russian, we may
be sure that they would not fail to take advantage of it were it within their
reach.
The Church as a church, whether it be Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, or
Presbyterian, or any denomination whatsoever, inasmuch as it is a church,
cannot help striving after the same object as the Russian Church—namely,
to conceal the true meaning of the doctrine of Christ, and to substitute a
meaning of its own, which imposes no obligations, which excludes the
possibility of understanding the true, living doctrine of Christ, and which
above all justifies the existence of a priesthood living at the expense of the
people.
Do we not find Catholicism with its prohibition against reading the Bible,
and with its demand for implicit obedience to the clergy and the infallible
Pope? Wherein does Catholicism differ in its preaching from the Russian
Church? The same external worship, the same relics, miracles, and statues,
Page 79
miracle-performing Madonnas and processions; the same vague and
mystical utterances concerning Christianity in books and sermons, and all in
support of the grossest idolatry.
And is it not the same in the Anglican or in the Lutheran, or in any other
Protestant denomination with an established form of church?
The same demands that the congregation shall acknowledge a belief in
dogmas which were defined in the fourth century, and which have lost all
meaning for the men of our time; the same call for idol worship, if not of
relics or ikons, at least of the Sabbath and the letter of the Bible; the same
endeavor to conceal the real requirement of Christianity and the substitution
of exterior rites, and "cant," as the English so happily define the tendency
which finds such sway among them.
This activity is more noticeable in Protestantism, because that creed has not
even the excuse of antiquity. And is not the same thing going on in the
present "Revivalism," a regenerated Calvinism, which has given birth to the
Salvation Army? Inasmuch as the attitude of all ecclesiastical dogmas
toward the doctrine of Christ is very much the same, so are their methods of
a similar character.
The attitude they have taken obliges them to make every effort to conceal
the doctrine of that Christ in whose name they speak.
The disparity between ecclesiastical creeds and the doctrine of Christ is so
great that a special effort is required to keep mankind in ignorance. Indeed,
one needs but to consider the position of any adult, I do not say educated,
but one who has assimilated superficially the current notions concerning
geology, physics, chemistry, cosmography, and history, when for the first
time he actually reflects on the faith impressed upon him in his childhood,
and maintained by the Church, concerning the creation of the world in six
days, the appearance of light before the sun was created, the story of Noah's
ark and the animals preserved in it,—concerning Jesus and his divine origin
as the Son of God who created all things before time existed; that this God
came down to earth because of Adam's sin; that he rose from the dead,
ascended into heaven, and sits on the right hand of the Father; that he will
come in the clouds to judge the living and the dead, etc.
mystical utterances concerning Christianity in books and sermons, and all in
support of the grossest idolatry.
And is it not the same in the Anglican or in the Lutheran, or in any other
Protestant denomination with an established form of church?
The same demands that the congregation shall acknowledge a belief in
dogmas which were defined in the fourth century, and which have lost all
meaning for the men of our time; the same call for idol worship, if not of
relics or ikons, at least of the Sabbath and the letter of the Bible; the same
endeavor to conceal the real requirement of Christianity and the substitution
of exterior rites, and "cant," as the English so happily define the tendency
which finds such sway among them.
This activity is more noticeable in Protestantism, because that creed has not
even the excuse of antiquity. And is not the same thing going on in the
present "Revivalism," a regenerated Calvinism, which has given birth to the
Salvation Army? Inasmuch as the attitude of all ecclesiastical dogmas
toward the doctrine of Christ is very much the same, so are their methods of
a similar character.
The attitude they have taken obliges them to make every effort to conceal
the doctrine of that Christ in whose name they speak.
The disparity between ecclesiastical creeds and the doctrine of Christ is so
great that a special effort is required to keep mankind in ignorance. Indeed,
one needs but to consider the position of any adult, I do not say educated,
but one who has assimilated superficially the current notions concerning
geology, physics, chemistry, cosmography, and history, when for the first
time he actually reflects on the faith impressed upon him in his childhood,
and maintained by the Church, concerning the creation of the world in six
days, the appearance of light before the sun was created, the story of Noah's
ark and the animals preserved in it,—concerning Jesus and his divine origin
as the Son of God who created all things before time existed; that this God
came down to earth because of Adam's sin; that he rose from the dead,
ascended into heaven, and sits on the right hand of the Father; that he will
come in the clouds to judge the living and the dead, etc.
Page 80
All these ideas evolved by the men of the fourth century, which had for
them a certain meaning, have none whatever for us. The present generation
may repeat these words, but it can never believe in them, because the
statements that God dwells in heaven, that the heavens opened and a voice
was heard to utter certain words, that Christ arose from the dead and
ascended into heaven, that he will come again from some place in the
clouds, etc., have no meaning for us.
It was possible for a man who believed that heaven was a substantial arch
of limited dimensions to believe or to disbelieve that God created it, that it
opened, and that Christ ascended thither,—but for us there is no sense in
such ideas. Men of our time can only affirm that it is one's duty to believe
all this,—which they do. But they cannot really believe in what has no
meaning in it for them.
But if all these utterances are supposed to have an allegorical signification
and are only intended as similes, then we know in the first place that all the
churchmen will not agree to this—on the contrary, the majority insist on
taking the Scriptures literally; and in the second place, that these
interpretations differ greatly, and are supported by no reliable authority.
And even if a man wished to believe the doctrine of the Church as it is
taught, the increase of culture, the reading of the Bible, and the intercourse
among the members of different churches, form a greater and more
insurmountable obstacle to belief.
Nowadays a man has but to buy the Bible for threepence, and to read the
simple, indisputable words of Christ to the Samaritan woman, that the
Father seeketh worshipers neither in Jerusalem nor in this or that mountain,
but worshipers in spirit and truth; or the words, that a Christian should pray
not like the heathen in the temples, nor at the corners of streets, but in the
secrecy of his closet; or, that a disciple of Christ may call no one father or
mother,—one has but to read these words to be indubitably convinced that
priests who call themselves teachers in opposition to the teaching of Christ,
and dispute among themselves, cannot be authorities, and that that which
they teach is not Christian.
But this is not enough. If the modern man were to go on believing in
miracles and never read the Bible, the fellowship with men of other creeds
and professions, which is so much a matter of course in these days, will
them a certain meaning, have none whatever for us. The present generation
may repeat these words, but it can never believe in them, because the
statements that God dwells in heaven, that the heavens opened and a voice
was heard to utter certain words, that Christ arose from the dead and
ascended into heaven, that he will come again from some place in the
clouds, etc., have no meaning for us.
It was possible for a man who believed that heaven was a substantial arch
of limited dimensions to believe or to disbelieve that God created it, that it
opened, and that Christ ascended thither,—but for us there is no sense in
such ideas. Men of our time can only affirm that it is one's duty to believe
all this,—which they do. But they cannot really believe in what has no
meaning in it for them.
But if all these utterances are supposed to have an allegorical signification
and are only intended as similes, then we know in the first place that all the
churchmen will not agree to this—on the contrary, the majority insist on
taking the Scriptures literally; and in the second place, that these
interpretations differ greatly, and are supported by no reliable authority.
And even if a man wished to believe the doctrine of the Church as it is
taught, the increase of culture, the reading of the Bible, and the intercourse
among the members of different churches, form a greater and more
insurmountable obstacle to belief.
Nowadays a man has but to buy the Bible for threepence, and to read the
simple, indisputable words of Christ to the Samaritan woman, that the
Father seeketh worshipers neither in Jerusalem nor in this or that mountain,
but worshipers in spirit and truth; or the words, that a Christian should pray
not like the heathen in the temples, nor at the corners of streets, but in the
secrecy of his closet; or, that a disciple of Christ may call no one father or
mother,—one has but to read these words to be indubitably convinced that
priests who call themselves teachers in opposition to the teaching of Christ,
and dispute among themselves, cannot be authorities, and that that which
they teach is not Christian.
But this is not enough. If the modern man were to go on believing in
miracles and never read the Bible, the fellowship with men of other creeds
and professions, which is so much a matter of course in these days, will
Page 81
compel him to question the truth of his religion. It was natural enough for a
man who had never met a believer in a creed different from his own, to
think that his was the only faith; but an intelligent man has but to encounter
—and that is an everyday occurrence—good and bad men of all creeds,
who criticize each other's beliefs, in order to question the truth of his own
religion. Now, only a man either totally ignorant or indifferent to the
problems of life as dealt with by religion can remain in the faith of the
Church.
What shrewdness is needed, and what efforts must the churches make, in
order to go on, in the face of all these faith-destroying influences, building
temples, saying masses, preaching, instructing, converting, and above all
receiving for this the large compensations which all those priests, pastors,
stewards, superintendents, abbots, archdeacons, bishops, and archbishops
receive!
A special and supernatural effort is called for, and to this the Church
responds, exerting herself more and more. In Russia, besides many other
measures, they employ a simple, rude violence, by virtue of the power
invested in the Church. People who shrink from an outward observance of
faith and who do not conceal the fact are simply punished or deprived of
their civil rights; and to those who strictly comply with the rites, privileges
and rewards are granted.
So much for the Orthodoxy; but every church, without exception, makes the
most of the means at its disposal, and hypnotism is one of the chief agents.
Every art, from architecture to poetry, is enlisted, in order to move and
intoxicate the human soul. This hypnotic and mesmerizing influence is
markedly displayed in the activity of the Salvation Army, which employs
novel, and to us abnormal, methods, such, for instance, as drums, horns,
singing, banners, uniforms, processions, dancing, outbursts of tears, and
dramatic gestures.
Still, these methods are startling simply because of their novelty. Is not the
familiar form of worship in cathedrals, with their peculiar illumination, the
golden pomp, the candles, choirs, organs, bells, vestments, the weeping
preachers, etc., of a similar nature? And yet, however powerful may be the
influence of this hypnotism, it is by no means the chief or most harmful
form which the activity of the Church assumes. Its most malign activity is
man who had never met a believer in a creed different from his own, to
think that his was the only faith; but an intelligent man has but to encounter
—and that is an everyday occurrence—good and bad men of all creeds,
who criticize each other's beliefs, in order to question the truth of his own
religion. Now, only a man either totally ignorant or indifferent to the
problems of life as dealt with by religion can remain in the faith of the
Church.
What shrewdness is needed, and what efforts must the churches make, in
order to go on, in the face of all these faith-destroying influences, building
temples, saying masses, preaching, instructing, converting, and above all
receiving for this the large compensations which all those priests, pastors,
stewards, superintendents, abbots, archdeacons, bishops, and archbishops
receive!
A special and supernatural effort is called for, and to this the Church
responds, exerting herself more and more. In Russia, besides many other
measures, they employ a simple, rude violence, by virtue of the power
invested in the Church. People who shrink from an outward observance of
faith and who do not conceal the fact are simply punished or deprived of
their civil rights; and to those who strictly comply with the rites, privileges
and rewards are granted.
So much for the Orthodoxy; but every church, without exception, makes the
most of the means at its disposal, and hypnotism is one of the chief agents.
Every art, from architecture to poetry, is enlisted, in order to move and
intoxicate the human soul. This hypnotic and mesmerizing influence is
markedly displayed in the activity of the Salvation Army, which employs
novel, and to us abnormal, methods, such, for instance, as drums, horns,
singing, banners, uniforms, processions, dancing, outbursts of tears, and
dramatic gestures.
Still, these methods are startling simply because of their novelty. Is not the
familiar form of worship in cathedrals, with their peculiar illumination, the
golden pomp, the candles, choirs, organs, bells, vestments, the weeping
preachers, etc., of a similar nature? And yet, however powerful may be the
influence of this hypnotism, it is by no means the chief or most harmful
form which the activity of the Church assumes. Its most malign activity is
Page 82
that which is devoted to deceiving the children—those little ones of whom
Jesus has said, "Woe be unto him who tempts the least of these." From the
earliest awakening of a child's intelligence he is deceived and formally
taught that which his teachers no longer believe themselves, and this goes
on until the delusion becomes from habit a part of his nature. A child is
systematically deceived concerning the most important affair in life, and
when this deception has become so incorporated with his being that it is
difficult to uproot it, then the world of science and reality is opened to him
—a world that is wholly at variance with the faith which he has imbibed
from his teachers—and he is left to reconcile those contradictions as best he
may.
Given the problem of how to muddle a man so that he will be unable to
discriminate between two antagonistic conceptions that have been taught to
him since his childhood, one could never have devised anything more
effectual than the education of every young man in our so-called Christian
society.
Shocking as it is to contemplate the work of the churches among men, still,
if we consider their position, we shall see that they cannot act otherwise.
They are face to face with a dilemma: the Sermon on the Mount or the
Nicene creed; the one excludes the other. If a man sincerely believes the
Sermon on the Mount, the Nicene creed must inevitably lose all its meaning
for him, and the same would hold true as regards the Church and its
representatives; but if a man accepts the Nicene creed, that is to say, the
Church, or those who call themselves its representatives, then he will find
no use for the Sermon on the Mount. Hence it is incumbent on the churches
to make every effort to obscure the meaning of the Sermon on the Mount
and to endeavor to draw the people toward them. It is only due to their
intense activity in that direction that the influence of the churches has not
decreased. Let the Church but pause in this effort to influence the masses by
hypnotizing men and deceiving children for ever so short a time, and men
will comprehend the doctrine of Christ, and this comprehension will do
away with churches and their influence. Therefore the churches cease not
for one moment their compulsory activity through the hypnotism of adults
and the deception of children. And it is this activity of the churches that
gives people a false conception of Christ's doctrine, and prevents the
majority of men, the so-called believers, from understanding it.
Jesus has said, "Woe be unto him who tempts the least of these." From the
earliest awakening of a child's intelligence he is deceived and formally
taught that which his teachers no longer believe themselves, and this goes
on until the delusion becomes from habit a part of his nature. A child is
systematically deceived concerning the most important affair in life, and
when this deception has become so incorporated with his being that it is
difficult to uproot it, then the world of science and reality is opened to him
—a world that is wholly at variance with the faith which he has imbibed
from his teachers—and he is left to reconcile those contradictions as best he
may.
Given the problem of how to muddle a man so that he will be unable to
discriminate between two antagonistic conceptions that have been taught to
him since his childhood, one could never have devised anything more
effectual than the education of every young man in our so-called Christian
society.
Shocking as it is to contemplate the work of the churches among men, still,
if we consider their position, we shall see that they cannot act otherwise.
They are face to face with a dilemma: the Sermon on the Mount or the
Nicene creed; the one excludes the other. If a man sincerely believes the
Sermon on the Mount, the Nicene creed must inevitably lose all its meaning
for him, and the same would hold true as regards the Church and its
representatives; but if a man accepts the Nicene creed, that is to say, the
Church, or those who call themselves its representatives, then he will find
no use for the Sermon on the Mount. Hence it is incumbent on the churches
to make every effort to obscure the meaning of the Sermon on the Mount
and to endeavor to draw the people toward them. It is only due to their
intense activity in that direction that the influence of the churches has not
decreased. Let the Church but pause in this effort to influence the masses by
hypnotizing men and deceiving children for ever so short a time, and men
will comprehend the doctrine of Christ, and this comprehension will do
away with churches and their influence. Therefore the churches cease not
for one moment their compulsory activity through the hypnotism of adults
and the deception of children. And it is this activity of the churches that
gives people a false conception of Christ's doctrine, and prevents the
majority of men, the so-called believers, from understanding it.
Page 83
Page 84
CHAPTER IV
MISCONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY BY SCIENTISTS
The relation of scientists to religions in general—What are religions, and their significance to
human life—Three conceptions of life—The Christian doctrine is the expression of the
divine life-conception—The misconception of Christianity by scientists who study its
outward manifestations due to the fact that they consider it from the standpoint of the
social life-conception—Opinion resulting therefrom, that the teaching of Christ is
exaggerated and unpractical—The expression of the life-conception of the gospel—
Erroneous judgments of scientists concerning Christianity are based upon the assurance
that they possess an infallible criterion of knowledge—Hence arise two misapprehensions
in regard to the Christian doctrine—The first misapprehension concerning the
impracticability of the doctrine arises from the fact that the Christian doctrine presents a
conduct of life different from that of the social life-conception—Christianity offers not a
rule, but an ideal—Christ adds the consciousness of a divine power to that of an animal
power—Christianity seems to exclude the possibility of life only when the indication of
the ideal is taken for the rule—An ideal cannot be belittled—According to the doctrine of
Christ, life is movement—The ideal and the commandments—The second
misapprehension arises from the attempt to replace the love of God and His service by the
love and service of humanity—Scientists believe that Christianity and their doctrine
concerning the service of humanity are identical—The doctrine of love toward humanity
has for its foundation the social life-conception—The love for humanity which springs
logically from love for the individual has no meaning, because humanity is a fiction—
Christian love springing from the love of God has for its object not only humanity but the
whole world—Christianity teaches a life in accordance with its divine nature—It
indicates that the essence of a man's soul is love, and that its good is obtained from its
love of God, whom he feels to be within him through love.
Let us now turn our attention to another fallacious conception of
Christianity, which is antagonistic to its actual principles,—the scientific
conception.
The Christianity of the churchmen is something which they have evolved
for themselves, and which they believe to be the only true interpretation of
Christian doctrine.
The scientists take the professions of faith of the various churches for
Christianity, and assuming that these dogmas embody an exhaustive
definition of Christian doctrine, they affirm that Christianity has had its day.
MISCONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY BY SCIENTISTS
The relation of scientists to religions in general—What are religions, and their significance to
human life—Three conceptions of life—The Christian doctrine is the expression of the
divine life-conception—The misconception of Christianity by scientists who study its
outward manifestations due to the fact that they consider it from the standpoint of the
social life-conception—Opinion resulting therefrom, that the teaching of Christ is
exaggerated and unpractical—The expression of the life-conception of the gospel—
Erroneous judgments of scientists concerning Christianity are based upon the assurance
that they possess an infallible criterion of knowledge—Hence arise two misapprehensions
in regard to the Christian doctrine—The first misapprehension concerning the
impracticability of the doctrine arises from the fact that the Christian doctrine presents a
conduct of life different from that of the social life-conception—Christianity offers not a
rule, but an ideal—Christ adds the consciousness of a divine power to that of an animal
power—Christianity seems to exclude the possibility of life only when the indication of
the ideal is taken for the rule—An ideal cannot be belittled—According to the doctrine of
Christ, life is movement—The ideal and the commandments—The second
misapprehension arises from the attempt to replace the love of God and His service by the
love and service of humanity—Scientists believe that Christianity and their doctrine
concerning the service of humanity are identical—The doctrine of love toward humanity
has for its foundation the social life-conception—The love for humanity which springs
logically from love for the individual has no meaning, because humanity is a fiction—
Christian love springing from the love of God has for its object not only humanity but the
whole world—Christianity teaches a life in accordance with its divine nature—It
indicates that the essence of a man's soul is love, and that its good is obtained from its
love of God, whom he feels to be within him through love.
Let us now turn our attention to another fallacious conception of
Christianity, which is antagonistic to its actual principles,—the scientific
conception.
The Christianity of the churchmen is something which they have evolved
for themselves, and which they believe to be the only true interpretation of
Christian doctrine.
The scientists take the professions of faith of the various churches for
Christianity, and assuming that these dogmas embody an exhaustive
definition of Christian doctrine, they affirm that Christianity has had its day.
Page 85
One needs but to take into consideration the important part which all
religions, and especially Christianity, have played in the life of man, and the
significance which science attaches to them, to see at once how impossible
it would be to obtain any just apprehension of Christian doctrine through
these conceptions. As each individual must possess certain impressions in
regard to the meaning of his life, and, though often unconsciously, conform
his conduct thereunto, so mankind in the aggregate, or groups of men living
under the same conditions, must likewise possess a conception of the
meaning of their common life and its consequent activities. As an individual
passing from one period of life to another inevitably changes his ideas, the
point of view of a grown-up man differs from that of a child, so also
mankind in the aggregate—the nation—inevitably, and in conformity with
its age, changes its views of life and the activity that springs therefrom.
The difference in this respect between an individual and mankind in general
lies in the fact that while the individual, in forming his conception of the
significance and responsibilities of that new period of life upon which he is
about to enter, may avail himself of the advice of his predecessors who have
already passed that stage, mankind can have no such advantage, because it
is advancing along an unbeaten track and there is no one of whom it can ask
for the clue to the mystery of life, or how it shall demean itself under these
unfamiliar conditions to which no nation has ever yet been subjected.
The married man with a family of children will not continue to view life as
he did when he was a child; neither is it possible for mankind, with the
many changes that have taken place,—the density of the population, the
constant intercourse of nations, the perfected means of combating the forces
of nature, and the increase of knowledge generally,—to view the life of the
present day in the light of the past; hence it becomes necessary to evolve a
life-conception from which activities corresponding with a new system
which is to be established will naturally develop.
And this need is supplied by that peculiar capacity of the race for producing
men able to impart a new significance to human life,—a significance
developing a different set of activities.
The birth of the life-conception, which always takes place when mankind
enters upon new conditions and its subsequent activities, is what we call
religion.
religions, and especially Christianity, have played in the life of man, and the
significance which science attaches to them, to see at once how impossible
it would be to obtain any just apprehension of Christian doctrine through
these conceptions. As each individual must possess certain impressions in
regard to the meaning of his life, and, though often unconsciously, conform
his conduct thereunto, so mankind in the aggregate, or groups of men living
under the same conditions, must likewise possess a conception of the
meaning of their common life and its consequent activities. As an individual
passing from one period of life to another inevitably changes his ideas, the
point of view of a grown-up man differs from that of a child, so also
mankind in the aggregate—the nation—inevitably, and in conformity with
its age, changes its views of life and the activity that springs therefrom.
The difference in this respect between an individual and mankind in general
lies in the fact that while the individual, in forming his conception of the
significance and responsibilities of that new period of life upon which he is
about to enter, may avail himself of the advice of his predecessors who have
already passed that stage, mankind can have no such advantage, because it
is advancing along an unbeaten track and there is no one of whom it can ask
for the clue to the mystery of life, or how it shall demean itself under these
unfamiliar conditions to which no nation has ever yet been subjected.
The married man with a family of children will not continue to view life as
he did when he was a child; neither is it possible for mankind, with the
many changes that have taken place,—the density of the population, the
constant intercourse of nations, the perfected means of combating the forces
of nature, and the increase of knowledge generally,—to view the life of the
present day in the light of the past; hence it becomes necessary to evolve a
life-conception from which activities corresponding with a new system
which is to be established will naturally develop.
And this need is supplied by that peculiar capacity of the race for producing
men able to impart a new significance to human life,—a significance
developing a different set of activities.
The birth of the life-conception, which always takes place when mankind
enters upon new conditions and its subsequent activities, is what we call
religion.
Page 86
Therefore, in the first place, religion is not, as science regards it, a
phenomenon which formerly traveled hand in hand with the development of
mankind, and which has since been left behind; on the contrary, it is a
phenomenon inherent to human existence itself, and never more distinctly
manifested than at the present day. In the second place, religion defines
future rather than past activities; therefore it is evident that an investigation
of the phenomena of the past can by no means touch the essence of religion.
The longing to typify the forces of nature is no more the essence of religion
than is the fear of those same forces, or the need of the miraculous and its
outward manifestations, as the scientists suppose. The essence of religion
lies in the power of man to foreknow and to point out the way in which
mankind must walk. It is a definition of a new life which will give birth to
new activities.
This faculty of foreknowledge concerning the destiny of humanity is more
or less common, no doubt, to all people; still from time to time a man
appears in whom the faculty has reached a higher development, and these
men have the power clearly and distinctly to formulate that which is
vaguely conceived by all men, thus instituting a new life-conception from
which is to flow an unwonted activity, whose results will endure for
centuries to come. Thus far there have been three of these life-conceptions;
two of them belong to a bygone era, while the third is of our own time and
is called Christianity. It is not that we have merged the various conceptions
of the significance of life into three arbitrary divisions, but that there really
have been but three distinct conceptions, by which the actions of mankind
have been influenced, and save through these we have no means of
comprehending life.
These three life-conceptions are—firstly, the individual or animal; secondly,
the social or pagan; and thirdly, the universal or divine.
According to the first of these, a man's life is his personality, and that only,
and his life's object is to gratify his desires. According to the second, his life
is not limited to his own personality; it includes the sum and continuity of
many personalities,—of the family, of the race, and of the State, and his
life's object is to gratify the will of the communities of individuals. And
according to the third, his life is confined neither to his personality nor to
phenomenon which formerly traveled hand in hand with the development of
mankind, and which has since been left behind; on the contrary, it is a
phenomenon inherent to human existence itself, and never more distinctly
manifested than at the present day. In the second place, religion defines
future rather than past activities; therefore it is evident that an investigation
of the phenomena of the past can by no means touch the essence of religion.
The longing to typify the forces of nature is no more the essence of religion
than is the fear of those same forces, or the need of the miraculous and its
outward manifestations, as the scientists suppose. The essence of religion
lies in the power of man to foreknow and to point out the way in which
mankind must walk. It is a definition of a new life which will give birth to
new activities.
This faculty of foreknowledge concerning the destiny of humanity is more
or less common, no doubt, to all people; still from time to time a man
appears in whom the faculty has reached a higher development, and these
men have the power clearly and distinctly to formulate that which is
vaguely conceived by all men, thus instituting a new life-conception from
which is to flow an unwonted activity, whose results will endure for
centuries to come. Thus far there have been three of these life-conceptions;
two of them belong to a bygone era, while the third is of our own time and
is called Christianity. It is not that we have merged the various conceptions
of the significance of life into three arbitrary divisions, but that there really
have been but three distinct conceptions, by which the actions of mankind
have been influenced, and save through these we have no means of
comprehending life.
These three life-conceptions are—firstly, the individual or animal; secondly,
the social or pagan; and thirdly, the universal or divine.
According to the first of these, a man's life is his personality, and that only,
and his life's object is to gratify his desires. According to the second, his life
is not limited to his own personality; it includes the sum and continuity of
many personalities,—of the family, of the race, and of the State, and his
life's object is to gratify the will of the communities of individuals. And
according to the third, his life is confined neither to his personality nor to
Page 87
that of the aggregate of individuals, but finds its significance in the eternal
source of all life,—in God Himself.
These three life-conceptions serve as the basis for the religions of every
age.
The savage sees life only through the medium of his own desires. He cares
for nothing but himself, and for him the highest good is the full satisfaction
of his own passions. The incentive of his life is personal enjoyment. His
religion consists of attempts to propitiate the gods in his favor, and of the
worship of imaginary deities, who exist only for their own personal ends.
A member of the pagan world recognizes life as something concerning
others besides himself; he sees it as concerning an aggregate of individuals,
—the family, the race, the nation, the State, and is ready to sacrifice himself
for the aggregate. The incentive of his life is glory. His religion consists in
honoring the chiefs of his race, his progenitors, his ancestors, his
sovereigns, and in the worship of those gods who are the exclusive patrons
of his family, his tribe, his race, and his State.[8]
The man who possesses the divine life-conception neither looks upon life as
centered in his own personality nor in that of mankind at large, whether
family, tribe, race, nation, or State; but rather does he conceive of it as
taking its rise in the eternal life of God, and to fulfil His will he is ready to
sacrifice his personal, family, and social well-being. Love is the impelling
motive of his life, and his religion is the worship, in deed and in truth, of the
beginning of all things,—of God Himself.
History is but the transcript of the gradual transition from the animal life-
conception of the individual to the social, and from the social to the divine.
The history of the ancients for thousands of centuries, culminating in that of
Rome, is the history of the evolution from the animal life-conception of the
individual to that of society and the State. From the advent of Christianity
and the fall of Imperial Rome we have the history of that change which is
still going on from the social to the divine life-conception.
The latter, together with the Christian doctrine which is based upon it, and
by which our lives are shaped, and our activities, both practical and
scientific, are quickened, is regarded by the pseudo-scientists, who judge it
source of all life,—in God Himself.
These three life-conceptions serve as the basis for the religions of every
age.
The savage sees life only through the medium of his own desires. He cares
for nothing but himself, and for him the highest good is the full satisfaction
of his own passions. The incentive of his life is personal enjoyment. His
religion consists of attempts to propitiate the gods in his favor, and of the
worship of imaginary deities, who exist only for their own personal ends.
A member of the pagan world recognizes life as something concerning
others besides himself; he sees it as concerning an aggregate of individuals,
—the family, the race, the nation, the State, and is ready to sacrifice himself
for the aggregate. The incentive of his life is glory. His religion consists in
honoring the chiefs of his race, his progenitors, his ancestors, his
sovereigns, and in the worship of those gods who are the exclusive patrons
of his family, his tribe, his race, and his State.[8]
The man who possesses the divine life-conception neither looks upon life as
centered in his own personality nor in that of mankind at large, whether
family, tribe, race, nation, or State; but rather does he conceive of it as
taking its rise in the eternal life of God, and to fulfil His will he is ready to
sacrifice his personal, family, and social well-being. Love is the impelling
motive of his life, and his religion is the worship, in deed and in truth, of the
beginning of all things,—of God Himself.
History is but the transcript of the gradual transition from the animal life-
conception of the individual to the social, and from the social to the divine.
The history of the ancients for thousands of centuries, culminating in that of
Rome, is the history of the evolution from the animal life-conception of the
individual to that of society and the State. From the advent of Christianity
and the fall of Imperial Rome we have the history of that change which is
still going on from the social to the divine life-conception.
The latter, together with the Christian doctrine which is based upon it, and
by which our lives are shaped, and our activities, both practical and
scientific, are quickened, is regarded by the pseudo-scientists, who judge it
Page 88
only by its outward signs, as something outlived, which has lost all meaning
for us.
According to scientists this doctrine is embodied in the dogmas of the
Trinity, the Redemption, the miracles, the Church and its sacraments, etc.,
and is only one of the many religions which have arisen during the progress
of human history, and now, having played its part and outlived its time, is
vanishing before the dawn of science and true enlightenment.
The grossest of human errors spring in most cases from the fact that men
who stand on a low intellectual plane, when they encounter phenomena of a
higher order, instead of trying to rise to the higher plane from which these
phenomena may be fitly regarded, and making an effort to understand them,
judge them by their own low standard, and the less they know of what they
speak, the more bold and determined are their judgments.
Most scientists, who treat of the moral doctrine of Christ from the lower
standpoint of a social life-conception, regard it as nothing more than an
amalgam without cohesion of the asceticism of India with the doctrine of
the Stoics and Neo-Platonists, and of vague anti-social dreams, devoid of all
serious meaning in these latter days; they simply see its outward
manifestation in the form of dogmas in Catholicism, in Protestantism, and
in its struggle with the powers of the world. Interpreting the design of
Christianity from its outward aspects, they are like unto deaf men, who
judge of the meaning and excellence of music by the movements of the
musicians.
Hence it is that all such men, from Comte and Strauss to Spencer and
Renan, not understanding the purport of Christ's words, knowing nothing
whatever of their intention, ignorant of the question to which they serve as
an answer, and taking no pains to learn it,—such men, if they are inimical to
Christianity, utterly deny the sense of the doctrine; but if they are leniently
inclined, then, from the height of their superior wisdom, they amend it,
taking for granted that Christ would have said what they think He meant,
had He known how to express himself. They treat His doctrine just as men
of overweening self-conceit treat their inferiors, correcting them in their
speech: "You mean so and so." And the spirit of emendation is always such
as to reduce the doctrine of the higher, the divine life-conception, to that of
the lower and the social conception.
for us.
According to scientists this doctrine is embodied in the dogmas of the
Trinity, the Redemption, the miracles, the Church and its sacraments, etc.,
and is only one of the many religions which have arisen during the progress
of human history, and now, having played its part and outlived its time, is
vanishing before the dawn of science and true enlightenment.
The grossest of human errors spring in most cases from the fact that men
who stand on a low intellectual plane, when they encounter phenomena of a
higher order, instead of trying to rise to the higher plane from which these
phenomena may be fitly regarded, and making an effort to understand them,
judge them by their own low standard, and the less they know of what they
speak, the more bold and determined are their judgments.
Most scientists, who treat of the moral doctrine of Christ from the lower
standpoint of a social life-conception, regard it as nothing more than an
amalgam without cohesion of the asceticism of India with the doctrine of
the Stoics and Neo-Platonists, and of vague anti-social dreams, devoid of all
serious meaning in these latter days; they simply see its outward
manifestation in the form of dogmas in Catholicism, in Protestantism, and
in its struggle with the powers of the world. Interpreting the design of
Christianity from its outward aspects, they are like unto deaf men, who
judge of the meaning and excellence of music by the movements of the
musicians.
Hence it is that all such men, from Comte and Strauss to Spencer and
Renan, not understanding the purport of Christ's words, knowing nothing
whatever of their intention, ignorant of the question to which they serve as
an answer, and taking no pains to learn it,—such men, if they are inimical to
Christianity, utterly deny the sense of the doctrine; but if they are leniently
inclined, then, from the height of their superior wisdom, they amend it,
taking for granted that Christ would have said what they think He meant,
had He known how to express himself. They treat His doctrine just as men
of overweening self-conceit treat their inferiors, correcting them in their
speech: "You mean so and so." And the spirit of emendation is always such
as to reduce the doctrine of the higher, the divine life-conception, to that of
the lower and the social conception.
Page 89
It is usually admitted that the moral teaching of Christianity is good but
exaggerated; that in order to make it perfect, its hyperboles, which are
incompatible with our present mode of life, should be discarded. "A
doctrine which requires so much that is impracticable is more hurtful than
one which demands of men only what is in proportion to their strength."
Thus declare the learned interpreters of Christianity, thus unwittingly
reiterating the assertion of those who misunderstood the Christian doctrine
long years ago, and crucified the Master.
The Hebrew law, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," the retributive
justice known to mankind thousands of years ago, seems far better suited to
the court of contemporary scientists than the law of love which Christ
preached 1800 years ago, and which was to replace this identical law of
justice.
It would seem that every action of those men who accepted the teaching of
Christ in its literal sense, and lived up to it, all the words and deeds of
sincere Christians, and all the agencies which, under the guise of socialism
and communism, are now transforming the world, are merely exaggeration,
not worth discussing. Nations which have lived under Christian influences,
and which are now represented by their advanced thinkers, the scientists,
have arrived at the conclusion that the Christian doctrine is a matter of
dogma; that its practical teaching has been a mistake and an exaggeration,
inimical to the just requirements of morality that are in accord with human
nature, and that the very doctrine which Christ repudiated, and for which he
substituted a dogma of his own, is far better suited to us. The scientist
considers the commandment of non-resistance to evil by violence an
exaggeration, and even an act of folly. It would be far better, in his opinion,
to reject it, never dreaming that it is not the doctrine of Christ which he is
controverting, but something which he assumes to be the doctrine in
question. He does not realize when he says that the commandment of non-
resistance in the doctrine of Christ is an exaggeration, that he is like one
who, teaching the theory of the circle, declares that the equality of the radii
is an exaggeration. It is just as if one who has no idea of the form of a circle
were to affirm that the law which requires that each point of its
circumference shall be equidistant from its center, is an exaggeration. As a
suggestion to reject or modify the proposition concerning the equality of the
radii of a circle signifies an ignorance in regard to the circle itself, so also
exaggerated; that in order to make it perfect, its hyperboles, which are
incompatible with our present mode of life, should be discarded. "A
doctrine which requires so much that is impracticable is more hurtful than
one which demands of men only what is in proportion to their strength."
Thus declare the learned interpreters of Christianity, thus unwittingly
reiterating the assertion of those who misunderstood the Christian doctrine
long years ago, and crucified the Master.
The Hebrew law, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," the retributive
justice known to mankind thousands of years ago, seems far better suited to
the court of contemporary scientists than the law of love which Christ
preached 1800 years ago, and which was to replace this identical law of
justice.
It would seem that every action of those men who accepted the teaching of
Christ in its literal sense, and lived up to it, all the words and deeds of
sincere Christians, and all the agencies which, under the guise of socialism
and communism, are now transforming the world, are merely exaggeration,
not worth discussing. Nations which have lived under Christian influences,
and which are now represented by their advanced thinkers, the scientists,
have arrived at the conclusion that the Christian doctrine is a matter of
dogma; that its practical teaching has been a mistake and an exaggeration,
inimical to the just requirements of morality that are in accord with human
nature, and that the very doctrine which Christ repudiated, and for which he
substituted a dogma of his own, is far better suited to us. The scientist
considers the commandment of non-resistance to evil by violence an
exaggeration, and even an act of folly. It would be far better, in his opinion,
to reject it, never dreaming that it is not the doctrine of Christ which he is
controverting, but something which he assumes to be the doctrine in
question. He does not realize when he says that the commandment of non-
resistance in the doctrine of Christ is an exaggeration, that he is like one
who, teaching the theory of the circle, declares that the equality of the radii
is an exaggeration. It is just as if one who has no idea of the form of a circle
were to affirm that the law which requires that each point of its
circumference shall be equidistant from its center, is an exaggeration. As a
suggestion to reject or modify the proposition concerning the equality of the
radii of a circle signifies an ignorance in regard to the circle itself, so also
Page 90
does the idea of rejecting or modifying, in the practical teaching of Christ,
the commandment of non-resistance to evil by violence signify a
misunderstanding of the doctrine.
And those who entertain these views do not really comprehend the doctrine.
They do not understand that it is the unfolding of a new conception of life,
corresponding to the new phase of existence upon which the world entered
1800 years ago, and a definition of the new activity to which it gave birth.
Either they do not believe that Christ said what He meant to say, or that
what is found in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere He said either
from His enthusiasm or lack of wisdom and simplicity of character.[9]
Matt. vi. 25-34.—25. Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for
your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your
body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body
than raiment?
26. Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap,
nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye
not much better than they?
27. Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?
28. And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the
field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:
29. And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not
arrayed like one of these.
30. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is,
and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe
you, O ye of little faith?
31. Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What
shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed?
32. (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly
Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.
33. But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and
all these things shall be added unto you.
the commandment of non-resistance to evil by violence signify a
misunderstanding of the doctrine.
And those who entertain these views do not really comprehend the doctrine.
They do not understand that it is the unfolding of a new conception of life,
corresponding to the new phase of existence upon which the world entered
1800 years ago, and a definition of the new activity to which it gave birth.
Either they do not believe that Christ said what He meant to say, or that
what is found in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere He said either
from His enthusiasm or lack of wisdom and simplicity of character.[9]
Matt. vi. 25-34.—25. Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for
your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your
body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body
than raiment?
26. Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap,
nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye
not much better than they?
27. Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?
28. And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the
field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:
29. And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not
arrayed like one of these.
30. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is,
and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe
you, O ye of little faith?
31. Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What
shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed?
32. (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly
Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.
33. But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and
all these things shall be added unto you.
Page 91
34. Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall
take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof.
Luke xii. 33-34.—33. Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide
yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that
faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth.
34. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
Matt. xix. 21.—"Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and
thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me."
Mark viii. 34.—"Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself,
and take up his cross, and follow me."
John iv. 34.—"My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to
finish his work."
Luke xxii. 42.—"Not my will, but thine, be done."
Not what I wish, but what Thou wishest, and not as I wish, but as Thou
wishest. Life consists in doing not your own will, but the will of God.
All these doctrines are regarded by men who adhere to the lower life-
conception as expressions of enthusiastic exaltation, with no special
reference to daily life. And yet these doctrines are no less the natural
outcome of the Christian life-conception than is the idea of giving one's
labor for the common good, or of sacrificing one's life to defend one's
country, the outcome of the social life-conception.
As the believer in the social life-conception says to the savage: "Rouse
yourself! Consider what you are doing! The life that man lives for himself
alone cannot be the true one, for life is fleeting and full of woe. It is the life
of the community at large, the race, the family, the State, that endures:
therefore a man must sacrifice his personality for the life of the family and
the State;" Christianity in like manner says unto him who believes in a
social life-conception of the community: "Repent, μετανοετα, that is, arouse
yourself, consider your ways, else shall you perish. Know you that this
bodily, animal life is born to-day and dies to-morrow; nothing can assure its
permanence, no outward expedients, no system whatsoever can give it
stability. Consider your ways and learn that the life you live is not the real
take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof.
Luke xii. 33-34.—33. Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide
yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that
faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth.
34. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
Matt. xix. 21.—"Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and
thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me."
Mark viii. 34.—"Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself,
and take up his cross, and follow me."
John iv. 34.—"My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to
finish his work."
Luke xxii. 42.—"Not my will, but thine, be done."
Not what I wish, but what Thou wishest, and not as I wish, but as Thou
wishest. Life consists in doing not your own will, but the will of God.
All these doctrines are regarded by men who adhere to the lower life-
conception as expressions of enthusiastic exaltation, with no special
reference to daily life. And yet these doctrines are no less the natural
outcome of the Christian life-conception than is the idea of giving one's
labor for the common good, or of sacrificing one's life to defend one's
country, the outcome of the social life-conception.
As the believer in the social life-conception says to the savage: "Rouse
yourself! Consider what you are doing! The life that man lives for himself
alone cannot be the true one, for life is fleeting and full of woe. It is the life
of the community at large, the race, the family, the State, that endures:
therefore a man must sacrifice his personality for the life of the family and
the State;" Christianity in like manner says unto him who believes in a
social life-conception of the community: "Repent, μετανοετα, that is, arouse
yourself, consider your ways, else shall you perish. Know you that this
bodily, animal life is born to-day and dies to-morrow; nothing can assure its
permanence, no outward expedients, no system whatsoever can give it
stability. Consider your ways and learn that the life you live is not the real
Page 92
life, that neither family, social, nor State life will save you from perdition.
An honest rational life is possible for man provided that he be, not a
participant of the life of the family or life of the State, but a partaker of the
source of all life—that of the Father Himself; then his life is united to the
life of the Father." Such is beyond a doubt the meaning of the Christian
conception of life, clearly set forth in every maxim of the New Testament.
One may not share such a conception of life, one may deny it, or prove it to
be inaccurate and fallacious; but no man can possibly judge a doctrine
without having first made himself familiar with the life-conception which
forms its basis; and still more impossible is it to judge a lofty subject from a
low standpoint, to pronounce upon the belfry from a knowledge of the
foundation. Yet this is precisely what is done by contemporary scientists.
And this is because they are laboring under an error similar to that of the
clergy, in believing that they possess such infallible methods of studying
their subject that, if they but bring their so-called scientific methods to bear
upon the subject under consideration, there can be no doubt as to the
accuracy of their conclusion.
The possession of a guide to knowledge, which they believe to be infallible,
is really the chief obstacle to the comprehension of the Christian doctrine
among unbelievers and so-called scientists, by whose opinions the great
majority of unbelievers, the so-called educated classes, are guided. All the
errors of the scientists concerning Christianity, and especially two strange
misapprehensions that avail more than anything else to blind men to its real
signification, arise therefrom.
One of these misapprehensions is that the doctrine of a Christian life not
being practical, it remains optional with the individual whether he take it for
his guide or no; and if he chooses to do so, it may then be modified to suit
the exigencies of our social life. The second misapprehension is that the
Christian doctrine of love of God, and therefore of the service due to Him,
is a mystical requirement, neither clearly expressed nor offering any well-
defined object of love: consequently the more definite and intelligible
doctrine of love of man and of the service of humanity may be substituted
for it.
The first misapprehension which relates to the impracticability of the
Christian doctrine arises from the fact that men who believe in the social
An honest rational life is possible for man provided that he be, not a
participant of the life of the family or life of the State, but a partaker of the
source of all life—that of the Father Himself; then his life is united to the
life of the Father." Such is beyond a doubt the meaning of the Christian
conception of life, clearly set forth in every maxim of the New Testament.
One may not share such a conception of life, one may deny it, or prove it to
be inaccurate and fallacious; but no man can possibly judge a doctrine
without having first made himself familiar with the life-conception which
forms its basis; and still more impossible is it to judge a lofty subject from a
low standpoint, to pronounce upon the belfry from a knowledge of the
foundation. Yet this is precisely what is done by contemporary scientists.
And this is because they are laboring under an error similar to that of the
clergy, in believing that they possess such infallible methods of studying
their subject that, if they but bring their so-called scientific methods to bear
upon the subject under consideration, there can be no doubt as to the
accuracy of their conclusion.
The possession of a guide to knowledge, which they believe to be infallible,
is really the chief obstacle to the comprehension of the Christian doctrine
among unbelievers and so-called scientists, by whose opinions the great
majority of unbelievers, the so-called educated classes, are guided. All the
errors of the scientists concerning Christianity, and especially two strange
misapprehensions that avail more than anything else to blind men to its real
signification, arise therefrom.
One of these misapprehensions is that the doctrine of a Christian life not
being practical, it remains optional with the individual whether he take it for
his guide or no; and if he chooses to do so, it may then be modified to suit
the exigencies of our social life. The second misapprehension is that the
Christian doctrine of love of God, and therefore of the service due to Him,
is a mystical requirement, neither clearly expressed nor offering any well-
defined object of love: consequently the more definite and intelligible
doctrine of love of man and of the service of humanity may be substituted
for it.
The first misapprehension which relates to the impracticability of the
Christian doctrine arises from the fact that men who believe in the social
Page 93
life-conception, not comprehending the rule obeyed by men who hold the
Christian doctrine, and mistaking the Christian standard of perfection for
the guiding principle of life, believe and declare that it is impossible to
follow the teaching of Christ, because implicit obedience to this doctrine
would end by destroying life. "If man were to fulfil the precepts of Christ,
he would destroy his life; and if all the world were to fulfil them, the human
race would soon become extinct. If you were to take no thought for the
morrow, neither of what ye shall eat or drink, nor what ye shall put on; if
one may not resist evil by violence or defend one's life, nor even give up
one's life for his friend; if one is to preserve absolute chastity, mankind
could not long exist;" so they believe and affirm.
And they are right, if one takes the incentives to perfection offered by the
teaching of Christ as laws which each man must obey, just as, for instance,
in the social order every man must pay his taxes, and some must serve in
the courts of law, and so on.
The misapprehension consists in overlooking the fact that the doctrine of
Christ, and the doctrine formulated by a lower life-conception, guide men in
very different ways. The doctrines of the social life-conception guide men
in fulfilling the requirements of the law. The doctrine of Christ guides men
by manifesting the infinite perfection of the Heavenly Father, to which it is
natural for every man to aspire, whatever may be his shortcomings.
The misconception of those who judge the Christian doctrine by the
standard of the state or civil doctrine is this,—that they imagine that the
perfection of which Christ speaks may be attained in this life, and ask
themselves just as they would ask concerning some law of the State, what
will happen when all this shall be fulfilled? This hypothesis is fallacious,
because the perfection indicated by Christianity is infinite and can never be
attained; and Christ promulgates his doctrine, knowing that although
absolute perfection will never be attained, yet the aspiration toward it will
ever contribute to the welfare of mankind, that this welfare may by this
means be everlastingly increased.
Christ is not teaching angels, but men who live and move in an animal life,
and whose impulses are of an animal nature. And to this animal impulse
Christ, so to speak, adds another force by communicating to man a sense of
the divine perfection, guiding the current of life between these two forces.
Christian doctrine, and mistaking the Christian standard of perfection for
the guiding principle of life, believe and declare that it is impossible to
follow the teaching of Christ, because implicit obedience to this doctrine
would end by destroying life. "If man were to fulfil the precepts of Christ,
he would destroy his life; and if all the world were to fulfil them, the human
race would soon become extinct. If you were to take no thought for the
morrow, neither of what ye shall eat or drink, nor what ye shall put on; if
one may not resist evil by violence or defend one's life, nor even give up
one's life for his friend; if one is to preserve absolute chastity, mankind
could not long exist;" so they believe and affirm.
And they are right, if one takes the incentives to perfection offered by the
teaching of Christ as laws which each man must obey, just as, for instance,
in the social order every man must pay his taxes, and some must serve in
the courts of law, and so on.
The misapprehension consists in overlooking the fact that the doctrine of
Christ, and the doctrine formulated by a lower life-conception, guide men in
very different ways. The doctrines of the social life-conception guide men
in fulfilling the requirements of the law. The doctrine of Christ guides men
by manifesting the infinite perfection of the Heavenly Father, to which it is
natural for every man to aspire, whatever may be his shortcomings.
The misconception of those who judge the Christian doctrine by the
standard of the state or civil doctrine is this,—that they imagine that the
perfection of which Christ speaks may be attained in this life, and ask
themselves just as they would ask concerning some law of the State, what
will happen when all this shall be fulfilled? This hypothesis is fallacious,
because the perfection indicated by Christianity is infinite and can never be
attained; and Christ promulgates his doctrine, knowing that although
absolute perfection will never be attained, yet the aspiration toward it will
ever contribute to the welfare of mankind, that this welfare may by this
means be everlastingly increased.
Christ is not teaching angels, but men who live and move in an animal life,
and whose impulses are of an animal nature. And to this animal impulse
Christ, so to speak, adds another force by communicating to man a sense of
the divine perfection, guiding the current of life between these two forces.
Page 94
To take it for granted that human life is to follow the direction indicated by
Christ would be like expecting the boatman, who, crossing a swift river,
steers almost directly against the current, to float in that direction.
Christ recognizes the fact that a parallelogram has two sides, and that a
man's life is controlled by two indestructible forces: his animal nature and
his consciousness of a filial relationship to God. Disregarding the factor of
the animal life, which never looses its hold, and is beyond man's control,
Christ speaks of the divine consciousness, urging man to its fuller
recognition, its complete emancipation from all that fetters it, and to its
utmost development.
Man's true life, according to the precepts of Christ, is only to be found in
this emancipation and in the growth of the divine consciousness. According
to the old dispensation, a true life meant the fulfilment of the precepts of the
law; but according to Christ, it means the closest approach to the divine
perfection which has been manifested to every man, and which every man
recognizes,—a closer and closer union of his will to the will of God; a
union which every man is striving to attain, and which would utterly
destroy the life we now lead.
God's perfection is the asymptote of human life, toward which it is forever
aspiring and drawing nearer, although it can only reach its goal in the
infinite.
It is only when men mistake the suggestion of an ideal for a rule of conduct
that the Christian doctrine seems at odds with life. Indeed, the reverse is
true, for it is by the doctrine of Christ, and that alone, that a true life is
rendered possible. "It is a mistake to require too much," men usually say,
when discussing the demands of the Christian religion. "One ought not to
be required to take no thought for the morrow, as the Bible teaches, but of
course one should not be over-anxious; one cannot give all that he possesses
to the poor, still he should bestow a certain portion of his goods in charity;
one ought not to remain unmarried, but let him avoid a dissolute life; one
need not renounce his wife and children, although one must not idolize
them."
These arguments are equivalent to telling a man who is crossing a swift
river and steering his boat against the current, that no one can cross a river
Christ would be like expecting the boatman, who, crossing a swift river,
steers almost directly against the current, to float in that direction.
Christ recognizes the fact that a parallelogram has two sides, and that a
man's life is controlled by two indestructible forces: his animal nature and
his consciousness of a filial relationship to God. Disregarding the factor of
the animal life, which never looses its hold, and is beyond man's control,
Christ speaks of the divine consciousness, urging man to its fuller
recognition, its complete emancipation from all that fetters it, and to its
utmost development.
Man's true life, according to the precepts of Christ, is only to be found in
this emancipation and in the growth of the divine consciousness. According
to the old dispensation, a true life meant the fulfilment of the precepts of the
law; but according to Christ, it means the closest approach to the divine
perfection which has been manifested to every man, and which every man
recognizes,—a closer and closer union of his will to the will of God; a
union which every man is striving to attain, and which would utterly
destroy the life we now lead.
God's perfection is the asymptote of human life, toward which it is forever
aspiring and drawing nearer, although it can only reach its goal in the
infinite.
It is only when men mistake the suggestion of an ideal for a rule of conduct
that the Christian doctrine seems at odds with life. Indeed, the reverse is
true, for it is by the doctrine of Christ, and that alone, that a true life is
rendered possible. "It is a mistake to require too much," men usually say,
when discussing the demands of the Christian religion. "One ought not to
be required to take no thought for the morrow, as the Bible teaches, but of
course one should not be over-anxious; one cannot give all that he possesses
to the poor, still he should bestow a certain portion of his goods in charity;
one ought not to remain unmarried, but let him avoid a dissolute life; one
need not renounce his wife and children, although one must not idolize
them."
These arguments are equivalent to telling a man who is crossing a swift
river and steering his boat against the current, that no one can cross a river
Page 95
by steering against the current, but that he must direct his boat in a straight
line toward the point he wishes to reach.
The doctrine of Christ differs from former doctrines in that it influences
men, not by outward observances, but by the interior consciousness that
divine perfection may be attained.
It is this illimitable and divine perfection that absorbs the soul of man, not
restricted laws of justice and philanthropy. It needs but the aspiration
toward this divine perfection to impel the course of human life from the
animal to the divine, so far as may be humanly possible.
In order to land at any given point one must steer beyond it. To lower the
standard of an ideal means not only to lessen the chances of attaining
perfection, but to destroy the ideal itself. The ideal that influences mankind
is not an ingenious invention; it is something that dwells in the soul of each
individual. It is this ideal of utter and infinite perfection that excites men
and urges them to action. A possible degree of perfection would have no
appeal to the souls of men.
It is because the doctrine of Christ requires illimitable perfection, that is to
say, the blending of the divine essence, which is in each man's soul, with the
will of God, the union of the Son with the Father, that it has authority. It is
only the emancipation of the Son of God, who dwells with each one of us,
from the animal element within us, and the drawing near to the Father, that
can, in the Christian sense of the word, be called life.
The presence of the animal element in man is not enough of itself to
constitute human life. Neither is a spiritual life, which is guided only by the
will of God, a human life. A true human life is composed of an animal and
of a spiritual life united to the will of God, and the nearer this component
life approaches to the life of God, the more it has life.
According to the Christian doctrine, life is a condition of progress toward
the perfection of God; hence no one condition can be either higher or lower
than another, because each is in itself a certain stage in human progress
toward the unattainable perfection, and therefore of equal importance with
all the others. Any spiritual quickening, according to this doctrine, is simply
an accelerated movement toward perfection. Therefore the impulse of
Zacchæus the publican, of the adulteress, and the thief on the cross, show
line toward the point he wishes to reach.
The doctrine of Christ differs from former doctrines in that it influences
men, not by outward observances, but by the interior consciousness that
divine perfection may be attained.
It is this illimitable and divine perfection that absorbs the soul of man, not
restricted laws of justice and philanthropy. It needs but the aspiration
toward this divine perfection to impel the course of human life from the
animal to the divine, so far as may be humanly possible.
In order to land at any given point one must steer beyond it. To lower the
standard of an ideal means not only to lessen the chances of attaining
perfection, but to destroy the ideal itself. The ideal that influences mankind
is not an ingenious invention; it is something that dwells in the soul of each
individual. It is this ideal of utter and infinite perfection that excites men
and urges them to action. A possible degree of perfection would have no
appeal to the souls of men.
It is because the doctrine of Christ requires illimitable perfection, that is to
say, the blending of the divine essence, which is in each man's soul, with the
will of God, the union of the Son with the Father, that it has authority. It is
only the emancipation of the Son of God, who dwells with each one of us,
from the animal element within us, and the drawing near to the Father, that
can, in the Christian sense of the word, be called life.
The presence of the animal element in man is not enough of itself to
constitute human life. Neither is a spiritual life, which is guided only by the
will of God, a human life. A true human life is composed of an animal and
of a spiritual life united to the will of God, and the nearer this component
life approaches to the life of God, the more it has life.
According to the Christian doctrine, life is a condition of progress toward
the perfection of God; hence no one condition can be either higher or lower
than another, because each is in itself a certain stage in human progress
toward the unattainable perfection, and therefore of equal importance with
all the others. Any spiritual quickening, according to this doctrine, is simply
an accelerated movement toward perfection. Therefore the impulse of
Zacchæus the publican, of the adulteress, and the thief on the cross, show
Page 96
forth a higher order of life than does the passive righteousness of the
Pharisee. This doctrine, therefore, can never be enforced by obligatory laws.
The man who, from a lower plane, lives up to the doctrine he professes,
ever advancing toward perfection, leads a higher life than one who may
perhaps stand on a superior plane of morality, but who is making no
progress toward perfection.
Thus the stray lamb is dearer to the Father than those which are in the fold;
the prodigal returned, the coin that was lost and is found again, more highly
prized than those that never were lost.
Since the fulfilment of this doctrine is an impulse from self toward God, it
is evident that there can be no fixed laws for its movement. It may spring
from any degree of perfection or of imperfection; the fulfilment of rules and
fulfilment of the doctrine are by no means synonymous; there could be no
rules or obligatory laws for its fulfilment.
The difference between social laws and the doctrine of Christ is the natural
result of the radical dissimilarity between the doctrine of Christ and those
earlier doctrines which had their source in a social life-conception. The
latter are for the most part positive, enjoining certain acts, by the
performance of which men are to be justified and made righteous, whereas
the Christian precepts (the precept of love is not a commandment in the
strict sense of the word, but the expression of the very essence of the
doctrine), the five commandments of the Sermon on the Mount, are all
negative, only meant to show men who have reached a certain degree of
development what they must avoid. These commandments are, so to speak,
mile-stones on the infinite road to perfection, toward which humanity is
struggling; they mark the degrees of perfection which it is possible for it to
attain at a certain period of its development.
In the Sermon on the Mount Christ expressed the eternal ideal to which
mankind instinctively aspires, showing at the same time the point of
perfection to which human nature in its present stage may attain.
The ideal is to bear no malice, excite no ill-will, and to love all men. The
commandment which forbids us to offend our neighbor is one which a man
who is striving to attain this ideal must not do less than obey. And this is the
first commandment.
Pharisee. This doctrine, therefore, can never be enforced by obligatory laws.
The man who, from a lower plane, lives up to the doctrine he professes,
ever advancing toward perfection, leads a higher life than one who may
perhaps stand on a superior plane of morality, but who is making no
progress toward perfection.
Thus the stray lamb is dearer to the Father than those which are in the fold;
the prodigal returned, the coin that was lost and is found again, more highly
prized than those that never were lost.
Since the fulfilment of this doctrine is an impulse from self toward God, it
is evident that there can be no fixed laws for its movement. It may spring
from any degree of perfection or of imperfection; the fulfilment of rules and
fulfilment of the doctrine are by no means synonymous; there could be no
rules or obligatory laws for its fulfilment.
The difference between social laws and the doctrine of Christ is the natural
result of the radical dissimilarity between the doctrine of Christ and those
earlier doctrines which had their source in a social life-conception. The
latter are for the most part positive, enjoining certain acts, by the
performance of which men are to be justified and made righteous, whereas
the Christian precepts (the precept of love is not a commandment in the
strict sense of the word, but the expression of the very essence of the
doctrine), the five commandments of the Sermon on the Mount, are all
negative, only meant to show men who have reached a certain degree of
development what they must avoid. These commandments are, so to speak,
mile-stones on the infinite road to perfection, toward which humanity is
struggling; they mark the degrees of perfection which it is possible for it to
attain at a certain period of its development.
In the Sermon on the Mount Christ expressed the eternal ideal to which
mankind instinctively aspires, showing at the same time the point of
perfection to which human nature in its present stage may attain.
The ideal is to bear no malice, excite no ill-will, and to love all men. The
commandment which forbids us to offend our neighbor is one which a man
who is striving to attain this ideal must not do less than obey. And this is the
first commandment.
Page 97
The ideal is perfect chastity in thought, no less than in deed; and the
commandment which enjoins purity in married life, forbidding adultery, is
one which every man who is striving to attain this ideal must not do less
than obey. And this is the second commandment.
The ideal is to take no thought for the morrow, to live in the present, and the
commandment, the fulfilment of which is the point beneath which we must
not fall, is against taking oath or making promises for the future. Such is the
third commandment.
The ideal—to use no violence whatsoever—shows us that we must return
good for evil, endure injuries with patience, and give up the cloak to him
who has taken the coat. Such is the fourth commandment.
The ideal is to love your enemies, to do good to them that despitefully use
you. In order to keep the spirit of this commandment one must at least
refrain from injuring one's enemies, one must speak kindly of them, and
treat all one's fellow-creatures with equal consideration. Such is the fifth
commandment.
All these commandments are reminders of that which we, in our striving for
perfection, must and can avoid; reminders, too, that we must labor now to
acquire by degrees habits of self-restraint, until such habits become second
nature. But these commandments, far from exhausting the doctrine, do not
by any means cover it. They are but stepping-stones on the way to
perfection, and must necessarily be followed by higher and still higher ones,
as men pursue the course toward perfection.
That is why a Christian doctrine would make higher demands than those
embodied in the commandments, and not in the least decrease its demands,
as they who judge the Christian doctrine from a social life-conception seem
to think.
This is one of the mistakes of the scientists in regard to the significance of
Christ's doctrine. And the substitution of the love of humanity for the love
and service of God is another, and it springs from the same source.
In the Christian doctrine of loving and of serving God, and (as the natural
consequence of such love and service) of loving and serving one's neighbor,
there seems to the scientific mind a certain mysticism, something at once
confused and arbitrary; and, believing that the doctrine of love for humanity
commandment which enjoins purity in married life, forbidding adultery, is
one which every man who is striving to attain this ideal must not do less
than obey. And this is the second commandment.
The ideal is to take no thought for the morrow, to live in the present, and the
commandment, the fulfilment of which is the point beneath which we must
not fall, is against taking oath or making promises for the future. Such is the
third commandment.
The ideal—to use no violence whatsoever—shows us that we must return
good for evil, endure injuries with patience, and give up the cloak to him
who has taken the coat. Such is the fourth commandment.
The ideal is to love your enemies, to do good to them that despitefully use
you. In order to keep the spirit of this commandment one must at least
refrain from injuring one's enemies, one must speak kindly of them, and
treat all one's fellow-creatures with equal consideration. Such is the fifth
commandment.
All these commandments are reminders of that which we, in our striving for
perfection, must and can avoid; reminders, too, that we must labor now to
acquire by degrees habits of self-restraint, until such habits become second
nature. But these commandments, far from exhausting the doctrine, do not
by any means cover it. They are but stepping-stones on the way to
perfection, and must necessarily be followed by higher and still higher ones,
as men pursue the course toward perfection.
That is why a Christian doctrine would make higher demands than those
embodied in the commandments, and not in the least decrease its demands,
as they who judge the Christian doctrine from a social life-conception seem
to think.
This is one of the mistakes of the scientists in regard to the significance of
Christ's doctrine. And the substitution of the love of humanity for the love
and service of God is another, and it springs from the same source.
In the Christian doctrine of loving and of serving God, and (as the natural
consequence of such love and service) of loving and serving one's neighbor,
there seems to the scientific mind a certain mysticism, something at once
confused and arbitrary; and, believing that the doctrine of love for humanity
Page 98
rests on a firmer basis and is altogether more intelligible, they utterly reject
the requirement of love and service of God.
The theory of a scientist is that a virtuous life, a life with a purpose, must be
useful to the world at large; and in a life of this kind they discover the
solution of the Christian doctrine, to which they reduce Christianity itself.
Assuming their own doctrine to be identical with that of Christianity, they
seek and believe that they find in the latter an affirmation of their own
views.
This is a fallacy. The Christian doctrine, and the doctrine of the Positivists,
and of all advocates of the universal brotherhood of man, founded on the
utility of such a brotherhood, have nothing in common, and especially do
they differ in that the doctrine of Christianity has a solid and a clearly
defined foundation in the human soul, whereas love of humanity is but a
theoretical conclusion reached through analogy.
The doctrine of the love of humanity has for its basis the social life-
conception.
The essence of the social life-conception consists in replacing the sense of
individual life by that of the life of the group. In its first steps, this is a
simple and natural progression, as from the family to the tribe; from the
family to the race is more difficult, and requires special education,—which
has arrived at its utmost limits when the State has been reached.
It is natural for every man to love himself, and he needs no incentive
thereto; to love his tribe, which lends both support and protection; to love
his wife, the delight and comfort of his daily life; the children, who are his
consolation and his future hope; his parents, who gave him life and
cherished him,—all this, although not so intense as love of self, is natural
and common to mankind.
To love one's race, one's people, for their own sake, although not so
instinctive, is also common. To love one's ancestors, one's kinsfolk, through
pride, is also natural and frequent; and a man may feel love for his fellow-
countrymen, who speak the same language and profess the same faith as
himself, although the emotion is less strong than love of self or love of
family. But love for a nation, Turkey, for instance, or Germany, England,
Austria, Russia, is almost impossible, and notwithstanding the training
the requirement of love and service of God.
The theory of a scientist is that a virtuous life, a life with a purpose, must be
useful to the world at large; and in a life of this kind they discover the
solution of the Christian doctrine, to which they reduce Christianity itself.
Assuming their own doctrine to be identical with that of Christianity, they
seek and believe that they find in the latter an affirmation of their own
views.
This is a fallacy. The Christian doctrine, and the doctrine of the Positivists,
and of all advocates of the universal brotherhood of man, founded on the
utility of such a brotherhood, have nothing in common, and especially do
they differ in that the doctrine of Christianity has a solid and a clearly
defined foundation in the human soul, whereas love of humanity is but a
theoretical conclusion reached through analogy.
The doctrine of the love of humanity has for its basis the social life-
conception.
The essence of the social life-conception consists in replacing the sense of
individual life by that of the life of the group. In its first steps, this is a
simple and natural progression, as from the family to the tribe; from the
family to the race is more difficult, and requires special education,—which
has arrived at its utmost limits when the State has been reached.
It is natural for every man to love himself, and he needs no incentive
thereto; to love his tribe, which lends both support and protection; to love
his wife, the delight and comfort of his daily life; the children, who are his
consolation and his future hope; his parents, who gave him life and
cherished him,—all this, although not so intense as love of self, is natural
and common to mankind.
To love one's race, one's people, for their own sake, although not so
instinctive, is also common. To love one's ancestors, one's kinsfolk, through
pride, is also natural and frequent; and a man may feel love for his fellow-
countrymen, who speak the same language and profess the same faith as
himself, although the emotion is less strong than love of self or love of
family. But love for a nation, Turkey, for instance, or Germany, England,
Austria, Russia, is almost impossible, and notwithstanding the training
Page 99
given in that direction, it is only a fictitious semblance; it has no real
existence. At this aggregate ceases man's power of transfusing his innermost
consciousness; for such a fiction he can feel no direct sentiment. And yet
the Positivists and all the preachers of the scientific fraternity, not taking
into consideration the fact that this feeling is weakened in proportion to the
expansion of its object, continue to theorize on the same lines. They say: "If
it were to the advantage of an individual to transfuse his consciousness into
the family, and thence into the nation and the State, it follows that it will be
to his further advantage to transfuse his consciousness into the universal
entity, mankind, that all men may live for humanity, as they have lived for
the family and for the State."
And theoretically they are right.
After having transferred the consciousness and love for the individual to the
family, and from the family to the race, the nation, and the State, it would
be perfectly logical for men, in order to escape the strife and disasters that
result from the division of mankind into nations and states, to transfer their
love to humanity at large. This would appear to be the logical outcome, and
it has been offered as a theory by those who forget that love is an innate
sentiment, which can never be inspired by preaching; that it must have a
real object, and that the entity which men call humanity is not a real object,
but a fiction.
A family, a race, even a State, are no inventions of men; these things have
formed themselves like a hive of bees, or a colony of ants, and possess an
actual existence. The man who loves his family, after a human fashion,
knows whom he is loving—Ann, Maria, John, or Peter. The man who loves
his ancestors, and is proud of them, knows that he loves the Guelphs, for
instance, or the Ghibellines; the man who loves his country knows that he
loves France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, that he loves its capital, Paris,
and all its history. But the man who loves humanity, what is it that he loves?
There is a State, there is a people, there is the abstract conception of man.
But humanity as a concrete conception is impossible.
Humanity? Where is its limit? Where does it end and where does it begin?
Does it exclude the savage, the idiot, the inebriate, the insane? If one were
to draw a line of demarcation so as to exclude the lower representatives of
the human race, where ought it to be drawn? Ought it to exclude the Negro,
existence. At this aggregate ceases man's power of transfusing his innermost
consciousness; for such a fiction he can feel no direct sentiment. And yet
the Positivists and all the preachers of the scientific fraternity, not taking
into consideration the fact that this feeling is weakened in proportion to the
expansion of its object, continue to theorize on the same lines. They say: "If
it were to the advantage of an individual to transfuse his consciousness into
the family, and thence into the nation and the State, it follows that it will be
to his further advantage to transfuse his consciousness into the universal
entity, mankind, that all men may live for humanity, as they have lived for
the family and for the State."
And theoretically they are right.
After having transferred the consciousness and love for the individual to the
family, and from the family to the race, the nation, and the State, it would
be perfectly logical for men, in order to escape the strife and disasters that
result from the division of mankind into nations and states, to transfer their
love to humanity at large. This would appear to be the logical outcome, and
it has been offered as a theory by those who forget that love is an innate
sentiment, which can never be inspired by preaching; that it must have a
real object, and that the entity which men call humanity is not a real object,
but a fiction.
A family, a race, even a State, are no inventions of men; these things have
formed themselves like a hive of bees, or a colony of ants, and possess an
actual existence. The man who loves his family, after a human fashion,
knows whom he is loving—Ann, Maria, John, or Peter. The man who loves
his ancestors, and is proud of them, knows that he loves the Guelphs, for
instance, or the Ghibellines; the man who loves his country knows that he
loves France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, that he loves its capital, Paris,
and all its history. But the man who loves humanity, what is it that he loves?
There is a State, there is a people, there is the abstract conception of man.
But humanity as a concrete conception is impossible.
Humanity? Where is its limit? Where does it end and where does it begin?
Does it exclude the savage, the idiot, the inebriate, the insane? If one were
to draw a line of demarcation so as to exclude the lower representatives of
the human race, where ought it to be drawn? Ought it to exclude the Negro,
Page 100
as they do in the United States, or the Hindoos, as some Englishmen do, or
the Jews, as does another nation? But if we include all humanity without
exception, why should we restrict ourselves to men? Why should we
exclude the higher animals, some of whom are superior to the lowest
representatives of the human race?
We do not know humanity in the concrete, nor can we fix its limits.
Humanity is a fiction, and therefore it cannot be loved. Indeed, it would be
advantageous if men could love humanity as they love the family. It would
be very useful, as the communists say, to substitute a community of
interests for individual competition, or the universal for the personal; in a
word, to make the whole world a mutual benefit society,—only that there
are no motives to bring about such a result. The Positivists, communists,
and all the exponents of the scientific fraternity exhort us to extend the love
which men feel for themselves, their families, their fellow-countrymen,
over humanity at large, forgetting that the love of which they speak is a
personal love, which may be kindled for the family, and even extend to
include one's native country, but which expires altogether when it is
appealed to in behalf of an artificial state, such as Austria, England, or
Turkey; and when claimed for that mystical object, humanity in general,
one cannot even grasp the idea.
"A man loves himself, his physical personality, he loves his family, he even
loves his country. Why should he not also love mankind? It would seem
such a happy consummation! And it so happens that Christianity inculcates
the same precept." These are the opinions of the Positivist, the communist,
and the socialist fraternities.
It would indeed be fortunate, but it is impossible, because love founded on a
personal and social life-conception can go no further than the love of
country.
The flaw in the argument arises from the fact that the social life-conception,
the basis of family love and of patriotism, is itself an individual love, and
such a love, in its transference from a person to a family, a race, a nation,
and a State, gradually loses its efficiency, and in the State has reached its
final limit, and can go no further.
The necessity for widening the sphere of love is not to be denied, and yet it
is the very attempt to satisfy this requirement that destroys its possibility,
the Jews, as does another nation? But if we include all humanity without
exception, why should we restrict ourselves to men? Why should we
exclude the higher animals, some of whom are superior to the lowest
representatives of the human race?
We do not know humanity in the concrete, nor can we fix its limits.
Humanity is a fiction, and therefore it cannot be loved. Indeed, it would be
advantageous if men could love humanity as they love the family. It would
be very useful, as the communists say, to substitute a community of
interests for individual competition, or the universal for the personal; in a
word, to make the whole world a mutual benefit society,—only that there
are no motives to bring about such a result. The Positivists, communists,
and all the exponents of the scientific fraternity exhort us to extend the love
which men feel for themselves, their families, their fellow-countrymen,
over humanity at large, forgetting that the love of which they speak is a
personal love, which may be kindled for the family, and even extend to
include one's native country, but which expires altogether when it is
appealed to in behalf of an artificial state, such as Austria, England, or
Turkey; and when claimed for that mystical object, humanity in general,
one cannot even grasp the idea.
"A man loves himself, his physical personality, he loves his family, he even
loves his country. Why should he not also love mankind? It would seem
such a happy consummation! And it so happens that Christianity inculcates
the same precept." These are the opinions of the Positivist, the communist,
and the socialist fraternities.
It would indeed be fortunate, but it is impossible, because love founded on a
personal and social life-conception can go no further than the love of
country.
The flaw in the argument arises from the fact that the social life-conception,
the basis of family love and of patriotism, is itself an individual love, and
such a love, in its transference from a person to a family, a race, a nation,
and a State, gradually loses its efficiency, and in the State has reached its
final limit, and can go no further.
The necessity for widening the sphere of love is not to be denied, and yet it
is the very attempt to satisfy this requirement that destroys its possibility,
Page 101
and proves the inadequacy of personal human love.
And here it is that the advocates of the Positivist, communist, and socialist
brotherhood offer as a prop to the humanitarianism that has proved its
inefficiency, a Christian love, not in its essence, but only in its results; in
other words, not the love of God, but the love of man.
But there can be no such love; it has no raison d'étre. Christian love comes
only from a Christian life-conception, whose sole manifestation is the love
and service of God.
By a natural sequence in the extension of love from the individual to the
family, and thence to the race, the nation, and the State, the social life-
conception has brought men not to the consciousness of love for humanity,
—which is illimitable—the unification of every living creature,—but to a
condition which evokes no feeling in man, to a contradiction for which it
provides no reconciliation.
It is only the Christian doctrine which, by lending to human life a new
significance, is able to solve the difficulty. Christianity presents the love of
self and the love of the family, as well as patriotism and the love of
humanity, but it is not to be restricted to humanity alone; it is to be given to
every living creature; it recognizes the possibility of an indefinite expansion
of the kingdom of love, but its object is not to be found outside itself, in the
aggregate of individuals, neither in the family, nor in the race, nor in the
State, nor in mankind, nor all the wide world, but in itself, in its personality,
—a divine personality, whose essence is the very love which needed a
wider sphere.
The distinction between the Christian doctrine and those which preceded it
may be thus defined. The social doctrine says: Curb thy nature (meaning the
animal nature alone); subject it to the visible law of the family, of society,
and of the State. Christianity says: Live up to thy nature (meaning the
divine nature); make it subject to nothing; neither to thine own animal
nature, nor to that of another, and then thou shalt attain what thou seekest
by subjecting thine outward personality to visible laws. The Christian
doctrine restores to man his original consciousness of self, not the animal
self, but the godlike self, the spark of divinity, as the son of God, like unto
the Father, but clothed in a human form. This consciousness of one's self as
a son of God, whose essence is love, satisfies at once all those demands
And here it is that the advocates of the Positivist, communist, and socialist
brotherhood offer as a prop to the humanitarianism that has proved its
inefficiency, a Christian love, not in its essence, but only in its results; in
other words, not the love of God, but the love of man.
But there can be no such love; it has no raison d'étre. Christian love comes
only from a Christian life-conception, whose sole manifestation is the love
and service of God.
By a natural sequence in the extension of love from the individual to the
family, and thence to the race, the nation, and the State, the social life-
conception has brought men not to the consciousness of love for humanity,
—which is illimitable—the unification of every living creature,—but to a
condition which evokes no feeling in man, to a contradiction for which it
provides no reconciliation.
It is only the Christian doctrine which, by lending to human life a new
significance, is able to solve the difficulty. Christianity presents the love of
self and the love of the family, as well as patriotism and the love of
humanity, but it is not to be restricted to humanity alone; it is to be given to
every living creature; it recognizes the possibility of an indefinite expansion
of the kingdom of love, but its object is not to be found outside itself, in the
aggregate of individuals, neither in the family, nor in the race, nor in the
State, nor in mankind, nor all the wide world, but in itself, in its personality,
—a divine personality, whose essence is the very love which needed a
wider sphere.
The distinction between the Christian doctrine and those which preceded it
may be thus defined. The social doctrine says: Curb thy nature (meaning the
animal nature alone); subject it to the visible law of the family, of society,
and of the State. Christianity says: Live up to thy nature (meaning the
divine nature); make it subject to nothing; neither to thine own animal
nature, nor to that of another, and then thou shalt attain what thou seekest
by subjecting thine outward personality to visible laws. The Christian
doctrine restores to man his original consciousness of self, not the animal
self, but the godlike self, the spark of divinity, as the son of God, like unto
the Father, but clothed in a human form. This consciousness of one's self as
a son of God, whose essence is love, satisfies at once all those demands
Page 102
made by the man who professes the social life-conception for a broader
sphere of love. Again, in the social life-conception the enlargement of the
domain of love was a necessity for the salvation of the individual; it was
attached to certain objects, to one's self, to one's family, to society, and to
humanity. With the Christian world-conception love is not a necessity,
neither is it attached to any special object; it is the inherent quality of a
man's soul; he loves because he cannot help loving.
The Christian doctrine teaches to man that the essence of his soul is love;
that his well-being may be traced, not to the fact that he loves this object or
that one, but to the fact that he loves the principle of all things—God,
whom he recognizes in himself through love, and will by the love of God
love all men and all things.
This is the essential difference between the Christian doctrine and that of
the Positivists, and all other non-Christian theorists of a universal
brotherhood.
Such are the two chief misapprehensions in regard to the Christian doctrine,
and from those most of the false arguments on the subject have originated.
One is, that the doctrine of Christ, like the doctrines which preceded it,
promulgates rules which men must obey, and that these rules are
impracticable. The other, that the whole meaning of Christianity is
contained in the doctrine of a coöperative union of mankind, in one family,
to attain which, leaving aside the question of love of God, one should obey
only the rule of love of one's fellow-men.
Finally, the mistake of scientists, in supposing that the doctrine of the
supernatural contains the essence of Christianity, that its life-teaching is not
practicable, together with the general misapprehensions that result from
such a misconception, further explains why men of our time have so
misunderstood Christianity.
sphere of love. Again, in the social life-conception the enlargement of the
domain of love was a necessity for the salvation of the individual; it was
attached to certain objects, to one's self, to one's family, to society, and to
humanity. With the Christian world-conception love is not a necessity,
neither is it attached to any special object; it is the inherent quality of a
man's soul; he loves because he cannot help loving.
The Christian doctrine teaches to man that the essence of his soul is love;
that his well-being may be traced, not to the fact that he loves this object or
that one, but to the fact that he loves the principle of all things—God,
whom he recognizes in himself through love, and will by the love of God
love all men and all things.
This is the essential difference between the Christian doctrine and that of
the Positivists, and all other non-Christian theorists of a universal
brotherhood.
Such are the two chief misapprehensions in regard to the Christian doctrine,
and from those most of the false arguments on the subject have originated.
One is, that the doctrine of Christ, like the doctrines which preceded it,
promulgates rules which men must obey, and that these rules are
impracticable. The other, that the whole meaning of Christianity is
contained in the doctrine of a coöperative union of mankind, in one family,
to attain which, leaving aside the question of love of God, one should obey
only the rule of love of one's fellow-men.
Finally, the mistake of scientists, in supposing that the doctrine of the
supernatural contains the essence of Christianity, that its life-teaching is not
practicable, together with the general misapprehensions that result from
such a misconception, further explains why men of our time have so
misunderstood Christianity.
Page 103
CHAPTER V
CONTRADICTION OF OUR LIFE AND CHRISTIAN
CONSCIOUSNESS
Men consider that they may accept Christianity without changing their life—The pagan life-
conception no longer corresponds to the present age of humanity, which the Christian
life-conception alone can satisfy—The Christian life-conception is still misunderstood by
men, but our life itself necessitates its acceptance—The requirements of a new life-
conception always seem unintelligible, mystical, and supernatural—Such, for the
majority of men, seem the requirements of the Christian life-conception—The acceptance
of a Christian life-conception will inevitably be accomplished both through spiritual and
material agencies—The fact that men, conscious of a higher life-conception, continue to
entertain the lower forms of life, causes contradiction and suffering, which embitter life
and require its alteration—Contradictions of our life—The economical contradiction, and
the suffering it causes to the working-men and to the rich—The contradiction of State,
and the sufferings that arise from obedience to State laws—The international
contradiction, and its acknowledgment by contemporary writers: Komarvosky, Ferri,
Booth, Passy, Lawson, Wilson, Bartlett, Defourny, Moneta—The military contradiction
the extreme.
Many causes have contributed toward the misunderstanding of the teaching
of Christ. One of these is that men assumed to understand the doctrine,
when, like the faithful of the Church, they accepted the statement that it had
been transmitted in a supernatural manner; or, like the scientists, after
having investigated certain of its outward manifestations. Another reason
may be found in the conviction that it is impracticable, and that it may be
replaced by the doctrine of love of humanity. But the principal reason of all
such misconceptions is that men look upon the doctrine of Christ as one that
may be accepted or rejected without any special change in one's life.
Men, attached by habit to the existing order, shrink from attempting to
change it, hence they agree to consider this doctrine as a mass of revelations
and laws that may be accepted without making any change in one's life:
whereas the doctrine of Christ is not a doctrine of rules for man to obey, but
unfolds a new life-conception, meant as a guide for men who are now
entering upon a new period, one entirely different from the past.
CONTRADICTION OF OUR LIFE AND CHRISTIAN
CONSCIOUSNESS
Men consider that they may accept Christianity without changing their life—The pagan life-
conception no longer corresponds to the present age of humanity, which the Christian
life-conception alone can satisfy—The Christian life-conception is still misunderstood by
men, but our life itself necessitates its acceptance—The requirements of a new life-
conception always seem unintelligible, mystical, and supernatural—Such, for the
majority of men, seem the requirements of the Christian life-conception—The acceptance
of a Christian life-conception will inevitably be accomplished both through spiritual and
material agencies—The fact that men, conscious of a higher life-conception, continue to
entertain the lower forms of life, causes contradiction and suffering, which embitter life
and require its alteration—Contradictions of our life—The economical contradiction, and
the suffering it causes to the working-men and to the rich—The contradiction of State,
and the sufferings that arise from obedience to State laws—The international
contradiction, and its acknowledgment by contemporary writers: Komarvosky, Ferri,
Booth, Passy, Lawson, Wilson, Bartlett, Defourny, Moneta—The military contradiction
the extreme.
Many causes have contributed toward the misunderstanding of the teaching
of Christ. One of these is that men assumed to understand the doctrine,
when, like the faithful of the Church, they accepted the statement that it had
been transmitted in a supernatural manner; or, like the scientists, after
having investigated certain of its outward manifestations. Another reason
may be found in the conviction that it is impracticable, and that it may be
replaced by the doctrine of love of humanity. But the principal reason of all
such misconceptions is that men look upon the doctrine of Christ as one that
may be accepted or rejected without any special change in one's life.
Men, attached by habit to the existing order, shrink from attempting to
change it, hence they agree to consider this doctrine as a mass of revelations
and laws that may be accepted without making any change in one's life:
whereas the doctrine of Christ is not a doctrine of rules for man to obey, but
unfolds a new life-conception, meant as a guide for men who are now
entering upon a new period, one entirely different from the past.
Page 104
The life of humanity continues its course and has its stages, like the life of
an individual; each age has its own life-conception, which a man must
adopt whether he will or no. Those who do not adopt it consciously, adopt it
unconsciously. The same change that takes place in the views of the
individual, as life goes on, occurs also in the existence of nations and of
humanity in general.
If a father were to conduct his affairs like a child, his life would certainly
become so unbearable that he would cast about for a different plan of life,
and would eagerly grasp at one better suited to his years.
And the human race is at the present time passing through a similar
experience, in its transition from a pagan to a Christian life-conception. A
man of the society of the present day finds that the pagan life-conception is
no longer suited to the times, hence he is induced to submit to the
requirements of the Christian religion, whose truths, however
misunderstood and falsely interpreted they may be, are yet familiar to his
ears, and seem to offer the only practical solution of the contradictions that
beset his path. If the demands of the Christian doctrine seem unintelligible,
peculiar, and dangerous to a man who has hitherto held the social life-
conception, the demands of the latter seemed none the less so to a savage of
a previous age, who neither fully apprehended them, nor was able to foresee
their consequences.
The savage reasoned thus: "It would be folly for me to sacrifice my peace
or my life to defend an incomprehensible, intangible, and uncertain ideal,
family, race, country, and, above all, it would be dangerous to deliver
myself into the hands of an unknown power." But there came a time in the
life of the savage when, on the one hand, he had begun, although vaguely,
to understand the meaning of social life, as well as that of its chief
incentive,—social approval or condemnation: glory,—while, on the other
hand, the sufferings of his personal life had become so severe that it was no
longer possible for him to go on believing in the truth of his former life-
conception; whereupon he accepted the social and State doctrine and
submitted to its laws.
And he who holds the social life-conception is now undergoing a similar
experience.
an individual; each age has its own life-conception, which a man must
adopt whether he will or no. Those who do not adopt it consciously, adopt it
unconsciously. The same change that takes place in the views of the
individual, as life goes on, occurs also in the existence of nations and of
humanity in general.
If a father were to conduct his affairs like a child, his life would certainly
become so unbearable that he would cast about for a different plan of life,
and would eagerly grasp at one better suited to his years.
And the human race is at the present time passing through a similar
experience, in its transition from a pagan to a Christian life-conception. A
man of the society of the present day finds that the pagan life-conception is
no longer suited to the times, hence he is induced to submit to the
requirements of the Christian religion, whose truths, however
misunderstood and falsely interpreted they may be, are yet familiar to his
ears, and seem to offer the only practical solution of the contradictions that
beset his path. If the demands of the Christian doctrine seem unintelligible,
peculiar, and dangerous to a man who has hitherto held the social life-
conception, the demands of the latter seemed none the less so to a savage of
a previous age, who neither fully apprehended them, nor was able to foresee
their consequences.
The savage reasoned thus: "It would be folly for me to sacrifice my peace
or my life to defend an incomprehensible, intangible, and uncertain ideal,
family, race, country, and, above all, it would be dangerous to deliver
myself into the hands of an unknown power." But there came a time in the
life of the savage when, on the one hand, he had begun, although vaguely,
to understand the meaning of social life, as well as that of its chief
incentive,—social approval or condemnation: glory,—while, on the other
hand, the sufferings of his personal life had become so severe that it was no
longer possible for him to go on believing in the truth of his former life-
conception; whereupon he accepted the social and State doctrine and
submitted to its laws.
And he who holds the social life-conception is now undergoing a similar
experience.
Page 105
"It is madness"—thus reasons the man holding such views—"to sacrifice
one's interests or those of one's family and of one's country, in order to fulfil
the requirements of a law that would compel one to renounce the most
natural and praiseworthy feelings toward one's self, one's family, and one's
country, and, above all, the guarantee of protection afforded by the State."
But there comes a time when, on the one hand, a vague awakening
consciousness stirs the soul, the consciousness of the higher law, love of
God and one's neighbor, and the sufferings a man endures from the
contradictions of life, compel him to renounce the social life-conception
and to adopt the new Christian life-conception which is offered him. And
this time has now arrived.
To us, who underwent the transition from the individual to the social life-
conception thousands of years ago, this transition appears to have been both
natural and inevitable, just as the present transition, through which we have
been passing these last 1800 years, seems arbitrary, unnatural, and
overwhelming. But it seems so for the simple reason that the former change
is a thing of the past, and has fixed in us certain habits, whereas we are still
practically accomplishing the present transition, and have to accomplish it
consciously.
It was centuries, indeed thousands of years, before the social life-
conception was adopted by all mankind; it passed through various phases,
and we ourselves possess it through heredity, education, and unconscious
habit; hence it seems natural to us. But 5000 years ago it seemed as strange
and unnatural to men as the Christian doctrine in its true meaning seems to
them now.
The universal brotherhood of man, the equality of races, the abolition of
property, the anomalous doctrine of non-resistance, all these requirements
of the Christian religion seem to us impossibilities. But in olden times,
thousands of years ago, not only the requirements of the State, but even
those of the family, as, for instance, the obligation of parents to feed their
children, of children to support their aged parents, and that of conjugal
fidelity, seemed equally impossible. And still more unreasonable seemed
the demands of the State, requiring citizens to submit to established
authority, to pay taxes, to perform military duty in defense of their country,
etc. We find no difficulty in comprehending these requirements now; they
one's interests or those of one's family and of one's country, in order to fulfil
the requirements of a law that would compel one to renounce the most
natural and praiseworthy feelings toward one's self, one's family, and one's
country, and, above all, the guarantee of protection afforded by the State."
But there comes a time when, on the one hand, a vague awakening
consciousness stirs the soul, the consciousness of the higher law, love of
God and one's neighbor, and the sufferings a man endures from the
contradictions of life, compel him to renounce the social life-conception
and to adopt the new Christian life-conception which is offered him. And
this time has now arrived.
To us, who underwent the transition from the individual to the social life-
conception thousands of years ago, this transition appears to have been both
natural and inevitable, just as the present transition, through which we have
been passing these last 1800 years, seems arbitrary, unnatural, and
overwhelming. But it seems so for the simple reason that the former change
is a thing of the past, and has fixed in us certain habits, whereas we are still
practically accomplishing the present transition, and have to accomplish it
consciously.
It was centuries, indeed thousands of years, before the social life-
conception was adopted by all mankind; it passed through various phases,
and we ourselves possess it through heredity, education, and unconscious
habit; hence it seems natural to us. But 5000 years ago it seemed as strange
and unnatural to men as the Christian doctrine in its true meaning seems to
them now.
The universal brotherhood of man, the equality of races, the abolition of
property, the anomalous doctrine of non-resistance, all these requirements
of the Christian religion seem to us impossibilities. But in olden times,
thousands of years ago, not only the requirements of the State, but even
those of the family, as, for instance, the obligation of parents to feed their
children, of children to support their aged parents, and that of conjugal
fidelity, seemed equally impossible. And still more unreasonable seemed
the demands of the State, requiring citizens to submit to established
authority, to pay taxes, to perform military duty in defense of their country,
etc. We find no difficulty in comprehending these requirements now; they
Page 106
seem perfectly simple and natural, with nothing mystical or alarming in
their aspect; but five or even three thousand years ago, such demands
seemed intolerable.
Thus the social life-conception served as a foundation for religion, for at the
time when it was first manifested to men it seemed to them to be utterly
incomprehensible, mystical, and supernatural. Now that we have passed
that phase of human life, we can understand the reasons for the aggregation
of men into families, communities, and states. But in the early ages the
demand for these aggregations was made in the name of the supernatural,
and its fulfilment assured by the same authority.
The patriarchal religion deified the family, the race, the people. State
religions deified the sovereigns and the State. Even at the present day the
uneducated masses, the Russian peasants, for instance, who call the Czar a
God upon earth, obey the laws from religious instinct, not because their
reason counsels them to do so, nor because they have the least idea of a
State.
And to those men of our own times who hold the social life-conception, the
Christian doctrine seems to be a supernatural religion, whereas in reality
there is nothing mystical or supernatural about it; it is only a doctrine
concerning human life, corresponding with the degree of development
which man has attained, and one which he cannot refuse to accept.
The time will come, and it is already near at hand, when the Christian
foundations of life—equality, brotherly love, community of goods, non-
resistance of evil by violence—will seem as natural and simple as the
foundations of family, social, and State life appear to us at the present time.
There can be no retrogression for humanity. Men have outgrown the lower
life-conception of the family and the State, and must press forward to
embrace the next higher conception, as they have already begun to do.
This movement is accomplished in two ways: consciously, by moral causes;
unconsciously, by material ones. It rarely happens that a man changes his
mode of life at the dictates of reason; however conscious he may be of the
new design and purpose revealed to him by his reason, he goes on in the old
fashion until his life has become intolerably inconsistent, and therefore
distressing. Likewise, the larger portion of mankind, after learning through
their aspect; but five or even three thousand years ago, such demands
seemed intolerable.
Thus the social life-conception served as a foundation for religion, for at the
time when it was first manifested to men it seemed to them to be utterly
incomprehensible, mystical, and supernatural. Now that we have passed
that phase of human life, we can understand the reasons for the aggregation
of men into families, communities, and states. But in the early ages the
demand for these aggregations was made in the name of the supernatural,
and its fulfilment assured by the same authority.
The patriarchal religion deified the family, the race, the people. State
religions deified the sovereigns and the State. Even at the present day the
uneducated masses, the Russian peasants, for instance, who call the Czar a
God upon earth, obey the laws from religious instinct, not because their
reason counsels them to do so, nor because they have the least idea of a
State.
And to those men of our own times who hold the social life-conception, the
Christian doctrine seems to be a supernatural religion, whereas in reality
there is nothing mystical or supernatural about it; it is only a doctrine
concerning human life, corresponding with the degree of development
which man has attained, and one which he cannot refuse to accept.
The time will come, and it is already near at hand, when the Christian
foundations of life—equality, brotherly love, community of goods, non-
resistance of evil by violence—will seem as natural and simple as the
foundations of family, social, and State life appear to us at the present time.
There can be no retrogression for humanity. Men have outgrown the lower
life-conception of the family and the State, and must press forward to
embrace the next higher conception, as they have already begun to do.
This movement is accomplished in two ways: consciously, by moral causes;
unconsciously, by material ones. It rarely happens that a man changes his
mode of life at the dictates of reason; however conscious he may be of the
new design and purpose revealed to him by his reason, he goes on in the old
fashion until his life has become intolerably inconsistent, and therefore
distressing. Likewise, the larger portion of mankind, after learning through
Page 107
its religious teachers a new conception of life and its objects, to which it has
yet to adjust itself, will for a long time pursue its wonted course, and only
make the change in the end because its former life has become impossible.
In spite of the necessity for a change of life, acknowledged and proclaimed
by our religious guides and admitted by the wisest men, in spite of the
religious respect entertained for these guides, the majority of men continue
to be influenced in life, now additionally complicated, by their former
views. It is as if the father of a family, knowing well enough how to conduct
himself properly, should through force of habit or thoughtlessness continue
to live as if he were still a child.
At this very moment we are experiencing one of these transitions.
Humanity has outgrown its social, its civic age, and has entered upon a new
epoch. It knows the doctrine that must underlie the foundations of life in
this new epoch; but, yielding to inertia, it still clings to its former habits.
From this inconsistency between the theory of life and its practice follow a
series of contradictions and sufferings that embitter man's life and compel
him to make a change.
One needs but to compare the practice of life with its theory to be horrified
at the extraordinary contradictions between the conditions of life and our
inner consciousness.
Man's whole life is a continual contradiction of what he knows to be his
duty. This contradiction prevails in every department of life, in the
economical, the political, and the international. As though his intelligence
were forgotten and his faith temporarily eclipsed,—for he must have faith,
else would his life have no permanence,—he acts in direct opposition to the
dictates of his conscience and his common sense.
In our economical and international relations we are guided by the
fundamental principles of bygone ages,—principles quite contradictory to
our mental attitude and the conditions of our present life.
It was right for a man who believed in the divine origin of slavery, and in its
necessity, to live in the relation of a master to his slaves. But is such a life
possible in these days? A man of antiquity might believe himself justified in
taking advantage of his fellow-man, oppressing him for generations, merely
because he believed in diversity of origin, noble or base, descent from Ham
yet to adjust itself, will for a long time pursue its wonted course, and only
make the change in the end because its former life has become impossible.
In spite of the necessity for a change of life, acknowledged and proclaimed
by our religious guides and admitted by the wisest men, in spite of the
religious respect entertained for these guides, the majority of men continue
to be influenced in life, now additionally complicated, by their former
views. It is as if the father of a family, knowing well enough how to conduct
himself properly, should through force of habit or thoughtlessness continue
to live as if he were still a child.
At this very moment we are experiencing one of these transitions.
Humanity has outgrown its social, its civic age, and has entered upon a new
epoch. It knows the doctrine that must underlie the foundations of life in
this new epoch; but, yielding to inertia, it still clings to its former habits.
From this inconsistency between the theory of life and its practice follow a
series of contradictions and sufferings that embitter man's life and compel
him to make a change.
One needs but to compare the practice of life with its theory to be horrified
at the extraordinary contradictions between the conditions of life and our
inner consciousness.
Man's whole life is a continual contradiction of what he knows to be his
duty. This contradiction prevails in every department of life, in the
economical, the political, and the international. As though his intelligence
were forgotten and his faith temporarily eclipsed,—for he must have faith,
else would his life have no permanence,—he acts in direct opposition to the
dictates of his conscience and his common sense.
In our economical and international relations we are guided by the
fundamental principles of bygone ages,—principles quite contradictory to
our mental attitude and the conditions of our present life.
It was right for a man who believed in the divine origin of slavery, and in its
necessity, to live in the relation of a master to his slaves. But is such a life
possible in these days? A man of antiquity might believe himself justified in
taking advantage of his fellow-man, oppressing him for generations, merely
because he believed in diversity of origin, noble or base, descent from Ham
Page 108
or Japheth. Not only have the greatest philosophers of ancient times, the
teachers of mankind, Plato and Aristotle, justified the existence of slavery
and adduced proofs of its legality, but no longer than three centuries ago
those who described an ideal state of society could not picture it without
slaves.
In ancient times, and even in the Middle Ages, it was honestly thought that
men were not born equal, that the men worthy of respect were only
Persians, only Greeks, only Romans, or only Frenchmen; but no one
believes it now. And the enthusiastic advocates of the principles of
aristocracy and patriotism at this present day cannot believe in their own
statements.
We all know, and cannot help knowing, even if we had never heard it
defined and never attempted to define it ourselves, that we all possess an
inherent conviction deep in our hearts of the truth of that fundamental
doctrine of Christianity, that we are all children of one Father, yea, every
one of us, wheresoever we may live, whatsoever language we may speak;
that we are all brothers, subject only to the law of love implanted in our
hearts by our common Father.
Whatever may be the habits of thought or the degree of education of a man
of our time, whether he be an educated liberal, whatsoever his shade of
opinion, a philosopher, whatsoever may be his system, a scientist, an
economist of any of the various schools, an uneducated adherent of any
religious faith,—every man in these days knows that in the matter of life
and worldly goods all men have equal rights; that no man is either better or
worse than his fellow-men, but that all men are born free and equal. Every
man has an instinctive assurance of this fact, and yet he sees his fellow-
beings divided into two classes, the one in poverty and distress, which
labors and is oppressed, the other idle, tyrannical, luxurious; and not only
does he see all this, but, whether voluntarily or otherwise, he falls in line
with one or the other of these divisions,—a course repugnant to his reason.
Hence he must suffer both from his sense of the incongruity and his own
share in it.
Whether he be master or slave, a man in these days is forever haunted by
this distressing inconsistency between his ideal and the actual fact, nor can
he fail to perceive the suffering that springs therefrom.
teachers of mankind, Plato and Aristotle, justified the existence of slavery
and adduced proofs of its legality, but no longer than three centuries ago
those who described an ideal state of society could not picture it without
slaves.
In ancient times, and even in the Middle Ages, it was honestly thought that
men were not born equal, that the men worthy of respect were only
Persians, only Greeks, only Romans, or only Frenchmen; but no one
believes it now. And the enthusiastic advocates of the principles of
aristocracy and patriotism at this present day cannot believe in their own
statements.
We all know, and cannot help knowing, even if we had never heard it
defined and never attempted to define it ourselves, that we all possess an
inherent conviction deep in our hearts of the truth of that fundamental
doctrine of Christianity, that we are all children of one Father, yea, every
one of us, wheresoever we may live, whatsoever language we may speak;
that we are all brothers, subject only to the law of love implanted in our
hearts by our common Father.
Whatever may be the habits of thought or the degree of education of a man
of our time, whether he be an educated liberal, whatsoever his shade of
opinion, a philosopher, whatsoever may be his system, a scientist, an
economist of any of the various schools, an uneducated adherent of any
religious faith,—every man in these days knows that in the matter of life
and worldly goods all men have equal rights; that no man is either better or
worse than his fellow-men, but that all men are born free and equal. Every
man has an instinctive assurance of this fact, and yet he sees his fellow-
beings divided into two classes, the one in poverty and distress, which
labors and is oppressed, the other idle, tyrannical, luxurious; and not only
does he see all this, but, whether voluntarily or otherwise, he falls in line
with one or the other of these divisions,—a course repugnant to his reason.
Hence he must suffer both from his sense of the incongruity and his own
share in it.
Whether he be master or slave, a man in these days is forever haunted by
this distressing inconsistency between his ideal and the actual fact, nor can
he fail to perceive the suffering that springs therefrom.
Page 109
The masses—that is to say, the majority of mankind, who suffer and toil,
their lives dull and uninteresting, never enlivened by a ray of brightness,
enduring numberless privations—are those who recognize most clearly the
sharp contrasts between what is and what ought to be, between the
professions of mankind and their actions.
They know that they work like slaves, that they are perishing in want and in
darkness, that they may minister to the pleasures of the minority. And it is
this very consciousness that enhances its bitterness; indeed, it constitutes
the essence of their suffering.
A slave in old times knew that he was a slave by birth, whereas the
working-man of our day, while he feels himself to be a slave, knows that he
ought not to be one, and suffers the tortures of Tantalus from his unsatisfied
yearning for that which not only could be granted him, but which is really
his due. The sufferings of the working-classes that spring from the
contradictions of their fate are magnified tenfold by the envy and hatred
which are the natural fruits of the sense of these contradictions.
A working-man in our period, even though his work may be less fatiguing
than the labor of the ancient slave, and even were he to succeed in obtaining
the eight-hour system and twelve-and-sixpence a day, still has the worst of
it, because he manufactures objects which he will never use or enjoy;—he
is not working for himself; he works in order to gratify the luxurious and
idle, to increase the wealth of the capitalist, the mill-owner, or
manufacturer. He knows that all this goes on in a world where men
acknowledge certain propositions such as the economic principle that labor
is wealth, that it is an act of injustice to employ another man's labor for
one's own benefit, that an illegal act is punishable by law, in a world,
moreover, where the doctrine of Christ is professed,—that doctrine which
teaches us that all men are brothers, and that it is the duty of a man to serve
his neighbor and to take no unfair advantage of him.
He realizes all this, and must suffer keenly from the shocking contradiction
between the world as it should be and the world as it is. "According to what
I am told and what I hear men profess," says a working-man to himself, "I
ought to be a free man equal to any other man, and loved; I am a slave,
hated and despised." Then he in his turn is filled with hatred, and seeks to
their lives dull and uninteresting, never enlivened by a ray of brightness,
enduring numberless privations—are those who recognize most clearly the
sharp contrasts between what is and what ought to be, between the
professions of mankind and their actions.
They know that they work like slaves, that they are perishing in want and in
darkness, that they may minister to the pleasures of the minority. And it is
this very consciousness that enhances its bitterness; indeed, it constitutes
the essence of their suffering.
A slave in old times knew that he was a slave by birth, whereas the
working-man of our day, while he feels himself to be a slave, knows that he
ought not to be one, and suffers the tortures of Tantalus from his unsatisfied
yearning for that which not only could be granted him, but which is really
his due. The sufferings of the working-classes that spring from the
contradictions of their fate are magnified tenfold by the envy and hatred
which are the natural fruits of the sense of these contradictions.
A working-man in our period, even though his work may be less fatiguing
than the labor of the ancient slave, and even were he to succeed in obtaining
the eight-hour system and twelve-and-sixpence a day, still has the worst of
it, because he manufactures objects which he will never use or enjoy;—he
is not working for himself; he works in order to gratify the luxurious and
idle, to increase the wealth of the capitalist, the mill-owner, or
manufacturer. He knows that all this goes on in a world where men
acknowledge certain propositions such as the economic principle that labor
is wealth, that it is an act of injustice to employ another man's labor for
one's own benefit, that an illegal act is punishable by law, in a world,
moreover, where the doctrine of Christ is professed,—that doctrine which
teaches us that all men are brothers, and that it is the duty of a man to serve
his neighbor and to take no unfair advantage of him.
He realizes all this, and must suffer keenly from the shocking contradiction
between the world as it should be and the world as it is. "According to what
I am told and what I hear men profess," says a working-man to himself, "I
ought to be a free man equal to any other man, and loved; I am a slave,
hated and despised." Then he in his turn is filled with hatred, and seeks to
Page 110
escape from his position, to overthrow the enemy that oppresses him, and to
get the upper hand himself.
They say: "It is wrong for a workman to wish himself in the place of a
capitalist, or for a poor man to envy the rich." But this is false. If this were a
world where God had ordained masters and slaves, rich and poor, it would
be wrong for the working-man or the poor man to wish himself in the place
of the rich: but this is not so; he wishes it in a world which professes the
doctrine of the gospel, whose first principle is embodied in the relation of
the son to the Father, and consequently of fraternity and equality. And
however reluctant men may be to acknowledge it, they cannot deny that one
of the first conditions of Christian life is love, expressed, not in words, but
in deeds.
The man of education suffers even more from these inconsistencies. If he
has any faith whatever he believes, perhaps, in fraternity,—at least in the
sentiment humanity; and if not in the sentiment humanity, then in justice;
and if not in justice, then surely in science; and he cannot help knowing all
the while that the conditions of his life are opposed to every principle of
Christianity, humanity, justice, and science.
He knows that the habits of life in which he has been bred, and whose
abandonment would cause him much discomfort, can only be supported by
the weary and often suicidal labor of the down-trodden working-class—that
is, by the open infraction of those principles of Christianity, humanity,
justice, and even of science (political science), in which he professes to
believe. He affirms his faith in the principles of fraternity, humanity, justice,
and political science, and yet the oppression of the working-class is an
indispensable factor in his daily life, and he constantly employs it to attain
his own ends in spite of his principles; and he not only lives in this manner,
but he devotes all his energies to maintain a system which is directly
opposed to all his beliefs.
We are brothers: but every morning my brother or my sister performs for
me the most menial offices. We are brothers: but I must have my morning
cigar, my sugar, my mirror, or what not,—objects whose manufacture has
often cost my brothers and sisters their health, yet I do not for that reason
forbear to use these things; on the contrary, I even demand them. We are
brothers: and yet I support myself by working in some bank, commercial
get the upper hand himself.
They say: "It is wrong for a workman to wish himself in the place of a
capitalist, or for a poor man to envy the rich." But this is false. If this were a
world where God had ordained masters and slaves, rich and poor, it would
be wrong for the working-man or the poor man to wish himself in the place
of the rich: but this is not so; he wishes it in a world which professes the
doctrine of the gospel, whose first principle is embodied in the relation of
the son to the Father, and consequently of fraternity and equality. And
however reluctant men may be to acknowledge it, they cannot deny that one
of the first conditions of Christian life is love, expressed, not in words, but
in deeds.
The man of education suffers even more from these inconsistencies. If he
has any faith whatever he believes, perhaps, in fraternity,—at least in the
sentiment humanity; and if not in the sentiment humanity, then in justice;
and if not in justice, then surely in science; and he cannot help knowing all
the while that the conditions of his life are opposed to every principle of
Christianity, humanity, justice, and science.
He knows that the habits of life in which he has been bred, and whose
abandonment would cause him much discomfort, can only be supported by
the weary and often suicidal labor of the down-trodden working-class—that
is, by the open infraction of those principles of Christianity, humanity,
justice, and even of science (political science), in which he professes to
believe. He affirms his faith in the principles of fraternity, humanity, justice,
and political science, and yet the oppression of the working-class is an
indispensable factor in his daily life, and he constantly employs it to attain
his own ends in spite of his principles; and he not only lives in this manner,
but he devotes all his energies to maintain a system which is directly
opposed to all his beliefs.
We are brothers: but every morning my brother or my sister performs for
me the most menial offices. We are brothers: but I must have my morning
cigar, my sugar, my mirror, or what not,—objects whose manufacture has
often cost my brothers and sisters their health, yet I do not for that reason
forbear to use these things; on the contrary, I even demand them. We are
brothers: and yet I support myself by working in some bank, commercial
Page 111
house, or shop, and am always trying to raise the price of the necessities of
life for my brothers and sisters. We are brothers: I receive a salary for
judging, convicting, and punishing the thief or the prostitute, whose
existence is the natural outcome of my own system of life, and I fully
realize that I should neither condemn nor punish. We are all brothers: yet I
make my living by collecting taxes from the poor, that the rich may live in
luxury and idleness. We are brothers: and yet I receive a salary for
preaching a pseudo-Christian doctrine, in which I do not myself believe,
thus hindering men from discovering the true one; I receive a salary as
priest or bishop for deceiving people in a matter which is of vital
importance to them. We are brothers: but I make my brother pay for all my
services, whether I write books for him, educate him, or prescribe for him
as a physician. We are all brothers: but I receive a salary for fitting myself
to be a murderer, for learning the art of war, or for manufacturing arms and
ammunition and building fortresses.
The whole existence of our upper classes is utterly contradictory, and the
more sensitive a man's nature the more painful is the incongruity.
A man with a sensitive conscience can enjoy no peace of mind in such a
life. Even supposing that he succeeds in stifling the reproaches of his
conscience, he is still unable to conquer his fears.
Those men and women of the dominant classes who have hardened
themselves, and have succeeded in stifling their consciences, must still
suffer through their fear of the hatred they inspire. They are quite well
aware of its existence among the laboring classes; they know that it can
never die; they know, too, that the working-men realize the deceits practised
upon them, and the abuses that they endure; that they have started
organizations to throw off the yoke, and to take vengeance on their
oppressors. The happiness of the upper classes is poisoned by fear of the
impending calamity, foreshadowed by the unions, the strikes, and First of
May demonstrations. Recognizing the calamity that threatens them, their
fear turns to defiance and hatred. They know that if they relax for one
moment in this conflict with the oppressed, they are lost, because their
slaves, already embittered, grow more and more so with every day's
oppression. The oppressors, though they may see it, cannot cease to
oppress. They realize that they themselves are doomed from the moment
they abate one jot of their severity. So they go on in their career of
life for my brothers and sisters. We are brothers: I receive a salary for
judging, convicting, and punishing the thief or the prostitute, whose
existence is the natural outcome of my own system of life, and I fully
realize that I should neither condemn nor punish. We are all brothers: yet I
make my living by collecting taxes from the poor, that the rich may live in
luxury and idleness. We are brothers: and yet I receive a salary for
preaching a pseudo-Christian doctrine, in which I do not myself believe,
thus hindering men from discovering the true one; I receive a salary as
priest or bishop for deceiving people in a matter which is of vital
importance to them. We are brothers: but I make my brother pay for all my
services, whether I write books for him, educate him, or prescribe for him
as a physician. We are all brothers: but I receive a salary for fitting myself
to be a murderer, for learning the art of war, or for manufacturing arms and
ammunition and building fortresses.
The whole existence of our upper classes is utterly contradictory, and the
more sensitive a man's nature the more painful is the incongruity.
A man with a sensitive conscience can enjoy no peace of mind in such a
life. Even supposing that he succeeds in stifling the reproaches of his
conscience, he is still unable to conquer his fears.
Those men and women of the dominant classes who have hardened
themselves, and have succeeded in stifling their consciences, must still
suffer through their fear of the hatred they inspire. They are quite well
aware of its existence among the laboring classes; they know that it can
never die; they know, too, that the working-men realize the deceits practised
upon them, and the abuses that they endure; that they have started
organizations to throw off the yoke, and to take vengeance on their
oppressors. The happiness of the upper classes is poisoned by fear of the
impending calamity, foreshadowed by the unions, the strikes, and First of
May demonstrations. Recognizing the calamity that threatens them, their
fear turns to defiance and hatred. They know that if they relax for one
moment in this conflict with the oppressed, they are lost, because their
slaves, already embittered, grow more and more so with every day's
oppression. The oppressors, though they may see it, cannot cease to
oppress. They realize that they themselves are doomed from the moment
they abate one jot of their severity. So they go on in their career of
Page 112
oppression, notwithstanding their affectation of interest in the welfare of the
working-men, the eight-hour system, the laws restricting the labor of
women and children, the pensions, and the rewards. All this is mere
pretense, or at best the natural anxiety of the master to keep his slave in
good condition; but the slave remains a slave all the while, and the master,
who cannot live without the slave, is less willing than ever to set him free.
The governing classes find themselves in regard to the working-men very
much in the position of one who has overthrown his opponent, and who
holds him down, not so much because he does not choose to let him escape,
but because he knows that should he for one moment lose his hold on him,
he would lose his own life, for the vanquished man is infuriated, and holds
a knife in his hand.
Hence our wealthy classes, whether their consciences be tender or
hardened, cannot enjoy the advantages they have wrung from the poor, as
did the ancients, who were convinced of the justice of their position. All the
pleasures of life are poisoned either by remorse or fear.
Such is the economic inconsistency. Still more striking is that of the civil
power.
A man is trained first of all in habits of obedience to state laws. At the
present time every act of our lives is under the supervision of the State, and
in accordance with its dictates a man marries and is divorced, rears his
children, and in some countries accepts the religion it prescribes. What is
this law, then, that determines the life of mankind? Do men believe in it?
Do they consider it true? Not at all. In most cases they recognize its
injustice, they despise it, and yet they obey it. It was fit that the ancients
should obey their law. It was chiefly religious, and they sincerely believed it
to be the only true law, to which all men owed obedience. Is that the case
with us? We cannot refuse to acknowledge that the law of our State is not
the eternal law, but only one of the many laws of many states, all equally
imperfect, and frequently wholly false and unjust,—a law that has been
openly discussed in all its aspects by the public press. It was fit that the
Hebrew should obey his laws, since he never doubted that the finger of God
Himself had traced them; or for the Roman, who believed that he received
them from the nymph Egeria; or even for those peoples who believed that
the rulers who made the laws were anointed of God, or that legislative
assemblies have both the will and the ability to devise laws as good as
working-men, the eight-hour system, the laws restricting the labor of
women and children, the pensions, and the rewards. All this is mere
pretense, or at best the natural anxiety of the master to keep his slave in
good condition; but the slave remains a slave all the while, and the master,
who cannot live without the slave, is less willing than ever to set him free.
The governing classes find themselves in regard to the working-men very
much in the position of one who has overthrown his opponent, and who
holds him down, not so much because he does not choose to let him escape,
but because he knows that should he for one moment lose his hold on him,
he would lose his own life, for the vanquished man is infuriated, and holds
a knife in his hand.
Hence our wealthy classes, whether their consciences be tender or
hardened, cannot enjoy the advantages they have wrung from the poor, as
did the ancients, who were convinced of the justice of their position. All the
pleasures of life are poisoned either by remorse or fear.
Such is the economic inconsistency. Still more striking is that of the civil
power.
A man is trained first of all in habits of obedience to state laws. At the
present time every act of our lives is under the supervision of the State, and
in accordance with its dictates a man marries and is divorced, rears his
children, and in some countries accepts the religion it prescribes. What is
this law, then, that determines the life of mankind? Do men believe in it?
Do they consider it true? Not at all. In most cases they recognize its
injustice, they despise it, and yet they obey it. It was fit that the ancients
should obey their law. It was chiefly religious, and they sincerely believed it
to be the only true law, to which all men owed obedience. Is that the case
with us? We cannot refuse to acknowledge that the law of our State is not
the eternal law, but only one of the many laws of many states, all equally
imperfect, and frequently wholly false and unjust,—a law that has been
openly discussed in all its aspects by the public press. It was fit that the
Hebrew should obey his laws, since he never doubted that the finger of God
Himself had traced them; or for the Roman, who believed that he received
them from the nymph Egeria; or even for those peoples who believed that
the rulers who made the laws were anointed of God, or that legislative
assemblies have both the will and the ability to devise laws as good as
Page 113
possible. But we know that laws are the offspring of party conflicts, false
dealing, and the greed of gain, that they are not, and can never be, the
depository of true justice; and therefore it is impossible for people of the
present day to believe that obedience to civil or state laws can ever satisfy
the rational demands of human nature. Men have long since realized that
there is no sense in obeying a law whose honesty is more than doubtful, and
therefore they must suffer when, though privately denying its prerogative,
they still conform to it. When a man's whole life is held in bondage by laws
whose injustice, cruelty, and artificiality he plainly discerns, and yet is
compelled to obey these laws under penalty of punishment, he must suffer;
it cannot be otherwise.
We recognize the disadvantages of custom-houses and import duties, but we
are yet obliged to pay them; we see the folly of supporting the court and its
numerous officials, we admit the harmful influence of church preaching,
and still we are compelled to support both; we also admit the cruel and
iniquitous punishments inflicted by the courts, and yet we play our part in
them; we acknowledge that the distribution of land is wrong and immoral,
but we have to submit to it; and despite the fact that we deny the necessity
for armies or warfare, we are made to bear the heavy burden of supporting
armies and waging war.
These contradictions, however, are but trifling in comparison with the one
which confronts us in the problem of our international relations, and which
cries aloud for solution, since both human reason and human life are at
stake, and this is the antagonism between the Christian faith and war.
We, Christian nations, whose spiritual life is one and the same, who
welcome the birth of every wholesome and profitable thought with joy and
pride, from whatsoever quarter of the globe it may spring, regardless of race
or creed; we, who love not only the philanthropists, the poets, the
philosophers, and the scientists of other lands; we, who take as much pride
in the heroism of a Father Damien as if it was our own; we, who love the
French, the Germans, the Americans, and the English, not only esteeming
their qualities, but ready to meet them with cordial friendship; we, who not
only would be shocked to consider war with them in the light of an exploit,
—when we picture to ourselves the possibility that at some future day a
difference may arise between us that can only be reconciled by murder, and
dealing, and the greed of gain, that they are not, and can never be, the
depository of true justice; and therefore it is impossible for people of the
present day to believe that obedience to civil or state laws can ever satisfy
the rational demands of human nature. Men have long since realized that
there is no sense in obeying a law whose honesty is more than doubtful, and
therefore they must suffer when, though privately denying its prerogative,
they still conform to it. When a man's whole life is held in bondage by laws
whose injustice, cruelty, and artificiality he plainly discerns, and yet is
compelled to obey these laws under penalty of punishment, he must suffer;
it cannot be otherwise.
We recognize the disadvantages of custom-houses and import duties, but we
are yet obliged to pay them; we see the folly of supporting the court and its
numerous officials, we admit the harmful influence of church preaching,
and still we are compelled to support both; we also admit the cruel and
iniquitous punishments inflicted by the courts, and yet we play our part in
them; we acknowledge that the distribution of land is wrong and immoral,
but we have to submit to it; and despite the fact that we deny the necessity
for armies or warfare, we are made to bear the heavy burden of supporting
armies and waging war.
These contradictions, however, are but trifling in comparison with the one
which confronts us in the problem of our international relations, and which
cries aloud for solution, since both human reason and human life are at
stake, and this is the antagonism between the Christian faith and war.
We, Christian nations, whose spiritual life is one and the same, who
welcome the birth of every wholesome and profitable thought with joy and
pride, from whatsoever quarter of the globe it may spring, regardless of race
or creed; we, who love not only the philanthropists, the poets, the
philosophers, and the scientists of other lands; we, who take as much pride
in the heroism of a Father Damien as if it was our own; we, who love the
French, the Germans, the Americans, and the English, not only esteeming
their qualities, but ready to meet them with cordial friendship; we, who not
only would be shocked to consider war with them in the light of an exploit,
—when we picture to ourselves the possibility that at some future day a
difference may arise between us that can only be reconciled by murder, and
Page 114
that any one of us may be called upon to play his part in an inevitable
tragedy,—we shudder at the thought.
It was well enough for a Hebrew, a Greek, or a Roman to maintain the
independence of his country by murder, and even to subdue other nations by
the same means, because he firmly believed himself a member of the one
favored people beloved by God, and that all the others were Philistines and
barbarians. Also, in the times of the Middle Ages men might well have held
these opinions, and even they who lived toward the end of the last century
and at the beginning of this. But we, whatever provocation may be offered
us, we cannot possibly believe as they did; and this difficulty is so painful
for us in these times that it has become impossible to live without trying to
solve it.
"We live in a time replete with contradictions," writes Count Komarovsky,
the Professor of International Law, in his learned treatise. "Everywhere the
tone of the public press seems to indicate a general desire for peace, and
shows the need of it for all nations. And the representatives of the
government, in their private as well as in their public capacity, in
parliamentary speeches and diplomatic negotiations, express themselves in
the same temper. Nevertheless, the governments increase the military force
year after year, impose new taxes, negotiate loans, and will leave as a
legacy to future generations the responsibilities of the present mistaken
policy. How are the word and the deed at variance!
"By way of justification the governments claim that all their armaments and
the consequent outlay are simply defensive in their character, but to the
uninitiated the question naturally suggests itself: Whence is to come the
attack if all the great powers are devoting themselves to a defensive policy?
It certainly looks as if each one of them lived in hourly expectation of
attack from his neighbor, and the consequence is a strife between the
different governments to surpass each other in strength. The very existence
of this spirit of rivalry favors the chances of war: the nations, no longer able
to support the increased armament, will sooner or later prefer open war to
the tension in which they live and the ruin which menaces them, so that the
slightest pretext will avail to kindle in Europe the conflagration of a general
war. It is a mistake to suppose that such a crisis will heal the political and
economic ills under which we groan. The experience of late wars shows us
that each one served only to exacerbate the animosity of the nations against
tragedy,—we shudder at the thought.
It was well enough for a Hebrew, a Greek, or a Roman to maintain the
independence of his country by murder, and even to subdue other nations by
the same means, because he firmly believed himself a member of the one
favored people beloved by God, and that all the others were Philistines and
barbarians. Also, in the times of the Middle Ages men might well have held
these opinions, and even they who lived toward the end of the last century
and at the beginning of this. But we, whatever provocation may be offered
us, we cannot possibly believe as they did; and this difficulty is so painful
for us in these times that it has become impossible to live without trying to
solve it.
"We live in a time replete with contradictions," writes Count Komarovsky,
the Professor of International Law, in his learned treatise. "Everywhere the
tone of the public press seems to indicate a general desire for peace, and
shows the need of it for all nations. And the representatives of the
government, in their private as well as in their public capacity, in
parliamentary speeches and diplomatic negotiations, express themselves in
the same temper. Nevertheless, the governments increase the military force
year after year, impose new taxes, negotiate loans, and will leave as a
legacy to future generations the responsibilities of the present mistaken
policy. How are the word and the deed at variance!
"By way of justification the governments claim that all their armaments and
the consequent outlay are simply defensive in their character, but to the
uninitiated the question naturally suggests itself: Whence is to come the
attack if all the great powers are devoting themselves to a defensive policy?
It certainly looks as if each one of them lived in hourly expectation of
attack from his neighbor, and the consequence is a strife between the
different governments to surpass each other in strength. The very existence
of this spirit of rivalry favors the chances of war: the nations, no longer able
to support the increased armament, will sooner or later prefer open war to
the tension in which they live and the ruin which menaces them, so that the
slightest pretext will avail to kindle in Europe the conflagration of a general
war. It is a mistake to suppose that such a crisis will heal the political and
economic ills under which we groan. The experience of late wars shows us
that each one served only to exacerbate the animosity of the nations against
Page 115
each other, to increase the unbearable burden of military despotism, and has
involved the political and economic situation of Europe in a more
melancholy and pitiable plight than ever."
"Contemporary Europe keeps under arms nine millions of men," says
Enrico Ferri, "and a reserve force of fifteen millions, at a cost of four
milliards of francs a year. By increasing its armament it paralyzes more and
more the springs of social and individual welfare, and may be compared to
a man who, in order to obtain weapons, condemns himself to anæmia,
thereby depriving himself of the strength to use the weapons he is
accumulating, whose weight will eventually overpower him."
The same idea has been expressed by Charles Booth, in his address
delivered in London, July 26, 1887, before the Association for the Reform
and Codification of National Laws. Having mentioned the same numbers,—
over nine millions in active service and fifteen millions in reserve, and the
enormous sums required to support these armies and armaments,—he says,
in substance: "These numbers represent but a small part of the actual
expenditure, because outside of the expenses enumerated in the budgets of
the nations we must take into consideration the great losses to society from
the removal of so many able-bodied men, lost to industry in all its branches,
and moreover, the interest on the enormous sums spent in military
preparations, which yield no returns. As might be expected, the constantly
increasing national debts are the inevitable result of these outlays in
preparation for war. By far the greater proportion of the debt of Europe has
been contracted for munitions of war. The sum total is four milliards of
pounds, or forty milliards of roubles, and these debts are increasing every
year."
Komarovsky, whom we lately quoted, says elsewhere: "We are living in
hard times. Everywhere we hear complaints of the stagnation of commerce
and industry, and of the wretched economical situation. They tell us of the
hard conditions of life among the laboring classes and the general
impoverishment of the people. But regardless of this, governments,
determined to maintain their independence, go to the utmost limits of folly.
Additional taxes are levied on every side, and the financial oppression of
the people knows no bounds. If we glance at the budgets of European states
for the last hundred years, we shall be struck with their constantly
involved the political and economic situation of Europe in a more
melancholy and pitiable plight than ever."
"Contemporary Europe keeps under arms nine millions of men," says
Enrico Ferri, "and a reserve force of fifteen millions, at a cost of four
milliards of francs a year. By increasing its armament it paralyzes more and
more the springs of social and individual welfare, and may be compared to
a man who, in order to obtain weapons, condemns himself to anæmia,
thereby depriving himself of the strength to use the weapons he is
accumulating, whose weight will eventually overpower him."
The same idea has been expressed by Charles Booth, in his address
delivered in London, July 26, 1887, before the Association for the Reform
and Codification of National Laws. Having mentioned the same numbers,—
over nine millions in active service and fifteen millions in reserve, and the
enormous sums required to support these armies and armaments,—he says,
in substance: "These numbers represent but a small part of the actual
expenditure, because outside of the expenses enumerated in the budgets of
the nations we must take into consideration the great losses to society from
the removal of so many able-bodied men, lost to industry in all its branches,
and moreover, the interest on the enormous sums spent in military
preparations, which yield no returns. As might be expected, the constantly
increasing national debts are the inevitable result of these outlays in
preparation for war. By far the greater proportion of the debt of Europe has
been contracted for munitions of war. The sum total is four milliards of
pounds, or forty milliards of roubles, and these debts are increasing every
year."
Komarovsky, whom we lately quoted, says elsewhere: "We are living in
hard times. Everywhere we hear complaints of the stagnation of commerce
and industry, and of the wretched economical situation. They tell us of the
hard conditions of life among the laboring classes and the general
impoverishment of the people. But regardless of this, governments,
determined to maintain their independence, go to the utmost limits of folly.
Additional taxes are levied on every side, and the financial oppression of
the people knows no bounds. If we glance at the budgets of European states
for the last hundred years, we shall be struck with their constantly
Page 116
increasing figures. How can we explain this abnormal condition that sooner
or later threatens to overwhelm us with inevitable bankruptcy?
"Most assuredly it is caused by the expense of maintaining armies, which
absorbs one-third, or even one-half, of the budget of all European nations.
The saddest part of it, however, is that there is no end to this increase of
budgets and consequent impoverishment of the masses. What is socialism
but a protest against the abnormal situation in which the majority of
mankind of our continent finds itself?"
"We are being ruined," says Frédéric Passy, in a paper read before the last
Peace Congress in London (1890), "to enable us to take part in the senseless
wars of the future, or to pay the interest of debts left us by the criminal and
insane wars and contests of the past. We shall perish with hunger, to have
success in murder."
Going on to speak of the opinion of France in regard to this matter, he says:
"We believe that now, a hundred years after the proclamation formulating
the belief in the rights of men and citizens, the time has come to declare the
rights of nations and to repudiate once and for all time those undertakings
of fraud and violence, which, under the name of conquests, are actually
crimes against humanity, and which, however much the pride of nations or
the ambition of monarchs may seek to justify them, serve only to enervate
the conquerors."
"I am always very much surprised at the way religion is carried on in this
country," says Sir Wilfred Lawson before the same Congress. "You send a
boy to the Sunday-school, and you tell him: 'My dear boy, you must love
your enemies; if any boy strikes you, don't strike him again; try to reform
him by loving him.' Well, the boy goes to the Sunday-school till he is
fourteen or fifteen years of age, and then his friends say, 'Put him in the
army.' What has he to do in the army? Why, not love his enemies, but
whenever he sees an enemy, to run him through the body with a bayonet is
the nature of all religious teaching in this country. I do not think that that is
a very good way of carrying out the precepts of religion. I think if it is a
good thing for the boy to love his enemy, it is a good thing for the man to
love his enemy."...
And later!
or later threatens to overwhelm us with inevitable bankruptcy?
"Most assuredly it is caused by the expense of maintaining armies, which
absorbs one-third, or even one-half, of the budget of all European nations.
The saddest part of it, however, is that there is no end to this increase of
budgets and consequent impoverishment of the masses. What is socialism
but a protest against the abnormal situation in which the majority of
mankind of our continent finds itself?"
"We are being ruined," says Frédéric Passy, in a paper read before the last
Peace Congress in London (1890), "to enable us to take part in the senseless
wars of the future, or to pay the interest of debts left us by the criminal and
insane wars and contests of the past. We shall perish with hunger, to have
success in murder."
Going on to speak of the opinion of France in regard to this matter, he says:
"We believe that now, a hundred years after the proclamation formulating
the belief in the rights of men and citizens, the time has come to declare the
rights of nations and to repudiate once and for all time those undertakings
of fraud and violence, which, under the name of conquests, are actually
crimes against humanity, and which, however much the pride of nations or
the ambition of monarchs may seek to justify them, serve only to enervate
the conquerors."
"I am always very much surprised at the way religion is carried on in this
country," says Sir Wilfred Lawson before the same Congress. "You send a
boy to the Sunday-school, and you tell him: 'My dear boy, you must love
your enemies; if any boy strikes you, don't strike him again; try to reform
him by loving him.' Well, the boy goes to the Sunday-school till he is
fourteen or fifteen years of age, and then his friends say, 'Put him in the
army.' What has he to do in the army? Why, not love his enemies, but
whenever he sees an enemy, to run him through the body with a bayonet is
the nature of all religious teaching in this country. I do not think that that is
a very good way of carrying out the precepts of religion. I think if it is a
good thing for the boy to love his enemy, it is a good thing for the man to
love his enemy."...
And later!
Page 117
"In Europe great Christian nations keep among them 28,000,000 of armed
men to settle quarrels by killing one another, instead of by arguing. This is
what the Christian nations of the world are doing at this moment. It is a
very expensive way also; for in a publication which I saw—I believe it was
correct—it was made out that since the year 1812 these nations had spent
the almost incredible amount of 1,500,000,000 of money in preparing and
settling their quarrels by killing one another. Now it seems to me that with
that state of things one of two positions must be accepted,—either that
Christianity is a failure, or that those who profess to expound Christianity
have failed in expounding it properly."
"So long as our men-of-war are not disarmed and our army not disbanded,
we have no right to be called a Christian nation," said Mr. F. L. Wilson.
In a conversation in regard to the duty of Christian ministers in the matter
of preaching against war, Mr. G. D. Bartlett remarked, among other things:
—
"If I understand the Scriptures, I say that men are only playing with
Christianity when they ignore this question.... I have lived a long life, I have
heard many sermons, and I can say without any exaggeration that I never
heard universal peace recommended from the pulpit half a dozen times in
my life.... Some twenty years ago I happened to stand in a drawing-room
where there were forty or fifty people, and I dared to make the proposition
that war was incompatible with Christianity. They looked upon me as an
arrant fanatic. The idea that we could get on without war was regarded as
unmitigated weakness and folly."
A Catholic priest, the Abbé Defourny, has spoken in a similar spirit. "One of
the first commandments of the eternal law, engraved in every man's
conscience," says the Abbé Defourny, "forbids a man to take his neighbor's
life or shed his blood" (without sufficient cause, being forced to it by stress
of circumstance). "This is a commandment more deeply engraved in the
human heart than all the others.... But as soon as it becomes a question of
war, that is, a question of the wholesale shedding of human blood, men in
these days do not wait for a sufficient cause. Those who are active in war
forget to ask themselves if there is any justification for the numerous
manslaughters that take place, whether they are just or unjust, legal or
illegal, innocent or criminal, or whether they break the principal law that
men to settle quarrels by killing one another, instead of by arguing. This is
what the Christian nations of the world are doing at this moment. It is a
very expensive way also; for in a publication which I saw—I believe it was
correct—it was made out that since the year 1812 these nations had spent
the almost incredible amount of 1,500,000,000 of money in preparing and
settling their quarrels by killing one another. Now it seems to me that with
that state of things one of two positions must be accepted,—either that
Christianity is a failure, or that those who profess to expound Christianity
have failed in expounding it properly."
"So long as our men-of-war are not disarmed and our army not disbanded,
we have no right to be called a Christian nation," said Mr. F. L. Wilson.
In a conversation in regard to the duty of Christian ministers in the matter
of preaching against war, Mr. G. D. Bartlett remarked, among other things:
—
"If I understand the Scriptures, I say that men are only playing with
Christianity when they ignore this question.... I have lived a long life, I have
heard many sermons, and I can say without any exaggeration that I never
heard universal peace recommended from the pulpit half a dozen times in
my life.... Some twenty years ago I happened to stand in a drawing-room
where there were forty or fifty people, and I dared to make the proposition
that war was incompatible with Christianity. They looked upon me as an
arrant fanatic. The idea that we could get on without war was regarded as
unmitigated weakness and folly."
A Catholic priest, the Abbé Defourny, has spoken in a similar spirit. "One of
the first commandments of the eternal law, engraved in every man's
conscience," says the Abbé Defourny, "forbids a man to take his neighbor's
life or shed his blood" (without sufficient cause, being forced to it by stress
of circumstance). "This is a commandment more deeply engraved in the
human heart than all the others.... But as soon as it becomes a question of
war, that is, a question of the wholesale shedding of human blood, men in
these days do not wait for a sufficient cause. Those who are active in war
forget to ask themselves if there is any justification for the numerous
manslaughters that take place, whether they are just or unjust, legal or
illegal, innocent or criminal, or whether they break the principal law that
Page 118
forbids us to commit murder" (without just cause). "Their conscience is
silent.... War has ceased to be a matter connected with morality. The soldier,
amid all the fatigues and dangers he undergoes, knows no joy but conquest,
no sorrow but defeat. Don't tell me that they serve the country. A great
genius has long ago answered this statement in words that have since
become a proverb: 'Take away justice, and what is then a nation but a great
band of robbers? And is not a band of robbers in itself a small state? They,
too, have their laws. They, too, fight for booty, and even honor.'
"The aim of this organization" (it was a question of establishing
international tribunals) "is to influence the European nations until they
cease to be nations of thieves, and their armies bands of robbers. Yes, our
armies are nothing less than a rabble of slaves belonging to one or two
monarchs and their ministers, who, as we all know, rule them tyrannically
and without any responsibility other than nominal, as we know.
"It is the characteristic of a slave that he is a tool in the hands of his master.
Such are the soldiers, officers, and generals, who at the beck of their
sovereign go forth to slay or to be slain. There is a military slavery, and it is
the worst of all slaveries, particularly now, when by means of conscription
it forges chains for the necks of all the free and strong men of the nation, in
order to use them as instruments of murder, to make them executioners and
butchers of human flesh, since that is the sole reason why they are drafted
and drilled....
"Two or three potentates in their cabinets make treaties, without protocols,
without publicity, and therefore without responsibility, sending men to the
slaughter.
"'Protests against increased armaments began before our time,' said Signor
E. G. Moneta. Listen to Montesquieu: 'France' (for France we might now
substitute Europe) 'is perishing from an overgrown army. A new disease is
spreading throughout Europe. It has affected kings, and obliges them to
maintain an incredible number of troops. It is like a rash, and therefore
contagious; for no sooner does one nation increase its troops than all the
others follow suit. Nothing can result from this condition of affairs but
general calamity.
"'Each government maintains as many troops as it would require if its
people were threatened with destruction, and this state of tension is called
silent.... War has ceased to be a matter connected with morality. The soldier,
amid all the fatigues and dangers he undergoes, knows no joy but conquest,
no sorrow but defeat. Don't tell me that they serve the country. A great
genius has long ago answered this statement in words that have since
become a proverb: 'Take away justice, and what is then a nation but a great
band of robbers? And is not a band of robbers in itself a small state? They,
too, have their laws. They, too, fight for booty, and even honor.'
"The aim of this organization" (it was a question of establishing
international tribunals) "is to influence the European nations until they
cease to be nations of thieves, and their armies bands of robbers. Yes, our
armies are nothing less than a rabble of slaves belonging to one or two
monarchs and their ministers, who, as we all know, rule them tyrannically
and without any responsibility other than nominal, as we know.
"It is the characteristic of a slave that he is a tool in the hands of his master.
Such are the soldiers, officers, and generals, who at the beck of their
sovereign go forth to slay or to be slain. There is a military slavery, and it is
the worst of all slaveries, particularly now, when by means of conscription
it forges chains for the necks of all the free and strong men of the nation, in
order to use them as instruments of murder, to make them executioners and
butchers of human flesh, since that is the sole reason why they are drafted
and drilled....
"Two or three potentates in their cabinets make treaties, without protocols,
without publicity, and therefore without responsibility, sending men to the
slaughter.
"'Protests against increased armaments began before our time,' said Signor
E. G. Moneta. Listen to Montesquieu: 'France' (for France we might now
substitute Europe) 'is perishing from an overgrown army. A new disease is
spreading throughout Europe. It has affected kings, and obliges them to
maintain an incredible number of troops. It is like a rash, and therefore
contagious; for no sooner does one nation increase its troops than all the
others follow suit. Nothing can result from this condition of affairs but
general calamity.
"'Each government maintains as many troops as it would require if its
people were threatened with destruction, and this state of tension is called
Page 119
peace. Europe is in truth ruined. If private individuals were reduced to such
straits as these, the richest man among them would be practically destitute.
The wealth of the world and its commerce are in our hands, and yet we are
poor.'
"This was written almost 150 years ago. It seems like a picture of the
present. One thing alone has changed—the form of government. In the time
of Montesquieu it was said that the reason for the maintenance of large
armies might be found in the unlimited power of kings, who carried on war
in the hope of increasing their private property and their glory.
"Then it was said: 'Ah! if the people could but choose representatives who
would have a right to refuse the governments when they called for soldiers
and money—there would be an end of a military policy.' Now, almost
everywhere in Europe there are representative governments, and still the
military expenditure in preparation for war has increased in frightful
proportion.
"It looks as though the folly of the rulers had passed into the ruling classes.
Now they no longer fight because one king has been rude to another king's
mistress, as in the time of Louis XIV., but by exaggerating the importance
of national dignity and patriotism,—emotions which are natural and
honorable in themselves,—and exciting the public opinion of one country
against the other, until they have arrived at such a pitch of sensitiveness that
it is enough to say, for instance (even were the report to prove false), one
country has refused to receive the ambassador of another, to precipitate the
most frightful and disastrous war. Europe maintains under arms at the
present time more soldiers than were in the field during the great wars of
Napoleon. Every citizen on our continent, with a few exceptions, is forced
to spend several years in the barracks. Fortresses, arsenals, men-of-war are
built, new firearms are invented, which in a short time are replaced by
others, because science, which should always be devoted to the promotion
of human welfare, contributes, it must be regretfully acknowledged, to
human destruction, inventing ever new means of killing greater numbers of
men in the shortest possible time.
"In these stupendous preparations for slaughter, and in the maintenance of
these vast numbers of troops, hundreds of millions are yearly expended—
sums that would suffice to educate the masses, and to carry on the most
straits as these, the richest man among them would be practically destitute.
The wealth of the world and its commerce are in our hands, and yet we are
poor.'
"This was written almost 150 years ago. It seems like a picture of the
present. One thing alone has changed—the form of government. In the time
of Montesquieu it was said that the reason for the maintenance of large
armies might be found in the unlimited power of kings, who carried on war
in the hope of increasing their private property and their glory.
"Then it was said: 'Ah! if the people could but choose representatives who
would have a right to refuse the governments when they called for soldiers
and money—there would be an end of a military policy.' Now, almost
everywhere in Europe there are representative governments, and still the
military expenditure in preparation for war has increased in frightful
proportion.
"It looks as though the folly of the rulers had passed into the ruling classes.
Now they no longer fight because one king has been rude to another king's
mistress, as in the time of Louis XIV., but by exaggerating the importance
of national dignity and patriotism,—emotions which are natural and
honorable in themselves,—and exciting the public opinion of one country
against the other, until they have arrived at such a pitch of sensitiveness that
it is enough to say, for instance (even were the report to prove false), one
country has refused to receive the ambassador of another, to precipitate the
most frightful and disastrous war. Europe maintains under arms at the
present time more soldiers than were in the field during the great wars of
Napoleon. Every citizen on our continent, with a few exceptions, is forced
to spend several years in the barracks. Fortresses, arsenals, men-of-war are
built, new firearms are invented, which in a short time are replaced by
others, because science, which should always be devoted to the promotion
of human welfare, contributes, it must be regretfully acknowledged, to
human destruction, inventing ever new means of killing greater numbers of
men in the shortest possible time.
"In these stupendous preparations for slaughter, and in the maintenance of
these vast numbers of troops, hundreds of millions are yearly expended—
sums that would suffice to educate the masses, and to carry on the most
Page 120
important works of public improvement, thereby contributing toward a
perfect solution of the social problem.
"Therefore, notwithstanding all our scientific victories, Europe finds herself
in this respect not one whit better off than she was in the most barbarous
times of the Middle Ages. Every one laments a state of things which is
neither war nor peace, and longs to be delivered from it. The heads of
governments emphatically affirm that they desire peace, and eagerly
emulate each other in their pacific utterances, but almost immediately
thereafter they propose to the legislative assemblies measures for increasing
the armament, asserting that they take these precautions for the preservation
of peace.
"But this is not the sort of peace we care for, and the nations are not
deceived by it. True peace has for its foundation mutual confidence,
whereas these appalling armaments show, if not a declared hostility, at least
a secret distrust among the different nations. What should we say of a man
who, wishing to show his friendly feelings to his neighbor, should invite
him to consider a certain scheme, holding a loaded pistol while he unfolds it
before him?
"It is this monstrous contradiction between the assurances of peace and the
military policy of the governments, that good citizens wish to put an end to,
at any cost."
One is amazed to learn that there are 60,000 suicides reported in Europe,
not including Turkey and Russia, every year, and these are all well-
substantiated cases; but it would be far more remarkable if the number were
less. Any man in these times who investigates the antagonism between his
convictions and his actions, finds himself in a desperate plight. Setting aside
the many other contradictions between actual life and conviction which
abound in the life of a man of the present day, to view the military situation
in Europe in the light of its profession of Christianity is enough to make a
man doubt the existence of human reason, and drive him to escape from a
barbarous and insane world by putting an end to his own life. This
inconsistency, which is the very quintessence of all the others, is so
shocking, that one can only go on living and taking any part in it, by dint of
trying not to think about it,—to forget it all.
perfect solution of the social problem.
"Therefore, notwithstanding all our scientific victories, Europe finds herself
in this respect not one whit better off than she was in the most barbarous
times of the Middle Ages. Every one laments a state of things which is
neither war nor peace, and longs to be delivered from it. The heads of
governments emphatically affirm that they desire peace, and eagerly
emulate each other in their pacific utterances, but almost immediately
thereafter they propose to the legislative assemblies measures for increasing
the armament, asserting that they take these precautions for the preservation
of peace.
"But this is not the sort of peace we care for, and the nations are not
deceived by it. True peace has for its foundation mutual confidence,
whereas these appalling armaments show, if not a declared hostility, at least
a secret distrust among the different nations. What should we say of a man
who, wishing to show his friendly feelings to his neighbor, should invite
him to consider a certain scheme, holding a loaded pistol while he unfolds it
before him?
"It is this monstrous contradiction between the assurances of peace and the
military policy of the governments, that good citizens wish to put an end to,
at any cost."
One is amazed to learn that there are 60,000 suicides reported in Europe,
not including Turkey and Russia, every year, and these are all well-
substantiated cases; but it would be far more remarkable if the number were
less. Any man in these times who investigates the antagonism between his
convictions and his actions, finds himself in a desperate plight. Setting aside
the many other contradictions between actual life and conviction which
abound in the life of a man of the present day, to view the military situation
in Europe in the light of its profession of Christianity is enough to make a
man doubt the existence of human reason, and drive him to escape from a
barbarous and insane world by putting an end to his own life. This
inconsistency, which is the very quintessence of all the others, is so
shocking, that one can only go on living and taking any part in it, by dint of
trying not to think about it,—to forget it all.
Page 121
What can it mean? We are Christians, who not only profess to love one
another, but are actually leading one common life; our pulses beat in
harmony; we meet each other in love and sympathy, deriving support and
counsel from our mutual intercourse. Were it not for this sympathy life
would have no meaning. But at any moment some demented ruler may utter
a few rash words, to which another gives reply, and lo! I am ordered to
march at the risk of my life, to slay those who have never injured me, whom
I really love. And it is no remote contingency, but an inevitable climax for
which we are all preparing ourselves.
Fully to realize this is enough to drive one to madness and to suicide, and
this is but too common an occurrence, especially among soldiers.
A moment's reflection shows us why this seems an inevitable conclusion.
It explains the frightful intensity with which men plunge into all kinds of
dissipation,—wine, tobacco, cards, newspaper reading, travel, all manner of
shows and pleasures. They pursue all these amusements in deadly earnest,
as if they were serious avocations, as indeed they are. If men possessed
none of these distractions, half of them would kill themselves out of hand,
for to live a life that is made up of contradictions is simply unbearable, and
such is the life that most of us lead at the present day. We are living in direct
contradiction to our inmost convictions. This contradiction is evident both
in economic and in political relations; it is manifested most unmistakably in
the inconsistency of the acknowledgment of the Christian law of brotherly
love and military conscription, which obliges men to hold themselves in
readiness to take each other's lives,—in short, every man to be at once a
Christian and a gladiator.
another, but are actually leading one common life; our pulses beat in
harmony; we meet each other in love and sympathy, deriving support and
counsel from our mutual intercourse. Were it not for this sympathy life
would have no meaning. But at any moment some demented ruler may utter
a few rash words, to which another gives reply, and lo! I am ordered to
march at the risk of my life, to slay those who have never injured me, whom
I really love. And it is no remote contingency, but an inevitable climax for
which we are all preparing ourselves.
Fully to realize this is enough to drive one to madness and to suicide, and
this is but too common an occurrence, especially among soldiers.
A moment's reflection shows us why this seems an inevitable conclusion.
It explains the frightful intensity with which men plunge into all kinds of
dissipation,—wine, tobacco, cards, newspaper reading, travel, all manner of
shows and pleasures. They pursue all these amusements in deadly earnest,
as if they were serious avocations, as indeed they are. If men possessed
none of these distractions, half of them would kill themselves out of hand,
for to live a life that is made up of contradictions is simply unbearable, and
such is the life that most of us lead at the present day. We are living in direct
contradiction to our inmost convictions. This contradiction is evident both
in economic and in political relations; it is manifested most unmistakably in
the inconsistency of the acknowledgment of the Christian law of brotherly
love and military conscription, which obliges men to hold themselves in
readiness to take each other's lives,—in short, every man to be at once a
Christian and a gladiator.
Page 122
CHAPTER VI
ATTITUDE OF MEN OF THE PRESENT DAY TOWARD
WAR
Men do not endeavor to destroy the contradiction between life and consciousness by a change
of life, but educated men use all their power to stifle the demands of consciousness and to
justify their lives, and thus degrade society to a condition worse than pagan, to a state of
primeval savagery—Uncertainty of the attitude of our leading men toward war, universal
armament, and general military conscription—Those who regard war as an accidental
political phenomenon easily to be remedied by external measures—The Peace Congress
—Article in the Revue des Revues—Proposition of Maxime du Camp—Significance of
Courts of Arbitration and Disarmament—Relations of governments to these, and the
business they pursue—Those who regard war as a cruel inevitable phenomenon—
Maupassant—Rod—Those who regard it as indispensable, even useful—Camille Doucet,
Claretie, Zola, Vogüé.
The contradictions of life and of consciousness may be solved in two ways:
by change of life, or by change of consciousness; and it would seem as if
there could be no hesitation in a choice between the two.
When a man acknowledges a deed to be evil he may refrain from the deed
itself, but he can never cease to regard it as evil. Indeed, the whole world
might cease from evil-doing, and yet have no power to transform, or even to
check for a season, the progress of knowledge in regard to that which is
evil, and which ought not to exist. One would think that the alternative of a
change of life to accord with consciousness might be settled without
question, and that it would therefore seem unavoidable for the Christian
world of the present day to abandon those pagan forms which it condemns,
and regulate its life by the Christian precepts which it acknowledges.
Such would be the result were it not for the principle of inertia (a principle
no less unalterable in human life than in the world of matter), which finds
its expression in the psychological law defined in the gospel by the words:
"Men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil" (John
iii. 19). Most persons, in conformity to this principle, do not use their
reason in order to ascertain the truth, but rather to persuade themselves that
ATTITUDE OF MEN OF THE PRESENT DAY TOWARD
WAR
Men do not endeavor to destroy the contradiction between life and consciousness by a change
of life, but educated men use all their power to stifle the demands of consciousness and to
justify their lives, and thus degrade society to a condition worse than pagan, to a state of
primeval savagery—Uncertainty of the attitude of our leading men toward war, universal
armament, and general military conscription—Those who regard war as an accidental
political phenomenon easily to be remedied by external measures—The Peace Congress
—Article in the Revue des Revues—Proposition of Maxime du Camp—Significance of
Courts of Arbitration and Disarmament—Relations of governments to these, and the
business they pursue—Those who regard war as a cruel inevitable phenomenon—
Maupassant—Rod—Those who regard it as indispensable, even useful—Camille Doucet,
Claretie, Zola, Vogüé.
The contradictions of life and of consciousness may be solved in two ways:
by change of life, or by change of consciousness; and it would seem as if
there could be no hesitation in a choice between the two.
When a man acknowledges a deed to be evil he may refrain from the deed
itself, but he can never cease to regard it as evil. Indeed, the whole world
might cease from evil-doing, and yet have no power to transform, or even to
check for a season, the progress of knowledge in regard to that which is
evil, and which ought not to exist. One would think that the alternative of a
change of life to accord with consciousness might be settled without
question, and that it would therefore seem unavoidable for the Christian
world of the present day to abandon those pagan forms which it condemns,
and regulate its life by the Christian precepts which it acknowledges.
Such would be the result were it not for the principle of inertia (a principle
no less unalterable in human life than in the world of matter), which finds
its expression in the psychological law defined in the gospel by the words:
"Men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil" (John
iii. 19). Most persons, in conformity to this principle, do not use their
reason in order to ascertain the truth, but rather to persuade themselves that
Page 123
they possess it, and that their daily life, which is pleasant for them, is in
harmony with the precepts of truth.
Slavery conflicted with all the moral principles taught by Plato and
Aristotle, and yet neither of them perceived this, because the disavowal of
slavery must have destroyed that life by which they lived. And the same
thing is repeated in our times.
The division of mankind into two classes, the existence of political and
military injustice, is opposed to all those moral principles which our society
professes, and yet the most progressive and cultivated men of the age seem
not to perceive this.
Almost every educated man at the present day is striving unconsciously to
preserve the old-time conception of society, which justifies his attitude, and
to conceal from others and from himself its inconsistencies, chief among
which is the necessity of adopting the Christian ideal, which is subversive
of the very structure of our social existence. It is this antiquated social
system, in which they no longer believe, because it is really a thing of the
past, that men are trying to uphold.
Contemporary literature, philosophical, political, and artistic,—all
contemporary literature affords a striking proof of the truth of my statement.
What wealth of imagination, what form and color, what erudition and art,
but what a lack of serious purpose, what reluctance to face any exact
thought! Ambiguity of expression, indirect allusion, witticisms, vague
reflection, but no straightforward or candid dealing with the subject they
treat of, namely, life.
Indeed, our writers treat of obscenities and improprieties; in the guise of
refined paradox they convey suggestions which thrust men back to primeval
savagery, to the lowest dregs, not only of pagan life, but animal life, which
we outlived 5000 years ago. Delivering themselves from the Christian life-
conception, which for some simply interferes with the accustomed current
of their lives, while for others it interferes with certain advantages, men
must of necessity return to the pagan life-conception and to the doctrines to
which it gave rise. Not only are patriotism and the rights of the aristocracy
preached at the present time as they used to be 2000 years ago, but also the
coarsest epicureanism and sensuality, with this difference only,—that the
teachers of old believed in the doctrines they taught, whereas those of the
harmony with the precepts of truth.
Slavery conflicted with all the moral principles taught by Plato and
Aristotle, and yet neither of them perceived this, because the disavowal of
slavery must have destroyed that life by which they lived. And the same
thing is repeated in our times.
The division of mankind into two classes, the existence of political and
military injustice, is opposed to all those moral principles which our society
professes, and yet the most progressive and cultivated men of the age seem
not to perceive this.
Almost every educated man at the present day is striving unconsciously to
preserve the old-time conception of society, which justifies his attitude, and
to conceal from others and from himself its inconsistencies, chief among
which is the necessity of adopting the Christian ideal, which is subversive
of the very structure of our social existence. It is this antiquated social
system, in which they no longer believe, because it is really a thing of the
past, that men are trying to uphold.
Contemporary literature, philosophical, political, and artistic,—all
contemporary literature affords a striking proof of the truth of my statement.
What wealth of imagination, what form and color, what erudition and art,
but what a lack of serious purpose, what reluctance to face any exact
thought! Ambiguity of expression, indirect allusion, witticisms, vague
reflection, but no straightforward or candid dealing with the subject they
treat of, namely, life.
Indeed, our writers treat of obscenities and improprieties; in the guise of
refined paradox they convey suggestions which thrust men back to primeval
savagery, to the lowest dregs, not only of pagan life, but animal life, which
we outlived 5000 years ago. Delivering themselves from the Christian life-
conception, which for some simply interferes with the accustomed current
of their lives, while for others it interferes with certain advantages, men
must of necessity return to the pagan life-conception and to the doctrines to
which it gave rise. Not only are patriotism and the rights of the aristocracy
preached at the present time as they used to be 2000 years ago, but also the
coarsest epicureanism and sensuality, with this difference only,—that the
teachers of old believed in the doctrines they taught, whereas those of the
Page 124
present day neither do nor can possess any faith in what they utter, because
there is no longer any sense in it. When the ground is shifting under our
feet, we cannot stand still, we must either recede or advance. It sounds
exaggerated to say that the enlightened men of our time, the advanced
thinkers, are speciously degrading society, plunging it into a condition
worse than pagan,—into a state of primeval barbarism.
In no other matter has this tendency of the leading men of our time been so
plainly shown as in their attitude toward that phenomenon in which at
present all the inconsistency of social life is concentrated,—toward war,
universal armament, and military conscription.
The equivocal, if not unscrupulous, attitude of the educated men of our time
toward this question is a striking one. It may be stated from three points of
view. Some regard this phenomenon as an accidental state of affairs, which
has sprung from the peculiar political situation of Europe, and believe it to
be susceptible of adjustment by diplomatic and international mediation,
without injury to the structure of nations. Others look upon it as something
appalling and cruel, fatal yet unavoidable,—like disease or death. Still
others, in cold blood, calmly pronounce war to be an indispensable,
salutary, and therefore desirable event.
Men may differ in their views in regard to this matter, but all discuss it as
something with which the will of the individuals who are to take part in it
has nothing whatever to do; therefore they do not even admit the natural
question which presents itself to most men; viz., "Is it my duty to take part
in it?" In the opinion of these judges there is no reason in such a question,
and every man, whatever may be his personal prejudices in regard to war,
must submit in this matter to the demands of the ruling powers.
The attitude of those in the first category, who expect deliverance from war
by means of diplomatic and international mediation, is well defined in the
results of the London Peace Congress, and in an article, together with letters
concerning war from prominent writers, which may be found in the Revue
des Revues (No. 8, 1891).
These are the results of the Congress.
Having collected from all parts of the globe the opinions of scientists, both
written and oral, the Congress, opening with a Te Deum in the cathedral,
there is no longer any sense in it. When the ground is shifting under our
feet, we cannot stand still, we must either recede or advance. It sounds
exaggerated to say that the enlightened men of our time, the advanced
thinkers, are speciously degrading society, plunging it into a condition
worse than pagan,—into a state of primeval barbarism.
In no other matter has this tendency of the leading men of our time been so
plainly shown as in their attitude toward that phenomenon in which at
present all the inconsistency of social life is concentrated,—toward war,
universal armament, and military conscription.
The equivocal, if not unscrupulous, attitude of the educated men of our time
toward this question is a striking one. It may be stated from three points of
view. Some regard this phenomenon as an accidental state of affairs, which
has sprung from the peculiar political situation of Europe, and believe it to
be susceptible of adjustment by diplomatic and international mediation,
without injury to the structure of nations. Others look upon it as something
appalling and cruel, fatal yet unavoidable,—like disease or death. Still
others, in cold blood, calmly pronounce war to be an indispensable,
salutary, and therefore desirable event.
Men may differ in their views in regard to this matter, but all discuss it as
something with which the will of the individuals who are to take part in it
has nothing whatever to do; therefore they do not even admit the natural
question which presents itself to most men; viz., "Is it my duty to take part
in it?" In the opinion of these judges there is no reason in such a question,
and every man, whatever may be his personal prejudices in regard to war,
must submit in this matter to the demands of the ruling powers.
The attitude of those in the first category, who expect deliverance from war
by means of diplomatic and international mediation, is well defined in the
results of the London Peace Congress, and in an article, together with letters
concerning war from prominent writers, which may be found in the Revue
des Revues (No. 8, 1891).
These are the results of the Congress.
Having collected from all parts of the globe the opinions of scientists, both
written and oral, the Congress, opening with a Te Deum in the cathedral,
Page 125
and closing with a dinner and speeches, listened for five days to numerous
addresses, and arrived at the following conclusions:—
Resolution I. The Congress affirms its belief that the brotherhood of man
involves as a necessary consequence a brotherhood of nations, in which, the
true interests of all are acknowledged to be identical. The Congress is
convinced that the true basis for an enduring peace will be found in the
application by nations of this great principle in all their relations one to
another.
II. The Congress recognizes the important influence which Christianity
exercises upon the moral and political progress of mankind, and earnestly
urges upon ministers of the gospel and other teachers of religion and
morality the duty of setting forth these principles of Peace and Good-will,
which occupy such a central place in the teaching of Jesus Christ, of
philosophers and of moralists, and it recommends that the third Sunday in
December in each year be set apart for that purpose.
III. The Congress expresses its opinion that all teachers of history should
call the attention of the young to the grave evils inflicted on mankind in all
ages by war, and to the fact that such war has been waged, as a rule, for
most inadequate causes.
IV. The Congress protests against the use of military drill in connection
with the physical exercises of schools, and suggests the formation of
brigades for saving life rather than any of quasi-military character; and it
urges the desirability of impressing on the Board of Examiners, who
formulate the questions for examination, the propriety of guiding the minds
of children into the principles of Peace.
V. The Congress holds that the doctrine of the universal rights of man
requires that aboriginal and weaker races shall be guarded from injustice
and fraud when brought into contact with civilized peoples, alike as to their
territories, their liberties, and their property, and that they shall be shielded
from the vices which are so prevalent among the so-called advanced races
of men. It further expresses its conviction that there should be concert of
action among the nations for the accomplishment of these ends. The
Congress desires to express its hearty appreciation of the conclusions
arrived at by the late Anti-Slavery Conference, held in Brussels, for the
amelioration of the condition of the peoples of Africa.
addresses, and arrived at the following conclusions:—
Resolution I. The Congress affirms its belief that the brotherhood of man
involves as a necessary consequence a brotherhood of nations, in which, the
true interests of all are acknowledged to be identical. The Congress is
convinced that the true basis for an enduring peace will be found in the
application by nations of this great principle in all their relations one to
another.
II. The Congress recognizes the important influence which Christianity
exercises upon the moral and political progress of mankind, and earnestly
urges upon ministers of the gospel and other teachers of religion and
morality the duty of setting forth these principles of Peace and Good-will,
which occupy such a central place in the teaching of Jesus Christ, of
philosophers and of moralists, and it recommends that the third Sunday in
December in each year be set apart for that purpose.
III. The Congress expresses its opinion that all teachers of history should
call the attention of the young to the grave evils inflicted on mankind in all
ages by war, and to the fact that such war has been waged, as a rule, for
most inadequate causes.
IV. The Congress protests against the use of military drill in connection
with the physical exercises of schools, and suggests the formation of
brigades for saving life rather than any of quasi-military character; and it
urges the desirability of impressing on the Board of Examiners, who
formulate the questions for examination, the propriety of guiding the minds
of children into the principles of Peace.
V. The Congress holds that the doctrine of the universal rights of man
requires that aboriginal and weaker races shall be guarded from injustice
and fraud when brought into contact with civilized peoples, alike as to their
territories, their liberties, and their property, and that they shall be shielded
from the vices which are so prevalent among the so-called advanced races
of men. It further expresses its conviction that there should be concert of
action among the nations for the accomplishment of these ends. The
Congress desires to express its hearty appreciation of the conclusions
arrived at by the late Anti-Slavery Conference, held in Brussels, for the
amelioration of the condition of the peoples of Africa.
Page 126
VI. The Congress believes that the warlike prejudices and traditions which
are still fostered in the various nationalities, and the misrepresentations by
leaders of public opinion in legislative assemblies, or through the press, are
not infrequently indirect causes of war. The Congress is therefore of opinion
that these ends should be counteracted by the publication of accurate
statements and information that would tend to the removal of
misunderstanding amongst nations, and recommends to the Inter-
Parliamentary Committee the importance of considering the question of
starting an international newspaper, which should have such a purpose as
one of its primary objects.
VII. The Congress proposes to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference that the
utmost support should be given to every project for the unification of
weights and measures, of coinage, tariffs, postal and telegraphic
arrangements, means of transport, etc., which would assist in constituting a
commercial, industrial, and scientific union of the peoples.
VIII. In view of the vast moral and social influence of woman, the Congress
urges upon every woman throughout the world to sustain, as wife, mother,
sister, or citizen, the things that make for peace, as otherwise she incurs
grave responsibilities for the continuance of the systems of war and
militarism, which not only desolate but corrupt the home-life of the nation.
To concentrate and to practically apply this influence, the Congress
recommends that women should unite themselves with societies for the
promotion of international peace.
IX. This Congress expresses the hope that the Financial Reform Association
and other similar societies in Europe and America should unite in
convoking at an early date a conference to consider the best means of
establishing equitable commercial relations between States by the reduction
of import duties as a step toward Free Trade. The Congress feels that it can
affirm that the whole of Europe desires Peace, and is impatiently waiting
for the moment when it shall see the end of those crushing armaments
which, under the plea of defense, become in their turn a danger, by keeping
alive mutual distrust, and are, at the same time, the cause of the general
economic disturbance which stands in the way of settling in a satisfactory
manner the problems of labor and poverty, which should take precedence of
all others.
are still fostered in the various nationalities, and the misrepresentations by
leaders of public opinion in legislative assemblies, or through the press, are
not infrequently indirect causes of war. The Congress is therefore of opinion
that these ends should be counteracted by the publication of accurate
statements and information that would tend to the removal of
misunderstanding amongst nations, and recommends to the Inter-
Parliamentary Committee the importance of considering the question of
starting an international newspaper, which should have such a purpose as
one of its primary objects.
VII. The Congress proposes to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference that the
utmost support should be given to every project for the unification of
weights and measures, of coinage, tariffs, postal and telegraphic
arrangements, means of transport, etc., which would assist in constituting a
commercial, industrial, and scientific union of the peoples.
VIII. In view of the vast moral and social influence of woman, the Congress
urges upon every woman throughout the world to sustain, as wife, mother,
sister, or citizen, the things that make for peace, as otherwise she incurs
grave responsibilities for the continuance of the systems of war and
militarism, which not only desolate but corrupt the home-life of the nation.
To concentrate and to practically apply this influence, the Congress
recommends that women should unite themselves with societies for the
promotion of international peace.
IX. This Congress expresses the hope that the Financial Reform Association
and other similar societies in Europe and America should unite in
convoking at an early date a conference to consider the best means of
establishing equitable commercial relations between States by the reduction
of import duties as a step toward Free Trade. The Congress feels that it can
affirm that the whole of Europe desires Peace, and is impatiently waiting
for the moment when it shall see the end of those crushing armaments
which, under the plea of defense, become in their turn a danger, by keeping
alive mutual distrust, and are, at the same time, the cause of the general
economic disturbance which stands in the way of settling in a satisfactory
manner the problems of labor and poverty, which should take precedence of
all others.
Page 127
X. This Congress, recognizing that a general disarmament would be the best
guarantee of Peace, and would lead to the solution, in the general interest,
of those questions which now must divide States, expresses the wish that a
Congress of Representatives of all the States of Europe may be assembled
as soon as possible to consider the means of effecting a gradual general
disarmament, which already seems feasible.
XI. This Congress, considering that the timidity of a single Power or other
cause might delay indefinitely the convocation of the above-mentioned
Congress, is of the opinion that the Government which should first dismiss
any considerable number of soldiers would confer a signal benefit on
Europe and mankind, because it would oblige other Governments, urged on
by public opinion, to follow its example, and by the moral force of this
accomplished fact would have increased rather than diminished the
conditions of its national defense.
XII. This Congress, considering the question of disarmament, as well as the
Peace question generally, depends upon public opinion, recommends the
Peace Societies here represented, and all friends of Peace, to carry on an
active propaganda among the people, especially at the time of
Parliamentary elections, in order that the electors should give their votes to
those candidates who have included in their programme Peace,
Disarmament, and Arbitration.
XIII. This Congress congratulates the friends of Peace on the resolution
adopted by the International American Conference (with the exception of
the representatives of Chili and Mexico) at Washington in April last, by
which it was recommended that arbitration should be obligatory in all
controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries,
territories, indemnities, right of navigation, and the validity, construction,
and enforcement of treaties, and in all other causes, whatever their origin,
nature, or occasion, except only those which, in the judgment of any of the
nations involved in the controversy, may imperil its independence.
XIV. This Congress respectfully recommends this resolution to the
statesmen of Europe, and expresses the ardent desire that treaties in similar
terms be speedily entered into between the other nations of the world.
XV. This Congress expresses its satisfaction at the adoption by the Spanish
Senate, on June 18th last, of a project of law authorizing the Government to
guarantee of Peace, and would lead to the solution, in the general interest,
of those questions which now must divide States, expresses the wish that a
Congress of Representatives of all the States of Europe may be assembled
as soon as possible to consider the means of effecting a gradual general
disarmament, which already seems feasible.
XI. This Congress, considering that the timidity of a single Power or other
cause might delay indefinitely the convocation of the above-mentioned
Congress, is of the opinion that the Government which should first dismiss
any considerable number of soldiers would confer a signal benefit on
Europe and mankind, because it would oblige other Governments, urged on
by public opinion, to follow its example, and by the moral force of this
accomplished fact would have increased rather than diminished the
conditions of its national defense.
XII. This Congress, considering the question of disarmament, as well as the
Peace question generally, depends upon public opinion, recommends the
Peace Societies here represented, and all friends of Peace, to carry on an
active propaganda among the people, especially at the time of
Parliamentary elections, in order that the electors should give their votes to
those candidates who have included in their programme Peace,
Disarmament, and Arbitration.
XIII. This Congress congratulates the friends of Peace on the resolution
adopted by the International American Conference (with the exception of
the representatives of Chili and Mexico) at Washington in April last, by
which it was recommended that arbitration should be obligatory in all
controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries,
territories, indemnities, right of navigation, and the validity, construction,
and enforcement of treaties, and in all other causes, whatever their origin,
nature, or occasion, except only those which, in the judgment of any of the
nations involved in the controversy, may imperil its independence.
XIV. This Congress respectfully recommends this resolution to the
statesmen of Europe, and expresses the ardent desire that treaties in similar
terms be speedily entered into between the other nations of the world.
XV. This Congress expresses its satisfaction at the adoption by the Spanish
Senate, on June 18th last, of a project of law authorizing the Government to
Page 128
negotiate general or special treaties of arbitration for the settlement of all
disputes, except those relating to the independence and internal government
of the States affected; also at the adoption of resolutions to a like effect by
the Norwegian Storthing on March 6th last, and by the Italian Chamber on
July 11th.
XVI. That a committee of five be appointed to prepare and address
communications, in the name of the Congress, to the principal religious,
political, economical, labor, and peace organizations in civilized countries,
requesting them to send petitions to the governmental authorities of their
respective countries, praying that measures be taken for the formation of
suitable tribunals for the adjudication of international questions, so as to
avoid the resort to war.
XVII. Seeing (1) that the object pursued by all Peace Societies is the
establishment of juridical order between nations:
(2) That neutralization by international treaties constitutes a step toward this
juridical state, and lessens the number of districts in which war can be
carried on:
This Congress recommends a larger extension of the rule of neutralization,
and expresses the wish:—
(1) That all treaties which at present assure to certain States the benefit of
neutrality remain in force, or, if necessary, be amended in a manner to
render the neutrality more effective, either by extending neutralization to
the whole of the State, of which a part only may be neutralized, or by
ordering the demolition of fortresses, which constitute rather a peril than a
guarantee for neutrality.
(2) That new treaties, provided that they are in harmony with the wishes of
the populations concerned, be concluded for establishing the neutralization
of other States.
XVIII. The Committee Section proposes:—
(1) That the next Congress be held immediately before or immediately after
the next session of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference, and at the same
places.
disputes, except those relating to the independence and internal government
of the States affected; also at the adoption of resolutions to a like effect by
the Norwegian Storthing on March 6th last, and by the Italian Chamber on
July 11th.
XVI. That a committee of five be appointed to prepare and address
communications, in the name of the Congress, to the principal religious,
political, economical, labor, and peace organizations in civilized countries,
requesting them to send petitions to the governmental authorities of their
respective countries, praying that measures be taken for the formation of
suitable tribunals for the adjudication of international questions, so as to
avoid the resort to war.
XVII. Seeing (1) that the object pursued by all Peace Societies is the
establishment of juridical order between nations:
(2) That neutralization by international treaties constitutes a step toward this
juridical state, and lessens the number of districts in which war can be
carried on:
This Congress recommends a larger extension of the rule of neutralization,
and expresses the wish:—
(1) That all treaties which at present assure to certain States the benefit of
neutrality remain in force, or, if necessary, be amended in a manner to
render the neutrality more effective, either by extending neutralization to
the whole of the State, of which a part only may be neutralized, or by
ordering the demolition of fortresses, which constitute rather a peril than a
guarantee for neutrality.
(2) That new treaties, provided that they are in harmony with the wishes of
the populations concerned, be concluded for establishing the neutralization
of other States.
XVIII. The Committee Section proposes:—
(1) That the next Congress be held immediately before or immediately after
the next session of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference, and at the same
places.
Page 129
(2) That the question of an international Peace Emblem be postponed sine
die.
(3) The adoption of the following resolutions:—
(a) Resolved, that we express our satisfaction at the formal and official
overtures of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
addressed to the highest representatives of each church organization in
Christendom, inviting the same to unite with itself in a general conference,
the object of which shall be to promote the substitution of international
arbitration for war.
(b) That this Congress, assembled in London from the 14th to the 19th July,
desires to express its profound reverence for the memory of Aurelio Salfi,
the great Italian jurist, a member of the Committee of the International
League of Peace and Liberty.
(4) That the memorial to the various heads of the civilized States adopted
by this Congress, and signed by the President, should, so far as practicable,
be presented to each Power by an influential deputation.
(5) That the Organization Committee be empowered to make the needful
verbal emendations in the papers and resolutions presented.
(6) That the following resolutions be adopted:—
(a) A resolution of thanks to the Presidents of the various sittings of the
Congress.
(b) A resolution of thanks to the chairman, the secretary, and the members
of the Bureau of this Congress.
(c) A resolution of thanks to the conveners and members of the sectional
committees.
(d) A resolution of thanks to Rev. Canon Scott Holland, Rev. Dr. Reuan
Thomas, and Rev. J. Morgan Gibbon, for their pulpit addresses before the
Congress, and that they be requested to furnish copies of the same for
publication; and also Stamford Hall Congregational Church for the use of
those buildings for public services.
(e) A letter of thanks to Her Majesty for permission to visit Windsor Castle.
die.
(3) The adoption of the following resolutions:—
(a) Resolved, that we express our satisfaction at the formal and official
overtures of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
addressed to the highest representatives of each church organization in
Christendom, inviting the same to unite with itself in a general conference,
the object of which shall be to promote the substitution of international
arbitration for war.
(b) That this Congress, assembled in London from the 14th to the 19th July,
desires to express its profound reverence for the memory of Aurelio Salfi,
the great Italian jurist, a member of the Committee of the International
League of Peace and Liberty.
(4) That the memorial to the various heads of the civilized States adopted
by this Congress, and signed by the President, should, so far as practicable,
be presented to each Power by an influential deputation.
(5) That the Organization Committee be empowered to make the needful
verbal emendations in the papers and resolutions presented.
(6) That the following resolutions be adopted:—
(a) A resolution of thanks to the Presidents of the various sittings of the
Congress.
(b) A resolution of thanks to the chairman, the secretary, and the members
of the Bureau of this Congress.
(c) A resolution of thanks to the conveners and members of the sectional
committees.
(d) A resolution of thanks to Rev. Canon Scott Holland, Rev. Dr. Reuan
Thomas, and Rev. J. Morgan Gibbon, for their pulpit addresses before the
Congress, and that they be requested to furnish copies of the same for
publication; and also Stamford Hall Congregational Church for the use of
those buildings for public services.
(e) A letter of thanks to Her Majesty for permission to visit Windsor Castle.
Page 130
(f) And also a resolution of thanks to the Lord Mayor and Lady Mayoress,
to Mr. Passmore Edwards, and other friends who have extended their
hospitality to the members of the Congress.
XIX. This Congress places on record a heartfelt expression of gratitude to
Almighty God for the remarkable harmony and concord which have
characterized the meetings of the Assembly, in which so many men and
women of varied nations, creeds, tongues, and races have gathered in
closest coöperation; and in the conclusion of the labors of this Congress, it
expresses its firm and unshaken belief in the ultimate triumph of the cause
of Peace, and of the principles which have been advocated at these
meetings.
The fundamental idea of the Congress is—firstly, that it is necessary to
disseminate by all means among all men the belief that war is not
advantageous for mankind, and that peace is a great benefit; and secondly,
to influence governments, impressing upon them the advantages and
necessity of disarmament.
To accomplish the first end, the Congress advises teachers of history,
women, and ministers of the gospel, to teach people, every third Sunday of
December, the evils of war and the benefits of peace; to accomplish the
second, the Congress addresses itself to governments, suggesting to them
disarmament and arbitration.
To preach the evils of war and the benefits of peace! But the evils of war are
so well known to men, that from the earliest ages the most welcome
greeting was always: "Peace be unto you!"
Not only Christians but all pagans were fully aware of the benefits of peace
and of the evils of war thousands of years ago, so that the advice to the
ministers of the gospel to preach against the evils of war and to advocate
the benefits of peace every third Sunday in December is quite superfluous.
A real Christian cannot do otherwise than preach thus, constantly, as long as
he lives. But if there are those who are called Christians, or Christian
preachers, who do not do this, there must be a cause for it, and so long as
to Mr. Passmore Edwards, and other friends who have extended their
hospitality to the members of the Congress.
XIX. This Congress places on record a heartfelt expression of gratitude to
Almighty God for the remarkable harmony and concord which have
characterized the meetings of the Assembly, in which so many men and
women of varied nations, creeds, tongues, and races have gathered in
closest coöperation; and in the conclusion of the labors of this Congress, it
expresses its firm and unshaken belief in the ultimate triumph of the cause
of Peace, and of the principles which have been advocated at these
meetings.
The fundamental idea of the Congress is—firstly, that it is necessary to
disseminate by all means among all men the belief that war is not
advantageous for mankind, and that peace is a great benefit; and secondly,
to influence governments, impressing upon them the advantages and
necessity of disarmament.
To accomplish the first end, the Congress advises teachers of history,
women, and ministers of the gospel, to teach people, every third Sunday of
December, the evils of war and the benefits of peace; to accomplish the
second, the Congress addresses itself to governments, suggesting to them
disarmament and arbitration.
To preach the evils of war and the benefits of peace! But the evils of war are
so well known to men, that from the earliest ages the most welcome
greeting was always: "Peace be unto you!"
Not only Christians but all pagans were fully aware of the benefits of peace
and of the evils of war thousands of years ago, so that the advice to the
ministers of the gospel to preach against the evils of war and to advocate
the benefits of peace every third Sunday in December is quite superfluous.
A real Christian cannot do otherwise than preach thus, constantly, as long as
he lives. But if there are those who are called Christians, or Christian
preachers, who do not do this, there must be a cause for it, and so long as
Page 131
this cause exists no advice will avail. Still less effective will be the advice
to governments to disband armies and have recourse to International Courts
of Arbitration. Governments know very well all the difficulties and burdens
of conscription and of maintaining armies, and if in the face of such
difficulties and burdens they still continue to do so, it is evident that they
have no means of doing otherwise, and the advice of a Congress could in no
way bring about a change. But scientists will not admit this, and still hope
to find some combination of influences by means of which those
governments which make war may be induced to restrain themselves.
"Is it possible to avoid war?" writes a scientist in the Revue des Revues (No.
8 of 1891). "All agree in recognizing the fact that if war should ever break
out in Europe, its consequences would be similar to those of the great
invasions. It would imperil the very existence of nations; it would be
bloody, atrocious, desperate. This consideration, and the consideration of
the terrible nature of the engines of destruction at the command of modern
science, retards its declaration and temporarily maintains the present
system,—a system which might be continued indefinitely, if it were not for
the enormous expenses that burden the European nations and threaten to
culminate in disasters fully equal to those occasioned by war.
"Impressed with these thoughts, men of all nationalities have sought for
means to arrest, or at least to diminish, the shocking consequences of the
carnage that threatens us.
"Such are the questions which are to be debated by the next Congress of
Universal Peace to be held in Rome, which have already been discussed in
a recently published pamphlet on Disarmament.
"Unfortunately, it is quite certain that with the present organization of the
greater number of the European states, isolated one from the other and
controlled by different interests, the absolute cessation of war is an illusion
which it would be folly to cherish. Still, the adoption of somewhat wiser
rules and regulations in regard to these international duels would at least
tend to limit their horrors. It is equally Utopian to build one's hope on
projects of disarmament, whose execution, owing to considerations of a
national character, which exist in the minds of all our readers, is practically
impossible." (This probably means that France cannot disarm until she has
retaliated.) "Public opinion is not prepared to accept them, and,
to governments to disband armies and have recourse to International Courts
of Arbitration. Governments know very well all the difficulties and burdens
of conscription and of maintaining armies, and if in the face of such
difficulties and burdens they still continue to do so, it is evident that they
have no means of doing otherwise, and the advice of a Congress could in no
way bring about a change. But scientists will not admit this, and still hope
to find some combination of influences by means of which those
governments which make war may be induced to restrain themselves.
"Is it possible to avoid war?" writes a scientist in the Revue des Revues (No.
8 of 1891). "All agree in recognizing the fact that if war should ever break
out in Europe, its consequences would be similar to those of the great
invasions. It would imperil the very existence of nations; it would be
bloody, atrocious, desperate. This consideration, and the consideration of
the terrible nature of the engines of destruction at the command of modern
science, retards its declaration and temporarily maintains the present
system,—a system which might be continued indefinitely, if it were not for
the enormous expenses that burden the European nations and threaten to
culminate in disasters fully equal to those occasioned by war.
"Impressed with these thoughts, men of all nationalities have sought for
means to arrest, or at least to diminish, the shocking consequences of the
carnage that threatens us.
"Such are the questions which are to be debated by the next Congress of
Universal Peace to be held in Rome, which have already been discussed in
a recently published pamphlet on Disarmament.
"Unfortunately, it is quite certain that with the present organization of the
greater number of the European states, isolated one from the other and
controlled by different interests, the absolute cessation of war is an illusion
which it would be folly to cherish. Still, the adoption of somewhat wiser
rules and regulations in regard to these international duels would at least
tend to limit their horrors. It is equally Utopian to build one's hope on
projects of disarmament, whose execution, owing to considerations of a
national character, which exist in the minds of all our readers, is practically
impossible." (This probably means that France cannot disarm until she has
retaliated.) "Public opinion is not prepared to accept them, and,
Page 132
furthermore, the international relations make it impossible to adopt them.
Disarmament demanded by one nation of another, under conditions
imperiling its security, would be equivalent to a declaration of war.
"Still, we must admit that an exchange of opinions between the nations
interested may to a certain extent aid in establishing an international
understanding, and also contribute to lessen the military expenses that now
crush European nations, to the great detriment of the solution of social
questions, the necessity of the solution of which is realized by each nation
individually, under the penalty of being confronted by a civil war, due to the
efforts made to prevent a foreign one.
"One may at least hope for a decrease of the enormous expenses necessary
for the present military organization, which is maintained for the purpose of
invading a foreign territory in twenty-four hours, or of a decisive battle a
week after the declaration of war."
It ought not to be possible for one nation to attack another and take
possession of its territory within twenty-four hours. This practical sentiment
was expressed by Maxime du Camp, and is the conclusion of his study of
the subject.
Maxime du Camp offers the following propositions:—
"1st. A Diplomatic Congress, to assemble every year.
"2d. No war to be declared until two months after the incident which gave
rise to it." (Here the difficulty lies in determining the nature of the incident
that kindled the war—that is, every declaration of war is caused by several
circumstances, and it would be necessary to determine from which one the
two months are to be reckoned.)
"3d. No war shall be declared until the vote of the people shall have been
taken.
"4th. Hostilities must not begin until a month after the declaration of war."
"No war shall be declared ..." etc. But who is to prevent hostilities
beginning? Who will compel men to do this or that? Who will compel
governments to wait a certain stated time? Other nations. But all the other
nations are in the very same position, requiring to be restrained and kept
within bounds, in other words, coerced. And who will coerce them? And
Disarmament demanded by one nation of another, under conditions
imperiling its security, would be equivalent to a declaration of war.
"Still, we must admit that an exchange of opinions between the nations
interested may to a certain extent aid in establishing an international
understanding, and also contribute to lessen the military expenses that now
crush European nations, to the great detriment of the solution of social
questions, the necessity of the solution of which is realized by each nation
individually, under the penalty of being confronted by a civil war, due to the
efforts made to prevent a foreign one.
"One may at least hope for a decrease of the enormous expenses necessary
for the present military organization, which is maintained for the purpose of
invading a foreign territory in twenty-four hours, or of a decisive battle a
week after the declaration of war."
It ought not to be possible for one nation to attack another and take
possession of its territory within twenty-four hours. This practical sentiment
was expressed by Maxime du Camp, and is the conclusion of his study of
the subject.
Maxime du Camp offers the following propositions:—
"1st. A Diplomatic Congress, to assemble every year.
"2d. No war to be declared until two months after the incident which gave
rise to it." (Here the difficulty lies in determining the nature of the incident
that kindled the war—that is, every declaration of war is caused by several
circumstances, and it would be necessary to determine from which one the
two months are to be reckoned.)
"3d. No war shall be declared until the vote of the people shall have been
taken.
"4th. Hostilities must not begin until a month after the declaration of war."
"No war shall be declared ..." etc. But who is to prevent hostilities
beginning? Who will compel men to do this or that? Who will compel
governments to wait a certain stated time? Other nations. But all the other
nations are in the very same position, requiring to be restrained and kept
within bounds, in other words, coerced. And who will coerce them? And
Page 133
how is it to be done? By public opinion. But if public opinion has sufficient
influence to force a nation to postpone its action until a stated time, this
public opinion can prevent it from waging war at any time.
But, it is said, there might be a balance of power, which would oblige
nations to restrain themselves. This very experiment has been and is still
being tried; this was the object of the Holy Alliance, the League of Peace,
etc.
But all would agree to this, it is said. If all would agree to this, then wars
would cease, and there would be no need of Courts of Appeal or of
Arbitration.
"A Court of Arbitration would take the place of war. Disputes would be
decided by a Board of Arbitrators, like that which pronounced on the
Alabama claims. The Pope has been requested to decide the question
concerning the Caroline Islands: Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, and
Holland have declared that they prefer the decision of a Court of Arbitration
to war."
I believe Monaco has expressed a similar wish. It is a pity that Germany,
Russia, Austria, and France have thus far shown no sign of imitating their
example.
It is astonishing how easily men can deceive themselves when they feel
inclined.
The governments will agree to allow their disputes to be decided by a Board
of Arbitration and to dismiss their armies. The trouble between Russia and
Poland, England and Ireland, Austria and the Czechs, Turkey and the Slavs,
France and Germany, will be settled by mutual consent. This is very much
like suggesting to merchants and bankers that they shall sell at cost price,
and devote their services gratuitously to the distribution of property.
Of course the essence of commerce and banking consists in buying cheap
and selling dear, and therefore the suggestion to sell at cost price and the
consequent overthrow of money amounts to a proposal of self-destruction.
The same is true in regard to governments.
The suggestion to governments to desist from violence, and to adjust all
differences by arbitration, would be to recommend a suicidal policy, and no
influence to force a nation to postpone its action until a stated time, this
public opinion can prevent it from waging war at any time.
But, it is said, there might be a balance of power, which would oblige
nations to restrain themselves. This very experiment has been and is still
being tried; this was the object of the Holy Alliance, the League of Peace,
etc.
But all would agree to this, it is said. If all would agree to this, then wars
would cease, and there would be no need of Courts of Appeal or of
Arbitration.
"A Court of Arbitration would take the place of war. Disputes would be
decided by a Board of Arbitrators, like that which pronounced on the
Alabama claims. The Pope has been requested to decide the question
concerning the Caroline Islands: Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, and
Holland have declared that they prefer the decision of a Court of Arbitration
to war."
I believe Monaco has expressed a similar wish. It is a pity that Germany,
Russia, Austria, and France have thus far shown no sign of imitating their
example.
It is astonishing how easily men can deceive themselves when they feel
inclined.
The governments will agree to allow their disputes to be decided by a Board
of Arbitration and to dismiss their armies. The trouble between Russia and
Poland, England and Ireland, Austria and the Czechs, Turkey and the Slavs,
France and Germany, will be settled by mutual consent. This is very much
like suggesting to merchants and bankers that they shall sell at cost price,
and devote their services gratuitously to the distribution of property.
Of course the essence of commerce and banking consists in buying cheap
and selling dear, and therefore the suggestion to sell at cost price and the
consequent overthrow of money amounts to a proposal of self-destruction.
The same is true in regard to governments.
The suggestion to governments to desist from violence, and to adjust all
differences by arbitration, would be to recommend a suicidal policy, and no
Page 134
government would ever agree to that. Learned men found societies (there
are more than one hundred of them), they assemble in Congresses (like
those held in London and Paris and the one which is to be held in Rome),
they read essays, hold banquets, make speeches, edit journals devoted to the
subject, and by all these means they endeavor to prove that the strain upon
nations who are obliged to support millions of soldiers has become so
severe that something must be done about it; that this armament is opposed
to the character, the aims, and the wishes of the populations; but they seem
to think that if they consume a good deal of paper, and devote a good deal
of eloquence to the subject, that they may succeed in conciliating opposing
parties and conflicting interests, and at last effect the suppression of war.
When I was a child I was told that if I wished to catch a bird I must put salt
on its tail. I took a handful and went in pursuit of the birds, but I saw at
once that if I could sprinkle salt on their tails I could catch them, and that
what I had been told was only a joke. Those who read essays and works on
Courts of Arbitration and the disarmament of nations must feel very much
the same.
If it were possible to sprinkle salt on a bird's tail it would be tantamount to
saying that the bird could not fly, and therefore it would be no effort to
catch it. If a bird has wings and does not wish to be caught, it will not allow
any salt to be put on its tail, for it is the nature of a bird to fly. Likewise it is
the nature of a government not to be ruled, but to rule its subjects. And a
government rightly is named such only when it is able to rule its subjects,
and not be ruled by them. This, therefore, is its constant aim, and it will
never voluntarily resign its power. And as it derives its power from the
army it will never give up the army, nor will it ever renounce that for which
the army is designed,—war.
The misapprehension springs from the fact that the learned jurists,
deceiving themselves as well as others, depict in their books an ideal of
government,—not as it really is, an assembly of men who oppress their
fellow-citizens, but in accordance with the scientific postulate, as a body of
men who act as the representatives of the rest of the nation. They have gone
on repeating this to others so long that they have ended by believing it
themselves, and they really seem to think that justice is one of the duties of
governments. History, however, shows us that governments, as seen from
the reign of Cæsar to those of the two Napoleons and Prince Bismarck, are
are more than one hundred of them), they assemble in Congresses (like
those held in London and Paris and the one which is to be held in Rome),
they read essays, hold banquets, make speeches, edit journals devoted to the
subject, and by all these means they endeavor to prove that the strain upon
nations who are obliged to support millions of soldiers has become so
severe that something must be done about it; that this armament is opposed
to the character, the aims, and the wishes of the populations; but they seem
to think that if they consume a good deal of paper, and devote a good deal
of eloquence to the subject, that they may succeed in conciliating opposing
parties and conflicting interests, and at last effect the suppression of war.
When I was a child I was told that if I wished to catch a bird I must put salt
on its tail. I took a handful and went in pursuit of the birds, but I saw at
once that if I could sprinkle salt on their tails I could catch them, and that
what I had been told was only a joke. Those who read essays and works on
Courts of Arbitration and the disarmament of nations must feel very much
the same.
If it were possible to sprinkle salt on a bird's tail it would be tantamount to
saying that the bird could not fly, and therefore it would be no effort to
catch it. If a bird has wings and does not wish to be caught, it will not allow
any salt to be put on its tail, for it is the nature of a bird to fly. Likewise it is
the nature of a government not to be ruled, but to rule its subjects. And a
government rightly is named such only when it is able to rule its subjects,
and not be ruled by them. This, therefore, is its constant aim, and it will
never voluntarily resign its power. And as it derives its power from the
army it will never give up the army, nor will it ever renounce that for which
the army is designed,—war.
The misapprehension springs from the fact that the learned jurists,
deceiving themselves as well as others, depict in their books an ideal of
government,—not as it really is, an assembly of men who oppress their
fellow-citizens, but in accordance with the scientific postulate, as a body of
men who act as the representatives of the rest of the nation. They have gone
on repeating this to others so long that they have ended by believing it
themselves, and they really seem to think that justice is one of the duties of
governments. History, however, shows us that governments, as seen from
the reign of Cæsar to those of the two Napoleons and Prince Bismarck, are
Page 135
in their very essence a violation of justice; a man or a body of men having
at command an army of trained soldiers, deluded creatures who are ready
for any violence, and through whose agency they govern the State, will
have no keen sense of the obligation of justice. Therefore governments will
never consent to diminish the number of those well-trained and submissive
servants, who constitute their power and influence.
Such is the attitude of certain scientists toward that self-contradiction under
which the world groans, and such are their expedients for its relief. Tell
these scientists that the question deals only with the personal relations of
each individual toward the moral and religious question, and then ask them
what they think of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of taking part in the
general conscription, and their sole reply will be a shrug of the shoulders;
they will not even deign to give a thought to your question. Their way of
solving the difficulty is to make speeches, write books, choose their
presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries; assembled in a body, to hold
forth in one city or another. They think that the result of their efforts will be
to induce governments to cease to recruit soldiers, on whom all their power
depends; they expect that their appeals will be heard, and that armies will
be disbanded, leaving governments defenseless, not only in the presence of
neighbors, but of their subjects; that they, like highwaymen who, having
bound their defenseless victims in order to rob them, no sooner hear the
outcries of pain than they loosen the rope that causes it, and let their
prisoners go free.
And there really are men who believe in this, who spend their time in
promoting Leagues of Peace, in delivering addresses, and in writing books;
and of course the governments sympathize with it all, pretending that they
approve of it; just as they pretend to support temperance, while they
actually derive the larger part of their income from intemperance; just as
they pretend to maintain liberty of the constitution, when it is the absence of
liberty to which they owe their power; just as they pretend to care for the
improvement of the laboring classes, while on oppression of the workman
rest the very foundations of the State; just as they pretend to uphold
Christianity, when Christianity is subversive of every government.
In order to accomplish these ends they have long since instituted laws in
regard to intemperance that can never avail to destroy it; educational
projects that not only do not prevent the spread of ignorance, but do
at command an army of trained soldiers, deluded creatures who are ready
for any violence, and through whose agency they govern the State, will
have no keen sense of the obligation of justice. Therefore governments will
never consent to diminish the number of those well-trained and submissive
servants, who constitute their power and influence.
Such is the attitude of certain scientists toward that self-contradiction under
which the world groans, and such are their expedients for its relief. Tell
these scientists that the question deals only with the personal relations of
each individual toward the moral and religious question, and then ask them
what they think of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of taking part in the
general conscription, and their sole reply will be a shrug of the shoulders;
they will not even deign to give a thought to your question. Their way of
solving the difficulty is to make speeches, write books, choose their
presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries; assembled in a body, to hold
forth in one city or another. They think that the result of their efforts will be
to induce governments to cease to recruit soldiers, on whom all their power
depends; they expect that their appeals will be heard, and that armies will
be disbanded, leaving governments defenseless, not only in the presence of
neighbors, but of their subjects; that they, like highwaymen who, having
bound their defenseless victims in order to rob them, no sooner hear the
outcries of pain than they loosen the rope that causes it, and let their
prisoners go free.
And there really are men who believe in this, who spend their time in
promoting Leagues of Peace, in delivering addresses, and in writing books;
and of course the governments sympathize with it all, pretending that they
approve of it; just as they pretend to support temperance, while they
actually derive the larger part of their income from intemperance; just as
they pretend to maintain liberty of the constitution, when it is the absence of
liberty to which they owe their power; just as they pretend to care for the
improvement of the laboring classes, while on oppression of the workman
rest the very foundations of the State; just as they pretend to uphold
Christianity, when Christianity is subversive of every government.
In order to accomplish these ends they have long since instituted laws in
regard to intemperance that can never avail to destroy it; educational
projects that not only do not prevent the spread of ignorance, but do
Page 136
everything to increase it; decrees in the name of liberty that are no restraint
upon despotism; measures for the benefit of the working-man which will
never liberate him from slavery; they have established a Christianity which
serves to prop the government rather than destroy it. And now another
interest is added to their cares,—the promotion of peace. Governments, or
rather those rulers who are going about at present with their ministers of
state, making up their minds on such radical questions as, for instance,
whether the slaughter of millions shall begin this year or next,—they are
quite well assured that discussions on peace are not going to prevent them
from sending millions of men to slaughter whenever they see fit to do so.
They like to hear these discussions, they encourage them, and even take
part themselves.
It does no harm to the government; on the contrary, it is useful, by way of
diverting observation from that radical question: When a man is drafted,
ought he or ought he not to fulfil his military duty?
Thanks to all these unions and congresses, peace will presently be
established; meanwhile put on your uniforms, and be prepared to worry and
harass each other for our benefit, say the governments. And the scientists,
the essayists, and the promoters of congresses take the same view.
This is one way of looking at it, and so advantageous for the State that all
prudent governments encourage it.
The way another class has of regarding it is more tragic. They declare that
although it is the fate of humanity to be forever striving after love and
peace, it is nevertheless abnormal and inconsistent. Those who affirm this
are mostly the sensitive men of genius, who see and realize all the horror,
folly, and cruelty of war, but by some strange turn of mind never look about
them for any means of escape, but who seem to take a morbid delight in
realizing to the utmost the desperate condition of mankind. The view of the
famous French writer, Maupassant, on the subject of war, affords a
noteworthy example of this kind. Gazing from his yacht upon a drill and
target-practice of French soldiers, the following thoughts arise in his mind:
—
upon despotism; measures for the benefit of the working-man which will
never liberate him from slavery; they have established a Christianity which
serves to prop the government rather than destroy it. And now another
interest is added to their cares,—the promotion of peace. Governments, or
rather those rulers who are going about at present with their ministers of
state, making up their minds on such radical questions as, for instance,
whether the slaughter of millions shall begin this year or next,—they are
quite well assured that discussions on peace are not going to prevent them
from sending millions of men to slaughter whenever they see fit to do so.
They like to hear these discussions, they encourage them, and even take
part themselves.
It does no harm to the government; on the contrary, it is useful, by way of
diverting observation from that radical question: When a man is drafted,
ought he or ought he not to fulfil his military duty?
Thanks to all these unions and congresses, peace will presently be
established; meanwhile put on your uniforms, and be prepared to worry and
harass each other for our benefit, say the governments. And the scientists,
the essayists, and the promoters of congresses take the same view.
This is one way of looking at it, and so advantageous for the State that all
prudent governments encourage it.
The way another class has of regarding it is more tragic. They declare that
although it is the fate of humanity to be forever striving after love and
peace, it is nevertheless abnormal and inconsistent. Those who affirm this
are mostly the sensitive men of genius, who see and realize all the horror,
folly, and cruelty of war, but by some strange turn of mind never look about
them for any means of escape, but who seem to take a morbid delight in
realizing to the utmost the desperate condition of mankind. The view of the
famous French writer, Maupassant, on the subject of war, affords a
noteworthy example of this kind. Gazing from his yacht upon a drill and
target-practice of French soldiers, the following thoughts arise in his mind:
—
Page 137
"I have but to think of the word 'war' and a paralyzing sense of horror
creeps over me, as though I were listening to stories of witchcraft, or
tales of the Inquisition, or of things abominable, monstrous, unnatural,
of ages past.
"When people talk of cannibals we smile contemptuously with a sense
of superiority to such savages. But who are the savages, the true
savages? Those who fight that they may drive off the conquered, or
those who fight for the pure pleasure of killing? Those sharp-shooters
running over yonder are destined to be killed like a flock of sheep who
are driven by the butcher to the slaughter-house. Those men will fall
on some battlefield with a sabre-cut in the head, or with a ball through
the heart. Yet they are young men, who might have done useful work.
Their fathers are old and poor; their mothers, who have idolized them
for twenty years as only mothers can idolize, will learn after six
months, or perhaps a year, that the son, the baby, the grown-up child
on whom so much love and pains were lavished, who was reared at
such an expense, has been torn by a bullet, trampled under foot, or
crushed by a cavalry charge, and finally flung like a dead dog into
some ditch. Why must her boy, her beautiful, her only boy, the hope
and pride of her life, why must he be killed? She knows not; she can
but ask why.
"War!... The fighting!... The murdering!... The slaughter of men!... And
to-day, with all our wisdom, civilization, with the advancement of
science, the degree of philosophy to which the human spirit has
attained, we have schools where the art of murder, of aiming with
deadly accuracy and killing large numbers of men at a distance, is
actually taught, killing poor, harmless devils who have families to
support, killing them without even the pretext of the law.
"It is stupefying that the people do not rise up in arms against the
governments. What difference is there between monarchies and
republics? It is stupefying that society does not revolt as a unit at the
very sound of the word war.
"Alas! we shall never be free from oppression of the hateful, hideous
customs, the criminal prejudices, and the ferocious impulses of our
creeps over me, as though I were listening to stories of witchcraft, or
tales of the Inquisition, or of things abominable, monstrous, unnatural,
of ages past.
"When people talk of cannibals we smile contemptuously with a sense
of superiority to such savages. But who are the savages, the true
savages? Those who fight that they may drive off the conquered, or
those who fight for the pure pleasure of killing? Those sharp-shooters
running over yonder are destined to be killed like a flock of sheep who
are driven by the butcher to the slaughter-house. Those men will fall
on some battlefield with a sabre-cut in the head, or with a ball through
the heart. Yet they are young men, who might have done useful work.
Their fathers are old and poor; their mothers, who have idolized them
for twenty years as only mothers can idolize, will learn after six
months, or perhaps a year, that the son, the baby, the grown-up child
on whom so much love and pains were lavished, who was reared at
such an expense, has been torn by a bullet, trampled under foot, or
crushed by a cavalry charge, and finally flung like a dead dog into
some ditch. Why must her boy, her beautiful, her only boy, the hope
and pride of her life, why must he be killed? She knows not; she can
but ask why.
"War!... The fighting!... The murdering!... The slaughter of men!... And
to-day, with all our wisdom, civilization, with the advancement of
science, the degree of philosophy to which the human spirit has
attained, we have schools where the art of murder, of aiming with
deadly accuracy and killing large numbers of men at a distance, is
actually taught, killing poor, harmless devils who have families to
support, killing them without even the pretext of the law.
"It is stupefying that the people do not rise up in arms against the
governments. What difference is there between monarchies and
republics? It is stupefying that society does not revolt as a unit at the
very sound of the word war.
"Alas! we shall never be free from oppression of the hateful, hideous
customs, the criminal prejudices, and the ferocious impulses of our
Page 138
barbarous ancestors, for we are beasts; and beasts we shall remain,
moved by our instincts and susceptible of no improvement.
"Any one but Victor Hugo would have been banished when he uttered
his sublime cry of freedom and truth:—
"'To-day force is called violence, and the nations condemn it; they
inveigh against war. Civilization, listening to the appeal of humanity,
undertakes the case and prepares the accusation against the victors and
the generals. The nations begin to understand that the magnitude of a
crime cannot lessen its wickedness; that if it be criminal to kill one
man, the killing of numbers cannot be regarded in the light of
extenuation; that if it be shameful to steal, it cannot be glorious to lead
an invading army.
"'Let us proclaim these absolute truths, let us dishonor the name of
war!'
"But the wrath and indignation of the poet are all in vain," continues
Maupassant. "War is more honored than ever.
"A clever expert in this business, a genius in the art of murder, Von
Moltke, once made to a peace-delegate the following astonishing
reply:—
"'War is sacred; it is a divine institution; it fosters every lofty and noble
sentiment in the human heart: honor, self-sacrifice, virtue, courage, and
saves men, so to speak, from settling into the most shocking
materialism.'
"Assembling in herds by the hundred thousand, marching night and
day without rest, with no time for thought or for study, never to read,
learning nothing, of no use whatsoever to any living being, rotting with
filth, sleeping in the mud, living like a wild beast in a perennial state of
stupidity, plundering cities, burning villages, ruining whole nations;
then to encounter another mountain of human flesh, rush upon it, cause
rivers of blood to flow, and strew the fields with the dead and the
dying, all stained with the muddy and reddened soil, to have one's
limbs severed, one's brain scattered as wanton waste, and to perish in
the corner of a field while one's aged parents, one's wife and children,
moved by our instincts and susceptible of no improvement.
"Any one but Victor Hugo would have been banished when he uttered
his sublime cry of freedom and truth:—
"'To-day force is called violence, and the nations condemn it; they
inveigh against war. Civilization, listening to the appeal of humanity,
undertakes the case and prepares the accusation against the victors and
the generals. The nations begin to understand that the magnitude of a
crime cannot lessen its wickedness; that if it be criminal to kill one
man, the killing of numbers cannot be regarded in the light of
extenuation; that if it be shameful to steal, it cannot be glorious to lead
an invading army.
"'Let us proclaim these absolute truths, let us dishonor the name of
war!'
"But the wrath and indignation of the poet are all in vain," continues
Maupassant. "War is more honored than ever.
"A clever expert in this business, a genius in the art of murder, Von
Moltke, once made to a peace-delegate the following astonishing
reply:—
"'War is sacred; it is a divine institution; it fosters every lofty and noble
sentiment in the human heart: honor, self-sacrifice, virtue, courage, and
saves men, so to speak, from settling into the most shocking
materialism.'
"Assembling in herds by the hundred thousand, marching night and
day without rest, with no time for thought or for study, never to read,
learning nothing, of no use whatsoever to any living being, rotting with
filth, sleeping in the mud, living like a wild beast in a perennial state of
stupidity, plundering cities, burning villages, ruining whole nations;
then to encounter another mountain of human flesh, rush upon it, cause
rivers of blood to flow, and strew the fields with the dead and the
dying, all stained with the muddy and reddened soil, to have one's
limbs severed, one's brain scattered as wanton waste, and to perish in
the corner of a field while one's aged parents, one's wife and children,
Page 139
are dying of hunger at home,—this is what it means to be saved from
falling into the grossest materialism!
"Soldiers are the scourge of the world. We struggle against nature,
ignorance, all kinds of obstacles, in the effort to make our wretched
lives more endurable. There are men, scientists and philanthropists,
who devote their whole lives to benefit their fellow-men, seeking to
improve their condition. They pursue their efforts tirelessly, adding
discovery to discovery, expanding the human intelligence, enriching
science, opening new fields of knowledge, day by day increasing the
well-being, comfort, and vigor of their country.
"Then war comes upon the scene, and in six months all the results of
twenty years of patient labor and of human genius are gone forever,
crushed by victorious generals.
"And this is what they mean when they speak of man's rescue from
materialism!
"We have seen war. We have seen men maddened; returned to the
condition of the brutes, we have seen them kill in wanton sport, out of
terror, or for mere bravado and show. Where right exists no longer, and
law is dead, where all sense of justice has been lost, we have seen
innocent men shot down on the highway, because they were timid and
thus excited suspicion. We have seen dogs chained to their masters'
doors killed by way of target-practice, we have seen cows lying in a
field fired at by the mitrailleuses, just for the fun of shooting at
something.
"And this is what they call saving men from the most shocking
materialism!
"To invade a country, to kill the man who defends his home because he
wears a blouse and does not wear a kepi, to burn the dwellings of
starving wretches, to ruin or plunder a man's household goods, to drink
the wine found in the cellars, to violate the women found in the streets,
consume millions of francs in powder, and to leave misery and cholera
in their track.
"This is what they mean by saving men from the most shocking
materialism!
falling into the grossest materialism!
"Soldiers are the scourge of the world. We struggle against nature,
ignorance, all kinds of obstacles, in the effort to make our wretched
lives more endurable. There are men, scientists and philanthropists,
who devote their whole lives to benefit their fellow-men, seeking to
improve their condition. They pursue their efforts tirelessly, adding
discovery to discovery, expanding the human intelligence, enriching
science, opening new fields of knowledge, day by day increasing the
well-being, comfort, and vigor of their country.
"Then war comes upon the scene, and in six months all the results of
twenty years of patient labor and of human genius are gone forever,
crushed by victorious generals.
"And this is what they mean when they speak of man's rescue from
materialism!
"We have seen war. We have seen men maddened; returned to the
condition of the brutes, we have seen them kill in wanton sport, out of
terror, or for mere bravado and show. Where right exists no longer, and
law is dead, where all sense of justice has been lost, we have seen
innocent men shot down on the highway, because they were timid and
thus excited suspicion. We have seen dogs chained to their masters'
doors killed by way of target-practice, we have seen cows lying in a
field fired at by the mitrailleuses, just for the fun of shooting at
something.
"And this is what they call saving men from the most shocking
materialism!
"To invade a country, to kill the man who defends his home because he
wears a blouse and does not wear a kepi, to burn the dwellings of
starving wretches, to ruin or plunder a man's household goods, to drink
the wine found in the cellars, to violate the women found in the streets,
consume millions of francs in powder, and to leave misery and cholera
in their track.
"This is what they mean by saving men from the most shocking
materialism!
Page 140
"What have military men ever done to prove that they possess the
smallest degree of intelligence? Nothing whatever. What have they
invented? The cannon and the musket; nothing more.
"Has not the inventor of the wheelbarrow, by the simple and practical
contrivance of a wheel and a couple of boards, accomplished more
than the inventor of modern fortification?
"What has Greece bequeathed to the world? Its literature and its
marbles. Was she great because she conquered, or because she
produced? Was it the Persian invasion that saved Greece from
succumbing to the most shocking materialism?
"Did the invasions of the Barbarians save and regenerate Rome?
"Did Napoleon I. continue the great intellectual movement started by
the philosophers at the end of the last century?
"Very well, then; can it be a matter of surprise, since governments
usurp the rights of life and death over the people, that the people from
time to time assume the right of life and death over their governments?
"They defend themselves, and they have the right. No man has an
inalienable right to govern others. It is allowable only when it
promotes the welfare of the governed. It is as much the duty of those
who govern to avoid war as it is that of a captain of a ship to avoid
shipwreck.
"When a captain has lost his ship he is indicted, and if he is found to
have been careless or even incompetent, he is convicted. As soon as
war has been declared why should not the people sit in judgment upon
the act of the government?
"If they could once be made to understand the power that would be
theirs, if they were the judges of the rulers who lead them on to slay
their fellow-men, if they refused to allow themselves to be needlessly
slaughtered, if they were to turn their weapons against the very men
who have put them into their hands—that day would see the last of
war.... But never will that day arrive."—"Sur l'Eau."
The author perceives the full horror of war, realizes that the government is
its author, that government forces men to go slay, or be slain, when there is
smallest degree of intelligence? Nothing whatever. What have they
invented? The cannon and the musket; nothing more.
"Has not the inventor of the wheelbarrow, by the simple and practical
contrivance of a wheel and a couple of boards, accomplished more
than the inventor of modern fortification?
"What has Greece bequeathed to the world? Its literature and its
marbles. Was she great because she conquered, or because she
produced? Was it the Persian invasion that saved Greece from
succumbing to the most shocking materialism?
"Did the invasions of the Barbarians save and regenerate Rome?
"Did Napoleon I. continue the great intellectual movement started by
the philosophers at the end of the last century?
"Very well, then; can it be a matter of surprise, since governments
usurp the rights of life and death over the people, that the people from
time to time assume the right of life and death over their governments?
"They defend themselves, and they have the right. No man has an
inalienable right to govern others. It is allowable only when it
promotes the welfare of the governed. It is as much the duty of those
who govern to avoid war as it is that of a captain of a ship to avoid
shipwreck.
"When a captain has lost his ship he is indicted, and if he is found to
have been careless or even incompetent, he is convicted. As soon as
war has been declared why should not the people sit in judgment upon
the act of the government?
"If they could once be made to understand the power that would be
theirs, if they were the judges of the rulers who lead them on to slay
their fellow-men, if they refused to allow themselves to be needlessly
slaughtered, if they were to turn their weapons against the very men
who have put them into their hands—that day would see the last of
war.... But never will that day arrive."—"Sur l'Eau."
The author perceives the full horror of war, realizes that the government is
its author, that government forces men to go slay, or be slain, when there is
Page 141
no need for it; he realizes that the men who make up the armies might turn
their weapons against the government and demand a reckoning. Still the
author does not believe that this will ever happen, or that there is any
possible deliverance from the existing condition of affairs.
He grants that the result of war is shocking, but he believes it to be
inevitable; assuming that the never ceasing requisition of soldiers on the
part of government is as inevitable as death, then wars must follow as a
matter of course.
These are the words of a writer of talent, endowed with a faculty of vividly
realizing his subject, which is the essence of the poetic gift. He shows us all
the cruel contradictions between creed and deed; but since he fails to offer a
solution, it is evident that he feels that such a contradiction must exist, and
regards it as a contribution to the romantic tragedy of life. Another and an
equally gifted writer, Edouard Rod, paints with colors still more vivid the
cruelty and folly of the present situation, but he, like Maupassant, feels the
influence of the dramatic element, and neither suggests a remedy nor
anticipates any change.
"Why do we toil? Why do we plan and hope to execute? And how can
one even love one's neighbor in these troublous times, when the
morrow is nothing but a menace?... Everything that we have begun,
our ripening schemes, our plans for work, the little good that we might
accomplish, will it not all be swept away by the storm that is
gathering?... Everywhere the soil quakes beneath our feet, and
threatening clouds hang low on the horizon. Ah! if we had nothing
more to fear than the bugbear of the Revolution!... Unable to conceive
a society worse than our own, I am more inclined to distrust than to
fear the one that may replace it, and if I should suffer in consequence
of the change, I should console myself with the reflection that the
executioners of the present were victims of the past, and the hope of a
change for the better would make me endure the worst. But it is not
this remote danger which alarms me. I see another close at hand and
far more cruel, since it is both unjustifiable and irrational, and nothing
good can come out of it. Day by day the chances of war are weighed,
and day by day they become more pitiless.
their weapons against the government and demand a reckoning. Still the
author does not believe that this will ever happen, or that there is any
possible deliverance from the existing condition of affairs.
He grants that the result of war is shocking, but he believes it to be
inevitable; assuming that the never ceasing requisition of soldiers on the
part of government is as inevitable as death, then wars must follow as a
matter of course.
These are the words of a writer of talent, endowed with a faculty of vividly
realizing his subject, which is the essence of the poetic gift. He shows us all
the cruel contradictions between creed and deed; but since he fails to offer a
solution, it is evident that he feels that such a contradiction must exist, and
regards it as a contribution to the romantic tragedy of life. Another and an
equally gifted writer, Edouard Rod, paints with colors still more vivid the
cruelty and folly of the present situation, but he, like Maupassant, feels the
influence of the dramatic element, and neither suggests a remedy nor
anticipates any change.
"Why do we toil? Why do we plan and hope to execute? And how can
one even love one's neighbor in these troublous times, when the
morrow is nothing but a menace?... Everything that we have begun,
our ripening schemes, our plans for work, the little good that we might
accomplish, will it not all be swept away by the storm that is
gathering?... Everywhere the soil quakes beneath our feet, and
threatening clouds hang low on the horizon. Ah! if we had nothing
more to fear than the bugbear of the Revolution!... Unable to conceive
a society worse than our own, I am more inclined to distrust than to
fear the one that may replace it, and if I should suffer in consequence
of the change, I should console myself with the reflection that the
executioners of the present were victims of the past, and the hope of a
change for the better would make me endure the worst. But it is not
this remote danger which alarms me. I see another close at hand and
far more cruel, since it is both unjustifiable and irrational, and nothing
good can come out of it. Day by day the chances of war are weighed,
and day by day they become more pitiless.
Page 142
"The human mind refuses to believe in the catastrophe which even
now looms up before us, and which the close of this century must
surely witness, a catastrophe which will put an end to all the progress
of our age, and yet we must try to realize it. Science has devoted all
her energy these twenty years to the invention of destructive weapons,
and soon a few cannon-balls will suffice to destroy an army;[10] not the
few thousands of wretched mercenaries, whose life-blood has been
bought and paid for, but whole nations are about to exterminate each
other; during conscription their time is stolen from them in order to
steal their lives with more certainty. By way of stimulating a thirst for
blood mutual animosities are excited, and gentle, kind-hearted men
allow themselves to be deluded, and it will not be long before they
attack each other with all the ferocity of wild beasts; multitudes of
peace-loving citizens will obey a foolish command, God only knows
on what pretext,—some stupid frontier quarrel, perhaps, or it may be
some colonial mercantile interest.... They will go like a flock of sheep
to the slaughter, yet knowing where they go, conscious that they are
leaving their wives and their children to suffer hunger; anxious, but
unable to resist the enticement of those plausible and treacherous
words that have been trumpeted into their ears. Unresistingly they go;
although they form a mass and a force, they fail to realize the extent of
their power, and that if they were all agreed they might establish the
reign of reason and fraternity, instead of lending themselves to the
barbarous trickeries of diplomacy.
"So self-deceived are they that bloodshed takes on the aspect of duty,
and they implore the blessing of God upon their sanguinary hopes. As
they march, they trample underfoot the harvests which they themselves
have planted, burning the cities which they have helped to build, with
songs, shouts of enthusiasm, and music. And their sons will raise a
statue to those who have slain them by the most approved methods....
The fate of a whole generation hangs on the hour when some saturnine
politician shall make the sign, and the nations will rush upon each
other. We know that the noblest among us will be cut down, and that
our affairs will go to destruction. We know this, we tremble in anger,
yet are powerless. We have been caught in a snare of bureaucracy and
waste paper from which we can only escape by measures too energetic
for us. We belong to the laws which we have made for our protection,
now looms up before us, and which the close of this century must
surely witness, a catastrophe which will put an end to all the progress
of our age, and yet we must try to realize it. Science has devoted all
her energy these twenty years to the invention of destructive weapons,
and soon a few cannon-balls will suffice to destroy an army;[10] not the
few thousands of wretched mercenaries, whose life-blood has been
bought and paid for, but whole nations are about to exterminate each
other; during conscription their time is stolen from them in order to
steal their lives with more certainty. By way of stimulating a thirst for
blood mutual animosities are excited, and gentle, kind-hearted men
allow themselves to be deluded, and it will not be long before they
attack each other with all the ferocity of wild beasts; multitudes of
peace-loving citizens will obey a foolish command, God only knows
on what pretext,—some stupid frontier quarrel, perhaps, or it may be
some colonial mercantile interest.... They will go like a flock of sheep
to the slaughter, yet knowing where they go, conscious that they are
leaving their wives and their children to suffer hunger; anxious, but
unable to resist the enticement of those plausible and treacherous
words that have been trumpeted into their ears. Unresistingly they go;
although they form a mass and a force, they fail to realize the extent of
their power, and that if they were all agreed they might establish the
reign of reason and fraternity, instead of lending themselves to the
barbarous trickeries of diplomacy.
"So self-deceived are they that bloodshed takes on the aspect of duty,
and they implore the blessing of God upon their sanguinary hopes. As
they march, they trample underfoot the harvests which they themselves
have planted, burning the cities which they have helped to build, with
songs, shouts of enthusiasm, and music. And their sons will raise a
statue to those who have slain them by the most approved methods....
The fate of a whole generation hangs on the hour when some saturnine
politician shall make the sign, and the nations will rush upon each
other. We know that the noblest among us will be cut down, and that
our affairs will go to destruction. We know this, we tremble in anger,
yet are powerless. We have been caught in a snare of bureaucracy and
waste paper from which we can only escape by measures too energetic
for us. We belong to the laws which we have made for our protection,
Page 143
and which oppress us. We are nothing more than the creatures of that
antinomic abstraction, the State, which makes of each individual a
slave in the name of all, each individual of which all, taken separately,
would desire the exact contrary of what he will be made to do.
"And if it were but the sacrifice of a single generation! But many other
interests are involved.
"Paid orators, demagogues, taking advantage of the passions of the
masses and of the simple-minded who are dazzled by high-sounding
phrases, have so embittered national hatreds that to-morrow's war will
decide the fate of a race: one of the component parts of the modern
world is threatened; the vanquished nation will morally disappear; it
matters not which chances to be the victim, a power will disappear (as
though there had ever been one too many for the good). A new Europe
will then be established on a basis so unjust, so brutal, so bloodstained,
that it cannot fail to be worse than that of to-day,—more iniquitous,
more barbarous, and more aggressive....
"Thus a fearful depression hangs over us. We are like men dashing up
and down a narrow passageway, with muskets pointed at us from all
the roofs. We work like sailors executing their last manœuver after the
ship has begun to sink. Our pleasures are those of the prisoner to
whom a choice dish is offered a quarter of an hour before his
execution. Anxiety paralyzes our thought, and the utmost we can do is
to wonder, as we con the vague utterances of ministers, or construe the
meaning of the words of monarchs, or turn over those ascribed to the
diplomatists, retailed at random by the newspapers, never sure of their
information, whether all this is to happen to-morrow or the day after,
whether it is this year or next that we are all to be killed. In truth, one
might seek in vain throughout the pages of history for an epoch more
unsettled or more pregnant with anxiety."—"Le Sens de la Vie."
He shows us that the power is really in the hands of those who allow
themselves to be destroyed, in the hands of separate individuals who
compose the mass; that the root of all evil is the State. It would seem as if
the contradiction between one's faith and one's actual life had reached its
utmost limit, and that the solution could not be far to seek.
antinomic abstraction, the State, which makes of each individual a
slave in the name of all, each individual of which all, taken separately,
would desire the exact contrary of what he will be made to do.
"And if it were but the sacrifice of a single generation! But many other
interests are involved.
"Paid orators, demagogues, taking advantage of the passions of the
masses and of the simple-minded who are dazzled by high-sounding
phrases, have so embittered national hatreds that to-morrow's war will
decide the fate of a race: one of the component parts of the modern
world is threatened; the vanquished nation will morally disappear; it
matters not which chances to be the victim, a power will disappear (as
though there had ever been one too many for the good). A new Europe
will then be established on a basis so unjust, so brutal, so bloodstained,
that it cannot fail to be worse than that of to-day,—more iniquitous,
more barbarous, and more aggressive....
"Thus a fearful depression hangs over us. We are like men dashing up
and down a narrow passageway, with muskets pointed at us from all
the roofs. We work like sailors executing their last manœuver after the
ship has begun to sink. Our pleasures are those of the prisoner to
whom a choice dish is offered a quarter of an hour before his
execution. Anxiety paralyzes our thought, and the utmost we can do is
to wonder, as we con the vague utterances of ministers, or construe the
meaning of the words of monarchs, or turn over those ascribed to the
diplomatists, retailed at random by the newspapers, never sure of their
information, whether all this is to happen to-morrow or the day after,
whether it is this year or next that we are all to be killed. In truth, one
might seek in vain throughout the pages of history for an epoch more
unsettled or more pregnant with anxiety."—"Le Sens de la Vie."
He shows us that the power is really in the hands of those who allow
themselves to be destroyed, in the hands of separate individuals who
compose the mass; that the root of all evil is the State. It would seem as if
the contradiction between one's faith and one's actual life had reached its
utmost limit, and that the solution could not be far to seek.
Page 144
But the author is of a different opinion. All that he sees in this is the tragedy
of human life, and having given us a detailed description of the horror of
this state of things, he perceives no reason why human life should not be
spent in the midst of this horror. Such are the views of the second class of
writers, who consider only the fatalistic and tragic side of war.
There is still another view, and this is the one held by men who have lost all
conscience, and are consequently dead to common sense and human
feeling.
To this class belong Moltke, whose opinions are quoted by Maupassant, and
nearly all military men who have been taught to believe this cruel
superstition, who are supported by it, and who naturally regard war not only
as an inevitable evil, but as a necessary and even profitable occupation. And
there are civilians too, scientists, men of refinement and education, who
hold very much the same views.
The famous academician Doucet, in reply to a query of the editor of the
Revue des Revues in regard to his opinions on war, replies as follows in the
number containing letters concerning war:[11]—
"Dear Sir,—When you ask of the least belligerent of all the
academicians if he is a partizan of war, his reply is already given.
Unfortunately you yourself classify the peaceful contemplations which
inspire your fellow-countrymen at the present hour as idle visions.
"Ever since I was born I have always heard good men protesting
against this shocking custom of international carnage. All recognize
this evil and lament it. But where is its remedy?
"The effort to suppress duelling has often been made. It seems to be so
easy. Far from it. All that has been accomplished toward achieving this
noble purpose amounts to nothing, nor will it ever amount to more.
Against war and duelling the congresses of the two hemispheres vote
in vain. Superior to all arbitrations, conventions, and legislations will
ever remain human honor, which has always demanded the duel, and
national interests, which have always called for war. Nevertheless, I
wish with all my heart that the Universal Peace Congress may succeed
at last in its difficult and honorable task.—Accept the assurance, etc.,
"Camille Doucet."
of human life, and having given us a detailed description of the horror of
this state of things, he perceives no reason why human life should not be
spent in the midst of this horror. Such are the views of the second class of
writers, who consider only the fatalistic and tragic side of war.
There is still another view, and this is the one held by men who have lost all
conscience, and are consequently dead to common sense and human
feeling.
To this class belong Moltke, whose opinions are quoted by Maupassant, and
nearly all military men who have been taught to believe this cruel
superstition, who are supported by it, and who naturally regard war not only
as an inevitable evil, but as a necessary and even profitable occupation. And
there are civilians too, scientists, men of refinement and education, who
hold very much the same views.
The famous academician Doucet, in reply to a query of the editor of the
Revue des Revues in regard to his opinions on war, replies as follows in the
number containing letters concerning war:[11]—
"Dear Sir,—When you ask of the least belligerent of all the
academicians if he is a partizan of war, his reply is already given.
Unfortunately you yourself classify the peaceful contemplations which
inspire your fellow-countrymen at the present hour as idle visions.
"Ever since I was born I have always heard good men protesting
against this shocking custom of international carnage. All recognize
this evil and lament it. But where is its remedy?
"The effort to suppress duelling has often been made. It seems to be so
easy. Far from it. All that has been accomplished toward achieving this
noble purpose amounts to nothing, nor will it ever amount to more.
Against war and duelling the congresses of the two hemispheres vote
in vain. Superior to all arbitrations, conventions, and legislations will
ever remain human honor, which has always demanded the duel, and
national interests, which have always called for war. Nevertheless, I
wish with all my heart that the Universal Peace Congress may succeed
at last in its difficult and honorable task.—Accept the assurance, etc.,
"Camille Doucet."
Page 145
It amounts to this, that honor obliges men to fight, that it is for the interest
of nations that they should attack and destroy one another, and that all
endeavors to abolish war can but excite a smile.
Jules Claretie expresses himself in similar terms:—
"Dear Sir,—A sensible man can have but one opinion on the question
of war and peace. Humanity was created to live—to live for the
purpose of perfecting its existence by peaceful labor. The mutual
relations of cordiality which are promoted and preached by the
Universal Congress of Peace may be but a dream perhaps, yet certainly
is the most delightful of dreams. The vision of the land of promise is
ever before the eyes, and upon the soil of the future the harvest will
ripen, secure from the plowing of the projectile, or the crushing of
cannon-wheels. But, alas!... Since philosophers and philanthropists are
not the rulers of mankind, it is fit that our soldiers should guard our
frontiers and our homes, and their weapons, skilfully wielded, are
perhaps the surest guarantees of the peace we love so well. Peace is
given only to the strong and the courageous.—Accept the assurances
of, etc.,
"Jules Claretie."
The substance of this is, that there is no harm in talking about what no one
intends to do, and what ought not in any event to be done. When fighting is
in order, there is no alternative but to fight.
Émile Zola, the most popular novelist in Europe, gives utterance to his
views on the subject of war in the following terms:—
"I look upon war as a fatal necessity which seems to us indispensable
because of its close connection with human nature and all creation.
Would that it might be postponed as long as possible! Nevertheless a
time will come when we shall be forced to fight. At this moment I am
regarding the subject from the universal standpoint, and am not hinting
at our unfriendly relations with Germany, which are but a trifling
incident in the world's history. I affirm that war is useful and necessary,
since it is one of the conditions of human existence. The fighting
instinct is to be found not only among the different tribes and peoples,
of nations that they should attack and destroy one another, and that all
endeavors to abolish war can but excite a smile.
Jules Claretie expresses himself in similar terms:—
"Dear Sir,—A sensible man can have but one opinion on the question
of war and peace. Humanity was created to live—to live for the
purpose of perfecting its existence by peaceful labor. The mutual
relations of cordiality which are promoted and preached by the
Universal Congress of Peace may be but a dream perhaps, yet certainly
is the most delightful of dreams. The vision of the land of promise is
ever before the eyes, and upon the soil of the future the harvest will
ripen, secure from the plowing of the projectile, or the crushing of
cannon-wheels. But, alas!... Since philosophers and philanthropists are
not the rulers of mankind, it is fit that our soldiers should guard our
frontiers and our homes, and their weapons, skilfully wielded, are
perhaps the surest guarantees of the peace we love so well. Peace is
given only to the strong and the courageous.—Accept the assurances
of, etc.,
"Jules Claretie."
The substance of this is, that there is no harm in talking about what no one
intends to do, and what ought not in any event to be done. When fighting is
in order, there is no alternative but to fight.
Émile Zola, the most popular novelist in Europe, gives utterance to his
views on the subject of war in the following terms:—
"I look upon war as a fatal necessity which seems to us indispensable
because of its close connection with human nature and all creation.
Would that it might be postponed as long as possible! Nevertheless a
time will come when we shall be forced to fight. At this moment I am
regarding the subject from the universal standpoint, and am not hinting
at our unfriendly relations with Germany, which are but a trifling
incident in the world's history. I affirm that war is useful and necessary,
since it is one of the conditions of human existence. The fighting
instinct is to be found not only among the different tribes and peoples,
Page 146
but in domestic and private life as well. It is one of the chief elements
of progress, and every advancing step taken by mankind up to the
present time has been accompanied by bloodshed.
"Men have talked, and still do talk, of disarmament; and yet
disarmament is utterly impossible, for even though it were possible,
we should be compelled to renounce it. It is only an armed nation that
can be powerful and great. I believe that a general disarmament would
be followed by a moral degradation, assuming the form of a
widespread effeminacy which would impede the progress of humanity.
Warlike nations have always been vigorous. The military art has
contributed to the development of other arts. History shows us this. In
Athens and Rome, for instance, commerce, industry, and literature
reached their highest development when these cities ruled the world by
the force of arms. And nearer to our own time we found an example in
the reign of Louis XIV. The wars of the great king, so far from
impeding the advance of arts and sciences, seemed rather to promote
and to favor their progress."
War is useful!
But chief among the advocates of these views, and the most talented of all
the writers of this tendency, is the academician Vogüé, who, in an article on
the military section of the Exhibition of 1889, writes as follows:—
"On the Esplanade des Invalides, the center of exotic and colonial
structures, a building of a more severe order stands out from the midst
of the picturesque bazaar; these various fragments of our terrestrial
globe adjoin the palace of war. A magnificent theme and antithesis for
humanitarian rhetoric which never loses a chance to lament a
juxtaposition of this kind, and to utter its 'this will kill that' [ceci tuera
cela[12]]; that the confederacy of nations brought about by science and
labor will overpower the military instinct. Let it cherish this vision of a
golden age, caressing it with fond hopes. We have no objection; but
should it ever be realized, it would very soon become an age of
corruption. History teaches us that the former has been accomplished
by the means of the latter, that blood is necessary to hasten and to seal
the confederacy of nations. In our own time the natural sciences have
of progress, and every advancing step taken by mankind up to the
present time has been accompanied by bloodshed.
"Men have talked, and still do talk, of disarmament; and yet
disarmament is utterly impossible, for even though it were possible,
we should be compelled to renounce it. It is only an armed nation that
can be powerful and great. I believe that a general disarmament would
be followed by a moral degradation, assuming the form of a
widespread effeminacy which would impede the progress of humanity.
Warlike nations have always been vigorous. The military art has
contributed to the development of other arts. History shows us this. In
Athens and Rome, for instance, commerce, industry, and literature
reached their highest development when these cities ruled the world by
the force of arms. And nearer to our own time we found an example in
the reign of Louis XIV. The wars of the great king, so far from
impeding the advance of arts and sciences, seemed rather to promote
and to favor their progress."
War is useful!
But chief among the advocates of these views, and the most talented of all
the writers of this tendency, is the academician Vogüé, who, in an article on
the military section of the Exhibition of 1889, writes as follows:—
"On the Esplanade des Invalides, the center of exotic and colonial
structures, a building of a more severe order stands out from the midst
of the picturesque bazaar; these various fragments of our terrestrial
globe adjoin the palace of war. A magnificent theme and antithesis for
humanitarian rhetoric which never loses a chance to lament a
juxtaposition of this kind, and to utter its 'this will kill that' [ceci tuera
cela[12]]; that the confederacy of nations brought about by science and
labor will overpower the military instinct. Let it cherish this vision of a
golden age, caressing it with fond hopes. We have no objection; but
should it ever be realized, it would very soon become an age of
corruption. History teaches us that the former has been accomplished
by the means of the latter, that blood is necessary to hasten and to seal
the confederacy of nations. In our own time the natural sciences have
Page 147
strengthened the mysterious law which revealed itself to Joseph de
Maistre through the inspiration of his genius and meditation on
primordial dogmas; he saw how the world would redeem its hereditary
fall by offering a sacrifice. Science shows us that the world is made
better by struggle and violent selection; this affirmation of the same
law, with varied utterance, comes from two sources. It is by no means
a pleasant one. The laws of the world, however, are not established for
our pleasure, but for our perfection. Let us then enter this necessary
and indispensable palace of war, and we shall have the opportunity to
observe how our most inveterate instinct, losing nothing of its power,
is transformed in its adaptation to the various demands of historical
moments."
This idea, namely, that the proof of the necessity of war may be found in the
writings of De Maistre and of Darwin, two great thinkers, as he calls them,
pleases Vogüé so much that he repeats it.
"Sir," he writes to the editor of the Revue des Revues, "you ask my opinion
in regard to the possible success of the Universal Peace Congress. I believe,
with Darwin, that vehement struggle is the law governing all being, and I
believe, with Joseph de Maistre, that it is a divine law,—two different
modes of characterizing the same principle. If, contrary to all expectations,
a certain fraction of humanity—for example, all the civilized West—should
succeed in arresting the issue of this law, the more primitive races would
execute it against us; in these races the voice of nature would prevail over
human intellect. And they would succeed, because the certainty of peace—I
do not say peace, but the absolute certainty of peace—would in less than
half a century produce a corruption and a decadence in men more
destructive than the worst of wars. I believe that one should act in regard to
war—that criminal law of humanity—as in regard to all criminal laws:
modify it, or endeavor to make its execution as rare as possible, and use
every means in our power to render it superfluous. But experience of all
history teaches us that it cannot be suppressed, so long as there shall be
found on earth two men, bread, money, and a woman between them. I
should be very glad if the Congress could prove to me the contrary; but I
doubt if it can disprove history, and the law of God and of nature.—Accept
my assurance, etc.,
Maistre through the inspiration of his genius and meditation on
primordial dogmas; he saw how the world would redeem its hereditary
fall by offering a sacrifice. Science shows us that the world is made
better by struggle and violent selection; this affirmation of the same
law, with varied utterance, comes from two sources. It is by no means
a pleasant one. The laws of the world, however, are not established for
our pleasure, but for our perfection. Let us then enter this necessary
and indispensable palace of war, and we shall have the opportunity to
observe how our most inveterate instinct, losing nothing of its power,
is transformed in its adaptation to the various demands of historical
moments."
This idea, namely, that the proof of the necessity of war may be found in the
writings of De Maistre and of Darwin, two great thinkers, as he calls them,
pleases Vogüé so much that he repeats it.
"Sir," he writes to the editor of the Revue des Revues, "you ask my opinion
in regard to the possible success of the Universal Peace Congress. I believe,
with Darwin, that vehement struggle is the law governing all being, and I
believe, with Joseph de Maistre, that it is a divine law,—two different
modes of characterizing the same principle. If, contrary to all expectations,
a certain fraction of humanity—for example, all the civilized West—should
succeed in arresting the issue of this law, the more primitive races would
execute it against us; in these races the voice of nature would prevail over
human intellect. And they would succeed, because the certainty of peace—I
do not say peace, but the absolute certainty of peace—would in less than
half a century produce a corruption and a decadence in men more
destructive than the worst of wars. I believe that one should act in regard to
war—that criminal law of humanity—as in regard to all criminal laws:
modify it, or endeavor to make its execution as rare as possible, and use
every means in our power to render it superfluous. But experience of all
history teaches us that it cannot be suppressed, so long as there shall be
found on earth two men, bread, money, and a woman between them. I
should be very glad if the Congress could prove to me the contrary; but I
doubt if it can disprove history, and the law of God and of nature.—Accept
my assurance, etc.,
Page 148
"E. M. de Vogüé."
This may be summed up as follows: History and nature, God and man,
show us that so long as there are two men left on earth, and the stakes are
bread, money, and woman, just so long there will be war. That is, that no
amount of civilization will ever destroy that abnormal concept of life which
makes it impossible for men to divide bread, money (of all absurdities), and
woman without a fight. It is odd that people meet in congresses and hold
forth as to the best method of catching birds by putting salt on their tails,
although they must know that this can never be done! It is astonishing that
men like Rod, Maupassant, and others, clearly realizing all the horrors of
war, and all the contradictions that ensue from men not doing what they
ought to do, and what it would be to their advantage to do, who bemoan the
tragedy of life, and yet fail to see that this tragic element would vanish as
soon as men ceased to discuss a subject which should not be discussed, and
ceased to do that which is both painful and repulsive for them to do!
One may wonder at them; but men who, like Vogüé and others, believe in
the law of evolution, and look upon war as not only unavoidable, but even
useful, and therefore desirable,—such men are fairly shocking, horrible in
their moral aberration. The former at least declare that they hate evil and
love good, but the latter believe there is neither good nor evil.
All this discussion of the possibility of establishing peace instead of
continual warfare is but the mischievous sentimentalism of idle talkers.
There is a law of evolution which seems to prove that I must live and do
wrong. What, then, can I do? I am an educated man,—I am familiar with
the doctrine of evolution; hence it follows that I shall work evil. "Entrons au
palais de la guerre." There is a law of evolution, and therefore there can be
no real evil; and one must live one's life and leave the rest to the law of
evolution. This is the last expression of refined civilization; it is with this
idea that the educated classes at the present day deaden their conscience.
The desire of these classes to preserve their favorite theories and the life
that they have built up on them can go no further. They lie, and by their
specious arguments deceive themselves as well as others, obscuring and
deadening their intuitive perceptions.
Rather than adapt their lives to their consciousness, they try by every means
to befog and to silence it. But the light shines in the darkness, and even now
This may be summed up as follows: History and nature, God and man,
show us that so long as there are two men left on earth, and the stakes are
bread, money, and woman, just so long there will be war. That is, that no
amount of civilization will ever destroy that abnormal concept of life which
makes it impossible for men to divide bread, money (of all absurdities), and
woman without a fight. It is odd that people meet in congresses and hold
forth as to the best method of catching birds by putting salt on their tails,
although they must know that this can never be done! It is astonishing that
men like Rod, Maupassant, and others, clearly realizing all the horrors of
war, and all the contradictions that ensue from men not doing what they
ought to do, and what it would be to their advantage to do, who bemoan the
tragedy of life, and yet fail to see that this tragic element would vanish as
soon as men ceased to discuss a subject which should not be discussed, and
ceased to do that which is both painful and repulsive for them to do!
One may wonder at them; but men who, like Vogüé and others, believe in
the law of evolution, and look upon war as not only unavoidable, but even
useful, and therefore desirable,—such men are fairly shocking, horrible in
their moral aberration. The former at least declare that they hate evil and
love good, but the latter believe there is neither good nor evil.
All this discussion of the possibility of establishing peace instead of
continual warfare is but the mischievous sentimentalism of idle talkers.
There is a law of evolution which seems to prove that I must live and do
wrong. What, then, can I do? I am an educated man,—I am familiar with
the doctrine of evolution; hence it follows that I shall work evil. "Entrons au
palais de la guerre." There is a law of evolution, and therefore there can be
no real evil; and one must live one's life and leave the rest to the law of
evolution. This is the last expression of refined civilization; it is with this
idea that the educated classes at the present day deaden their conscience.
The desire of these classes to preserve their favorite theories and the life
that they have built up on them can go no further. They lie, and by their
specious arguments deceive themselves as well as others, obscuring and
deadening their intuitive perceptions.
Rather than adapt their lives to their consciousness, they try by every means
to befog and to silence it. But the light shines in the darkness, and even now
Page 149
it begins to dawn.
Page 150
CHAPTER VII
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY CONSCRIPTION
General military conscription is not a political accident, but the extreme limit of contradiction
contained in the social life-conception—Rise of power in society—The basis of power is
personal violence—The organization of armed men, an army, is required by power to
enable it to accomplish violence—The rise of power in society, that is, of violence,
destroys by degrees the social life-conception—Attitude of power toward the masses, that
is to say, the oppressed—Governments endeavor to make workmen believe in the
necessity of State violence for their preservation from external foes—But the army is
needed principally to defend government from its own subjects, the oppressed working-
men—Address of Caprivi—All the privileges of the ruling classes are assured by
violence—Increase of armies leads to a general military conscription—General military
conscription destroys all the advantages of social life which it is the duty of the State to
guard—General military conscription is the extreme limit of obedience, as it demands in
the name of the State the abnegation of all that may be dear to man—Is the State needed?
—The sacrifices which it requires from citizens through the general military conscription
have no longer any basis—Hence it is more advantageous for man to rebel against the
demands of the State than to submit to them.
The efforts which the educated men of the upper classes are making to
silence the growing consciousness that the present system of life must be
changed, are constantly on the increase, while life itself, continuing to
develop and to become more complex without changing its direction, as it
increases the incongruities and suffering of human existence, brings men to
the extreme limit of this contradiction. An example of this uttermost limit is
found in the general military conscription.
It is usually supposed that this conscription, together with the increasing
armaments and the consequent increase of the taxes and national debts of
all countries, are the accidental results of a certain crisis in European affairs,
which might be obviated by certain political combinations, without change
of the interior life.
This is utterly erroneous. The general conscription is nothing but an internal
contradiction which has crept into the social life-conception, and which has
only become evident because it has arrived at its utmost limits at a period
when men have attained a certain degree of material development.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY CONSCRIPTION
General military conscription is not a political accident, but the extreme limit of contradiction
contained in the social life-conception—Rise of power in society—The basis of power is
personal violence—The organization of armed men, an army, is required by power to
enable it to accomplish violence—The rise of power in society, that is, of violence,
destroys by degrees the social life-conception—Attitude of power toward the masses, that
is to say, the oppressed—Governments endeavor to make workmen believe in the
necessity of State violence for their preservation from external foes—But the army is
needed principally to defend government from its own subjects, the oppressed working-
men—Address of Caprivi—All the privileges of the ruling classes are assured by
violence—Increase of armies leads to a general military conscription—General military
conscription destroys all the advantages of social life which it is the duty of the State to
guard—General military conscription is the extreme limit of obedience, as it demands in
the name of the State the abnegation of all that may be dear to man—Is the State needed?
—The sacrifices which it requires from citizens through the general military conscription
have no longer any basis—Hence it is more advantageous for man to rebel against the
demands of the State than to submit to them.
The efforts which the educated men of the upper classes are making to
silence the growing consciousness that the present system of life must be
changed, are constantly on the increase, while life itself, continuing to
develop and to become more complex without changing its direction, as it
increases the incongruities and suffering of human existence, brings men to
the extreme limit of this contradiction. An example of this uttermost limit is
found in the general military conscription.
It is usually supposed that this conscription, together with the increasing
armaments and the consequent increase of the taxes and national debts of
all countries, are the accidental results of a certain crisis in European affairs,
which might be obviated by certain political combinations, without change
of the interior life.
This is utterly erroneous. The general conscription is nothing but an internal
contradiction which has crept into the social life-conception, and which has
only become evident because it has arrived at its utmost limits at a period
when men have attained a certain degree of material development.
Page 151
The social life-conception transfers the significance of life from the
individual to mankind in general, through the unbroken continuity of the
family, the tribe, and the State.
According to the social life-conception it is supposed that as the
significance of life is comprised in the sum total of mankind, each
individual will of his own accord sacrifice his interests to those of the
whole. This in fact has always been the case with certain aggregates, like
the family or the tribe.
In consequence of custom, transmitted by education and confirmed by
religious suggestion, and without compulsion, the individual merges his
interests in those of the group, and sacrifices himself for the benefit of the
whole.
But the more complex became societies, the larger they grew,—conquest
especially contributing to unite men in social organizations,—the more
individuals would be found striving to attain their ends at the expense of
their fellow-men; and thus the necessity for subjugation by power, or, in
other words, by violence, became more and more frequent.
The advocates of the social life-conception usually attempt to combine the
idea of authority, otherwise violence, with that of moral influence; but such
a union is utterly impossible.
The result of moral influence upon man is to change his desires, so that he
willingly complies with what is required of him. A man who yields to moral
influence takes pleasure in conforming his actions to its laws; whereas
authority, as the word is commonly understood, is a means of coercion, by
which a man is forced to act in opposition to his wishes. A man who
submits to authority does not do as he pleases, he yields to compulsion, and
in order to force a man to do something for which he has an aversion, the
threat of physical violence, or violence itself, must be employed: he may be
deprived of his liberty, flogged, mutilated, or he may be threatened with
these punishments. And this is what constitutes power both in the past and
in the present.
Despite the unremitting efforts of rulers to conceal these facts, and to
attribute a different significance to authority, it simply means the rope and
chain wherewith a man is bound and dragged, the lash wherewith he is
individual to mankind in general, through the unbroken continuity of the
family, the tribe, and the State.
According to the social life-conception it is supposed that as the
significance of life is comprised in the sum total of mankind, each
individual will of his own accord sacrifice his interests to those of the
whole. This in fact has always been the case with certain aggregates, like
the family or the tribe.
In consequence of custom, transmitted by education and confirmed by
religious suggestion, and without compulsion, the individual merges his
interests in those of the group, and sacrifices himself for the benefit of the
whole.
But the more complex became societies, the larger they grew,—conquest
especially contributing to unite men in social organizations,—the more
individuals would be found striving to attain their ends at the expense of
their fellow-men; and thus the necessity for subjugation by power, or, in
other words, by violence, became more and more frequent.
The advocates of the social life-conception usually attempt to combine the
idea of authority, otherwise violence, with that of moral influence; but such
a union is utterly impossible.
The result of moral influence upon man is to change his desires, so that he
willingly complies with what is required of him. A man who yields to moral
influence takes pleasure in conforming his actions to its laws; whereas
authority, as the word is commonly understood, is a means of coercion, by
which a man is forced to act in opposition to his wishes. A man who
submits to authority does not do as he pleases, he yields to compulsion, and
in order to force a man to do something for which he has an aversion, the
threat of physical violence, or violence itself, must be employed: he may be
deprived of his liberty, flogged, mutilated, or he may be threatened with
these punishments. And this is what constitutes power both in the past and
in the present.
Despite the unremitting efforts of rulers to conceal these facts, and to
attribute a different significance to authority, it simply means the rope and
chain wherewith a man is bound and dragged, the lash wherewith he is
Page 152
flogged, the knife or ax wherewith his limbs, nose, ears, and head are
hewed off. Authority is either the menace or the perpetration of these acts.
This was the practice in the times of Nero and Genghis Khan, and is still in
force even in the most liberal governments, like the republics of France and
America. If men submit to authority, it is only because they fear that if they
were to resist, they would be subjected to violence. All the requisitions of
the State, such as the payment of taxes and the fulfilment of public duties,
the submission to penalties in the form of exile, fines, etc., to which men
seem to yield voluntarily, are always enforced by the physical threat or the
reality of physical punishment.
Physical violence is the basis of authority.
It is the military organization that makes it possible to inflict physical
violence, that organization wherein the entire armed force acts as one man,
obeying a single will. This assemblage of armed men, submitting to one
will, forms what is called an army. The army has ever been and still is the
basis of an authority, vested in the commanding generals; and the most
engrossing interest of every sovereign, from the Roman Cæsars to the
Russian and German emperors, has always been to protect and flatter the
army, for they realize that when the army is on their side, power is also in
their hands.
It is the drilling and the increase of the troops required for the maintenance
of authority which has brought into the social life-conception an element of
dissolution.
The aim of authority, and its consequent justification, is to restrain those
men who are endeavoring, by methods which are detrimental to those of
mankind in general, to promote their own interests. But whether authority
has been acquired by force of arms, or by hereditary succession, or by
election, men who have gained authority are in no way different from their
fellow-men; they are just like all others, not inclined to waive their own
interests in favor of the many, but, since they hold power in their hands, are
more likely to make the interests of the many give way to their own.
Whatever measures may have been devised by way of restraining those in
authority who might seek their own ends at the expense of the public, or to
vest authority in the hands of infallible men, no satisfactory results have as
yet been attained.
hewed off. Authority is either the menace or the perpetration of these acts.
This was the practice in the times of Nero and Genghis Khan, and is still in
force even in the most liberal governments, like the republics of France and
America. If men submit to authority, it is only because they fear that if they
were to resist, they would be subjected to violence. All the requisitions of
the State, such as the payment of taxes and the fulfilment of public duties,
the submission to penalties in the form of exile, fines, etc., to which men
seem to yield voluntarily, are always enforced by the physical threat or the
reality of physical punishment.
Physical violence is the basis of authority.
It is the military organization that makes it possible to inflict physical
violence, that organization wherein the entire armed force acts as one man,
obeying a single will. This assemblage of armed men, submitting to one
will, forms what is called an army. The army has ever been and still is the
basis of an authority, vested in the commanding generals; and the most
engrossing interest of every sovereign, from the Roman Cæsars to the
Russian and German emperors, has always been to protect and flatter the
army, for they realize that when the army is on their side, power is also in
their hands.
It is the drilling and the increase of the troops required for the maintenance
of authority which has brought into the social life-conception an element of
dissolution.
The aim of authority, and its consequent justification, is to restrain those
men who are endeavoring, by methods which are detrimental to those of
mankind in general, to promote their own interests. But whether authority
has been acquired by force of arms, or by hereditary succession, or by
election, men who have gained authority are in no way different from their
fellow-men; they are just like all others, not inclined to waive their own
interests in favor of the many, but, since they hold power in their hands, are
more likely to make the interests of the many give way to their own.
Whatever measures may have been devised by way of restraining those in
authority who might seek their own ends at the expense of the public, or to
vest authority in the hands of infallible men, no satisfactory results have as
yet been attained.
Page 153
Attributing divine right to kings, hereditary succession, election;
congresses, parliaments, and senates;—none of these have ever yet proved
effectual. Everybody knows that no expedient has ever succeeded either in
committing authority into the hands of infallible men, or of preventing its
abuses. On the contrary, we know that men who have the authority, be they
emperors, ministers of State, chiefs of police, or even policemen, always are
more liable, because of their position, to become immoral,—that is, to put
their own private interests before those of the public,—than men who do
not possess such an authority; and this is inevitable.
The social life-conception could be justified only while all men voluntarily
sacrificed their private interests to those of the public in general; but no
sooner did men appear who refused to sacrifice their interests, than
authority, in other words, violence, was required to restrain these men. Thus
there entered into the social life-conception, and the organization based on
it, a principle containing within itself the germs of dissolution,—the
principle of authority, or the tyranny of the few over the many. In order that
the authority held by certain men might fulfil its object, which is to restrain
those who are trying to further their own interests to the detriment of
society in general, it would be necessary to have it in the hands of infallible
men, as is supposed to be the case in China, or as it was believed to be in
the Middle Ages, and is even at the present time by those who have faith in
consecration by unction. It is only under such conditions that the social
organization can be justified.
But as no such conditions exist, and, furthermore, as men who are in
authority, from the very fact of its possession, must ever be far from being
saints, the social organization that is based upon authority cannot possibly
have any justification.
If there ever was a time when a low standard of morality, and the general
tendency of men toward violence, called for an authority possessing the
power to restrict this violence, an authority whose existence may have been
an advantage,—that is, when the violence of the State was less than the
violence of individuals toward each other,—we cannot help seeing now that
this prerogative of the State, when violence no longer exists, cannot go on
forever. Morals improved in proportion to the gradual decrease of
individual violence, while the prerogative of authority lost ground in
measure as it became corrupted by the possession of unbridled power.
congresses, parliaments, and senates;—none of these have ever yet proved
effectual. Everybody knows that no expedient has ever succeeded either in
committing authority into the hands of infallible men, or of preventing its
abuses. On the contrary, we know that men who have the authority, be they
emperors, ministers of State, chiefs of police, or even policemen, always are
more liable, because of their position, to become immoral,—that is, to put
their own private interests before those of the public,—than men who do
not possess such an authority; and this is inevitable.
The social life-conception could be justified only while all men voluntarily
sacrificed their private interests to those of the public in general; but no
sooner did men appear who refused to sacrifice their interests, than
authority, in other words, violence, was required to restrain these men. Thus
there entered into the social life-conception, and the organization based on
it, a principle containing within itself the germs of dissolution,—the
principle of authority, or the tyranny of the few over the many. In order that
the authority held by certain men might fulfil its object, which is to restrain
those who are trying to further their own interests to the detriment of
society in general, it would be necessary to have it in the hands of infallible
men, as is supposed to be the case in China, or as it was believed to be in
the Middle Ages, and is even at the present time by those who have faith in
consecration by unction. It is only under such conditions that the social
organization can be justified.
But as no such conditions exist, and, furthermore, as men who are in
authority, from the very fact of its possession, must ever be far from being
saints, the social organization that is based upon authority cannot possibly
have any justification.
If there ever was a time when a low standard of morality, and the general
tendency of men toward violence, called for an authority possessing the
power to restrict this violence, an authority whose existence may have been
an advantage,—that is, when the violence of the State was less than the
violence of individuals toward each other,—we cannot help seeing now that
this prerogative of the State, when violence no longer exists, cannot go on
forever. Morals improved in proportion to the gradual decrease of
individual violence, while the prerogative of authority lost ground in
measure as it became corrupted by the possession of unbridled power.
Page 154
The entire history of the last 2000 years will have been told when we have
described this change in the relations between the moral development of
man and the demoralization of governments. In its simplest form it runs
thus: men lived together in tribes, in families, and in races, and were at
enmity one with another; they employed violence, they spread desolation,
they murdered one another. Thus devastation was on a scale both great and
small: man fought with man, tribe with tribe, family with family, race with
race, nation with nation. The larger and more powerful communities
absorbed the weaker ones; and the greater and more vigorous became the
aggregation of men, the more seldom did one hear of acts of violence
within these communities, and the more secure the continuity of their
existence appeared.
When the members of a tribe or a family unite together to form one
community, they are naturally less hostile to each other, and the tribes and
families are not so likely to die out; while among the citizens of a State
subjected to one authority the contentions seem even less frequent, and
hence is the life of the State on a basis still more assured.
These fusions into larger and larger aggregates took place, not because men
realized that it would be to their advantage, as is illustrated by the fable that
tells of the falling of the Varegs in Russia, but are due rather to natural
growth on the one hand, and struggle and conquest on the other.
When conquest was achieved, the authority of the conqueror put an end to
internal strife, and the social life-conception was justified. But this
justification is only temporary. Internal feuds cease only when the pressure
of authority is brought to bear with greater weight upon individuals
formerly inimical to one another. The violence of the internal struggle, not
annihilated by authority, is the offspring of authority itself. Authority is in
the hands of men who, like all the rest, are ever ready to sacrifice the
common weal if their own personal interests are at stake; with the sole
difference that these men, encountering no resistance from the oppressed,
are wholly subject to the corrupting influence of authority itself.
Therefore it is that the evil principle of violence relegated to authority is
ever increasing, and the evil becomes in time worse than that which it is
supposed to control: whereas, in the individual members of society, the
described this change in the relations between the moral development of
man and the demoralization of governments. In its simplest form it runs
thus: men lived together in tribes, in families, and in races, and were at
enmity one with another; they employed violence, they spread desolation,
they murdered one another. Thus devastation was on a scale both great and
small: man fought with man, tribe with tribe, family with family, race with
race, nation with nation. The larger and more powerful communities
absorbed the weaker ones; and the greater and more vigorous became the
aggregation of men, the more seldom did one hear of acts of violence
within these communities, and the more secure the continuity of their
existence appeared.
When the members of a tribe or a family unite together to form one
community, they are naturally less hostile to each other, and the tribes and
families are not so likely to die out; while among the citizens of a State
subjected to one authority the contentions seem even less frequent, and
hence is the life of the State on a basis still more assured.
These fusions into larger and larger aggregates took place, not because men
realized that it would be to their advantage, as is illustrated by the fable that
tells of the falling of the Varegs in Russia, but are due rather to natural
growth on the one hand, and struggle and conquest on the other.
When conquest was achieved, the authority of the conqueror put an end to
internal strife, and the social life-conception was justified. But this
justification is only temporary. Internal feuds cease only when the pressure
of authority is brought to bear with greater weight upon individuals
formerly inimical to one another. The violence of the internal struggle, not
annihilated by authority, is the offspring of authority itself. Authority is in
the hands of men who, like all the rest, are ever ready to sacrifice the
common weal if their own personal interests are at stake; with the sole
difference that these men, encountering no resistance from the oppressed,
are wholly subject to the corrupting influence of authority itself.
Therefore it is that the evil principle of violence relegated to authority is
ever increasing, and the evil becomes in time worse than that which it is
supposed to control: whereas, in the individual members of society, the
Page 155
inclination to violence is always diminishing, and the violence of authority
becomes less and less necessary.
As its power increases in measure of its duration, State authority, though it
may eradicate internal violence, introduces into life other and new forms of
violence, always increasing in intensity. And though the violence of
authority in the State is less striking than that of individual members of
society toward each other, its principal manifestation being not that of strife,
but of oppression, it exists none the less, and in the highest degree.
It cannot be otherwise; for not only does the possession of authority corrupt
men, but, either from design or unconsciously, rulers are always striving to
reduce their subjects to the lowest degree of weakness,—for the more
feeble the subject, the less the effort required to subdue him.
Therefore violence employed against the oppressed is pushed to its utmost
limit, just stopping short of killing the hen that lays the golden egg. But if
the hen has ceased to lay, like the American Indians, the Fiji Islanders, or
the Negroes, then it is killed, despite the sincere protests of the
philanthropists against that mode of procedure.
The most conclusive proof of this assertion, at the present time, is the
position of the working-men, who are in truth simply vanquished men.
Despite all the pretended efforts of the upper classes to lighten their
position, all the working-men of the world are subjected to an immutable
iron rule, which prescribes that they shall have scarcely enough to live
upon, in order that their necessities may urge them to unremitting toil, the
fruits of which are to be enjoyed by their masters, in other words, their
conquerors.
It has always been the case that, after the long continuance and growth of
power, the advantages accruing to those who have submitted to it have
failed, while the disadvantages have multiplied.
Thus it is and thus it always has been, under whatsoever form of
government the nation may have lived; only that where despotism prevails
authority is confined to a limited number of oppressors, and violence takes
on a ruder form, while in the constitutional monarchies, and in the republics
of France and America, authority is distributed among a greater number of
oppressors, and its manifestations are less rude; but the result, in which the
becomes less and less necessary.
As its power increases in measure of its duration, State authority, though it
may eradicate internal violence, introduces into life other and new forms of
violence, always increasing in intensity. And though the violence of
authority in the State is less striking than that of individual members of
society toward each other, its principal manifestation being not that of strife,
but of oppression, it exists none the less, and in the highest degree.
It cannot be otherwise; for not only does the possession of authority corrupt
men, but, either from design or unconsciously, rulers are always striving to
reduce their subjects to the lowest degree of weakness,—for the more
feeble the subject, the less the effort required to subdue him.
Therefore violence employed against the oppressed is pushed to its utmost
limit, just stopping short of killing the hen that lays the golden egg. But if
the hen has ceased to lay, like the American Indians, the Fiji Islanders, or
the Negroes, then it is killed, despite the sincere protests of the
philanthropists against that mode of procedure.
The most conclusive proof of this assertion, at the present time, is the
position of the working-men, who are in truth simply vanquished men.
Despite all the pretended efforts of the upper classes to lighten their
position, all the working-men of the world are subjected to an immutable
iron rule, which prescribes that they shall have scarcely enough to live
upon, in order that their necessities may urge them to unremitting toil, the
fruits of which are to be enjoyed by their masters, in other words, their
conquerors.
It has always been the case that, after the long continuance and growth of
power, the advantages accruing to those who have submitted to it have
failed, while the disadvantages have multiplied.
Thus it is and thus it always has been, under whatsoever form of
government the nation may have lived; only that where despotism prevails
authority is confined to a limited number of oppressors, and violence takes
on a ruder form, while in the constitutional monarchies, and in the republics
of France and America, authority is distributed among a greater number of
oppressors, and its manifestations are less rude; but the result, in which the
Page 156
disadvantages of dominion are greater than the advantages, and the method
—reduction of the oppressed to the lowest possible degree of abjection, for
the benefit of the oppressors, remain ever the same.
Such has been the position of all the oppressed, but until lately they have
been unaware of the fact, and for the most part have innocently believed
that governments were instituted for their benefit, to preserve them from
destruction, and that to permit the idea that men might live without
governments would be a thought sacrilegious beyond expression; it would
be the doctrine of anarchy, with all its attendant horrors.
Men believed, as in something so thoroughly proved that it needed no
further testimony, that as all nations had hitherto developed into the State
form, this was to remain the indispensable condition for the development of
mankind forever.
And so it has gone on for hundreds, nay, thousands of years, and the
governments, that is to say, their representatives, have endeavored, and still
go on endeavoring, to preserve this delusion among the people.
As it was during the time of the Roman emperors, so it is now. Although the
idea of the uselessness, and even of the detriment, of power enters more and
more into the consciousness of men, it might endure forever, if
governments did not think it necessary to increase the armies in order to
support their authority.
It is the popular belief that governments increase armies as a means of
defense against other nations, forgetting that troops are principally needed
by governments to protect them against their own enslaved subjects.
This has always been necessary, and has grown more so with the spread of
education, the increase of intercourse among different nationalities; and at
the present time, in view of the communist, socialist, anarchist, and labor
movements, it is a more urgent necessity than ever. Governments realize
this fact, and increase their principal means of defense,—the disciplined
army.[13]
It was but recently that in the German Reichstag, in giving the reason why
more money was needed to increase the pay of the subaltern officers, the
German Chancellor answered candidly that trusty subaltern officers are
needed in order to fight against socialism. Caprivi put into words what
—reduction of the oppressed to the lowest possible degree of abjection, for
the benefit of the oppressors, remain ever the same.
Such has been the position of all the oppressed, but until lately they have
been unaware of the fact, and for the most part have innocently believed
that governments were instituted for their benefit, to preserve them from
destruction, and that to permit the idea that men might live without
governments would be a thought sacrilegious beyond expression; it would
be the doctrine of anarchy, with all its attendant horrors.
Men believed, as in something so thoroughly proved that it needed no
further testimony, that as all nations had hitherto developed into the State
form, this was to remain the indispensable condition for the development of
mankind forever.
And so it has gone on for hundreds, nay, thousands of years, and the
governments, that is to say, their representatives, have endeavored, and still
go on endeavoring, to preserve this delusion among the people.
As it was during the time of the Roman emperors, so it is now. Although the
idea of the uselessness, and even of the detriment, of power enters more and
more into the consciousness of men, it might endure forever, if
governments did not think it necessary to increase the armies in order to
support their authority.
It is the popular belief that governments increase armies as a means of
defense against other nations, forgetting that troops are principally needed
by governments to protect them against their own enslaved subjects.
This has always been necessary, and has grown more so with the spread of
education, the increase of intercourse among different nationalities; and at
the present time, in view of the communist, socialist, anarchist, and labor
movements, it is a more urgent necessity than ever. Governments realize
this fact, and increase their principal means of defense,—the disciplined
army.[13]
It was but recently that in the German Reichstag, in giving the reason why
more money was needed to increase the pay of the subaltern officers, the
German Chancellor answered candidly that trusty subaltern officers are
needed in order to fight against socialism. Caprivi put into words what
Page 157
every one knows, although it has been carefully concealed from the people.
The reason why the Swiss and Scottish Guards were hired to protect the
popes and the French kings, and why the Russian regiments are so carefully
shuffled, is in order that those which are posted in the interior may be
recruited by men from the borders, and those on the borders by men from
the interior. The meaning of Caprivi's reply, translated into simple, everyday
language, means that money is needed, not to repel a foreign enemy, but to
bribe the subaltern officers to hold themselves in readiness to act against the
oppressed working-men.
Caprivi incidentally expressed what every man knows—or if he does not
know it he feels it—namely, that the existing system of life is such as it is,
not because it is natural for it to be so, or that the people are content to have
it so, but because violence on the part of governments, the army, with its
bribed subaltern officers, its captains and generals, sustains it.
If a working-man has no land, if he is not allowed to enjoy the natural right
possessed by every man, to draw from the soil the means of subsistence for
himself and his family, it is not so because the people oppose it, but because
the right to grant or to withhold this privilege from working-men is given to
certain individuals—namely, to the landed proprietors. And this unnatural
order of things is maintained by the troops. If the enormous wealth earned
and saved by working-men is not regarded as common property, but as
something to be enjoyed by the chosen few; if certain men are invested with
the power of levying taxes on labor, and with the right of using that money
for whatsoever purposes they deem necessary; if the strikes of the working-
men are suppressed, and the trusts of the capitalists are encouraged; if
certain men are allowed to choose in the matter of religious and civil
education and the instruction of children; if to certain others the right is
given to frame laws which all men must obey, and if they are to enjoy the
control of human life and property,—all this is not because the people wish
it, or because it has come about in the course of nature, but because the
governments will have it so for their own advantage and that of the ruling
classes; and all this is accomplished by means of physical violence.
If every man is not yet aware of this, he will find it out whenever attempts
are made to change the present order of things.
The reason why the Swiss and Scottish Guards were hired to protect the
popes and the French kings, and why the Russian regiments are so carefully
shuffled, is in order that those which are posted in the interior may be
recruited by men from the borders, and those on the borders by men from
the interior. The meaning of Caprivi's reply, translated into simple, everyday
language, means that money is needed, not to repel a foreign enemy, but to
bribe the subaltern officers to hold themselves in readiness to act against the
oppressed working-men.
Caprivi incidentally expressed what every man knows—or if he does not
know it he feels it—namely, that the existing system of life is such as it is,
not because it is natural for it to be so, or that the people are content to have
it so, but because violence on the part of governments, the army, with its
bribed subaltern officers, its captains and generals, sustains it.
If a working-man has no land, if he is not allowed to enjoy the natural right
possessed by every man, to draw from the soil the means of subsistence for
himself and his family, it is not so because the people oppose it, but because
the right to grant or to withhold this privilege from working-men is given to
certain individuals—namely, to the landed proprietors. And this unnatural
order of things is maintained by the troops. If the enormous wealth earned
and saved by working-men is not regarded as common property, but as
something to be enjoyed by the chosen few; if certain men are invested with
the power of levying taxes on labor, and with the right of using that money
for whatsoever purposes they deem necessary; if the strikes of the working-
men are suppressed, and the trusts of the capitalists are encouraged; if
certain men are allowed to choose in the matter of religious and civil
education and the instruction of children; if to certain others the right is
given to frame laws which all men must obey, and if they are to enjoy the
control of human life and property,—all this is not because the people wish
it, or because it has come about in the course of nature, but because the
governments will have it so for their own advantage and that of the ruling
classes; and all this is accomplished by means of physical violence.
If every man is not yet aware of this, he will find it out whenever attempts
are made to change the present order of things.
Page 158
And therefore all the governments and the ruling classes stand in need of
troops above all things, in order to maintain a system of life which, far from
having developed from the needs of the people, is often detrimental to
them, and is only advantageous for the government and the ruling classes.
Every government requires troops to enforce obedience, that it may profit
by the labor of its subjects. But no government exists alone: side by side
with it stands the government of the adjacent country, which is also
profiting by the enforced labor of its subjects, and ever ready to pounce
upon its neighbor and take possession of the goods which it has won from
the labor of its own subjects. Hence it is that every government needs an
army, not only for home use, but to guard its plunder from foreign
depredations. Thus each government finds itself obliged to outdo its
neighbor in the increase of its army, and, as Montesquieu said one hundred
and fifty years ago, the expansion of armies is a veritable contagion.
One State makes additions to its army in order to overawe its own subjects;
its neighbor takes alarm, and straightway follows the example.
Armies have reached the millions which they now number not only from
the fear of foreign invasion; the increase was first caused by the necessity
for putting down all attempts at rebellion on the part of the subjects of the
State. The causes for the expansion of armies are contemporary, the one
depending on the other; armies are needed against internal attempts at
revolt, as well as for external defense. The one depends upon the other. The
despotism of governments increases exactly in proportion to the increase of
their strength and their internal successes, and their foreign aggression with
the increase of internal despotism.
European governments try to outdo one another, ever increasing their
armaments, and compelled at last to adopt the expedient of a general
conscription as a means of enrolling the greatest number of troops at the
smallest possible expense.
Germany was the first to whom this plan suggested itself. And no sooner
was it done by one nation than all the others were forced to do likewise.
Thus all the citizens took up arms to assist in upholding the wrongs that
were committed against them; in fact, they became their own oppressors.
troops above all things, in order to maintain a system of life which, far from
having developed from the needs of the people, is often detrimental to
them, and is only advantageous for the government and the ruling classes.
Every government requires troops to enforce obedience, that it may profit
by the labor of its subjects. But no government exists alone: side by side
with it stands the government of the adjacent country, which is also
profiting by the enforced labor of its subjects, and ever ready to pounce
upon its neighbor and take possession of the goods which it has won from
the labor of its own subjects. Hence it is that every government needs an
army, not only for home use, but to guard its plunder from foreign
depredations. Thus each government finds itself obliged to outdo its
neighbor in the increase of its army, and, as Montesquieu said one hundred
and fifty years ago, the expansion of armies is a veritable contagion.
One State makes additions to its army in order to overawe its own subjects;
its neighbor takes alarm, and straightway follows the example.
Armies have reached the millions which they now number not only from
the fear of foreign invasion; the increase was first caused by the necessity
for putting down all attempts at rebellion on the part of the subjects of the
State. The causes for the expansion of armies are contemporary, the one
depending on the other; armies are needed against internal attempts at
revolt, as well as for external defense. The one depends upon the other. The
despotism of governments increases exactly in proportion to the increase of
their strength and their internal successes, and their foreign aggression with
the increase of internal despotism.
European governments try to outdo one another, ever increasing their
armaments, and compelled at last to adopt the expedient of a general
conscription as a means of enrolling the greatest number of troops at the
smallest possible expense.
Germany was the first to whom this plan suggested itself. And no sooner
was it done by one nation than all the others were forced to do likewise.
Thus all the citizens took up arms to assist in upholding the wrongs that
were committed against them; in fact, they became their own oppressors.
Page 159
General military conscription was the inevitable and logical consummation
at which it was but natural to arrive; at the same time it is the last
expression of the innate contradiction of the social life-conception which
sprang into existence when violence was required for its support.
General military conscription made this contradiction a conspicuous fact.
Indeed, the very significance of the social life-conception consists in this,—
that a man, realizing the cruelty of the struggle of individuals among
themselves, and the peril that the individual incurs, seeks protection by
transferring his private interests to a social community; whereas the result
of the system of conscription is that men, after having made every sacrifice
to escape from the cruel struggle and uncertainties of life, are once more
called upon to undergo all the dangers they had hoped to escape, and
moreover, the community—the State for which the individuals gave up
their previous advantages—is now exposed to the same risk of destruction
from which the individual himself formerly suffered. Governments should
have set men free from the cruelty of the personal struggle, and given them
confidence in the inviolable structure of State life; but instead of doing this
they impose on individuals a repetition of the same dangers, with this
difference, that in the place of struggle between individuals of the same
group, it is a case of struggle between groups.
The establishment of a general military conscription is like the work of a
man who props a crumbling house. The walls have settled, sloping inward
—he braces them; the ceiling begins to hang down—he supports that; and
when the boards between give way, other braces are supplied. At last it
reaches the point when, although the braces hold the house together, they
actually make it uninhabitable.
The same may be said of the general conscription system. The general
military conscription nullifies all those advantages of social life which it is
expected to protect.
The advantages of social life are those guarantees which it offers for the
protection of property and labor, as well as coöperation for the purposes of
mutual advantage; the general military conscription destroys all this.
The taxes collected from the people for purposes of war absorb the greater
part of the productions of their labor, which the army ought to protect.
at which it was but natural to arrive; at the same time it is the last
expression of the innate contradiction of the social life-conception which
sprang into existence when violence was required for its support.
General military conscription made this contradiction a conspicuous fact.
Indeed, the very significance of the social life-conception consists in this,—
that a man, realizing the cruelty of the struggle of individuals among
themselves, and the peril that the individual incurs, seeks protection by
transferring his private interests to a social community; whereas the result
of the system of conscription is that men, after having made every sacrifice
to escape from the cruel struggle and uncertainties of life, are once more
called upon to undergo all the dangers they had hoped to escape, and
moreover, the community—the State for which the individuals gave up
their previous advantages—is now exposed to the same risk of destruction
from which the individual himself formerly suffered. Governments should
have set men free from the cruelty of the personal struggle, and given them
confidence in the inviolable structure of State life; but instead of doing this
they impose on individuals a repetition of the same dangers, with this
difference, that in the place of struggle between individuals of the same
group, it is a case of struggle between groups.
The establishment of a general military conscription is like the work of a
man who props a crumbling house. The walls have settled, sloping inward
—he braces them; the ceiling begins to hang down—he supports that; and
when the boards between give way, other braces are supplied. At last it
reaches the point when, although the braces hold the house together, they
actually make it uninhabitable.
The same may be said of the general conscription system. The general
military conscription nullifies all those advantages of social life which it is
expected to protect.
The advantages of social life are those guarantees which it offers for the
protection of property and labor, as well as coöperation for the purposes of
mutual advantage; the general military conscription destroys all this.
The taxes collected from the people for purposes of war absorb the greater
part of the productions of their labor, which the army ought to protect.
Page 160
When men are taken from the ordinary avocations of daily life, labor is
practically destroyed. Where war is ever threatening to break forth, it does
not seem worth while to improve social conditions.
If a man had formerly been told that unless he submitted to the civil
authority he would run the risk of being assaulted by wicked men, that he
would be in danger from domestic as well as from foreign foes, against
whom he would be forced to defend himself, that he might be murdered,
and therefore he would find it for his advantage to suffer certain privations
if by that means he succeeded in escaping all these perils, he might have
believed this, especially as the sacrifices required by the State promised him
the hope of a peaceful existence within the well-established community in
whose name he had made them. But now, when these sacrifices are not only
multiplied, but the promised advantages are not realized, it is quite natural
for men to think that their subjection to authority is utterly useless.
But the fatal significance of the general conscription, as the manifestation
of that contradiction which dwells in the social life-conception, lies not in
this. Wherever military conscription exists, every citizen who becomes a
soldier likewise becomes a supporter of the State system, and a participant
in whatsoever the State may do, at the same time that he does not
acknowledge its validity; and this may be called its chief manifestation.
Governments declare that armies are principally required for external
defense; but this is untrue. They are, in the first place, needed to overawe
their own subjects, and every man who yields to military conscription
becomes an involuntary participator in all the oppressive acts of
government toward its subjects. It is necessary to remember what goes on in
every State in the name of order and the welfare of the community, all the
while enforced by military authority, to be convinced that every man who
fulfils military duty becomes a participant in acts of the State of which he
cannot approve. Every dynastic and political feud, all the executions
resulting from such feuds, the crushing of rebellions, the use of the military
in dispersing mobs, in putting down strikes, all extortionate taxation, the
injustice of land ownership and the limitations of freedom of labor,—all this
is done, if not directly by the troops, then by the police supported by the
troops. He who performs his military duty becomes a participant in all these
acts, about which he often feels more than dubious, and which are in most
cases directly opposed to his conscience. Men do not wish to leave the land
practically destroyed. Where war is ever threatening to break forth, it does
not seem worth while to improve social conditions.
If a man had formerly been told that unless he submitted to the civil
authority he would run the risk of being assaulted by wicked men, that he
would be in danger from domestic as well as from foreign foes, against
whom he would be forced to defend himself, that he might be murdered,
and therefore he would find it for his advantage to suffer certain privations
if by that means he succeeded in escaping all these perils, he might have
believed this, especially as the sacrifices required by the State promised him
the hope of a peaceful existence within the well-established community in
whose name he had made them. But now, when these sacrifices are not only
multiplied, but the promised advantages are not realized, it is quite natural
for men to think that their subjection to authority is utterly useless.
But the fatal significance of the general conscription, as the manifestation
of that contradiction which dwells in the social life-conception, lies not in
this. Wherever military conscription exists, every citizen who becomes a
soldier likewise becomes a supporter of the State system, and a participant
in whatsoever the State may do, at the same time that he does not
acknowledge its validity; and this may be called its chief manifestation.
Governments declare that armies are principally required for external
defense; but this is untrue. They are, in the first place, needed to overawe
their own subjects, and every man who yields to military conscription
becomes an involuntary participator in all the oppressive acts of
government toward its subjects. It is necessary to remember what goes on in
every State in the name of order and the welfare of the community, all the
while enforced by military authority, to be convinced that every man who
fulfils military duty becomes a participant in acts of the State of which he
cannot approve. Every dynastic and political feud, all the executions
resulting from such feuds, the crushing of rebellions, the use of the military
in dispersing mobs, in putting down strikes, all extortionate taxation, the
injustice of land ownership and the limitations of freedom of labor,—all this
is done, if not directly by the troops, then by the police supported by the
troops. He who performs his military duty becomes a participant in all these
acts, about which he often feels more than dubious, and which are in most
cases directly opposed to his conscience. Men do not wish to leave the land
Page 161
which they have tilled for generations; they do not wish to disperse on the
bidding of the government; they do not wish to pay the taxes which are
extorted from them; neither do they willingly submit to laws which they
have not helped to make; they do not wish to give up their nationality. And
I, if I am performing military duty, must come forward and strike these men
down. I cannot take part in such proceedings without asking myself if they
be right. And ought I to coöperate in carrying them out?
General military conscription is the last step in the process of coercion
required by governments for the support of the whole structure; for subjects
it is the extreme limit of obedience. It is the keystone of the arch that
supports the walls, the abstraction of which would destroy the whole fabric.
The time has come when the ever growing abuses of governments, and their
mutual contests, have required from all their subjects not only material but
moral sacrifices, till each man pauses and asks himself, Can I make these
sacrifices? And for whose sake am I to make them? These sacrifices are
demanded in the name of the State. In the name of the State I am asked to
give up all that makes life dear to a man,—peace, family, safety, and
personal dignity. What, then, is this State in whose name such appalling
sacrifices are demanded? And of what use is it?
We are told that the State is necessary, in the first place, because were it not
for that no man would be safe from violence and the attacks of wicked men;
in the second place, without the State we should be like savages, possessing
neither religion, morals, education, instruction, commerce, means of
communication, nor any other social institutions; and, in the third place,
because without the State we should be subject to the invasion of the
neighboring nations.
"Were it not for the State," we are told, "we should be subjected to violence
and to the attacks of evil men in our own land."
But who are these evil men from whose violence and attacks the
government and the army saves us? If such men existed three or four
centuries ago, when men prided themselves on their military skill and
strength of arm, when a man proved his valor by killing his fellow-men, we
find none such at the present time: men of our time neither use nor carry
weapons, and, believing in the precepts of humanity and pity for their
neighbors, they are as desirous for peace and a quiet life as we are
bidding of the government; they do not wish to pay the taxes which are
extorted from them; neither do they willingly submit to laws which they
have not helped to make; they do not wish to give up their nationality. And
I, if I am performing military duty, must come forward and strike these men
down. I cannot take part in such proceedings without asking myself if they
be right. And ought I to coöperate in carrying them out?
General military conscription is the last step in the process of coercion
required by governments for the support of the whole structure; for subjects
it is the extreme limit of obedience. It is the keystone of the arch that
supports the walls, the abstraction of which would destroy the whole fabric.
The time has come when the ever growing abuses of governments, and their
mutual contests, have required from all their subjects not only material but
moral sacrifices, till each man pauses and asks himself, Can I make these
sacrifices? And for whose sake am I to make them? These sacrifices are
demanded in the name of the State. In the name of the State I am asked to
give up all that makes life dear to a man,—peace, family, safety, and
personal dignity. What, then, is this State in whose name such appalling
sacrifices are demanded? And of what use is it?
We are told that the State is necessary, in the first place, because were it not
for that no man would be safe from violence and the attacks of wicked men;
in the second place, without the State we should be like savages, possessing
neither religion, morals, education, instruction, commerce, means of
communication, nor any other social institutions; and, in the third place,
because without the State we should be subject to the invasion of the
neighboring nations.
"Were it not for the State," we are told, "we should be subjected to violence
and to the attacks of evil men in our own land."
But who are these evil men from whose violence and attacks the
government and the army saves us? If such men existed three or four
centuries ago, when men prided themselves on their military skill and
strength of arm, when a man proved his valor by killing his fellow-men, we
find none such at the present time: men of our time neither use nor carry
weapons, and, believing in the precepts of humanity and pity for their
neighbors, they are as desirous for peace and a quiet life as we are
Page 162
ourselves. Hence this extraordinary class of marauders, against whom the
State might defend us, no longer exists. But if, when they speak of the men
from whose attacks the government defends us, we understand that they
mean the criminal classes, in that case we know that they are not
extraordinary beings, like beasts of prey among sheep, but are men very
much like ourselves, who are naturally just as reluctant to commit crimes as
those against whom they commit them. We know now that threats and
punishments are powerless to decrease the numbers of such men, but that
their numbers may be decreased by change of environment and by moral
influence. Hence the theory of the necessity of State violence in order to
protect mankind against evil-doers, if it had any foundation three or four
centuries ago, has none whatever at the present time. One might say quite
the reverse nowadays, for the activity of governments, with their antiquated
and merciless methods of punishment, their galleys, prisons, gallows, and
guillotines, so far below the general plane of morality, tends rather to lower
the standard of morals than to elevate it, and therefore rather to increase
than to lessen the number of criminals.
It is said that "without the State there would be no institutions, educational,
moral, religious, or international; there would be no means of
communication. Were it not for the State, we should be without
organizations necessary to all of us."
An argument like this could only have had a basis several centuries ago. If
there ever was a time when men had so little international communication,
and were so unused to intercourse or interchange of thought that they could
not come to an agreement on matters of general interest—commercial,
industrial, or economical—without the assistance of the State, such is not
the case at present. The widely diffused means of communication and
transmission of thought have achieved this result,—that when the modern
man desires to found societies, assemblies, corporations, congresses,
scientific, economical, or political institutions, not only can he easily
dispense with the assistance of governments, but in the majority of cases
governments are more of a hindrance than a help in the pursuit of such
objects.
Since the end of the last century almost every progressive movement on the
part of mankind has been not only discouraged, but invariably hampered, by
governments. Such was the case with the abolition of corporal punishment,
State might defend us, no longer exists. But if, when they speak of the men
from whose attacks the government defends us, we understand that they
mean the criminal classes, in that case we know that they are not
extraordinary beings, like beasts of prey among sheep, but are men very
much like ourselves, who are naturally just as reluctant to commit crimes as
those against whom they commit them. We know now that threats and
punishments are powerless to decrease the numbers of such men, but that
their numbers may be decreased by change of environment and by moral
influence. Hence the theory of the necessity of State violence in order to
protect mankind against evil-doers, if it had any foundation three or four
centuries ago, has none whatever at the present time. One might say quite
the reverse nowadays, for the activity of governments, with their antiquated
and merciless methods of punishment, their galleys, prisons, gallows, and
guillotines, so far below the general plane of morality, tends rather to lower
the standard of morals than to elevate it, and therefore rather to increase
than to lessen the number of criminals.
It is said that "without the State there would be no institutions, educational,
moral, religious, or international; there would be no means of
communication. Were it not for the State, we should be without
organizations necessary to all of us."
An argument like this could only have had a basis several centuries ago. If
there ever was a time when men had so little international communication,
and were so unused to intercourse or interchange of thought that they could
not come to an agreement on matters of general interest—commercial,
industrial, or economical—without the assistance of the State, such is not
the case at present. The widely diffused means of communication and
transmission of thought have achieved this result,—that when the modern
man desires to found societies, assemblies, corporations, congresses,
scientific, economical, or political institutions, not only can he easily
dispense with the assistance of governments, but in the majority of cases
governments are more of a hindrance than a help in the pursuit of such
objects.
Since the end of the last century almost every progressive movement on the
part of mankind has been not only discouraged, but invariably hampered, by
governments. Such was the case with the abolition of corporal punishment,
Page 163
torture, and slavery; with the establishment of freedom of the press and
liberty of meeting. Furthermore, State authorities and governments
nowadays not only do not coöperate, but they directly hinder the activity by
means of which men work out new forms of life. The solution of labor and
land questions, of political and religious problems, is not only
unencouraged, but distinctly opposed, by the government authority.
"If there were no State and government authority, nations would be
subjugated by their neighbors."
It is not worth while to answer this last argument. It refutes itself.
We are told that the government and its armies are necessary for our
defense against the neighboring States which might subject us. But all the
governments say this of one another; and yet we know that every European
nation professes the same principles of liberty and fraternity, and therefore
needs no defense against its neighbor. But if one speaks of defense against
barbarians, then one per cent of the troops under arms at the present time
would suffice. It is not only that the increase of armed force fails to protect
us from danger of attack from our neighbors, it actually provokes the very
attack which it deprecates.
Hence no man who reflects on the significance of the State, in whose name
he is required to sacrifice his peace, his safety, and his life, can escape the
conviction that there is no longer any reasonable ground for such sacrifices.
Even regarding the subject theoretically, a man must realize that the
sacrifices demanded by the State are without sufficient reason; and when he
considers the matter from a practical point of view, weighing all the
different conditions in which he has been placed by the State, every man
must see that so far as he himself is concerned, the fulfilment of the
requirements of the State and his own subjection to military conscription is
indubitably and in every case less advantageous for him than if he refused
to comply with it. If the majority of people prefer obedience to
insubordination, it is not because they have given the subject dispassionate
consideration, weighing the advantages and disadvantages, but because they
are, so to speak, under the influence of hypnotic suggestion. Men submit to
demands like this without using their reason or making the least effort of
the will. It requires independent reasoning, as well as effort, to refuse
submission,—effort which some men are incapable of making. But
liberty of meeting. Furthermore, State authorities and governments
nowadays not only do not coöperate, but they directly hinder the activity by
means of which men work out new forms of life. The solution of labor and
land questions, of political and religious problems, is not only
unencouraged, but distinctly opposed, by the government authority.
"If there were no State and government authority, nations would be
subjugated by their neighbors."
It is not worth while to answer this last argument. It refutes itself.
We are told that the government and its armies are necessary for our
defense against the neighboring States which might subject us. But all the
governments say this of one another; and yet we know that every European
nation professes the same principles of liberty and fraternity, and therefore
needs no defense against its neighbor. But if one speaks of defense against
barbarians, then one per cent of the troops under arms at the present time
would suffice. It is not only that the increase of armed force fails to protect
us from danger of attack from our neighbors, it actually provokes the very
attack which it deprecates.
Hence no man who reflects on the significance of the State, in whose name
he is required to sacrifice his peace, his safety, and his life, can escape the
conviction that there is no longer any reasonable ground for such sacrifices.
Even regarding the subject theoretically, a man must realize that the
sacrifices demanded by the State are without sufficient reason; and when he
considers the matter from a practical point of view, weighing all the
different conditions in which he has been placed by the State, every man
must see that so far as he himself is concerned, the fulfilment of the
requirements of the State and his own subjection to military conscription is
indubitably and in every case less advantageous for him than if he refused
to comply with it. If the majority of people prefer obedience to
insubordination, it is not because they have given the subject dispassionate
consideration, weighing the advantages and disadvantages, but because they
are, so to speak, under the influence of hypnotic suggestion. Men submit to
demands like this without using their reason or making the least effort of
the will. It requires independent reasoning, as well as effort, to refuse
submission,—effort which some men are incapable of making. But
Page 164
supposing we exclude the moral significance of submission and non-
submission, and consider only their advantages, then non-submission will
always prove more advantageous than submission. Whoever I may be,
whether I belong to the well-to-do—the oppressing class—or to the
oppressed laboring class, in either case the disadvantages of non-
submission are less numerous than the disadvantages of submission, and the
advantages of non-submission greater than those of submission.
If I belong to the oppressive, which is the smallest class, and refuse to
submit to the demands of the government, I shall be tried as one who
refuses to fulfil his obligations,—I shall be tried, and in case my trial
terminates favorably, I shall either be declared not guilty, or I may be dealt
with as they treat the Mennonites in Russia—that is, be compelled to serve
my term of military service by performing some non-military work; if, on
the contrary, an unfavorable verdict is rendered, I shall be condemned to
exile or imprisonment for two or three years (I am speaking of cases in
Russia); or possibly my term of imprisonment may be longer. And I may
even be condemned to suffer the penalty of death, although that is not at all
probable. Such are the disadvantages of non-submission.
The disadvantages of submission are as follows:—If I am fortunate I shall
not be sent to murder men, neither shall I run the risk myself of being
disabled or killed; they will simply make a military slave of me. I shall be
arrayed in the garments of a clown; my superior officers, from the corporal
to the field-marshal, will order me about. At their word of command I shall
be put through a series of gymnastic contortions, and after being detained
from one to five years I shall be released, but still obliged for ten years
longer to hold myself in readiness at any moment I may be summoned to
execute the orders these people give me. And if I am less fortunate I shall
be sent to the wars, still in the same condition of slavery, and there I shall
be forced to slay fellow-men of other countries who never did me any harm.
Or I may be sent to a place where I may be mutilated or killed; perhaps find
myself, as at Sevastopol, sent to certain death; these things happen in every
war. Worse than all things else, I may be sent to fight against my fellow-
countrymen, and compelled to kill my own brethren for some matter
dynastic or governmental, and to me of foreign interest. Such are the
comparative disadvantages.
submission, and consider only their advantages, then non-submission will
always prove more advantageous than submission. Whoever I may be,
whether I belong to the well-to-do—the oppressing class—or to the
oppressed laboring class, in either case the disadvantages of non-
submission are less numerous than the disadvantages of submission, and the
advantages of non-submission greater than those of submission.
If I belong to the oppressive, which is the smallest class, and refuse to
submit to the demands of the government, I shall be tried as one who
refuses to fulfil his obligations,—I shall be tried, and in case my trial
terminates favorably, I shall either be declared not guilty, or I may be dealt
with as they treat the Mennonites in Russia—that is, be compelled to serve
my term of military service by performing some non-military work; if, on
the contrary, an unfavorable verdict is rendered, I shall be condemned to
exile or imprisonment for two or three years (I am speaking of cases in
Russia); or possibly my term of imprisonment may be longer. And I may
even be condemned to suffer the penalty of death, although that is not at all
probable. Such are the disadvantages of non-submission.
The disadvantages of submission are as follows:—If I am fortunate I shall
not be sent to murder men, neither shall I run the risk myself of being
disabled or killed; they will simply make a military slave of me. I shall be
arrayed in the garments of a clown; my superior officers, from the corporal
to the field-marshal, will order me about. At their word of command I shall
be put through a series of gymnastic contortions, and after being detained
from one to five years I shall be released, but still obliged for ten years
longer to hold myself in readiness at any moment I may be summoned to
execute the orders these people give me. And if I am less fortunate I shall
be sent to the wars, still in the same condition of slavery, and there I shall
be forced to slay fellow-men of other countries who never did me any harm.
Or I may be sent to a place where I may be mutilated or killed; perhaps find
myself, as at Sevastopol, sent to certain death; these things happen in every
war. Worse than all things else, I may be sent to fight against my fellow-
countrymen, and compelled to kill my own brethren for some matter
dynastic or governmental, and to me of foreign interest. Such are the
comparative disadvantages.
Page 165
The comparative advantages of submission and non-submission are as
follows:—For him who has submitted the advantages are these: after he has
subjected himself to all the degradations and committed all the cruel deeds
required of him, he may, provided he be not killed, receive some scarlet or
golden bauble to decorate his clown's attire; or if he be especially favored,
hundreds of thousands of just such brutal men like himself may be put
under his command, and he be called field-marshal, and receive large sums
of money.
By refusing to submit he will possess the advantages of preserving his
manly dignity, of winning the respect of good men, and, above all, he will
enjoy the assurance that he is doing God's business, and therefore an
unquestionable benefit to mankind.
Such are the advantages and disadvantages, on either side, for the
oppressor, a member of the wealthy class. For a man of the working-class—
a poor man—the advantages and disadvantages are about the same, if we
include one important addition to the disadvantages. The special
disadvantage for a man of the working-class who has not refused to perform
military service is that, when he enters the service, his participation and his
tacit consent go toward confirming the oppression in which he finds
himself.
But the question concerning the State, whether its continued existence is a
necessity, or whether it would be wiser to abolish it, cannot be decided by
discussion on its usefulness for the men who are required to support it by
taking part in the military service, and still less by weighing the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of submission or non-
submission for the individual himself. It is decided irrevocably and without
appeal by the religious consciousness, by the conscience of each individual,
to whom no sooner does military conscription become a question than it is
followed by that of the necessity or non-necessity of the State.
follows:—For him who has submitted the advantages are these: after he has
subjected himself to all the degradations and committed all the cruel deeds
required of him, he may, provided he be not killed, receive some scarlet or
golden bauble to decorate his clown's attire; or if he be especially favored,
hundreds of thousands of just such brutal men like himself may be put
under his command, and he be called field-marshal, and receive large sums
of money.
By refusing to submit he will possess the advantages of preserving his
manly dignity, of winning the respect of good men, and, above all, he will
enjoy the assurance that he is doing God's business, and therefore an
unquestionable benefit to mankind.
Such are the advantages and disadvantages, on either side, for the
oppressor, a member of the wealthy class. For a man of the working-class—
a poor man—the advantages and disadvantages are about the same, if we
include one important addition to the disadvantages. The special
disadvantage for a man of the working-class who has not refused to perform
military service is that, when he enters the service, his participation and his
tacit consent go toward confirming the oppression in which he finds
himself.
But the question concerning the State, whether its continued existence is a
necessity, or whether it would be wiser to abolish it, cannot be decided by
discussion on its usefulness for the men who are required to support it by
taking part in the military service, and still less by weighing the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of submission or non-
submission for the individual himself. It is decided irrevocably and without
appeal by the religious consciousness, by the conscience of each individual,
to whom no sooner does military conscription become a question than it is
followed by that of the necessity or non-necessity of the State.
Page 166
CHAPTER VIII
CERTAINTY OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE TO EVIL BY
VIOLENCE BY THE MEN OF OUR WORLD
Christianity is not a legislation but a new life-conception; hence it was not obligatory, nor has
it been accepted by all men in its full meaning, but only by a few; the rest have accepted
it in a corrupted form—Moreover, Christianity is a prophecy of the disappearance of the
pagan life, and therefore of the necessity of accepting the Christian doctrine—Non-
resistance of evil by violence is one of the principles of the Christian doctrine which must
inevitably be accepted by men at the present day—Two methods of solving every
struggle—The first method consists in believing the general definitions of evil to be
binding upon all, and to resist this evil by violence—The second, the Christian method,
consists in not resisting evil by violence—Although the failure of the first method was
recognized in the first centuries of Christianity, it is still employed; but as humanity
advanced it has become more evident that there is not, nor can there be, a general
definition of evil—Now this has become evident to all, and if the violence which is
destined to combat evil exists, it is not because it is considered necessary, but because
men do not know how to dispense with it—The difficulty of dispensing with it is due to
the skilfulness and complexity of political violence—This violence is supported by four
methods: by threats, bribes, hypnotism, and the employment of military force—
Deliverance from State violence cannot be accomplished by overthrowing the State—
Through experience of the misery of pagan life men are compelled to acknowledge the
doctrine of Christ, with its non-resistance to evil,—a doctrine which they have hitherto
ignored—To this same necessity of acknowledging the Christian doctrine we are brought
by the consciousness of its truth—This consciousness is in utter contradiction to our life,
and is especially evident in regard to general military conscription; but, in consequence of
habit and the four methods of State violence, men do not see this inconsistency of
Christianity with the duties of a soldier—Men do not see it even when the authorities
themselves show them plainly all the immorality of the duties of a soldier—The call of
the general conscription is the extreme trial for every man,—the command to choose
between the Christian doctrine of non-resistance or servile submission to the existing
organization of the State—Men generally submit to the demands of the State
organization, renouncing all that is sacred, as though there were no other issue—For men
of the pagan life-conception, indeed, no other issue does exist; they are compelled to
acknowledge it, regardless of all the dreadful calamities of war—Society composed of
such men must inevitably perish, and no social changes can save it—The pagan life has
reached its last limits; it works its own destruction.
It is frequently said that if Christianity be a truth, it would have been
accepted by all men on its first appearance, and would straightway have
CERTAINTY OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE TO EVIL BY
VIOLENCE BY THE MEN OF OUR WORLD
Christianity is not a legislation but a new life-conception; hence it was not obligatory, nor has
it been accepted by all men in its full meaning, but only by a few; the rest have accepted
it in a corrupted form—Moreover, Christianity is a prophecy of the disappearance of the
pagan life, and therefore of the necessity of accepting the Christian doctrine—Non-
resistance of evil by violence is one of the principles of the Christian doctrine which must
inevitably be accepted by men at the present day—Two methods of solving every
struggle—The first method consists in believing the general definitions of evil to be
binding upon all, and to resist this evil by violence—The second, the Christian method,
consists in not resisting evil by violence—Although the failure of the first method was
recognized in the first centuries of Christianity, it is still employed; but as humanity
advanced it has become more evident that there is not, nor can there be, a general
definition of evil—Now this has become evident to all, and if the violence which is
destined to combat evil exists, it is not because it is considered necessary, but because
men do not know how to dispense with it—The difficulty of dispensing with it is due to
the skilfulness and complexity of political violence—This violence is supported by four
methods: by threats, bribes, hypnotism, and the employment of military force—
Deliverance from State violence cannot be accomplished by overthrowing the State—
Through experience of the misery of pagan life men are compelled to acknowledge the
doctrine of Christ, with its non-resistance to evil,—a doctrine which they have hitherto
ignored—To this same necessity of acknowledging the Christian doctrine we are brought
by the consciousness of its truth—This consciousness is in utter contradiction to our life,
and is especially evident in regard to general military conscription; but, in consequence of
habit and the four methods of State violence, men do not see this inconsistency of
Christianity with the duties of a soldier—Men do not see it even when the authorities
themselves show them plainly all the immorality of the duties of a soldier—The call of
the general conscription is the extreme trial for every man,—the command to choose
between the Christian doctrine of non-resistance or servile submission to the existing
organization of the State—Men generally submit to the demands of the State
organization, renouncing all that is sacred, as though there were no other issue—For men
of the pagan life-conception, indeed, no other issue does exist; they are compelled to
acknowledge it, regardless of all the dreadful calamities of war—Society composed of
such men must inevitably perish, and no social changes can save it—The pagan life has
reached its last limits; it works its own destruction.
It is frequently said that if Christianity be a truth, it would have been
accepted by all men on its first appearance, and would straightway have
Page 167
changed and improved the lives of men. One might as well say that if the
seed is alive it must instantly sprout and produce its flower or its fruit.
The Christian doctrine is not a law which, being introduced by violence,
can forthwith change the life of mankind. Christianity is a life-conception
more lofty and excellent than the ancient; and such a new conception of life
cannot be enforced; it must be adopted voluntarily, and by two processes,
the spiritual or interior process, and the experimental or external process.
Some men there are—but the smaller proportion—who instantly, and as
though by prophetic intuition, divine the truth, surrender themselves to its
influence, and live up to its precepts; others—and they are the majority—
are brought to the knowledge of the truth, and the necessity for its adoption,
by a long series of errors, by experience and suffering.
It is to this necessity of adopting the doctrine by the external process of
experience that Christendom has at last arrived.
Now and then one wonders why the mistaken presentment of Christianity,
which even at the present time prevents men from accepting it in its true
significance, could have been necessary. And yet the very errors, having
brought men to their present position, have been the medium through which
it has become possible for the majority to accept Christianity in its true
meaning.
If instead of that corrupted form of Christianity which was given to the
people, it had been offered to them in its purity, the greater portion of
mankind would have refused it, like the Asiatic peoples to whom it is yet
unknown. But having once accepted it in its corrupted form, the nations
embracing it were subjected to its slow but sure influence, and by a long
succession of errors, and the suffering that ensued therefrom, have now
been brought to the necessity of adopting it in its true meaning.
The erroneous presentation of Christianity, and its acceptance by the
majority of mankind, with all its errors, was then a necessity, just as the
seed, if it is to sprout, must for a time be buried in the soil.
The Christian doctrine is the doctrine of truth as well as of prophecy.
Eighteen hundred years ago the Christian doctrine revealed to men the true
conduct of life, and at the same time foretold the result of disobeying its
injunctions and of continuing to pursue their former course, guided only by
seed is alive it must instantly sprout and produce its flower or its fruit.
The Christian doctrine is not a law which, being introduced by violence,
can forthwith change the life of mankind. Christianity is a life-conception
more lofty and excellent than the ancient; and such a new conception of life
cannot be enforced; it must be adopted voluntarily, and by two processes,
the spiritual or interior process, and the experimental or external process.
Some men there are—but the smaller proportion—who instantly, and as
though by prophetic intuition, divine the truth, surrender themselves to its
influence, and live up to its precepts; others—and they are the majority—
are brought to the knowledge of the truth, and the necessity for its adoption,
by a long series of errors, by experience and suffering.
It is to this necessity of adopting the doctrine by the external process of
experience that Christendom has at last arrived.
Now and then one wonders why the mistaken presentment of Christianity,
which even at the present time prevents men from accepting it in its true
significance, could have been necessary. And yet the very errors, having
brought men to their present position, have been the medium through which
it has become possible for the majority to accept Christianity in its true
meaning.
If instead of that corrupted form of Christianity which was given to the
people, it had been offered to them in its purity, the greater portion of
mankind would have refused it, like the Asiatic peoples to whom it is yet
unknown. But having once accepted it in its corrupted form, the nations
embracing it were subjected to its slow but sure influence, and by a long
succession of errors, and the suffering that ensued therefrom, have now
been brought to the necessity of adopting it in its true meaning.
The erroneous presentation of Christianity, and its acceptance by the
majority of mankind, with all its errors, was then a necessity, just as the
seed, if it is to sprout, must for a time be buried in the soil.
The Christian doctrine is the doctrine of truth as well as of prophecy.
Eighteen hundred years ago the Christian doctrine revealed to men the true
conduct of life, and at the same time foretold the result of disobeying its
injunctions and of continuing to pursue their former course, guided only by
Page 168
the precepts which were taught before the dawn of Christianity; and it also
showed them what life may become if they accept the Christian doctrine
and obey its dictates.
Having taught in the Sermon on the Mount those precepts by which men
should order their daily lives, Christ said: "Therefore whosoever heareth
these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man,
which built his house upon a rock: and the rain descended, and the floods
came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it
was founded upon a rock. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine,
and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his
house upon the sand: and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the
winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of
it" (Matthew vii. 24-27).
And thus, after eighteen centuries, the prophecy has been fulfilled. As the
result of the abandonment of Christ's teachings, having disregarded the
principle of non-resistance to evil, men have unwittingly fallen into the
condition of imminent peril foretold by Christ to those who refused to
follow His precepts.
Men often think that the question of resistance or non-resistance to evil by
violence is an artificial question, which may be evaded. And yet this is the
question that life presents to mankind in general, and to each thinking man
in particular, and it is one that must be solved. In social life, ever since
Christianity was first preached, this question has been like the doubt that
confronts the traveler when he comes to a place where the road which he
has followed divides, and he knows not which branch to choose. He must
pursue his way, and he can no longer go on without pausing to deliberate,
because there are now two roads from which to choose, whereas before
there was but one; he must make up his mind which he will take.
In like manner, since the doctrine of Christ has been made known to men,
they can no longer say, I will go on living as I did before, without deciding
the question of resistance or non-resistance to evil by violence. One must
decide at the beginning of every fresh struggle whether one ought or ought
not to resist by violence that which one believes to be evil.
The question of resistance or non-resistance of evil by violence arose with
the first contest among men, for every contest is simply the resistance by
showed them what life may become if they accept the Christian doctrine
and obey its dictates.
Having taught in the Sermon on the Mount those precepts by which men
should order their daily lives, Christ said: "Therefore whosoever heareth
these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man,
which built his house upon a rock: and the rain descended, and the floods
came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it
was founded upon a rock. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine,
and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his
house upon the sand: and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the
winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of
it" (Matthew vii. 24-27).
And thus, after eighteen centuries, the prophecy has been fulfilled. As the
result of the abandonment of Christ's teachings, having disregarded the
principle of non-resistance to evil, men have unwittingly fallen into the
condition of imminent peril foretold by Christ to those who refused to
follow His precepts.
Men often think that the question of resistance or non-resistance to evil by
violence is an artificial question, which may be evaded. And yet this is the
question that life presents to mankind in general, and to each thinking man
in particular, and it is one that must be solved. In social life, ever since
Christianity was first preached, this question has been like the doubt that
confronts the traveler when he comes to a place where the road which he
has followed divides, and he knows not which branch to choose. He must
pursue his way, and he can no longer go on without pausing to deliberate,
because there are now two roads from which to choose, whereas before
there was but one; he must make up his mind which he will take.
In like manner, since the doctrine of Christ has been made known to men,
they can no longer say, I will go on living as I did before, without deciding
the question of resistance or non-resistance to evil by violence. One must
decide at the beginning of every fresh struggle whether one ought or ought
not to resist by violence that which one believes to be evil.
The question of resistance or non-resistance of evil by violence arose with
the first contest among men, for every contest is simply the resistance by
Page 169
violence of something which each combatant believes to be an evil. But
before the time of Christ men did not understand that resistance by violence
of whatever the individual believed to be evil—only the same action which
seems evil to one man may seem good to another—is simply one mode of
settling the difficulty, and that the other method consists in not resisting evil
by violence.
Before the appearance of the doctrine of Christ men believed that there
could be but one way of deciding the contest, that of resisting evil by
violence, and acted accordingly, while each combatant strove to persuade
himself and others that what he regarded as evil was in fact the actual and
absolute evil. For this purpose, dating from the oldest times, men began to
invent certain definitions of evil which should be obligatory for all, and for
the purpose of establishing definitions which should be thus binding, were
issued, either certain laws supposed to have been received in a supernatural
manner, or commands of individuals or of bodies of men to whom an
infallible wisdom was ascribed. Men used violence against their fellow-men
and assured themselves and others that they were but using such violence
against an evil acknowledged by all.
This was the custom from the most ancient times, particularly among men
who had usurped authority, and men have been long in seeing its
baselessness.
But the longer mankind existed the more complex grew its mutual relations,
and the more evident it became that to resist by violence everything that is
considered evil is unwise; that the struggle is not diminished thereby, and
that no human wisdom can ever define an infallible standard of evil.
When Christianity first appeared in the Roman Empire it had already
become evident to most men that whatever Nero or Caligula called evil, and
sought to overcome by violence, was not necessarily an evil for the rest of
mankind. Even then men had already begun to realize that the human laws
for which a divine origin was claimed were really written by men; that men
cannot be infallible, no matter with what external authority they may be
invested; and that fallible men will not become infallible because they meet
together and call themselves a Senate, or any other similar name. Even then
this had been perceived and understood by many. And it was then that
Christ preached His doctrine, which not only embodied the principle of
before the time of Christ men did not understand that resistance by violence
of whatever the individual believed to be evil—only the same action which
seems evil to one man may seem good to another—is simply one mode of
settling the difficulty, and that the other method consists in not resisting evil
by violence.
Before the appearance of the doctrine of Christ men believed that there
could be but one way of deciding the contest, that of resisting evil by
violence, and acted accordingly, while each combatant strove to persuade
himself and others that what he regarded as evil was in fact the actual and
absolute evil. For this purpose, dating from the oldest times, men began to
invent certain definitions of evil which should be obligatory for all, and for
the purpose of establishing definitions which should be thus binding, were
issued, either certain laws supposed to have been received in a supernatural
manner, or commands of individuals or of bodies of men to whom an
infallible wisdom was ascribed. Men used violence against their fellow-men
and assured themselves and others that they were but using such violence
against an evil acknowledged by all.
This was the custom from the most ancient times, particularly among men
who had usurped authority, and men have been long in seeing its
baselessness.
But the longer mankind existed the more complex grew its mutual relations,
and the more evident it became that to resist by violence everything that is
considered evil is unwise; that the struggle is not diminished thereby, and
that no human wisdom can ever define an infallible standard of evil.
When Christianity first appeared in the Roman Empire it had already
become evident to most men that whatever Nero or Caligula called evil, and
sought to overcome by violence, was not necessarily an evil for the rest of
mankind. Even then men had already begun to realize that the human laws
for which a divine origin was claimed were really written by men; that men
cannot be infallible, no matter with what external authority they may be
invested; and that fallible men will not become infallible because they meet
together and call themselves a Senate, or any other similar name. Even then
this had been perceived and understood by many. And it was then that
Christ preached His doctrine, which not only embodied the principle of
Page 170
non-resistance, but which revealed a new conception of life, of which the
application to social life would lead to the suppression of strife among men,
not by obliging one class to yield to whatsoever authority shall ordain, but
by forbidding all men, and especially those in power, to employ violence
against others.
The doctrine was at that time embraced by a very limited number of
disciples, while the majority of men, particularly those who were in
authority, although they nominally accepted Christianity, continued to
follow the practice of resisting by violence whatever they regarded as evil.
So it was during the times of the Roman and Byzantine emperors, and so it
went on in later times.
The inconsistency of an authoritative definition of evil and its resistance by
violence, already apparent in the first centuries of Christianity, had grown
still more evident at the time of the dissolution of the Roman Empire and its
subdivision into numerous independent states hostile to one another and
torn by internal dissensions.
But men were not yet ready to accept the law of Christ, and the former
method of defining an evil to be resisted by the establishment of laws,
enforced by coercion and binding upon all men, continued to be employed.
The arbiter, whose office it was to decide upon the nature of the evil to be
resisted by violence, was alternately the Emperor, the Pope, the elected
body, or the nation at large. But both within and without the State men were
always to be found who refused to hold themselves bound, either by those
laws which were supposed to be the expression of the divine will, or by the
human laws which claimed to manifest the will of the people;—men whose
views on the subject of evil were quite at variance with those of the existing
authorities, men who resisted the authorities, employing the same methods
of violence that had been directed against themselves.
Men invested with religious authority would condemn as evil a matter
which to men and institutions invested with a temporal authority
commended itself as desirable, and vice versa, and more and more furious
grew the struggle. And the oftener men had recourse to violence in settling
the difficulty, the more evident it became that it was ill chosen, because
there is not, nor can there ever be, a standard authority of evil to which all
mankind would agree.
application to social life would lead to the suppression of strife among men,
not by obliging one class to yield to whatsoever authority shall ordain, but
by forbidding all men, and especially those in power, to employ violence
against others.
The doctrine was at that time embraced by a very limited number of
disciples, while the majority of men, particularly those who were in
authority, although they nominally accepted Christianity, continued to
follow the practice of resisting by violence whatever they regarded as evil.
So it was during the times of the Roman and Byzantine emperors, and so it
went on in later times.
The inconsistency of an authoritative definition of evil and its resistance by
violence, already apparent in the first centuries of Christianity, had grown
still more evident at the time of the dissolution of the Roman Empire and its
subdivision into numerous independent states hostile to one another and
torn by internal dissensions.
But men were not yet ready to accept the law of Christ, and the former
method of defining an evil to be resisted by the establishment of laws,
enforced by coercion and binding upon all men, continued to be employed.
The arbiter, whose office it was to decide upon the nature of the evil to be
resisted by violence, was alternately the Emperor, the Pope, the elected
body, or the nation at large. But both within and without the State men were
always to be found who refused to hold themselves bound, either by those
laws which were supposed to be the expression of the divine will, or by the
human laws which claimed to manifest the will of the people;—men whose
views on the subject of evil were quite at variance with those of the existing
authorities, men who resisted the authorities, employing the same methods
of violence that had been directed against themselves.
Men invested with religious authority would condemn as evil a matter
which to men and institutions invested with a temporal authority
commended itself as desirable, and vice versa, and more and more furious
grew the struggle. And the oftener men had recourse to violence in settling
the difficulty, the more evident it became that it was ill chosen, because
there is not, nor can there ever be, a standard authority of evil to which all
mankind would agree.
Page 171
Thus matters went on for eighteen centuries, and at last arrived at their
present condition, which is, that no man can dispute the fact that an
infallible definition of evil will never be made. We have reached the point
when men have ceased not only to believe in the possibility of finding a
universal definition which all men will admit, but they have even ceased to
believe in the necessity of such a definition. We have reached the point
when men in authority no longer seek to prove that that which they consider
evil is evil, but candidly acknowledge that they consider that to be evil
which does not please them, and those who are subject to authority obey,
not because they believe that the definitions of evil made by authority are
just, but only because they have no power to resist. The annexation of Nice
to France, Lorraine to Germany, the Czechs to Austria, the partition of
Poland, the subjection of Ireland and India to the English rule, the waging
of war against China, the slaughter of Africans, the expulsion of the
Chinese, the persecution of the Jews in Russia, or the derivation of profits
by landowners from land which they do not cultivate, and by capitalists
from the results of labor performed by others,—none of all this is done
because it is virtuous, or because it will benefit mankind and is essentially
opposed to evil, but because those who hold authority will have it so. The
result at the present time is this: certain men use violence, no longer in the
name of resistance to evil, but from caprice, or because it is for their
advantage; while certain other men submit to violence, not because they
believe, like those of former ages, that violence is used to defend them from
evil, but simply because they cannot escape it.
If a Roman, or a man of the Middle Ages, or a Russian, such a man as I can
remember fifty years ago, believed implicitly that the existing violence of
authority was needed to save him from evil,—that taxes, duties, serfdom,
prisons, the lash, the knout, galleys, executions, military conscription, and
wars were unavoidable,—it would be difficult to find a man at the present
time who believes that all the violences committed saves a single man from
evil; on the contrary, not one could be found who had not a distinct
assurance that most of the violations to which he is subjected, and in which
he himself participates, are in themselves a great and unprofitable calamity.
There is hardly a man to be found at the present time who fails to realize all
the uselessness and absurdity of collecting taxes from the laboring classes
for the purpose of enriching idle officials; or the folly of punishing weak
present condition, which is, that no man can dispute the fact that an
infallible definition of evil will never be made. We have reached the point
when men have ceased not only to believe in the possibility of finding a
universal definition which all men will admit, but they have even ceased to
believe in the necessity of such a definition. We have reached the point
when men in authority no longer seek to prove that that which they consider
evil is evil, but candidly acknowledge that they consider that to be evil
which does not please them, and those who are subject to authority obey,
not because they believe that the definitions of evil made by authority are
just, but only because they have no power to resist. The annexation of Nice
to France, Lorraine to Germany, the Czechs to Austria, the partition of
Poland, the subjection of Ireland and India to the English rule, the waging
of war against China, the slaughter of Africans, the expulsion of the
Chinese, the persecution of the Jews in Russia, or the derivation of profits
by landowners from land which they do not cultivate, and by capitalists
from the results of labor performed by others,—none of all this is done
because it is virtuous, or because it will benefit mankind and is essentially
opposed to evil, but because those who hold authority will have it so. The
result at the present time is this: certain men use violence, no longer in the
name of resistance to evil, but from caprice, or because it is for their
advantage; while certain other men submit to violence, not because they
believe, like those of former ages, that violence is used to defend them from
evil, but simply because they cannot escape it.
If a Roman, or a man of the Middle Ages, or a Russian, such a man as I can
remember fifty years ago, believed implicitly that the existing violence of
authority was needed to save him from evil,—that taxes, duties, serfdom,
prisons, the lash, the knout, galleys, executions, military conscription, and
wars were unavoidable,—it would be difficult to find a man at the present
time who believes that all the violences committed saves a single man from
evil; on the contrary, not one could be found who had not a distinct
assurance that most of the violations to which he is subjected, and in which
he himself participates, are in themselves a great and unprofitable calamity.
There is hardly a man to be found at the present time who fails to realize all
the uselessness and absurdity of collecting taxes from the laboring classes
for the purpose of enriching idle officials; or the folly of punishing weak
Page 172
and immoral men by exile or imprisonment, where, supported as they are,
and living in idleness, they become still weaker and more depraved; or,
again, the unspeakable folly and cruelty of those preparations for war,
which can neither be explained nor justified, and which ruin and imperil the
safety of nations. Nevertheless these violations continue, and the very men
who realize and even suffer from their uselessness, absurdity, and cruelty,
contribute to their encouragement.
If fifty years ago it was possible that the wealthy man of leisure and the
illiterate laborer should both believe that their positions, the one a continual
holiday, the other a life of incessant labor, were ordained by God—in these
days, not only throughout Europe, and even in Russia, owing to the activity
of the people, the growth of education, and the art of printing, it is hardly
possible to find a man, either rich or poor, who in one way or another would
not question the justice of such an order of things. Not only do the rich
realize that the possession of wealth is in itself a fault, for which they strive
to atone by donations to science and art, as formerly they redeemed their
sins by endowing churches; but even the majority of the laboring class now
understand that the existing order is false, and should be altered, if not
abolished. Men who profess religion, of whom we have millions in Russia,
the so-called sectarians, acknowledge, because they interpret the gospel
doctrine correctly, that this order of things is false and should be destroyed.
The working-men consider it false because of the socialistic, communistic,
or anarchical theories that have already found way into their ranks. In these
days the principle of violence is maintained, not because it is considered
necessary, but simply because it has been so long in existence, and is so
thoroughly organized by those who profit by it—that is to say, by the
governments and ruling classes—that those who are in their power find it
impossible to escape.
Nowadays every government, the despotic as well as the most liberal, has
become what Herzen has so cleverly termed a Genghis Khan with a
telegraphic equipment, that is, with an organization of violence, having for
basis nothing less than the most brutal tyranny, and converting all the means
invented by science for the inter-communication and peaceful activities of
free and equal men to its own tyrannous and oppressive ends.
The existing governments and the ruling classes no longer care to present
even the semblance of justice, but rely, thanks to scientific progress, on an
and living in idleness, they become still weaker and more depraved; or,
again, the unspeakable folly and cruelty of those preparations for war,
which can neither be explained nor justified, and which ruin and imperil the
safety of nations. Nevertheless these violations continue, and the very men
who realize and even suffer from their uselessness, absurdity, and cruelty,
contribute to their encouragement.
If fifty years ago it was possible that the wealthy man of leisure and the
illiterate laborer should both believe that their positions, the one a continual
holiday, the other a life of incessant labor, were ordained by God—in these
days, not only throughout Europe, and even in Russia, owing to the activity
of the people, the growth of education, and the art of printing, it is hardly
possible to find a man, either rich or poor, who in one way or another would
not question the justice of such an order of things. Not only do the rich
realize that the possession of wealth is in itself a fault, for which they strive
to atone by donations to science and art, as formerly they redeemed their
sins by endowing churches; but even the majority of the laboring class now
understand that the existing order is false, and should be altered, if not
abolished. Men who profess religion, of whom we have millions in Russia,
the so-called sectarians, acknowledge, because they interpret the gospel
doctrine correctly, that this order of things is false and should be destroyed.
The working-men consider it false because of the socialistic, communistic,
or anarchical theories that have already found way into their ranks. In these
days the principle of violence is maintained, not because it is considered
necessary, but simply because it has been so long in existence, and is so
thoroughly organized by those who profit by it—that is to say, by the
governments and ruling classes—that those who are in their power find it
impossible to escape.
Nowadays every government, the despotic as well as the most liberal, has
become what Herzen has so cleverly termed a Genghis Khan with a
telegraphic equipment, that is, with an organization of violence, having for
basis nothing less than the most brutal tyranny, and converting all the means
invented by science for the inter-communication and peaceful activities of
free and equal men to its own tyrannous and oppressive ends.
The existing governments and the ruling classes no longer care to present
even the semblance of justice, but rely, thanks to scientific progress, on an
Page 173
organization so ingenious that it is able to inclose all men within a circle of
violence through which it is impossible to break. This circle is made up of
four expedients, each connected with and supporting the other like the rings
of a chain.
The first and the oldest expedient is intimidation. It consists in representing
the actual organization of the State, whether it be that of a liberal republic
or of an arbitrary despotism, as something sacred and immutable, which
therefore punishes by the most cruel penalties any attempt at revolution.
This expedient has been put into practice recently wherever a government
exists: in Russia against the so-called nihilists, in America against the
anarchists, in France against the imperialists, monarchists, communists, and
anarchists. Railroads, telegraphs, telephones, photography, the improved
method of disposing of criminals by imprisoning them in solitary
confinement for the remainder of their lives in cells, where, hidden from
human view, they die forgotten, as well as numerous other modern
inventions upon which governments have the prior claim, give them such
power, that if once the authority fell into certain hands, and the regular and
secret police, administrative officials, and all kinds of procureurs, jailers,
and executioners labored zealously to support it, there would be no
possibility whatsoever of overthrowing the government, however cruel or
senseless it might be.
The second expedient is bribery. This consists in taking the property of the
laboring classes by means of taxation and distributing it among the officials,
who, in consideration of this, are bound to maintain and increase the
bondage of the people. The bribed officials, from the prime ministers to the
lowest scribes, form one unbroken chain of individuals, united by a
common interest, supported by the labor of the people, fulfilling the will of
the government with a submission proportionate to their gains, never
hesitating to use any means in any department of business to promote the
action of that governmental violence on which their well-being rests.
The third expedient I can call by no other name than hypnotism. It consists
in retarding the spiritual development of men, and, by means of various
suggestions, influencing them to cling to the theory of life which mankind
has already left behind, and upon which rests the foundation of
governmental authority. We have at the present time a hypnotizing system,
organized in a most complex manner, beginning in childhood and continued
violence through which it is impossible to break. This circle is made up of
four expedients, each connected with and supporting the other like the rings
of a chain.
The first and the oldest expedient is intimidation. It consists in representing
the actual organization of the State, whether it be that of a liberal republic
or of an arbitrary despotism, as something sacred and immutable, which
therefore punishes by the most cruel penalties any attempt at revolution.
This expedient has been put into practice recently wherever a government
exists: in Russia against the so-called nihilists, in America against the
anarchists, in France against the imperialists, monarchists, communists, and
anarchists. Railroads, telegraphs, telephones, photography, the improved
method of disposing of criminals by imprisoning them in solitary
confinement for the remainder of their lives in cells, where, hidden from
human view, they die forgotten, as well as numerous other modern
inventions upon which governments have the prior claim, give them such
power, that if once the authority fell into certain hands, and the regular and
secret police, administrative officials, and all kinds of procureurs, jailers,
and executioners labored zealously to support it, there would be no
possibility whatsoever of overthrowing the government, however cruel or
senseless it might be.
The second expedient is bribery. This consists in taking the property of the
laboring classes by means of taxation and distributing it among the officials,
who, in consideration of this, are bound to maintain and increase the
bondage of the people. The bribed officials, from the prime ministers to the
lowest scribes, form one unbroken chain of individuals, united by a
common interest, supported by the labor of the people, fulfilling the will of
the government with a submission proportionate to their gains, never
hesitating to use any means in any department of business to promote the
action of that governmental violence on which their well-being rests.
The third expedient I can call by no other name than hypnotism. It consists
in retarding the spiritual development of men, and, by means of various
suggestions, influencing them to cling to the theory of life which mankind
has already left behind, and upon which rests the foundation of
governmental authority. We have at the present time a hypnotizing system,
organized in a most complex manner, beginning in childhood and continued
Page 174
until the hour of death. This hypnotism begins during the early years of a
man's life in a system of compulsory education. Children receive in school
the same ideas in regard to the universe which their ancestors entertained,
and which are in direct contradiction to contemporary knowledge. In
countries where a State religion exists, children are taught the senseless and
sacrilegious utterances of church catechisms, with the duty of obedience to
authorities; in the republics they are taught the absurd superstition of
patriotism, and the same obligation of obedience to the government. In
maturer years this hypnotizing process is continued by the encouragement
of religious and patriotic superstition. Religious superstition is encouraged
by the erection of churches built from money collected from the people, by
holidays, processions, painting, architecture, music, by incense that
stupefies the brain, and, above all, by the maintenance of the so-called
clergy, whose duty consists in befogging the minds of men and keeping
them in a continual state of imbecility, what with the solemnity of their
services, their sermons, their intervention with the private lives of men in
time of marriage, birth, and death. The patriotic superstition is encouraged
by the governments and the ruling classes by instituting national festivals,
spectacles, and holidays, by erecting monuments with money collected
from the people, which will influence men to believe in the exclusive
importance and greatness of their own State or country and its rulers, and
encourage a feeling of hostility and even of hatred toward other nations.
Furthermore, autocratic governments directly forbid the printing and
circulation of books and the delivery of speeches that might enlighten men;
and those teachers who have the power to rouse the people from its torpor
are either banished or imprisoned. And every government, without
exception, conceals from the masses all that would tend to set them free,
and encourages all that would demoralize them,—all those writings, for
instance, that tend to confirm them in the crudeness of their religious and
patriotic superstition; all kinds of sensual pleasures, shows, circuses,
theaters; and all means for producing physical stupor, especially those, like
tobacco or brandy, which are among the principal sources of national
income. Even prostitution is encouraged; it is not only recognized, but
organized by the majority of governments. Such is the third expedient.
The fourth expedient consists in this: certain individuals are selected from
among the mass of enslaved and stupefied beings, and these, after having
been subjected to a still more vigorous process of brutalization, are made
man's life in a system of compulsory education. Children receive in school
the same ideas in regard to the universe which their ancestors entertained,
and which are in direct contradiction to contemporary knowledge. In
countries where a State religion exists, children are taught the senseless and
sacrilegious utterances of church catechisms, with the duty of obedience to
authorities; in the republics they are taught the absurd superstition of
patriotism, and the same obligation of obedience to the government. In
maturer years this hypnotizing process is continued by the encouragement
of religious and patriotic superstition. Religious superstition is encouraged
by the erection of churches built from money collected from the people, by
holidays, processions, painting, architecture, music, by incense that
stupefies the brain, and, above all, by the maintenance of the so-called
clergy, whose duty consists in befogging the minds of men and keeping
them in a continual state of imbecility, what with the solemnity of their
services, their sermons, their intervention with the private lives of men in
time of marriage, birth, and death. The patriotic superstition is encouraged
by the governments and the ruling classes by instituting national festivals,
spectacles, and holidays, by erecting monuments with money collected
from the people, which will influence men to believe in the exclusive
importance and greatness of their own State or country and its rulers, and
encourage a feeling of hostility and even of hatred toward other nations.
Furthermore, autocratic governments directly forbid the printing and
circulation of books and the delivery of speeches that might enlighten men;
and those teachers who have the power to rouse the people from its torpor
are either banished or imprisoned. And every government, without
exception, conceals from the masses all that would tend to set them free,
and encourages all that would demoralize them,—all those writings, for
instance, that tend to confirm them in the crudeness of their religious and
patriotic superstition; all kinds of sensual pleasures, shows, circuses,
theaters; and all means for producing physical stupor, especially those, like
tobacco or brandy, which are among the principal sources of national
income. Even prostitution is encouraged; it is not only recognized, but
organized by the majority of governments. Such is the third expedient.
The fourth expedient consists in this: certain individuals are selected from
among the mass of enslaved and stupefied beings, and these, after having
been subjected to a still more vigorous process of brutalization, are made
Page 175
the passive instruments of the cruelties and brutalities indispensable to the
government. This state of brutality and imbecility is produced by taking
men in their youth, before they have yet had time to gain any clear
conception of morality; and then, having removed them from all the natural
conditions of human life, from home, family, birthplace, and the possibility
of intelligent labor, by shutting them up together in barracks, where, dressed
in a peculiar uniform, to the accompaniment of shouts, drums, music, and
the display of glittering gewgaws, they are daily forced to perform certain
prescribed evolutions. By these methods they are reduced to that hypnotic
condition when they cease to be men and become imbecile and docile
machines in the hands of the hypnotizer. These physically strong young
men thus hypnotized (and at the present time, with the general conscription
system, all young men answer to this description), supplied with murderous
weapons, ever obedient to the authority of the government, and ready at its
command to commit any violence whatsoever, constitute the fourth and the
principal means for subjugating men. So the circle of violence is completed.
Intimidation, bribery, and hypnotism force men to become soldiers; soldiers
give power and make it possible to execute and to rob mankind (with the
aid of bribed officials), as well as to hypnotize and to recruit men who are
in their turn to become soldiers.
The circle is complete, and there is no possibility of escape from it.
If some men believe that deliverance from violence, or even a certain
abatement of its energy, may be the result of its overthrow by the oppressed,
who will then replace it by a system which will require no such violence
and subjugation, and if, so believing, they attempt to bring this about, they
only deceive themselves and others. So far from improving the position,
these attempts will only render things worse.
The activity of such men only strengthens the despotism of governments by
giving the latter a convenient pretext for increasing their defenses. For even
when, following a train of circumstances highly demoralizing to the
government,—take the case of France in 1870, for example,—a government
is overthrown by violence and the authority passes into other hands, this
new authority is by no means likely to be less oppressive than the former.
On the contrary, obliged to defend itself from its exasperated and
government. This state of brutality and imbecility is produced by taking
men in their youth, before they have yet had time to gain any clear
conception of morality; and then, having removed them from all the natural
conditions of human life, from home, family, birthplace, and the possibility
of intelligent labor, by shutting them up together in barracks, where, dressed
in a peculiar uniform, to the accompaniment of shouts, drums, music, and
the display of glittering gewgaws, they are daily forced to perform certain
prescribed evolutions. By these methods they are reduced to that hypnotic
condition when they cease to be men and become imbecile and docile
machines in the hands of the hypnotizer. These physically strong young
men thus hypnotized (and at the present time, with the general conscription
system, all young men answer to this description), supplied with murderous
weapons, ever obedient to the authority of the government, and ready at its
command to commit any violence whatsoever, constitute the fourth and the
principal means for subjugating men. So the circle of violence is completed.
Intimidation, bribery, and hypnotism force men to become soldiers; soldiers
give power and make it possible to execute and to rob mankind (with the
aid of bribed officials), as well as to hypnotize and to recruit men who are
in their turn to become soldiers.
The circle is complete, and there is no possibility of escape from it.
If some men believe that deliverance from violence, or even a certain
abatement of its energy, may be the result of its overthrow by the oppressed,
who will then replace it by a system which will require no such violence
and subjugation, and if, so believing, they attempt to bring this about, they
only deceive themselves and others. So far from improving the position,
these attempts will only render things worse.
The activity of such men only strengthens the despotism of governments by
giving the latter a convenient pretext for increasing their defenses. For even
when, following a train of circumstances highly demoralizing to the
government,—take the case of France in 1870, for example,—a government
is overthrown by violence and the authority passes into other hands, this
new authority is by no means likely to be less oppressive than the former.
On the contrary, obliged to defend itself from its exasperated and
Page 176
overthrown enemies, it will be even more cruel and despotic than its
predecessor, as has ever been the case in periods of revolution.
If socialists and communists believe that the possession of individual
capital is a pernicious influence in society, and anarchists regard
government itself as an evil, there are, on the other hand, monarchists,
conservatives, and capitalists who look upon the social and communal state
as an evil order of society, no less than anarchy itself; and all these parties
have nothing better to offer by way of reconciling mankind than violence.
Thus, whichever party gains the upper hand, it will be forced, in order to
introduce and maintain its own system, not only to avail itself of all former
methods of violence, but to invent new ones as well. It simply means a
change of slavery with new victims and a new organization; but the
violence will remain,—nay, increase,—because human hatred, intensified
by the struggle, will devise new means for reducing the conquered to
subjection. This has always been the result of every revolution and violent
overthrow of government. Each struggle serves but to increase the power of
those in authority at the time to enslave their fellow-men.
One domain of human activity, and only one, has hitherto escaped the
encroachments of the governments—the domain of the family, the
economical domain of private life and domestic labor. But now even this
domain, in consequence of the struggle of socialists and communists, is
gradually passing into the hands of the governments, so that labor and
recreation, the dwellings, clothes, and food of the people will by degrees, if
the desires of the reformers are accomplished, be determined and regulated
by the government.
The long experiment of Christian life by nation after nation, during eighteen
centuries, has inevitably brought men to the necessity of deciding whether
the doctrine of Christ is to be accepted or refused, and of deciding, too, the
question of social life dependent thereupon,—the resistance or non-
resistance of evil by violence. But there is this difference,—that formerly
men could either accept or reject the decision given by Christianity, whereas
now it has become imperative, because it affords the sole means of
deliverance from that condition of slavery in which, as in a net, men find
themselves entangled.
Nor is it alone this sad plight that brings them to this necessity.
predecessor, as has ever been the case in periods of revolution.
If socialists and communists believe that the possession of individual
capital is a pernicious influence in society, and anarchists regard
government itself as an evil, there are, on the other hand, monarchists,
conservatives, and capitalists who look upon the social and communal state
as an evil order of society, no less than anarchy itself; and all these parties
have nothing better to offer by way of reconciling mankind than violence.
Thus, whichever party gains the upper hand, it will be forced, in order to
introduce and maintain its own system, not only to avail itself of all former
methods of violence, but to invent new ones as well. It simply means a
change of slavery with new victims and a new organization; but the
violence will remain,—nay, increase,—because human hatred, intensified
by the struggle, will devise new means for reducing the conquered to
subjection. This has always been the result of every revolution and violent
overthrow of government. Each struggle serves but to increase the power of
those in authority at the time to enslave their fellow-men.
One domain of human activity, and only one, has hitherto escaped the
encroachments of the governments—the domain of the family, the
economical domain of private life and domestic labor. But now even this
domain, in consequence of the struggle of socialists and communists, is
gradually passing into the hands of the governments, so that labor and
recreation, the dwellings, clothes, and food of the people will by degrees, if
the desires of the reformers are accomplished, be determined and regulated
by the government.
The long experiment of Christian life by nation after nation, during eighteen
centuries, has inevitably brought men to the necessity of deciding whether
the doctrine of Christ is to be accepted or refused, and of deciding, too, the
question of social life dependent thereupon,—the resistance or non-
resistance of evil by violence. But there is this difference,—that formerly
men could either accept or reject the decision given by Christianity, whereas
now it has become imperative, because it affords the sole means of
deliverance from that condition of slavery in which, as in a net, men find
themselves entangled.
Nor is it alone this sad plight that brings them to this necessity.
Page 177
Parallel with the negative proof of the falsehood of the pagan order of
things there has been positive proof of the truth of the Christian doctrine.
Indeed, in the course of the eighteen centuries, the best men in all
Christendom, through an inner spiritual medium, having recognized the
truths of the doctrine, have borne witness of it, regardless of threats,
privations, miseries, and torture. These nobler men, by their martyrdom,
have sealed the truth of the doctrine.
Christianity penetrated into human consciousness, not alone by the method
of negative proof, that, namely, it had become impossible to go on with the
pagan life; but by its simplifying process, by its explanation of, and its
deliverance from, superstition, and by its consequent spread among all
classes of society.
Eighteen centuries of the profession of Christianity have not passed in vain
for those who accepted it, even if it were but in outward form. These
eighteen centuries have made men realize all the miseries of the pagan state,
even though they have continued to lead a pagan existence, out of harmony
with an age of humanity; and at the bottom of their hearts they believe now
(and herein lies the only reason for living at all) that salvation from such an
existence can be found in the fulfilment of the Christian doctrine in its true
sense. As to when and where this salvation is to be accomplished, opinions
differ, according to the intellectual development of men and the prejudices
among which they live; but every educated man recognizes that our
salvation is to be found in the fulfilment of the Christian doctrine. Certain
believers, those who consider the Christian doctrine divine, affirm that this
salvation will be accomplished when all men believe in Christ and the time
of the second advent approaches; others, who also have faith in the divinity
of Christ's doctrine, believe that this salvation will come through the
churches, which, having got all men within the fold, will implant in their
hearts those Christian virtues which will transform their lives. Others,
again, who do not accept the divinity of Christ, believe that the salvation of
men will be accomplished by means of a slow, continuous progress, during
which the groundwork of pagan life will be gradually replaced by the
groundwork of liberty, equality, and fraternity—that is, by the basis of
Christianity. Still others there are who preach a new social organization, and
who believe that this salvation will be brought about when, by means of a
violent revolution, men are forced to a community of goods, to the abolition
things there has been positive proof of the truth of the Christian doctrine.
Indeed, in the course of the eighteen centuries, the best men in all
Christendom, through an inner spiritual medium, having recognized the
truths of the doctrine, have borne witness of it, regardless of threats,
privations, miseries, and torture. These nobler men, by their martyrdom,
have sealed the truth of the doctrine.
Christianity penetrated into human consciousness, not alone by the method
of negative proof, that, namely, it had become impossible to go on with the
pagan life; but by its simplifying process, by its explanation of, and its
deliverance from, superstition, and by its consequent spread among all
classes of society.
Eighteen centuries of the profession of Christianity have not passed in vain
for those who accepted it, even if it were but in outward form. These
eighteen centuries have made men realize all the miseries of the pagan state,
even though they have continued to lead a pagan existence, out of harmony
with an age of humanity; and at the bottom of their hearts they believe now
(and herein lies the only reason for living at all) that salvation from such an
existence can be found in the fulfilment of the Christian doctrine in its true
sense. As to when and where this salvation is to be accomplished, opinions
differ, according to the intellectual development of men and the prejudices
among which they live; but every educated man recognizes that our
salvation is to be found in the fulfilment of the Christian doctrine. Certain
believers, those who consider the Christian doctrine divine, affirm that this
salvation will be accomplished when all men believe in Christ and the time
of the second advent approaches; others, who also have faith in the divinity
of Christ's doctrine, believe that this salvation will come through the
churches, which, having got all men within the fold, will implant in their
hearts those Christian virtues which will transform their lives. Others,
again, who do not accept the divinity of Christ, believe that the salvation of
men will be accomplished by means of a slow, continuous progress, during
which the groundwork of pagan life will be gradually replaced by the
groundwork of liberty, equality, and fraternity—that is, by the basis of
Christianity. Still others there are who preach a new social organization, and
who believe that this salvation will be brought about when, by means of a
violent revolution, men are forced to a community of goods, to the abolition
Page 178
of governments, to collective rather than individual labor—that is, by the
realization of one of the aspects of Christianity. Thus, after one fashion or
another, all men of our epoch not only renounce the existing order of life as
no longer suited to the times, but acknowledge, often without realizing it,
and regarding themselves as enemies of Christianity, that our salvation lies
only in the adaptation to life of a whole or a part of the Christian doctrine in
its true sense.
For the majority of men Christianity, as its Teacher has expressed it, could
not be comprehended at once, but was to grow, like unto a huge tree, from
the tiniest seed. "The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed,
... which indeed is the least of all seeds: but when it is grown, it is the
greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree." And thus it has grown and
continues to grow, if not in manifestation, then in human consciousness.
It is no longer reserved for the minority of men, who have always
understood Christianity by its veritable truth; but it is acknowledged by the
great majority, who, if we are to judge by their social life, are far removed
from it.
Look at the private life of individuals, listen to their estimation of human
actions as they pronounce judgment on each other; listen not only to public
sermons and orations, but to the precepts which parents and teachers offer
to their charges, and you will see that, however far removed from the
practice of Christian truths may be the political or social existence of men
who are in bonds to violence, yet Christian virtues are admired and exalted
by all; while, on the contrary, the anti-Christian vices are unhesitatingly
condemned as harmful to all mankind. Those who sacrifice their lives in the
service of humanity are looked upon as the better men; while those who
take advantage of the misfortune of their neighbors to further their own
selfish interests are universally condemned.
There may still be men who, insensible to Christian ideals, have set up for
themselves other ideals, such as power, courage, or wealth; but these ideals
are passing away; they are not accepted by all, nor by the men of the better
class. Indeed, the Christian ideals are the only ones which are recognized as
obligatory for all.
The position of our Christian world, looked at from without, with its cruelty
and slavery, is indeed appalling. But if we consider it from the standpoint of
realization of one of the aspects of Christianity. Thus, after one fashion or
another, all men of our epoch not only renounce the existing order of life as
no longer suited to the times, but acknowledge, often without realizing it,
and regarding themselves as enemies of Christianity, that our salvation lies
only in the adaptation to life of a whole or a part of the Christian doctrine in
its true sense.
For the majority of men Christianity, as its Teacher has expressed it, could
not be comprehended at once, but was to grow, like unto a huge tree, from
the tiniest seed. "The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed,
... which indeed is the least of all seeds: but when it is grown, it is the
greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree." And thus it has grown and
continues to grow, if not in manifestation, then in human consciousness.
It is no longer reserved for the minority of men, who have always
understood Christianity by its veritable truth; but it is acknowledged by the
great majority, who, if we are to judge by their social life, are far removed
from it.
Look at the private life of individuals, listen to their estimation of human
actions as they pronounce judgment on each other; listen not only to public
sermons and orations, but to the precepts which parents and teachers offer
to their charges, and you will see that, however far removed from the
practice of Christian truths may be the political or social existence of men
who are in bonds to violence, yet Christian virtues are admired and exalted
by all; while, on the contrary, the anti-Christian vices are unhesitatingly
condemned as harmful to all mankind. Those who sacrifice their lives in the
service of humanity are looked upon as the better men; while those who
take advantage of the misfortune of their neighbors to further their own
selfish interests are universally condemned.
There may still be men who, insensible to Christian ideals, have set up for
themselves other ideals, such as power, courage, or wealth; but these ideals
are passing away; they are not accepted by all, nor by the men of the better
class. Indeed, the Christian ideals are the only ones which are recognized as
obligatory for all.
The position of our Christian world, looked at from without, with its cruelty
and slavery, is indeed appalling. But if we consider it from the standpoint of
Page 179
human consciousness, it presents a very different aspect. All the evil of our
life seems to exist only because it always has existed from all ages, and the
men whose actions are evil have had neither the time nor the experience to
overcome their evil habits, although all are willing to abandon them. Evil
seems to exist by reason of some cause apparently independent of the
consciousness of men.
Strange and contradictory as it may seem, modern men hate the very order
of things which they themselves support.
I believe it is Max Müller who describes the astonishment of an Indian
converted to Christianity, who, having apprehended the essence of the
Christian doctrine, came to Europe and beheld the life of Christians. He
could not recover from his astonishment in the presence of the reality, so
different from the state of things he had expected to find among Christian
nations.
If we are not surprised at the contradiction between our convictions and our
actions, it is only because the influences which obscure this contradiction
act upon us. We have but to look at our life from the standpoint of the
Indian, who understood Christianity in its true significance, without any
concessions or adaptations, and to behold the barbarous cruelties with
which our life is filled, in order to be horrified at the contradictions in the
midst of which we live, without noticing them.
One has but to remember the preparations for war, the cartridge-boxes, the
silver-plated bullets, the torpedoes, and—the Red Cross; the establishment
of prisons for solitary confinement, experiments with electrocution, and—
the care for the welfare of the prisoners; the philanthropic activity of the
rich, and—their daily life, which brings about the existence of the poor,
whom they seek to benefit. And these contradictions arise, not, as it might
seem, because men pretend to be Christians while they are actually
heathens, but because they lack something, or because there is some power
which prevents them from being what they really desire to be, and what
they even conscientiously believe themselves to be. It is not that modern
men merely pretend to hate oppression, the inequality of class distinctions,
and all kinds of cruelty, whether practised against their fellow-men or
against animals. They are sincere in their hatred of these abuses; but they
do not know how to abolish them, or they lack the courage to alter their
life seems to exist only because it always has existed from all ages, and the
men whose actions are evil have had neither the time nor the experience to
overcome their evil habits, although all are willing to abandon them. Evil
seems to exist by reason of some cause apparently independent of the
consciousness of men.
Strange and contradictory as it may seem, modern men hate the very order
of things which they themselves support.
I believe it is Max Müller who describes the astonishment of an Indian
converted to Christianity, who, having apprehended the essence of the
Christian doctrine, came to Europe and beheld the life of Christians. He
could not recover from his astonishment in the presence of the reality, so
different from the state of things he had expected to find among Christian
nations.
If we are not surprised at the contradiction between our convictions and our
actions, it is only because the influences which obscure this contradiction
act upon us. We have but to look at our life from the standpoint of the
Indian, who understood Christianity in its true significance, without any
concessions or adaptations, and to behold the barbarous cruelties with
which our life is filled, in order to be horrified at the contradictions in the
midst of which we live, without noticing them.
One has but to remember the preparations for war, the cartridge-boxes, the
silver-plated bullets, the torpedoes, and—the Red Cross; the establishment
of prisons for solitary confinement, experiments with electrocution, and—
the care for the welfare of the prisoners; the philanthropic activity of the
rich, and—their daily life, which brings about the existence of the poor,
whom they seek to benefit. And these contradictions arise, not, as it might
seem, because men pretend to be Christians while they are actually
heathens, but because they lack something, or because there is some power
which prevents them from being what they really desire to be, and what
they even conscientiously believe themselves to be. It is not that modern
men merely pretend to hate oppression, the inequality of class distinctions,
and all kinds of cruelty, whether practised against their fellow-men or
against animals. They are sincere in their hatred of these abuses; but they
do not know how to abolish them, or they lack the courage to alter their
Page 180
own mode of life, which depends upon all this, and which seems to them so
important.
Ask, indeed, any individual if he considers it praiseworthy or even
honorable for a man to fill a position for which he receives a salary so high
as to be out of all proportion to the amount of his labor, as, for instance, that
of collecting from the people, often from beggars, taxes which are to be
devoted to the purchase of cannon, torpedoes, and other instruments for
murdering the men with whom we wish to live in peace, and who wish to
live in peace with us; or, to receive a salary for spending his life either in
perfecting these instruments of murder, or in the military exercises by
which men are trained for slaughter? Ask whether it be praiseworthy or
compatible with the dignity of man, or becoming to a Christian, to
undertake, also for money, to arrest some unfortunate man, some illiterate
drunkard, for some petty theft not to be compared with the magnitude of
our own appropriation, or for manslaughter not conducted by our advanced
methods; and for such offenses to throw people into prison, or put them to
death? Ask whether it be laudable and becoming in a man and a Christian,
also for money, to teach the people foolish and injurious superstitions
instead of the doctrine of Christ? Whether, again, it be laudable and worthy
of a man to wrench from his neighbor, in order to gratify his own caprice,
the very necessaries of life, as the great landowners do; or to exact from his
fellow-man an excessive and exhausting toil for the purpose of increasing
his own wealth, as the mill-owners and manufacturers do; or to take
advantage of human necessities to build up colossal fortunes, as the
merchants do?
Every individual would reply not, especially if the question regarded his
neighbor. And at the same time the very man who acknowledges all the
ignominy of such deeds, when the case is presented to him, will often, of
his own accord, and for no advantage of a salary, but moved by childish
vanity, the desire to possess a trinket of enamel, a decoration, a stripe,
voluntarily enter the military service, or become an examining magistrate, a
justice of the peace, a minister of state, an uriadnik, a bishop, accepting an
office whose duties will oblige him to do things, the shame and ignominy of
which he cannot help realizing.
Many of these men will, I am sure, defend themselves on the ground of the
lawfulness and necessity of their position; they will argue that the
important.
Ask, indeed, any individual if he considers it praiseworthy or even
honorable for a man to fill a position for which he receives a salary so high
as to be out of all proportion to the amount of his labor, as, for instance, that
of collecting from the people, often from beggars, taxes which are to be
devoted to the purchase of cannon, torpedoes, and other instruments for
murdering the men with whom we wish to live in peace, and who wish to
live in peace with us; or, to receive a salary for spending his life either in
perfecting these instruments of murder, or in the military exercises by
which men are trained for slaughter? Ask whether it be praiseworthy or
compatible with the dignity of man, or becoming to a Christian, to
undertake, also for money, to arrest some unfortunate man, some illiterate
drunkard, for some petty theft not to be compared with the magnitude of
our own appropriation, or for manslaughter not conducted by our advanced
methods; and for such offenses to throw people into prison, or put them to
death? Ask whether it be laudable and becoming in a man and a Christian,
also for money, to teach the people foolish and injurious superstitions
instead of the doctrine of Christ? Whether, again, it be laudable and worthy
of a man to wrench from his neighbor, in order to gratify his own caprice,
the very necessaries of life, as the great landowners do; or to exact from his
fellow-man an excessive and exhausting toil for the purpose of increasing
his own wealth, as the mill-owners and manufacturers do; or to take
advantage of human necessities to build up colossal fortunes, as the
merchants do?
Every individual would reply not, especially if the question regarded his
neighbor. And at the same time the very man who acknowledges all the
ignominy of such deeds, when the case is presented to him, will often, of
his own accord, and for no advantage of a salary, but moved by childish
vanity, the desire to possess a trinket of enamel, a decoration, a stripe,
voluntarily enter the military service, or become an examining magistrate, a
justice of the peace, a minister of state, an uriadnik, a bishop, accepting an
office whose duties will oblige him to do things, the shame and ignominy of
which he cannot help realizing.
Many of these men will, I am sure, defend themselves on the ground of the
lawfulness and necessity of their position; they will argue that the
Page 181
authorities are of God, that the functions of State are indispensable for the
good of mankind, that Christianity is not opposed to wealth, that the rich
youth was bidden to give up his goods only if he wished to be perfect, that
the present distribution of wealth and commerce is beneficial to all men,
and that it is right and lawful. But however much they may try to deceive
themselves and others, they all know that what they do is opposed to the
highest interests of life, and at the bottom of their hearts, when they listen
only to their consciences, they are ashamed and pained to think of what
they are doing, especially when the baseness of their deeds has been pointed
out to them. A man in modern life, whether he does or does not profess to
believe in the divinity of Christ, must know that to be instrumental either as
a czar, minister, governor, or policeman, as in selling a poor family's last
cow to pay taxes to the treasury, the money of which is devoted to the
purchase of cannon or to pay the salaries or pensions of idle and luxurious
officials, is to do more harm than good; or to be a party to the imprisonment
of the father of a family, for whose demoralization we are ourselves
responsible, and to bring his family to beggary; or to take part in piratical
and murderous warfare; or to teach absurd superstitions of idol-worship
instead of the doctrine of Christ; or to impound a stray cow belonging to a
man who has no land; or to deduct the value of an accidentally injured
article from the wages of a mechanic; or to sell something to a poor man for
double its value, only because he is in dire necessity;—the men of our
modern life cannot but know that all such deeds are wrong, shameful, and
that they ought not to commit them. They do all know it. They know that
they are doing wrong, and would abstain from it, had they but the strength
to oppose those forces which blind them to the criminality of their actions
while drawing them on to do wrong.
But there is nothing that demonstrates so vividly the degree of contradiction
to which human life has attained as the system that embodies both the
method and the expression of violence,—the general conscription system. It
is only because a general armament and military conscription have come
imperceptibly and by slow degrees, and that governments employ for their
support all the means of intimidation at their disposal,—bribery,
bewilderment, and violence,—that we do not realize the glaring
contradiction between this state of affairs and those Christian feelings and
ideas with which all modern men are penetrated.
good of mankind, that Christianity is not opposed to wealth, that the rich
youth was bidden to give up his goods only if he wished to be perfect, that
the present distribution of wealth and commerce is beneficial to all men,
and that it is right and lawful. But however much they may try to deceive
themselves and others, they all know that what they do is opposed to the
highest interests of life, and at the bottom of their hearts, when they listen
only to their consciences, they are ashamed and pained to think of what
they are doing, especially when the baseness of their deeds has been pointed
out to them. A man in modern life, whether he does or does not profess to
believe in the divinity of Christ, must know that to be instrumental either as
a czar, minister, governor, or policeman, as in selling a poor family's last
cow to pay taxes to the treasury, the money of which is devoted to the
purchase of cannon or to pay the salaries or pensions of idle and luxurious
officials, is to do more harm than good; or to be a party to the imprisonment
of the father of a family, for whose demoralization we are ourselves
responsible, and to bring his family to beggary; or to take part in piratical
and murderous warfare; or to teach absurd superstitions of idol-worship
instead of the doctrine of Christ; or to impound a stray cow belonging to a
man who has no land; or to deduct the value of an accidentally injured
article from the wages of a mechanic; or to sell something to a poor man for
double its value, only because he is in dire necessity;—the men of our
modern life cannot but know that all such deeds are wrong, shameful, and
that they ought not to commit them. They do all know it. They know that
they are doing wrong, and would abstain from it, had they but the strength
to oppose those forces which blind them to the criminality of their actions
while drawing them on to do wrong.
But there is nothing that demonstrates so vividly the degree of contradiction
to which human life has attained as the system that embodies both the
method and the expression of violence,—the general conscription system. It
is only because a general armament and military conscription have come
imperceptibly and by slow degrees, and that governments employ for their
support all the means of intimidation at their disposal,—bribery,
bewilderment, and violence,—that we do not realize the glaring
contradiction between this state of affairs and those Christian feelings and
ideas with which all modern men are penetrated.
Page 182
This contradiction has become so common that we fail to see the shocking
imbecility and immorality of the actions, not only of those men who, of
their own accord, choose the profession of murder as something honorable,
but of those unfortunates who consent to serve in the army, and of those
who, in countries where military conscription has not yet been introduced,
give of their own free will the fruits of their labor to be used for the
payment of mercenaries and for the organization for murder. All these men
are either Christians or men professing humanitarianism and liberalism,
who know that they participate in the most imbecile, aimless, and cruel
murders; yet still they go on committing them. But this is not all. In
Germany, where the system of general military conscription originated,
Caprivi has revealed something that has always been carefully hidden: that
the men who run the risk of being killed are not only foreigners, but are
quite as likely to be fellow-countrymen,—working-men,—from which class
most of the soldiers are obtained. Nevertheless, this admission neither
opened men's eyes nor shocked their sensibilities. They continue just as
they did before, to go like sheep, and submit to anything that is demanded
of them. And this is not all. The German Emperor has recently explained
with minute precision the character and vocation of a soldier, having
distinguished, thanked, and rewarded a private for killing a defenseless
prisoner who attempted to escape. In thanking and rewarding a man for an
act which is looked upon even by men of the lowest type of morality as
base and cowardly, Wilhelm pointed out that the principal duty of a soldier,
and one most highly prized by the authorities, is that of an executioner,—
not like the professional executioners who put to death condemned
prisoners only, but an executioner of the innocent men whom his superiors
order him to kill.
Yet more. In 1891 this same Wilhelm, the enfant terrible of State authority,
who expresses what other men only venture to think, in a talk with certain
soldiers, uttered publicly the following words, which were repeated the next
day in thousands of papers:—
"Recruits! You have given me the oath of allegiance before the altar and the
servant of the Lord. You are still too young to comprehend the true meaning
of what has been said here, but first of all take care ever to follow the orders
and instructions that are given to you. You have taken the oath of allegiance
imbecility and immorality of the actions, not only of those men who, of
their own accord, choose the profession of murder as something honorable,
but of those unfortunates who consent to serve in the army, and of those
who, in countries where military conscription has not yet been introduced,
give of their own free will the fruits of their labor to be used for the
payment of mercenaries and for the organization for murder. All these men
are either Christians or men professing humanitarianism and liberalism,
who know that they participate in the most imbecile, aimless, and cruel
murders; yet still they go on committing them. But this is not all. In
Germany, where the system of general military conscription originated,
Caprivi has revealed something that has always been carefully hidden: that
the men who run the risk of being killed are not only foreigners, but are
quite as likely to be fellow-countrymen,—working-men,—from which class
most of the soldiers are obtained. Nevertheless, this admission neither
opened men's eyes nor shocked their sensibilities. They continue just as
they did before, to go like sheep, and submit to anything that is demanded
of them. And this is not all. The German Emperor has recently explained
with minute precision the character and vocation of a soldier, having
distinguished, thanked, and rewarded a private for killing a defenseless
prisoner who attempted to escape. In thanking and rewarding a man for an
act which is looked upon even by men of the lowest type of morality as
base and cowardly, Wilhelm pointed out that the principal duty of a soldier,
and one most highly prized by the authorities, is that of an executioner,—
not like the professional executioners who put to death condemned
prisoners only, but an executioner of the innocent men whom his superiors
order him to kill.
Yet more. In 1891 this same Wilhelm, the enfant terrible of State authority,
who expresses what other men only venture to think, in a talk with certain
soldiers, uttered publicly the following words, which were repeated the next
day in thousands of papers:—
"Recruits! You have given me the oath of allegiance before the altar and the
servant of the Lord. You are still too young to comprehend the true meaning
of what has been said here, but first of all take care ever to follow the orders
and instructions that are given to you. You have taken the oath of allegiance
Page 183
to me; this means, children of my guards, that you are now my soldiers, that
you have given yourselves up to me, body and soul.
"But one enemy exists for you—my enemy. With the present socialistic
intrigues it may happen that I shall command you to shoot your own
relatives, your brothers, even your parents (from which may God preserve
us!), and then you are in duty bound to obey my orders unhesitatingly."
This man expresses what is known, but carefully concealed, by all wise
rulers. He says outright that the men who serve in the army serve himand
his advantage, and should be ready for that purpose to kill their brothers and
fathers.
Roughly but distinctly he lays bare all the horror of the crime for which
men who become soldiers prepare themselves,—all that abyss of self-
abasement into which they fling themselves when they promise obedience.
Like a bold hypnotizer, he tests the depth of the slumber; he applies red-hot
iron to the sleeper's body; it smokes and shrivels, but the sleeper does not
awaken.
Poor, sick, miserable man, intoxicated with power, who by these words
insults all that is sacred to men of modern civilization! And we, Christians,
liberals, men of culture, so far from feeling indignant at this insult, pass it
over in silence. Men are put to the final test in its rudest form; but they
hardly observe that a test is in question, that a choice is put before them. It
seems to them as if there were no choice, but only the one necessity of
slavish submission. It would seem as if these insane words, offensive to all
that a civilized human being holds sacred, ought to rouse indignation,—but
nothing of the kind happens. Year after year every young man in Europe is
subjected to the same test, and with very few exceptions they all forswear
what is and should be sacred to every man; all manifest a readiness to kill
their brothers and even their fathers, at the order of the first misguided man
who wears a red and gold livery, asking only when and whom they are to be
ordered to kill—for they are ready to do it.
Even by savages certain objects are held sacred, for whose sake they are
ready to suffer rather than submit. But what is sacred for the man of the
modern world? He is told: Be my slave, in a bondage where you may have
to murder your own father; and he, oftentimes a man of learning, who has
studied all the sciences in the university, submissively offers his neck to the
you have given yourselves up to me, body and soul.
"But one enemy exists for you—my enemy. With the present socialistic
intrigues it may happen that I shall command you to shoot your own
relatives, your brothers, even your parents (from which may God preserve
us!), and then you are in duty bound to obey my orders unhesitatingly."
This man expresses what is known, but carefully concealed, by all wise
rulers. He says outright that the men who serve in the army serve himand
his advantage, and should be ready for that purpose to kill their brothers and
fathers.
Roughly but distinctly he lays bare all the horror of the crime for which
men who become soldiers prepare themselves,—all that abyss of self-
abasement into which they fling themselves when they promise obedience.
Like a bold hypnotizer, he tests the depth of the slumber; he applies red-hot
iron to the sleeper's body; it smokes and shrivels, but the sleeper does not
awaken.
Poor, sick, miserable man, intoxicated with power, who by these words
insults all that is sacred to men of modern civilization! And we, Christians,
liberals, men of culture, so far from feeling indignant at this insult, pass it
over in silence. Men are put to the final test in its rudest form; but they
hardly observe that a test is in question, that a choice is put before them. It
seems to them as if there were no choice, but only the one necessity of
slavish submission. It would seem as if these insane words, offensive to all
that a civilized human being holds sacred, ought to rouse indignation,—but
nothing of the kind happens. Year after year every young man in Europe is
subjected to the same test, and with very few exceptions they all forswear
what is and should be sacred to every man; all manifest a readiness to kill
their brothers and even their fathers, at the order of the first misguided man
who wears a red and gold livery, asking only when and whom they are to be
ordered to kill—for they are ready to do it.
Even by savages certain objects are held sacred, for whose sake they are
ready to suffer rather than submit. But what is sacred for the man of the
modern world? He is told: Be my slave, in a bondage where you may have
to murder your own father; and he, oftentimes a man of learning, who has
studied all the sciences in the university, submissively offers his neck to the
Page 184
halter. He is dressed in a clown's garments, ordered to leap, to make
contortions, to salute, to kill—and he submissively obeys; and when at last
allowed to return to his former life, he continues to hold forth on the dignity
of man, freedom, equality, and brotherhood.
"But what is to be done?" we often hear men ask in perplexity. "If every
man were to refuse, it would be a different matter; but, as it is, I should
suffer alone without benefiting any one." And they are right; for a man who
holds the social life-conception cannot refuse. Life has no significance for
him except as it concerns his personal welfare; it is for his advantage to
submit, therefore he does so.
To whatever torture or injury he may be subjected he will submit, because
he can do nothing alone; he lacks the foundation which alone would enable
him to resist violence, and those who are in authority over him will never
give him the chance of uniting with others.
It has often been said that the invention of the terrible military instruments
of murder will put an end to war, and that war will exhaust itself. This is not
true. As it is possible to increase the means for killing men, so it is possible
to increase the means for subjecting those who hold the social life-
conception. Let them be exterminated by thousands and millions, let them
be torn to pieces, men will still continue like stupid cattle to go to the
slaughter, some because they are driven thither under the lash, others that
they may win the decorations and ribbons which fill their hearts with pride.
And it is with material like this that the public leaders—conservatives,
liberals, socialists, anarchists—discuss the ways and means of organizing
an intelligent and moral society, with men who have been so thoroughly
confused and bewildered that they will promise to murder their own
parents. What kind of intelligence and morality can there be in a society
organized from material like this? Just as it is impossible to build a house
from bent and rotten timber, however manipulated, so also is it impossible
with such materials to organize an intelligent and moral society. They can
only be governed like a drove of cattle, by the shouts and lash of the
herdsman. And so, indeed, they are governed.
Again, while on the one hand we find men, Christians in name, professing
the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, on the other hand we see
these same men ready, in the name of liberty, to yield the most abject and
contortions, to salute, to kill—and he submissively obeys; and when at last
allowed to return to his former life, he continues to hold forth on the dignity
of man, freedom, equality, and brotherhood.
"But what is to be done?" we often hear men ask in perplexity. "If every
man were to refuse, it would be a different matter; but, as it is, I should
suffer alone without benefiting any one." And they are right; for a man who
holds the social life-conception cannot refuse. Life has no significance for
him except as it concerns his personal welfare; it is for his advantage to
submit, therefore he does so.
To whatever torture or injury he may be subjected he will submit, because
he can do nothing alone; he lacks the foundation which alone would enable
him to resist violence, and those who are in authority over him will never
give him the chance of uniting with others.
It has often been said that the invention of the terrible military instruments
of murder will put an end to war, and that war will exhaust itself. This is not
true. As it is possible to increase the means for killing men, so it is possible
to increase the means for subjecting those who hold the social life-
conception. Let them be exterminated by thousands and millions, let them
be torn to pieces, men will still continue like stupid cattle to go to the
slaughter, some because they are driven thither under the lash, others that
they may win the decorations and ribbons which fill their hearts with pride.
And it is with material like this that the public leaders—conservatives,
liberals, socialists, anarchists—discuss the ways and means of organizing
an intelligent and moral society, with men who have been so thoroughly
confused and bewildered that they will promise to murder their own
parents. What kind of intelligence and morality can there be in a society
organized from material like this? Just as it is impossible to build a house
from bent and rotten timber, however manipulated, so also is it impossible
with such materials to organize an intelligent and moral society. They can
only be governed like a drove of cattle, by the shouts and lash of the
herdsman. And so, indeed, they are governed.
Again, while on the one hand we find men, Christians in name, professing
the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, on the other hand we see
these same men ready, in the name of liberty, to yield the most abject and
Page 185
slavish obedience; in the name of equality, to approve of the most rigid and
senseless subdivision of men into classes; and in the name of fraternity,
ready to slay their own brothers.[14]
The contradiction of the moral consciousness, and hence the misery of life,
has reached its utmost limit, beyond which it can go no further. Life, based
on principles of violence, has culminated in the negation of the basis on
which it was founded. The organization, on principles of violence, of a
society whose object was to insure the happiness of the individual and the
family, and the social welfare of humanity, has brought men to such a pass
that these benefits are practically annulled.
The first part of the prophecy in regard to those men and their descendants
who adopted this doctrine has been fulfilled, and now their descendants are
forced to realize the justice of its second part.
senseless subdivision of men into classes; and in the name of fraternity,
ready to slay their own brothers.[14]
The contradiction of the moral consciousness, and hence the misery of life,
has reached its utmost limit, beyond which it can go no further. Life, based
on principles of violence, has culminated in the negation of the basis on
which it was founded. The organization, on principles of violence, of a
society whose object was to insure the happiness of the individual and the
family, and the social welfare of humanity, has brought men to such a pass
that these benefits are practically annulled.
The first part of the prophecy in regard to those men and their descendants
who adopted this doctrine has been fulfilled, and now their descendants are
forced to realize the justice of its second part.
Page 186
CHAPTER IX
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE-
CONCEPTION DELIVERS MEN FROM THE MISERIES
OF OUR PAGAN LIFE
The external life of Christian nations remains pagan, but they are already penetrated by the
Christian life-conception—The issue from this contradiction is in the acceptance of the
Christian life-conception—In it alone is every man free, and it alone frees him from all
human authority—This deliverance is brought about, not by a change of external
conditions, but only by a change in the conception of one's life—The Christian life-
conception demands the renunciation of violence, and, in delivering the man who accepts
it, it frees the world from all external authority—The issue from the present apparently
hopeless position consists in every man accepting the Christian life-conception and living
accordingly—But men consider this method too slow, and see their salvation in change of
the material conditions of life made with the aid of the authority of the State—This
method will have no issue, because men themselves cause the evil from which they suffer
—This is especially evident in regard to the submissive acceptance of military duty, for it
is more advantageous for a man to refuse than accept—Human freedom will be brought
about only through the liberation of each individual man, and already there are signs of
this liberation, which threatens to destroy State organization—The repudiation of the un-
Christian demands of governments undermines their authority and makes men free—
Therefore instances of such refusals are feared by governments more than conspiracies or
violence—Instances, in Russia, of refusals to take the oath of allegiance, to pay taxes, to
accept passports or positions in the police, to take part in courts of law, or to be drafted as
soldiers—Similar instances in other countries—Governments know not how to dispose of
men who refuse to obey their requirements because of the Christian doctrine—These men
destroy without a struggle the foundations of governments from the inside—To punish
them would mean for governments to deny Christianity themselves, and to contribute to
the diffusion of that consciousness from which such refusals spring—Hence the position
of governments is a desperate one, and men who preach the uselessness of personal
deliverance only arrest the destruction of the existing system of government founded on
violence.
The Christian nations of the present day are in a position no less cruel than
that of pagan times. In many respects, especially in the matter of
oppression, their position has grown worse.
A contrast like that of modern and ancient times may be seen in the
vegetation of the last days of autumn as compared with that of the early
days of spring. In the autumn the outward decay and death correspond to
the interior process, which is the suspension of life; in the spring the
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE-
CONCEPTION DELIVERS MEN FROM THE MISERIES
OF OUR PAGAN LIFE
The external life of Christian nations remains pagan, but they are already penetrated by the
Christian life-conception—The issue from this contradiction is in the acceptance of the
Christian life-conception—In it alone is every man free, and it alone frees him from all
human authority—This deliverance is brought about, not by a change of external
conditions, but only by a change in the conception of one's life—The Christian life-
conception demands the renunciation of violence, and, in delivering the man who accepts
it, it frees the world from all external authority—The issue from the present apparently
hopeless position consists in every man accepting the Christian life-conception and living
accordingly—But men consider this method too slow, and see their salvation in change of
the material conditions of life made with the aid of the authority of the State—This
method will have no issue, because men themselves cause the evil from which they suffer
—This is especially evident in regard to the submissive acceptance of military duty, for it
is more advantageous for a man to refuse than accept—Human freedom will be brought
about only through the liberation of each individual man, and already there are signs of
this liberation, which threatens to destroy State organization—The repudiation of the un-
Christian demands of governments undermines their authority and makes men free—
Therefore instances of such refusals are feared by governments more than conspiracies or
violence—Instances, in Russia, of refusals to take the oath of allegiance, to pay taxes, to
accept passports or positions in the police, to take part in courts of law, or to be drafted as
soldiers—Similar instances in other countries—Governments know not how to dispose of
men who refuse to obey their requirements because of the Christian doctrine—These men
destroy without a struggle the foundations of governments from the inside—To punish
them would mean for governments to deny Christianity themselves, and to contribute to
the diffusion of that consciousness from which such refusals spring—Hence the position
of governments is a desperate one, and men who preach the uselessness of personal
deliverance only arrest the destruction of the existing system of government founded on
violence.
The Christian nations of the present day are in a position no less cruel than
that of pagan times. In many respects, especially in the matter of
oppression, their position has grown worse.
A contrast like that of modern and ancient times may be seen in the
vegetation of the last days of autumn as compared with that of the early
days of spring. In the autumn the outward decay and death correspond to
the interior process, which is the suspension of life; in the spring the
Page 187
apparent lifelessness is in direct contradiction to the real vitality within, and
the approaching transition to new forms of life.
And thus it is as regards the apparent resemblance between pagan life and
that of the present day. It exists only in appearance. The inner lives of men
in the times of paganism were quite unlike those of the men of our days.
In the former the external aspect of cruelty and slavery corresponded with
the inner consciousness of men, a conformity which only increased as time
went on; in the latter the external condition of cruelty and slavery is in utter
contradiction to the Christian consciousness of men, a contradiction which
grows more and more striking every year.
The misery and suffering resulting therefrom seem so useless. It is like
prolonged suffering in child-labor. Everything is ready for the coming life,
and yet no life appears.
Apparently the situation is without deliverance. It would indeed be so were
it not that to men, and therefore to the world, there has been vouchsafed the
capacity for a loftier conception of life, which has the power to set free, and
at once, from all fetters, however firmly riveted.
And this is the Christian life-conception presented to men 1800 years ago.
A man has but to assimilate this life-conception and he will be set free, as a
matter of course, from the fetters that now restrain him, and feel free as a
bird who spreads his wings and flies over the wall that has kept him a
prisoner.
They talk of setting the Christian Church free from the State, of granting
freedom to or withholding it from Christians. Such thoughts and
expressions are strangely misleading. Liberty can neither be granted to nor
withheld from a Christian or Christians.
But if there is a question of granting or withholding liberty, then evidently it
is not the true Christians who are meant, but only men who call themselves
by that name. A Christian cannot help being free, because in the pursuit and
attainment of his object no one can either hinder or retard him.
A man has but to understand his life as Christianity teaches him to
understand it; that is, he must realize that it does not belong to himself, nor
to his family, nor to the State, but to Him who sent him into the world; he
the approaching transition to new forms of life.
And thus it is as regards the apparent resemblance between pagan life and
that of the present day. It exists only in appearance. The inner lives of men
in the times of paganism were quite unlike those of the men of our days.
In the former the external aspect of cruelty and slavery corresponded with
the inner consciousness of men, a conformity which only increased as time
went on; in the latter the external condition of cruelty and slavery is in utter
contradiction to the Christian consciousness of men, a contradiction which
grows more and more striking every year.
The misery and suffering resulting therefrom seem so useless. It is like
prolonged suffering in child-labor. Everything is ready for the coming life,
and yet no life appears.
Apparently the situation is without deliverance. It would indeed be so were
it not that to men, and therefore to the world, there has been vouchsafed the
capacity for a loftier conception of life, which has the power to set free, and
at once, from all fetters, however firmly riveted.
And this is the Christian life-conception presented to men 1800 years ago.
A man has but to assimilate this life-conception and he will be set free, as a
matter of course, from the fetters that now restrain him, and feel free as a
bird who spreads his wings and flies over the wall that has kept him a
prisoner.
They talk of setting the Christian Church free from the State, of granting
freedom to or withholding it from Christians. Such thoughts and
expressions are strangely misleading. Liberty can neither be granted to nor
withheld from a Christian or Christians.
But if there is a question of granting or withholding liberty, then evidently it
is not the true Christians who are meant, but only men who call themselves
by that name. A Christian cannot help being free, because in the pursuit and
attainment of his object no one can either hinder or retard him.
A man has but to understand his life as Christianity teaches him to
understand it; that is, he must realize that it does not belong to himself, nor
to his family, nor to the State, but to Him who sent him into the world; he
Page 188
must therefore know that it is his duty to live, not in accordance with the
law of his own personality, nor of that of his family or State, but to fulfil the
infinite law of Him who gave him life, in order to feel himself so entirely
free from all human authority that he will cease to regard it as a possible
obstacle.
A man needs but to realize that the object of his life is the fulfilment of
God's law; then the preëminence of that law, claiming as it does his entire
allegiance, will of necessity invalidate the authority and restrictions of all
human laws.
The Christian who contemplates that law of love implanted in every human
soul, and quickened by Christ, the only guide for all mankind, is set free
from human authority.
A Christian may suffer from external violence, may be deprived of his
personal freedom, may be a slave to his passions,—the man who commits
sin is the slave of the sin,—but he cannot be controlled or coerced by
threats into committing an act contrary to his consciousness. He cannot be
forced to this, because the privations and sufferings that are so powerful an
influence over men who hold the social life-conception have no influence
whatever over him. The privations and sufferings that destroy the material
welfare which is the object of the social life-conception produce no effect
upon the welfare of the Christian's life, which rests on the consciousness
that he is doing God's will—nay, they may even serve to promote that
welfare when they are visited upon him for fulfilling that will.
A Christian, therefore, who submits to the inner, the divine law, is not only
unable to execute the biddings of the outward law when they are at variance
with his consciousness of God's law of love, as in the case of the demands
made upon him by the government; but he cannot acknowledge the
obligation of obeying any individual whomsoever, cannot acknowledge
himself to be what is called a subject. For a Christian to promise to subject
himself to any government whatsoever—a subjection which may be
considered the foundation of State life—is a direct negation of Christianity;
since an individual who promises beforehand to obey implicitly every law
that men may enact, by that promise utters an emphatic denial of
Christianity, whose very essence is obedience in all contingencies to the law
which he feels to be within him—the law of love.
law of his own personality, nor of that of his family or State, but to fulfil the
infinite law of Him who gave him life, in order to feel himself so entirely
free from all human authority that he will cease to regard it as a possible
obstacle.
A man needs but to realize that the object of his life is the fulfilment of
God's law; then the preëminence of that law, claiming as it does his entire
allegiance, will of necessity invalidate the authority and restrictions of all
human laws.
The Christian who contemplates that law of love implanted in every human
soul, and quickened by Christ, the only guide for all mankind, is set free
from human authority.
A Christian may suffer from external violence, may be deprived of his
personal freedom, may be a slave to his passions,—the man who commits
sin is the slave of the sin,—but he cannot be controlled or coerced by
threats into committing an act contrary to his consciousness. He cannot be
forced to this, because the privations and sufferings that are so powerful an
influence over men who hold the social life-conception have no influence
whatever over him. The privations and sufferings that destroy the material
welfare which is the object of the social life-conception produce no effect
upon the welfare of the Christian's life, which rests on the consciousness
that he is doing God's will—nay, they may even serve to promote that
welfare when they are visited upon him for fulfilling that will.
A Christian, therefore, who submits to the inner, the divine law, is not only
unable to execute the biddings of the outward law when they are at variance
with his consciousness of God's law of love, as in the case of the demands
made upon him by the government; but he cannot acknowledge the
obligation of obeying any individual whomsoever, cannot acknowledge
himself to be what is called a subject. For a Christian to promise to subject
himself to any government whatsoever—a subjection which may be
considered the foundation of State life—is a direct negation of Christianity;
since an individual who promises beforehand to obey implicitly every law
that men may enact, by that promise utters an emphatic denial of
Christianity, whose very essence is obedience in all contingencies to the law
which he feels to be within him—the law of love.
Page 189
With the pagan life-conception it was possible to promise to obey the will
of temporal authorities without violating the laws of God, which were
supposed to consist in carrying out such customs as circumcision, the
observance of the Sabbath, the utterance of prayer at certain periods,
abstinence from certain kinds of food, etc. The one did not contradict the
other. But Christianity differs from paganism inasmuch as its requirements
are not of an external or negative character; on the contrary, they are such as
reverse man's former relations toward his fellow-men, and may call for acts
on his part which could not be anticipated, and consequently are not
defined. Hence it is that a Christian can neither promise to obey nor to
disobey the will of another, ignorant as he must be of the nature of its
requirements; not only must he refuse to obey human laws, but he cannot
promise to do or abstain from doing anything definite at any given time,
because he can never tell at what hour or in what manner the Christian law
of love, on which his life-conception is based, will demand his coöperation.
A Christian, promising in advance to obey unconditionally the laws of men,
admits by that promise that the inner law of God does not constitute for him
the sole law of his life.
When a Christian promises to obey the commands or laws of men, he is like
a craftsman who, having hired himself out to one master, promises at the
same time to execute the orders of other persons. No man can serve two
masters.
A Christian is freed from human authority by acknowledging the supremacy
of one authority alone, that of God, whose law, revealed to him through
Christ, he recognizes within himself, and obeys,—that and no other.
And this deliverance is accomplished neither by means of a struggle, nor by
the destruction of previous customs of life, but only through a change in his
life-conception. The deliverance proceeds, in the first place, from the
Christian's acknowledgment of the law of love, as revealed to him by his
Teacher, which suffices to determine the relations of men, and according to
which every act of violence seems superfluous and unlawful. Secondly,
because those privations and miseries, or the anticipations of such, which
influence a man who holds the social life-conception and reduces him to
obedience, seem to him no more than the inevitable consequences of
existence, which he would never dream of opposing by violence, but bears
patiently, as he would bear disease, hunger, or any other misery; which,
of temporal authorities without violating the laws of God, which were
supposed to consist in carrying out such customs as circumcision, the
observance of the Sabbath, the utterance of prayer at certain periods,
abstinence from certain kinds of food, etc. The one did not contradict the
other. But Christianity differs from paganism inasmuch as its requirements
are not of an external or negative character; on the contrary, they are such as
reverse man's former relations toward his fellow-men, and may call for acts
on his part which could not be anticipated, and consequently are not
defined. Hence it is that a Christian can neither promise to obey nor to
disobey the will of another, ignorant as he must be of the nature of its
requirements; not only must he refuse to obey human laws, but he cannot
promise to do or abstain from doing anything definite at any given time,
because he can never tell at what hour or in what manner the Christian law
of love, on which his life-conception is based, will demand his coöperation.
A Christian, promising in advance to obey unconditionally the laws of men,
admits by that promise that the inner law of God does not constitute for him
the sole law of his life.
When a Christian promises to obey the commands or laws of men, he is like
a craftsman who, having hired himself out to one master, promises at the
same time to execute the orders of other persons. No man can serve two
masters.
A Christian is freed from human authority by acknowledging the supremacy
of one authority alone, that of God, whose law, revealed to him through
Christ, he recognizes within himself, and obeys,—that and no other.
And this deliverance is accomplished neither by means of a struggle, nor by
the destruction of previous customs of life, but only through a change in his
life-conception. The deliverance proceeds, in the first place, from the
Christian's acknowledgment of the law of love, as revealed to him by his
Teacher, which suffices to determine the relations of men, and according to
which every act of violence seems superfluous and unlawful. Secondly,
because those privations and miseries, or the anticipations of such, which
influence a man who holds the social life-conception and reduces him to
obedience, seem to him no more than the inevitable consequences of
existence, which he would never dream of opposing by violence, but bears
patiently, as he would bear disease, hunger, or any other misery; which,
Page 190
indeed, have no possible influence over his actions. The Christian's only
guide must be the divine indwelling element, subject neither to restriction
nor to control.
A Christian lives in accordance with the words spoken by the Master: "He
shall not strive, nor cry; neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets.
A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, till
he send forth judgment unto victory."[15]
A Christian enters into no dispute with his neighbor, he neither attacks nor
uses violence; on the contrary, he suffers violence himself without
resistance, and by his very attitude toward evil not only sets himself free,
but helps to free the world at large from all outward authority.
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."[16] If there
were any doubt of the truth of Christianity there could be no more
indubitable proof of its authenticity than the complete freedom, recognizing
no fetters, which a man feels as soon as he assimilates the Christian life-
conception.
Human beings in their present condition may be likened to bees in the act of
swarming, as we see them clinging in a mass to a single bough. Their
position is a temporary one, and must inevitably be changed. They must rise
and find themselves a new abode. Every bee knows this, and is eager to
shift its own position, as well as that of the others, but not one of them will
do so until the whole swarm rises. The swarm cannot rise, because one bee
clings to the other and prevents it from separating itself from the swarm,
and so they all continue to hang. It might seem as if there were no
deliverance from this position, precisely as it seems to men of the world
who have become entangled in the social net. Indeed, there would be no
outlet for the bees if each one were not a living creature possessed of a pair
of wings. Neither would there be any issue for men if each one were not a
living individual, being gifted with a capacity for assimilating the Christian
life-conception.
If among these bees who are able to fly not one could be found willing to
start, the swarm would never change its position. And it is the same among
men. If the man who has assimilated the Christian life-conception waits for
others before he proceeds to live in accordance with it, mankind will never
change its attitude. And as all that is needed to change a solid mass of bees
guide must be the divine indwelling element, subject neither to restriction
nor to control.
A Christian lives in accordance with the words spoken by the Master: "He
shall not strive, nor cry; neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets.
A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, till
he send forth judgment unto victory."[15]
A Christian enters into no dispute with his neighbor, he neither attacks nor
uses violence; on the contrary, he suffers violence himself without
resistance, and by his very attitude toward evil not only sets himself free,
but helps to free the world at large from all outward authority.
"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."[16] If there
were any doubt of the truth of Christianity there could be no more
indubitable proof of its authenticity than the complete freedom, recognizing
no fetters, which a man feels as soon as he assimilates the Christian life-
conception.
Human beings in their present condition may be likened to bees in the act of
swarming, as we see them clinging in a mass to a single bough. Their
position is a temporary one, and must inevitably be changed. They must rise
and find themselves a new abode. Every bee knows this, and is eager to
shift its own position, as well as that of the others, but not one of them will
do so until the whole swarm rises. The swarm cannot rise, because one bee
clings to the other and prevents it from separating itself from the swarm,
and so they all continue to hang. It might seem as if there were no
deliverance from this position, precisely as it seems to men of the world
who have become entangled in the social net. Indeed, there would be no
outlet for the bees if each one were not a living creature possessed of a pair
of wings. Neither would there be any issue for men if each one were not a
living individual, being gifted with a capacity for assimilating the Christian
life-conception.
If among these bees who are able to fly not one could be found willing to
start, the swarm would never change its position. And it is the same among
men. If the man who has assimilated the Christian life-conception waits for
others before he proceeds to live in accordance with it, mankind will never
change its attitude. And as all that is needed to change a solid mass of bees
Page 191
into a flying swarm is for one bee to spread its wings and fly away, when
the second, the third, the tenth, and the hundredth will follow suit; so all
that is needed to break through the magic circle of social life, deliverance
from which seems so hopeless, is, that one man should view life from a
Christian standpoint and begin to frame his own life accordingly,
whereupon others will follow in his footsteps.
But men think that the deliverance of mankind by this method is too slow a
process, and that a simultaneous deliverance might be effected by some
other method. Just as if bees, when the swarm was ready to rise, were to
decide that it would be too long a process if they waited for each bee to
spread its wings and rise separately, and that some means must be devised
whereby the swarm may rise all at once, whenever it pleases. But that is
impossible. Not until the first, second, third, and hundredth bee has
unfolded its wings and flown away can the swarm take flight and find for
itself a new home. Not until each individual man adopts the Christian life-
conception, and begins to live in conformity with its precepts, will the
contradictions of human life be solved, and new forms of life become
established.
One of the most striking events of our time is the propaganda of slavery
which is spread among the masses, not only by the government, to whom it
is of use, but by those exponents of socialistic theories who consider
themselves the champions of freedom.
These men preach that the amelioration in the conditions of life, the
reconciliation between actuality and consciousness, will not be brought
about by the personal efforts of individual men, but that it will evolve itself
out of a certain forced reorganization of society by some unknown
influence. Their theory is that men should not proceed of their own accord
to the place where they wish to go, but that they should have a platform
built under their feet, upon which they may be carried to the spot they
desire to reach. Hence they must not move as far as their strength will
permit, but all their efforts must be directed toward building this imaginary
platform without stirring from their position.
There is a theory in economics preached in these days of which the essential
principle is this: the worse the condition of affairs, the better the prospect;
the greater the accumulation of capital and oppression of the working-man
the second, the third, the tenth, and the hundredth will follow suit; so all
that is needed to break through the magic circle of social life, deliverance
from which seems so hopeless, is, that one man should view life from a
Christian standpoint and begin to frame his own life accordingly,
whereupon others will follow in his footsteps.
But men think that the deliverance of mankind by this method is too slow a
process, and that a simultaneous deliverance might be effected by some
other method. Just as if bees, when the swarm was ready to rise, were to
decide that it would be too long a process if they waited for each bee to
spread its wings and rise separately, and that some means must be devised
whereby the swarm may rise all at once, whenever it pleases. But that is
impossible. Not until the first, second, third, and hundredth bee has
unfolded its wings and flown away can the swarm take flight and find for
itself a new home. Not until each individual man adopts the Christian life-
conception, and begins to live in conformity with its precepts, will the
contradictions of human life be solved, and new forms of life become
established.
One of the most striking events of our time is the propaganda of slavery
which is spread among the masses, not only by the government, to whom it
is of use, but by those exponents of socialistic theories who consider
themselves the champions of freedom.
These men preach that the amelioration in the conditions of life, the
reconciliation between actuality and consciousness, will not be brought
about by the personal efforts of individual men, but that it will evolve itself
out of a certain forced reorganization of society by some unknown
influence. Their theory is that men should not proceed of their own accord
to the place where they wish to go, but that they should have a platform
built under their feet, upon which they may be carried to the spot they
desire to reach. Hence they must not move as far as their strength will
permit, but all their efforts must be directed toward building this imaginary
platform without stirring from their position.
There is a theory in economics preached in these days of which the essential
principle is this: the worse the condition of affairs, the better the prospect;
the greater the accumulation of capital and oppression of the working-man
Page 192
resulting therefrom, the nearer the day of deliverance; and therefore any
effort on the part of the individual to free himself from the oppression of
capital is useless. In regard to the government it is declared that the greater
its authority, which, according to this theory, should include the domain of
private life, hitherto uninvaded, the better it will be, and hence one should
solicit the interference of governments with private life. In regard to
international politics, it is declared that the increase of armies and modes of
extermination will lead to the necessity of a general disarmament through
the agency of congresses, arbitration, etc. And the most surprising part of all
is that human lethargy is so profound that men credit these theories,
although the whole structure of life, and every stage in human progress,
demonstrate their fallacy.
Men suffer from oppression, and by way of deliverance certain expedients
are suggested for the improvement of their condition, these means of relief
to be administered by authority, to which they continue to submit. This will
naturally tend to augment authority and to increase the consequent
oppression of government.
Of all the errors of humanity there is none that so retards its progress as
this. Men will do anything in the world to achieve their purpose save the
one simple deed, which it is every man's duty to perform. Men will invent
the most ingenious devices for changing the position which is burdensome
to them, but never dream of the simple remedy of abstaining from the acts
which cause it.
I was told of an incident which happened to an intrepid stanovoy, who, on
arriving in a village where the peasants had revolted, and whither troops
had been sent, undertook, like the Emperor Nicholas I., to quell the
disturbance by his personal influence. He ordered several loads of rods to
be brought, and having gathered all the peasants into the barn, he entered
himself, shut himself in with them, and so terrified them by his shouts and
threats that in compliance with his commands they began to flog each other.
And so they went on flogging one another until some fool revolted, and,
shouting to his comrades, bade them leave off. It was not until then that the
flogging ceased, and the stanovoy escaped from the barn.
It is this very advice of the fool that men who believe in the necessity of
civil government seem unable to follow. They are unable to stop punishing
effort on the part of the individual to free himself from the oppression of
capital is useless. In regard to the government it is declared that the greater
its authority, which, according to this theory, should include the domain of
private life, hitherto uninvaded, the better it will be, and hence one should
solicit the interference of governments with private life. In regard to
international politics, it is declared that the increase of armies and modes of
extermination will lead to the necessity of a general disarmament through
the agency of congresses, arbitration, etc. And the most surprising part of all
is that human lethargy is so profound that men credit these theories,
although the whole structure of life, and every stage in human progress,
demonstrate their fallacy.
Men suffer from oppression, and by way of deliverance certain expedients
are suggested for the improvement of their condition, these means of relief
to be administered by authority, to which they continue to submit. This will
naturally tend to augment authority and to increase the consequent
oppression of government.
Of all the errors of humanity there is none that so retards its progress as
this. Men will do anything in the world to achieve their purpose save the
one simple deed, which it is every man's duty to perform. Men will invent
the most ingenious devices for changing the position which is burdensome
to them, but never dream of the simple remedy of abstaining from the acts
which cause it.
I was told of an incident which happened to an intrepid stanovoy, who, on
arriving in a village where the peasants had revolted, and whither troops
had been sent, undertook, like the Emperor Nicholas I., to quell the
disturbance by his personal influence. He ordered several loads of rods to
be brought, and having gathered all the peasants into the barn, he entered
himself, shut himself in with them, and so terrified them by his shouts and
threats that in compliance with his commands they began to flog each other.
And so they went on flogging one another until some fool revolted, and,
shouting to his comrades, bade them leave off. It was not until then that the
flogging ceased, and the stanovoy escaped from the barn.
It is this very advice of the fool that men who believe in the necessity of
civil government seem unable to follow. They are unable to stop punishing
Page 193
themselves, and setting an absurd example for others to imitate. Such is the
consummation of merely human wisdom.
Is it possible, indeed, to imagine a more striking imitation of those men
flogging one another than the meekness with which the men of these days
fulfil those social duties that lead them into bondage, especially the military
conscription? It is clear that men enslave themselves; they suffer from this
slavery, and yet they believe it inevitable; they also believe that it will not
affect the ultimate emancipation of mankind, which they declare the final
outcome, in spite of the fact that slavery is ever increasing.
The man of modern times, whoever he may be (I do not mean a true
Christian), educated or ignorant, a believer or an unbeliever, rich or poor,
married or single, does his work, takes his pleasures, and dreads all
restrictions and privations, all enmity and suffering. Thus he is living,
peaceably. Suddenly men come to him and say: "First, promise on your oath
that you will obey us like a slave in all that we command; believe that
whatever we tell you is unquestionably true, and submit to all that we shall
call laws. Or, secondly, give us a share in the product of your labor, that we
may use it to keep you in bondage, and prevent you from revolting against
our commands. Or, thirdly, choose, or be chosen among, the so-called
officials of the government, knowing that the government will go on quite
regardless of the foolish speeches which you, or others like you, may utter;
that it will be carried on in accordance with our wishes and the wishes of
those who control the army. Or, fourthly, come to the law-courts, and take
part in all the senseless cruelties which we commit against men, who are
erring and depraved men, and who have become so through our fault,—in
the form of imprisonment, exile, solitary confinement, and execution. Or,
lastly, although you may be on the most friendly terms with men who
belong to other nations, you must be ready at a moment's notice, whenever
the command is issued, to look upon such of them as we shall indicate as
your enemies, and either personally or by substitute contribute to the ruin,
robbery, and murder of these men, of old men, women, and children—even,
if we require it, of your fellow-countrymen and your parents."
One would think that in these days there could be but one reply from any
man in his senses.
consummation of merely human wisdom.
Is it possible, indeed, to imagine a more striking imitation of those men
flogging one another than the meekness with which the men of these days
fulfil those social duties that lead them into bondage, especially the military
conscription? It is clear that men enslave themselves; they suffer from this
slavery, and yet they believe it inevitable; they also believe that it will not
affect the ultimate emancipation of mankind, which they declare the final
outcome, in spite of the fact that slavery is ever increasing.
The man of modern times, whoever he may be (I do not mean a true
Christian), educated or ignorant, a believer or an unbeliever, rich or poor,
married or single, does his work, takes his pleasures, and dreads all
restrictions and privations, all enmity and suffering. Thus he is living,
peaceably. Suddenly men come to him and say: "First, promise on your oath
that you will obey us like a slave in all that we command; believe that
whatever we tell you is unquestionably true, and submit to all that we shall
call laws. Or, secondly, give us a share in the product of your labor, that we
may use it to keep you in bondage, and prevent you from revolting against
our commands. Or, thirdly, choose, or be chosen among, the so-called
officials of the government, knowing that the government will go on quite
regardless of the foolish speeches which you, or others like you, may utter;
that it will be carried on in accordance with our wishes and the wishes of
those who control the army. Or, fourthly, come to the law-courts, and take
part in all the senseless cruelties which we commit against men, who are
erring and depraved men, and who have become so through our fault,—in
the form of imprisonment, exile, solitary confinement, and execution. Or,
lastly, although you may be on the most friendly terms with men who
belong to other nations, you must be ready at a moment's notice, whenever
the command is issued, to look upon such of them as we shall indicate as
your enemies, and either personally or by substitute contribute to the ruin,
robbery, and murder of these men, of old men, women, and children—even,
if we require it, of your fellow-countrymen and your parents."
One would think that in these days there could be but one reply from any
man in his senses.
Page 194
"Why must I do all this? Why must I promise to obey all the orders of
Salisbury to-day, those of Gladstone to-morrow; Boulanger to-day, and to-
morrow the orders of an assembly composed of men like Boulanger; Peter
III. to-day, Catharine to-morrow, and the next day Pugatchov; to-day the
insane King of Bavaria, to-morrow the Emperor William? Why should I
promise this to men whom I know to be wicked or foolish, or men whom I
know nothing at all about? Why should I, in the form of taxes, hand over to
them the fruits of my labor, knowing that this money will be used to bribe
officials, to support prisons, churches, and armies, to pay for the execution
of evil acts destined for my oppression? In other words, why should I apply
the rod to my own back? Why should I go on wasting my time, averting my
eyes, helping to give a semblance of legality to the acts of wrong-doers,
play a part in elections, and pretend to participate in the government, when I
know perfectly well that the country is ruled by those who control the
army? Why should I go into the courts and be a party to the infliction of
tortures and executions upon my erring fellow-beings, knowing, if I am a
Christian, that the law of love has been substituted for the law of
vengeance, and if I am an educated man, that punishment, so far from
reforming its victims, serves only to demoralize them? Why should I, in
person or in substitute, go and kill and despoil, and expose myself to the
dangers of war, simply because the key of the temple of Jerusalem happens
to be in the keeping of one bishop rather than in that of another; because
Bulgaria is to be ruled by one German prince instead of another; or because
the privileges of the seal fishery are reserved for the English to the
exclusion of the American merchants. Why should I regard as my enemies
the inhabitants of a neighboring country, with whom up to the present day I
have lived, and still wish to live, in peace and amity,—why should I go
myself, or pay for soldiers, to murder and ruin them?
"And, above all, why should I contribute, whether in person or by paying
for military service, to the enslavement and destruction of my brothers and
parents? Why should I scourge myself? All this is of no use to me; on the
contrary, it does me harm. It is altogether degrading, immoral, mean, and
contemptible. Why, then, should I do all this? If I am told that I shall be
made to suffer in any event, I reply that in the first place, there can be no
possible suffering greater than that which would befall me were I to execute
your commands. And in the second place, it is perfectly evident to me that
if we refuse to scourge ourselves, no one else will do it for us. Governments
Salisbury to-day, those of Gladstone to-morrow; Boulanger to-day, and to-
morrow the orders of an assembly composed of men like Boulanger; Peter
III. to-day, Catharine to-morrow, and the next day Pugatchov; to-day the
insane King of Bavaria, to-morrow the Emperor William? Why should I
promise this to men whom I know to be wicked or foolish, or men whom I
know nothing at all about? Why should I, in the form of taxes, hand over to
them the fruits of my labor, knowing that this money will be used to bribe
officials, to support prisons, churches, and armies, to pay for the execution
of evil acts destined for my oppression? In other words, why should I apply
the rod to my own back? Why should I go on wasting my time, averting my
eyes, helping to give a semblance of legality to the acts of wrong-doers,
play a part in elections, and pretend to participate in the government, when I
know perfectly well that the country is ruled by those who control the
army? Why should I go into the courts and be a party to the infliction of
tortures and executions upon my erring fellow-beings, knowing, if I am a
Christian, that the law of love has been substituted for the law of
vengeance, and if I am an educated man, that punishment, so far from
reforming its victims, serves only to demoralize them? Why should I, in
person or in substitute, go and kill and despoil, and expose myself to the
dangers of war, simply because the key of the temple of Jerusalem happens
to be in the keeping of one bishop rather than in that of another; because
Bulgaria is to be ruled by one German prince instead of another; or because
the privileges of the seal fishery are reserved for the English to the
exclusion of the American merchants. Why should I regard as my enemies
the inhabitants of a neighboring country, with whom up to the present day I
have lived, and still wish to live, in peace and amity,—why should I go
myself, or pay for soldiers, to murder and ruin them?
"And, above all, why should I contribute, whether in person or by paying
for military service, to the enslavement and destruction of my brothers and
parents? Why should I scourge myself? All this is of no use to me; on the
contrary, it does me harm. It is altogether degrading, immoral, mean, and
contemptible. Why, then, should I do all this? If I am told that I shall be
made to suffer in any event, I reply that in the first place, there can be no
possible suffering greater than that which would befall me were I to execute
your commands. And in the second place, it is perfectly evident to me that
if we refuse to scourge ourselves, no one else will do it for us. Governments
Page 195
are but sovereigns, statesmen, officials, who can no more force me against
my will, than the stanovoy could force the peasants; I should be brought
before the court, or thrown into prison, or executed, not by the sovereign, or
the high officials, but by men in the same position as myself; and as it
would be equally injurious and disagreeable for them to be scourged as for
me, I should probably open their eyes, and they would not only refrain from
injuring me, but would doubtless follow my example. And in the third
place, though I were made to suffer for this, it would still be better for me to
be exiled or imprisoned, doing battle in the cause of common sense and
truth, which must eventually triumph, if not to-day, then to-morrow, or
before many days, than to suffer in the cause of folly and evil. It would
rather be to my advantage to risk being exiled, imprisoned, or even
executed, than remain, through my own fault, a life-long slave of evil men,
to be ruined by an invading enemy, or mutilated like an idiot, or killed
while defending a cannon, a useless territory, or a senseless piece of cloth
called a flag. I have no inclination to scourge myself, it would be of no use.
You may do it yourselves if you choose—I refuse."
It would seem as though not only the religious and moral element in human
nature, but ordinary common sense and wise counsel, would influence
every man of the present day thus to make reply, and to suit the action to the
word. But no. Men who hold the social life-conception consider such a
course not only useless, but even prejudicial to the object in view,—the
deliverance of mankind from slavery. They advise us to go on, like the
peasants, punishing one another, comforting ourselves with the reflection
that our chatter in parliaments and assemblies, our trade unions, our First of
May demonstrations, our conspiracies and covert threats to the governments
that scourge us, must result in our final deliverance, even though we go on
strengthening our fetters. Nothing so hampers human liberty as this
wonderful delusion. Instead of making individual efforts to achieve
freedom, every man for himself devoting all his energies to that object,
through the attainment of a new life-conception, men are looking for a
universal scheme of deliverance, and are in the meanwhile sinking deeper
and deeper into slavery. It is as if a man were to declare that in order to
obtain heat one must merely place every lump of coal in a certain position,
never minding whether it kindled or not. And yet that the liberation of
mankind can only be accomplished by means of the deliverance of the
individual grows more and more evident.
my will, than the stanovoy could force the peasants; I should be brought
before the court, or thrown into prison, or executed, not by the sovereign, or
the high officials, but by men in the same position as myself; and as it
would be equally injurious and disagreeable for them to be scourged as for
me, I should probably open their eyes, and they would not only refrain from
injuring me, but would doubtless follow my example. And in the third
place, though I were made to suffer for this, it would still be better for me to
be exiled or imprisoned, doing battle in the cause of common sense and
truth, which must eventually triumph, if not to-day, then to-morrow, or
before many days, than to suffer in the cause of folly and evil. It would
rather be to my advantage to risk being exiled, imprisoned, or even
executed, than remain, through my own fault, a life-long slave of evil men,
to be ruined by an invading enemy, or mutilated like an idiot, or killed
while defending a cannon, a useless territory, or a senseless piece of cloth
called a flag. I have no inclination to scourge myself, it would be of no use.
You may do it yourselves if you choose—I refuse."
It would seem as though not only the religious and moral element in human
nature, but ordinary common sense and wise counsel, would influence
every man of the present day thus to make reply, and to suit the action to the
word. But no. Men who hold the social life-conception consider such a
course not only useless, but even prejudicial to the object in view,—the
deliverance of mankind from slavery. They advise us to go on, like the
peasants, punishing one another, comforting ourselves with the reflection
that our chatter in parliaments and assemblies, our trade unions, our First of
May demonstrations, our conspiracies and covert threats to the governments
that scourge us, must result in our final deliverance, even though we go on
strengthening our fetters. Nothing so hampers human liberty as this
wonderful delusion. Instead of making individual efforts to achieve
freedom, every man for himself devoting all his energies to that object,
through the attainment of a new life-conception, men are looking for a
universal scheme of deliverance, and are in the meanwhile sinking deeper
and deeper into slavery. It is as if a man were to declare that in order to
obtain heat one must merely place every lump of coal in a certain position,
never minding whether it kindled or not. And yet that the liberation of
mankind can only be accomplished by means of the deliverance of the
individual grows more and more evident.
Page 196
The liberation of individuals from the dominion of the State, in the name of
the Christian life-conception, which was formerly an exceptional
occurrence and one that attracted but little attention, has attained in these
days a menacing significance for the authority of State.
If in the days of ancient Rome it happened that a Christian, professing his
faith, refused to take a part in sacrifices, or in the worship of the emperors
or the gods, or in the Middle Ages refused to worship ikons or to
acknowledge the temporal authority of the Pope, such refusals were the
exception; a man might be obliged to confess to his faith, but he might
perhaps live all his life without being forced to do so. But now all men,
without exception, are subjected to trial of faith. Every man of modern
times is obliged, either to participate in the cruelties of pagan life, or to
repudiate them. And secondly, in those days any refusal to bow before the
gods, the ikons, or the Pope was of no consequence to the State. Whether
those who bowed before the gods, the ikons, or the Pope were many or few,
the State lost none of its power. Whereas at the present time every refusal to
execute the un-Christian demands of the government undermines the
authority of the State, because the authority of the State rests on the
fulfilment of these anti-Christian requirements.
Temporal authority, in order to maintain itself, has been forced by the
conditions of life to demand from its subjects certain actions which it is
impossible for men who profess true Christianity to perform. Therefore at
the present time every man who professes it helps to undermine the
authority of the government, and will eventually pave the way for the
liberation of mankind.
Of what apparent importance are such acts as the refusal of a score or two
of fools, as they are called,—men who decline to take the oath of
allegiance, to pay taxes, or to take part in courts of law, or to serve in the
army? Such men are tried and condemned, and life remains unchanged.
These occurrences may seem unimportant, and yet these are precisely the
factors that undermine the authority of the government more than any
others, and thus prepare the way for the liberation of mankind. These are
the bees who are the first to separate themselves from the swarm, and, still
hovering near, they wait for the whole swarm to rise and follow them. The
governments are aware of this, and look upon such occurrences with more
the Christian life-conception, which was formerly an exceptional
occurrence and one that attracted but little attention, has attained in these
days a menacing significance for the authority of State.
If in the days of ancient Rome it happened that a Christian, professing his
faith, refused to take a part in sacrifices, or in the worship of the emperors
or the gods, or in the Middle Ages refused to worship ikons or to
acknowledge the temporal authority of the Pope, such refusals were the
exception; a man might be obliged to confess to his faith, but he might
perhaps live all his life without being forced to do so. But now all men,
without exception, are subjected to trial of faith. Every man of modern
times is obliged, either to participate in the cruelties of pagan life, or to
repudiate them. And secondly, in those days any refusal to bow before the
gods, the ikons, or the Pope was of no consequence to the State. Whether
those who bowed before the gods, the ikons, or the Pope were many or few,
the State lost none of its power. Whereas at the present time every refusal to
execute the un-Christian demands of the government undermines the
authority of the State, because the authority of the State rests on the
fulfilment of these anti-Christian requirements.
Temporal authority, in order to maintain itself, has been forced by the
conditions of life to demand from its subjects certain actions which it is
impossible for men who profess true Christianity to perform. Therefore at
the present time every man who professes it helps to undermine the
authority of the government, and will eventually pave the way for the
liberation of mankind.
Of what apparent importance are such acts as the refusal of a score or two
of fools, as they are called,—men who decline to take the oath of
allegiance, to pay taxes, or to take part in courts of law, or to serve in the
army? Such men are tried and condemned, and life remains unchanged.
These occurrences may seem unimportant, and yet these are precisely the
factors that undermine the authority of the government more than any
others, and thus prepare the way for the liberation of mankind. These are
the bees who are the first to separate themselves from the swarm, and, still
hovering near, they wait for the whole swarm to rise and follow them. The
governments are aware of this, and look upon such occurrences with more
Page 197
apprehension than upon all the socialists, anarchists, and communists, with
their conspiracies and their dynamite bombs.
A new régime is inaugurated. Each subject, according to custom, is required
to take the oath of allegiance to the new government. A proclamation is
issued, and all are bidden to assemble in the cathedral to take the oath.
Suddenly one man in Perm, another in Tula, a third in Moscow, a fourth in
Kaluga, refuse to take the oath and (without preconcerted action) justify
their refusal by the same argument,—that the Christian law forbids the oath;
but, even were the oath not forbidden, they could not, according to the spirit
of this law, promise to perform such evil deeds as the oath requires,—such
as reporting those antagonistic to the interests of the government, defending
that government by armed force, or attacking its enemies. They are
summoned to appear before the Stanovoys, spravniks, priests, governors;
they are reasoned with, coaxed, threatened, and punished; yet they adhere to
their determination, and refuse to take the oath. They are asked, "Is it true
that you never took the oath?"
"It is."
"And what was done to you?"
"Nothing."
Every subject is required to pay his taxes, and the taxes are paid. But one
man in Charkov, another in Iver, and a third in Samara, refuse to comply,
and, as by one accord, each man alleges the same reason. One of them says
that he will pay after he has learned the object for which his money is to be
used. "If it is to be used for charity, he will give of his own free will, and
even more than is demanded of him. But if it is to be applied to evil
purposes, he will give nothing of his own free will, because, according to
the law of Christ, which he obeys, he can take no part in doing evil." And
the others who refuse to pay taxes, except on compulsion, express the same
idea, perhaps in other words. Those who have property are forced to pay,
and those who have none are simply let alone.
"Then you have not paid your tax?"
"No."
"And what was done to you?"
their conspiracies and their dynamite bombs.
A new régime is inaugurated. Each subject, according to custom, is required
to take the oath of allegiance to the new government. A proclamation is
issued, and all are bidden to assemble in the cathedral to take the oath.
Suddenly one man in Perm, another in Tula, a third in Moscow, a fourth in
Kaluga, refuse to take the oath and (without preconcerted action) justify
their refusal by the same argument,—that the Christian law forbids the oath;
but, even were the oath not forbidden, they could not, according to the spirit
of this law, promise to perform such evil deeds as the oath requires,—such
as reporting those antagonistic to the interests of the government, defending
that government by armed force, or attacking its enemies. They are
summoned to appear before the Stanovoys, spravniks, priests, governors;
they are reasoned with, coaxed, threatened, and punished; yet they adhere to
their determination, and refuse to take the oath. They are asked, "Is it true
that you never took the oath?"
"It is."
"And what was done to you?"
"Nothing."
Every subject is required to pay his taxes, and the taxes are paid. But one
man in Charkov, another in Iver, and a third in Samara, refuse to comply,
and, as by one accord, each man alleges the same reason. One of them says
that he will pay after he has learned the object for which his money is to be
used. "If it is to be used for charity, he will give of his own free will, and
even more than is demanded of him. But if it is to be applied to evil
purposes, he will give nothing of his own free will, because, according to
the law of Christ, which he obeys, he can take no part in doing evil." And
the others who refuse to pay taxes, except on compulsion, express the same
idea, perhaps in other words. Those who have property are forced to pay,
and those who have none are simply let alone.
"Then you have not paid your tax?"
"No."
"And what was done to you?"
Page 198
"Nothing."
The passport system is instituted. Every man who leaves his home must
apply for one, and pay a tax for it. Suddenly, in different places, are to be
found those who declare that passports should not be used, that a man
should not acknowledge his dependence upon the State, which is supported
by violence; and these men take no passports, consequently they pay no tax
for them. And again, there are no means of coercing them to comply with
the demand. They are imprisoned, but when after a time they find
themselves at liberty again, they go on living without passports.
Every peasant is expected to perform police duty as sotsky or dessiatsky,[17]
etc.; but some peasant in Charkov refuses to fulfil this duty, because, as he
says in explanation of his refusal, the law of Christ, which he professes,
forbids him to arrest, imprison, or transport his fellow-men. Another
peasant in Iver or in Tambov makes the same statement. The peasants are
threatened, beaten, and imprisoned, but they adhere to their resolution, and
refuse to perform actions contrary to their religious belief. And they cease
to be elected sotsky, and are gradually left in peace.
It is the duty of every citizen to serve on the jury. All at once men of widely
different classes,—carriage-makers, professors, merchants, peasants,
nobles,—as if moved by a single impulse, refuse to fulfil this duty, not for
reasons valid in the eyes of the law, but because the tribunal itself is, in their
opinion, illegal and un-Christian, and ought not to exist. These men are
fined, and false reasons are ascribed for their refusal, the true ones
meanwhile remaining hidden from the public. The same treatment is
employed in regard to those who, for similar reasons, refuse to appear as
witnesses in courts of law. These, too, are finally left undisturbed.
Every man at the age of twenty-one must draw lots. Suddenly there is found
a man in Moscow, another in Iver, another in Charkov, and still another in
Kiev, who, as it were by agreement, go to the department and declare that
they will neither take the oath of allegiance nor serve in the army, because
they are Christians. Here are the details of an affair which was among the
earlier cases,—of late these refusals have begun to multiply,—a case with
which I am myself familiar,[18] which is but one example among many.
In the City Hall of Moscow a young man of average education gives his
reasons for refusing to comply. His words are not heeded, and he is bidden
The passport system is instituted. Every man who leaves his home must
apply for one, and pay a tax for it. Suddenly, in different places, are to be
found those who declare that passports should not be used, that a man
should not acknowledge his dependence upon the State, which is supported
by violence; and these men take no passports, consequently they pay no tax
for them. And again, there are no means of coercing them to comply with
the demand. They are imprisoned, but when after a time they find
themselves at liberty again, they go on living without passports.
Every peasant is expected to perform police duty as sotsky or dessiatsky,[17]
etc.; but some peasant in Charkov refuses to fulfil this duty, because, as he
says in explanation of his refusal, the law of Christ, which he professes,
forbids him to arrest, imprison, or transport his fellow-men. Another
peasant in Iver or in Tambov makes the same statement. The peasants are
threatened, beaten, and imprisoned, but they adhere to their resolution, and
refuse to perform actions contrary to their religious belief. And they cease
to be elected sotsky, and are gradually left in peace.
It is the duty of every citizen to serve on the jury. All at once men of widely
different classes,—carriage-makers, professors, merchants, peasants,
nobles,—as if moved by a single impulse, refuse to fulfil this duty, not for
reasons valid in the eyes of the law, but because the tribunal itself is, in their
opinion, illegal and un-Christian, and ought not to exist. These men are
fined, and false reasons are ascribed for their refusal, the true ones
meanwhile remaining hidden from the public. The same treatment is
employed in regard to those who, for similar reasons, refuse to appear as
witnesses in courts of law. These, too, are finally left undisturbed.
Every man at the age of twenty-one must draw lots. Suddenly there is found
a man in Moscow, another in Iver, another in Charkov, and still another in
Kiev, who, as it were by agreement, go to the department and declare that
they will neither take the oath of allegiance nor serve in the army, because
they are Christians. Here are the details of an affair which was among the
earlier cases,—of late these refusals have begun to multiply,—a case with
which I am myself familiar,[18] which is but one example among many.
In the City Hall of Moscow a young man of average education gives his
reasons for refusing to comply. His words are not heeded, and he is bidden
Page 199
to repeat the words of the oath with the other men. He still persists in his
refusal, and quotes a certain passage in the Bible that forbids men to take an
oath. No attention is paid to his arguments, and again he is ordered to take
the oath, which he declines to do. Whereupon it is taken for granted that he
is a sectarian, and therefore misunderstands Christianity; in other words,
that he differs from the priests paid by the State. He is then sent under guard
to the priests that they may convince him, which they endeavor to do; but
the arguments uttered in the name of Christ, by which they strive to
persuade him to deny Christ, evidently have no effect on the young man. So
they declare him incorrigible, and send him back to the army. Still he
openly refuses to take the oath and to fulfil his military duties.
It is a case not anticipated by the law. A refusal to comply with the demands
of the government cannot be overlooked, neither can this case be called one
of ordinary insubordination. After conferring, the military authorities decide
that, in order to rid themselves of this objectionable youth, the better way
will be to consider him as a rebel and forward him under military escort to
the Department of the Secret Police. The police officials and the gendarmes
question the young man, but his replies will not serve to classify his offense
under the heading of any crime that comes within their jurisdiction; they
cannot either accuse him of revolutionary motives, or of conspiracy,
because he declares that he has no desire to destroy anything whatsoever;
on the contrary, he opposes all violence. He says that he has nothing to
conceal; he desires only an opportunity for saying and doing all things in
the most open manner. And as it resulted with the clergy, so also with the
gendarmes, who, though rarely embarrassed as to how to put the law in
operation, can find no pretext for an accusation against the young man, and
send him back to the ranks. Once more there is a conference, and his
superiors decide that, although he has not taken the oath of allegiance, he is
to be regarded as a soldier. He is put into uniform, his name is entered on
the lists, and he is sent under convoy to his post. Here his immediate
superiors once more order him to perform his military duty, and still he
refuses to obey, and in the presence of the other soldiers he states his
reasons, saying that, as a Christian, he cannot of his own free will prepare
himself to commit murder, which was forbidden even by the law of Moses.
All this takes place in a provincial city. The occurrence excites the interest
and the sympathy, not only of outsiders, but even of the officers, and
refusal, and quotes a certain passage in the Bible that forbids men to take an
oath. No attention is paid to his arguments, and again he is ordered to take
the oath, which he declines to do. Whereupon it is taken for granted that he
is a sectarian, and therefore misunderstands Christianity; in other words,
that he differs from the priests paid by the State. He is then sent under guard
to the priests that they may convince him, which they endeavor to do; but
the arguments uttered in the name of Christ, by which they strive to
persuade him to deny Christ, evidently have no effect on the young man. So
they declare him incorrigible, and send him back to the army. Still he
openly refuses to take the oath and to fulfil his military duties.
It is a case not anticipated by the law. A refusal to comply with the demands
of the government cannot be overlooked, neither can this case be called one
of ordinary insubordination. After conferring, the military authorities decide
that, in order to rid themselves of this objectionable youth, the better way
will be to consider him as a rebel and forward him under military escort to
the Department of the Secret Police. The police officials and the gendarmes
question the young man, but his replies will not serve to classify his offense
under the heading of any crime that comes within their jurisdiction; they
cannot either accuse him of revolutionary motives, or of conspiracy,
because he declares that he has no desire to destroy anything whatsoever;
on the contrary, he opposes all violence. He says that he has nothing to
conceal; he desires only an opportunity for saying and doing all things in
the most open manner. And as it resulted with the clergy, so also with the
gendarmes, who, though rarely embarrassed as to how to put the law in
operation, can find no pretext for an accusation against the young man, and
send him back to the ranks. Once more there is a conference, and his
superiors decide that, although he has not taken the oath of allegiance, he is
to be regarded as a soldier. He is put into uniform, his name is entered on
the lists, and he is sent under convoy to his post. Here his immediate
superiors once more order him to perform his military duty, and still he
refuses to obey, and in the presence of the other soldiers he states his
reasons, saying that, as a Christian, he cannot of his own free will prepare
himself to commit murder, which was forbidden even by the law of Moses.
All this takes place in a provincial city. The occurrence excites the interest
and the sympathy, not only of outsiders, but even of the officers, and
Page 200
therefore there is hesitation about employing the usual punishment for
contumacy. However, for the sake of appearances, he is thrown into jail,
and a request is sent to the higher military authorities for further
instructions in the case. From an official standpoint this refusal to take part
in a military organization, in which the Czar himself serves, and which is
blessed by the Church, must be regarded as insanity, and therefore the
message is received from St. Petersburg that the young man is probably
insane, and that before any violent measures are used against him he must
be sent to the insane hospital. Thither he is sent in the hope that he will
remain there, as happened some ten years ago in the case of a young man
from Iver, who also refused to serve, and who was tortured in the hospital
until at last he was subdued. But in the present instance even this measure
fails to relieve the military authorities from this troublesome young man.
The doctors examine him, become interested in him, and, discovering no
symptoms of insanity, they return him to his post. He is received, and
pretending that his refusal and its causes are forgotten, he is once more
invited to join the drill, and again he refuses, in the presence of other
soldiers, stating his reasons for his refusal. The affair attracts more and
more notice from soldiers as well as from civilians. Again the question is
referred to St. Petersburg, and thence comes the order to transfer the young
man to the frontier, where the troops are in active service, and where, if he
refuses to obey orders, he may be shot without exciting attention, as there
are but few Russians and Christians in that far-away territory, the majority
being foreigners and Mohammedans. This is done. The young man is
ordered to join the Trans-Caspian troops, and with other criminals he is
delivered into the hands of commanders noted for their severity and
determination.
Meanwhile, during all these transportations from place to place, the young
man has suffered from harsh treatment, from cold, hunger, and filth, and his
life has been made miserable. Yet all these trials do not weaken his
resolution. In the Trans-Caspian province, where he is once more ordered to
serve as a sentry under arms, he refuses to obey. He consents to stand where
he is sent, beside the hayricks, but declines to take a weapon in his hand,
declaring that on no account will he use violence against any one
whomsoever. All this occurs in the presence of the soldiers. Such
contumacy cannot go unpunished; consequently he is court-martialed for an
infringement of military discipline, convicted, and sentenced to two years'
contumacy. However, for the sake of appearances, he is thrown into jail,
and a request is sent to the higher military authorities for further
instructions in the case. From an official standpoint this refusal to take part
in a military organization, in which the Czar himself serves, and which is
blessed by the Church, must be regarded as insanity, and therefore the
message is received from St. Petersburg that the young man is probably
insane, and that before any violent measures are used against him he must
be sent to the insane hospital. Thither he is sent in the hope that he will
remain there, as happened some ten years ago in the case of a young man
from Iver, who also refused to serve, and who was tortured in the hospital
until at last he was subdued. But in the present instance even this measure
fails to relieve the military authorities from this troublesome young man.
The doctors examine him, become interested in him, and, discovering no
symptoms of insanity, they return him to his post. He is received, and
pretending that his refusal and its causes are forgotten, he is once more
invited to join the drill, and again he refuses, in the presence of other
soldiers, stating his reasons for his refusal. The affair attracts more and
more notice from soldiers as well as from civilians. Again the question is
referred to St. Petersburg, and thence comes the order to transfer the young
man to the frontier, where the troops are in active service, and where, if he
refuses to obey orders, he may be shot without exciting attention, as there
are but few Russians and Christians in that far-away territory, the majority
being foreigners and Mohammedans. This is done. The young man is
ordered to join the Trans-Caspian troops, and with other criminals he is
delivered into the hands of commanders noted for their severity and
determination.
Meanwhile, during all these transportations from place to place, the young
man has suffered from harsh treatment, from cold, hunger, and filth, and his
life has been made miserable. Yet all these trials do not weaken his
resolution. In the Trans-Caspian province, where he is once more ordered to
serve as a sentry under arms, he refuses to obey. He consents to stand where
he is sent, beside the hayricks, but declines to take a weapon in his hand,
declaring that on no account will he use violence against any one
whomsoever. All this occurs in the presence of the soldiers. Such
contumacy cannot go unpunished; consequently he is court-martialed for an
infringement of military discipline, convicted, and sentenced to two years'
Page 201
confinement in a military prison. And once again, with the criminals, he is
sent by étape to the Caucasus and then thrown into prison, his fate being
left to the discretionary power of the jailer. There he is tortured for a year
and a half, but still his resolution to avoid the use of weapons remains
unchanged, and he continues to explain to every one whom he meets the
reasons for his refusal. Toward the end of the second year, before his term
has really expired, he is set at liberty; and although not in accordance with
the law, they are so anxious to rid themselves of him, that his imprisonment
is accepted as an equivalent of further active service.
And in various parts of Russia others are found who, as if by a concerted
plan, imitate his example, and in every case the action of the government is
undecided, vacillating, and underhanded. Some of these men are confined
in the insane hospitals, some are appointed military clerks and sent to serve
in Siberia, some are made foresters, others are thrown into prison, others are
fined. At the present time several of these men are imprisoned, not for their
substantial offense, denying the legality of the acts of the government, but
for disobeying the particular orders of their superiors. For instance, an
officer of the reserve recently failed to give information of the place of his
residence, and declined to serve further in the army; he was fined thirty
roubles for disobeying the orders of the authorities,—and this he declined to
pay, except under compulsion. Several peasants and soldiers who refused to
take part in a drill and to use weapons were put under arrest for
disobedience and contention.
Such instances of a refusal to comply with the demands of the State when
opposed to Christianity, especially refusals to perform military service,
occur not only in Russia, but everywhere. I know that in Servia, men from
the so-called sect of Nazarenes steadily refuse to enter the army, and the
Austrian government has for several years made futile attempts to convert
them by means of imprisonment. In 1885 there were 130 refusals of this
kind. I know that in Switzerland, in 1890, there were men in confinement in
the castle of Chillon for refusing to perform military duty whose
determination was not to be influenced by punishment. Such refusals have
occurred in Sweden; the men there also were imprisoned, and the
government carefully concealed the affairs from the people. Similar
instances occurred in Prussia. I know of one subaltern officer in the guards
who, in 1891, in Berlin, announced to his superiors that he, as a Christian,
sent by étape to the Caucasus and then thrown into prison, his fate being
left to the discretionary power of the jailer. There he is tortured for a year
and a half, but still his resolution to avoid the use of weapons remains
unchanged, and he continues to explain to every one whom he meets the
reasons for his refusal. Toward the end of the second year, before his term
has really expired, he is set at liberty; and although not in accordance with
the law, they are so anxious to rid themselves of him, that his imprisonment
is accepted as an equivalent of further active service.
And in various parts of Russia others are found who, as if by a concerted
plan, imitate his example, and in every case the action of the government is
undecided, vacillating, and underhanded. Some of these men are confined
in the insane hospitals, some are appointed military clerks and sent to serve
in Siberia, some are made foresters, others are thrown into prison, others are
fined. At the present time several of these men are imprisoned, not for their
substantial offense, denying the legality of the acts of the government, but
for disobeying the particular orders of their superiors. For instance, an
officer of the reserve recently failed to give information of the place of his
residence, and declined to serve further in the army; he was fined thirty
roubles for disobeying the orders of the authorities,—and this he declined to
pay, except under compulsion. Several peasants and soldiers who refused to
take part in a drill and to use weapons were put under arrest for
disobedience and contention.
Such instances of a refusal to comply with the demands of the State when
opposed to Christianity, especially refusals to perform military service,
occur not only in Russia, but everywhere. I know that in Servia, men from
the so-called sect of Nazarenes steadily refuse to enter the army, and the
Austrian government has for several years made futile attempts to convert
them by means of imprisonment. In 1885 there were 130 refusals of this
kind. I know that in Switzerland, in 1890, there were men in confinement in
the castle of Chillon for refusing to perform military duty whose
determination was not to be influenced by punishment. Such refusals have
occurred in Sweden; the men there also were imprisoned, and the
government carefully concealed the affairs from the people. Similar
instances occurred in Prussia. I know of one subaltern officer in the guards
who, in 1891, in Berlin, announced to his superiors that he, as a Christian,
Page 202
could not continue his military service, and in spite of all remonstrances and
threats he adhered to his resolution. In the south of France a community of
men called the Hinschist has recently been established (my information is
derived from the Peace Herald of July, 1891), who, as professing the
Christian doctrine, refuse to perform military duty. At first they were told
off to serve in hospitals, but now, with the increase of the sect, they are
punished for insubordination, while they still refuse to bear arms.
Socialists, communists, and anarchists, with their bombs and their
revolutions, are far less dangerous to governments than these men, who
from different places proclaim their refusals, all based upon the same
doctrine, familiar to all. Every government knows how to defend itself from
revolutionists; it holds the means in its own hands, and therefore does not
fear these external foes. But what can a government do to protect itself from
men who declaim against all authority as useless, superfluous, and
injurious, offering, however, no opposition to authority, merely rejecting its
offices, dispensing with its services, and therefore refusing to participate in
it?
The revolutionists say: "State organization is bad, either for one reason or
for another; it should be destroyed, and replaced by such and such a
system." But a Christian says: "I know nothing of State organization,
whether it be good or bad, and it is for this very reason that I do not wish to
support it. And I cannot undertake submission, because such submission is
contrary to my conscience."
All the institutions of the State are opposed to the conscience of a Christian:
the oath of allegiance, taxation, courts of law, armies; while the whole
authority of government is dependent upon them. Revolutionary foes
struggle against the government, but Christianity enters not into this
contest; internally, it destroys the principles on which government is based.
With the Russian people, in whose midst, particularly since the time of
Peter I., the protest of Christianity against the State has never ceased; in the
midst of this people, where the conditions of life are such that whole
communes emigrate to Turkey, China, and uninhabited portions of the
globe, who, so far from needing the government, always consider it an
unnecessary burden, and only endure it as a calamity, whether it be Russian,
Chinese, or Turkish,—the cases of isolated individuals who, from Christian
threats he adhered to his resolution. In the south of France a community of
men called the Hinschist has recently been established (my information is
derived from the Peace Herald of July, 1891), who, as professing the
Christian doctrine, refuse to perform military duty. At first they were told
off to serve in hospitals, but now, with the increase of the sect, they are
punished for insubordination, while they still refuse to bear arms.
Socialists, communists, and anarchists, with their bombs and their
revolutions, are far less dangerous to governments than these men, who
from different places proclaim their refusals, all based upon the same
doctrine, familiar to all. Every government knows how to defend itself from
revolutionists; it holds the means in its own hands, and therefore does not
fear these external foes. But what can a government do to protect itself from
men who declaim against all authority as useless, superfluous, and
injurious, offering, however, no opposition to authority, merely rejecting its
offices, dispensing with its services, and therefore refusing to participate in
it?
The revolutionists say: "State organization is bad, either for one reason or
for another; it should be destroyed, and replaced by such and such a
system." But a Christian says: "I know nothing of State organization,
whether it be good or bad, and it is for this very reason that I do not wish to
support it. And I cannot undertake submission, because such submission is
contrary to my conscience."
All the institutions of the State are opposed to the conscience of a Christian:
the oath of allegiance, taxation, courts of law, armies; while the whole
authority of government is dependent upon them. Revolutionary foes
struggle against the government, but Christianity enters not into this
contest; internally, it destroys the principles on which government is based.
With the Russian people, in whose midst, particularly since the time of
Peter I., the protest of Christianity against the State has never ceased; in the
midst of this people, where the conditions of life are such that whole
communes emigrate to Turkey, China, and uninhabited portions of the
globe, who, so far from needing the government, always consider it an
unnecessary burden, and only endure it as a calamity, whether it be Russian,
Chinese, or Turkish,—the cases of isolated individuals who, from Christian
Page 203
motives, have liberated themselves from the control of government have
grown more and more frequent in these latter days. Such manifestations are
particularly dreaded by the government at the present time, because the men
who protest often belong not to the so-called lower, the uneducated classes,
but are men of average and even superior education, and because these men
explain their refusals, not by some mystical belief peculiar to the individual,
as in olden times, nor do they complicate them with superstition and
fanaticism, like the sects of the Self-burners or Bieguni, but assign as the
reason for their refusals the simplest, most obvious of truths, patent to and
admitted by all the world.
Thus men refuse to pay taxes of their own free will, because the money is
used to promote violence; in other words, to pay the wages of the violators
in the army, for building prisons and fortresses, or for manufacturing
cannon,—in all of which, as Christians, they consider it wrong and immoral
to take a part.
They refuse to take the oath of allegiance, for were they to promise to obey
the authorities,—that is, men who use violence,—they must contradict the
sense of the Christian doctrine.
They refuse to swear in court, because an oath is distinctly forbidden by the
gospel.
They decline police duties, because in that office they would be compelled
to use violence against their brethren and to distress them, and a Christian
cannot do this.
They refuse to take part in courts of law, because they look upon every
tribunal as a vehicle for the law of vengeance, and therefore incompatible
with the Christian law of forgiveness and love.
They decline to have anything to do with military preparations, or to enter
the ranks of the army, because they neither can nor will be executioners, nor
prepare themselves for such an office.
And the reasons alleged for these refusals are of such a nature that, however
arbitrary the governments may be, they cannot punish openly those who
refuse.
Were the governments to punish men for such refusals, they would be
forced to abjure forever both justice and virtue, those principles by which,
grown more and more frequent in these latter days. Such manifestations are
particularly dreaded by the government at the present time, because the men
who protest often belong not to the so-called lower, the uneducated classes,
but are men of average and even superior education, and because these men
explain their refusals, not by some mystical belief peculiar to the individual,
as in olden times, nor do they complicate them with superstition and
fanaticism, like the sects of the Self-burners or Bieguni, but assign as the
reason for their refusals the simplest, most obvious of truths, patent to and
admitted by all the world.
Thus men refuse to pay taxes of their own free will, because the money is
used to promote violence; in other words, to pay the wages of the violators
in the army, for building prisons and fortresses, or for manufacturing
cannon,—in all of which, as Christians, they consider it wrong and immoral
to take a part.
They refuse to take the oath of allegiance, for were they to promise to obey
the authorities,—that is, men who use violence,—they must contradict the
sense of the Christian doctrine.
They refuse to swear in court, because an oath is distinctly forbidden by the
gospel.
They decline police duties, because in that office they would be compelled
to use violence against their brethren and to distress them, and a Christian
cannot do this.
They refuse to take part in courts of law, because they look upon every
tribunal as a vehicle for the law of vengeance, and therefore incompatible
with the Christian law of forgiveness and love.
They decline to have anything to do with military preparations, or to enter
the ranks of the army, because they neither can nor will be executioners, nor
prepare themselves for such an office.
And the reasons alleged for these refusals are of such a nature that, however
arbitrary the governments may be, they cannot punish openly those who
refuse.
Were the governments to punish men for such refusals, they would be
forced to abjure forever both justice and virtue, those principles by which,
Page 204
as they assure us, all their authority is supported.
What are governments to do with these men? Of course they have the
power to execute, to imprison, and to condemn to transportation and penal
servitude all enemies who attempt to overthrow them by violence; they can
obtain by bribery half the men they need, and have at their command
millions of armed soldiers, who are ready to put to death all the enemies of
authority. But what can be done with men who wish neither to destroy nor
to establish anything, whose sole desire is to avoid in their own private lives
any act that may be opposed to the Christian law, and who consequently
refuse to perform duties which are regarded by the government as the most
natural and obligatory of all?
If they were revolutionists, preaching violence and practising it, it would be
an easy matter to oppose them. Some might be bribed, some deceived,
others intimidated, and those who could neither be bought, deceived, nor
intimidated would be manifestly criminals, enemies of society who, as such,
could be executed or beaten to death; and the people would approve the acts
of the government. If they were fanatics belonging to some particular sect,
one might, in view of the superstitions inherent in their doctrine, refute at
the same time what truth their arguments contained. But what is to be done
with men who neither preach rebellion nor any special dogmas, who wish to
live in peace with all mankind, who refuse to take the oath of allegiance or
to pay taxes, or to take part in tribunals, to perform military service, and the
various duties of a similar nature, on which the whole organization of the
State is founded? What is to be done with them? They cannot be bribed.
The very risk they are willing to take shows their integrity. Neither can they
be deceived when these things are represented as the commands of God,
because their refusal is based on the indubitable law of God, by which the
very men who are trying to coerce them to disobey this law profess to hold
themselves bound. It is vain to hope to intimidate them by threats, because
the very suffering and privations which they endure for righteousness' sake
serve but to strengthen their devotion to their faith, whose law distinctly
commands them first of all to obey God, to fear not them that kill the body,
but to fear those who can kill both body and soul. Neither can they be
executed or imprisoned for life. Their past lives, their thoughts and actions,
their friends, speak for them; every one knows them to be gentle, kindly,
and harmless men, and it is impossible to represent them in the light of
What are governments to do with these men? Of course they have the
power to execute, to imprison, and to condemn to transportation and penal
servitude all enemies who attempt to overthrow them by violence; they can
obtain by bribery half the men they need, and have at their command
millions of armed soldiers, who are ready to put to death all the enemies of
authority. But what can be done with men who wish neither to destroy nor
to establish anything, whose sole desire is to avoid in their own private lives
any act that may be opposed to the Christian law, and who consequently
refuse to perform duties which are regarded by the government as the most
natural and obligatory of all?
If they were revolutionists, preaching violence and practising it, it would be
an easy matter to oppose them. Some might be bribed, some deceived,
others intimidated, and those who could neither be bought, deceived, nor
intimidated would be manifestly criminals, enemies of society who, as such,
could be executed or beaten to death; and the people would approve the acts
of the government. If they were fanatics belonging to some particular sect,
one might, in view of the superstitions inherent in their doctrine, refute at
the same time what truth their arguments contained. But what is to be done
with men who neither preach rebellion nor any special dogmas, who wish to
live in peace with all mankind, who refuse to take the oath of allegiance or
to pay taxes, or to take part in tribunals, to perform military service, and the
various duties of a similar nature, on which the whole organization of the
State is founded? What is to be done with them? They cannot be bribed.
The very risk they are willing to take shows their integrity. Neither can they
be deceived when these things are represented as the commands of God,
because their refusal is based on the indubitable law of God, by which the
very men who are trying to coerce them to disobey this law profess to hold
themselves bound. It is vain to hope to intimidate them by threats, because
the very suffering and privations which they endure for righteousness' sake
serve but to strengthen their devotion to their faith, whose law distinctly
commands them first of all to obey God, to fear not them that kill the body,
but to fear those who can kill both body and soul. Neither can they be
executed or imprisoned for life. Their past lives, their thoughts and actions,
their friends, speak for them; every one knows them to be gentle, kindly,
and harmless men, and it is impossible to represent them in the light of
Page 205
criminals whose suppression is needed for the salvation of society.
Moreover, the execution of men acknowledged by all to be virtuous would
arouse defenders who would endeavor to explain the causes for their
disobedience. And when all men are made to recognize the reasons why
these Christians refuse to obey the demands of the State, they cannot fail to
acknowledge the same obligation, and to admit that all men should long
since have refused obedience.
Confronted with these insubordinations, governments find themselves in a
desperate plight. They realize that the prophecies of Christianity are about
to be fulfilled, that it is loosening the fetters of them that are in bonds and
setting men free; they realize that such freedom will inevitably destroy
those who have held mankind in bondage. Governments realize this; they
know that their hours are counted, that they are helpless to resist. All that
they are able to do is to retard the hour of dissolution. And this they try to
do; but their position is still a desperate one.
It is like the predicament of a conqueror who wishes to preserve the town
set on fire by the inhabitants. No sooner does he put the fire out in one place
than two other fires break out; when he separates the burning portion from
the main body of a large building the flames burst out at both extremities.
These outbreaks are not, as yet, of frequent occurrence, but the spark has
been kindled, and the fire will burn steadily until all is consumed.
The position of governments in the presence of men who profess
Christianity is so precarious that very little is needed to shake to pieces their
power, built up through so many centuries, and apparently so solid in
structure. And it is now that the sociologist comes forward, preaching that it
is useless, and even hurtful and immoral, for the individual to emancipate
himself alone.
Let us suppose that men have been working for a long time to divert the
course of a river; they have at last succeeded in digging a canal, and all that
remains now is to make an opening and let the water flow through it into
the canal; suppose now certain other men arrive upon the scene and suggest
that, instead of letting the water flow into the canal, it would be much better
to erect over the river some form of machinery, by means of which the
water would be poured from one side to the other.
Moreover, the execution of men acknowledged by all to be virtuous would
arouse defenders who would endeavor to explain the causes for their
disobedience. And when all men are made to recognize the reasons why
these Christians refuse to obey the demands of the State, they cannot fail to
acknowledge the same obligation, and to admit that all men should long
since have refused obedience.
Confronted with these insubordinations, governments find themselves in a
desperate plight. They realize that the prophecies of Christianity are about
to be fulfilled, that it is loosening the fetters of them that are in bonds and
setting men free; they realize that such freedom will inevitably destroy
those who have held mankind in bondage. Governments realize this; they
know that their hours are counted, that they are helpless to resist. All that
they are able to do is to retard the hour of dissolution. And this they try to
do; but their position is still a desperate one.
It is like the predicament of a conqueror who wishes to preserve the town
set on fire by the inhabitants. No sooner does he put the fire out in one place
than two other fires break out; when he separates the burning portion from
the main body of a large building the flames burst out at both extremities.
These outbreaks are not, as yet, of frequent occurrence, but the spark has
been kindled, and the fire will burn steadily until all is consumed.
The position of governments in the presence of men who profess
Christianity is so precarious that very little is needed to shake to pieces their
power, built up through so many centuries, and apparently so solid in
structure. And it is now that the sociologist comes forward, preaching that it
is useless, and even hurtful and immoral, for the individual to emancipate
himself alone.
Let us suppose that men have been working for a long time to divert the
course of a river; they have at last succeeded in digging a canal, and all that
remains now is to make an opening and let the water flow through it into
the canal; suppose now certain other men arrive upon the scene and suggest
that, instead of letting the water flow into the canal, it would be much better
to erect over the river some form of machinery, by means of which the
water would be poured from one side to the other.
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But things have gone too far. Governments are aware of their weakness and
helplessness, and men of the Christian faith are awakening from their
torpor, beginning already to realize their power.
"I am come to send fire on the earth," said Christ.
And this is the fire that begins to burn.
helplessness, and men of the Christian faith are awakening from their
torpor, beginning already to realize their power.
"I am come to send fire on the earth," said Christ.
And this is the fire that begins to burn.
Page 207
CHAPTER X
USELESSNESS OF VIOLENCE FOR THE DESTRUCTION
OF EVIL. THE MORAL ADVANCE OF MANKIND IS
ACCOMPLISHED, NOT ONLY THROUGH THE
KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH, BUT ALSO THROUGH THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Christianity destroys the State—Which is more necessary, Christianity or the State?—There
are men who defend the necessity of the State, and others who, on the same grounds,
deny this necessity—Neither can be proved by abstract reasoning—The question decides
the character of a man's consciousness, which either allows or forbids him to participate
in the organization of the State—Realization of the uselessness and immorality of taking
part in the organization of the State, which is contradictory to Christian doctrine, decides
this question for each one, regardless of the destiny of the State—Argument of the
defenders of the State, as a form of social life indispensable for the defense of the good
from the wicked, until all nations, and all members of each nation, shall have become
Christians—The more wicked are always those in power—History is but a recital of the
usurpation of power by the bad over the good—The acknowledgment by authority of the
necessity of struggle with evil by violence is equivalent to self-destruction—The
annihilation of violence is not only possible, but is going on before our eyes—However,
it is not destroyed by State violence, but through those men who, obtaining power by
violence, and recognizing its vanity and futility, benefit by experience and become
incapable of using violence—This is the process through which individual men, as well
as whole nations, have passed—It is in that way that Christianity penetrates into the
consciousness of men, and not only is this accomplished despite the violence used by
authority, but through its agency, and therefore the abolition of authority is not only
without danger, but it goes on continually as life itself—Objection of the defenders of the
State system that the diffusion of Christianity is improbable—Diffusion of Christian truth
interdicting violence accomplished not only slowly and gradually, by the internal method,
by individual recognition of the truth, by prophetic intuition, by the realizing of the
emptiness of power and abandonment of it by individual men, but accomplished also by
the external method, by which large numbers of men, inferior in intellectual development,
at once, in view of their confidence in the others, adopt the new truth—The diffusion of
truth at a certain stage creates a public opinion, which compels the majority of men who
have previously opposed it to recognize the new truth at once—Therefore a universal
renunciation of violence may very soon come to pass; namely, when a Christian public
opinion shall be established—The conviction of the necessity of violence prevents the
establishment of Christian public opinion—Violence compels men to discredit the moral
force which can alone exalt them—Neither nations nor individual men have been
conquered by violence, but by public opinion, which no violence can resist—It is possible
to conquer savage men and nations only by the diffusion of Christian public opinion
among them, whereas the Christian nations, in order to conquer them, do everything in
USELESSNESS OF VIOLENCE FOR THE DESTRUCTION
OF EVIL. THE MORAL ADVANCE OF MANKIND IS
ACCOMPLISHED, NOT ONLY THROUGH THE
KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH, BUT ALSO THROUGH THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Christianity destroys the State—Which is more necessary, Christianity or the State?—There
are men who defend the necessity of the State, and others who, on the same grounds,
deny this necessity—Neither can be proved by abstract reasoning—The question decides
the character of a man's consciousness, which either allows or forbids him to participate
in the organization of the State—Realization of the uselessness and immorality of taking
part in the organization of the State, which is contradictory to Christian doctrine, decides
this question for each one, regardless of the destiny of the State—Argument of the
defenders of the State, as a form of social life indispensable for the defense of the good
from the wicked, until all nations, and all members of each nation, shall have become
Christians—The more wicked are always those in power—History is but a recital of the
usurpation of power by the bad over the good—The acknowledgment by authority of the
necessity of struggle with evil by violence is equivalent to self-destruction—The
annihilation of violence is not only possible, but is going on before our eyes—However,
it is not destroyed by State violence, but through those men who, obtaining power by
violence, and recognizing its vanity and futility, benefit by experience and become
incapable of using violence—This is the process through which individual men, as well
as whole nations, have passed—It is in that way that Christianity penetrates into the
consciousness of men, and not only is this accomplished despite the violence used by
authority, but through its agency, and therefore the abolition of authority is not only
without danger, but it goes on continually as life itself—Objection of the defenders of the
State system that the diffusion of Christianity is improbable—Diffusion of Christian truth
interdicting violence accomplished not only slowly and gradually, by the internal method,
by individual recognition of the truth, by prophetic intuition, by the realizing of the
emptiness of power and abandonment of it by individual men, but accomplished also by
the external method, by which large numbers of men, inferior in intellectual development,
at once, in view of their confidence in the others, adopt the new truth—The diffusion of
truth at a certain stage creates a public opinion, which compels the majority of men who
have previously opposed it to recognize the new truth at once—Therefore a universal
renunciation of violence may very soon come to pass; namely, when a Christian public
opinion shall be established—The conviction of the necessity of violence prevents the
establishment of Christian public opinion—Violence compels men to discredit the moral
force which can alone exalt them—Neither nations nor individual men have been
conquered by violence, but by public opinion, which no violence can resist—It is possible
to conquer savage men and nations only by the diffusion of Christian public opinion
among them, whereas the Christian nations, in order to conquer them, do everything in
Page 208
their power to destroy the establishment of a Christian public opinion—These
unsuccessful experiments cannot be cited as a proof of the impossibility of conquering
men by Christianity—Violence which corrupts public opinion only prevents the social
organization from becoming what it should be, and with the abolition of violence
Christian public opinion will be established—Whatever may take place when violence
has been abolished, the unknown future can be no worse than the present, and therefore
one need not fear it—To penetrate to the unknown and move toward it is the essence of
life.
Christianity, faithfully interpreted, saps the foundations of the civil law, and
this was always understood from the very outset. It was for this that Christ
was crucified; and until men felt the necessity for justifying the
establishment of the Christian state, they always accepted that
interpretation. The cleverly constructed theories intended to reconcile the
doctrines of Christianity with that of the State date back to the time when
rulers of nations adopted a nominal external Christianity. But in these times
it is impossible for a sincere and earnest man not to perceive the
incompatibility of the Christian doctrine of love, meekness of spirit, and
forgiveness of injuries, with the despotism, the violence, and the wars of the
State. The profession of true Christianity not only forbids the recognition of
the State, but strikes at its very foundations.
But if it be true that Christianity is incompatible with the State, one
naturally asks which is the better adapted to promote the well-being of
mankind, the system prescribed by the State, or the precepts of Christianity?
There are those who affirm that the State organization is the more
indispensable; they declare that its overthrow would check all human
progress, that no development is possible save through the channels of civil
government, and that all those evils which we find prevailing among
nations who live under State laws are not the result of the organization,
which permits progress and the attainment of the highest degree of
civilization.
They who hold these views quote, in support of their position, certain
historical, philosophical, and even religious arguments, which seem to them
irrefutable. But there are others who entertain views diametrically opposed
to these. For instance, they say that the fact of the world having existed at
one time without a government, might be taken to prove the State to be only
a temporary condition; that the time was sure to come when men would
require a change, which time had now arrived. To support their theory, these
unsuccessful experiments cannot be cited as a proof of the impossibility of conquering
men by Christianity—Violence which corrupts public opinion only prevents the social
organization from becoming what it should be, and with the abolition of violence
Christian public opinion will be established—Whatever may take place when violence
has been abolished, the unknown future can be no worse than the present, and therefore
one need not fear it—To penetrate to the unknown and move toward it is the essence of
life.
Christianity, faithfully interpreted, saps the foundations of the civil law, and
this was always understood from the very outset. It was for this that Christ
was crucified; and until men felt the necessity for justifying the
establishment of the Christian state, they always accepted that
interpretation. The cleverly constructed theories intended to reconcile the
doctrines of Christianity with that of the State date back to the time when
rulers of nations adopted a nominal external Christianity. But in these times
it is impossible for a sincere and earnest man not to perceive the
incompatibility of the Christian doctrine of love, meekness of spirit, and
forgiveness of injuries, with the despotism, the violence, and the wars of the
State. The profession of true Christianity not only forbids the recognition of
the State, but strikes at its very foundations.
But if it be true that Christianity is incompatible with the State, one
naturally asks which is the better adapted to promote the well-being of
mankind, the system prescribed by the State, or the precepts of Christianity?
There are those who affirm that the State organization is the more
indispensable; they declare that its overthrow would check all human
progress, that no development is possible save through the channels of civil
government, and that all those evils which we find prevailing among
nations who live under State laws are not the result of the organization,
which permits progress and the attainment of the highest degree of
civilization.
They who hold these views quote, in support of their position, certain
historical, philosophical, and even religious arguments, which seem to them
irrefutable. But there are others who entertain views diametrically opposed
to these. For instance, they say that the fact of the world having existed at
one time without a government, might be taken to prove the State to be only
a temporary condition; that the time was sure to come when men would
require a change, which time had now arrived. To support their theory, these
Page 209
men in turn adduce historical, philosophical, and religious arguments which
seem to them irrefutable.
Volumes may be and have been written in defense of the former position,
and of late years a great deal has been written, and ably written too, from
the opposite standpoint.
It can neither be proved on the one hand, as the partizans of the State claim,
that its destruction would be followed by a general upheaval, by robberies
and murders, and by the nullification of all social laws, and the return of
man to a condition of barbarism; nor on the other, as the enemies of the
State affirm, that man has grown so virtuous and well disposed that,
preferring peace to enmity, he will no longer rob and murder his neighbor;
that he is quite able, without State assistance, to establish a community, and
conduct his own affairs; and that the State itself, while assuming an air of
protection, is really exerting a demoralizing influence. It is impossible to
prove either one or the other by abstract arguments. And naturally neither
point can be proved by experience, as it is a question first of all of getting
the requisite experience.
Whether or not the time has arrived for abolishing the State is a question
which could not be answered were it not that we possess other means that
will assist us to settle it beyond dispute.
It needs no one to tell the young birds when it is time to burst the shell; they
know very well when there is no longer room for them in the eggs, and
begin of their own accord to break the shell and leave it behind. So it is with
this question of a change in human affairs. Has the time come for men to
cast aside the customs of the State and establish a new order? When a man's
inner consciousness has so developed that he feels himself hampered by the
requirements of the State, and can no longer submit to the restraint,
realizing at the same time that he has ceased to need its protecting care, the
question whether or no men have matured sufficiently to enable them to
dispense with the State is disposed of without reference to former
arguments. A man who has outgrown the State can no more be coerced into
submission to its laws than can the fledgling be made to reënter its shell.
"The State may have been necessary at one time, and for aught that I know
it may even now serve the purposes you mention," says the man who holds
the Christian life-conception. "I can only say that I have no need of it, nor
seem to them irrefutable.
Volumes may be and have been written in defense of the former position,
and of late years a great deal has been written, and ably written too, from
the opposite standpoint.
It can neither be proved on the one hand, as the partizans of the State claim,
that its destruction would be followed by a general upheaval, by robberies
and murders, and by the nullification of all social laws, and the return of
man to a condition of barbarism; nor on the other, as the enemies of the
State affirm, that man has grown so virtuous and well disposed that,
preferring peace to enmity, he will no longer rob and murder his neighbor;
that he is quite able, without State assistance, to establish a community, and
conduct his own affairs; and that the State itself, while assuming an air of
protection, is really exerting a demoralizing influence. It is impossible to
prove either one or the other by abstract arguments. And naturally neither
point can be proved by experience, as it is a question first of all of getting
the requisite experience.
Whether or not the time has arrived for abolishing the State is a question
which could not be answered were it not that we possess other means that
will assist us to settle it beyond dispute.
It needs no one to tell the young birds when it is time to burst the shell; they
know very well when there is no longer room for them in the eggs, and
begin of their own accord to break the shell and leave it behind. So it is with
this question of a change in human affairs. Has the time come for men to
cast aside the customs of the State and establish a new order? When a man's
inner consciousness has so developed that he feels himself hampered by the
requirements of the State, and can no longer submit to the restraint,
realizing at the same time that he has ceased to need its protecting care, the
question whether or no men have matured sufficiently to enable them to
dispense with the State is disposed of without reference to former
arguments. A man who has outgrown the State can no more be coerced into
submission to its laws than can the fledgling be made to reënter its shell.
"The State may have been necessary at one time, and for aught that I know
it may even now serve the purposes you mention," says the man who holds
the Christian life-conception. "I can only say that I have no need of it, nor
Page 210
can I conform to its requirements. You must decide for yourself whether it
be advantageous or no. I shall not attempt to generalize on the subject with
the expectation of proving my point. I only recognize what I need and what
I don't need; what I can, and what I cannot do. I know, as far as I am myself
concerned, that I do not need to separate from the men of other nations, and
therefore I can neither recognize an exclusive affiliation to this or that one,
nor acknowledge myself the subject of any one government. I need none of
the institutions established by the State, and therefore I am not willing to
surrender the fruits of my labor in the form of taxes to support institutions
which I believe to be not only unnecessary but positively injurious. I know
that I need neither magistrates, nor tribunals founded on and supported by
violence, and therefore I can have nothing to do with them; I know that I
feel no inclination to attack other nations and put their citizens to death,
neither do I wish to defend myself against them by force of arms, and
therefore I can take no part in wars nor in preparations for wars. Doubtless
there are men who believe that all these things are an indispensable part of
human life,—I cannot argue with them,—but I know that for me they have
no meaning, and that I will have nothing to do with them.
"And this is not a matter of personal selection, but because I must obey the
commands of Him who has sent me into the world, and has given me an
unmistakable law by which I am to be guided through life."
Whatever arguments may be advanced to prove that harm and probably
disaster will accrue from abolishing the authority of the State, the man who
has already outgrown the State ideal cannot possibly be bound by it. And
whatever arguments may be adduced to prove its necessity, he can never
return to it. He is like the young bird who can never return to its outgrown
shell.
"But granting this to be true," say the partizans of the existing order, "we
cannot dispense with the supremacy of the State until all men are
Christians, because even among those who claim the title there are many
who are very far from being Christians—evil-doers, who seek their own
gratification at the expense of their fellow-men, and if the governments
were overthrown, so far from improving the condition of the people, it
would greatly add to their miseries. The subversion of the State would be a
misfortune, not only where the minority are true Christians, but even
supposing the whole people to be so; while the neighboring nations are still
be advantageous or no. I shall not attempt to generalize on the subject with
the expectation of proving my point. I only recognize what I need and what
I don't need; what I can, and what I cannot do. I know, as far as I am myself
concerned, that I do not need to separate from the men of other nations, and
therefore I can neither recognize an exclusive affiliation to this or that one,
nor acknowledge myself the subject of any one government. I need none of
the institutions established by the State, and therefore I am not willing to
surrender the fruits of my labor in the form of taxes to support institutions
which I believe to be not only unnecessary but positively injurious. I know
that I need neither magistrates, nor tribunals founded on and supported by
violence, and therefore I can have nothing to do with them; I know that I
feel no inclination to attack other nations and put their citizens to death,
neither do I wish to defend myself against them by force of arms, and
therefore I can take no part in wars nor in preparations for wars. Doubtless
there are men who believe that all these things are an indispensable part of
human life,—I cannot argue with them,—but I know that for me they have
no meaning, and that I will have nothing to do with them.
"And this is not a matter of personal selection, but because I must obey the
commands of Him who has sent me into the world, and has given me an
unmistakable law by which I am to be guided through life."
Whatever arguments may be advanced to prove that harm and probably
disaster will accrue from abolishing the authority of the State, the man who
has already outgrown the State ideal cannot possibly be bound by it. And
whatever arguments may be adduced to prove its necessity, he can never
return to it. He is like the young bird who can never return to its outgrown
shell.
"But granting this to be true," say the partizans of the existing order, "we
cannot dispense with the supremacy of the State until all men are
Christians, because even among those who claim the title there are many
who are very far from being Christians—evil-doers, who seek their own
gratification at the expense of their fellow-men, and if the governments
were overthrown, so far from improving the condition of the people, it
would greatly add to their miseries. The subversion of the State would be a
misfortune, not only where the minority are true Christians, but even
supposing the whole people to be so; while the neighboring nations are still
Page 211
non-Christian, these latter would make their lives a martyrdom by rapine
and murder and all manner of violence. It would serve only to provide the
vicious and unprincipled with an opportunity to oppress the innocent.
Therefore the State should not be abolished until all the wicked have ceased
from troubling, which will not happen just at present. Hence, however
much certain individual Christians may wish to escape from the authority of
the State, the greater good of the greater number demands its preservation."
So say the defenders of the State principle. "If it were not," they say, "for
State authority there would be no protection against the malice and injustice
of the oppressor; that authority alone makes it possible to restrain the
wicked."
But in uttering these sentiments the partizans of the existing order take it for
granted that they have proved the truth of what they assert. When they
declare that the evil-doers would ride roughshod over the defenseless and
the innocent were it not for the authority of the State, they imply that the
governing power is vested at the present time in a body of virtuous men,
who control all the wrong-doers. But this is a proposition which must be
proved. It could only be a correct statement if we happened to resemble the
inhabitants of China, where it is popularly believed, although the belief is
not justified by fact, that the good are always in authority, because should it
become known that the rulers are no better than those over whom they rule,
it is the duty of the citizens to overthrow the government. But although this
is supposed to be one of the customs of China, it is not, nor would it be
possible for it to be so, since, in order to overthrow a criminal government,
one needs the power as well as the right. Even in China this is a mere
supposition, and in our own Christian land we have never so much as
dreamed of it. As far as we are concerned, there is no reason to believe that
power is in the hands of the virtuous and high-minded, rather than in those
of men who took it by violence and have held it for themselves and their
descendants. For surely it would be impossible for a high-minded man to
usurp authority by violence and to continue to hold it.
In order to gain possession of power, and to retain it, one must have a love
for it, and the love of power is incompatible with goodness; it accords with
the opposite qualities of pride, duplicity, and cruelty.
Both the origin and the maintenance of power depend upon the exaltation of
the individual, and the degradation of the people by means of hypocrisy and
and murder and all manner of violence. It would serve only to provide the
vicious and unprincipled with an opportunity to oppress the innocent.
Therefore the State should not be abolished until all the wicked have ceased
from troubling, which will not happen just at present. Hence, however
much certain individual Christians may wish to escape from the authority of
the State, the greater good of the greater number demands its preservation."
So say the defenders of the State principle. "If it were not," they say, "for
State authority there would be no protection against the malice and injustice
of the oppressor; that authority alone makes it possible to restrain the
wicked."
But in uttering these sentiments the partizans of the existing order take it for
granted that they have proved the truth of what they assert. When they
declare that the evil-doers would ride roughshod over the defenseless and
the innocent were it not for the authority of the State, they imply that the
governing power is vested at the present time in a body of virtuous men,
who control all the wrong-doers. But this is a proposition which must be
proved. It could only be a correct statement if we happened to resemble the
inhabitants of China, where it is popularly believed, although the belief is
not justified by fact, that the good are always in authority, because should it
become known that the rulers are no better than those over whom they rule,
it is the duty of the citizens to overthrow the government. But although this
is supposed to be one of the customs of China, it is not, nor would it be
possible for it to be so, since, in order to overthrow a criminal government,
one needs the power as well as the right. Even in China this is a mere
supposition, and in our own Christian land we have never so much as
dreamed of it. As far as we are concerned, there is no reason to believe that
power is in the hands of the virtuous and high-minded, rather than in those
of men who took it by violence and have held it for themselves and their
descendants. For surely it would be impossible for a high-minded man to
usurp authority by violence and to continue to hold it.
In order to gain possession of power, and to retain it, one must have a love
for it, and the love of power is incompatible with goodness; it accords with
the opposite qualities of pride, duplicity, and cruelty.
Both the origin and the maintenance of power depend upon the exaltation of
the individual, and the degradation of the people by means of hypocrisy and
Page 212
fraud, by prisons, fortresses, and murders. "If State authority were to be
abolished, then would the more wicked people dominate over the less
wicked," say the upholders of State organization. But if the Egyptians
conquered the Hebrews, and the Persians the Egyptians, and the
Macedonians the Persians, and the Romans the Greeks, and the barbarians
the Romans, is it really possible that the conquerors are always better than
the conquered? And so with political changes in the State; is the power
always transferred to the better men? When Louis XVI. was deposed, and
control passed into the hands of Robespierre, and when, later, he was in turn
succeeded by Napoleon, was it the better or the worse man who held the
power? Again, were they of Versailles or the communists the better men?
Charles the First or Cromwell? When Peter III. reigned, or, after his murder,
when Catharine ruled over one part of Russia, and Pugatchov over the other
—who then was good and who was wicked?
All those in authority affirm that their office is required in order that the
unprincipled may be hindered from oppressing the innocent, implying
thereby that they themselves, being virtuous, are protecting other virtuous
men from the malice of the evil-doer. To possess power and to do violence
are synonymous terms; to do violence means doing something to which the
victim of violence objects, and which the aggressor would resent were it
directed against himself. Therefore the possession of power really means
doing unto others what we should not like if it were done to ourselves,—
that is, harm.
Obedience signifies that a man holds patience to be better than violence,
and to choose patience rather than violence means to be good, or, at least,
not so wicked as those who do unto others what they would not wish to
have done to themselves.
Therefore all the probabilities are that those in authority were in past times,
as they are in present, worse men than those they ruled over. Doubtless
there are wicked men among those who submit to authority, but it is
impossible that the better men should rule over the worse.
This might be thought in pagan times, when the definition of goodness was
inaccurate; but with the clear and exact conception of the qualities of good
and evil presented by Christianity before us we cannot imagine it. If in the
pagan world they who were more or less good, and they who were more or
abolished, then would the more wicked people dominate over the less
wicked," say the upholders of State organization. But if the Egyptians
conquered the Hebrews, and the Persians the Egyptians, and the
Macedonians the Persians, and the Romans the Greeks, and the barbarians
the Romans, is it really possible that the conquerors are always better than
the conquered? And so with political changes in the State; is the power
always transferred to the better men? When Louis XVI. was deposed, and
control passed into the hands of Robespierre, and when, later, he was in turn
succeeded by Napoleon, was it the better or the worse man who held the
power? Again, were they of Versailles or the communists the better men?
Charles the First or Cromwell? When Peter III. reigned, or, after his murder,
when Catharine ruled over one part of Russia, and Pugatchov over the other
—who then was good and who was wicked?
All those in authority affirm that their office is required in order that the
unprincipled may be hindered from oppressing the innocent, implying
thereby that they themselves, being virtuous, are protecting other virtuous
men from the malice of the evil-doer. To possess power and to do violence
are synonymous terms; to do violence means doing something to which the
victim of violence objects, and which the aggressor would resent were it
directed against himself. Therefore the possession of power really means
doing unto others what we should not like if it were done to ourselves,—
that is, harm.
Obedience signifies that a man holds patience to be better than violence,
and to choose patience rather than violence means to be good, or, at least,
not so wicked as those who do unto others what they would not wish to
have done to themselves.
Therefore all the probabilities are that those in authority were in past times,
as they are in present, worse men than those they ruled over. Doubtless
there are wicked men among those who submit to authority, but it is
impossible that the better men should rule over the worse.
This might be thought in pagan times, when the definition of goodness was
inaccurate; but with the clear and exact conception of the qualities of good
and evil presented by Christianity before us we cannot imagine it. If in the
pagan world they who were more or less good, and they who were more or
Page 213
less bad, might not be easily distinguished, the characteristics of goodness
and wickedness have been so clearly defined by the Christian conception
that it is impossible to mistake them. According to the doctrine of Christ,
the good are those who submit and are long-suffering, who do not resist evil
by violence, who forgive injuries, and love their enemies; the wicked are
the vainglorious, who tyrannize, who are arrogant and violent with others.
Therefore, if we are guided by the doctrine of Christ, we shall have no
difficulty in deciding where to seek the good and the wicked among rulers
and subjects. It is even absurd to speak of Christians as sovereigns or rulers.
The non-Christians—that is, those to whom life is but a matter of temporal
welfare—must always rule over the Christians, for whom life means self-
denial and disregard of temporal things.
And thus it has always been, and it has been manifested more and more
plainly as the Christian doctrine has become more clearly defined and
widespread.
The farther true Christianity extended, the firmer the hold it gained on the
consciousness of men, the less possible it became for Christians to belong
to the dominant class, and the easier for non-Christians to gain the
ascendancy.
"To abolish the supremacy of the State before all men have become true
Christians would only afford the wicked a chance to tyrannize over the
good and maltreat them with impunity," say the upholders of the existing
order.
It has always been the same from the beginning of the world until this
present time, and it always will be. The wicked always rule over the good
and do violence to them. Cain did violence to Abel, the astute Jacob
betrayed the trusting Esau, and was himself deceived by Laban; Caiaphas
and Pilate sat in judgment on Christ; the Roman emperors ruled over
Seneca, Epictetus, and other high-minded Romans of those times; Ivan IV.
with his Opritchniks, the tipsy syphilitic Peter with his clowns, the
prostitute Catharine with her lovers, ruled over the industrious, God-fearing
Russian people of those times, and trampled upon them. William rules the
Germans, Stambulov the Bulgarians, and the Russian officials rule over the
Russian people; the Germans ruled over the Italians, and now they rule over
the Hungarians and the Slavs. The Turks ruled over the Greeks and now
and wickedness have been so clearly defined by the Christian conception
that it is impossible to mistake them. According to the doctrine of Christ,
the good are those who submit and are long-suffering, who do not resist evil
by violence, who forgive injuries, and love their enemies; the wicked are
the vainglorious, who tyrannize, who are arrogant and violent with others.
Therefore, if we are guided by the doctrine of Christ, we shall have no
difficulty in deciding where to seek the good and the wicked among rulers
and subjects. It is even absurd to speak of Christians as sovereigns or rulers.
The non-Christians—that is, those to whom life is but a matter of temporal
welfare—must always rule over the Christians, for whom life means self-
denial and disregard of temporal things.
And thus it has always been, and it has been manifested more and more
plainly as the Christian doctrine has become more clearly defined and
widespread.
The farther true Christianity extended, the firmer the hold it gained on the
consciousness of men, the less possible it became for Christians to belong
to the dominant class, and the easier for non-Christians to gain the
ascendancy.
"To abolish the supremacy of the State before all men have become true
Christians would only afford the wicked a chance to tyrannize over the
good and maltreat them with impunity," say the upholders of the existing
order.
It has always been the same from the beginning of the world until this
present time, and it always will be. The wicked always rule over the good
and do violence to them. Cain did violence to Abel, the astute Jacob
betrayed the trusting Esau, and was himself deceived by Laban; Caiaphas
and Pilate sat in judgment on Christ; the Roman emperors ruled over
Seneca, Epictetus, and other high-minded Romans of those times; Ivan IV.
with his Opritchniks, the tipsy syphilitic Peter with his clowns, the
prostitute Catharine with her lovers, ruled over the industrious, God-fearing
Russian people of those times, and trampled upon them. William rules the
Germans, Stambulov the Bulgarians, and the Russian officials rule over the
Russian people; the Germans ruled over the Italians, and now they rule over
the Hungarians and the Slavs. The Turks ruled over the Greeks and now
Page 214
rule over the Slavs, the English over the Hindoos, the Mongolians over the
Chinese.
So we see that whether the tyranny of the State is or is not to be abolished,
the position of the innocent, who are oppressed by the tyrants, will not be
materially affected thereby.
Men are not to be frightened by being told that the wicked will oppress the
good, because that is the natural course, and will never change.
The whole of pagan history is a mere narrative of events wherein the
wicked have got the upper hand, and, once in power, by craft and cruelty
have kept their hold upon men, announcing themselves meanwhile as the
guardians of justice and the defenders of the innocent against the oppressor.
All revolutions are but the result of the appropriation of power by the
wicked and their rule over the good. When the rulers say that if their power
were to be destroyed the evil-doers would tyrannize over the innocent, what
they really mean is that the tyrants in power are reluctant to yield to those
other tyrants who would fain wrest from them their authority. When they
protest that this authority of theirs, which is actually violence, is necessary
to defend the people against the possible tyranny of others,[19] they are
simply denouncing themselves. The reason why violence is dangerous is
that, whenever it is employed, all the arguments which the perpetrators
advanced in their own defense may be used against them with even greater
force. They talk of the violence done in the past, and more frequently of
future and imaginary violence, while they themselves are the real offenders.
"You say that men committed robbery and murder in former times, and
profess anxiety lest all men be robbed or murdered unless protected by your
authority. This may or may not be true, but the fact that you allow
thousands of men to perish in prisons by enforced labor, in fortresses, and
in exile, that your military requisitions ruin millions of families and imperil,
morally and physically, millions of men, this is not a supposititious but an
actual violence, which, according to your own reasoning, should be resisted
by violence. And therefore, by your own admission, the wicked ones,
against whom one should use violence, are yourselves." Thus should the
oppressed reply to their oppressors. And such are the language, the
thoughts, and the actions of non-Christians. Wherever the oppressed are
more wicked than the oppressor, they attack and overthrow them whenever
Chinese.
So we see that whether the tyranny of the State is or is not to be abolished,
the position of the innocent, who are oppressed by the tyrants, will not be
materially affected thereby.
Men are not to be frightened by being told that the wicked will oppress the
good, because that is the natural course, and will never change.
The whole of pagan history is a mere narrative of events wherein the
wicked have got the upper hand, and, once in power, by craft and cruelty
have kept their hold upon men, announcing themselves meanwhile as the
guardians of justice and the defenders of the innocent against the oppressor.
All revolutions are but the result of the appropriation of power by the
wicked and their rule over the good. When the rulers say that if their power
were to be destroyed the evil-doers would tyrannize over the innocent, what
they really mean is that the tyrants in power are reluctant to yield to those
other tyrants who would fain wrest from them their authority. When they
protest that this authority of theirs, which is actually violence, is necessary
to defend the people against the possible tyranny of others,[19] they are
simply denouncing themselves. The reason why violence is dangerous is
that, whenever it is employed, all the arguments which the perpetrators
advanced in their own defense may be used against them with even greater
force. They talk of the violence done in the past, and more frequently of
future and imaginary violence, while they themselves are the real offenders.
"You say that men committed robbery and murder in former times, and
profess anxiety lest all men be robbed or murdered unless protected by your
authority. This may or may not be true, but the fact that you allow
thousands of men to perish in prisons by enforced labor, in fortresses, and
in exile, that your military requisitions ruin millions of families and imperil,
morally and physically, millions of men, this is not a supposititious but an
actual violence, which, according to your own reasoning, should be resisted
by violence. And therefore, by your own admission, the wicked ones,
against whom one should use violence, are yourselves." Thus should the
oppressed reply to their oppressors. And such are the language, the
thoughts, and the actions of non-Christians. Wherever the oppressed are
more wicked than the oppressor, they attack and overthrow them whenever
Page 215
they are able; or else—and this is more frequently the case—they enter the
ranks of the oppressors and take part in their tyranny.
Thus the dangers of which the defenders of State rights make a bugbear—
that if authority were overthrown the wicked would prevail over the good—
potentially exist at all times. The destruction of State violence, in fact, never
can, for this very reason, lead to any real increase of violence on the part of
the wicked over the good.
If State violence disappeared, it is not unlikely that other acts of violence
would be committed; but the sum of violence can never be increased simply
because the power passes from the hands of one into those of another.
"State violence can never be abolished until all the wicked disappear," say
the advocates of the existing order, by which they imply that there must
always be violence, because there will always be wicked people. This could
only prove true, supposing the oppressors to be really beneficent, and
supposing the true deliverance of mankind from evil must be accomplished
by violence. Then, of course, violence could never cease. But as, on the
contrary, violence never really overcomes evil, and since there is another
way altogether to overcome it, the assertion that violence will never cease is
untrue. Violence is diminishing, and clearly tending to disappear; though
not, as is claimed by the defenders of the existing order, in consequence of
the amelioration of those who live under an oppressive government (their
condition really gets worse), but because the consciousness of mankind is
becoming more clear. Hence even the wicked men who are in power are
growing less and less wicked, and will at last become so good that they will
be incapable of committing deeds of violence.
The reason why humanity marches forward is not because the inferior men,
having gained possession of power, reform their subjects by arbitrary
methods, as is claimed both by Conservatives and Revolutionists, but is due
above all to the fact that mankind in general is steadily, and with an ever
increasing appreciation, adopting the Christian life-conception. There is a
phenomenon observable in human life in a manner analogous to that of
boiling. Those who profess the social life-conception are always ambitious
to rule, and struggle to attain power. In this struggle the most gross and
cruel, the least Christian elements of society, bubble up, as it were, and rise,
by reason of their violence, into the ruling or upper classes of society. But
ranks of the oppressors and take part in their tyranny.
Thus the dangers of which the defenders of State rights make a bugbear—
that if authority were overthrown the wicked would prevail over the good—
potentially exist at all times. The destruction of State violence, in fact, never
can, for this very reason, lead to any real increase of violence on the part of
the wicked over the good.
If State violence disappeared, it is not unlikely that other acts of violence
would be committed; but the sum of violence can never be increased simply
because the power passes from the hands of one into those of another.
"State violence can never be abolished until all the wicked disappear," say
the advocates of the existing order, by which they imply that there must
always be violence, because there will always be wicked people. This could
only prove true, supposing the oppressors to be really beneficent, and
supposing the true deliverance of mankind from evil must be accomplished
by violence. Then, of course, violence could never cease. But as, on the
contrary, violence never really overcomes evil, and since there is another
way altogether to overcome it, the assertion that violence will never cease is
untrue. Violence is diminishing, and clearly tending to disappear; though
not, as is claimed by the defenders of the existing order, in consequence of
the amelioration of those who live under an oppressive government (their
condition really gets worse), but because the consciousness of mankind is
becoming more clear. Hence even the wicked men who are in power are
growing less and less wicked, and will at last become so good that they will
be incapable of committing deeds of violence.
The reason why humanity marches forward is not because the inferior men,
having gained possession of power, reform their subjects by arbitrary
methods, as is claimed both by Conservatives and Revolutionists, but is due
above all to the fact that mankind in general is steadily, and with an ever
increasing appreciation, adopting the Christian life-conception. There is a
phenomenon observable in human life in a manner analogous to that of
boiling. Those who profess the social life-conception are always ambitious
to rule, and struggle to attain power. In this struggle the most gross and
cruel, the least Christian elements of society, bubble up, as it were, and rise,
by reason of their violence, into the ruling or upper classes of society. But
Page 216
then is fulfilled what Christ prophesied: "Woe unto you that are rich! Woe
unto you that are full! Woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of
you!" (Luke vi. 24-26). The men who have attained power, and glory, and
riches, and who have realized all their cherished aims, live to discover that
all is vanity, and gladly return to their former estate. Charles V., Ivan the
Terrible, Alexander I., having realized the evils of power and its futility,
renounced it because they recognized it as a calamity, having lost all
pleasure in the deeds of violence which they formerly enjoyed.
But it is not alone kings like Charles V. and Alexander I. who arrive at this
disgust of power, but every man who has attained the object of his
ambition. Not only the statesman, the general, the millionaire, the merchant,
but every official who has gained the position for which he has longed this
half score of years, every well-to-do peasant who has saved one or two
hundred roubles, finds at last the same disillusion.
Not only individuals, but entire nations, mankind as a whole, have passed
through this experience.
The attractions of power and all it brings—riches, honors, luxury—seem to
men really worth struggling for only until they are won; for no sooner does
a man hold them within his grasp than they manifest their own emptiness
and gradually lose their charm, like clouds, lovely and picturesque in
outline seen from afar, but no sooner is one enveloped in them than all their
beauty vanishes.
Men who have obtained riches and power, those who have struggled for
them, but more particularly those who have inherited them, cease to be
greedy for power or cruel in its acquisition.
Having learned by experience, sometimes in one generation, sometimes in
several, how utterly worthless are the fruits of violence, men abandon those
vices acquired by the passion for riches and power, and growing more
humane, they lose their positions, being crowded out by others who are less
Christian and more wicked; whereupon they fall back into a stratum, which,
though lower in the social scale, is higher in that of morality, thus
increasing the mean level of Christian consciousness. But straightway, the
worse, the rougher, and less Christian elements rise to the surface, and
being subject to the same experience as their predecessors, after one or two
generations these men, too, recognize the hollowness of violent ambitions,
unto you that are full! Woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of
you!" (Luke vi. 24-26). The men who have attained power, and glory, and
riches, and who have realized all their cherished aims, live to discover that
all is vanity, and gladly return to their former estate. Charles V., Ivan the
Terrible, Alexander I., having realized the evils of power and its futility,
renounced it because they recognized it as a calamity, having lost all
pleasure in the deeds of violence which they formerly enjoyed.
But it is not alone kings like Charles V. and Alexander I. who arrive at this
disgust of power, but every man who has attained the object of his
ambition. Not only the statesman, the general, the millionaire, the merchant,
but every official who has gained the position for which he has longed this
half score of years, every well-to-do peasant who has saved one or two
hundred roubles, finds at last the same disillusion.
Not only individuals, but entire nations, mankind as a whole, have passed
through this experience.
The attractions of power and all it brings—riches, honors, luxury—seem to
men really worth struggling for only until they are won; for no sooner does
a man hold them within his grasp than they manifest their own emptiness
and gradually lose their charm, like clouds, lovely and picturesque in
outline seen from afar, but no sooner is one enveloped in them than all their
beauty vanishes.
Men who have obtained riches and power, those who have struggled for
them, but more particularly those who have inherited them, cease to be
greedy for power or cruel in its acquisition.
Having learned by experience, sometimes in one generation, sometimes in
several, how utterly worthless are the fruits of violence, men abandon those
vices acquired by the passion for riches and power, and growing more
humane, they lose their positions, being crowded out by others who are less
Christian and more wicked; whereupon they fall back into a stratum, which,
though lower in the social scale, is higher in that of morality, thus
increasing the mean level of Christian consciousness. But straightway, the
worse, the rougher, and less Christian elements rise to the surface, and
being subject to the same experience as their predecessors, after one or two
generations these men, too, recognize the hollowness of violent ambitions,
Page 217
and, being penetrated with the spirit of Christianity, fall back into the ranks
of the oppressed. These are in turn replaced by new oppressors, less
despotic than the former, but rougher than those whom they oppress. So that
although the authority is to all outward seeming unchanged, yet the number
of those who have been driven by the exigencies of life to adopt the
Christian life-conception increases with every change of rulers. They may
be more harsh, more cruel, and less Christian than their subjects; but always
men less and less violent replace their predecessors in authority.
Violence chooses its instruments from among the worst elements of society;
men who gradually become leavened, and, softened and changed for the
better, are returned into society.
Such is the process by means of which Christianity takes fuller possession
of men day by day. Christianity enters into the consciousness of men in
spite of the violence of power, and even owing to that violence.
The argument of the defenders of the State, that if power were abolished the
wicked would tyrannize over the good, not only fails to prove that the
domination of the wicked is a new thing to be dreaded,—as it exists already,
—but proves, on the contrary, that the tyranny of the State, which allows
the wicked to govern the good, is itself the real evil which we ought to
eradicate, and which is constantly decreasing by the very nature of things.
"But if State violence is not to cease until the rulers have become so far
Christianized that they will renounce it of their own accord and no others
will be found to take their places,—if these things are coming to pass," say
the defenders of the existing order, "when is it to happen? If 1800 years
have passed, and still so many long to rule, it is wholly improbable that we
shall soon behold this change, if it ever takes place at all.
"Even though there may be at present, as there always have been, certain
individuals who would not rule if they could, who do not choose to benefit
themselves in that way, still the number of those who do prefer to rule
rather than to be ruled is so great that it is difficult to imagine a time when
the number will be exhausted.
"In order to accomplish the conversion of all men, to induce each one to
exchange the pagan for the Christian life-conception, voluntarily resigning
riches and power, there being none left to profit by these, it would be
of the oppressed. These are in turn replaced by new oppressors, less
despotic than the former, but rougher than those whom they oppress. So that
although the authority is to all outward seeming unchanged, yet the number
of those who have been driven by the exigencies of life to adopt the
Christian life-conception increases with every change of rulers. They may
be more harsh, more cruel, and less Christian than their subjects; but always
men less and less violent replace their predecessors in authority.
Violence chooses its instruments from among the worst elements of society;
men who gradually become leavened, and, softened and changed for the
better, are returned into society.
Such is the process by means of which Christianity takes fuller possession
of men day by day. Christianity enters into the consciousness of men in
spite of the violence of power, and even owing to that violence.
The argument of the defenders of the State, that if power were abolished the
wicked would tyrannize over the good, not only fails to prove that the
domination of the wicked is a new thing to be dreaded,—as it exists already,
—but proves, on the contrary, that the tyranny of the State, which allows
the wicked to govern the good, is itself the real evil which we ought to
eradicate, and which is constantly decreasing by the very nature of things.
"But if State violence is not to cease until the rulers have become so far
Christianized that they will renounce it of their own accord and no others
will be found to take their places,—if these things are coming to pass," say
the defenders of the existing order, "when is it to happen? If 1800 years
have passed, and still so many long to rule, it is wholly improbable that we
shall soon behold this change, if it ever takes place at all.
"Even though there may be at present, as there always have been, certain
individuals who would not rule if they could, who do not choose to benefit
themselves in that way, still the number of those who do prefer to rule
rather than to be ruled is so great that it is difficult to imagine a time when
the number will be exhausted.
"In order to accomplish the conversion of all men, to induce each one to
exchange the pagan for the Christian life-conception, voluntarily resigning
riches and power, there being none left to profit by these, it would be
Page 218
necessary that not only all the rude, half-barbarous people, unfitted either to
accept Christianity or follow its precepts, who are always to be found in
every Christian community, should become Christians, but that all savage
and non-Christian nations, which are still numerous, should also become
Christian.
"Therefore were one to admit that the Christianizing process may at some
future time embrace all humanity, we must still take into consideration the
degree of progress that has been made in 1800 years, and realize that this
can only happen after many centuries. Hence we need not for the present
trouble ourselves about the overthrow of authority; all we have to do is to
look to it that it is in the best hands."
Thus reply the partizans of the existing system. And this reasoning would
be perfectly consistent, provided that the transition of men from one life-
conception to another were only to be effected by the process of individual
conversion; that is to say, that each man, through his personal experience,
should realize the vanity of power, and apprehend Christian truth. This
process is constantly going on, and in that way, one by one, men are
converted to Christianity.
But men do not become converted to Christianity merely in this way; there
is an exterior influence brought to bear which accelerates the process. The
progression of mankind from one system of life to another is accomplished
not only gradually, as the sand glides through the hour-glass, grain by grain,
until all has run out, but rather as water which enters an immersed vessel, at
first slowly, at one side, then, borne down by its weight, suddenly plunges,
and at once fills completely.
And this is what happens in human communities during a change in their
life-conception, which is equivalent to the change from one organization to
another. It is only at first that men by degrees, one by one, accept the new
truth and obey its dictates; but after it has been to a certain extent
disseminated, it is accepted, not through intuition, and not by degrees, but
generally and at once, and almost involuntarily.
And therefore the argument of the advocates of the present system, that but
a minority have embraced Christianity during the last 1800 years, and that
another 1800 years must pass away before the rest of mankind will accept
it, is erroneous. For one must take into consideration another mode, in
accept Christianity or follow its precepts, who are always to be found in
every Christian community, should become Christians, but that all savage
and non-Christian nations, which are still numerous, should also become
Christian.
"Therefore were one to admit that the Christianizing process may at some
future time embrace all humanity, we must still take into consideration the
degree of progress that has been made in 1800 years, and realize that this
can only happen after many centuries. Hence we need not for the present
trouble ourselves about the overthrow of authority; all we have to do is to
look to it that it is in the best hands."
Thus reply the partizans of the existing system. And this reasoning would
be perfectly consistent, provided that the transition of men from one life-
conception to another were only to be effected by the process of individual
conversion; that is to say, that each man, through his personal experience,
should realize the vanity of power, and apprehend Christian truth. This
process is constantly going on, and in that way, one by one, men are
converted to Christianity.
But men do not become converted to Christianity merely in this way; there
is an exterior influence brought to bear which accelerates the process. The
progression of mankind from one system of life to another is accomplished
not only gradually, as the sand glides through the hour-glass, grain by grain,
until all has run out, but rather as water which enters an immersed vessel, at
first slowly, at one side, then, borne down by its weight, suddenly plunges,
and at once fills completely.
And this is what happens in human communities during a change in their
life-conception, which is equivalent to the change from one organization to
another. It is only at first that men by degrees, one by one, accept the new
truth and obey its dictates; but after it has been to a certain extent
disseminated, it is accepted, not through intuition, and not by degrees, but
generally and at once, and almost involuntarily.
And therefore the argument of the advocates of the present system, that but
a minority have embraced Christianity during the last 1800 years, and that
another 1800 years must pass away before the rest of mankind will accept
it, is erroneous. For one must take into consideration another mode, in
Page 219
addition to the intuitive of assimilating new truth, and of making the
transition from one mode of life to another. This other mode is this: men
assimilate a truth not alone because they may have come to realize it
through prophetic insight or through individual experience, but the truth
having been spread abroad, those who dwell on a lower plane of
intelligence accept it at once, because of their confidence in those who have
received it and incorporated it in their lives.
Every new truth that changes the manner of life and causes humanity to
move onward is at first accepted by a very limited number, who grasp it by
knowledge of it. The rest of mankind, accepting on faith the former truth
upon which the existing system has been founded, is always opposed to the
spread of the new truth.
But as, in the first place, mankind is not stationary, but is ever progressing,
growing more and more familiar with truth and approaching nearer to it in
everyday life: and secondly, as all men progress according to their
opportunities, age, education, nationality, beginning with those who are
more, and ending with those who are less, capable of receiving new truth—
the men nearest those who have perceived the truth intuitively pass, one by
one, and with gradually diminishing intervals, over to the side of the new
truth. So, as the number of men who acknowledge it increases, the truth
itself becomes more clearly manifested. The feeling of confidence in the
new truth increases in proportion to the numbers who have accepted it. For,
owing to the growing intelligibility of the truth itself, it becomes easier for
men to grasp it, especially for those lower intellectually, until finally the
greater number readily adopt it, and help to found a new régime.
The men who go over to the new truth, once it has gained a certain hold, go
over en masse, of one accord, much as ballast is rapidly put into a ship to
maintain its equilibrium. If not ballasted, the vessel would not be
sufficiently immersed, and would change its position every moment. This
ballast, which at first may seem superfluous and a hindrance to the progress
of the ship, is indispensable to its equipoise and motion.
Thus it is with the masses when, under the influence of some new idea that
has won social approval, they abandon one system to adopt another, not
singly, but in a body. It is the inertia of this mass which impedes the rapid
and frequent transition from one system of life, not ratified by wisdom, to
transition from one mode of life to another. This other mode is this: men
assimilate a truth not alone because they may have come to realize it
through prophetic insight or through individual experience, but the truth
having been spread abroad, those who dwell on a lower plane of
intelligence accept it at once, because of their confidence in those who have
received it and incorporated it in their lives.
Every new truth that changes the manner of life and causes humanity to
move onward is at first accepted by a very limited number, who grasp it by
knowledge of it. The rest of mankind, accepting on faith the former truth
upon which the existing system has been founded, is always opposed to the
spread of the new truth.
But as, in the first place, mankind is not stationary, but is ever progressing,
growing more and more familiar with truth and approaching nearer to it in
everyday life: and secondly, as all men progress according to their
opportunities, age, education, nationality, beginning with those who are
more, and ending with those who are less, capable of receiving new truth—
the men nearest those who have perceived the truth intuitively pass, one by
one, and with gradually diminishing intervals, over to the side of the new
truth. So, as the number of men who acknowledge it increases, the truth
itself becomes more clearly manifested. The feeling of confidence in the
new truth increases in proportion to the numbers who have accepted it. For,
owing to the growing intelligibility of the truth itself, it becomes easier for
men to grasp it, especially for those lower intellectually, until finally the
greater number readily adopt it, and help to found a new régime.
The men who go over to the new truth, once it has gained a certain hold, go
over en masse, of one accord, much as ballast is rapidly put into a ship to
maintain its equilibrium. If not ballasted, the vessel would not be
sufficiently immersed, and would change its position every moment. This
ballast, which at first may seem superfluous and a hindrance to the progress
of the ship, is indispensable to its equipoise and motion.
Thus it is with the masses when, under the influence of some new idea that
has won social approval, they abandon one system to adopt another, not
singly, but in a body. It is the inertia of this mass which impedes the rapid
and frequent transition from one system of life, not ratified by wisdom, to
Page 220
another; and which for a long time arrests the progress of every truth
destined to become a part of human consciousness.
It is erroneous, then, to argue that because only a small percentage of the
human race has in these eighteen centuries adopted the Christian doctrine,
that many, many times eighteen centuries must elapse before the whole
world will accept it,—a period of time so remote that we who are now
living can have no interest in it. It is unfair, because those men who stand
on a lower plane of development, whom the partizans of the existing order
represent as hindrances to the realization of the Christian system of life, are
those men who always go over in a body to a truth accepted by those above
them.
And therefore that change in the life of mankind, when the powerful will
give up their power without finding any to assume it in their stead, will
come to pass when the Christian life-conception, rendered familiar,
conquers, not merely men one by one, but masses at a time.
"But even if it were true," the advocates of the existing order may say, "that
public opinion has the power to convert the inert non-Christian mass of
men, as well as the corrupt and gross who are to be found in every Christian
community, how shall we know that a Christian mode of life is born, and
that State violence will be rendered useless?
"After renouncing the despotism by which the existing order has been
maintained, in order to trust to the vague and indefinite force of public
opinion, we risk permitting those savages, those existing among us, as well
as those outside, to commit robbery, murder, and other outrages upon
Christians.
"If even with the help of authority we have a hard struggle against the anti-
Christian elements ever ready to overpower us, and destroy all the progress
made by civilization, how then could public opinion prove an efficient
substitute for the use of force, and avail for our protection? To rely upon
public opinion alone would be as foolhardy as to let loose all the wild
beasts of a menagerie, because they seem inoffensive when in their cages
and held in awe by red-hot irons.
"Those men entrusted with authority, or born to rule over others by the
divine will of God, have no right to imperil all the results of civilization,
destined to become a part of human consciousness.
It is erroneous, then, to argue that because only a small percentage of the
human race has in these eighteen centuries adopted the Christian doctrine,
that many, many times eighteen centuries must elapse before the whole
world will accept it,—a period of time so remote that we who are now
living can have no interest in it. It is unfair, because those men who stand
on a lower plane of development, whom the partizans of the existing order
represent as hindrances to the realization of the Christian system of life, are
those men who always go over in a body to a truth accepted by those above
them.
And therefore that change in the life of mankind, when the powerful will
give up their power without finding any to assume it in their stead, will
come to pass when the Christian life-conception, rendered familiar,
conquers, not merely men one by one, but masses at a time.
"But even if it were true," the advocates of the existing order may say, "that
public opinion has the power to convert the inert non-Christian mass of
men, as well as the corrupt and gross who are to be found in every Christian
community, how shall we know that a Christian mode of life is born, and
that State violence will be rendered useless?
"After renouncing the despotism by which the existing order has been
maintained, in order to trust to the vague and indefinite force of public
opinion, we risk permitting those savages, those existing among us, as well
as those outside, to commit robbery, murder, and other outrages upon
Christians.
"If even with the help of authority we have a hard struggle against the anti-
Christian elements ever ready to overpower us, and destroy all the progress
made by civilization, how then could public opinion prove an efficient
substitute for the use of force, and avail for our protection? To rely upon
public opinion alone would be as foolhardy as to let loose all the wild
beasts of a menagerie, because they seem inoffensive when in their cages
and held in awe by red-hot irons.
"Those men entrusted with authority, or born to rule over others by the
divine will of God, have no right to imperil all the results of civilization,
Page 221
simply to make an experiment, and learn whether public opinion can or
cannot be substituted for the safeguard of authority."
Alphonse Karr, a French writer, forgotten to-day, once said, in trying to
prove the impossibility of abolishing the death penalty: "Que Messieurs les
assassins commencent par nous donner l'exemple." And I have often heard
this witticism quoted by persons who really believed they were using a
convincing and intellectual argument against the suppression of the penalty
of death. Nevertheless, there could be no better argument against the
violence of government.
"Let the assassins begin by showing us an example," say the defenders of
government authority. The assassins say the same, but with more justice.
They say: "Let those who have set themselves up as teachers and guides
show us an example by the suppression of legal assassination, and we will
imitate it." And this they say, not by way of a jest, but in all seriousness, for
such is in reality the situation.
"We cannot cease to use violence while we are surrounded by those who
commit violence."
There is no more insuperable barrier at the present time to the progress of
humanity, and to the establishment of a system that shall be in harmony
with its present conception of life, than this erroneous argument.
Those holding positions of authority are fully convinced that men are to be
influenced and controlled by force alone, and therefore to preserve the
existing system they do not hesitate to employ it. And yet this very system
is supported, not by violence, but by public opinion, the action of which is
compromised by violence. The action of violence actually weakens and
destroys that which it wishes to support.
At best, violence, if not employed as a vehicle for the ambition of those in
high places, condemns in the inflexible form a law which public opinion
has most probably long ago repudiated and condemned; but there is this
difference, that while public opinion rejects and condemns all acts that are
opposed to the moral law, the law supported by force repudiates and
condemns only a certain limited number of acts, seeming thus to justify all
acts of a like order which have not been included in its formula.
cannot be substituted for the safeguard of authority."
Alphonse Karr, a French writer, forgotten to-day, once said, in trying to
prove the impossibility of abolishing the death penalty: "Que Messieurs les
assassins commencent par nous donner l'exemple." And I have often heard
this witticism quoted by persons who really believed they were using a
convincing and intellectual argument against the suppression of the penalty
of death. Nevertheless, there could be no better argument against the
violence of government.
"Let the assassins begin by showing us an example," say the defenders of
government authority. The assassins say the same, but with more justice.
They say: "Let those who have set themselves up as teachers and guides
show us an example by the suppression of legal assassination, and we will
imitate it." And this they say, not by way of a jest, but in all seriousness, for
such is in reality the situation.
"We cannot cease to use violence while we are surrounded by those who
commit violence."
There is no more insuperable barrier at the present time to the progress of
humanity, and to the establishment of a system that shall be in harmony
with its present conception of life, than this erroneous argument.
Those holding positions of authority are fully convinced that men are to be
influenced and controlled by force alone, and therefore to preserve the
existing system they do not hesitate to employ it. And yet this very system
is supported, not by violence, but by public opinion, the action of which is
compromised by violence. The action of violence actually weakens and
destroys that which it wishes to support.
At best, violence, if not employed as a vehicle for the ambition of those in
high places, condemns in the inflexible form a law which public opinion
has most probably long ago repudiated and condemned; but there is this
difference, that while public opinion rejects and condemns all acts that are
opposed to the moral law, the law supported by force repudiates and
condemns only a certain limited number of acts, seeming thus to justify all
acts of a like order which have not been included in its formula.
Page 222
From the time of Moses public opinion has regarded covetousness, lust, and
cruelty as crimes, and condemned them as such. It condemns and repudiates
every form that covetousness may assume, not only the acquisition of
another man's property by violence, fraud, or cunning, but the cruel abuse
of wealth as well. It condemns all kinds of lust, let it be impudicity with a
mistress, a slave, a divorced wife, or with one's wife; it condemns all
cruelty,—blows, bad usage, murder,—all cruelty, not only toward human
beings, but toward animals. Whereas, the law, based upon violence, attacks
only certain forms of covetousness, such as theft and fraud, and certain
forms of lust and cruelty, such as conjugal infidelity, assault, and murder;
and thus it seems to condone those manifestations of covetousness, lust, and
cruelty which do not fall within its narrow limits.
But violence not only demoralizes public opinion, it excites in the minds of
men a pernicious conviction that they move onward, not through the
impulsion of a spiritual power, which would help them to comprehend and
realize the truth by bringing them nearer to that moral force which is the
source of every progressive movement of mankind,—but, by means of
violence,—by the very factor that not only impedes our progress toward
truth, but withdraws us from it. This is a fatal error, inasmuch as it inspires
in man a contempt for the fundamental principle of his life,—spiritual
activity,—and leads him to transfer all his strength and energy to the
practice of external violence.
It is as though men would try to put a locomotive in motion by turning its
wheels with their hands, not knowing that the expansion of steam was the
real motive-power, and that the action of the wheels was but the effect, and
not the cause. If by their hands and their levers they move the wheels, it is
but the semblance of motion, and, if anything, injures the wheels and makes
them useless.
The same mistake is made by those who expect to move the world by
violence.
Men affirm that the Christian life cannot be established save by violence,
because there are still uncivilized nations outside of the Christian world, in
Africa and Asia (some regard even the Chinese as a menace of our
civilization), and because, according to the new theory of heredity, there
exist in society congenital criminals, savage and irredeemably vicious.
cruelty as crimes, and condemned them as such. It condemns and repudiates
every form that covetousness may assume, not only the acquisition of
another man's property by violence, fraud, or cunning, but the cruel abuse
of wealth as well. It condemns all kinds of lust, let it be impudicity with a
mistress, a slave, a divorced wife, or with one's wife; it condemns all
cruelty,—blows, bad usage, murder,—all cruelty, not only toward human
beings, but toward animals. Whereas, the law, based upon violence, attacks
only certain forms of covetousness, such as theft and fraud, and certain
forms of lust and cruelty, such as conjugal infidelity, assault, and murder;
and thus it seems to condone those manifestations of covetousness, lust, and
cruelty which do not fall within its narrow limits.
But violence not only demoralizes public opinion, it excites in the minds of
men a pernicious conviction that they move onward, not through the
impulsion of a spiritual power, which would help them to comprehend and
realize the truth by bringing them nearer to that moral force which is the
source of every progressive movement of mankind,—but, by means of
violence,—by the very factor that not only impedes our progress toward
truth, but withdraws us from it. This is a fatal error, inasmuch as it inspires
in man a contempt for the fundamental principle of his life,—spiritual
activity,—and leads him to transfer all his strength and energy to the
practice of external violence.
It is as though men would try to put a locomotive in motion by turning its
wheels with their hands, not knowing that the expansion of steam was the
real motive-power, and that the action of the wheels was but the effect, and
not the cause. If by their hands and their levers they move the wheels, it is
but the semblance of motion, and, if anything, injures the wheels and makes
them useless.
The same mistake is made by those who expect to move the world by
violence.
Men affirm that the Christian life cannot be established save by violence,
because there are still uncivilized nations outside of the Christian world, in
Africa and Asia (some regard even the Chinese as a menace of our
civilization), and because, according to the new theory of heredity, there
exist in society congenital criminals, savage and irredeemably vicious.
Page 223
But the savages whom we find in our own community, as well as those
beyond its pale, with whom we threaten ourselves and others, have never
yielded to violence, and are not yielding to it now. One people never
conquered another by violence alone. If the victors stood on a lower plane
of civilization than the conquered, they always adopted the habits and
customs of the latter, never attempting to force their own methods of life
upon them. It is by the influence of public opinion, not by violence, that
nations are reduced to submission.
When a people have accepted a new religion, have become Christians, or
turned Mohammedans, it has come to pass, not because it was made
obligatory by those in power (violence often produced quite the opposite
result), but because they were influenced by public opinion. Nations
constrained by violence to accept the religion of the conqueror have never
really done so.
The same may be said in regard to the savage elements found in all
communities: neither severity nor clemency in the matter of punishments,
nor modifications in the prison system, nor augmenting of the police force,
have either diminished or increased the aggregate of crimes, which will
only decrease through an evolution in our manner of life. No severities have
ever succeeded in suppressing the vendetta, or the custom of dueling in
certain countries. However many of his fellows may be put to death for
thieving, the Tcherkess continues to steal out of vainglory. No girl will
marry a Tcherkess who has not proved his daring by stealing a horse, or at
least a sheep. When men no longer fight duels, and the Tcherkess cease to
steal, it will not be from fear of punishment (the danger of capital
punishment adds to the prestige of daring), but because public manners will
have undergone a change. The same may be said of all other crimes.
Violence can never suppress that which is countenanced by general custom.
If public opinion would but frown upon violence, it would destroy all its
power.
What would happen if violence were not employed against hostile nations
and the criminal element in society we do not know. But that the use of
violence subdues neither we do know through long experience.
And how can we expect to subdue by violence nations whose education,
traditions, and even religious training all tend to glorify resistence to the
beyond its pale, with whom we threaten ourselves and others, have never
yielded to violence, and are not yielding to it now. One people never
conquered another by violence alone. If the victors stood on a lower plane
of civilization than the conquered, they always adopted the habits and
customs of the latter, never attempting to force their own methods of life
upon them. It is by the influence of public opinion, not by violence, that
nations are reduced to submission.
When a people have accepted a new religion, have become Christians, or
turned Mohammedans, it has come to pass, not because it was made
obligatory by those in power (violence often produced quite the opposite
result), but because they were influenced by public opinion. Nations
constrained by violence to accept the religion of the conqueror have never
really done so.
The same may be said in regard to the savage elements found in all
communities: neither severity nor clemency in the matter of punishments,
nor modifications in the prison system, nor augmenting of the police force,
have either diminished or increased the aggregate of crimes, which will
only decrease through an evolution in our manner of life. No severities have
ever succeeded in suppressing the vendetta, or the custom of dueling in
certain countries. However many of his fellows may be put to death for
thieving, the Tcherkess continues to steal out of vainglory. No girl will
marry a Tcherkess who has not proved his daring by stealing a horse, or at
least a sheep. When men no longer fight duels, and the Tcherkess cease to
steal, it will not be from fear of punishment (the danger of capital
punishment adds to the prestige of daring), but because public manners will
have undergone a change. The same may be said of all other crimes.
Violence can never suppress that which is countenanced by general custom.
If public opinion would but frown upon violence, it would destroy all its
power.
What would happen if violence were not employed against hostile nations
and the criminal element in society we do not know. But that the use of
violence subdues neither we do know through long experience.
And how can we expect to subdue by violence nations whose education,
traditions, and even religious training all tend to glorify resistence to the
Page 224
conqueror, and love of liberty as the loftiest of virtues? And how is it
possible to extirpate crime by violence in the midst of communities where
the same act, regarded by the government as criminal, is transformed into
an heroic exploit by public opinion?
Nations and races may be destroyed by violence—it has been done. They
cannot be subdued.
The power transcending all others which has influenced individuals and
nations since time began, that power which is the convergence of the
invisible, intangible, spiritual forces of all humanity, is public opinion.
Violence serves but to enervate this influence, disintegrating it, and
substituting for it one not only useless, but pernicious to the welfare of
humanity.
In order to win over all those outside the Christian fold, all the Zulus, the
Manchurians, the Chinese, whom many consider uncivilized, and the
uncivilized among ourselves, there is only one way. This is by the diffusion
of a Christian mode of thought, which is only to be accomplished by a
Christian life, Christian deeds, a Christian example. But instead of
employing this one way of winning those who have remained outside the
fold of Christianity, men of our epoch have done just the opposite.
In order to convert uncivilized nations who do us no harm, whom we have
no motive for oppressing, we ought, above all, to leave them in peace, and
act upon them only by our showing them an example of the Christian
virtues of patience, meekness, temperance, purity, and brotherly love.
Instead of this we begin by seizing their territory, and establishing among
them new marts for our commerce, with the sole view of furthering our own
interests—we, in fact, rob them; we sell them wine, tobacco, and opium,
and thereby demoralize them; we establish our own customs among them,
we teach them violence and all its lessons; we teach them the animal law of
strife, that lowest depth of human degradation, and do all that we can to
conceal the Christian virtues we possess. Then, having sent them a score of
missionaries, who gabble an absurd clerical jargon, we quote the results of
our attempt to convert the heathen as an indubitable proof that the truths of
Christianity are not adaptable to everyday life.
possible to extirpate crime by violence in the midst of communities where
the same act, regarded by the government as criminal, is transformed into
an heroic exploit by public opinion?
Nations and races may be destroyed by violence—it has been done. They
cannot be subdued.
The power transcending all others which has influenced individuals and
nations since time began, that power which is the convergence of the
invisible, intangible, spiritual forces of all humanity, is public opinion.
Violence serves but to enervate this influence, disintegrating it, and
substituting for it one not only useless, but pernicious to the welfare of
humanity.
In order to win over all those outside the Christian fold, all the Zulus, the
Manchurians, the Chinese, whom many consider uncivilized, and the
uncivilized among ourselves, there is only one way. This is by the diffusion
of a Christian mode of thought, which is only to be accomplished by a
Christian life, Christian deeds, a Christian example. But instead of
employing this one way of winning those who have remained outside the
fold of Christianity, men of our epoch have done just the opposite.
In order to convert uncivilized nations who do us no harm, whom we have
no motive for oppressing, we ought, above all, to leave them in peace, and
act upon them only by our showing them an example of the Christian
virtues of patience, meekness, temperance, purity, and brotherly love.
Instead of this we begin by seizing their territory, and establishing among
them new marts for our commerce, with the sole view of furthering our own
interests—we, in fact, rob them; we sell them wine, tobacco, and opium,
and thereby demoralize them; we establish our own customs among them,
we teach them violence and all its lessons; we teach them the animal law of
strife, that lowest depth of human degradation, and do all that we can to
conceal the Christian virtues we possess. Then, having sent them a score of
missionaries, who gabble an absurd clerical jargon, we quote the results of
our attempt to convert the heathen as an indubitable proof that the truths of
Christianity are not adaptable to everyday life.
Page 225
And as for those whom we call criminals, who live in our midst, all that has
just been said applies equally to them. There is only one way to convert
them, and that is by means of a public opinion founded on true Christianity,
accompanied by the example of a sincere Christian life. And by way of
preaching this Christian gospel and confirming it by Christian example, we
imprison, we execute, guillotine, hang; we encourage the masses in
idolatrous religions calculated to stultify them; the government authorizes
the sale of brain-destroying poisons—wine, tobacco, opium; prostitution is
legalized; we bestow land upon those who need it not; surrounded by
misery, we display in our entertainments an unbridled extravagance; we
render impossible in such ways any semblance of a Christian life, and do
our best to destroy Christian ideas already established; and then, after doing
all we can to demoralize men, we take and confine them like wild beasts in
places from which they cannot escape, and where they will become more
brutal than ever; or we murder the men we have demoralized, and then use
them as an example to illustrate and prove our argument that people are
only to be controlled by violence.
Even so does the ignorant physician act, who, having placed his patient in
the most unsanitary conditions, or having administered to him poisonous
drugs, afterward contends that his patient has succumbed to the disease,
when had he been left to himself he would have recovered long ago.
Violence, which men regard as an instrument for the support of Christian
life, on the contrary, prevents the social system from reaching its full and
perfect development. The social system is such as it is, not because of
violence, but in spite of it.
Therefore the defenders of the existing social system are self-deceived
when they say that, since violence barely holds the evil and un-Christian
elements of society in awe, its subversion, and the substitution of the moral
influence of public opinion, would leave us helpless in face of them. They
are wrong, because violence does not protect mankind; but it deprives men
of the only possible chance of an effectual defense by the establishment and
propagation of the Christian principle of life.
"But how can one discard the visible and tangible protection of the
policeman with his baton, and trust to invisible, intangible public opinion?
And, moreover, is not its very existence problematical? We are all familiar
just been said applies equally to them. There is only one way to convert
them, and that is by means of a public opinion founded on true Christianity,
accompanied by the example of a sincere Christian life. And by way of
preaching this Christian gospel and confirming it by Christian example, we
imprison, we execute, guillotine, hang; we encourage the masses in
idolatrous religions calculated to stultify them; the government authorizes
the sale of brain-destroying poisons—wine, tobacco, opium; prostitution is
legalized; we bestow land upon those who need it not; surrounded by
misery, we display in our entertainments an unbridled extravagance; we
render impossible in such ways any semblance of a Christian life, and do
our best to destroy Christian ideas already established; and then, after doing
all we can to demoralize men, we take and confine them like wild beasts in
places from which they cannot escape, and where they will become more
brutal than ever; or we murder the men we have demoralized, and then use
them as an example to illustrate and prove our argument that people are
only to be controlled by violence.
Even so does the ignorant physician act, who, having placed his patient in
the most unsanitary conditions, or having administered to him poisonous
drugs, afterward contends that his patient has succumbed to the disease,
when had he been left to himself he would have recovered long ago.
Violence, which men regard as an instrument for the support of Christian
life, on the contrary, prevents the social system from reaching its full and
perfect development. The social system is such as it is, not because of
violence, but in spite of it.
Therefore the defenders of the existing social system are self-deceived
when they say that, since violence barely holds the evil and un-Christian
elements of society in awe, its subversion, and the substitution of the moral
influence of public opinion, would leave us helpless in face of them. They
are wrong, because violence does not protect mankind; but it deprives men
of the only possible chance of an effectual defense by the establishment and
propagation of the Christian principle of life.
"But how can one discard the visible and tangible protection of the
policeman with his baton, and trust to invisible, intangible public opinion?
And, moreover, is not its very existence problematical? We are all familiar
Page 226
with the actual state of things; whether it be good or bad we know its faults,
and are accustomed to them; we know how to conduct ourselves, how to act
in the present conditions; but what will happen when we renounce the
present organization, and confide ourselves to something invisible,
intangible, and utterly unfamiliar?"
Men dread the uncertainty into which they would plunge if they were to
renounce the familiar order of things. Certainly were our situation an
assured and stable one, it would be well to dread the uncertainties of
change. But so far from enjoying an assured position, we know that we are
on the verge of a catastrophe.
If we are to give way to fear, then let it be before something that is really
fearful, and not before something that we imagine may be so.
In fearing to make an effort to escape from conditions that are fatal to us,
only because the future is obscure and unknown, we are like the passengers
of a sinking ship who crowd into the cabin and refuse to leave it, because
they have not the courage to enter the boat that would carry them to the
shore; or like sheep who, in fear of the fire that has broken out in the
farmyard, huddle together in a corner and will not go out through the open
gate.
How can we, who stand on the threshold of a shocking and devastating
social war, before which, as those who are preparing for it tell us, the
horrors of 1793 will pale, talk seriously about the danger threatened by the
natives of Dahomey, the Zulus, and others who live far away, and who have
no intention of attacking us; or about the few thousands of malefactors,
thieves, and murderers—men whom we have helped to demoralize, and
whose numbers are not decreased by all our courts, prisons, and executions?
Moreover, this anxiety lest the visible protection of the police be
overthrown, is chiefly confined to the inhabitants of cities—that is, to those
who live under abnormal and artificial conditions. Those who live normally
in the midst of nature, dealing with its forces, require no such protection;
they realize how little avails violence to protect us from the real danger that
surrounds us. There is something morbid in this fear, which arises chiefly
from the false conditions in which most of us have grown up and continue
to live.
and are accustomed to them; we know how to conduct ourselves, how to act
in the present conditions; but what will happen when we renounce the
present organization, and confide ourselves to something invisible,
intangible, and utterly unfamiliar?"
Men dread the uncertainty into which they would plunge if they were to
renounce the familiar order of things. Certainly were our situation an
assured and stable one, it would be well to dread the uncertainties of
change. But so far from enjoying an assured position, we know that we are
on the verge of a catastrophe.
If we are to give way to fear, then let it be before something that is really
fearful, and not before something that we imagine may be so.
In fearing to make an effort to escape from conditions that are fatal to us,
only because the future is obscure and unknown, we are like the passengers
of a sinking ship who crowd into the cabin and refuse to leave it, because
they have not the courage to enter the boat that would carry them to the
shore; or like sheep who, in fear of the fire that has broken out in the
farmyard, huddle together in a corner and will not go out through the open
gate.
How can we, who stand on the threshold of a shocking and devastating
social war, before which, as those who are preparing for it tell us, the
horrors of 1793 will pale, talk seriously about the danger threatened by the
natives of Dahomey, the Zulus, and others who live far away, and who have
no intention of attacking us; or about the few thousands of malefactors,
thieves, and murderers—men whom we have helped to demoralize, and
whose numbers are not decreased by all our courts, prisons, and executions?
Moreover, this anxiety lest the visible protection of the police be
overthrown, is chiefly confined to the inhabitants of cities—that is, to those
who live under abnormal and artificial conditions. Those who live normally
in the midst of nature, dealing with its forces, require no such protection;
they realize how little avails violence to protect us from the real danger that
surrounds us. There is something morbid in this fear, which arises chiefly
from the false conditions in which most of us have grown up and continue
to live.
Page 227
A doctor to the insane related how, one day in summer, when he was about
to leave the asylum, the patients accompanied him as far as the gate that led
into the street.
"Come with me into town!" he proposed to them.
The patients agreed, and a little band followed him. But the farther they
went through the streets where they met their sane fellow-men moving
freely to and fro, the more timid they grew, and pressed more closely
around the doctor. At last they begged to be taken back to the asylum, to
their old but accustomed mode of insane life, to their keepers and their
rough ways, to strait jackets and solitary confinement.
And thus it is with those whom Christianity is waiting to set free, to whom
it offers the untrammeled rational life of the future, the coming century;
they huddle together and cling to their insane customs, to their factories,
courts, and prisons, their executioners, and their warfare.
They ask: "What security will there be for us when the existing order has
been swept away? What kind of laws are to take the place of those under
which we are now living? Not until we know exactly how our life is to be
ordered will we take a single step toward making a change." It is as if a
discoverer were to insist upon a detailed description of the region he is
about to explore. If the individual man, while passing from one period of
his life to another, could read the future and know just what his whole life
were to be, he would have no reason for living. And so it is with the career
of humanity. If, upon entering a new period, a program detailing the
incidents of its future existence were possible, humanity would stagnate.
We cannot know the conditions of the new order of things, because we have
to work them out for ourselves. The meaning of life is to search out that
which is hidden, and then to conform our activity to our new knowledge.
This is the life of the individual as it is the life of humanity.
to leave the asylum, the patients accompanied him as far as the gate that led
into the street.
"Come with me into town!" he proposed to them.
The patients agreed, and a little band followed him. But the farther they
went through the streets where they met their sane fellow-men moving
freely to and fro, the more timid they grew, and pressed more closely
around the doctor. At last they begged to be taken back to the asylum, to
their old but accustomed mode of insane life, to their keepers and their
rough ways, to strait jackets and solitary confinement.
And thus it is with those whom Christianity is waiting to set free, to whom
it offers the untrammeled rational life of the future, the coming century;
they huddle together and cling to their insane customs, to their factories,
courts, and prisons, their executioners, and their warfare.
They ask: "What security will there be for us when the existing order has
been swept away? What kind of laws are to take the place of those under
which we are now living? Not until we know exactly how our life is to be
ordered will we take a single step toward making a change." It is as if a
discoverer were to insist upon a detailed description of the region he is
about to explore. If the individual man, while passing from one period of
his life to another, could read the future and know just what his whole life
were to be, he would have no reason for living. And so it is with the career
of humanity. If, upon entering a new period, a program detailing the
incidents of its future existence were possible, humanity would stagnate.
We cannot know the conditions of the new order of things, because we have
to work them out for ourselves. The meaning of life is to search out that
which is hidden, and then to conform our activity to our new knowledge.
This is the life of the individual as it is the life of humanity.
Page 228
CHAPTER XI
CHRISTIAN PUBLIC OPINION ALREADY ARISES IN OUR
SOCIETY, AND WILL INEVITABLY DESTROY THE
SYSTEM OF VIOLENCE OF OUR LIFE. WHEN THIS
WILL COME ABOUT
The condition and organization of our society is shocking; it is upheld by public opinion, but
can be abolished by it—Men's views in regard to violence have already changed; the
number of men ready to serve the governments decreases, and functionaries of
government themselves begin to be ashamed of their position, to the point of often not
fulfilling their duties—These facts, signs of the birth of a public opinion, which, in
becoming more and more general, will lead finally to the impossibility of finding men
willing to serve governments—It becomes more and more clear that such positions are no
longer needed—Men begin to realize the uselessness of all the institutions of violence;
and if this is realized by a few men, it will later be understood by all—The time when the
deliverance will be accomplished is unknown, but it depends on men themselves; it
depends on how much each man is willing to live by the light that is within him.
The position of the Christian nations, with their prisons, their gallows, their
factories, their accumulations of capital, taxes, churches, taverns, and public
brothels, their increasing armaments, and their millions of besotted men,
ready, like dogs, to spring at a word from the master, would be shocking
indeed if it were the result of violence; but such a state of things is, before
all, the result of public opinion; and what has been established by public
opinion not only may be, but will be, overthrown by it.
Millions and millions of money, tens of millions of disciplined soldiers,
marvelous weapons of destruction, an infinitely perfected organization,
legions of men charged to delude and hypnotize the people,—this is all
under the control of men who believe that this organization is advantageous
for them, who know that without it they would disappear, and who therefore
devote all their energy to its maintenance. What an indomitable array of
power it seems! And yet we have but to realize whither we are fatally
tending, for men to become as much ashamed of acts of violence, and to
profit by them, as they are ashamed now of dishonesty, theft, beggary,
cowardice; and the whole complicated and apparently omnipotent system
CHRISTIAN PUBLIC OPINION ALREADY ARISES IN OUR
SOCIETY, AND WILL INEVITABLY DESTROY THE
SYSTEM OF VIOLENCE OF OUR LIFE. WHEN THIS
WILL COME ABOUT
The condition and organization of our society is shocking; it is upheld by public opinion, but
can be abolished by it—Men's views in regard to violence have already changed; the
number of men ready to serve the governments decreases, and functionaries of
government themselves begin to be ashamed of their position, to the point of often not
fulfilling their duties—These facts, signs of the birth of a public opinion, which, in
becoming more and more general, will lead finally to the impossibility of finding men
willing to serve governments—It becomes more and more clear that such positions are no
longer needed—Men begin to realize the uselessness of all the institutions of violence;
and if this is realized by a few men, it will later be understood by all—The time when the
deliverance will be accomplished is unknown, but it depends on men themselves; it
depends on how much each man is willing to live by the light that is within him.
The position of the Christian nations, with their prisons, their gallows, their
factories, their accumulations of capital, taxes, churches, taverns, and public
brothels, their increasing armaments, and their millions of besotted men,
ready, like dogs, to spring at a word from the master, would be shocking
indeed if it were the result of violence; but such a state of things is, before
all, the result of public opinion; and what has been established by public
opinion not only may be, but will be, overthrown by it.
Millions and millions of money, tens of millions of disciplined soldiers,
marvelous weapons of destruction, an infinitely perfected organization,
legions of men charged to delude and hypnotize the people,—this is all
under the control of men who believe that this organization is advantageous
for them, who know that without it they would disappear, and who therefore
devote all their energy to its maintenance. What an indomitable array of
power it seems! And yet we have but to realize whither we are fatally
tending, for men to become as much ashamed of acts of violence, and to
profit by them, as they are ashamed now of dishonesty, theft, beggary,
cowardice; and the whole complicated and apparently omnipotent system
Page 229
will die at once without any struggle. To accomplish this transformation it is
not necessary that any new ideas should find their way into the human
consciousness, but only that the mist which now veils the true significance
of violence should lift, in order that the growing Christian public opinion
and methods may conquer the methods of the pagan world. And this is
gradually coming to pass. We do not observe it, as we do not observe the
movement of things when we are turning, and everything around us is
turning as well.
It is true that the social organization seems for the most part as much under
the influence of violence as it seemed a thousand years ago, and in respect
of armaments and war seems even more; but the Christian view of life is
already having its effect. The withered tree, to all appearance, stands as
firmly as ever; it seems even firmer, because it has grown harder, but it is
already rotten at the heart and preparing to fall. It is the same with the
present mode of life based upon violence. The outward position of man
appears the same. There are the same oppressors, the same oppressed, but
the feeling of both classes in regard to their respective positions has
undergone a change. The oppressors, that is, those who take part in the
government, and those who are benefited by oppression, the wealthy
classes, do not constitute, as formerly, the élite of society, nor does their
condition suggest that ideal of human prosperity and greatness to which
formerly all the oppressed aspired. Now, it often happens that the
oppressors renounce of their own accord the advantages of their position,
choosing the position of the oppressed, and endeavor, by the simplicity of
their mode of life, to resemble them.
Not to speak of those offices and positions generally considered
contemptible, such as that of the spy, the detective, the usurer, or the keeper
of a tavern, a great many of the positions held by the oppressors, and
formerly considered honorable, such as those of police officers, courtiers,
judges, administrative functionaries, ecclesiastical or military, masters on a
large scale, and bankers, are not only considered little enviable, but are
already avoided by estimable men. Already there are men who choose to
renounce such once envied positions, preferring others which, although less
advantageous, are not associated with violence.
It is not merely such as these who renounce their privileges; men
influenced, not by religious motives, as was the case in former ages, but by
not necessary that any new ideas should find their way into the human
consciousness, but only that the mist which now veils the true significance
of violence should lift, in order that the growing Christian public opinion
and methods may conquer the methods of the pagan world. And this is
gradually coming to pass. We do not observe it, as we do not observe the
movement of things when we are turning, and everything around us is
turning as well.
It is true that the social organization seems for the most part as much under
the influence of violence as it seemed a thousand years ago, and in respect
of armaments and war seems even more; but the Christian view of life is
already having its effect. The withered tree, to all appearance, stands as
firmly as ever; it seems even firmer, because it has grown harder, but it is
already rotten at the heart and preparing to fall. It is the same with the
present mode of life based upon violence. The outward position of man
appears the same. There are the same oppressors, the same oppressed, but
the feeling of both classes in regard to their respective positions has
undergone a change. The oppressors, that is, those who take part in the
government, and those who are benefited by oppression, the wealthy
classes, do not constitute, as formerly, the élite of society, nor does their
condition suggest that ideal of human prosperity and greatness to which
formerly all the oppressed aspired. Now, it often happens that the
oppressors renounce of their own accord the advantages of their position,
choosing the position of the oppressed, and endeavor, by the simplicity of
their mode of life, to resemble them.
Not to speak of those offices and positions generally considered
contemptible, such as that of the spy, the detective, the usurer, or the keeper
of a tavern, a great many of the positions held by the oppressors, and
formerly considered honorable, such as those of police officers, courtiers,
judges, administrative functionaries, ecclesiastical or military, masters on a
large scale, and bankers, are not only considered little enviable, but are
already avoided by estimable men. Already there are men who choose to
renounce such once envied positions, preferring others which, although less
advantageous, are not associated with violence.
It is not merely such as these who renounce their privileges; men
influenced, not by religious motives, as was the case in former ages, but by
Page 230
growing public opinion, refuse to accept fortunes fallen to them by
inheritance, because they believe that a man ought to possess only the fruits
of his own labor.
High-minded youths, not as yet depraved by life, when about to choose a
career, prefer the professions of doctors, engineers, teachers, artists, writers,
or even of farmers, who live by their daily toil, to the positions of judges,
administrators, priests, soldiers in the pay of government; they decline even
the position of living on their income.
Most of the monuments at the present day are no longer erected in honor of
statesmen or generals, still less of men of wealth, but to scientists, artists,
and inventors, to men who not only had nothing in common with
government or authority, but who frequently opposed it. It is to their
memory that the arts are thus consecrated.
The class of men who will govern, and of rich men, tends every day to grow
less numerous, and so far as intellect, education, and especially morality,
are concerned, rich men and men in power are not the most distinguished
members of society, as was the case in olden times. In Russia and Turkey,
as in France and America, notwithstanding the frequent changes of officials,
the greater number are often covetous and venal, and so little to be
commended from the point of view of morality that they do not satisfy even
the elementary exigencies of honesty demanded in government posts. Thus
one hears often the ingenuous complaints of those in government that the
best men among us, strangely enough as it seems to them, are always found
among those opposed to them. It is as if one complained that it is not the
nice, good people who become hangmen.
Rich men of the present day, as a general thing, are mere vulgar amassers of
wealth, for the most part having but little care beyond that of increasing
their capital, and that most often by impure means; or are the degenerate
inheritors, who, far from playing an important part in society, often incur
general contempt.
Many positions have lost their ancient importance. Kings and emperors now
hardly direct at all; they seldom effect internal changes or modify external
policy, leaving the decision of such questions to the departments of State, or
to public opinion. Their function is reduced to being the representatives of
state unity and power. But even this duty they begin to neglect. Most of
inheritance, because they believe that a man ought to possess only the fruits
of his own labor.
High-minded youths, not as yet depraved by life, when about to choose a
career, prefer the professions of doctors, engineers, teachers, artists, writers,
or even of farmers, who live by their daily toil, to the positions of judges,
administrators, priests, soldiers in the pay of government; they decline even
the position of living on their income.
Most of the monuments at the present day are no longer erected in honor of
statesmen or generals, still less of men of wealth, but to scientists, artists,
and inventors, to men who not only had nothing in common with
government or authority, but who frequently opposed it. It is to their
memory that the arts are thus consecrated.
The class of men who will govern, and of rich men, tends every day to grow
less numerous, and so far as intellect, education, and especially morality,
are concerned, rich men and men in power are not the most distinguished
members of society, as was the case in olden times. In Russia and Turkey,
as in France and America, notwithstanding the frequent changes of officials,
the greater number are often covetous and venal, and so little to be
commended from the point of view of morality that they do not satisfy even
the elementary exigencies of honesty demanded in government posts. Thus
one hears often the ingenuous complaints of those in government that the
best men among us, strangely enough as it seems to them, are always found
among those opposed to them. It is as if one complained that it is not the
nice, good people who become hangmen.
Rich men of the present day, as a general thing, are mere vulgar amassers of
wealth, for the most part having but little care beyond that of increasing
their capital, and that most often by impure means; or are the degenerate
inheritors, who, far from playing an important part in society, often incur
general contempt.
Many positions have lost their ancient importance. Kings and emperors now
hardly direct at all; they seldom effect internal changes or modify external
policy, leaving the decision of such questions to the departments of State, or
to public opinion. Their function is reduced to being the representatives of
state unity and power. But even this duty they begin to neglect. Most of
Page 231
them not only fail to maintain themselves in their former unapproachable
majesty, but they grow more and more democratic, they prefer even to be
bourgeois; they lay down thus their last distinction, destroying precisely
what they are expected to maintain.
The same may be said of the army. The high officers, instead of
encouraging the roughness and cruelty of the soldiers, which befit their
occupation, promote the diffusion of education among them, preach
humanity, often sympathize with the socialistic ideas of the masses, and
deny the utility of war. In the late conspiracies against the Russian
government many of those concerned were military men. It often happens,
as it did recently, that the troops, when called upon to establish order, refuse
to fire on the people. The barrack code of ideas is frankly deprecated by
military men themselves, who often enough make it the subject of derision.
The same may be said of judges and lawyers. Judges, whose duty it is to
judge and condemn criminals, conduct their trials in such a fashion as to
prove them innocent; thus the Russian government, when it desires the
condemnation of those it wishes to punish, never confides them to the
ordinary tribunals; it tries them by court-martial, which is but a parody of
justice. The same may be said of lawyers, who often refuse to accuse, and,
twisting round the law, defend those they should accuse. Learned jurists,
whose duty it is to justify the violence of authority, deny more and more
frequently the right of punishment, and in its place introduce theories of
irresponsibility, often prescribing, not punishment, but medical treatment
for so-called criminals.
Jailers and turnkeys in convict prisons often become the protectors of those
it is a part of their business to torture. Policemen and detectives are
constantly saving those they ought to arrest. Ecclesiastics preach tolerance;
they often deny the right of violence, and the more educated among them
attempt in their sermons to avoid the deception which constitutes all the
meaning of their position, and which they are expected to preach.
Executioners refuse to perform their duty; the result is that often in Russia
death-warrants cannot be carried out for lack of executioners, for,
notwithstanding all the advantages of the position, the candidates, who are
chosen from convicts, diminish in number every year. Governors,
commissioners, and tax-collectors, pitying the people, often try to find
pretexts for remitting the taxes. Rich men no longer dare to use their wealth
majesty, but they grow more and more democratic, they prefer even to be
bourgeois; they lay down thus their last distinction, destroying precisely
what they are expected to maintain.
The same may be said of the army. The high officers, instead of
encouraging the roughness and cruelty of the soldiers, which befit their
occupation, promote the diffusion of education among them, preach
humanity, often sympathize with the socialistic ideas of the masses, and
deny the utility of war. In the late conspiracies against the Russian
government many of those concerned were military men. It often happens,
as it did recently, that the troops, when called upon to establish order, refuse
to fire on the people. The barrack code of ideas is frankly deprecated by
military men themselves, who often enough make it the subject of derision.
The same may be said of judges and lawyers. Judges, whose duty it is to
judge and condemn criminals, conduct their trials in such a fashion as to
prove them innocent; thus the Russian government, when it desires the
condemnation of those it wishes to punish, never confides them to the
ordinary tribunals; it tries them by court-martial, which is but a parody of
justice. The same may be said of lawyers, who often refuse to accuse, and,
twisting round the law, defend those they should accuse. Learned jurists,
whose duty it is to justify the violence of authority, deny more and more
frequently the right of punishment, and in its place introduce theories of
irresponsibility, often prescribing, not punishment, but medical treatment
for so-called criminals.
Jailers and turnkeys in convict prisons often become the protectors of those
it is a part of their business to torture. Policemen and detectives are
constantly saving those they ought to arrest. Ecclesiastics preach tolerance;
they often deny the right of violence, and the more educated among them
attempt in their sermons to avoid the deception which constitutes all the
meaning of their position, and which they are expected to preach.
Executioners refuse to perform their duty; the result is that often in Russia
death-warrants cannot be carried out for lack of executioners, for,
notwithstanding all the advantages of the position, the candidates, who are
chosen from convicts, diminish in number every year. Governors,
commissioners, and tax-collectors, pitying the people, often try to find
pretexts for remitting the taxes. Rich men no longer dare to use their wealth
Page 232
for themselves alone, but sacrifice a part of it to social charities.
Landowners establish hospitals and schools on their estates, and some even
renounce their estates and bestow them on the cultivators of the soil, or
establish agricultural colonies upon them. Manufacturers and mill-owners
found schools, hospitals, and savings-banks, institute pensions, and build
houses for the workmen; some start associations of which the profits are
equally divided among all. Capitalists expend a portion of their wealth on
educational, artistic, and philanthropic institutions for the public benefit.
Many men who are unwilling to part with their riches during their lifetime
bequeath them to public institutions.
These facts might be deemed the result of chance were it not that they all
originate from one source, as, when certain trees begin to bud in the spring
of the year, we might believe it accidental, only we know the cause; and
that if on some trees the buds begin to swell, we know that the same thing
will happen to all of them.
Even so is it in regard to Christian public opinion and its manifestations. If
this public opinion already influences some of the more sensitive men, and
makes each one in his own sphere decline the advantages obtained by
violence or its use, it will continue to influence men more and more, until it
brings about a change in their mode of life and reconciles it with that
Christian consciousness already possessed by the most advanced.
And if there are already rulers who do not venture on any undertaking on
their own responsibility, and who try to be like ordinary men rather than
monarchs, who declare themselves ready to give up their prerogatives and
become the first citizens of their country, and soldiers who, realizing all the
sin and evil of war, do not wish to kill either foreigners or their fellow-
countrymen, judges and lawyers who do not wish to accuse and condemn
criminals, priests who evade preaching lies, tax-gatherers who endeavor to
fulfil as gently as possible what they are called upon to do, and rich men
who give up their wealth, then surely it will ultimately come to pass that
other rulers, soldiers, priests, and rich men will follow their example. And
when there are no more men ready to occupy positions supported by
violence, the positions themselves will cease to exist.
But this is not the only way by which public opinion leads toward the
abolition of the existing system, and the substitution of a new one. As the
Landowners establish hospitals and schools on their estates, and some even
renounce their estates and bestow them on the cultivators of the soil, or
establish agricultural colonies upon them. Manufacturers and mill-owners
found schools, hospitals, and savings-banks, institute pensions, and build
houses for the workmen; some start associations of which the profits are
equally divided among all. Capitalists expend a portion of their wealth on
educational, artistic, and philanthropic institutions for the public benefit.
Many men who are unwilling to part with their riches during their lifetime
bequeath them to public institutions.
These facts might be deemed the result of chance were it not that they all
originate from one source, as, when certain trees begin to bud in the spring
of the year, we might believe it accidental, only we know the cause; and
that if on some trees the buds begin to swell, we know that the same thing
will happen to all of them.
Even so is it in regard to Christian public opinion and its manifestations. If
this public opinion already influences some of the more sensitive men, and
makes each one in his own sphere decline the advantages obtained by
violence or its use, it will continue to influence men more and more, until it
brings about a change in their mode of life and reconciles it with that
Christian consciousness already possessed by the most advanced.
And if there are already rulers who do not venture on any undertaking on
their own responsibility, and who try to be like ordinary men rather than
monarchs, who declare themselves ready to give up their prerogatives and
become the first citizens of their country, and soldiers who, realizing all the
sin and evil of war, do not wish to kill either foreigners or their fellow-
countrymen, judges and lawyers who do not wish to accuse and condemn
criminals, priests who evade preaching lies, tax-gatherers who endeavor to
fulfil as gently as possible what they are called upon to do, and rich men
who give up their wealth, then surely it will ultimately come to pass that
other rulers, soldiers, priests, and rich men will follow their example. And
when there are no more men ready to occupy positions supported by
violence, the positions themselves will cease to exist.
But this is not the only way by which public opinion leads toward the
abolition of the existing system, and the substitution of a new one. As the
Page 233
positions supported by violence become by degrees less and less attractive,
and there are fewer and fewer applicants to fill them, their uselessness
becomes more and more apparent.
We have to-day the same rulers and governments, the same armies, courts
of law, tax-gatherers, priests, wealthy landowners, manufacturers, and
capitalists as formerly, but their relative positions are changed.
The same rulers go about to their various interviews, they have the same
meetings, hunts, festivities, balls, and uniforms; the same diplomatists have
the same conversations about alliances and armies; the same parliaments, in
which Eastern and African questions are discussed, and questions in regard
to alliances, ruptures, "Home Rule," the eight-hour day. Changes of
ministry take place just as of old, accompanied by the same speeches and
incidents. But to those who know how an article in a newspaper changes
perhaps the position of affairs more than dozens of royal interviews and
parliamentary sessions, it becomes more and more evident that it is not
these meetings, interviews, and parliamentary discussions that control
affairs, but something independent of all this, something which has no local
habitation.
The same generals, officers, soldiers, cannon, fortresses, parades, and
evolutions. But one year elapses, ten, twenty years elapse, and there is no
war. And troops are less and less to be relied on to suppress insurrection,
and it becomes more and more evident that generals, officers, and soldiers
are only figure-heads in triumphal processions, the plaything of a sovereign,
a sort of unwieldy and expensive corps-de-ballet.
The same lawyers and judges, and the same sessions, but it becomes more
and more evident that as civil courts make decisions in a great variety of
causes without anxiety about purely legal justice, and that criminal courts
are useless, because the punishment does not produce the desired result,
therefore these institutions have no other object than the maintenance of
men incapable of doing other things more useful.
The same priests, bishops, churches, and synods, but it becomes more and
more evident to all that these men themselves have long since ceased to
believe what they preach, and are therefore unable to persuade any one of
the necessity of believing what they no longer believe themselves.
and there are fewer and fewer applicants to fill them, their uselessness
becomes more and more apparent.
We have to-day the same rulers and governments, the same armies, courts
of law, tax-gatherers, priests, wealthy landowners, manufacturers, and
capitalists as formerly, but their relative positions are changed.
The same rulers go about to their various interviews, they have the same
meetings, hunts, festivities, balls, and uniforms; the same diplomatists have
the same conversations about alliances and armies; the same parliaments, in
which Eastern and African questions are discussed, and questions in regard
to alliances, ruptures, "Home Rule," the eight-hour day. Changes of
ministry take place just as of old, accompanied by the same speeches and
incidents. But to those who know how an article in a newspaper changes
perhaps the position of affairs more than dozens of royal interviews and
parliamentary sessions, it becomes more and more evident that it is not
these meetings, interviews, and parliamentary discussions that control
affairs, but something independent of all this, something which has no local
habitation.
The same generals, officers, soldiers, cannon, fortresses, parades, and
evolutions. But one year elapses, ten, twenty years elapse, and there is no
war. And troops are less and less to be relied on to suppress insurrection,
and it becomes more and more evident that generals, officers, and soldiers
are only figure-heads in triumphal processions, the plaything of a sovereign,
a sort of unwieldy and expensive corps-de-ballet.
The same lawyers and judges, and the same sessions, but it becomes more
and more evident that as civil courts make decisions in a great variety of
causes without anxiety about purely legal justice, and that criminal courts
are useless, because the punishment does not produce the desired result,
therefore these institutions have no other object than the maintenance of
men incapable of doing other things more useful.
The same priests, bishops, churches, and synods, but it becomes more and
more evident to all that these men themselves have long since ceased to
believe what they preach, and are therefore unable to persuade any one of
the necessity of believing what they no longer believe themselves.
Page 234
The same tax-gatherers, but more and more incapable of extorting money
from the people by force, and it becomes more and more evident that,
without such collectors, it would be possible to obtain by voluntary
contribution all that is required for social needs.
The same rich men, and yet it becomes more and more evident that they can
be useful only when they cease to be personal administrators of their
possessions, and surrender to society their wealth in whole or part.
When this becomes as plain to all men as it now is to a few, the question
will naturally arise: Why should we feed and support all those emperors,
kings, presidents, members of departments, and ministers, if all their
interviews and conversations amount to nothing? Would it not be better, as
some wit expressed it, to set up an india-rubber queen?
And of what use to us are armies, with their generals, their musicians, their
horses, and drums? Of what use are they when there is no war, when no one
wishes to conquer anybody else? And even if there were a war, other
nations would prevent us from reaping its advantages; while upon their
compatriots the troops would refuse to fire.
And what is the use of judges and attorneys whose decisions in civil cases
are not according to the law, and who, in criminal ones, are aware that
punishments are of no avail?
And of what use are tax-gatherers who are reluctant to collect the taxes,
when all that is needed could be contributed without their assistance?
And where is the use of a clergy which has long ceased to believe what it
preaches?
And of what use is capital in the hands of private individuals when it can be
beneficial only when it becomes public property? Having once asked all
these questions, men cannot but arrive at the conclusion that institutions
which have lost their usefulness should no longer be supported.
And furthermore, men who themselves occupy positions of privilege come
to see the necessity of abandoning them.
One day, in Moscow, I was present at a religious discussion which is
usually held during St. Thomas's week, near the church in the Okhotny
Ryad. A group of perhaps twenty men had gathered on the pavement, and a
from the people by force, and it becomes more and more evident that,
without such collectors, it would be possible to obtain by voluntary
contribution all that is required for social needs.
The same rich men, and yet it becomes more and more evident that they can
be useful only when they cease to be personal administrators of their
possessions, and surrender to society their wealth in whole or part.
When this becomes as plain to all men as it now is to a few, the question
will naturally arise: Why should we feed and support all those emperors,
kings, presidents, members of departments, and ministers, if all their
interviews and conversations amount to nothing? Would it not be better, as
some wit expressed it, to set up an india-rubber queen?
And of what use to us are armies, with their generals, their musicians, their
horses, and drums? Of what use are they when there is no war, when no one
wishes to conquer anybody else? And even if there were a war, other
nations would prevent us from reaping its advantages; while upon their
compatriots the troops would refuse to fire.
And what is the use of judges and attorneys whose decisions in civil cases
are not according to the law, and who, in criminal ones, are aware that
punishments are of no avail?
And of what use are tax-gatherers who are reluctant to collect the taxes,
when all that is needed could be contributed without their assistance?
And where is the use of a clergy which has long ceased to believe what it
preaches?
And of what use is capital in the hands of private individuals when it can be
beneficial only when it becomes public property? Having once asked all
these questions, men cannot but arrive at the conclusion that institutions
which have lost their usefulness should no longer be supported.
And furthermore, men who themselves occupy positions of privilege come
to see the necessity of abandoning them.
One day, in Moscow, I was present at a religious discussion which is
usually held during St. Thomas's week, near the church in the Okhotny
Ryad. A group of perhaps twenty men had gathered on the pavement, and a
Page 235
serious discussion concerning religion was in progress. Meanwhile, in the
nobles' club near at hand, a concert was taking place, and a police-officer,
having noticed the group of people gathered near the church, sent a
mounted policeman to order them to disperse,—not that the police-officer
cared in the least whether the group stayed where it was or dispersed. The
twenty men who had gathered inconvenienced no one, but the officer had
been on duty all the morning and felt obliged to do something. The young
policeman, a smart-looking fellow, with his right arm akimbo and a
clanking sword, rode up to us, calling out in an imperative tone: "Disperse,
you fellows! What business have you to gather there?" Every one turned to
look at him, while one of the speakers, a modest-looking man in a peasant's
coat, replied calmly and pleasantly: "We are talking about business, and
there is no reason why we should disperse; it might be better for you, my
young friend, if you were to jump off from your horse and to listen to us.
Very likely it would do you good;" and turning away he continued the
conversation. The policeman turned his horse without a word and rode
away.
Such scenes as this must be of frequent occurrence in countries where
violence is employed. The officer was bored; he had nothing to do, and the
poor fellow was placed in a position where he felt in duty bound to give
orders. He was deprived of a rational human existence; he could do nothing
but look on and give orders, give orders and look on, although both were
works of supererogation. It will not be long before all those unfortunate
rulers, ministers, members of parliaments, governors, generals, officers,
bishops, priests, and even rich men, will find themselves—indeed they have
already done so—in precisely the same position. Their sole occupation
consists in issuing orders; they send out their subordinates, like the officer
who sent the policeman to interfere with the people; and as the people with
whom they interfere ask not to be interfered with, this seems to their official
intelligence only to prove that they are very necessary.
But the time will surely come when it will be perfectly evident to every one
that they are not only useless, but an actual impediment, and those whose
course they obstruct will say gently and pleasantly, like the man in the
peasant's coat: "We beg that you will let us alone." Then the subordinates as
well as their instructors will find themselves compelled to take the good
advice that is offered them, cease to prance about among men with their
nobles' club near at hand, a concert was taking place, and a police-officer,
having noticed the group of people gathered near the church, sent a
mounted policeman to order them to disperse,—not that the police-officer
cared in the least whether the group stayed where it was or dispersed. The
twenty men who had gathered inconvenienced no one, but the officer had
been on duty all the morning and felt obliged to do something. The young
policeman, a smart-looking fellow, with his right arm akimbo and a
clanking sword, rode up to us, calling out in an imperative tone: "Disperse,
you fellows! What business have you to gather there?" Every one turned to
look at him, while one of the speakers, a modest-looking man in a peasant's
coat, replied calmly and pleasantly: "We are talking about business, and
there is no reason why we should disperse; it might be better for you, my
young friend, if you were to jump off from your horse and to listen to us.
Very likely it would do you good;" and turning away he continued the
conversation. The policeman turned his horse without a word and rode
away.
Such scenes as this must be of frequent occurrence in countries where
violence is employed. The officer was bored; he had nothing to do, and the
poor fellow was placed in a position where he felt in duty bound to give
orders. He was deprived of a rational human existence; he could do nothing
but look on and give orders, give orders and look on, although both were
works of supererogation. It will not be long before all those unfortunate
rulers, ministers, members of parliaments, governors, generals, officers,
bishops, priests, and even rich men, will find themselves—indeed they have
already done so—in precisely the same position. Their sole occupation
consists in issuing orders; they send out their subordinates, like the officer
who sent the policeman to interfere with the people; and as the people with
whom they interfere ask not to be interfered with, this seems to their official
intelligence only to prove that they are very necessary.
But the time will surely come when it will be perfectly evident to every one
that they are not only useless, but an actual impediment, and those whose
course they obstruct will say gently and pleasantly, like the man in the
peasant's coat: "We beg that you will let us alone." Then the subordinates as
well as their instructors will find themselves compelled to take the good
advice that is offered them, cease to prance about among men with their
Page 236
arms akimbo, and having discarded their glittering livery, listen to what is
said among men, and unite with them to help to promote the serious work
of the world.
Sooner or later the time will surely come when all the present institutions
supported by violence will cease to be; their too evident uselessness,
absurdity, and even unseemliness, will finally destroy them.
There must come a time when the same thing that happened to the king in
Andersen's fairy tale, "The King's New Clothes," will happen to men
occupying positions created by violence.
The tale tells of a king who cared enormously for new clothes, and to whom
one day came two tailors who agreed to make him a suit woven from a
wonderful stuff. The king engaged them and they set to work, saying that
the stuff possessed the remarkable quality of becoming invisible to any one
unfit for the office he holds. The courtiers came to inspect the work of the
tailors, but could see nothing, because these men were drawing their
needles through empty space. However, remembering the consequences,
they all pretended to see the cloth and to be very much pleased with it. Even
the king himself praised it. The hour appointed for the procession when he
was to walk wearing his new garment arrived. The king took off his clothes
and put on the new ones—that is, he remained naked all the while, and thus
he went in procession. But remembering the consequences, no one had the
courage to say that he was not dressed, until a little child, catching sight of
the naked king, innocently exclaimed, "But he has nothing on!" Whereupon
all the others who had known this before, but had not acknowledged it,
could no longer conceal the fact.
Thus will it be with those who, through inertia, continue to fill offices that
have long ceased to be of any consequence, until some chance observer,
who happens not to be engaged, as the Russian proverb has it, in "washing
one hand with the other," will ingenuously exclaim, "It is a long time since
these men were good for anything!"
The position of the Christian world, with its fortresses, cannon, dynamite,
guns, torpedoes, prisons, gallows, churches, factories, custom-houses, and
palaces is monstrous. But neither fortresses nor cannon nor guns by
themselves can make war, nor can the prisons lock their gates, nor the
gallows hang, nor the churches themselves lead men astray, nor the custom-
said among men, and unite with them to help to promote the serious work
of the world.
Sooner or later the time will surely come when all the present institutions
supported by violence will cease to be; their too evident uselessness,
absurdity, and even unseemliness, will finally destroy them.
There must come a time when the same thing that happened to the king in
Andersen's fairy tale, "The King's New Clothes," will happen to men
occupying positions created by violence.
The tale tells of a king who cared enormously for new clothes, and to whom
one day came two tailors who agreed to make him a suit woven from a
wonderful stuff. The king engaged them and they set to work, saying that
the stuff possessed the remarkable quality of becoming invisible to any one
unfit for the office he holds. The courtiers came to inspect the work of the
tailors, but could see nothing, because these men were drawing their
needles through empty space. However, remembering the consequences,
they all pretended to see the cloth and to be very much pleased with it. Even
the king himself praised it. The hour appointed for the procession when he
was to walk wearing his new garment arrived. The king took off his clothes
and put on the new ones—that is, he remained naked all the while, and thus
he went in procession. But remembering the consequences, no one had the
courage to say that he was not dressed, until a little child, catching sight of
the naked king, innocently exclaimed, "But he has nothing on!" Whereupon
all the others who had known this before, but had not acknowledged it,
could no longer conceal the fact.
Thus will it be with those who, through inertia, continue to fill offices that
have long ceased to be of any consequence, until some chance observer,
who happens not to be engaged, as the Russian proverb has it, in "washing
one hand with the other," will ingenuously exclaim, "It is a long time since
these men were good for anything!"
The position of the Christian world, with its fortresses, cannon, dynamite,
guns, torpedoes, prisons, gallows, churches, factories, custom-houses, and
palaces is monstrous. But neither fortresses nor cannon nor guns by
themselves can make war, nor can the prisons lock their gates, nor the
gallows hang, nor the churches themselves lead men astray, nor the custom-
Page 237
houses claim their dues, nor palaces and factories build and support
themselves; all these operations are performed by men. And when men
understand that they need not make them, then these things will cease to be.
And already men are beginning to understand this. If not yet understood by
all, it is already understood by those whom the rest of the world eventually
follows. And it is impossible to cease to understand what once has been
understood, and the masses not only can, but inevitably must, follow where
those who have understood have already led the way.
Hence the prophecy: that a time will come when all men will hearken unto
the word of God, will forget the arts of war, will melt their swords into
plowshares and their lances into reaping-hooks;—which, being translated,
means when all the prisons, the fortresses, the barracks, the palaces, and the
churches will remain empty, the gallows and the cannon will be useless.
This is no longer a mere Utopia, but a new and definite system of life,
toward which mankind is progressing with ever increasing rapidity.
But when will it come?
Eighteen hundred years ago Christ, in answer to this question, replied that
the end of the present world—that is, of the pagan system—would come
when the miseries of man had increased to their utmost limit; and when, at
the same time, the good news of the Kingdom of Heaven—that is, of the
possibility of a new system, one not founded upon violence—should be
proclaimed throughout the earth.[20]
"But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven,
but my Father only,"[21] said Christ. "Watch therefore: for ye know not what
hour your Lord doth come."
When will the hour arrive? Christ said that we cannot know. And for that
very reason we should hold ourselves in readiness to meet it, as the
goodman should watch his house against thieves, or like the virgins who
await with their lamps the coming of the bridegroom; and, moreover, we
should work with all our might to hasten the coming of that hour, as the
servants should use the talents they have received that they may increase.[22]
And there can be no other answer. The day and the hour of the advent of the
Kingdom of God men cannot know, since the coming of that hour depends
only on men themselves.
themselves; all these operations are performed by men. And when men
understand that they need not make them, then these things will cease to be.
And already men are beginning to understand this. If not yet understood by
all, it is already understood by those whom the rest of the world eventually
follows. And it is impossible to cease to understand what once has been
understood, and the masses not only can, but inevitably must, follow where
those who have understood have already led the way.
Hence the prophecy: that a time will come when all men will hearken unto
the word of God, will forget the arts of war, will melt their swords into
plowshares and their lances into reaping-hooks;—which, being translated,
means when all the prisons, the fortresses, the barracks, the palaces, and the
churches will remain empty, the gallows and the cannon will be useless.
This is no longer a mere Utopia, but a new and definite system of life,
toward which mankind is progressing with ever increasing rapidity.
But when will it come?
Eighteen hundred years ago Christ, in answer to this question, replied that
the end of the present world—that is, of the pagan system—would come
when the miseries of man had increased to their utmost limit; and when, at
the same time, the good news of the Kingdom of Heaven—that is, of the
possibility of a new system, one not founded upon violence—should be
proclaimed throughout the earth.[20]
"But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven,
but my Father only,"[21] said Christ. "Watch therefore: for ye know not what
hour your Lord doth come."
When will the hour arrive? Christ said that we cannot know. And for that
very reason we should hold ourselves in readiness to meet it, as the
goodman should watch his house against thieves, or like the virgins who
await with their lamps the coming of the bridegroom; and, moreover, we
should work with all our might to hasten the coming of that hour, as the
servants should use the talents they have received that they may increase.[22]
And there can be no other answer. The day and the hour of the advent of the
Kingdom of God men cannot know, since the coming of that hour depends
only on men themselves.
Page 238
The reply is like that of the wise man who, when the traveler asked him
how far he was from the city, answered, "Go on!"
How can we know if it is still far to the goal toward which humanity is
aiming, when we do not know how it will move toward it; that it depends
on humanity whether it moves steadily onward or pauses, whether it
accelerates or retards its pace.
All that we can know is what we who form humanity should or should not
do in order to bring about this Kingdom of God. And that we all know; for
each one has but to begin to do his duty, each one has but to live according
to the light that is within him, to bring about the immediate advent of the
promised Kingdom of God, for which the heart of every man yearns.
how far he was from the city, answered, "Go on!"
How can we know if it is still far to the goal toward which humanity is
aiming, when we do not know how it will move toward it; that it depends
on humanity whether it moves steadily onward or pauses, whether it
accelerates or retards its pace.
All that we can know is what we who form humanity should or should not
do in order to bring about this Kingdom of God. And that we all know; for
each one has but to begin to do his duty, each one has but to live according
to the light that is within him, to bring about the immediate advent of the
promised Kingdom of God, for which the heart of every man yearns.
Page 239
CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSION
"REPENT, FOR THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS AT HAND!"
1
Encounter with a train carrying soldiers to establish order among famine-stricken peasants—
The cause of the disorder—How the mandates of the higher authorities are carried out in
case of peasants' resistance—The affair at Orel as an example of violence and murder
committed for the purpose of asserting the rights of the rich—All the advantages of the
rich are founded on like acts of violence.
2
The Tula train and the behavior of the persons composing it—How men can behave as these
do—The reasons are neither ignorance, nor cruelty, nor cowardice, nor lack of
comprehension or of moral sense—They do these things because they think them
necessary to maintain the existing system, to support which they believe to be every
man's duty—On what the belief of the necessity and immutability of the existing order of
things is founded—For the upper classes it is based on the advantages it affords them—
But what compels men of the lower classes to believe in the immutability of this system,
when they derive no advantage from it, and maintain it with acts contrary to their
conscience?—The reason lies in the deceit practised by the upper classes upon the lower
in regard to the necessity of the existing order, and the legitimacy of acts of violence for
its maintenance—General deception—Special deception—The conscription.
3
How men reconcile the legitimacy of murder with the precepts of morality, and how they
admit the existence in their midst of a military organization for purposes of violence
which incessantly threatens the safety of society—Admitted only by the powers for
whom the present organization is advantageous—Violence sanctioned by the higher
authorities and carried out by the lower, notwithstanding the knowledge of its immorality,
because, owing to the organization of the State, the moral responsibility is divided among
a large number of participants, each of whom considers some other than himself
responsible—Moreover, the loss of consciousness of moral responsibility is also due to a
mistaken opinion as to the inequality of men, the consequent abuse of power by the
authorities, and servility of the lower classes—The condition of men who commit acts
contrary to their conscience is like the condition of a hypnotized person acting under the
influence of suggestion—In what does submission to the suggestion of the State differ
from submission to men of a higher order of consciousness or to public opinion?—The
CONCLUSION
"REPENT, FOR THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS AT HAND!"
1
Encounter with a train carrying soldiers to establish order among famine-stricken peasants—
The cause of the disorder—How the mandates of the higher authorities are carried out in
case of peasants' resistance—The affair at Orel as an example of violence and murder
committed for the purpose of asserting the rights of the rich—All the advantages of the
rich are founded on like acts of violence.
2
The Tula train and the behavior of the persons composing it—How men can behave as these
do—The reasons are neither ignorance, nor cruelty, nor cowardice, nor lack of
comprehension or of moral sense—They do these things because they think them
necessary to maintain the existing system, to support which they believe to be every
man's duty—On what the belief of the necessity and immutability of the existing order of
things is founded—For the upper classes it is based on the advantages it affords them—
But what compels men of the lower classes to believe in the immutability of this system,
when they derive no advantage from it, and maintain it with acts contrary to their
conscience?—The reason lies in the deceit practised by the upper classes upon the lower
in regard to the necessity of the existing order, and the legitimacy of acts of violence for
its maintenance—General deception—Special deception—The conscription.
3
How men reconcile the legitimacy of murder with the precepts of morality, and how they
admit the existence in their midst of a military organization for purposes of violence
which incessantly threatens the safety of society—Admitted only by the powers for
whom the present organization is advantageous—Violence sanctioned by the higher
authorities and carried out by the lower, notwithstanding the knowledge of its immorality,
because, owing to the organization of the State, the moral responsibility is divided among
a large number of participants, each of whom considers some other than himself
responsible—Moreover, the loss of consciousness of moral responsibility is also due to a
mistaken opinion as to the inequality of men, the consequent abuse of power by the
authorities, and servility of the lower classes—The condition of men who commit acts
contrary to their conscience is like the condition of a hypnotized person acting under the
influence of suggestion—In what does submission to the suggestion of the State differ
from submission to men of a higher order of consciousness or to public opinion?—The
Page 240
present system, which is the outcome of ancient public opinion, and which is already in
contradiction to the modern, is maintained only through torpor of conscience, induced by
auto-suggestion among the upper classes, and by the hypnotization of the lower—The
conscience or intelligent consciousness of these men may awaken, and there are instances
when it does awaken; therefore it cannot be said that any one of them will, or will not, do
what he sets out to do—Everything depends on the degree of comprehension of the
illegitimacy of the acts of violence, and this consciousness in men may either awaken
spontaneously or be roused by those already awakened.
4
Everything depends upon the strength of conviction of each individual man in regard to
Christian truth—But the advanced men of the present day consider it unnecessary to
explain and profess Christian truth, regarding it sufficient for the improvement of human
life to change its outward conditions within the limits allowed by power—Upon this
scientific theory of hypocrisy, which has taken the place of the hypocrisy of religion, men
of the wealthy classes base the justification of their position—In consequence of this
hypocrisy, maintained by violence and falsehood, they can pretend before each other to
be Christians, and rest content—The same hypocrisy allows men who preach the
Christian doctrine to take part in a régime of violence—No external improvements of life
can make it less miserable; its miseries are caused by disunion; disunion springs from
following falsehood instead of truth—Union is possible only in truth—Hypocrisy forbids
such a union, for while remaining hypocrites, men conceal from themselves and others
the truth they know—Hypocrisy changes into evil everything destined to ameliorate life
—It perverts the conception of right and wrong, and therefore is a bar to the perfection of
men—Acknowledged malefactors and criminals do less harm than those who live by
legalized violence cloaked by hypocrisy—All recognize the iniquity of our life, and
would long since have modified it, if it were not covered by the cloak of hypocrisy—But
it seems as if we had reached the limits of hypocrisy, and have but to make an effort of
consciousness in order to awaken—like the man who has nightmare—to a different
reality.
5
Can man make this effort?—According to the existing hypocritical theory, man is not free to
change his life—He is not free in his acts, but is always free to acknowledge or disregard
certain truths already known to him—The recognition of truth is the cause of action—The
cause of the apparent insolvability of the question of man's freedom—It lies only in the
acknowledgment of the truth revealed unto him—No other freedom exists—The
acknowledgment of the truth gives freedom, and points the way in which a man, willingly
or unwillingly, must walk—The recognition of truth and of true freedom allows man to
become a participant of the work of God, to be not the slave but a creator of life—Men
have but to forego the attempt to improve the external conditions of life, and direct all
their energies toward the recognition and profession of the truth that is known to them,
and the present painful system of life will vanish forthwith, and that portion of the
Kingdom of God which is accessible to men would be established—One has only to
cease lying and shamming to accomplish this—But what awaits us in the future?—What
will happen to mankind when they begin to obey the dictates of their conscience, and how
will they exist without the customary conditions of civilization?—Nothing truly good and
contradiction to the modern, is maintained only through torpor of conscience, induced by
auto-suggestion among the upper classes, and by the hypnotization of the lower—The
conscience or intelligent consciousness of these men may awaken, and there are instances
when it does awaken; therefore it cannot be said that any one of them will, or will not, do
what he sets out to do—Everything depends on the degree of comprehension of the
illegitimacy of the acts of violence, and this consciousness in men may either awaken
spontaneously or be roused by those already awakened.
4
Everything depends upon the strength of conviction of each individual man in regard to
Christian truth—But the advanced men of the present day consider it unnecessary to
explain and profess Christian truth, regarding it sufficient for the improvement of human
life to change its outward conditions within the limits allowed by power—Upon this
scientific theory of hypocrisy, which has taken the place of the hypocrisy of religion, men
of the wealthy classes base the justification of their position—In consequence of this
hypocrisy, maintained by violence and falsehood, they can pretend before each other to
be Christians, and rest content—The same hypocrisy allows men who preach the
Christian doctrine to take part in a régime of violence—No external improvements of life
can make it less miserable; its miseries are caused by disunion; disunion springs from
following falsehood instead of truth—Union is possible only in truth—Hypocrisy forbids
such a union, for while remaining hypocrites, men conceal from themselves and others
the truth they know—Hypocrisy changes into evil everything destined to ameliorate life
—It perverts the conception of right and wrong, and therefore is a bar to the perfection of
men—Acknowledged malefactors and criminals do less harm than those who live by
legalized violence cloaked by hypocrisy—All recognize the iniquity of our life, and
would long since have modified it, if it were not covered by the cloak of hypocrisy—But
it seems as if we had reached the limits of hypocrisy, and have but to make an effort of
consciousness in order to awaken—like the man who has nightmare—to a different
reality.
5
Can man make this effort?—According to the existing hypocritical theory, man is not free to
change his life—He is not free in his acts, but is always free to acknowledge or disregard
certain truths already known to him—The recognition of truth is the cause of action—The
cause of the apparent insolvability of the question of man's freedom—It lies only in the
acknowledgment of the truth revealed unto him—No other freedom exists—The
acknowledgment of the truth gives freedom, and points the way in which a man, willingly
or unwillingly, must walk—The recognition of truth and of true freedom allows man to
become a participant of the work of God, to be not the slave but a creator of life—Men
have but to forego the attempt to improve the external conditions of life, and direct all
their energies toward the recognition and profession of the truth that is known to them,
and the present painful system of life will vanish forthwith, and that portion of the
Kingdom of God which is accessible to men would be established—One has only to
cease lying and shamming to accomplish this—But what awaits us in the future?—What
will happen to mankind when they begin to obey the dictates of their conscience, and how
will they exist without the customary conditions of civilization?—Nothing truly good and
Page 241
beneficial can perish because of the realization of the truth, but will only increase in
strength when freed from the admixture of falsehood and hypocrisy.
6
Our system of life has reached the limit of misery, and cannot be ameliorated by any pagan
reorganization—All our life, with its pagan institutions, is devoid of meaning—Are we
obeying the will of God in maintaining our present privileges and obligations?—We are
in this position, not because such is the law of the universe, that it is inevitable, but
because we wish it, because it is advantageous for some of us—All our consciousness
contradicts this, and our deliverance consists in acknowledging the Christian truth, not to
do to one's neighbor that which one would not have done to one's self—As our
obligations in regard to ourselves should be subordinate to our obligations to others, so in
like manner our obligations to others should be subordinate to our obligations to God—
Deliverance from our position consists, if not in giving up our position and its rights at
once, at least in acknowledging our guilt, and neither lying nor trying to justify ourselves
—The true significance of our life consists in knowing and professing the truth, whereas
our approval of, and our activity in, the service of the State takes all meaning from life—
God demands that we serve Him, that is, that we seek to establish the greatest degree of
union among all human beings, which union is possible only in truth.
I was just putting the finishing touches to this two years' work when, on the
9th day of September,[23] I had occasion to go by rail to visit districts in the
governments of Tula and Ryazan, where certain peasants were suffering
from last year's famine, and others were enduring still greater suffering
from the same causes this year.[24] At one of the stations the train in which I
was a passenger met the express, which carried the Governor and troops
supplied with rods and loaded rifles for torturing and murdering the famine-
stricken peasants.
Although corporal punishment was legally abolished in Russia thirty years
ago, the custom of flogging as a means of making the decisions of authority
respected has been revived, and has of late been frequently employed. I had
heard of it, had read in the papers of the frightful tortures of which the
Governor of Nijni-Novgorod, Baranov, has gone so far as to boast, and of
the tortures that have been inflicted in Tchernigov, Tambov, Saratov,
Astrakhan, and Orel, but I had never yet witnessed, as I did now, how these
things were actually done.
And I myself saw well-meaning Russians, penetrated with the spirit of
Christ, but armed with muskets and carrying rods, on their way to murder
and torture their starving brothers.
The pretext was as follows:—
strength when freed from the admixture of falsehood and hypocrisy.
6
Our system of life has reached the limit of misery, and cannot be ameliorated by any pagan
reorganization—All our life, with its pagan institutions, is devoid of meaning—Are we
obeying the will of God in maintaining our present privileges and obligations?—We are
in this position, not because such is the law of the universe, that it is inevitable, but
because we wish it, because it is advantageous for some of us—All our consciousness
contradicts this, and our deliverance consists in acknowledging the Christian truth, not to
do to one's neighbor that which one would not have done to one's self—As our
obligations in regard to ourselves should be subordinate to our obligations to others, so in
like manner our obligations to others should be subordinate to our obligations to God—
Deliverance from our position consists, if not in giving up our position and its rights at
once, at least in acknowledging our guilt, and neither lying nor trying to justify ourselves
—The true significance of our life consists in knowing and professing the truth, whereas
our approval of, and our activity in, the service of the State takes all meaning from life—
God demands that we serve Him, that is, that we seek to establish the greatest degree of
union among all human beings, which union is possible only in truth.
I was just putting the finishing touches to this two years' work when, on the
9th day of September,[23] I had occasion to go by rail to visit districts in the
governments of Tula and Ryazan, where certain peasants were suffering
from last year's famine, and others were enduring still greater suffering
from the same causes this year.[24] At one of the stations the train in which I
was a passenger met the express, which carried the Governor and troops
supplied with rods and loaded rifles for torturing and murdering the famine-
stricken peasants.
Although corporal punishment was legally abolished in Russia thirty years
ago, the custom of flogging as a means of making the decisions of authority
respected has been revived, and has of late been frequently employed. I had
heard of it, had read in the papers of the frightful tortures of which the
Governor of Nijni-Novgorod, Baranov, has gone so far as to boast, and of
the tortures that have been inflicted in Tchernigov, Tambov, Saratov,
Astrakhan, and Orel, but I had never yet witnessed, as I did now, how these
things were actually done.
And I myself saw well-meaning Russians, penetrated with the spirit of
Christ, but armed with muskets and carrying rods, on their way to murder
and torture their starving brothers.
The pretext was as follows:—
Page 242
On the estate of a rich landowner, upon a piece of ground held by him in
common with the peasants, a forest had been allowed to grow. (When I say
that the forest "grew," I mean that the peasants had not only planted it, but
had continued to take care of it.) They had always had the use of it, and
therefore looked upon it as their own, or at least as common property; but
the landowner, confiscating it entirely to himself, began to cut down the
trees. The peasants lodged a complaint. The judge of the lower court
pronounced an illegal decision (I call it illegal on the authority of the
Procureur[25] and the Governor, who surely ought to understand the case) in
favor of the landowner. The higher courts, as well as the Senate, although
they could see that the case had been unfairly tried, confirmed the decision,
and the wood was awarded to the landowner, who continued to fell the
trees. But the peasants, believing it impossible that such an injustice could
be perpetrated by the higher magistrates, refused to submit to the decision,
and drove away the workmen sent to cut down the trees, saying that the
forest belonged to them, and that they would appeal to the Czar himself
before they would allow it to be touched.
The case was reported to St. Petersburg, from whence the Governor
received the order to enforce the decision of the courts, and in order to
execute the command, asked for troops.
Hence these soldiers who, armed with bayonets and provided with
cartridges and rods expressly prepared for the occasion and stored in one of
the vans, were on their way to enforce the decision of the higher authorities.
The execution of an order from the ruling powers can be accomplished
either by threats of torture and death, or by the enforcement of those threats,
according to the degree of resistance on the part of the people.
If, for instance, in Russia (it is practically the same in other lands where
state authority and the rights of ownership exist), the peasants offer to resist,
the result is as follows: The superior officer makes a speech and orders
them to obey. The excited crowd, accustomed to be duped by those in high
places, understands not a word that the representative of authority is saying
in his official, conventional language, and is by no means pacified.
Whereupon the commanding officer declares that unless they submit and
disperse, he will be forced to have recourse to arms. If the crowd still
refuses to yield and does not disperse, he orders his men to load the muskets
and to fire over their heads, and then, if the peasants still stand their ground,
common with the peasants, a forest had been allowed to grow. (When I say
that the forest "grew," I mean that the peasants had not only planted it, but
had continued to take care of it.) They had always had the use of it, and
therefore looked upon it as their own, or at least as common property; but
the landowner, confiscating it entirely to himself, began to cut down the
trees. The peasants lodged a complaint. The judge of the lower court
pronounced an illegal decision (I call it illegal on the authority of the
Procureur[25] and the Governor, who surely ought to understand the case) in
favor of the landowner. The higher courts, as well as the Senate, although
they could see that the case had been unfairly tried, confirmed the decision,
and the wood was awarded to the landowner, who continued to fell the
trees. But the peasants, believing it impossible that such an injustice could
be perpetrated by the higher magistrates, refused to submit to the decision,
and drove away the workmen sent to cut down the trees, saying that the
forest belonged to them, and that they would appeal to the Czar himself
before they would allow it to be touched.
The case was reported to St. Petersburg, from whence the Governor
received the order to enforce the decision of the courts, and in order to
execute the command, asked for troops.
Hence these soldiers who, armed with bayonets and provided with
cartridges and rods expressly prepared for the occasion and stored in one of
the vans, were on their way to enforce the decision of the higher authorities.
The execution of an order from the ruling powers can be accomplished
either by threats of torture and death, or by the enforcement of those threats,
according to the degree of resistance on the part of the people.
If, for instance, in Russia (it is practically the same in other lands where
state authority and the rights of ownership exist), the peasants offer to resist,
the result is as follows: The superior officer makes a speech and orders
them to obey. The excited crowd, accustomed to be duped by those in high
places, understands not a word that the representative of authority is saying
in his official, conventional language, and is by no means pacified.
Whereupon the commanding officer declares that unless they submit and
disperse, he will be forced to have recourse to arms. If the crowd still
refuses to yield and does not disperse, he orders his men to load the muskets
and to fire over their heads, and then, if the peasants still stand their ground,
Page 243
he orders the soldiers to aim at the crowds; they fire, and men fall wounded
and killed in the street. The crowd is dispersed, the soldiers, carrying out the
orders of their commanders, having laid hands upon those whom they
suppose to be the chief instigators, and arrested them. The dying, stained
with blood, the wounded, mutilated, and dead, among whom are often
women and children, are picked up. The dead are buried, the wounded sent
to the hospitals. Those who are supposed to be the ringleaders are taken to
the city and court-martialed, and if proved that they have used violence,
they are summarily hung. This has happened in Russia repeatedly, and
similar scenes must take place wherever the system of government is based
upon violence. Such is the course adopted in cases of revolt.
If, on the other hand, the peasants submit, the scene that ensues is entirely
original and peculiarly Russian. The Governor, on his arrival at the place,
either quarters the soldiers in the different houses of the village, where their
maintenance ruins the peasants, or, satisfied by threatening the people, he
graciously pardons them and departs. Or, as more frequently happens, he
addresses the multitude, upbraids it for disobedience, and announces that
the ringleaders must be punished; he seizes a certain number of men
considered as such, and without any form of trial causes them to be beaten
with rods in his presence.
In order to give an idea of the manner in which such an affair is conducted,
I will describe an instance of the kind which happened in Orel, which was
approved by the higher authorities. Like the landowner in Tula, the landed
proprietor at Orel chose to take possession of the peasants' property, and
here, too, as in the former instance, the peasants resisted. In this case, the
landowner, without the consent of the peasants, wished to dam up, for the
benefit of his mill, a flow of water which supplied the meadows. The
peasants resisted this.
The landlord lodged a complaint with the rural commissary, who illegally
(as was afterward admitted by the court) decided the case in favor of the
landowner, giving him leave to divert the water. The landowner sent
workmen to close the channel through which the water descended. The
peasants, excited at this unfair judgment, sent their women to prevent the
landowner's men from damming the channel. The women proceeded to the
dam, upset the carts, and drove the workmen away. The landowner entered
a complaint against them for committing a lawless act. The rural
and killed in the street. The crowd is dispersed, the soldiers, carrying out the
orders of their commanders, having laid hands upon those whom they
suppose to be the chief instigators, and arrested them. The dying, stained
with blood, the wounded, mutilated, and dead, among whom are often
women and children, are picked up. The dead are buried, the wounded sent
to the hospitals. Those who are supposed to be the ringleaders are taken to
the city and court-martialed, and if proved that they have used violence,
they are summarily hung. This has happened in Russia repeatedly, and
similar scenes must take place wherever the system of government is based
upon violence. Such is the course adopted in cases of revolt.
If, on the other hand, the peasants submit, the scene that ensues is entirely
original and peculiarly Russian. The Governor, on his arrival at the place,
either quarters the soldiers in the different houses of the village, where their
maintenance ruins the peasants, or, satisfied by threatening the people, he
graciously pardons them and departs. Or, as more frequently happens, he
addresses the multitude, upbraids it for disobedience, and announces that
the ringleaders must be punished; he seizes a certain number of men
considered as such, and without any form of trial causes them to be beaten
with rods in his presence.
In order to give an idea of the manner in which such an affair is conducted,
I will describe an instance of the kind which happened in Orel, which was
approved by the higher authorities. Like the landowner in Tula, the landed
proprietor at Orel chose to take possession of the peasants' property, and
here, too, as in the former instance, the peasants resisted. In this case, the
landowner, without the consent of the peasants, wished to dam up, for the
benefit of his mill, a flow of water which supplied the meadows. The
peasants resisted this.
The landlord lodged a complaint with the rural commissary, who illegally
(as was afterward admitted by the court) decided the case in favor of the
landowner, giving him leave to divert the water. The landowner sent
workmen to close the channel through which the water descended. The
peasants, excited at this unfair judgment, sent their women to prevent the
landowner's men from damming the channel. The women proceeded to the
dam, upset the carts, and drove the workmen away. The landowner entered
a complaint against them for committing a lawless act. The rural
Page 244
commissary gave the order to arrest and lock up in the village jail one
woman out of every family,—an order rather difficult to execute, since each
family included several women; and as it was impossible to tell which of
them to arrest, the police could not fulfil the order. The landowner
complained to the Governor of the laxity of the police. The Governor,
without stopping to consider the case, gave strict orders to the Ispravnik to
carry out at once the orders of the rural commissary. In obedience to his
superior the Ispravnik arrived in the village, and with that contempt for the
individual peculiar to Russian authorities, ordered the police to seize the
first women they could. Disputes and resistance arose. The Ispravnik,
paying no attention to this, persisted in his order that the police should take
one woman, innocent or guilty, from every household, and put her under
arrest. The peasants defended their wives and mothers; they refused to give
them up, and resisted the police and the Ispravnik. Thus another and a
greater offense was committed,—resistance to authority,—which was at
once reported in town. Then the Governor, just as I saw the Governor of
Tula, with a battalion of soldiers supplied with rods and muskets, backed by
all due accessories of telegraph and telephone, accompanied by a learned
physician who was to superintend the flogging from a medical standpoint,
started on an express train for the spot, like the modern Genghis Khan
predicted by Herzen. In the Volostnoye Pravlenie[26] were the soldiers, a
detachment of police with their revolvers suspended on red cords, the
principal peasants of the neighborhood, and the men accused. Around them
had collected a crowd of perhaps a thousand.
Driving up to the house of the Volostnoye Pravlenie, the Governor alighted
from his carriage and delivered an address, which had been prepared in
advance, after which he inquired for the criminals, and ordered a bench to
be brought. No one understood what he meant until the policeman, who
always accompanied the Governor and made all the arrangements for the
punishments which had already been enforced several times in the
government of Orel, explained that the bench was to be used for flogging.
This bench and the rods that had been brought by the party were both
produced. The executioners had been previously selected from certain
horse-thieves taken from the same village, the military having refused to do
the business.
woman out of every family,—an order rather difficult to execute, since each
family included several women; and as it was impossible to tell which of
them to arrest, the police could not fulfil the order. The landowner
complained to the Governor of the laxity of the police. The Governor,
without stopping to consider the case, gave strict orders to the Ispravnik to
carry out at once the orders of the rural commissary. In obedience to his
superior the Ispravnik arrived in the village, and with that contempt for the
individual peculiar to Russian authorities, ordered the police to seize the
first women they could. Disputes and resistance arose. The Ispravnik,
paying no attention to this, persisted in his order that the police should take
one woman, innocent or guilty, from every household, and put her under
arrest. The peasants defended their wives and mothers; they refused to give
them up, and resisted the police and the Ispravnik. Thus another and a
greater offense was committed,—resistance to authority,—which was at
once reported in town. Then the Governor, just as I saw the Governor of
Tula, with a battalion of soldiers supplied with rods and muskets, backed by
all due accessories of telegraph and telephone, accompanied by a learned
physician who was to superintend the flogging from a medical standpoint,
started on an express train for the spot, like the modern Genghis Khan
predicted by Herzen. In the Volostnoye Pravlenie[26] were the soldiers, a
detachment of police with their revolvers suspended on red cords, the
principal peasants of the neighborhood, and the men accused. Around them
had collected a crowd of perhaps a thousand.
Driving up to the house of the Volostnoye Pravlenie, the Governor alighted
from his carriage and delivered an address, which had been prepared in
advance, after which he inquired for the criminals, and ordered a bench to
be brought. No one understood what he meant until the policeman, who
always accompanied the Governor and made all the arrangements for the
punishments which had already been enforced several times in the
government of Orel, explained that the bench was to be used for flogging.
This bench and the rods that had been brought by the party were both
produced. The executioners had been previously selected from certain
horse-thieves taken from the same village, the military having refused to do
the business.
Page 245
When all was ready the Governor bade the first of the twelve men who
were pointed out to him by the landowner as the ringleaders to step
forward. It so happened that he was the father of a family, a man forty-five
years of age, respected in the community, whose rights he had manfully
defended.
He was led to the bench, stripped, and ordered to lie down.
He would have begged for mercy, but realizing how little it would avail, he
made the sign of the cross and stretched himself out on the bench. Two
policemen held him down, and the learned doctor stood by, ready in case of
need to give his scientific assistance. The executioners having spat upon
their hands, swung the rods, and the flogging began. The bench, it seemed,
was too narrow, and it was found difficult to keep the writhing victim,
whose muscles twitched convulsively, from falling off. Then the Governor
ordered to be brought another bench, to which a plank was adjusted in such
a way as to support it. The soldiers, ever ready with their continual salutes
and responses of "Yes, your Excellency," swiftly and obediently executed
the orders, while in the meantime the half-naked, pale, and suffering man,
trembling, with contracted brows and downcast eyes, stood by waiting.
When the bench was readjusted, he was again stretched out upon it, and the
horse-stealers renewed their blows. His back, his legs, and even his sides
were covered with bleeding wounds, and every blow was followed by the
muffled groan which he could no longer repress. In the crowd that stood by
one could hear the sobs of the wife and mother, the children, and the
kinsfolk of the man, as well as of all who had been called to witness the
punishment.
The wretched Governor, intoxicated with power, who had no doubt
convinced himself of the necessity for this performance, counted the strokes
on his fingers, while he smoked cigarette after cigarette, for the lighting of
which several obliging persons hastened to offer him a burning match.
After fifty blows had been given, the peasant lay motionless, without
uttering a sound, and the doctor, who had been educated in a government
school that he might devote his scientific knowledge to the service of his
country and his sovereign, approached the tortured man, felt his pulse,
listened to the beating of his heart, and reported to the representative of
authority that the victim had become unconscious, and declared that, from a
were pointed out to him by the landowner as the ringleaders to step
forward. It so happened that he was the father of a family, a man forty-five
years of age, respected in the community, whose rights he had manfully
defended.
He was led to the bench, stripped, and ordered to lie down.
He would have begged for mercy, but realizing how little it would avail, he
made the sign of the cross and stretched himself out on the bench. Two
policemen held him down, and the learned doctor stood by, ready in case of
need to give his scientific assistance. The executioners having spat upon
their hands, swung the rods, and the flogging began. The bench, it seemed,
was too narrow, and it was found difficult to keep the writhing victim,
whose muscles twitched convulsively, from falling off. Then the Governor
ordered to be brought another bench, to which a plank was adjusted in such
a way as to support it. The soldiers, ever ready with their continual salutes
and responses of "Yes, your Excellency," swiftly and obediently executed
the orders, while in the meantime the half-naked, pale, and suffering man,
trembling, with contracted brows and downcast eyes, stood by waiting.
When the bench was readjusted, he was again stretched out upon it, and the
horse-stealers renewed their blows. His back, his legs, and even his sides
were covered with bleeding wounds, and every blow was followed by the
muffled groan which he could no longer repress. In the crowd that stood by
one could hear the sobs of the wife and mother, the children, and the
kinsfolk of the man, as well as of all who had been called to witness the
punishment.
The wretched Governor, intoxicated with power, who had no doubt
convinced himself of the necessity for this performance, counted the strokes
on his fingers, while he smoked cigarette after cigarette, for the lighting of
which several obliging persons hastened to offer him a burning match.
After fifty blows had been given, the peasant lay motionless, without
uttering a sound, and the doctor, who had been educated in a government
school that he might devote his scientific knowledge to the service of his
country and his sovereign, approached the tortured man, felt his pulse,
listened to the beating of his heart, and reported to the representative of
authority that the victim had become unconscious, and declared that, from a
Page 246
scientific point of view, it might prove dangerous to prolong the
punishment. But the unfortunate Governor, utterly intoxicated by the sight
of blood, ordered the flogging to go on until seventy strokes had been
given, the number which he for some reason deemed necessary. After the
seventieth blow the Governor said:—
"That will do! Now bring on the next one!"
They raised the mutilated and unconscious man, with his swollen back, and
carried him away, and the next was brought forward. The sobs and groans
of the crowd increased, but the tortures were continued.
So it went on until each of the twelve men had received seventy strokes.
They begged for mercy, they groaned and screamed. The sobs and moans of
the women grew louder and more heartrending, and the faces of the men of
the crowd more gloomy. But there stood the troops, and the torture did not
cease until it had seemed sufficient to the unfortunate, half-intoxicated,
erring man called the Governor.
Not only did the magistrates, the officers, and the soldiers sanction this act
by their presence, but they took part in it, preventing the crowd from
interfering with the order of its execution.
When I asked one of the chief officials why these tortures were inflicted
after the men had already submitted, he replied, with the significant air of a
man who understands all the fine points of political wisdom, that it was
done because it had been proved by experience that if the peasants are not
punished they will soon begin again to oppose the decrees of authority, and
that the punishment of a few strengthens forever the power of authority.
And now I saw the Governor of Tula, with his clerks, officers, and soldiers,
on his way to perform a similar act. Once more by murder or torture the
sentence of the higher authorities was to be carried out,—a sentence whose
object was to enable a young landowner, the possessor of a yearly income
of 100,000 roubles, to receive 3000 more for a tract of wood of which he
had basely defrauded a whole community of needy and starving peasants,
the price of which he would squander in a few weeks in the restaurants of
St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Paris. Such was the errand of the men I met.
It would seem as if there must be some purpose in this encounter, when,
after two years of incessant contemplation, of continuous thought in one
punishment. But the unfortunate Governor, utterly intoxicated by the sight
of blood, ordered the flogging to go on until seventy strokes had been
given, the number which he for some reason deemed necessary. After the
seventieth blow the Governor said:—
"That will do! Now bring on the next one!"
They raised the mutilated and unconscious man, with his swollen back, and
carried him away, and the next was brought forward. The sobs and groans
of the crowd increased, but the tortures were continued.
So it went on until each of the twelve men had received seventy strokes.
They begged for mercy, they groaned and screamed. The sobs and moans of
the women grew louder and more heartrending, and the faces of the men of
the crowd more gloomy. But there stood the troops, and the torture did not
cease until it had seemed sufficient to the unfortunate, half-intoxicated,
erring man called the Governor.
Not only did the magistrates, the officers, and the soldiers sanction this act
by their presence, but they took part in it, preventing the crowd from
interfering with the order of its execution.
When I asked one of the chief officials why these tortures were inflicted
after the men had already submitted, he replied, with the significant air of a
man who understands all the fine points of political wisdom, that it was
done because it had been proved by experience that if the peasants are not
punished they will soon begin again to oppose the decrees of authority, and
that the punishment of a few strengthens forever the power of authority.
And now I saw the Governor of Tula, with his clerks, officers, and soldiers,
on his way to perform a similar act. Once more by murder or torture the
sentence of the higher authorities was to be carried out,—a sentence whose
object was to enable a young landowner, the possessor of a yearly income
of 100,000 roubles, to receive 3000 more for a tract of wood of which he
had basely defrauded a whole community of needy and starving peasants,
the price of which he would squander in a few weeks in the restaurants of
St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Paris. Such was the errand of the men I met.
It would seem as if there must be some purpose in this encounter, when,
after two years of incessant contemplation, of continuous thought in one
Page 247
direction, fate should, for the first time in my life, bring me face to face
with this phenomenon, a living illustration of the theory I have so long
cherished; namely, that the entire organization of our life rests, not on any
principle of justice, as men who occupy and enjoy advantageous positions
under the existing system like to imagine, but on the rudest and most
barefaced violence, on the murder and torture of human beings.
Those who possess large estates and large capital, or who receive high
salaries collected from the needy working-classes, from the people who
often lack the necessaries of life; merchants, clerks, doctors, lawyers,
artists, scientists, writers, coachmen, cooks, and valets, who earn their
living in the service of rich men,—fondly believe that the privileges which
they enjoy are not the outcome of violence, but the natural result of a
voluntary interchange of services; that these privileges are by no means the
result of the outrages and floggings endured by their fellow-men, such as
took place last summer, in Russia, in Orel and elsewhere, as the like took
place in many parts of Europe and America. They prefer to believe that the
privileges they enjoy are the spontaneous result of a mutual agreement
among men; that violence is only the natural result of certain universal and
superior laws, judicial, political, or economic. They try not to see that the
privileges they possess are only held by them in consequence of some
circumstance, not unlike that which compelled the peasants, who had
tended the growing forest and greatly needed it, to surrender it to the rich
landowner, who had taken no pains to preserve it, and who did not require it
for his own use; men who will either be flogged or murdered if they refuse
to surrender it. Now, if it is an undeniable fact that the mill in Orel was
made to yield an increased income to the proprietor, and that the forest
raised by the peasants was given to the landowner only because of the
flogging and the executions either threatened or actually suffered, then it
must be equally evident that all the other exclusive rights of the rich, which
deprive the poor of the bare necessaries of life, rest on the same basis.
If the peasants who need land in order to support their families may not
cultivate the land around them, and if land sufficient to feed a thousand
families is in the hands of one man, a Russian, an Englishman, an Austrian,
a rich landowner of whatever nationality; and if the merchant who buys
grain from the needy grower keeps it in his warehouses in the midst of a
destitute and famishing population, or sells it for three times its value to
with this phenomenon, a living illustration of the theory I have so long
cherished; namely, that the entire organization of our life rests, not on any
principle of justice, as men who occupy and enjoy advantageous positions
under the existing system like to imagine, but on the rudest and most
barefaced violence, on the murder and torture of human beings.
Those who possess large estates and large capital, or who receive high
salaries collected from the needy working-classes, from the people who
often lack the necessaries of life; merchants, clerks, doctors, lawyers,
artists, scientists, writers, coachmen, cooks, and valets, who earn their
living in the service of rich men,—fondly believe that the privileges which
they enjoy are not the outcome of violence, but the natural result of a
voluntary interchange of services; that these privileges are by no means the
result of the outrages and floggings endured by their fellow-men, such as
took place last summer, in Russia, in Orel and elsewhere, as the like took
place in many parts of Europe and America. They prefer to believe that the
privileges they enjoy are the spontaneous result of a mutual agreement
among men; that violence is only the natural result of certain universal and
superior laws, judicial, political, or economic. They try not to see that the
privileges they possess are only held by them in consequence of some
circumstance, not unlike that which compelled the peasants, who had
tended the growing forest and greatly needed it, to surrender it to the rich
landowner, who had taken no pains to preserve it, and who did not require it
for his own use; men who will either be flogged or murdered if they refuse
to surrender it. Now, if it is an undeniable fact that the mill in Orel was
made to yield an increased income to the proprietor, and that the forest
raised by the peasants was given to the landowner only because of the
flogging and the executions either threatened or actually suffered, then it
must be equally evident that all the other exclusive rights of the rich, which
deprive the poor of the bare necessaries of life, rest on the same basis.
If the peasants who need land in order to support their families may not
cultivate the land around them, and if land sufficient to feed a thousand
families is in the hands of one man, a Russian, an Englishman, an Austrian,
a rich landowner of whatever nationality; and if the merchant who buys
grain from the needy grower keeps it in his warehouses in the midst of a
destitute and famishing population, or sells it for three times its value to
Page 248
those of whom he bought it at the lowest price,—it evidently springs from
the same cause.
And if, beyond a certain line called the frontier, one man is not allowed to
purchase certain goods without paying duties to other men who have
nothing to do with their production, and if a man is obliged to part with his
last cow in order to pay taxes which are distributed by the government
among its officials, or used for the support of soldiers who may kill the
taxpayers, it would seem evident that all this is not the result of certain
abstract rights, but of incidents like those which may even now be going on
in the government of Tula, which in one form or another occur periodically
all the world over, wherever state organization exists, and wherever there
are rich and poor.
Owing to the fact that outrage and murder do not accompany all social
relations founded on violence, those who possess the exclusive privileges of
the governing classes assure themselves and others that the advantages
which they enjoy are not the result of violence and bloodshed, but derived
from certain vague and abstract rights. Still it ought to be evident that if
those men, who realize the injustice of it all (as is the case with the
working-classes at the present day), continue to surrender the greater part of
their earnings to the capitalist and the landowner, and if they pay taxes,
knowing that such taxes are not put to a good use, they do this, not because
they acknowledge the justice of certain abstract rights, whose meaning is
unknown to them, but only because they know that they will be whipped
and put to death if they refuse to comply.
the same cause.
And if, beyond a certain line called the frontier, one man is not allowed to
purchase certain goods without paying duties to other men who have
nothing to do with their production, and if a man is obliged to part with his
last cow in order to pay taxes which are distributed by the government
among its officials, or used for the support of soldiers who may kill the
taxpayers, it would seem evident that all this is not the result of certain
abstract rights, but of incidents like those which may even now be going on
in the government of Tula, which in one form or another occur periodically
all the world over, wherever state organization exists, and wherever there
are rich and poor.
Owing to the fact that outrage and murder do not accompany all social
relations founded on violence, those who possess the exclusive privileges of
the governing classes assure themselves and others that the advantages
which they enjoy are not the result of violence and bloodshed, but derived
from certain vague and abstract rights. Still it ought to be evident that if
those men, who realize the injustice of it all (as is the case with the
working-classes at the present day), continue to surrender the greater part of
their earnings to the capitalist and the landowner, and if they pay taxes,
knowing that such taxes are not put to a good use, they do this, not because
they acknowledge the justice of certain abstract rights, whose meaning is
unknown to them, but only because they know that they will be whipped
and put to death if they refuse to comply.
Page 249
If it is not always necessary to imprison men, to flog them, or to put them to
death when the landowner collects his rents, if the needy peasant pays a
treble price to the merchant who deceives him, or the mechanic accepts
wages absurdly small in comparison with the income of his master, or the
poor man parts with his last rouble for duties and taxes, it is because he
remembers that men have been flogged and put to death for trying to avoid
compliance with what was demanded of them. Like a caged tiger, who does
not touch the meat that lies before his eyes, and who when he is ordered to
leap over a stick obeys at once, not because he likes it, but because he has
not forgotten past hunger or the red-hot iron which he felt every time he
refused to obey; so it is with men, who, when they submit to a law which is
not for their advantage, to a law which is disastrous to their interests, or to
one which they firmly believe to be unjust, do so because they remember
what they will have to suffer if they refuse to comply.
Those who benefit by privileges born of violence long since perpetrated,
often forget, and are very glad to forget, how such privileges were obtained.
And yet one has but to recall the annals of history,—not the history of the
exploits of kings, but genuine history,—the history of the oppression of the
majority by the minority, in order to acknowledge that the scourge, the
prison, and the gallows have been the original and only sources whence all
the advantages of the rich over the poor have sprung. One has but to
remember the persistent and undying passion for gain among men, the
mainspring of human action in these days, to become convinced that the
advantages of the rich over the poor can be maintained in no other way.
At rare intervals, oppression, flogging, imprisonment, executions, the direct
object of which is not to promote the welfare of the rich, may possibly
occur, but we can positively declare that in our community, where for every
man who lives at ease there are ten overworked, hungry, and often cruelly
suffering families of working-men, all the privileges of the rich, all their
luxury, all their superfluities, are acquired and maintained only by tortures,
imprisonments, and executions.
The train that I met on the 9th day of September carrying soldiers, muskets,
ammunition, and rods to the famine-stricken peasants, in order that the
wealthy landowner might possess in peace the tract of wood he had wrested
from the peasants, a necessity of life to them, to him a mere superfluity,
death when the landowner collects his rents, if the needy peasant pays a
treble price to the merchant who deceives him, or the mechanic accepts
wages absurdly small in comparison with the income of his master, or the
poor man parts with his last rouble for duties and taxes, it is because he
remembers that men have been flogged and put to death for trying to avoid
compliance with what was demanded of them. Like a caged tiger, who does
not touch the meat that lies before his eyes, and who when he is ordered to
leap over a stick obeys at once, not because he likes it, but because he has
not forgotten past hunger or the red-hot iron which he felt every time he
refused to obey; so it is with men, who, when they submit to a law which is
not for their advantage, to a law which is disastrous to their interests, or to
one which they firmly believe to be unjust, do so because they remember
what they will have to suffer if they refuse to comply.
Those who benefit by privileges born of violence long since perpetrated,
often forget, and are very glad to forget, how such privileges were obtained.
And yet one has but to recall the annals of history,—not the history of the
exploits of kings, but genuine history,—the history of the oppression of the
majority by the minority, in order to acknowledge that the scourge, the
prison, and the gallows have been the original and only sources whence all
the advantages of the rich over the poor have sprung. One has but to
remember the persistent and undying passion for gain among men, the
mainspring of human action in these days, to become convinced that the
advantages of the rich over the poor can be maintained in no other way.
At rare intervals, oppression, flogging, imprisonment, executions, the direct
object of which is not to promote the welfare of the rich, may possibly
occur, but we can positively declare that in our community, where for every
man who lives at ease there are ten overworked, hungry, and often cruelly
suffering families of working-men, all the privileges of the rich, all their
luxury, all their superfluities, are acquired and maintained only by tortures,
imprisonments, and executions.
The train that I met on the 9th day of September carrying soldiers, muskets,
ammunition, and rods to the famine-stricken peasants, in order that the
wealthy landowner might possess in peace the tract of wood he had wrested
from the peasants, a necessity of life to them, to him a mere superfluity,
Page 250
affords a vivid proof of the degree to which men have unconsciously
acquired the habit of committing acts wholly at variance with their
convictions and their conscience.
The express consisted of one first-class carriage for the Governor, officials,
and officers, and several vans crowded with soldiers. The jaunty young
fellows in their fresh new uniforms were crowded together, either standing,
or sitting with their legs dangling outside the wide open sliding doors of the
vans. Some were smoking, laughing, and jesting, some cracking seeds and
spitting out the shells. A few who jumped down upon the platform to get a
drink of water from the tub, meeting some of the officers, slackened their
pace and made that senseless gesture of lifting one hand to the forehead;
then, with serious faces, as though they had been doing something not only
sensible but actually important, they passed by, watching the officers as
they went. Soon they broke into a run, evidently in high spirits, stamping on
the planks of the platform as they ran, and chatting, as is but natural for
good-natured, healthy young fellows who are making a journey together.
These men, who were on their way to murder starving fathers and
grandfathers, seemed as unconcerned as though they were off on the
pleasantest, or at least the most everyday, business in the world.
The gaily dressed officers and officials who were scattered about on the
platform and in the first-class waiting-room produced the same impression.
At a table laden with bottles sat the Governor, the commander of the
expedition, attired in his semi-military uniform, eating his luncheon and
quietly discussing the weather with some friends he had met, as though the
business that called him hither was so simple a matter that it could neither
ruffle his equanimity nor diminish his interest in the change of the weather.
At some distance, but tasting no food, sat the chief of the police with a
mournful countenance, seemingly oppressed with the tiresome formalities.
Officers in gaudy, gold-embroidered uniforms moved to and fro, talking
loudly; one group was seated at a table just finishing a bottle of wine; an
officer at the bar who had eaten a cake brushed away the crumbs that had
fallen on his uniform, and with a self-sufficient air flung a coin upon the
counter; some walked nonchalantly up and down in front of our train
looking at the faces of the women.
acquired the habit of committing acts wholly at variance with their
convictions and their conscience.
The express consisted of one first-class carriage for the Governor, officials,
and officers, and several vans crowded with soldiers. The jaunty young
fellows in their fresh new uniforms were crowded together, either standing,
or sitting with their legs dangling outside the wide open sliding doors of the
vans. Some were smoking, laughing, and jesting, some cracking seeds and
spitting out the shells. A few who jumped down upon the platform to get a
drink of water from the tub, meeting some of the officers, slackened their
pace and made that senseless gesture of lifting one hand to the forehead;
then, with serious faces, as though they had been doing something not only
sensible but actually important, they passed by, watching the officers as
they went. Soon they broke into a run, evidently in high spirits, stamping on
the planks of the platform as they ran, and chatting, as is but natural for
good-natured, healthy young fellows who are making a journey together.
These men, who were on their way to murder starving fathers and
grandfathers, seemed as unconcerned as though they were off on the
pleasantest, or at least the most everyday, business in the world.
The gaily dressed officers and officials who were scattered about on the
platform and in the first-class waiting-room produced the same impression.
At a table laden with bottles sat the Governor, the commander of the
expedition, attired in his semi-military uniform, eating his luncheon and
quietly discussing the weather with some friends he had met, as though the
business that called him hither was so simple a matter that it could neither
ruffle his equanimity nor diminish his interest in the change of the weather.
At some distance, but tasting no food, sat the chief of the police with a
mournful countenance, seemingly oppressed with the tiresome formalities.
Officers in gaudy, gold-embroidered uniforms moved to and fro, talking
loudly; one group was seated at a table just finishing a bottle of wine; an
officer at the bar who had eaten a cake brushed away the crumbs that had
fallen on his uniform, and with a self-sufficient air flung a coin upon the
counter; some walked nonchalantly up and down in front of our train
looking at the faces of the women.
Page 251
All these men on their way to commit murder, or to torture the starved and
defenseless peasants, by whose toil they were supported, looked as if
engaged upon some important business which they were really proud to
execute.
What did it mean?
These men, who were within half an hour's ride of the spot where, in order
to procure for a rich man an extra 3000 roubles, of which he had no need
whatever, which he was unjustly confiscating from a community of
famished peasants, might be obliged to perform the most shocking deeds
that the imagination can conceive,—to murder and torture, as they did in
Orel, innocent men, their brothers. These men were now calmly
approaching the time and place when these horrors were to begin.
Since the preparations had been made, it could not very well be claimed
that all these men, officers and privates, did not know what was before
them, and what they were expected to do. The Governor had given orders
for the rods, the officials had purchased the birch twigs, bargained for them,
and noted the purchase in their accounts. In the military department orders
had been given and received concerning ball cartridges. They all knew that
they were on their way to torture and possibly to put to death their brothers
exhausted by famine, and that perhaps in an hour they might begin the
work.
To say, as they themselves would say, that they are acting from principle,
from a conviction that the state system must be maintained, is untrue. Those
men, in the first place, have rarely, if ever, bestowed a single thought upon
political science; and in the second place, because they could never be
convinced that the business on which they are engaged serves to support
rather than destroy the State; and finally, because, as a matter of fact, the
majority of these men, if not all of them, would not only be unwilling to
sacrifice their peace and comfort to maintain the State, but would never
miss the opportunity to promote their own interests at the expense of the
State,—therefore it is not for the sake of so vague a principle as that of
maintaining the State that they do this.
What, then, does all this mean?
defenseless peasants, by whose toil they were supported, looked as if
engaged upon some important business which they were really proud to
execute.
What did it mean?
These men, who were within half an hour's ride of the spot where, in order
to procure for a rich man an extra 3000 roubles, of which he had no need
whatever, which he was unjustly confiscating from a community of
famished peasants, might be obliged to perform the most shocking deeds
that the imagination can conceive,—to murder and torture, as they did in
Orel, innocent men, their brothers. These men were now calmly
approaching the time and place when these horrors were to begin.
Since the preparations had been made, it could not very well be claimed
that all these men, officers and privates, did not know what was before
them, and what they were expected to do. The Governor had given orders
for the rods, the officials had purchased the birch twigs, bargained for them,
and noted the purchase in their accounts. In the military department orders
had been given and received concerning ball cartridges. They all knew that
they were on their way to torture and possibly to put to death their brothers
exhausted by famine, and that perhaps in an hour they might begin the
work.
To say, as they themselves would say, that they are acting from principle,
from a conviction that the state system must be maintained, is untrue. Those
men, in the first place, have rarely, if ever, bestowed a single thought upon
political science; and in the second place, because they could never be
convinced that the business on which they are engaged serves to support
rather than destroy the State; and finally, because, as a matter of fact, the
majority of these men, if not all of them, would not only be unwilling to
sacrifice their peace and comfort to maintain the State, but would never
miss the opportunity to promote their own interests at the expense of the
State,—therefore it is not for the sake of so vague a principle as that of
maintaining the State that they do this.
What, then, does all this mean?
Page 252
I know these men. I may not know them as individuals, it is true, yet I know
their dispositions, their past lives, their modes of thought. They have had
mothers, some have wives and children. Actually, they are, for the most
part, kindly, gentle, tender-hearted men, who abhor any kind of cruelty, to
say nothing of killing or torturing; moreover, every one of them professes
Christianity, and considers violence perpetrated against the defenseless a
contemptible and shameful act. Each taken individually, in everyday life, is
not only incapable, for the sake of personal advantage, of doing one-
hundredth part of what was done by the Governor at Orel, but any one of
them would consider himself insulted if it were suggested that he could be
capable of doing anything like it in private life. And yet they are within a
half-hour's ride of the spot where they will inevitably find themselves
compelled to do such deeds.
What can it mean, then?
It is not only the men on this train who are ready to commit murder and
violence, but those others with whom the affair originated, the landowner,
the steward, the judge, those in St. Petersburg who issue orders,—the
Minister of State, the Czar, also worthy men and professors of Christianity,
—how can they, knowing the consequences, conceive such a scheme, and
direct its execution?
How can they, even, who take no active part in it,—the spectators, whose
indignation would be aroused by accounts of private violence, even though
it be but the ill-usage of a horse,—how can they allow this shocking
business to go on without rising in wrath to resist it, crying aloud, "No, we
will not allow you to flog or to kill starving men because they refuse to
surrender their last property villainously attempted to be wrested from
them!" And not only are men found willing to do these deeds, but most of
them, even the chief instigators, like the steward, the landowner, the judge,
and those who take part in originating prosecution and punishment, the
Governor, the Minister of State, the Czar, remain perfectly calm, and show
no sign of remorse over such things. And they who are about to execute this
crime are equally calm.
Even the spectators, who, it would seem, have no personal interest in the
matter, look upon these men who are about to take part in this dastardly
business with sympathy rather than with aversion or condemnation.
their dispositions, their past lives, their modes of thought. They have had
mothers, some have wives and children. Actually, they are, for the most
part, kindly, gentle, tender-hearted men, who abhor any kind of cruelty, to
say nothing of killing or torturing; moreover, every one of them professes
Christianity, and considers violence perpetrated against the defenseless a
contemptible and shameful act. Each taken individually, in everyday life, is
not only incapable, for the sake of personal advantage, of doing one-
hundredth part of what was done by the Governor at Orel, but any one of
them would consider himself insulted if it were suggested that he could be
capable of doing anything like it in private life. And yet they are within a
half-hour's ride of the spot where they will inevitably find themselves
compelled to do such deeds.
What can it mean, then?
It is not only the men on this train who are ready to commit murder and
violence, but those others with whom the affair originated, the landowner,
the steward, the judge, those in St. Petersburg who issue orders,—the
Minister of State, the Czar, also worthy men and professors of Christianity,
—how can they, knowing the consequences, conceive such a scheme, and
direct its execution?
How can they, even, who take no active part in it,—the spectators, whose
indignation would be aroused by accounts of private violence, even though
it be but the ill-usage of a horse,—how can they allow this shocking
business to go on without rising in wrath to resist it, crying aloud, "No, we
will not allow you to flog or to kill starving men because they refuse to
surrender their last property villainously attempted to be wrested from
them!" And not only are men found willing to do these deeds, but most of
them, even the chief instigators, like the steward, the landowner, the judge,
and those who take part in originating prosecution and punishment, the
Governor, the Minister of State, the Czar, remain perfectly calm, and show
no sign of remorse over such things. And they who are about to execute this
crime are equally calm.
Even the spectators, who, it would seem, have no personal interest in the
matter, look upon these men who are about to take part in this dastardly
business with sympathy rather than with aversion or condemnation.
Page 253
In the same compartment with me sat a merchant who dealt in timber, a
peasant by birth, who in loud and decided tones expressed his approval of
the outrage which the peasants were about to suffer. "The government must
be obeyed; that's what it's for. If we pepper them well, they will never rebel
again. It's no more than they deserve!" he said.
What did it all mean?
It could not be said that all these men, the instigators, the participants, the
accomplices in this business, were rascals, who, in defiance of conscience,
realizing the utter abomination of the act, were, either from mercenary
motives or from fear of punishment, determined to commit it. Any man of
them would, given the requisite circumstances, stand up for his convictions.
Not one of those officials would steal a purse, or read another man's letter,
or endure an insult without demanding satisfaction from the offender. Not
one of those officers would cheat at cards, or neglect to pay a gambling
debt, or betray a companion, or flee from the battlefield, or abandon a flag.
Not one of those soldiers would dare to reject the sacrament, or even taste
meat on Good Friday. Each of these men would choose to endure any kind
of privation, suffering, or danger, rather than consent to do a deed which he
considered wrong. Hence it is evident that they are able to resist whatever is
contrary to their convictions.
Still less true would it be to pronounce these men brutes, to whom such
deeds are congenial rather than repulsive. One needs but to talk with them
to become convinced that all,—landowner, judge, minister, governor, Czar,
officers, and soldiers,—at the bottom of their hearts not only disapprove of
such deeds, but when a sense of their true significance is borne in upon
them, really suffer at being forced to take part in these scenes. They can
only try not to think of them.
One needs but to speak to those who are actors in this business, beginning
with the landowner and ending with the lowest policeman or soldier, to
discover that at the bottom of their hearts they all acknowledge the
wickedness of the deed, and know that it would be better to abstain from it;
and this knowledge makes them suffer.
A lady of liberal views in our train, seeing the Governor and the officers in
the first-class waiting-room, and learning the object of their journey, began
to talk in an ostensibly loud tone, in order that they might hear what she
peasant by birth, who in loud and decided tones expressed his approval of
the outrage which the peasants were about to suffer. "The government must
be obeyed; that's what it's for. If we pepper them well, they will never rebel
again. It's no more than they deserve!" he said.
What did it all mean?
It could not be said that all these men, the instigators, the participants, the
accomplices in this business, were rascals, who, in defiance of conscience,
realizing the utter abomination of the act, were, either from mercenary
motives or from fear of punishment, determined to commit it. Any man of
them would, given the requisite circumstances, stand up for his convictions.
Not one of those officials would steal a purse, or read another man's letter,
or endure an insult without demanding satisfaction from the offender. Not
one of those officers would cheat at cards, or neglect to pay a gambling
debt, or betray a companion, or flee from the battlefield, or abandon a flag.
Not one of those soldiers would dare to reject the sacrament, or even taste
meat on Good Friday. Each of these men would choose to endure any kind
of privation, suffering, or danger, rather than consent to do a deed which he
considered wrong. Hence it is evident that they are able to resist whatever is
contrary to their convictions.
Still less true would it be to pronounce these men brutes, to whom such
deeds are congenial rather than repulsive. One needs but to talk with them
to become convinced that all,—landowner, judge, minister, governor, Czar,
officers, and soldiers,—at the bottom of their hearts not only disapprove of
such deeds, but when a sense of their true significance is borne in upon
them, really suffer at being forced to take part in these scenes. They can
only try not to think of them.
One needs but to speak to those who are actors in this business, beginning
with the landowner and ending with the lowest policeman or soldier, to
discover that at the bottom of their hearts they all acknowledge the
wickedness of the deed, and know that it would be better to abstain from it;
and this knowledge makes them suffer.
A lady of liberal views in our train, seeing the Governor and the officers in
the first-class waiting-room, and learning the object of their journey, began
to talk in an ostensibly loud tone, in order that they might hear what she
Page 254
said, condemning the present laws and crying shame upon the men who
took part in this business. This made everybody feel uncomfortable. The
men knew not where to look, yet no one ventured to argue the point. The
passengers pretended that remarks so senseless deserved no reply, but it was
evident by the expression of their faces and their wandering eyes that they
felt ashamed. I noticed the same in regard to the soldiers. They knew well
enough that they were going about an evil business, and they preferred not
to think of what was before them. When the timber merchant, insincerely, in
my opinion, and simply by way of showing his superior knowledge, began
to speak of the necessity of these measures, the soldiers who heard him
turned away frowning, and pretended not to listen to him.
The landowner, his steward, the minister, the Czar, all who are parties to
this business, those who were traveling by this train, even those who, taking
no part in the affair, were but lookers-on, all really know it to be wicked.
Why, then, do they do these things, why do they repeat them, why do they
permit them to be?
Ask the landowner who started the affair; the judge who rendered a decision
legal in form, but absolutely unjust; and those who, like the soldiers and the
peasants, will, with their own hands, execute this work of beating and
murdering their brothers,—all of them, instigators, administrators, and
executioners, will make essentially the same reply.
The officials will say that the present system requires to be supported in this
manner, and it is for this reason that they do these things, because the good
of the country, the welfare of mankind in general, of social life and
civilization, demand it.
The soldiers, men of the lower classes, who are forced to execute this
violence with their own hands, will answer that the higher authorities, who
are supposed to know their business, have commanded it, and that it is for
them to obey. It never occurs to them to question the capacity of those who
represent the higher authorities. If the possibility of error is ever admitted, it
is only in the case of some subordinate authority; the higher power whence
all things emanate is supposed to be absolutely infallible.
Thus, while attributing their actions to various motives, both principals and
subordinates agree that the existing order is the one best suited to the
present time, and that it is the sacred duty of every man to maintain it.
took part in this business. This made everybody feel uncomfortable. The
men knew not where to look, yet no one ventured to argue the point. The
passengers pretended that remarks so senseless deserved no reply, but it was
evident by the expression of their faces and their wandering eyes that they
felt ashamed. I noticed the same in regard to the soldiers. They knew well
enough that they were going about an evil business, and they preferred not
to think of what was before them. When the timber merchant, insincerely, in
my opinion, and simply by way of showing his superior knowledge, began
to speak of the necessity of these measures, the soldiers who heard him
turned away frowning, and pretended not to listen to him.
The landowner, his steward, the minister, the Czar, all who are parties to
this business, those who were traveling by this train, even those who, taking
no part in the affair, were but lookers-on, all really know it to be wicked.
Why, then, do they do these things, why do they repeat them, why do they
permit them to be?
Ask the landowner who started the affair; the judge who rendered a decision
legal in form, but absolutely unjust; and those who, like the soldiers and the
peasants, will, with their own hands, execute this work of beating and
murdering their brothers,—all of them, instigators, administrators, and
executioners, will make essentially the same reply.
The officials will say that the present system requires to be supported in this
manner, and it is for this reason that they do these things, because the good
of the country, the welfare of mankind in general, of social life and
civilization, demand it.
The soldiers, men of the lower classes, who are forced to execute this
violence with their own hands, will answer that the higher authorities, who
are supposed to know their business, have commanded it, and that it is for
them to obey. It never occurs to them to question the capacity of those who
represent the higher authorities. If the possibility of error is ever admitted, it
is only in the case of some subordinate authority; the higher power whence
all things emanate is supposed to be absolutely infallible.
Thus, while attributing their actions to various motives, both principals and
subordinates agree that the existing order is the one best suited to the
present time, and that it is the sacred duty of every man to maintain it.
Page 255
This assurance of the necessity and immutability of the existing order is
continually advanced by all participators in violence committed by the
State, and that, as the existing order never can be changed, the refusal of a
single individual to perform the duties imposed on him will make no
difference as far as the fundamental principle is concerned, and will only
result in the substitution of another who may be more cruel and do more
harm.
This belief that the existing order is immutable, and that it is the sacred duty
of every man to lend it support, encourages every man of good moral
character to take part, with a conscience more or less clear, in such affairs
as that which occurred in Orel, and the one in which those in the train for
Tula were going to take part.
On what, then, is this belief founded?
It is but natural that it should seem pleasant and desirable to a landowner to
believe that the existing order is indispensable and immutable, because it
secures to him the income from his hundreds and thousands of dessiatins by
which his idle and luxurious existence is maintained.
It is also natural that the judge should willingly admit the necessity of a
system through which he receives fifty times more than the most hard-
working laboring man. And the same may be said in regard to the other
higher functionaries. It is only while the present system endures that he, as
governor, procureur, senator, or member of the council, can receive his
salary of several thousands, without which he and his family would
certainly perish; for outside the place which he fills, more or less well
according to his abilities and diligence, he could command only a fraction
of what he receives. The ministers, the head of the State, and every person
in high authority are all alike in this, save that the higher their rank, the
more exclusive their position, the more important it becomes that they
should believe no order possible, except that which now exists; for were it
overthrown, not only would they find it impossible to gain similar positions,
but they would fall lower in the scale than other men. The man who
voluntarily hires himself out as a policeman for ten roubles a month, a sum
which he could easily earn in any other position, has but little interest in the
preservation of the existing system, and therefore may or may not believe in
its immutability.
continually advanced by all participators in violence committed by the
State, and that, as the existing order never can be changed, the refusal of a
single individual to perform the duties imposed on him will make no
difference as far as the fundamental principle is concerned, and will only
result in the substitution of another who may be more cruel and do more
harm.
This belief that the existing order is immutable, and that it is the sacred duty
of every man to lend it support, encourages every man of good moral
character to take part, with a conscience more or less clear, in such affairs
as that which occurred in Orel, and the one in which those in the train for
Tula were going to take part.
On what, then, is this belief founded?
It is but natural that it should seem pleasant and desirable to a landowner to
believe that the existing order is indispensable and immutable, because it
secures to him the income from his hundreds and thousands of dessiatins by
which his idle and luxurious existence is maintained.
It is also natural that the judge should willingly admit the necessity of a
system through which he receives fifty times more than the most hard-
working laboring man. And the same may be said in regard to the other
higher functionaries. It is only while the present system endures that he, as
governor, procureur, senator, or member of the council, can receive his
salary of several thousands, without which he and his family would
certainly perish; for outside the place which he fills, more or less well
according to his abilities and diligence, he could command only a fraction
of what he receives. The ministers, the head of the State, and every person
in high authority are all alike in this, save that the higher their rank, the
more exclusive their position, the more important it becomes that they
should believe no order possible, except that which now exists; for were it
overthrown, not only would they find it impossible to gain similar positions,
but they would fall lower in the scale than other men. The man who
voluntarily hires himself out as a policeman for ten roubles a month, a sum
which he could easily earn in any other position, has but little interest in the
preservation of the existing system, and therefore may or may not believe in
its immutability.
Page 256
But the king or emperor, who receives his millions, who knows that around
him there are thousands of men envious to take his place, who knows that
from no other quarter could he draw such an income or receive such
homage, that, if overthrown, he might be judged for abuse of power,—there
is neither king nor emperor who can help believing in the immutability and
sanctity of the existing order. The higher the position in which a man is
placed, the more unstable it is; and the more perilous and frightful the
possible downfall, the more firmly will he believe in the immutability of the
existing order; and he is able to do wicked and cruel deeds with a perfectly
peaceful conscience, because he persuades himself that they are done, not
for his own benefit, but for the support of the existing order.
And so it is with every individual in authority, from obscure policemen to
the man who occupies the most exalted rank,—the positions they occupy
being more advantageous than those which they might be capable of filling
if the present system did not exist. All these men believe more or less in its
immutability, because it is advantageous to them.
But what influences the peasants, the soldiers, who stand on the lowest rung
of the ladder and who derive no advantage from the existing system, who
are in the most enslaved and degraded condition; what induces them to
believe that the existing order, which serves to keep them in this inferior
position, is the best, and one which should be maintained; and why are they
willing, in order to promote this end, to violate their consciences by
committing wicked deeds?
What urges them to the false conclusion that the existing order is immutable
and ought therefore to be maintained, when the fact is that its immutability
is due only to their own effort to maintain it?
Why do those men, taken from the plow, whom we see masquerading in
ugly, objectionable uniforms, with blue collars and gold buttons, go about
armed with muskets and sabers to kill their famishing fathers and brothers?
They derive no advantage from their present position; they would be no
losers were they deprived of it, since it is worse than the one from which
they were taken.
Those in authority belonging to the higher classes, the landowners and
merchants, the judges, senators, governors, ministers, and kings, the
officials in general, participate in such actions and maintain the present
him there are thousands of men envious to take his place, who knows that
from no other quarter could he draw such an income or receive such
homage, that, if overthrown, he might be judged for abuse of power,—there
is neither king nor emperor who can help believing in the immutability and
sanctity of the existing order. The higher the position in which a man is
placed, the more unstable it is; and the more perilous and frightful the
possible downfall, the more firmly will he believe in the immutability of the
existing order; and he is able to do wicked and cruel deeds with a perfectly
peaceful conscience, because he persuades himself that they are done, not
for his own benefit, but for the support of the existing order.
And so it is with every individual in authority, from obscure policemen to
the man who occupies the most exalted rank,—the positions they occupy
being more advantageous than those which they might be capable of filling
if the present system did not exist. All these men believe more or less in its
immutability, because it is advantageous to them.
But what influences the peasants, the soldiers, who stand on the lowest rung
of the ladder and who derive no advantage from the existing system, who
are in the most enslaved and degraded condition; what induces them to
believe that the existing order, which serves to keep them in this inferior
position, is the best, and one which should be maintained; and why are they
willing, in order to promote this end, to violate their consciences by
committing wicked deeds?
What urges them to the false conclusion that the existing order is immutable
and ought therefore to be maintained, when the fact is that its immutability
is due only to their own effort to maintain it?
Why do those men, taken from the plow, whom we see masquerading in
ugly, objectionable uniforms, with blue collars and gold buttons, go about
armed with muskets and sabers to kill their famishing fathers and brothers?
They derive no advantage from their present position; they would be no
losers were they deprived of it, since it is worse than the one from which
they were taken.
Those in authority belonging to the higher classes, the landowners and
merchants, the judges, senators, governors, ministers, and kings, the
officials in general, participate in such actions and maintain the present
Page 257
system, because such a system is for their interest. Often enough they are
kind-hearted and gentle men. They play no personal part in these acts; all
they do is to institute inquiries, pronounce judgments, and issue commands.
Those in authority do not themselves execute the deeds which they have
devised and ordered. They but rarely see in what manner these dreadful
deeds are executed. But the unfortunate members of the lower classes, who
receive no benefit from the existing system, who, on the other hand, find
themselves greatly despised because of the duties which they perform in
order that a system which is opposed to their own interests may be
maintained,—they who tear men from the bosom of their families to send
them to the galleys, who bind and imprison them, who stand on guard over
them, who shoot them, why do they do this? What is it that compels these
men to believe that the existing order is immutable, and that it is their duty
to maintain it? Violence exists only because there are those who with their
own hands maltreat, bind, imprison, and murder. If there were no
policemen, or soldiers, or armed men of any sort ready when bidden to use
violence and to put men to death, not one of those who sign death-warrants,
or sentence for imprisonment for life or hard labor in the galleys, would
ever have sufficient courage himself to hang, imprison, or torture one
thousandth part of those whom now, sitting in their studies, these men
calmly order to be hung or tortured, because they do not see it done, they do
not do it themselves. Their servants do it for them in some far-away corner.
All these deeds of injustice and cruelty have become an integral part of the
existing system of life, only because there are men ever ready to execute
them. If there were no such men, the multitude of human beings who are
now the victims of violence would be spared, and furthermore, the
magistrates would never dare to issue, nor even dream of issuing, those
commands which they now send forth with such assurance. If there were no
men to obey the will of others and to execute commands to torture and
murder, no one would ever dare to defend the declaration so confidently
made by landowners and men of leisure; namely, that the land lying on all
sides of the unfortunate peasants, who are perishing for the want of it, is the
property of the man who does not till it, and that reserves of grain,
fraudulently obtained, are to be held intact amidst a famine-stricken and
dying population, because the merchant must have his profit. If there were
no men ready at the bidding of the authorities to torture and murder, the
landowner would never dream of seizing a forest which had been tended by
kind-hearted and gentle men. They play no personal part in these acts; all
they do is to institute inquiries, pronounce judgments, and issue commands.
Those in authority do not themselves execute the deeds which they have
devised and ordered. They but rarely see in what manner these dreadful
deeds are executed. But the unfortunate members of the lower classes, who
receive no benefit from the existing system, who, on the other hand, find
themselves greatly despised because of the duties which they perform in
order that a system which is opposed to their own interests may be
maintained,—they who tear men from the bosom of their families to send
them to the galleys, who bind and imprison them, who stand on guard over
them, who shoot them, why do they do this? What is it that compels these
men to believe that the existing order is immutable, and that it is their duty
to maintain it? Violence exists only because there are those who with their
own hands maltreat, bind, imprison, and murder. If there were no
policemen, or soldiers, or armed men of any sort ready when bidden to use
violence and to put men to death, not one of those who sign death-warrants,
or sentence for imprisonment for life or hard labor in the galleys, would
ever have sufficient courage himself to hang, imprison, or torture one
thousandth part of those whom now, sitting in their studies, these men
calmly order to be hung or tortured, because they do not see it done, they do
not do it themselves. Their servants do it for them in some far-away corner.
All these deeds of injustice and cruelty have become an integral part of the
existing system of life, only because there are men ever ready to execute
them. If there were no such men, the multitude of human beings who are
now the victims of violence would be spared, and furthermore, the
magistrates would never dare to issue, nor even dream of issuing, those
commands which they now send forth with such assurance. If there were no
men to obey the will of others and to execute commands to torture and
murder, no one would ever dare to defend the declaration so confidently
made by landowners and men of leisure; namely, that the land lying on all
sides of the unfortunate peasants, who are perishing for the want of it, is the
property of the man who does not till it, and that reserves of grain,
fraudulently obtained, are to be held intact amidst a famine-stricken and
dying population, because the merchant must have his profit. If there were
no men ready at the bidding of the authorities to torture and murder, the
landowner would never dream of seizing a forest which had been tended by
Page 258
the peasants; nor would officials consider themselves entitled to salaries
paid to them from money wrung from the famished people whom they
oppress, or which they derive for the prosecution, imprisonment, and exile
of men who denounce falsehood and preach the truth.
All this is done because those in authority well know that they have always
at hand submissive agents ready to obey their commands to outrage and to
murder.
It is to this crowd of submissive slaves, ready to obey all orders, that we
owe the deeds of the whole series of tyrants, from Napoleon to the obscure
captain who bids his men fire upon the people. It is through the agency of
policemen and soldiers (especially the latter, since the former can act only
when supported by military force) that these deeds of violence are
committed. What, then, has induced those who are by no means benefited
by doing with their hands these dreadful deeds,—what is it that has led
these kindly men into an error so gross that they actually believe that the
present system, which is so distressing, so baleful, so fatal, is the one best
suited to the times? Who has led them into this extraordinary aberration?
They can never have persuaded themselves that a course which is not only
painful and opposed to their interests, but which is fatal to their class, which
forms nine-tenths of the entire population, one which, too, is opposed to
their conscience, is right. "What reason can you give for killing men, when
God's commandment says, 'Thou shalt not kill'?" is a question I have often
put to different soldiers. And it always embarrassed them to have a question
put which recalled what they would rather not remember.
They knew that the divine law forbade murder,—thou shalt not kill,—and
they had always known of this compulsory military duty, but had never
thought of one as contradictory to the other. The hesitating replies to my
question were usually to the effect that the act of killing a man in war and
the execution of criminals by order of the government were not included in
the general prohibition against murder. But when I rejoined that no such
limitation existed in the law of God, and cited the Christian doctrine of
brotherhood, the forgiveness of injuries, the injunction to love one's
neighbor, all of which precepts are quite contrary to murder, the men of the
lower class would usually agree with me and ask, "How then can it be that
the government (which they believe cannot err) sends troops to war and
paid to them from money wrung from the famished people whom they
oppress, or which they derive for the prosecution, imprisonment, and exile
of men who denounce falsehood and preach the truth.
All this is done because those in authority well know that they have always
at hand submissive agents ready to obey their commands to outrage and to
murder.
It is to this crowd of submissive slaves, ready to obey all orders, that we
owe the deeds of the whole series of tyrants, from Napoleon to the obscure
captain who bids his men fire upon the people. It is through the agency of
policemen and soldiers (especially the latter, since the former can act only
when supported by military force) that these deeds of violence are
committed. What, then, has induced those who are by no means benefited
by doing with their hands these dreadful deeds,—what is it that has led
these kindly men into an error so gross that they actually believe that the
present system, which is so distressing, so baleful, so fatal, is the one best
suited to the times? Who has led them into this extraordinary aberration?
They can never have persuaded themselves that a course which is not only
painful and opposed to their interests, but which is fatal to their class, which
forms nine-tenths of the entire population, one which, too, is opposed to
their conscience, is right. "What reason can you give for killing men, when
God's commandment says, 'Thou shalt not kill'?" is a question I have often
put to different soldiers. And it always embarrassed them to have a question
put which recalled what they would rather not remember.
They knew that the divine law forbade murder,—thou shalt not kill,—and
they had always known of this compulsory military duty, but had never
thought of one as contradictory to the other. The hesitating replies to my
question were usually to the effect that the act of killing a man in war and
the execution of criminals by order of the government were not included in
the general prohibition against murder. But when I rejoined that no such
limitation existed in the law of God, and cited the Christian doctrine of
brotherhood, the forgiveness of injuries, the injunction to love one's
neighbor, all of which precepts are quite contrary to murder, the men of the
lower class would usually agree with me and ask, "How then can it be that
the government (which they believe cannot err) sends troops to war and
Page 259
orders the execution of criminals?" When I replied that this was a mistake
on the part of the government, my interlocutors became still more
uncomfortable, and either dropped the conversation or showed annoyance.
"Probably there is a law for it. I should think the bishops know more than
you do," a Russian soldier once said to me. And he evidently felt relieved,
confident that his superiors had found a law, one that had authorized his
ancestors and their successors, millions of men like himself, to serve the
State, and that the question I had asked is in the nature of a conundrum.
Every man in Christendom has undoubtedly been taught by tradition, by
revelation, and by the voice of conscience, which can never be gainsaid,
that murder is one of the most heinous crimes men can commit; it is thus
affirmed in the gospel, and they know that this sin of murder is not altered
by conditions—that is to say, if it is sinful to kill one man, it is sinful to kill
another. Any man knows that, if murder be a sin, it is not changed by the
character or position of the man against whom it is committed, which is the
case also with adultery, theft, and all other sins, and yet men are
accustomed from childhood to see murder, not only acknowledged, but
blessed by those whom they are taught to regard as their spiritual directors
appointed by Christ, and to know that their temporal leaders, with calm
assurance, countenance the custom of murder, and summon all men, in the
name of the law and even the name of God, to its participation. Men
perceive the existence of an inconsistency, but finding themselves unable to
discern its cause, they naturally attribute the idea to their own ignorance.
The obviousness and crudity of the contradiction confirms them in this
belief. They cannot imagine that their superiors and teachers, even the
scientists, could advocate with so much assurance two principles so utterly
at variance as the command to follow the law of Christ, and the requirement
to commit murder. No pure-minded, innocent child, no youth, could
imagine that men who stand so high in his esteem, whom he looks upon
with such reverence, could for any purpose deceive him so unscrupulously.
And yet it is this very deception which is constantly practised. In the first
place, to all working-men, who have personally no time to analyze moral
and religious problems, it is taught from childhood, by example and
precept, that tortures and murders are compatible with Christianity, and in
certain cases they should not only be permitted, but must be employed; in
the second place, to certain among them, engaged in the army either
on the part of the government, my interlocutors became still more
uncomfortable, and either dropped the conversation or showed annoyance.
"Probably there is a law for it. I should think the bishops know more than
you do," a Russian soldier once said to me. And he evidently felt relieved,
confident that his superiors had found a law, one that had authorized his
ancestors and their successors, millions of men like himself, to serve the
State, and that the question I had asked is in the nature of a conundrum.
Every man in Christendom has undoubtedly been taught by tradition, by
revelation, and by the voice of conscience, which can never be gainsaid,
that murder is one of the most heinous crimes men can commit; it is thus
affirmed in the gospel, and they know that this sin of murder is not altered
by conditions—that is to say, if it is sinful to kill one man, it is sinful to kill
another. Any man knows that, if murder be a sin, it is not changed by the
character or position of the man against whom it is committed, which is the
case also with adultery, theft, and all other sins, and yet men are
accustomed from childhood to see murder, not only acknowledged, but
blessed by those whom they are taught to regard as their spiritual directors
appointed by Christ, and to know that their temporal leaders, with calm
assurance, countenance the custom of murder, and summon all men, in the
name of the law and even the name of God, to its participation. Men
perceive the existence of an inconsistency, but finding themselves unable to
discern its cause, they naturally attribute the idea to their own ignorance.
The obviousness and crudity of the contradiction confirms them in this
belief. They cannot imagine that their superiors and teachers, even the
scientists, could advocate with so much assurance two principles so utterly
at variance as the command to follow the law of Christ, and the requirement
to commit murder. No pure-minded, innocent child, no youth, could
imagine that men who stand so high in his esteem, whom he looks upon
with such reverence, could for any purpose deceive him so unscrupulously.
And yet it is this very deception which is constantly practised. In the first
place, to all working-men, who have personally no time to analyze moral
and religious problems, it is taught from childhood, by example and
precept, that tortures and murders are compatible with Christianity, and in
certain cases they should not only be permitted, but must be employed; in
the second place, to certain among them, engaged in the army either
Page 260
through conscription or voluntarily, it is conveyed that the accomplishment
with their own hands of torture or homicide is not only their sacred duty,
but a glorious exploit, meriting praise and recompense.
This universal deception is propagated by all catechisms or their substitutes,
those books which at the present time teachers are compelled to use in the
instruction of the young. It is taught that violence,—outrage, imprisonment,
execution,—the murder that takes place in civil or in foreign war, has for its
object the maintenance and security of the political organization,—whether
this be an absolute or a constitutional monarchy, consulate, republic, or
commune,—that it is perfectly legitimate, and that it is in contradiction
neither to morality nor Christianity.
And men are so firmly convinced of this that they grow up, live, and die in
the belief, never for a moment doubting it.
So much for this universal deception. And now for another, which is
special, and practised upon soldiers and police, the instruments by whose
agency outrages and murders, necessary for the support and maintenance of
the existing order, are accomplished.
The military rules and regulations of every country are practically the same
as those formulated in the Russian military code.
"87. To fulfil exactly, and without comment, the orders of the superior
officers, means—to execute orders with precision, without considering
whether they are good or bad, or whether their execution be possible. Only
the superior is responsible for the consequences of his order.
"88. The only occasion on which the inferior should not obey the order of
his superior is when he sees plainly that in obeying it ..." (Here one
naturally thinks it will surely go on to say when he plainly sees that in
fulfilling the order of his superior he violates the law of God. Not at all; it
goes on to say:) "sees plainly that he violates the oath of allegiance and
duty to his sovereign."
It is stated in the code that a man, in becoming a soldier, can and must
execute all the orders, without exception, which he receives from his
superior; orders which, for a soldier, are for the most part connected with
murder. He may violate every law, human and divine, as long as he does not
with their own hands of torture or homicide is not only their sacred duty,
but a glorious exploit, meriting praise and recompense.
This universal deception is propagated by all catechisms or their substitutes,
those books which at the present time teachers are compelled to use in the
instruction of the young. It is taught that violence,—outrage, imprisonment,
execution,—the murder that takes place in civil or in foreign war, has for its
object the maintenance and security of the political organization,—whether
this be an absolute or a constitutional monarchy, consulate, republic, or
commune,—that it is perfectly legitimate, and that it is in contradiction
neither to morality nor Christianity.
And men are so firmly convinced of this that they grow up, live, and die in
the belief, never for a moment doubting it.
So much for this universal deception. And now for another, which is
special, and practised upon soldiers and police, the instruments by whose
agency outrages and murders, necessary for the support and maintenance of
the existing order, are accomplished.
The military rules and regulations of every country are practically the same
as those formulated in the Russian military code.
"87. To fulfil exactly, and without comment, the orders of the superior
officers, means—to execute orders with precision, without considering
whether they are good or bad, or whether their execution be possible. Only
the superior is responsible for the consequences of his order.
"88. The only occasion on which the inferior should not obey the order of
his superior is when he sees plainly that in obeying it ..." (Here one
naturally thinks it will surely go on to say when he plainly sees that in
fulfilling the order of his superior he violates the law of God. Not at all; it
goes on to say:) "sees plainly that he violates the oath of allegiance and
duty to his sovereign."
It is stated in the code that a man, in becoming a soldier, can and must
execute all the orders, without exception, which he receives from his
superior; orders which, for a soldier, are for the most part connected with
murder. He may violate every law, human and divine, as long as he does not
Page 261
violate his oath of allegiance to him who, at a given time, happens to be in
power.
Thus it stands in the Russian military code, and this is the substance of the
military codes of other nations. It could not be otherwise. The foundations
of the power of the State rest upon the delusion by means of which men are
set free from their obligations to God and to their own consciences, and
bound to obey the will of a casual superior.
This is the basis of the appalling conviction that prevails among the lower
classes, that the existing system, so ruinous to them, is necessary and
justifiable, and that it must be maintained by outrage and murder.
This is inevitable. In order to force the lower, the more numerous classes to
act as their own oppressors and tormentors, to commit deeds contrary to
their consciences, it is necessary to deceive them.
And this is done.
Not long since I saw again put into practice this shameful deception, and
again wondered to see it effected without opposition and so audaciously.
In the beginning of November, on my way through Tula, I saw at the gates
of the Zemskaya Uprava the familiar dense crowd of men and women, from
which issued the sounds of drunken voices, blended with the heartrending
sobs of the wives and mothers.
The military conscription was in progress.
As usual, I could not pass by without pausing; the sight attracts me as by
fascination.
Again I mingled with the crowd, and stood looking on, questioning, and
marveling at the facility with which this most terrible of all offenses is
committed in broad daylight, and in the midst of a large city.
On the first day of November, in every village in Russia, with its population
of one hundred millions, the starostas,[27] according to custom, take the men
whose names are entered on the rolls, frequently their own sons, and carry
them to town.
On the way the men drink freely, unchecked by the elder men; they realize
that entering upon this insane business of leaving their wives and mothers,
power.
Thus it stands in the Russian military code, and this is the substance of the
military codes of other nations. It could not be otherwise. The foundations
of the power of the State rest upon the delusion by means of which men are
set free from their obligations to God and to their own consciences, and
bound to obey the will of a casual superior.
This is the basis of the appalling conviction that prevails among the lower
classes, that the existing system, so ruinous to them, is necessary and
justifiable, and that it must be maintained by outrage and murder.
This is inevitable. In order to force the lower, the more numerous classes to
act as their own oppressors and tormentors, to commit deeds contrary to
their consciences, it is necessary to deceive them.
And this is done.
Not long since I saw again put into practice this shameful deception, and
again wondered to see it effected without opposition and so audaciously.
In the beginning of November, on my way through Tula, I saw at the gates
of the Zemskaya Uprava the familiar dense crowd of men and women, from
which issued the sounds of drunken voices, blended with the heartrending
sobs of the wives and mothers.
The military conscription was in progress.
As usual, I could not pass by without pausing; the sight attracts me as by
fascination.
Again I mingled with the crowd, and stood looking on, questioning, and
marveling at the facility with which this most terrible of all offenses is
committed in broad daylight, and in the midst of a large city.
On the first day of November, in every village in Russia, with its population
of one hundred millions, the starostas,[27] according to custom, take the men
whose names are entered on the rolls, frequently their own sons, and carry
them to town.
On the way the men drink freely, unchecked by the elder men; they realize
that entering upon this insane business of leaving their wives and mothers,
Page 262
giving up everything that is sacred to them, only to become the senseless
tools of murder, is too painful if one's senses are not stupefied with wine.
And thus they journey on, carousing, brawling, singing, and fighting. The
night is spent in a tavern, and on this morning, having drunk still more, they
assemble before the house of the Uprava.
Some in new sheepskin coats, with knit mufflers wound round their necks,
some with their eyes swollen with drinking, some noisy and boisterous, by
way of stimulating their courage, others silent and woebegone, they were
gathered near the gates, surrounded by their wives and mothers with tear-
stained faces, awaiting their turn (I happened to be there on the day when
the recruits were received, that is to say, the day on which they were
examined), while others were crowding the entry of the office.
Meanwhile they are hurrying on the work within. A door opens and the
guard calls for Piotr Sidorov. Piotr Sidorov makes the sign of the cross,
looks around with a startled gaze, and opening a glass door, he enters the
small room where the recruits take off their clothes. The man before him,
his friend, who has just been enrolled, has but this moment stepped out of
the office stark naked, and with chattering teeth hastens to put on his
clothes. Piotr Sidorov has heard, and can plainly see by the look on his face,
that the man has been enlisted. He longs to question him, but he is ordered
to undress as quickly as possible. He pulls off his sheepskin coat, drops his
waistcoat and his shirt, and with prominent ribs, trembling and reeking with
the odors of liquor, tobacco, and sweat, steps barefooted into the office,
wondering what he shall do with his large sinewy hands.
A portrait of the Emperor in uniform, with a ribbon across his breast, in a
large golden frame, hangs in a conspicuous place, while a small ikon of
Christ, clad in a loose garment, with the crown of thorns on his head, hangs
in one corner. In the middle of the room is a table covered with a green
cloth on which papers are lying, and on which stands a small three-cornered
object surmounted by an eagle and called the mirror of justice. Around the
table the officials sit tranquilly. One smokes, another turns over the papers.
As soon as Sidorov enters a guard comes up and measures him. His chin is
raised and his feet are adjusted. Then a man who is smoking a cigarette—
the doctor—approaches him, and without glancing at his face, but gazing in
another direction, touches his body with an expression of disgust, measures
tools of murder, is too painful if one's senses are not stupefied with wine.
And thus they journey on, carousing, brawling, singing, and fighting. The
night is spent in a tavern, and on this morning, having drunk still more, they
assemble before the house of the Uprava.
Some in new sheepskin coats, with knit mufflers wound round their necks,
some with their eyes swollen with drinking, some noisy and boisterous, by
way of stimulating their courage, others silent and woebegone, they were
gathered near the gates, surrounded by their wives and mothers with tear-
stained faces, awaiting their turn (I happened to be there on the day when
the recruits were received, that is to say, the day on which they were
examined), while others were crowding the entry of the office.
Meanwhile they are hurrying on the work within. A door opens and the
guard calls for Piotr Sidorov. Piotr Sidorov makes the sign of the cross,
looks around with a startled gaze, and opening a glass door, he enters the
small room where the recruits take off their clothes. The man before him,
his friend, who has just been enrolled, has but this moment stepped out of
the office stark naked, and with chattering teeth hastens to put on his
clothes. Piotr Sidorov has heard, and can plainly see by the look on his face,
that the man has been enlisted. He longs to question him, but he is ordered
to undress as quickly as possible. He pulls off his sheepskin coat, drops his
waistcoat and his shirt, and with prominent ribs, trembling and reeking with
the odors of liquor, tobacco, and sweat, steps barefooted into the office,
wondering what he shall do with his large sinewy hands.
A portrait of the Emperor in uniform, with a ribbon across his breast, in a
large golden frame, hangs in a conspicuous place, while a small ikon of
Christ, clad in a loose garment, with the crown of thorns on his head, hangs
in one corner. In the middle of the room is a table covered with a green
cloth on which papers are lying, and on which stands a small three-cornered
object surmounted by an eagle and called the mirror of justice. Around the
table the officials sit tranquilly. One smokes, another turns over the papers.
As soon as Sidorov enters a guard comes up and measures him. His chin is
raised and his feet are adjusted. Then a man who is smoking a cigarette—
the doctor—approaches him, and without glancing at his face, but gazing in
another direction, touches his body with an expression of disgust, measures
Page 263
him, orders the guard to open his mouth, tells him to breathe, and then
proceeds to dictate to another man who takes down the minutes. Finally,
and still without even one glance at his face, the doctor says: "He will do!
The next!" and with a wearied air he seats himself at the table. Once more
the guard hustles him about, bidding him to make haste. Somehow or other
he pulls on his shirt, fumbling for the sleeves, hastily gets on his trousers,
wraps his feet in the rags he uses for stockings, pulls on his boots, hunts for
his muffler and cap, tucks his sheepskin coat under his arm, and is escorted
to that part of the hall which is fenced off by a bench, where the recruits
who have been admitted are placed. A young countryman like himself, but
from another, far-away government, who is a soldier already, with a musket
to which a bayonet is attached, guards him, ready to run him through the
body if he should attempt to escape.
Meanwhile the crowd of fathers, mothers, and wives, hustled by policemen,
presses around the gates, trying to find out who has been taken and who
rejected. A man who has been rejected comes out and tells them that Piotr
has been admitted; then is heard the cry of Piotr's young wife, for whom
this word means a four or five years' separation, and the dissolute life such
as a soldier's wife in domestic service is.
But here comes a man with flowing hair and dressed differently from the
others, who has just arrived; he descends from his droschky and goes
toward the house of the Zemskaya Uprava, while the policemen clear a way
for him through the crowd.
"The Father has arrived to swear them in." And this "Father," who has
always been accustomed to believe himself a special and privileged servant
of Christ, and who is usually quite unconscious of his false position, enters
the room where the recruits who have been admitted are waiting for him; he
puts on, as a vestment, a sort of brocade curtain, disengages from it his
flowing hair, opens the Bible wherein an oath is forbidden, lifts the cross,
that cross on which Christ was crucified for refusing to do what this person,
his supposed servant, commands men to do, and all these defenseless and
deluded young men repeat after him the lie so familiar to his lips, which he
utters with such assurance. He reads while they repeat: "I promise and
swear to the Lord Almighty, upon His holy Bible," etc. ... to defend (that is,
to murder all those whom I shall be ordered to murder) and to do whatever
those men, strangers to me, who regard me only as a necessary tool to be
proceeds to dictate to another man who takes down the minutes. Finally,
and still without even one glance at his face, the doctor says: "He will do!
The next!" and with a wearied air he seats himself at the table. Once more
the guard hustles him about, bidding him to make haste. Somehow or other
he pulls on his shirt, fumbling for the sleeves, hastily gets on his trousers,
wraps his feet in the rags he uses for stockings, pulls on his boots, hunts for
his muffler and cap, tucks his sheepskin coat under his arm, and is escorted
to that part of the hall which is fenced off by a bench, where the recruits
who have been admitted are placed. A young countryman like himself, but
from another, far-away government, who is a soldier already, with a musket
to which a bayonet is attached, guards him, ready to run him through the
body if he should attempt to escape.
Meanwhile the crowd of fathers, mothers, and wives, hustled by policemen,
presses around the gates, trying to find out who has been taken and who
rejected. A man who has been rejected comes out and tells them that Piotr
has been admitted; then is heard the cry of Piotr's young wife, for whom
this word means a four or five years' separation, and the dissolute life such
as a soldier's wife in domestic service is.
But here comes a man with flowing hair and dressed differently from the
others, who has just arrived; he descends from his droschky and goes
toward the house of the Zemskaya Uprava, while the policemen clear a way
for him through the crowd.
"The Father has arrived to swear them in." And this "Father," who has
always been accustomed to believe himself a special and privileged servant
of Christ, and who is usually quite unconscious of his false position, enters
the room where the recruits who have been admitted are waiting for him; he
puts on, as a vestment, a sort of brocade curtain, disengages from it his
flowing hair, opens the Bible wherein an oath is forbidden, lifts the cross,
that cross on which Christ was crucified for refusing to do what this person,
his supposed servant, commands men to do, and all these defenseless and
deluded young men repeat after him the lie so familiar to his lips, which he
utters with such assurance. He reads while they repeat: "I promise and
swear to the Lord Almighty, upon His holy Bible," etc. ... to defend (that is,
to murder all those whom I shall be ordered to murder) and to do whatever
those men, strangers to me, who regard me only as a necessary tool to be
Page 264
used in perpetrating the outrages by which they oppress my brethren and
preserve their own positions, command me to do. All the recruits having
stupidly repeated the words, the so-called Father departs, quite sure that he
has performed his duty in the most accurate and conscientious manner,
while the young men deluded by him really believe that by the absurd, and
to them almost unintelligible, words which they have just uttered, they are
released during their term of service from all obligations to their fellow-
men, and are bound by new and more imperative ties to the duties of a
soldier.
And this is done publicly, but not a man comes forward to say to the
deceived and the deceivers, "Come to your senses and go your way; this is
all a base and treacherous lie; it imperils not only your bodies, but your
souls."
No one does this. On the contrary, as if in derision, after they have all been
enrolled and are about to depart, the colonel enters the hall where these
poor, drunken, and deluded creatures are locked in, and with a solemn air,
calls out to them in military fashion: "Good day, men! I congratulate you
upon entering the Czar's service." And they, poor fellows, mumble in their
semi-drunken way, a reply which has already been taught them, to the effect
that it fills their hearts with joy.
The expectant crowd of fathers, mothers, and wives is still standing at the
gates. Women, with tear-worn, wide-open eyes, watch the door. Suddenly it
opens and the men come rolling out, assuming an air of bravado, the
Petruhas, Vanuhas, and Makars, now enrolled, trying to avoid the eyes of
their relatives, pretending not to see them. At once break out the sobs and
cries of the wives and mothers. Some of the men clasp them in their arms,
weeping, some put on a devil-may-care look, others make an attempt to
console them. The wives, the mothers, realizing that they are now
abandoned, without support, for three or four years, cry and wail bitterly.
The fathers say little; they only sigh and make a clicking sound with their
tongues that indicates their grief; they know that they are about to lose that
help which they have reared and trained their sons to render; that when their
sons return they will no longer be sober and industrious laborers, but
soldiers, weaned from their former life of simplicity, grown dissolute, and
vain of their uniforms.
preserve their own positions, command me to do. All the recruits having
stupidly repeated the words, the so-called Father departs, quite sure that he
has performed his duty in the most accurate and conscientious manner,
while the young men deluded by him really believe that by the absurd, and
to them almost unintelligible, words which they have just uttered, they are
released during their term of service from all obligations to their fellow-
men, and are bound by new and more imperative ties to the duties of a
soldier.
And this is done publicly, but not a man comes forward to say to the
deceived and the deceivers, "Come to your senses and go your way; this is
all a base and treacherous lie; it imperils not only your bodies, but your
souls."
No one does this. On the contrary, as if in derision, after they have all been
enrolled and are about to depart, the colonel enters the hall where these
poor, drunken, and deluded creatures are locked in, and with a solemn air,
calls out to them in military fashion: "Good day, men! I congratulate you
upon entering the Czar's service." And they, poor fellows, mumble in their
semi-drunken way, a reply which has already been taught them, to the effect
that it fills their hearts with joy.
The expectant crowd of fathers, mothers, and wives is still standing at the
gates. Women, with tear-worn, wide-open eyes, watch the door. Suddenly it
opens and the men come rolling out, assuming an air of bravado, the
Petruhas, Vanuhas, and Makars, now enrolled, trying to avoid the eyes of
their relatives, pretending not to see them. At once break out the sobs and
cries of the wives and mothers. Some of the men clasp them in their arms,
weeping, some put on a devil-may-care look, others make an attempt to
console them. The wives, the mothers, realizing that they are now
abandoned, without support, for three or four years, cry and wail bitterly.
The fathers say little; they only sigh and make a clicking sound with their
tongues that indicates their grief; they know that they are about to lose that
help which they have reared and trained their sons to render; that when their
sons return they will no longer be sober and industrious laborers, but
soldiers, weaned from their former life of simplicity, grown dissolute, and
vain of their uniforms.
Page 265
Now the whole crowd has departed, driving down the street in sleighs to the
taverns and inns, and louder grows the chorus of mingled sobs, songs, and
drunken cries, the moaning and muttering of the wives and mothers, the
sounds of the accordion, the noise of altercations.
All repair to the eating-houses and taverns, from the traffic of which part of
the revenue of the government is derived, and there they give themselves up
to drink, stupefying their senses so that they care nothing for the injustice
done to them.
Then they spend several weeks at home, drinking nearly all the time.
When the day arrives, they are driven like cattle to the appointed place,
where they are drilled in military exercises by those who a few years ago,
like themselves, were deceived and brutalized. During the instructions the
means employed are lying, blows, and vodka. And before the year is over
the good, kindly, and intelligent fellows will have become as brutal as their
teachers.
"Suppose your father were arrested and attempted escape," I once suggested
to a young soldier, "what would you do?"
"It would be my duty to thrust my bayonet through his body," he replied, in
the peculiar, meaningless monotone of the soldier. "And if he ran I should
shoot," he added, taking pride apparently in thinking what he should do if
his father attempted to run.
When a good young fellow is reduced to a condition lower than that of the
brute, he is ready for those who wish to use him as an instrument of
violence. He is ready. The man is lost, and a new instrument of violence has
been created. And all this goes on throughout Russia in the autumn of every
year, in broad daylight, in the heart of a great city, witnessed by all the
inhabitants, and the stratagem is so skilfully managed, that though men at
the bottom of their hearts realize its infamy, still they have not the power to
throw off the yoke.
After our eyes are once opened, and we view this frightful delusion in its
true light, it is astonishing that preachers of Christianity and morality,
teachers of youth, or even those kindly and sensible parents who are to be
found in every community, can advocate any principles of morality
whatever in the midst of a society where torture and murder are openly
taverns and inns, and louder grows the chorus of mingled sobs, songs, and
drunken cries, the moaning and muttering of the wives and mothers, the
sounds of the accordion, the noise of altercations.
All repair to the eating-houses and taverns, from the traffic of which part of
the revenue of the government is derived, and there they give themselves up
to drink, stupefying their senses so that they care nothing for the injustice
done to them.
Then they spend several weeks at home, drinking nearly all the time.
When the day arrives, they are driven like cattle to the appointed place,
where they are drilled in military exercises by those who a few years ago,
like themselves, were deceived and brutalized. During the instructions the
means employed are lying, blows, and vodka. And before the year is over
the good, kindly, and intelligent fellows will have become as brutal as their
teachers.
"Suppose your father were arrested and attempted escape," I once suggested
to a young soldier, "what would you do?"
"It would be my duty to thrust my bayonet through his body," he replied, in
the peculiar, meaningless monotone of the soldier. "And if he ran I should
shoot," he added, taking pride apparently in thinking what he should do if
his father attempted to run.
When a good young fellow is reduced to a condition lower than that of the
brute, he is ready for those who wish to use him as an instrument of
violence. He is ready. The man is lost, and a new instrument of violence has
been created. And all this goes on throughout Russia in the autumn of every
year, in broad daylight, in the heart of a great city, witnessed by all the
inhabitants, and the stratagem is so skilfully managed, that though men at
the bottom of their hearts realize its infamy, still they have not the power to
throw off the yoke.
After our eyes are once opened, and we view this frightful delusion in its
true light, it is astonishing that preachers of Christianity and morality,
teachers of youth, or even those kindly and sensible parents who are to be
found in every community, can advocate any principles of morality
whatever in the midst of a society where torture and murder are openly
Page 266
recognized as constituting indispensable conditions in human life,—openly
acknowledged by all churches and governments,—where certain men
among us must be always ready to murder their brethren, and where any of
us may have to do the same.
Not to speak of Christian doctrine, how are children, how are youths, how
are any to be taught morality, while the principle that murder is required in
order to maintain the general welfare is taught; when men are made to
believe that murder is lawful, that some men, and any of us may be among
them, must kill and torture their neighbors, and commit every kind of crime
at the command of those in authority? If this principle is right, then there is
not, nor can there be, any doctrine of morality; might is right, and there is
no other law. This principle, which some seek to justify on the hypothesis of
the struggle for existence, in fact dominates society.
What kind of moral doctrine can that be which permits murder for any
object whatsoever? It is as impossible as a mathematical problem which
would affirm that 2 = 3. It may be admitted that 2 = 3 looks like
mathematics, but it is not mathematics at all. Every code of morals must be
founded first of all upon the acknowledgment that human life is to be held
sacred.
The doctrine of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life,
has been revoked by Christianity because that doctrine was but the
justification of immorality, a semblance of justice, but without meaning.
Life is a substance which can neither be weighed, measured, nor compared;
hence the taking of one life for another has no sense. Moreover, the aim of
every social law is amelioration of human life. How, then, can the
destruction of certain lives improve the condition of other lives? The
destruction of life is not an act that tends to improve it; it is suicide.
To destroy human life, and call it justice, may be likened to the act of a man
who, having lost one arm, cuts off the other, by way of making matters
even.
Not to speak of the deceit of presenting the most shocking crimes in the
light of a duty, of the shocking abuse of using Christ's name and authority in
order to confirm acts which he condemned, how can men, looking at the
matter from the standpoint merely of personal safety, suffer the existence of
acknowledged by all churches and governments,—where certain men
among us must be always ready to murder their brethren, and where any of
us may have to do the same.
Not to speak of Christian doctrine, how are children, how are youths, how
are any to be taught morality, while the principle that murder is required in
order to maintain the general welfare is taught; when men are made to
believe that murder is lawful, that some men, and any of us may be among
them, must kill and torture their neighbors, and commit every kind of crime
at the command of those in authority? If this principle is right, then there is
not, nor can there be, any doctrine of morality; might is right, and there is
no other law. This principle, which some seek to justify on the hypothesis of
the struggle for existence, in fact dominates society.
What kind of moral doctrine can that be which permits murder for any
object whatsoever? It is as impossible as a mathematical problem which
would affirm that 2 = 3. It may be admitted that 2 = 3 looks like
mathematics, but it is not mathematics at all. Every code of morals must be
founded first of all upon the acknowledgment that human life is to be held
sacred.
The doctrine of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life,
has been revoked by Christianity because that doctrine was but the
justification of immorality, a semblance of justice, but without meaning.
Life is a substance which can neither be weighed, measured, nor compared;
hence the taking of one life for another has no sense. Moreover, the aim of
every social law is amelioration of human life. How, then, can the
destruction of certain lives improve the condition of other lives? The
destruction of life is not an act that tends to improve it; it is suicide.
To destroy human life, and call it justice, may be likened to the act of a man
who, having lost one arm, cuts off the other, by way of making matters
even.
Not to speak of the deceit of presenting the most shocking crimes in the
light of a duty, of the shocking abuse of using Christ's name and authority in
order to confirm acts which he condemned, how can men, looking at the
matter from the standpoint merely of personal safety, suffer the existence of
Page 267
the shocking, senseless, cruel, and dangerous force which every organized
government, supported by the army, represents?
The most violent and rapacious band of robbers is less to be feared than
such an organization. Even the authority of the leader of a band of robbers
is more or less limited by the will of each individual member of the band,
who, retaining a certain degree of independence, has the right to oppose
acts with which he does not agree. But the authority of men who form part
of an organized government, maintained by the army with its present
system of discipline, is unlimited. When their master, be he Boulanger,
Pugatchov, or Napoleon, issues his commands, there is no crime too
hideous for those who form part of the government and the army to commit.
It must often occur to one who sees conscriptions, drills, and military
manœuvers taking place, who sees police going about with loaded
revolvers, sentinels armed with bayonets,—to one who hears from morning
till night, as I do (in the district of Hamovniky,[28] where I live), the whirring
balls and the concussion as they strike the target,—to ask why these things
are tolerated. And when one sees in the same city, where every attempt at
violence is at once suppressed, where even the sale of powder or medicines
is prohibited, where a doctor is not allowed to practice without a diploma,
thousands of disciplined men, controlled by one individual, being trained
for murder, one cannot help asking how men who have any regard for their
own safety can calmly endure such a condition of affairs, and allow it to
continue? Leaving aside the question of the immorality and pernicious
influence of it, what could be more dangerous? What are they thinking of,
—I speak not now of Christians, Christian pastors, philanthropists, or
moralists, but simply those who value their lives, their safety, their welfare?
Granting that power is at present in the hands of a moderate ruler, it may
fall to-morrow into those of a Biron, an Elizabeth, a Catharine, a Pugatchov,
a Napoleon. And even though the ruler be moderate to-day, he may become
a mere savage to-morrow; he may be succeeded by an insane or half-insane
heir, like the King of Bavaria or the Emperor Paul.
It is not only those who fill the highest offices, but all the lesser authorities
scattered over the land—the chiefs of police, the commanders of
companies, even the stanovoys[29]—may commit shocking crimes before
they can be dismissed; it is an everyday occurrence.
government, supported by the army, represents?
The most violent and rapacious band of robbers is less to be feared than
such an organization. Even the authority of the leader of a band of robbers
is more or less limited by the will of each individual member of the band,
who, retaining a certain degree of independence, has the right to oppose
acts with which he does not agree. But the authority of men who form part
of an organized government, maintained by the army with its present
system of discipline, is unlimited. When their master, be he Boulanger,
Pugatchov, or Napoleon, issues his commands, there is no crime too
hideous for those who form part of the government and the army to commit.
It must often occur to one who sees conscriptions, drills, and military
manœuvers taking place, who sees police going about with loaded
revolvers, sentinels armed with bayonets,—to one who hears from morning
till night, as I do (in the district of Hamovniky,[28] where I live), the whirring
balls and the concussion as they strike the target,—to ask why these things
are tolerated. And when one sees in the same city, where every attempt at
violence is at once suppressed, where even the sale of powder or medicines
is prohibited, where a doctor is not allowed to practice without a diploma,
thousands of disciplined men, controlled by one individual, being trained
for murder, one cannot help asking how men who have any regard for their
own safety can calmly endure such a condition of affairs, and allow it to
continue? Leaving aside the question of the immorality and pernicious
influence of it, what could be more dangerous? What are they thinking of,
—I speak not now of Christians, Christian pastors, philanthropists, or
moralists, but simply those who value their lives, their safety, their welfare?
Granting that power is at present in the hands of a moderate ruler, it may
fall to-morrow into those of a Biron, an Elizabeth, a Catharine, a Pugatchov,
a Napoleon. And even though the ruler be moderate to-day, he may become
a mere savage to-morrow; he may be succeeded by an insane or half-insane
heir, like the King of Bavaria or the Emperor Paul.
It is not only those who fill the highest offices, but all the lesser authorities
scattered over the land—the chiefs of police, the commanders of
companies, even the stanovoys[29]—may commit shocking crimes before
they can be dismissed; it is an everyday occurrence.
Page 268
Involuntarily one asks: How can men allow these things to go on? How can
they tolerate them with any regard to their own personal safety?
It may be replied that some men do oppose it. (Those who are deluded and
live in subjection have nothing either to tolerate or interdict.) Those who
favor the continuance of the present system are only those who derive some
special advantage from it. They favor it, and even with the disadvantages of
having an insane or tyrannical man at the head of the government and the
army, the position is less disadvantageous to them than if the present
organization were abolished.
Whether his position be held under a Boulanger, a Republic, a Pugatchov,
or a Catharine,—the judge, the police commissioner, the governor, the
officer, will remain in it. But if the system which assures their positions
were overthrown, they would lose them. Therefore it is a matter of
indifference to these men whether one man or another be at the head of the
organization of violence. What they do fear is its abolition; so they support
it.
One wonders why men of independent means, who are not obliged to
become soldiers, the so-called élite of society, enter military service in
Russia, in England, in Germany, in Austria, and even in France, and desire
the chance of killing? Why do parents, why do moral men, send their
children to military schools? Why do mothers buy them such toys as
helmets, swords, and muskets? (No child of a peasant ever plays at being a
soldier.) Why do kindly men and women, who can have no manner of
interest in war, go into ecstasies over the exploits of a man like Skobelev?
Why do men who are under no obligation to do it, and who receive no pay
for it, like Marshals of Nobility in Russia, devote months to the service
which demands such unremitting labor, wearying to the minds as well as to
the body,—the enlistment of recruits? Why do all emperors and kings wear
a military dress, why do they have drills and parades and military rewards?
Why are monuments built to generals and conquerors? Why do wealthy and
independent men regard it as an honor to occupy the position of lackeys to
kings, to flatter them and feign a belief in their special superiority? Why do
men who have long since ceased to believe in the medieval superstitions of
the Church still constantly and solemnly pretend to do so, and thus support
a sacrilegious and demoralizing institution? Why is the ignorance of the
people so zealously preserved, not only by the government, but by men of
they tolerate them with any regard to their own personal safety?
It may be replied that some men do oppose it. (Those who are deluded and
live in subjection have nothing either to tolerate or interdict.) Those who
favor the continuance of the present system are only those who derive some
special advantage from it. They favor it, and even with the disadvantages of
having an insane or tyrannical man at the head of the government and the
army, the position is less disadvantageous to them than if the present
organization were abolished.
Whether his position be held under a Boulanger, a Republic, a Pugatchov,
or a Catharine,—the judge, the police commissioner, the governor, the
officer, will remain in it. But if the system which assures their positions
were overthrown, they would lose them. Therefore it is a matter of
indifference to these men whether one man or another be at the head of the
organization of violence. What they do fear is its abolition; so they support
it.
One wonders why men of independent means, who are not obliged to
become soldiers, the so-called élite of society, enter military service in
Russia, in England, in Germany, in Austria, and even in France, and desire
the chance of killing? Why do parents, why do moral men, send their
children to military schools? Why do mothers buy them such toys as
helmets, swords, and muskets? (No child of a peasant ever plays at being a
soldier.) Why do kindly men and women, who can have no manner of
interest in war, go into ecstasies over the exploits of a man like Skobelev?
Why do men who are under no obligation to do it, and who receive no pay
for it, like Marshals of Nobility in Russia, devote months to the service
which demands such unremitting labor, wearying to the minds as well as to
the body,—the enlistment of recruits? Why do all emperors and kings wear
a military dress, why do they have drills and parades and military rewards?
Why are monuments built to generals and conquerors? Why do wealthy and
independent men regard it as an honor to occupy the position of lackeys to
kings, to flatter them and feign a belief in their special superiority? Why do
men who have long since ceased to believe in the medieval superstitions of
the Church still constantly and solemnly pretend to do so, and thus support
a sacrilegious and demoralizing institution? Why is the ignorance of the
people so zealously preserved, not only by the government, but by men of
Page 269
the higher classes? Why do they so energetically denounce every attempt to
overthrow popular superstition and to promote popular education? Why do
historians, novelists, and poets, who can derive no benefit in exchange for
their flattery, paint in such glowing colors the emperors, kings, and generals
of bygone times? Why do the so-called scientists devote their lives to
formulate theories that violence committed on the people by power is
legitimate violence—is right?
One often wonders why an artist or a woman of the world, neither of whom,
it would seem, ordinarily take much interest in sociological or military
questions—why should they condemn strikes among workmen, or advocate
war with such partizan zeal?
But one ceases to feel surprise when one realizes that the members of the
higher classes possess the keenest insight, an intuitive perception, as it
were, concerning those conditions which are friendly and those which are
hostile to the organization upon whose existence their privileges depend.
It is true that the woman of society does not deliberately argue thus: "Were
there no capitalists, or armies to defend them, my husband would have no
money, and I should have neither salon nor fashionable gowns;" nor does
the artist tell himself, in so many words, that if his pictures are to be sold
there must be capitalists, defended by armies, to buy them; yet instinct, here
doing duty for reason, is their surest guide. This instinct guides, with rare
exceptions, all men who support those political, religious, and economic
institutions which are advantageous to themselves.
But is it possible that men who belong to the higher classes defend this
organization only because it is for their own advantage? They surely cannot
fail to see that as an organization it is irrational, incompatible with the
present consciousness of men, with public opinion, and that it is fraught
with danger. Good, intelligent, honest men who belong to the ruling class
cannot but suffer from such contradictions, nor can they close their eyes to
the dangers that menace them.
And is it possible that the millions of men of the lower classes can go on
calmly committing deeds which are so manifestly criminal, such as are the
murders and tortures which they commit, simply from fear of punishment?
Surely these things could not exist were not the falsehood and brutality of
overthrow popular superstition and to promote popular education? Why do
historians, novelists, and poets, who can derive no benefit in exchange for
their flattery, paint in such glowing colors the emperors, kings, and generals
of bygone times? Why do the so-called scientists devote their lives to
formulate theories that violence committed on the people by power is
legitimate violence—is right?
One often wonders why an artist or a woman of the world, neither of whom,
it would seem, ordinarily take much interest in sociological or military
questions—why should they condemn strikes among workmen, or advocate
war with such partizan zeal?
But one ceases to feel surprise when one realizes that the members of the
higher classes possess the keenest insight, an intuitive perception, as it
were, concerning those conditions which are friendly and those which are
hostile to the organization upon whose existence their privileges depend.
It is true that the woman of society does not deliberately argue thus: "Were
there no capitalists, or armies to defend them, my husband would have no
money, and I should have neither salon nor fashionable gowns;" nor does
the artist tell himself, in so many words, that if his pictures are to be sold
there must be capitalists, defended by armies, to buy them; yet instinct, here
doing duty for reason, is their surest guide. This instinct guides, with rare
exceptions, all men who support those political, religious, and economic
institutions which are advantageous to themselves.
But is it possible that men who belong to the higher classes defend this
organization only because it is for their own advantage? They surely cannot
fail to see that as an organization it is irrational, incompatible with the
present consciousness of men, with public opinion, and that it is fraught
with danger. Good, intelligent, honest men who belong to the ruling class
cannot but suffer from such contradictions, nor can they close their eyes to
the dangers that menace them.
And is it possible that the millions of men of the lower classes can go on
calmly committing deeds which are so manifestly criminal, such as are the
murders and tortures which they commit, simply from fear of punishment?
Surely these things could not exist were not the falsehood and brutality of
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their actions hidden from all classes of men by the system of the political
organization.
When such deeds are committed, there are so many instigators, participants,
and abettors that no single individual feels himself morally responsible.
Assassins compel all the witnesses of an assassination to strike the body of
the victim, with the intention of dividing the responsibility among the
greatest number possible. And whenever those crimes by the aid of which
the state system is maintained are to be committed, this same thing is
observed. The rulers of State always endeavor to involve the greatest
possible number of citizens in the participation of the crimes which it is to
their interest to have committed.
In these latter days this is made especially evident by the drawing of
citizens on the jury in courts of law, by drafting them into the army as
soldiers, and into the communal or legislative administration as electors or
elected.
As in a wicker basket all the ends are so carefully interwoven that they
cannot be seen, so is it with the responsibility for crime. Individual
responsibilities are so manipulated that no man perceives precisely what he
is incurring.
In olden times tyrants were responsible for the crimes which were
committed, but in the present age the most frightful crimes are perpetrated,
such as would hardly have been possible in the time of Nero, and still no
one is held responsible.
Some demand the crime, some propose it, some determine it, some confirm
it, some order it, some execute it.
Women and old men are hung, are flogged to death—even quite innocent
people, as was recently the case with us in Russia, in the affair of the
factory at Uzova; or, as is done all over in Europe and America, in the
struggle with anarchists and other revolutionists, hundreds, thousands of
men are shot, are killed; or, as happens in time of war, millions of men are
massacred; or, as is happening always, the souls of men are destroyed by
solitary confinement, by the debauchery of barrack life—and no one is
responsible.
organization.
When such deeds are committed, there are so many instigators, participants,
and abettors that no single individual feels himself morally responsible.
Assassins compel all the witnesses of an assassination to strike the body of
the victim, with the intention of dividing the responsibility among the
greatest number possible. And whenever those crimes by the aid of which
the state system is maintained are to be committed, this same thing is
observed. The rulers of State always endeavor to involve the greatest
possible number of citizens in the participation of the crimes which it is to
their interest to have committed.
In these latter days this is made especially evident by the drawing of
citizens on the jury in courts of law, by drafting them into the army as
soldiers, and into the communal or legislative administration as electors or
elected.
As in a wicker basket all the ends are so carefully interwoven that they
cannot be seen, so is it with the responsibility for crime. Individual
responsibilities are so manipulated that no man perceives precisely what he
is incurring.
In olden times tyrants were responsible for the crimes which were
committed, but in the present age the most frightful crimes are perpetrated,
such as would hardly have been possible in the time of Nero, and still no
one is held responsible.
Some demand the crime, some propose it, some determine it, some confirm
it, some order it, some execute it.
Women and old men are hung, are flogged to death—even quite innocent
people, as was recently the case with us in Russia, in the affair of the
factory at Uzova; or, as is done all over in Europe and America, in the
struggle with anarchists and other revolutionists, hundreds, thousands of
men are shot, are killed; or, as happens in time of war, millions of men are
massacred; or, as is happening always, the souls of men are destroyed by
solitary confinement, by the debauchery of barrack life—and no one is
responsible.
Page 271
On the lower scale of the social ladder are posted soldiers armed with
muskets, pistols, swords; they go about doing violence and killing, and
through their doing so force other men to become soldiers like themselves,
and yet they never dream that the responsibility rests on their shoulders;
they shift it on to their superiors, who give the orders.
The czars, the presidents, the ministers of State, the general assemblies,
order tortures, murders, conscriptions, and as they enjoy the absolute
assurance that they rule by the grace of God or by the will of the society
they govern, and that that society demands from them what they order, they
cannot regard themselves as responsible.
Between these two classes we find a number of intermediaries, who take
charge of the executions, tortures, conscriptions, and they, too, wash their
hands of all responsibility, alleging on the one hand the orders of their
superiors, and on the other that it is for such as themselves, who stand lower
on the social ladder, to do these things.
The power that demands and the power that fulfils commands, the two
extremes of governmental organization, unite like the two ends of a chain,
each depending on and supporting the other, and all the intervening links.
Were it not for the conviction that there are men who assume the whole
responsibility of such deeds, no soldier would lift his hand to torture or
murder his fellow-man. Were it not for the conviction that the nation
demands it, no king, emperor, president, or assembly would venture to issue
commands for murder and torture. Were it not that he believes that there are
men above him who assume the responsibility of his actions, and others
below him whose welfare requires this treatment, no man of the
intermediate class would ever perform the functions committed to him.
The organization of the State is such that on whatever position of the social
ladder a man may stand, his irresponsibility remains intact. The higher he
stands, the more liable he is to feel the pressure brought to bear on him
from below, urging him to issue commands, and the less likely he will be to
be influenced by orders from above, and vice versa.
But it is not enough that all men bound by the organization of the State
transfer their responsibility from one to the other,—the peasant, for
instance, who becomes a soldier to the merchant who has become an
muskets, pistols, swords; they go about doing violence and killing, and
through their doing so force other men to become soldiers like themselves,
and yet they never dream that the responsibility rests on their shoulders;
they shift it on to their superiors, who give the orders.
The czars, the presidents, the ministers of State, the general assemblies,
order tortures, murders, conscriptions, and as they enjoy the absolute
assurance that they rule by the grace of God or by the will of the society
they govern, and that that society demands from them what they order, they
cannot regard themselves as responsible.
Between these two classes we find a number of intermediaries, who take
charge of the executions, tortures, conscriptions, and they, too, wash their
hands of all responsibility, alleging on the one hand the orders of their
superiors, and on the other that it is for such as themselves, who stand lower
on the social ladder, to do these things.
The power that demands and the power that fulfils commands, the two
extremes of governmental organization, unite like the two ends of a chain,
each depending on and supporting the other, and all the intervening links.
Were it not for the conviction that there are men who assume the whole
responsibility of such deeds, no soldier would lift his hand to torture or
murder his fellow-man. Were it not for the conviction that the nation
demands it, no king, emperor, president, or assembly would venture to issue
commands for murder and torture. Were it not that he believes that there are
men above him who assume the responsibility of his actions, and others
below him whose welfare requires this treatment, no man of the
intermediate class would ever perform the functions committed to him.
The organization of the State is such that on whatever position of the social
ladder a man may stand, his irresponsibility remains intact. The higher he
stands, the more liable he is to feel the pressure brought to bear on him
from below, urging him to issue commands, and the less likely he will be to
be influenced by orders from above, and vice versa.
But it is not enough that all men bound by the organization of the State
transfer their responsibility from one to the other,—the peasant, for
instance, who becomes a soldier to the merchant who has become an
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officer; the officer to the noble who occupies the position of governor; the
governor to the minister of State; the minister to the sovereign; and the
sovereign who in his turn shifts the responsibility upon all,—officials,
nobles, merchants, peasants. Not only do men in this way merely free
themselves from all sense of responsibility for their actions, but because, as
they adapt themselves to fulfil the requirements of political organizations,
they so constantly, persistently, and strenuously assure themselves and
others that all men are not equal that they begin to believe it sincerely
themselves. Thus we are assured that some men are superior and must be
especially honored and obeyed; while, on the other hand, we are assured in
every way that others are inferior, and therefore bound to obey without
murmur the commands of their superiors.
It is to this inequality,—the exaltation of some upon the abasement of
others,—that we may chiefly attribute the incapacity which men display for
discerning the folly of the existing system, with the cruelty and deceptions
committed by some, and suffered by others.
There are certain men who have been made to believe that they are
possessed of a peculiar importance and greatness, who have become so
intoxicated by their imaginary superiority that they cease to realize their
responsibility for the actions they commit; others who, on the contrary, have
been told that they are insignificant beings, and that it is their duty to submit
to those above them, and, as the natural result of this continual state of
degradation, fall into a strange condition of stupefied servility, and in this
state they, too, lose all sense of responsibility for their actions. And as to the
intermediate class, subservient to those above them, and yet to a certain
extent regarding themselves as superiors, they are apt to be both servile and
arrogant, and they also lose the sense of responsibility.
One needs but to glance at any official of high rank in the act of reviewing
the troops. Accompanied by his staff, mounted on a magnificently
caparisoned charger, equipped in a brilliant uniform, displaying all his
decorations, he rides in front of the ranks, while the band plays martial
music and the soldiers present arms, standing, as they do, as though verily
petrified with servility,—one has but to see this to understand how in such
moments, under such conditions, both generals and soldiers might commit
deeds which they never would have dreamed of committing.
governor to the minister of State; the minister to the sovereign; and the
sovereign who in his turn shifts the responsibility upon all,—officials,
nobles, merchants, peasants. Not only do men in this way merely free
themselves from all sense of responsibility for their actions, but because, as
they adapt themselves to fulfil the requirements of political organizations,
they so constantly, persistently, and strenuously assure themselves and
others that all men are not equal that they begin to believe it sincerely
themselves. Thus we are assured that some men are superior and must be
especially honored and obeyed; while, on the other hand, we are assured in
every way that others are inferior, and therefore bound to obey without
murmur the commands of their superiors.
It is to this inequality,—the exaltation of some upon the abasement of
others,—that we may chiefly attribute the incapacity which men display for
discerning the folly of the existing system, with the cruelty and deceptions
committed by some, and suffered by others.
There are certain men who have been made to believe that they are
possessed of a peculiar importance and greatness, who have become so
intoxicated by their imaginary superiority that they cease to realize their
responsibility for the actions they commit; others who, on the contrary, have
been told that they are insignificant beings, and that it is their duty to submit
to those above them, and, as the natural result of this continual state of
degradation, fall into a strange condition of stupefied servility, and in this
state they, too, lose all sense of responsibility for their actions. And as to the
intermediate class, subservient to those above them, and yet to a certain
extent regarding themselves as superiors, they are apt to be both servile and
arrogant, and they also lose the sense of responsibility.
One needs but to glance at any official of high rank in the act of reviewing
the troops. Accompanied by his staff, mounted on a magnificently
caparisoned charger, equipped in a brilliant uniform, displaying all his
decorations, he rides in front of the ranks, while the band plays martial
music and the soldiers present arms, standing, as they do, as though verily
petrified with servility,—one has but to see this to understand how in such
moments, under such conditions, both generals and soldiers might commit
deeds which they never would have dreamed of committing.
Page 273
But the intoxication to which men succumb under conditions like parades,
pageants, religious ceremonies, and coronations, though acute, is not
enduring, while there is another which is chronic, shared by all who have
any authority whatsoever, from the Czar to the policemen on the street,
shared, too, by the masses who submit to authority in a state of stupefied
servility, and who by way of justifying their submission, after the usual
manner of slaves, ascribe the greatest importance and dignity to those
whom they obey.
It is this delusion in regard to human inequality and the consequent
intoxication of power and stupefaction of servility, which makes it possible
for those who are associated in a state organization to commit crimes and
suffer no remorse.
Under the influence of this intoxication,—there is an intoxication of
servility as well as of power,—men seem to others, no less than to
themselves, not the ordinary human beings which they really are, but
specially privileged beings,—nobles, merchants, governors, judges,
officers, kings, statesmen, soldiers, having no longer ordinary human duties,
but only the duties of the class to which they belong.
Thus the landed proprietor who prosecuted the peasants on account of the
forest did so because he did not regard himself as an ordinary man, with the
same rights as the peasants, his neighbors, but as a great landowner and a
member of the nobility, and, as such, exalted by the intoxication of
authority, felt himself insulted by the opposition of the peasants. And
regardless of the consequences, he sends in his petition to be reinstated in
his pretended rights. The judges who rendered an unfair decision in his
favor, did so because they fancied themselves different from ordinary men,
who are guided only by truth; under the spell of the intoxication of
authority, they believed themselves the guardians of a justice which cannot
err; and at the same time, under the influence of servility, they considered
themselves obliged to apply certain texts set forth in a certain book and
called the laws; and all the other persons who took part in this affair, from
the representatives of higher authority down to the last soldier ready to fire
upon his brother,—they all accepted themselves in their conventionally
accredited characters. Not one asked himself if he should take part in an act
which his conscience reprobated, but each accepted himself as one who had
simply to fulfil a certain function; let it be the Czar, anointed of God, an
pageants, religious ceremonies, and coronations, though acute, is not
enduring, while there is another which is chronic, shared by all who have
any authority whatsoever, from the Czar to the policemen on the street,
shared, too, by the masses who submit to authority in a state of stupefied
servility, and who by way of justifying their submission, after the usual
manner of slaves, ascribe the greatest importance and dignity to those
whom they obey.
It is this delusion in regard to human inequality and the consequent
intoxication of power and stupefaction of servility, which makes it possible
for those who are associated in a state organization to commit crimes and
suffer no remorse.
Under the influence of this intoxication,—there is an intoxication of
servility as well as of power,—men seem to others, no less than to
themselves, not the ordinary human beings which they really are, but
specially privileged beings,—nobles, merchants, governors, judges,
officers, kings, statesmen, soldiers, having no longer ordinary human duties,
but only the duties of the class to which they belong.
Thus the landed proprietor who prosecuted the peasants on account of the
forest did so because he did not regard himself as an ordinary man, with the
same rights as the peasants, his neighbors, but as a great landowner and a
member of the nobility, and, as such, exalted by the intoxication of
authority, felt himself insulted by the opposition of the peasants. And
regardless of the consequences, he sends in his petition to be reinstated in
his pretended rights. The judges who rendered an unfair decision in his
favor, did so because they fancied themselves different from ordinary men,
who are guided only by truth; under the spell of the intoxication of
authority, they believed themselves the guardians of a justice which cannot
err; and at the same time, under the influence of servility, they considered
themselves obliged to apply certain texts set forth in a certain book and
called the laws; and all the other persons who took part in this affair, from
the representatives of higher authority down to the last soldier ready to fire
upon his brother,—they all accepted themselves in their conventionally
accredited characters. Not one asked himself if he should take part in an act
which his conscience reprobated, but each accepted himself as one who had
simply to fulfil a certain function; let it be the Czar, anointed of God, an
Page 274
exceptional being called to look after the welfare of a hundred million men;
let it be the noble; the priest, the recipient of grace through ordination; the
soldier, bound by oath to fulfil commands without hesitation,—it is the
same with all.
All their activity, past, present, and future, is stimulated by a like
intoxicating influence. If they had not the firm conviction that the title of
king, statesman, governor, judge, landowner, marshal of nobility, officer, or
soldier is of serious import and necessity, not one of them could
contemplate without horror and disgust his own share in the deeds done in
these latter days.
Arbitrary distinctions, established hundreds of years ago, recognized for
hundreds of years, described by special names and distinguished by special
dress, sanctioned by all kinds of solemnities calculated to influence men
through their emotions, have been so thoroughly impressed upon the human
imagination that men have forgotten the common, everyday aspects of life;
they look upon themselves and others from a point of view dependent upon
outward conditions, and regard their own acts and those of their neighbors
accordingly.
Here, for instance, we see a man of advanced years, a man perfectly in
possession of his senses, who, because he has been decorated with some
bauble, and is attired in a ridiculous habit, or because he is the holder of
certain keys, or has received a bit of blue ribbon fitter for the wear of a
coquettish child, when he is called general, chamberlain, chevalier of the
order of St. Andrew, or some such absurdity, becomes at once proud,
arrogant, happy; if, on the contrary, he fails to get the gewgaw or the
nickname he expected, he becomes unhappy and ill, really to the point of
sickness.
Or let us take a still more remarkable case. A man, morally sane, young,
free, and absolutely safe from want, has no sooner received the name of
district-attorney, of Zemsky Nachalnik, than he pounces upon some luckless
widow, takes her from her small children, and throws her into jail, all
because the poor woman has been secretly selling wine, and thus depriving
the treasury of 25 roubles' revenue. This man feels no remorse. Another still
more surprising case is that of a man, ordinarily kind and good, who,
because he wears a uniform or carries a medal, and is told that he is a
let it be the noble; the priest, the recipient of grace through ordination; the
soldier, bound by oath to fulfil commands without hesitation,—it is the
same with all.
All their activity, past, present, and future, is stimulated by a like
intoxicating influence. If they had not the firm conviction that the title of
king, statesman, governor, judge, landowner, marshal of nobility, officer, or
soldier is of serious import and necessity, not one of them could
contemplate without horror and disgust his own share in the deeds done in
these latter days.
Arbitrary distinctions, established hundreds of years ago, recognized for
hundreds of years, described by special names and distinguished by special
dress, sanctioned by all kinds of solemnities calculated to influence men
through their emotions, have been so thoroughly impressed upon the human
imagination that men have forgotten the common, everyday aspects of life;
they look upon themselves and others from a point of view dependent upon
outward conditions, and regard their own acts and those of their neighbors
accordingly.
Here, for instance, we see a man of advanced years, a man perfectly in
possession of his senses, who, because he has been decorated with some
bauble, and is attired in a ridiculous habit, or because he is the holder of
certain keys, or has received a bit of blue ribbon fitter for the wear of a
coquettish child, when he is called general, chamberlain, chevalier of the
order of St. Andrew, or some such absurdity, becomes at once proud,
arrogant, happy; if, on the contrary, he fails to get the gewgaw or the
nickname he expected, he becomes unhappy and ill, really to the point of
sickness.
Or let us take a still more remarkable case. A man, morally sane, young,
free, and absolutely safe from want, has no sooner received the name of
district-attorney, of Zemsky Nachalnik, than he pounces upon some luckless
widow, takes her from her small children, and throws her into jail, all
because the poor woman has been secretly selling wine, and thus depriving
the treasury of 25 roubles' revenue. This man feels no remorse. Another still
more surprising case is that of a man, ordinarily kind and good, who,
because he wears a uniform or carries a medal, and is told that he is a
Page 275
keeper [garde-champêtre] or custom-house officer, considers himself
justified in shooting men down, and no one ever dreams of blaming him for
it, nor does he think himself in the wrong; but if he failed to fire upon his
fellow-men he would then indeed be culpable. I say nothing of judges and
jurymen, who condemn men to death, nor of troops, who slaughter
thousands without a vestige of remorse, because they are told that they are
not in the position of ordinary men, but are jurymen, judges, generals,
soldiers.
This abnormal and surprising state of affairs is formulated in words like
these: "As a man, I sympathize with him, but as a keeper, a judge, a general,
a czar, or a soldier, I must torture or murder him."
So it is in this present case; men are on the way to slaughter and torment
their famine-stricken brethren, admitting all the while that in this dispute
between the peasants and the landowner the former are in the right (all the
superior officials told me so). They know that the peasants are miserable,
poor, and hungry, and that the landowner is wealthy and one who inspires
no sympathy, and yet these men are going to kill the peasants in order that
this landowner may gain 3000 roubles; and all because they regard
themselves at the moment not as men, but one as a governor, another as a
general of gendarmerie, another as an officer, or as soldiers, as the case may
be, and bound not by the eternal laws of the human conscience, but by the
accidental, transitory demands of their positions.
However strange it may appear, the only explanation of this surprising
phenomenon is that men are like those under hypnotic influence, who, as
suggested by the hypnotizers, imagine themselves in certain conditions.
Thus, for instance, when it is suggested to a hypnotized patient that he is
lame, he proceeds to limp; that he is blind, he ceases to see; that he is an
animal, and he begins to bite. And this is the state of all those who put their
social and political duties before, and to the detriment of, their duties as
human beings.
The essential characteristic of this condition is, that men, influenced by the
thought that has been suggested to them, are unable to weigh their own
actions, and simply obey the suggestion that has been communicated to
them.
justified in shooting men down, and no one ever dreams of blaming him for
it, nor does he think himself in the wrong; but if he failed to fire upon his
fellow-men he would then indeed be culpable. I say nothing of judges and
jurymen, who condemn men to death, nor of troops, who slaughter
thousands without a vestige of remorse, because they are told that they are
not in the position of ordinary men, but are jurymen, judges, generals,
soldiers.
This abnormal and surprising state of affairs is formulated in words like
these: "As a man, I sympathize with him, but as a keeper, a judge, a general,
a czar, or a soldier, I must torture or murder him."
So it is in this present case; men are on the way to slaughter and torment
their famine-stricken brethren, admitting all the while that in this dispute
between the peasants and the landowner the former are in the right (all the
superior officials told me so). They know that the peasants are miserable,
poor, and hungry, and that the landowner is wealthy and one who inspires
no sympathy, and yet these men are going to kill the peasants in order that
this landowner may gain 3000 roubles; and all because they regard
themselves at the moment not as men, but one as a governor, another as a
general of gendarmerie, another as an officer, or as soldiers, as the case may
be, and bound not by the eternal laws of the human conscience, but by the
accidental, transitory demands of their positions.
However strange it may appear, the only explanation of this surprising
phenomenon is that men are like those under hypnotic influence, who, as
suggested by the hypnotizers, imagine themselves in certain conditions.
Thus, for instance, when it is suggested to a hypnotized patient that he is
lame, he proceeds to limp; that he is blind, he ceases to see; that he is an
animal, and he begins to bite. And this is the state of all those who put their
social and political duties before, and to the detriment of, their duties as
human beings.
The essential characteristic of this condition is, that men, influenced by the
thought that has been suggested to them, are unable to weigh their own
actions, and simply obey the suggestion that has been communicated to
them.
Page 276
The difference between men artificially hypnotized and those under the
influence of governmental suggestion consists in this,—that to the former
their imagined environment is suggested suddenly by one person, and the
suggestion operates only for a short time; whereas to the latter, their
imagined position has been the result of gradual suggestion, going on, not
for years, but for generations, and proceeds not from a single individual, but
from their entire circumstances.
"But," it will be objected, "always, in all societies, the majority of men, all
the children, all the women, absorbed in the duties and cares of
motherhood, all the great mass of workers, who are completely absorbed by
their labor, all those of weak mind, all the enfeebled, the many who have
come under the subjection of nicotine, alcohol, opium, or what not,—all
these are not in a position to think for themselves, and consequently they
submit to those who stand on a higher intellectual level, or they simply act
according to domestic or social tradition, or in accordance with public
opinion,—and in their acting thus there is nothing abnormal or
contradictory."
Indeed, there is nothing unnatural in it, and the readiness with which those
who reason but little submit to the guidance of men who stand on a higher
plane of consciousness is a universal phenomenon, and one without which
social life could not be. The minority submit to principles which they have
considered for themselves, and in consequence of the accordance of these
principles with their reason; the rest of men, the majority, submit to the
same principles, not because of personal apprehension of their validity, but
because public opinion demands it.
Such submission to public opinion of men who can think but little for
themselves has nothing abnormal about it so long as public opinion
maintains its unity.
But there is a period when the higher forms of truth, having been revealed
to the few, are in process of transmission to the many; and when the public
opinion which was based on a lower plane of consciousness has already
begun to waver, to give place to the new, ready to be established. And now
men begin to view their own and other men's actions in the light of their
new consciousness, while, influenced by inertia and tradition, they still
continue to apply principles which were the outcome of the once highest
influence of governmental suggestion consists in this,—that to the former
their imagined environment is suggested suddenly by one person, and the
suggestion operates only for a short time; whereas to the latter, their
imagined position has been the result of gradual suggestion, going on, not
for years, but for generations, and proceeds not from a single individual, but
from their entire circumstances.
"But," it will be objected, "always, in all societies, the majority of men, all
the children, all the women, absorbed in the duties and cares of
motherhood, all the great mass of workers, who are completely absorbed by
their labor, all those of weak mind, all the enfeebled, the many who have
come under the subjection of nicotine, alcohol, opium, or what not,—all
these are not in a position to think for themselves, and consequently they
submit to those who stand on a higher intellectual level, or they simply act
according to domestic or social tradition, or in accordance with public
opinion,—and in their acting thus there is nothing abnormal or
contradictory."
Indeed, there is nothing unnatural in it, and the readiness with which those
who reason but little submit to the guidance of men who stand on a higher
plane of consciousness is a universal phenomenon, and one without which
social life could not be. The minority submit to principles which they have
considered for themselves, and in consequence of the accordance of these
principles with their reason; the rest of men, the majority, submit to the
same principles, not because of personal apprehension of their validity, but
because public opinion demands it.
Such submission to public opinion of men who can think but little for
themselves has nothing abnormal about it so long as public opinion
maintains its unity.
But there is a period when the higher forms of truth, having been revealed
to the few, are in process of transmission to the many; and when the public
opinion which was based on a lower plane of consciousness has already
begun to waver, to give place to the new, ready to be established. And now
men begin to view their own and other men's actions in the light of their
new consciousness, while, influenced by inertia and tradition, they still
continue to apply principles which were the outcome of the once highest
Page 277
consciousness, but which are now distinctly opposed to it. Hence it is that
men find themselves in an abnormal position, and that, while realizing the
necessity of conforming to this new public opinion, they lack courage to
abandon conformity to the old one. This is the attitude which men, not only
the men on the train, but the greater part of mankind, occupy toward
Christian truths.
The attitude of those who belong to the upper classes, and who have all the
advantages of high position, is the same as that of the lower classes who
obey implicitly every command that is given to them.
Men of the ruling classes, who have no reasonable explanation of their
privileges, and who in order to retain them are forced to repress all their
nobler and more humane tendencies, try to persuade themselves of the
necessity of their superior position; while the lower classes, stultified and
oppressed by labor, are kept by the higher classes in a state of constant
subjection.
This is the only possible explanation of the amazing phenomena which I
witnessed on the train on the 9th of September, when men, naturally kindly
and inoffensive, were to be seen going with an easy conscience to commit
the most cruel, contemptible and idiotic of crimes.
It cannot be said that they are devoid of the conscience which should forbid
them to do these things, as was the case with the men who, centuries ago,
tortured their fellow-men, scourged them to death, and burned them at the
stake;—nay, it does exist in them, but it is kept dormant; auto-suggestion, as
the psychologist calls it, keeps it thus among the upper classes, while the
soldiers, the executioners, are under the hypnotic influence of the classes
above them.
Conscience may slumber for a time, but it is not dead, and in spite of
suggestion and auto-suggestion, it still whispers; yet a little while and it will
awaken.
One might compare these men to a person under the influence of
hypnotism, to whom it has been suggested that he shall commit some act
contrary to his conception of right and wrong, as, for example, to murder
his mother or his child. He feels himself so far coerced by the suggestion
given him that he cannot refrain; and yet as the appointed time and place
men find themselves in an abnormal position, and that, while realizing the
necessity of conforming to this new public opinion, they lack courage to
abandon conformity to the old one. This is the attitude which men, not only
the men on the train, but the greater part of mankind, occupy toward
Christian truths.
The attitude of those who belong to the upper classes, and who have all the
advantages of high position, is the same as that of the lower classes who
obey implicitly every command that is given to them.
Men of the ruling classes, who have no reasonable explanation of their
privileges, and who in order to retain them are forced to repress all their
nobler and more humane tendencies, try to persuade themselves of the
necessity of their superior position; while the lower classes, stultified and
oppressed by labor, are kept by the higher classes in a state of constant
subjection.
This is the only possible explanation of the amazing phenomena which I
witnessed on the train on the 9th of September, when men, naturally kindly
and inoffensive, were to be seen going with an easy conscience to commit
the most cruel, contemptible and idiotic of crimes.
It cannot be said that they are devoid of the conscience which should forbid
them to do these things, as was the case with the men who, centuries ago,
tortured their fellow-men, scourged them to death, and burned them at the
stake;—nay, it does exist in them, but it is kept dormant; auto-suggestion, as
the psychologist calls it, keeps it thus among the upper classes, while the
soldiers, the executioners, are under the hypnotic influence of the classes
above them.
Conscience may slumber for a time, but it is not dead, and in spite of
suggestion and auto-suggestion, it still whispers; yet a little while and it will
awaken.
One might compare these men to a person under the influence of
hypnotism, to whom it has been suggested that he shall commit some act
contrary to his conception of right and wrong, as, for example, to murder
his mother or his child. He feels himself so far coerced by the suggestion
given him that he cannot refrain; and yet as the appointed time and place
Page 278
draw near, he seems to hear the stifled voice of conscience reviving, and he
begins to draw back, he tries to awaken himself. And no one can tell
whether or not hypnotic suggestion will conquer in the end; all depends on
the relative strength of conflicting influences.
So it was with the soldiers on that train, so it is with all men of our period
who take part in state violence and profit by it.
There was a time when, having gone forth to do violence and murder, to
terrify by an example, men did not return until they had performed their
mission, and then they suffered no doubt or remorse; but having done their
fellow-men to death, they placidly returned to the bosom of their families,
caressed their children, and with jest and laughter gave themselves up to all
the pure joys of the hearth.
The men who were then benefited by violence, landed proprietors and men
of wealth, believed their own interests to have a direct connection with
these cruelties. It is different now, when men know, or at least suspect, the
real reason why they do these things. They may close their eyes and try to
silence their consciences, but neither those who commit such outrages, nor
those who order them, can longer fail to discern the significance of their
acts. It may be that they do not fully appreciate it until they are on the point
of committing the deed, or in some cases not until after the deed has been
done. Those soldiers, for instance, who administered the tortures during the
riot at the Yuzovo factory, at Nijni-Novgorod, Saratov, and Orel, did not
fully apprehend the significance of what they were doing until it was all
over; and now, both they who gave the orders, and they who executed them,
suffer agonies of shame in the condemnation of public opinion and of their
own conscience. I have talked with some of the soldiers about it; they either
tried to change the subject or spoke of it with horror and repugnance.
There are instances of men coming to their senses, however, just as they are
on the point of committing deeds of the kind. I know of a sergeant who
during the riots was beaten by two peasants; he reported the fact to the
commander of his company, but on the following day, when he saw the
tortures inflicted upon other peasants, he persuaded his superior officer to
destroy his report and to allow the peasants who had beaten him to depart
unpunished. I know of a case where the soldiers appointed to shoot a
begins to draw back, he tries to awaken himself. And no one can tell
whether or not hypnotic suggestion will conquer in the end; all depends on
the relative strength of conflicting influences.
So it was with the soldiers on that train, so it is with all men of our period
who take part in state violence and profit by it.
There was a time when, having gone forth to do violence and murder, to
terrify by an example, men did not return until they had performed their
mission, and then they suffered no doubt or remorse; but having done their
fellow-men to death, they placidly returned to the bosom of their families,
caressed their children, and with jest and laughter gave themselves up to all
the pure joys of the hearth.
The men who were then benefited by violence, landed proprietors and men
of wealth, believed their own interests to have a direct connection with
these cruelties. It is different now, when men know, or at least suspect, the
real reason why they do these things. They may close their eyes and try to
silence their consciences, but neither those who commit such outrages, nor
those who order them, can longer fail to discern the significance of their
acts. It may be that they do not fully appreciate it until they are on the point
of committing the deed, or in some cases not until after the deed has been
done. Those soldiers, for instance, who administered the tortures during the
riot at the Yuzovo factory, at Nijni-Novgorod, Saratov, and Orel, did not
fully apprehend the significance of what they were doing until it was all
over; and now, both they who gave the orders, and they who executed them,
suffer agonies of shame in the condemnation of public opinion and of their
own conscience. I have talked with some of the soldiers about it; they either
tried to change the subject or spoke of it with horror and repugnance.
There are instances of men coming to their senses, however, just as they are
on the point of committing deeds of the kind. I know of a sergeant who
during the riots was beaten by two peasants; he reported the fact to the
commander of his company, but on the following day, when he saw the
tortures inflicted upon other peasants, he persuaded his superior officer to
destroy his report and to allow the peasants who had beaten him to depart
unpunished. I know of a case where the soldiers appointed to shoot a
Page 279
prisoner refused to obey; and of other occasions where the superior officers
have refused to direct tortures and executions.
The men who were in the train on the 9th of September started with the
intention of torturing and murdering their fellow-men, but whether they
would carry out their intention one could not know. However each one's
share in the responsibility of this affair might be concealed from him,
however strong the hypnotic suggestion among those taking part in it that
they did so, not as men, but as functionaries, and so could violate all human
obligations,—in spite of this,—the nearer they approached their destination,
the more they must have hesitated about it.
It is impossible that the Governor should not pause at the moment of giving
the decisive order to begin to murder and torture. He knows that the
conduct of the Governor at Orel has excited the indignation of the
honorable men, and he himself, influenced by public opinion, has
repeatedly expressed his own disapproval of the affair; he knows that the
lawyer who ought to have accompanied him distinctly refused to do so,
denouncing the whole affair as shameful; he knows that changes are likely
to take place in the government at any moment, the result of which would
be that those who were in favor yesterday may be in disgrace to-morrow;
that if the Russian press remains silent, the foreign press may give an
account of this business that might cover him with opprobrium. Already he
feels the influence of the new public opinion which is to supersede and
destroy the old one. Moreover, he has no assurance that his subordinates
may not at the last moment refuse to obey him. He hesitates; it is impossible
to divine what he will do.
The functionaries and officers who accompany him feel more or less as he
does. They all know at the bottom of their hearts that they are engaged in a
shameful business, that their share in it stains and degrades them in the eyes
of those persons whose opinion they value. They know that a man who
participates in deeds like these feels shame in the presence of the woman he
loves. And like the Governor, they, too, feel doubtful whether the soldiers
will obey them at the last moment. What a contrast to the self-assurance of
their bearing on the platform of the station! Not only do they suffer, but
they actually hesitate, and it is partly to hide their inward agitation that they
assume an air of bravado. And this agitation increases as they draw nearer
to their destination.
have refused to direct tortures and executions.
The men who were in the train on the 9th of September started with the
intention of torturing and murdering their fellow-men, but whether they
would carry out their intention one could not know. However each one's
share in the responsibility of this affair might be concealed from him,
however strong the hypnotic suggestion among those taking part in it that
they did so, not as men, but as functionaries, and so could violate all human
obligations,—in spite of this,—the nearer they approached their destination,
the more they must have hesitated about it.
It is impossible that the Governor should not pause at the moment of giving
the decisive order to begin to murder and torture. He knows that the
conduct of the Governor at Orel has excited the indignation of the
honorable men, and he himself, influenced by public opinion, has
repeatedly expressed his own disapproval of the affair; he knows that the
lawyer who ought to have accompanied him distinctly refused to do so,
denouncing the whole affair as shameful; he knows that changes are likely
to take place in the government at any moment, the result of which would
be that those who were in favor yesterday may be in disgrace to-morrow;
that if the Russian press remains silent, the foreign press may give an
account of this business that might cover him with opprobrium. Already he
feels the influence of the new public opinion which is to supersede and
destroy the old one. Moreover, he has no assurance that his subordinates
may not at the last moment refuse to obey him. He hesitates; it is impossible
to divine what he will do.
The functionaries and officers who accompany him feel more or less as he
does. They all know at the bottom of their hearts that they are engaged in a
shameful business, that their share in it stains and degrades them in the eyes
of those persons whose opinion they value. They know that a man who
participates in deeds like these feels shame in the presence of the woman he
loves. And like the Governor, they, too, feel doubtful whether the soldiers
will obey them at the last moment. What a contrast to the self-assurance of
their bearing on the platform of the station! Not only do they suffer, but
they actually hesitate, and it is partly to hide their inward agitation that they
assume an air of bravado. And this agitation increases as they draw nearer
to their destination.
Page 280
And, indeed, the entire body of soldiers, although they give no outward
sign, and seem utterly submissive, are really in the same state of mind.
They are no longer like the soldiers of former days, who gave up the natural
life of labor, and surrendered themselves to debauchery, rapine, and murder,
as the Roman legions did, or the veterans of the Thirty Years' War, or even
those soldiers of more modern times, whose term of service lasted twenty-
five years. Now they are for the most part men newly taken from their
families, with all the memories of the wholesome, rational life from which
they have been torn still fresh in their minds.
These young men, peasants for the most part, know what they are going to
do; they know that the land-owners generally ill-treat the peasants, and that
this probably is a case in point. Furthermore, the majority of them can read,
and the books they read are not always in favor of the service; some even
demonstrate its immorality. They find comrades who are independent
thinkers, volunteers and young officers, and the seed of doubt respecting the
merit and rectitude of such deeds as they are about to commit has already
been sown in their minds. True, they have all been subjected to that
ingenious discipline, the work of centuries, which tends to kill the spirit of
independence in every man, and are so accustomed to automatic obedience
that at the words of command, "Fire along the line!... Fire!" and so forth,
their muskets are raised mechanically, and they perform the customary
movements. But now, "Fire!" means something more than firing at a target;
it means the murder of their abused, downtrodden fathers and brothers, who
are grouped yonder in the street with their wives and children, gesticulating
and crying out one does not know what.
There they are: here a man with thin beard, clad in a patched kaftan, with
bast shoes on his feet, just like the father left behind in the province of
Kazan or Ryazan; there another, with gray beard and bowed shoulders,
leaning on a stout staff, just like the grandfather; and here a youth, with big
boots and red shirt, just like himself a year ago,—the soldier who is about
to shoot him. And there is a woman, with her bast shoes and petticoat, like
the mother he left behind him.
And he must fire upon them!
And God alone knows what each soldier will do at the supreme moment.
The slightest suggestion that they ought not to do it, that they must not do it,
sign, and seem utterly submissive, are really in the same state of mind.
They are no longer like the soldiers of former days, who gave up the natural
life of labor, and surrendered themselves to debauchery, rapine, and murder,
as the Roman legions did, or the veterans of the Thirty Years' War, or even
those soldiers of more modern times, whose term of service lasted twenty-
five years. Now they are for the most part men newly taken from their
families, with all the memories of the wholesome, rational life from which
they have been torn still fresh in their minds.
These young men, peasants for the most part, know what they are going to
do; they know that the land-owners generally ill-treat the peasants, and that
this probably is a case in point. Furthermore, the majority of them can read,
and the books they read are not always in favor of the service; some even
demonstrate its immorality. They find comrades who are independent
thinkers, volunteers and young officers, and the seed of doubt respecting the
merit and rectitude of such deeds as they are about to commit has already
been sown in their minds. True, they have all been subjected to that
ingenious discipline, the work of centuries, which tends to kill the spirit of
independence in every man, and are so accustomed to automatic obedience
that at the words of command, "Fire along the line!... Fire!" and so forth,
their muskets are raised mechanically, and they perform the customary
movements. But now, "Fire!" means something more than firing at a target;
it means the murder of their abused, downtrodden fathers and brothers, who
are grouped yonder in the street with their wives and children, gesticulating
and crying out one does not know what.
There they are: here a man with thin beard, clad in a patched kaftan, with
bast shoes on his feet, just like the father left behind in the province of
Kazan or Ryazan; there another, with gray beard and bowed shoulders,
leaning on a stout staff, just like the grandfather; and here a youth, with big
boots and red shirt, just like himself a year ago,—the soldier who is about
to shoot him. And there is a woman, with her bast shoes and petticoat, like
the mother he left behind him.
And he must fire upon them!
And God alone knows what each soldier will do at the supreme moment.
The slightest suggestion that they ought not to do it, that they must not do it,
Page 281
—a single word or hint,—would be enough to make them pause.
Every one of these men at the moment of action will be like one
hypnotized, to whom it has been suggested to chop a log, who, as he
approaches the object which is told to him is a log, sees as he raises the ax
that it is not a log at all, but his own brother who lies sleeping there. He
may accomplish the act which has been suggested to him, or he may awake
at the moment of committing it. It is the same with these men. If they do not
awaken, then will a deed be done as shocking as that committed in Orel,
and the reign of official hypnotism will thereby gain new power. If they
awaken, then not only will the deed remain undone, but many of those who
hear of their refusal to do it will free themselves from the suggestion under
whose influence they have hitherto acted, or at least will think of the
possibility of doing so.
If only a few of these men come to their senses, and refuse to do the deed,
and fearlessly express their opinion of the wickedness of such deeds, even
such a few men might enable the rest to throw off the suggestion under the
influence of which they act, and such evil deeds would not be done.
And another thing: if but a few of those persons who are simply spectators
of the affair would, from their knowledge of other affairs of the same kind,
boldly express their opinion to those engaged in it, and point out to them
their folly, cruelty, and criminality, even this would not be without a
salutary influence.
This is precisely what happened in the case of Tula. Partly because certain
persons expressed reluctance to take a part in the affair; because a lady
passenger and others showed their indignation at a railway station; because
one of the colonels whose regiment was summoned to reduce the peasants
to obedience declared that soldiers are not executioners,—because of these
and other apparently trifling influences the affair took on a different aspect,
and the troops, on arriving, did not commit outrages, but contented
themselves with cutting down the trees and sending them to the landowner.
Had it not been that certain of these men conceived a distinct idea that they
were doing wrong, and had not the idea got abroad, the occurrences at Orel
would have been repeated. Had the feeling been stronger, perhaps the
Governor and his troops would not have gone so far as even to fell the trees
and deliver them to the landowner. Had it been more powerful still, perhaps
Every one of these men at the moment of action will be like one
hypnotized, to whom it has been suggested to chop a log, who, as he
approaches the object which is told to him is a log, sees as he raises the ax
that it is not a log at all, but his own brother who lies sleeping there. He
may accomplish the act which has been suggested to him, or he may awake
at the moment of committing it. It is the same with these men. If they do not
awaken, then will a deed be done as shocking as that committed in Orel,
and the reign of official hypnotism will thereby gain new power. If they
awaken, then not only will the deed remain undone, but many of those who
hear of their refusal to do it will free themselves from the suggestion under
whose influence they have hitherto acted, or at least will think of the
possibility of doing so.
If only a few of these men come to their senses, and refuse to do the deed,
and fearlessly express their opinion of the wickedness of such deeds, even
such a few men might enable the rest to throw off the suggestion under the
influence of which they act, and such evil deeds would not be done.
And another thing: if but a few of those persons who are simply spectators
of the affair would, from their knowledge of other affairs of the same kind,
boldly express their opinion to those engaged in it, and point out to them
their folly, cruelty, and criminality, even this would not be without a
salutary influence.
This is precisely what happened in the case of Tula. Partly because certain
persons expressed reluctance to take a part in the affair; because a lady
passenger and others showed their indignation at a railway station; because
one of the colonels whose regiment was summoned to reduce the peasants
to obedience declared that soldiers are not executioners,—because of these
and other apparently trifling influences the affair took on a different aspect,
and the troops, on arriving, did not commit outrages, but contented
themselves with cutting down the trees and sending them to the landowner.
Had it not been that certain of these men conceived a distinct idea that they
were doing wrong, and had not the idea got abroad, the occurrences at Orel
would have been repeated. Had the feeling been stronger, perhaps the
Governor and his troops would not have gone so far as even to fell the trees
and deliver them to the landowner. Had it been more powerful still, perhaps
Page 282
the Governor would not have dared even to set out for Tula; its influence
might even have gone so far as to prevent the Minister from framing, and
the Emperor from confirming, such decrees.
All depends, as we come therefore to see, upon the degree of consciousness
that men possess of Christian truth.
Hence, let all men to-day who wish to promote the welfare of mankind
direct their efforts toward the development of this consciousness of
Christian truth.
But, strange to say, those men who nowadays talk most of the amelioration
of human life, and who are the acknowledged leaders of public opinion,
declare this to be precisely the wrong thing to do, and that there are more
effectual expedients for improving human existence. They insist that any
improvement in the conditions of human life must be accomplished, not
through individual moral effort, nor through the propagation of truth, but
through progressive modifications in the general material conditions of life.
Therefore, they say, individual effort should be devoted to the gradual
reform of the everyday conditions of life; and seeing that any individual
profession of the truth which may happen to be incompatible with the
existing order is harmful, because it provokes, on the part of the
government, an opposition which prevents the individual from continuing
efforts which may be of utility to society.
According to this theory, all changes in the life of mankind proceed from
the same causes that control the lives of the brute creation.
And all the religious teachers, like Moses and the Prophets, Confucius, Lao
Tze, Buddha, and Christ, preached their doctrines, and their followers
adopted them, not because they divined and loved the truth, but because the
political, social, and, above all, the economical conditions of the nations in
whose midst these doctrines found expression were favorable to their
exposition and development.
Therefore the principal activity of a man who wishes to serve the world and
to improve the condition of his kind should be directed, according to this
theory, not to teaching and profession of the truth, but to the improvement
of the outward, political, social, and, above all, economic conditions of life.
The change in these conditions may be accomplished by serving the
might even have gone so far as to prevent the Minister from framing, and
the Emperor from confirming, such decrees.
All depends, as we come therefore to see, upon the degree of consciousness
that men possess of Christian truth.
Hence, let all men to-day who wish to promote the welfare of mankind
direct their efforts toward the development of this consciousness of
Christian truth.
But, strange to say, those men who nowadays talk most of the amelioration
of human life, and who are the acknowledged leaders of public opinion,
declare this to be precisely the wrong thing to do, and that there are more
effectual expedients for improving human existence. They insist that any
improvement in the conditions of human life must be accomplished, not
through individual moral effort, nor through the propagation of truth, but
through progressive modifications in the general material conditions of life.
Therefore, they say, individual effort should be devoted to the gradual
reform of the everyday conditions of life; and seeing that any individual
profession of the truth which may happen to be incompatible with the
existing order is harmful, because it provokes, on the part of the
government, an opposition which prevents the individual from continuing
efforts which may be of utility to society.
According to this theory, all changes in the life of mankind proceed from
the same causes that control the lives of the brute creation.
And all the religious teachers, like Moses and the Prophets, Confucius, Lao
Tze, Buddha, and Christ, preached their doctrines, and their followers
adopted them, not because they divined and loved the truth, but because the
political, social, and, above all, the economical conditions of the nations in
whose midst these doctrines found expression were favorable to their
exposition and development.
Therefore the principal activity of a man who wishes to serve the world and
to improve the condition of his kind should be directed, according to this
theory, not to teaching and profession of the truth, but to the improvement
of the outward, political, social, and, above all, economic conditions of life.
The change in these conditions may be accomplished by serving the
Page 283
government and introducing liberal and progressive principles, by
contributing to the development of commerce, by propagating socialistic
principles, but, above all, by promoting the diffusion of science.
According to this doctrine, it is a matter of no consequence whether one
profess the revealed truth or not; there is no obligation to live in accordance
with its precepts, or to refrain from actions opposed to them,—as, for
instance, to serve the government, though one considers its power
detrimental; to profit by the organization of capital, though one disapproves
of it; to subscribe to certain forms of religion, though one considers them
superstitions. Practise in the courts of law, though one believes them to be
corrupt; or enter the army, or take the oath of allegiance, or indeed lie, or do
anything that is convenient. These things are trivial; for it is a matter of vital
importance, instead of challenging the prevailing customs of the day, to
conform to them, though they be contrary to one's convictions, satisfied
meanwhile to try and liberalize the existing institutions, by encouraging
commerce, propagating socialistic doctrines, and generally promoting soi-
disant science and civilization. According to this convenient theory, it is
possible for a man to remain a landowner, a merchant, a manufacturer, a
judge, a functionary paid by the government, a soldier, an officer, and at the
same time to be humanitarian, socialist, and revolutionary.
Hypocrisy, formerly growing only out of such religious doctrines as that of
original sin, redemption, the Church, has in these latter days, by means of
the new theory, gained for itself a scientific basis, and those whose
intellectual habit of mind renders the hypocrisy of the Church unendurable,
are yet deceived by this new hypocrisy with the cachet of science. If in old
times a man who professed the doctrines taught by the Church could with a
clear conscience take part in any political crime, and benefit by so doing,
provided he complied with the external forms of his faith, men of the
present day, who deny Christianity, and view the conduct of life from a
secular and scientific standpoint, are every whit as sure of their own
innocence, even of their lofty morality, when they participate in and benefit
by the evil-doings of government.
It is not alone in Russia, but in France, England, Germany, and America as
well, that we find the wealthy landed proprietor, who, in return for having
allowed the men who live on his estate and who supply him with the
products of the soil, extorts from these men, who are often poverty-stricken,
contributing to the development of commerce, by propagating socialistic
principles, but, above all, by promoting the diffusion of science.
According to this doctrine, it is a matter of no consequence whether one
profess the revealed truth or not; there is no obligation to live in accordance
with its precepts, or to refrain from actions opposed to them,—as, for
instance, to serve the government, though one considers its power
detrimental; to profit by the organization of capital, though one disapproves
of it; to subscribe to certain forms of religion, though one considers them
superstitions. Practise in the courts of law, though one believes them to be
corrupt; or enter the army, or take the oath of allegiance, or indeed lie, or do
anything that is convenient. These things are trivial; for it is a matter of vital
importance, instead of challenging the prevailing customs of the day, to
conform to them, though they be contrary to one's convictions, satisfied
meanwhile to try and liberalize the existing institutions, by encouraging
commerce, propagating socialistic doctrines, and generally promoting soi-
disant science and civilization. According to this convenient theory, it is
possible for a man to remain a landowner, a merchant, a manufacturer, a
judge, a functionary paid by the government, a soldier, an officer, and at the
same time to be humanitarian, socialist, and revolutionary.
Hypocrisy, formerly growing only out of such religious doctrines as that of
original sin, redemption, the Church, has in these latter days, by means of
the new theory, gained for itself a scientific basis, and those whose
intellectual habit of mind renders the hypocrisy of the Church unendurable,
are yet deceived by this new hypocrisy with the cachet of science. If in old
times a man who professed the doctrines taught by the Church could with a
clear conscience take part in any political crime, and benefit by so doing,
provided he complied with the external forms of his faith, men of the
present day, who deny Christianity, and view the conduct of life from a
secular and scientific standpoint, are every whit as sure of their own
innocence, even of their lofty morality, when they participate in and benefit
by the evil-doings of government.
It is not alone in Russia, but in France, England, Germany, and America as
well, that we find the wealthy landed proprietor, who, in return for having
allowed the men who live on his estate and who supply him with the
products of the soil, extorts from these men, who are often poverty-stricken,
Page 284
all that he possibly can. Whenever these oppressed laborers make an
attempt to gain something for themselves from the lands which the rich man
calls his own, without first asking his consent, troops are called out, who
torture and put to death those who have been bold enough to take such
liberties.
By methods like this are claims to the ownership of land made good. One
would hardly imagine that a man who lived in such a wicked and selfish
manner could call himself a Christian, or even liberal. One would think that
if a man cared to seem Christian or liberal, he would at least cease to
plunder and to torment his fellow-men with the aid of the government, in
order to vindicate his claims to the ownership of land. And such would be
the case were it not for the metaphysical hypocrisy which teaches that from
a religious standpoint it is immaterial whether one owns land or not, and
that, from the scientific point of view, for a single individual to give up his
land would be a useless sacrifice, without any effect on the well-being of
mankind, the amelioration of which can only be brought about by a
progressive modification of outward conditions.
Meanwhile, your modern landowner will, without the least hesitation or
doubt, organize an agricultural exhibition, or a temperance society, or,
through his wife and daughters, distribute warm underclothing and soup to
three old women; and he will hold forth before the domestic circle, or in
society, or as a member of committees, or in the public press, upon the
gospel of love for mankind in general and the agricultural class in
particular, that class which he never ceases to torment and oppress. And
those who occupy a similar position will believe in him and sing his praises,
and take counsel together upon the best methods of improving the condition
of those very laboring classes they spend their lives in exploiting; and for
this purpose they suggest every possible expedient, save that which would
effect it,—namely, to desist from robbing the poor of the land necessary for
their subsistence.
(A striking example of this hypocrisy was presented by the Russian
landowners during the struggle with the famine of last year,[30] a famine of
which they were themselves the cause, and by which they profited, not only
by selling bread at the highest price, but even by disposing of the dried
potato-plants for five roubles a dessiatin, to be used as fuel by the freezing
peasants.)
attempt to gain something for themselves from the lands which the rich man
calls his own, without first asking his consent, troops are called out, who
torture and put to death those who have been bold enough to take such
liberties.
By methods like this are claims to the ownership of land made good. One
would hardly imagine that a man who lived in such a wicked and selfish
manner could call himself a Christian, or even liberal. One would think that
if a man cared to seem Christian or liberal, he would at least cease to
plunder and to torment his fellow-men with the aid of the government, in
order to vindicate his claims to the ownership of land. And such would be
the case were it not for the metaphysical hypocrisy which teaches that from
a religious standpoint it is immaterial whether one owns land or not, and
that, from the scientific point of view, for a single individual to give up his
land would be a useless sacrifice, without any effect on the well-being of
mankind, the amelioration of which can only be brought about by a
progressive modification of outward conditions.
Meanwhile, your modern landowner will, without the least hesitation or
doubt, organize an agricultural exhibition, or a temperance society, or,
through his wife and daughters, distribute warm underclothing and soup to
three old women; and he will hold forth before the domestic circle, or in
society, or as a member of committees, or in the public press, upon the
gospel of love for mankind in general and the agricultural class in
particular, that class which he never ceases to torment and oppress. And
those who occupy a similar position will believe in him and sing his praises,
and take counsel together upon the best methods of improving the condition
of those very laboring classes they spend their lives in exploiting; and for
this purpose they suggest every possible expedient, save that which would
effect it,—namely, to desist from robbing the poor of the land necessary for
their subsistence.
(A striking example of this hypocrisy was presented by the Russian
landowners during the struggle with the famine of last year,[30] a famine of
which they were themselves the cause, and by which they profited, not only
by selling bread at the highest price, but even by disposing of the dried
potato-plants for five roubles a dessiatin, to be used as fuel by the freezing
peasants.)
Page 285
The business of the merchant, again (as is the case with business of any
kind), is based upon a series of frauds; he takes advantage of the necessities
of men by buying his merchandise below, and selling it above, its value.
One would think that a man, the mainspring of whose activity is what he
himself in his own language calls shrewdness, ought to feel ashamed of
this, and never dream of calling himself Christian or liberal while he
continues a merchant. But, according to the new metaphysic of hypocrisy,
he may pass for a virtuous man and still pursue his evil career; the religious
man has but to believe, the liberal man but to coöperate, in the reform of
external conditions to promote the general progress of commerce; the rest
does not signify. So this merchant (who, besides, often sells bad
commodities, adulterates, and uses false weights and measures, or deals
exclusively in commodities that imperil human life, such as alcohol or
opium) frankly considers himself, and is considered by others,—always
provided he only does not cheat his colleagues in business and knavery, his
fellow-tradesmen,—a model of conscientiousness and honesty. And if he
spend one per cent of his stolen money on some public institution, hospital,
museum, or school, men call him the benefactor of the people on whose
exploitation all his welfare depends; and if he gives but the least part of this
money to the Church or to the poor, then is he deemed an exemplary
Christian indeed.
Take again the factory-owner, whose entire income is derived from
reducing the pay of his workmen to its lowest terms, and whose whole
business is carried on by forced and unnatural labor, endangering the health
of generations of men. One would suppose that if this man professed
Christian or liberal principles he would cease to sacrifice human lives to his
interests. But, according to the existing theory, he encourages industry, and
it would be a positive injury to society if he were to abandon his operations,
even supposing he were willing to do so. And, too, this man, the cruel
slave-driver of thousands of human beings, having built for those injured in
his service minute houses, with gardens six feet in extent, or established a
fund, or a home for the aged, or a hospital, is perfectly satisfied that he has
more than atoned for the moral and physical jeopardy into which he has
plunged so many lives; and he continues to live calmly, proud of his work.
We find that the functionary, civil, military, or ecclesiastical, who performs
his duties to gratify his selfishness or ambition, or, as is more usually the
kind), is based upon a series of frauds; he takes advantage of the necessities
of men by buying his merchandise below, and selling it above, its value.
One would think that a man, the mainspring of whose activity is what he
himself in his own language calls shrewdness, ought to feel ashamed of
this, and never dream of calling himself Christian or liberal while he
continues a merchant. But, according to the new metaphysic of hypocrisy,
he may pass for a virtuous man and still pursue his evil career; the religious
man has but to believe, the liberal man but to coöperate, in the reform of
external conditions to promote the general progress of commerce; the rest
does not signify. So this merchant (who, besides, often sells bad
commodities, adulterates, and uses false weights and measures, or deals
exclusively in commodities that imperil human life, such as alcohol or
opium) frankly considers himself, and is considered by others,—always
provided he only does not cheat his colleagues in business and knavery, his
fellow-tradesmen,—a model of conscientiousness and honesty. And if he
spend one per cent of his stolen money on some public institution, hospital,
museum, or school, men call him the benefactor of the people on whose
exploitation all his welfare depends; and if he gives but the least part of this
money to the Church or to the poor, then is he deemed an exemplary
Christian indeed.
Take again the factory-owner, whose entire income is derived from
reducing the pay of his workmen to its lowest terms, and whose whole
business is carried on by forced and unnatural labor, endangering the health
of generations of men. One would suppose that if this man professed
Christian or liberal principles he would cease to sacrifice human lives to his
interests. But, according to the existing theory, he encourages industry, and
it would be a positive injury to society if he were to abandon his operations,
even supposing he were willing to do so. And, too, this man, the cruel
slave-driver of thousands of human beings, having built for those injured in
his service minute houses, with gardens six feet in extent, or established a
fund, or a home for the aged, or a hospital, is perfectly satisfied that he has
more than atoned for the moral and physical jeopardy into which he has
plunged so many lives; and he continues to live calmly, proud of his work.
We find that the functionary, civil, military, or ecclesiastical, who performs
his duties to gratify his selfishness or ambition, or, as is more usually the
Page 286
case, for the sake of the stipend, collected in the shape of taxes from an
exhausted and crippled people,—if, by a rare exception, he does not directly
steal from the public treasury,—considers himself, and is considered by his
equals, a most useful and virtuous member of society.
There are judges and other legal functionaries who know that their
decisions have condemned hundreds and thousands of unfortunate men to
be torn from their families and thrown into prison. There these hapless
beings are locked up in solitary confinement, or sent to the galleys, where
they go desperate and put an end to themselves by starving themselves to
death, by swallowing glass, or by some such means. And who knows what
the mothers, wives, and children of these men suffer by the separation and
imprisonment, and the disgrace of it,—who have vainly begged for pardon
for their sons, husbands, brothers, or that their lot may be a little alleviated.
But the judge or other legal functionary is so primed with the current
hypocrisy that he himself, his colleagues, his wife, and his friends are all
quite sure, despite what he does, that he is a good and sensible man.
According to the current philosophy of hypocrisy, such a man performs a
duty of great importance to the public. And this man, who has injured
hundreds or thousands of human beings, who owe it to him that they have
lost their belief in goodness and their faith in God, goes to church with a
benevolent smile, listens to the Bible, makes liberal speeches, caresses his
children, bestows moral lessons upon them, for their edification, and grows
sentimental over imaginary suffering.
Not only these men, their wives and children, but the entire community
around them, all the teachers, actors, cooks, jockeys, live by preying upon
the life-blood of the working-people, which in one way or another they
absorb like leeches. Every one of their days of pleasure costs thousands of
days in the lives of the workers. They see the suffering and privation of
these workmen, of their wives and children, of their aged and feeble. They
know what punishments are visited upon those who attempt to resist the
organized system of pillage, but so far from abandoning or concealing their
luxurious habits, they flaunt them in the faces of those whom they oppress
and by whom they are hated. All the while they assure themselves and
others that they have the welfare of the working-man greatly at heart. On
Sundays, clad in rich garments, they drive in their carriages to churches
where the mockery of Christianity is preached, and listen there to the words
exhausted and crippled people,—if, by a rare exception, he does not directly
steal from the public treasury,—considers himself, and is considered by his
equals, a most useful and virtuous member of society.
There are judges and other legal functionaries who know that their
decisions have condemned hundreds and thousands of unfortunate men to
be torn from their families and thrown into prison. There these hapless
beings are locked up in solitary confinement, or sent to the galleys, where
they go desperate and put an end to themselves by starving themselves to
death, by swallowing glass, or by some such means. And who knows what
the mothers, wives, and children of these men suffer by the separation and
imprisonment, and the disgrace of it,—who have vainly begged for pardon
for their sons, husbands, brothers, or that their lot may be a little alleviated.
But the judge or other legal functionary is so primed with the current
hypocrisy that he himself, his colleagues, his wife, and his friends are all
quite sure, despite what he does, that he is a good and sensible man.
According to the current philosophy of hypocrisy, such a man performs a
duty of great importance to the public. And this man, who has injured
hundreds or thousands of human beings, who owe it to him that they have
lost their belief in goodness and their faith in God, goes to church with a
benevolent smile, listens to the Bible, makes liberal speeches, caresses his
children, bestows moral lessons upon them, for their edification, and grows
sentimental over imaginary suffering.
Not only these men, their wives and children, but the entire community
around them, all the teachers, actors, cooks, jockeys, live by preying upon
the life-blood of the working-people, which in one way or another they
absorb like leeches. Every one of their days of pleasure costs thousands of
days in the lives of the workers. They see the suffering and privation of
these workmen, of their wives and children, of their aged and feeble. They
know what punishments are visited upon those who attempt to resist the
organized system of pillage, but so far from abandoning or concealing their
luxurious habits, they flaunt them in the faces of those whom they oppress
and by whom they are hated. All the while they assure themselves and
others that they have the welfare of the working-man greatly at heart. On
Sundays, clad in rich garments, they drive in their carriages to churches
where the mockery of Christianity is preached, and listen there to the words
Page 287
of men who have learned their falsehoods by heart. Some of these men
wear stoles, some wear white cravats; they all preach the doctrine of love
for one's neighbor, a doctrine belied by their daily lives. And they have all
grown so accustomed to playing this part that they really believe themselves
to be what they pretend.
This universal hypocrisy, which has become to every class of society at the
present day like the air it breathes, is so familiar that men are no longer
exasperated by it. It is very fitting that hypocrisy should signify acting or
playing of a part. It has become so much a matter of course that it no longer
excites surprise when the representatives of Christ pronounce a blessing
over murderers as they stand in rank holding their guns in the position
which signifies, in military parlance, "for prayers," or when the priests and
pastors of various Christian sects accompany the executioner to the
scaffold, and, by lending the sanction of their presence to murder, make
men believe it compatible with Christianity. (One minister was present
when experiments in "electrocution" took place in the United States.) At the
International Prison Exposition recently held in St. Petersburg, where
instruments of torture, such as chains, and models of prison-cells for
solitary confinement,—means of torture worse than the knout or the rod,—
were on exhibition, sympathetic ladies and gentlemen went to see them, and
seemed greatly entertained.
No one marvels to find liberal science insisting upon the equality, fraternity,
and liberty of men on the one hand, while on the other it is striving to prove
the necessity of armies, executions, custom-houses, of censorship of the
press, of legalized prostitution, of the expulsion of foreign labor, of the
prohibition of emigration, and of the necessity and justice of colonization
established by the pillage and extermination of whole races of so-called
savages, etc.
They talk of what will happen when all men shall profess what they call
Christianity (by which they mean the different conflicting creeds); when
every one will be fed and clothed; when men will communicate with one
another all over the world by telegraph and telephones, and will travel in
balloons; when all working-men will accept the doctrine of socialism; when
the trade unions will embrace many millions of men and possess millions of
money; when all men will be educated, will read the papers, and be familiar
with all the sciences.
wear stoles, some wear white cravats; they all preach the doctrine of love
for one's neighbor, a doctrine belied by their daily lives. And they have all
grown so accustomed to playing this part that they really believe themselves
to be what they pretend.
This universal hypocrisy, which has become to every class of society at the
present day like the air it breathes, is so familiar that men are no longer
exasperated by it. It is very fitting that hypocrisy should signify acting or
playing of a part. It has become so much a matter of course that it no longer
excites surprise when the representatives of Christ pronounce a blessing
over murderers as they stand in rank holding their guns in the position
which signifies, in military parlance, "for prayers," or when the priests and
pastors of various Christian sects accompany the executioner to the
scaffold, and, by lending the sanction of their presence to murder, make
men believe it compatible with Christianity. (One minister was present
when experiments in "electrocution" took place in the United States.) At the
International Prison Exposition recently held in St. Petersburg, where
instruments of torture, such as chains, and models of prison-cells for
solitary confinement,—means of torture worse than the knout or the rod,—
were on exhibition, sympathetic ladies and gentlemen went to see them, and
seemed greatly entertained.
No one marvels to find liberal science insisting upon the equality, fraternity,
and liberty of men on the one hand, while on the other it is striving to prove
the necessity of armies, executions, custom-houses, of censorship of the
press, of legalized prostitution, of the expulsion of foreign labor, of the
prohibition of emigration, and of the necessity and justice of colonization
established by the pillage and extermination of whole races of so-called
savages, etc.
They talk of what will happen when all men shall profess what they call
Christianity (by which they mean the different conflicting creeds); when
every one will be fed and clothed; when men will communicate with one
another all over the world by telegraph and telephones, and will travel in
balloons; when all working-men will accept the doctrine of socialism; when
the trade unions will embrace many millions of men and possess millions of
money; when all men will be educated, will read the papers, and be familiar
with all the sciences.
Page 288
But what good will this do if after all these improvements men are still false
to the truth?
The miseries of men are caused by disunion, and disunion arises from the
fact that men follow not truth, but falsehood, of which there is no end. Truth
is the only bond by which men may be united; and the more sincerely men
strive after the truth the nearer they approach to true unity.
But how are men to be united in the truth, or even approach it, if they not
only fail to proclaim the truth which they possess, but actually think it
useless to do so, and pretend to believe in something which they know to be
a lie? In reality no improvement in the condition of mankind is possible
while men continue to hide the truth from themselves, nor until they
acknowledge that their unity, and consequently their welfare, can be
promoted only by the spirit of truth; until they admit that to profess, and to
act in obedience to the truth as it has been revealed to them, is more
important than all things else.
Let all the material progress ever dreamt of by religious and scientific men
be made; let all men accept Christianity, and let all the improvements
suggested by the Bellamys and Richets, with every possible addition and
correction, be carried out; and yet if the hypocrisy of to-day still flourishes,
if men do not make known the truth that is within them, but go on
pretending to believe what they know to be untrue, showing respect where
they no longer feel it, their condition will never improve; on the contrary, it
will become worse. The more men are raised above want, the more
telegraphs, telephones, books, newspapers, and reviews they possess, the
more numerous will be the channels for the diffusion of falsehood and
hypocrisy, and the more at variance and miserable will men become,—and
it is even so at the present time.
Let all those material changes take place, and still the position of humanity
will in no way be improved by them; but let every man, so far as he is able,
begin at once and live up to his highest ideal of the truth or, at the least,
cease to defend a lie, then indeed should we see even in this year of 1893
such an advance in the establishment of the truth upon earth, and in the
deliverance of mankind, as could hardly be hoped for in a hundred years.
It was not without reason that the only harsh and denunciatory words that
Christ uttered were addressed to hypocrites. It is neither theft, nor robbery,
to the truth?
The miseries of men are caused by disunion, and disunion arises from the
fact that men follow not truth, but falsehood, of which there is no end. Truth
is the only bond by which men may be united; and the more sincerely men
strive after the truth the nearer they approach to true unity.
But how are men to be united in the truth, or even approach it, if they not
only fail to proclaim the truth which they possess, but actually think it
useless to do so, and pretend to believe in something which they know to be
a lie? In reality no improvement in the condition of mankind is possible
while men continue to hide the truth from themselves, nor until they
acknowledge that their unity, and consequently their welfare, can be
promoted only by the spirit of truth; until they admit that to profess, and to
act in obedience to the truth as it has been revealed to them, is more
important than all things else.
Let all the material progress ever dreamt of by religious and scientific men
be made; let all men accept Christianity, and let all the improvements
suggested by the Bellamys and Richets, with every possible addition and
correction, be carried out; and yet if the hypocrisy of to-day still flourishes,
if men do not make known the truth that is within them, but go on
pretending to believe what they know to be untrue, showing respect where
they no longer feel it, their condition will never improve; on the contrary, it
will become worse. The more men are raised above want, the more
telegraphs, telephones, books, newspapers, and reviews they possess, the
more numerous will be the channels for the diffusion of falsehood and
hypocrisy, and the more at variance and miserable will men become,—and
it is even so at the present time.
Let all those material changes take place, and still the position of humanity
will in no way be improved by them; but let every man, so far as he is able,
begin at once and live up to his highest ideal of the truth or, at the least,
cease to defend a lie, then indeed should we see even in this year of 1893
such an advance in the establishment of the truth upon earth, and in the
deliverance of mankind, as could hardly be hoped for in a hundred years.
It was not without reason that the only harsh and denunciatory words that
Christ uttered were addressed to hypocrites. It is neither theft, nor robbery,
Page 289
nor murder, nor fornication, nor fraud, but falsehood, that particular
hypocritical falsehood, which destroys in men's conscience the distinction
between good and evil, which corrupts them and takes from them the
possibility of avoiding evil and of seeking good, which deprives them of
that which constitutes the essence of a true human life,—it is this which
bars the way to all improvement. Those men who do evil, knowing not the
truth, inspire in the beholder compassion for their victims and repugnance
for themselves, but they only injure the few whom they molest. Whereas
those men who, knowing the good, yet pursue the evil, wearing all the
while the mantle of hypocrisy, commit a wrong, not only against themselves
and their victims, but also against thousands of other men who are deceived
by the falsehood under which they conceal the wrong.
Thieves, robbers, murderers, rogues, who commit acts which they
themselves, as well as other men, know to be evil, serve as a warning to
show men what is evil, and make them hate it. Those, however, who steal,
rob, torture, and murder, justifying themselves by pretended religious,
scientific, or other motives, like the landowners, merchants, factory-owners,
and government servants of the present time, by provoking imitation, injure
not only their victims, but thousands and millions of men who are corrupted
by their influence, and who become so blinded that they cannot distinguish
the difference between good and evil.
One fortune acquired by trading in the necessaries of life or in articles that
tend to demoralize men, or by speculations in the stock exchange, or by the
acquisition of cheap lands which subsequently rise in value by reason of the
increasing needs of the people, or by the establishment of factories that
endanger human health and human lives, or by rendering civil or military
service to the State, or by any occupation that tends to the demoralization of
mankind,—a fortune acquired in any of these ways, not only permitted, but
approved by the leaders of society, when, furthermore, it is supported by a
show of charity, surely demoralizes men more than millions of thefts,
frauds, or robberies,—sins committed against the laws of the land and
subject to judicial prosecution.
A single enforcement of capital punishment, ordained by men of education
and wealth, sanctioned by the approval of the Christian clergy, and declared
to be an act of justice essential to the welfare of the State, tends far more to
degrade and brutalize mankind than hundreds and thousands of murders
hypocritical falsehood, which destroys in men's conscience the distinction
between good and evil, which corrupts them and takes from them the
possibility of avoiding evil and of seeking good, which deprives them of
that which constitutes the essence of a true human life,—it is this which
bars the way to all improvement. Those men who do evil, knowing not the
truth, inspire in the beholder compassion for their victims and repugnance
for themselves, but they only injure the few whom they molest. Whereas
those men who, knowing the good, yet pursue the evil, wearing all the
while the mantle of hypocrisy, commit a wrong, not only against themselves
and their victims, but also against thousands of other men who are deceived
by the falsehood under which they conceal the wrong.
Thieves, robbers, murderers, rogues, who commit acts which they
themselves, as well as other men, know to be evil, serve as a warning to
show men what is evil, and make them hate it. Those, however, who steal,
rob, torture, and murder, justifying themselves by pretended religious,
scientific, or other motives, like the landowners, merchants, factory-owners,
and government servants of the present time, by provoking imitation, injure
not only their victims, but thousands and millions of men who are corrupted
by their influence, and who become so blinded that they cannot distinguish
the difference between good and evil.
One fortune acquired by trading in the necessaries of life or in articles that
tend to demoralize men, or by speculations in the stock exchange, or by the
acquisition of cheap lands which subsequently rise in value by reason of the
increasing needs of the people, or by the establishment of factories that
endanger human health and human lives, or by rendering civil or military
service to the State, or by any occupation that tends to the demoralization of
mankind,—a fortune acquired in any of these ways, not only permitted, but
approved by the leaders of society, when, furthermore, it is supported by a
show of charity, surely demoralizes men more than millions of thefts,
frauds, or robberies,—sins committed against the laws of the land and
subject to judicial prosecution.
A single enforcement of capital punishment, ordained by men of education
and wealth, sanctioned by the approval of the Christian clergy, and declared
to be an act of justice essential to the welfare of the State, tends far more to
degrade and brutalize mankind than hundreds and thousands of murders
Page 290
committed in passion by the ignorant. A more demoralizing scene than the
execution suggested by Jukovsky, calculated as it is to excite a feeling of
religious exaltation, it would be difficult to conceive.[31]
A war, even of the shortest duration,—with all its customary consequences,
the destruction of harvests, the thefts, the unchecked debauchery and
murders, with the usual explanations of its necessity and justice, with the
accompanying glorification and praise bestowed upon military exploits,
upon patriotism, devotion to the flag, with the assumption of tenderness and
care for the wounded,—will do more in one year to demoralize men than
thousands of robberies, arsons, and murders committed in the course of
centuries by individual men carried away by passion.
The existence of one household, one not even extravagant beyond the
ordinary limits, esteeming itself virtuous and innocent, which yet consumes
the production of enough to support thousands of the men who live near in
poverty and distress, has a more degrading influence on mankind than
innumerable orgies of gross shopkeepers, officers, or workmen who are
addicted to drink and debauchery, and who smash mirrors and crockery by
way of amusement.
One solemn procession, one religious service, or one sermon from the
pulpit, embodying a falsehood which the preacher himself does not believe,
does infinitely more harm than thousands of frauds, adulterations of food,
etc.
Men talk of the hypocrisy of the Pharisees; but the hypocrisy of our
contemporaries far surpasses the comparatively harmless
sanctimoniousness of the Pharisees. They at least had an outward religious
law, whose fulfilment may perhaps have prevented them from discerning
their duty toward their neighbors; indeed, those duties had not then been
distinctly defined. To-day there is no such law. (I do not consider such gross
and stupid men as even now believe that sacraments or absolution of the
Pope can free them from sins.) On the contrary, the law of the gospel, which
in one form or another we all profess, makes our duties perfectly plain.
Indeed, those precepts which were but vaguely indicated by certain of the
prophets have since been so clearly formulated, have grown to be such
truisms, that the very school-boys and hack writers repeat them. Therefore
men of our times cannot feign ignorance concerning them.
execution suggested by Jukovsky, calculated as it is to excite a feeling of
religious exaltation, it would be difficult to conceive.[31]
A war, even of the shortest duration,—with all its customary consequences,
the destruction of harvests, the thefts, the unchecked debauchery and
murders, with the usual explanations of its necessity and justice, with the
accompanying glorification and praise bestowed upon military exploits,
upon patriotism, devotion to the flag, with the assumption of tenderness and
care for the wounded,—will do more in one year to demoralize men than
thousands of robberies, arsons, and murders committed in the course of
centuries by individual men carried away by passion.
The existence of one household, one not even extravagant beyond the
ordinary limits, esteeming itself virtuous and innocent, which yet consumes
the production of enough to support thousands of the men who live near in
poverty and distress, has a more degrading influence on mankind than
innumerable orgies of gross shopkeepers, officers, or workmen who are
addicted to drink and debauchery, and who smash mirrors and crockery by
way of amusement.
One solemn procession, one religious service, or one sermon from the
pulpit, embodying a falsehood which the preacher himself does not believe,
does infinitely more harm than thousands of frauds, adulterations of food,
etc.
Men talk of the hypocrisy of the Pharisees; but the hypocrisy of our
contemporaries far surpasses the comparatively harmless
sanctimoniousness of the Pharisees. They at least had an outward religious
law, whose fulfilment may perhaps have prevented them from discerning
their duty toward their neighbors; indeed, those duties had not then been
distinctly defined. To-day there is no such law. (I do not consider such gross
and stupid men as even now believe that sacraments or absolution of the
Pope can free them from sins.) On the contrary, the law of the gospel, which
in one form or another we all profess, makes our duties perfectly plain.
Indeed, those precepts which were but vaguely indicated by certain of the
prophets have since been so clearly formulated, have grown to be such
truisms, that the very school-boys and hack writers repeat them. Therefore
men of our times cannot feign ignorance concerning them.
Page 291
Those men who enjoy the advantages of the existing system, and who are
always protesting love for their neighbor, without suspicion that their own
lives are an injury to their neighbors, are like the robber who, caught with
an uplifted knife, his victim crying desperately for help, protests that he did
not know that he was doing anything unpleasant to the man whom he was
in the act of robbing and about to murder. Since the denial of this robber
and murderer would be of no avail, his act being patent to all observers, it
would seem equally futile for our fellow-citizens, who live by the sufferings
of the oppressed, to assure themselves and others that they desire the
welfare of those whom they never cease to rob, and that they had not
realized the nature of the methods by which their prosperity had been
attained.
We can no longer persuade ourselves that we do not know of the one
hundred thousand men in Russia alone who have been shut up in galleys or
in prisons for the purpose of securing to us our property and our peace; and
that we do not know of the existence of those courts of law at which we
preside, to which we bring our accusations, which sentence those men, who
have attacked our property or our lives, to the galleys, to imprisonment, or
to exile, where human beings, no worse than they who have pronounced
judgment upon them, become degraded and lost; nor that we do not know
that everything that we possess has been won and is preserved at the
expense of murder and violence. We cannot shut our eyes and pretend that
we do not see the policeman, who, armed with a revolver, paces before our
window, protecting us while we are eating our excellent dinner, or when we
are at the theater seeing a new play; nor do not know of the existence of the
soldiers who will appear armed with guns and cartridges whenever our
property is menaced. We know perfectly well that if we finish our dinner,
see the new play to its end, enjoy a merry-making at Christmas, take a walk,
go to a ball, a race, or a hunt, we owe it to the policeman's revolver or the
ball in the soldier's musket, which will pierce the hungry belly of the
disinherited man who, with watering mouth, peeps round the corner at our
pleasures, and who might interrupt them if the policeman or the soldiers in
the barracks were not ready to appear at our first call. Hence, as the man
who is caught in the act of robbery in broad daylight cannot deny that he
threatened his victim with a knife for the purpose of stealing his purse, it
might be supposed that we could no longer represent to ourselves and to
others that the soldiers and policemen whom we see around us are here, not
always protesting love for their neighbor, without suspicion that their own
lives are an injury to their neighbors, are like the robber who, caught with
an uplifted knife, his victim crying desperately for help, protests that he did
not know that he was doing anything unpleasant to the man whom he was
in the act of robbing and about to murder. Since the denial of this robber
and murderer would be of no avail, his act being patent to all observers, it
would seem equally futile for our fellow-citizens, who live by the sufferings
of the oppressed, to assure themselves and others that they desire the
welfare of those whom they never cease to rob, and that they had not
realized the nature of the methods by which their prosperity had been
attained.
We can no longer persuade ourselves that we do not know of the one
hundred thousand men in Russia alone who have been shut up in galleys or
in prisons for the purpose of securing to us our property and our peace; and
that we do not know of the existence of those courts of law at which we
preside, to which we bring our accusations, which sentence those men, who
have attacked our property or our lives, to the galleys, to imprisonment, or
to exile, where human beings, no worse than they who have pronounced
judgment upon them, become degraded and lost; nor that we do not know
that everything that we possess has been won and is preserved at the
expense of murder and violence. We cannot shut our eyes and pretend that
we do not see the policeman, who, armed with a revolver, paces before our
window, protecting us while we are eating our excellent dinner, or when we
are at the theater seeing a new play; nor do not know of the existence of the
soldiers who will appear armed with guns and cartridges whenever our
property is menaced. We know perfectly well that if we finish our dinner,
see the new play to its end, enjoy a merry-making at Christmas, take a walk,
go to a ball, a race, or a hunt, we owe it to the policeman's revolver or the
ball in the soldier's musket, which will pierce the hungry belly of the
disinherited man who, with watering mouth, peeps round the corner at our
pleasures, and who might interrupt them if the policeman or the soldiers in
the barracks were not ready to appear at our first call. Hence, as the man
who is caught in the act of robbery in broad daylight cannot deny that he
threatened his victim with a knife for the purpose of stealing his purse, it
might be supposed that we could no longer represent to ourselves and to
others that the soldiers and policemen whom we see around us are here, not
Page 292
for the purpose of protecting us, but to repulse foreign enemies, to assure
public order, to adorn by their presence public rejoicings and ceremonies.
We cannot pretend we do not know that men are not fond of starving to
death. We know that they do not like to die of hunger, being deprived of the
right to earn their living from the soil upon which they live, that they are
not anxious to work ten to fourteen hours a day underground, standing in
water, or in over-heated rooms, twelve or fourteen hours a day, or at night,
manufacturing articles which contribute to our pleasures. It would seem
impossible to deny what is so evident, and yet it is what we do deny.
It cannot be denied that there are people of the wealthy class, and I am glad
to say that I meet them more and more frequently, particularly in the
younger generation and among women, who, on being reminded by what
means and at what a price their pleasures are obtained, instantly admit the
truth of it, and with bowed heads exclaim: "Ah, do not tell us of it! If it is as
you say, one cannot live!" If, however, there are some who are willing to
admit their sin, though they know not how to escape from it, still, the
majority of men nowadays have become so confirmed in hypocrisy that
they boldly deny facts that are patent to every one who has eyes.
"It is all nonsense," they say. "No one forces the people to work for the
landowners or in the factories. It is a matter of mutual accommodation.
Large properties and capital are indispensable, because they enable men to
organize companies and provide work for the laboring classes, and the work
in mills and factories is by no means so dreadful as you represent it. When
real abuses are found to exist, the government and society in general take
measures to abolish them and to render the labor of the working-men easier
and more agreeable. The working-classes are used to physical labor, and are
not as yet capable of doing anything else. The poverty of the people is
caused neither by the landowners nor by the tyranny of the capitalists; it
springs from other causes,—from ignorance, disorder, and intemperance.
We, the governing classes, who counteract this state of poverty by wise
administration; and we, the capitalists, who counteract it by the
multiplication of useful inventions; and we, the liberals, who contribute our
share by instituting trade unions and by diffusing education,—these are the
methods by which we promote the welfare of the people, without making
any radical change in our position. We do not wish all to be poor like the
poor; we wish all to be rich like the rich.
public order, to adorn by their presence public rejoicings and ceremonies.
We cannot pretend we do not know that men are not fond of starving to
death. We know that they do not like to die of hunger, being deprived of the
right to earn their living from the soil upon which they live, that they are
not anxious to work ten to fourteen hours a day underground, standing in
water, or in over-heated rooms, twelve or fourteen hours a day, or at night,
manufacturing articles which contribute to our pleasures. It would seem
impossible to deny what is so evident, and yet it is what we do deny.
It cannot be denied that there are people of the wealthy class, and I am glad
to say that I meet them more and more frequently, particularly in the
younger generation and among women, who, on being reminded by what
means and at what a price their pleasures are obtained, instantly admit the
truth of it, and with bowed heads exclaim: "Ah, do not tell us of it! If it is as
you say, one cannot live!" If, however, there are some who are willing to
admit their sin, though they know not how to escape from it, still, the
majority of men nowadays have become so confirmed in hypocrisy that
they boldly deny facts that are patent to every one who has eyes.
"It is all nonsense," they say. "No one forces the people to work for the
landowners or in the factories. It is a matter of mutual accommodation.
Large properties and capital are indispensable, because they enable men to
organize companies and provide work for the laboring classes, and the work
in mills and factories is by no means so dreadful as you represent it. When
real abuses are found to exist, the government and society in general take
measures to abolish them and to render the labor of the working-men easier
and more agreeable. The working-classes are used to physical labor, and are
not as yet capable of doing anything else. The poverty of the people is
caused neither by the landowners nor by the tyranny of the capitalists; it
springs from other causes,—from ignorance, disorder, and intemperance.
We, the governing classes, who counteract this state of poverty by wise
administration; and we, the capitalists, who counteract it by the
multiplication of useful inventions; and we, the liberals, who contribute our
share by instituting trade unions and by diffusing education,—these are the
methods by which we promote the welfare of the people, without making
any radical change in our position. We do not wish all to be poor like the
poor; we wish all to be rich like the rich.
Page 293
"As to torturing and killing men for the purpose of making them work for
the rich, that is all sophistry; the troops are sent out to quell disturbances
when men, not appreciating their advantages, rebel and disturb the peace
essential for the general welfare. It is equally necessary to restrain
malefactors, for whom prisons, gallows, and the like are established. We are
anxious enough to abolish them as far as possible ourselves, and are
working for that purpose."
Hypocrisy, which nowadays is supported by two methods, the quasi-
religious and the quasi-scientific, has attained such proportions, that if we
did not live in its atmosphere continually, it would be impossible to believe
that humanity could sink to such depths of self-deception. Men have
reached so surprising a state, their hearts have become so hardened, that
they look and do not see; listen, and do not hear or understand.
For a long time they have been living a life that is contrary to their
conscience. Were it not for the aid of hypocrisy they would be unable so to
live, for such a life, so opposed to conscience, can only continue because it
is veiled by hypocrisy.
And the greater the difference between the practice and the conscience of
men, the more elastic becomes hypocrisy. Yet even hypocrisy has its limits,
and I believe that we have reached them.
Every man of the present day, with the Christian consciousness that has
involuntarily become his, may be likened to a sleeper who dreams that he is
doing what even in his dream he knows he ought not to do. In the depths of
his dream-consciousness he realizes his conduct, and yet seems unable to
change his course, and to cease doing that which he is aware he should not
do.
Then, in the progress of his dream, his state of mind becoming less and less
endurable, he begins to doubt the reality of what has seemed so real, and
makes a conscious effort to break the spell that holds him.
The average man of our Christian world is in exactly the same strait. He
feels that everything going on around him is absurd, senseless, and
impossible; that the situation is becoming more and more painful, that it has
indeed reached the crisis.
the rich, that is all sophistry; the troops are sent out to quell disturbances
when men, not appreciating their advantages, rebel and disturb the peace
essential for the general welfare. It is equally necessary to restrain
malefactors, for whom prisons, gallows, and the like are established. We are
anxious enough to abolish them as far as possible ourselves, and are
working for that purpose."
Hypocrisy, which nowadays is supported by two methods, the quasi-
religious and the quasi-scientific, has attained such proportions, that if we
did not live in its atmosphere continually, it would be impossible to believe
that humanity could sink to such depths of self-deception. Men have
reached so surprising a state, their hearts have become so hardened, that
they look and do not see; listen, and do not hear or understand.
For a long time they have been living a life that is contrary to their
conscience. Were it not for the aid of hypocrisy they would be unable so to
live, for such a life, so opposed to conscience, can only continue because it
is veiled by hypocrisy.
And the greater the difference between the practice and the conscience of
men, the more elastic becomes hypocrisy. Yet even hypocrisy has its limits,
and I believe that we have reached them.
Every man of the present day, with the Christian consciousness that has
involuntarily become his, may be likened to a sleeper who dreams that he is
doing what even in his dream he knows he ought not to do. In the depths of
his dream-consciousness he realizes his conduct, and yet seems unable to
change his course, and to cease doing that which he is aware he should not
do.
Then, in the progress of his dream, his state of mind becoming less and less
endurable, he begins to doubt the reality of what has seemed so real, and
makes a conscious effort to break the spell that holds him.
The average man of our Christian world is in exactly the same strait. He
feels that everything going on around him is absurd, senseless, and
impossible; that the situation is becoming more and more painful, that it has
indeed reached the crisis.
Page 294
It is impossible that we of the present age, endowed with the Christian
conscience that has become a part of our very flesh and blood as it were,
who live with a full consciousness of the dignity of man and the equality of
all men, who feel our need for peaceable relations with each other and for
the unity of all nations, should go on living in such a way. It is impossible
that all our pleasures, all our satisfactions, should be purchased by the
sufferings and the lives of our brethren; impossible that we should be ready
at a moment's notice to rush upon each other like wild beasts, one nation
against another, and relentlessly destroy the lives and labor of men, only
because one foolish diplomatist or ruler says or writes something foolish to
another.
It is impossible; and yet all men of our time see that this is what does
happen every day, and all wait for the catastrophe, while the situation grows
more and more strained and painful.
And as a man in his sleep doubts the reality of his dream and longs to
awaken and return to real life, so the average man of our day cannot, in the
bottom of his heart, believe the terrible situation in which he finds himself,
and which is growing worse and worse, to be the reality. He longs to attain
to a higher reality, the consciousness of which is already within him.
And like this sleeper, who has but to make the conscious effort to ask
himself whether it be a dream, in order to transform its seeming
hopelessness into a joyous awakening, our average man has but to make a
conscious effort and ask himself, "Is not all this an illusion?" in order to feel
himself forthwith like the awakened sleeper, transported from an
hypocritical and horrible dream-world into a living, peaceful, and joyous
real one.
And for this he has no need of any heroic achievement; he has only to make
the effort prompted by his moral consciousness.
But is man able to make this effort?
According to the existing theory, one indispensable from the point of view
of hypocrisy, man is not free and may not change his life.
"A man cannot change his life, because he is not a free agent. He is not a
free agent, because his acts are the result of preceding causes. And whatever
he may do, certain it is that preceding causes always determine that a man
conscience that has become a part of our very flesh and blood as it were,
who live with a full consciousness of the dignity of man and the equality of
all men, who feel our need for peaceable relations with each other and for
the unity of all nations, should go on living in such a way. It is impossible
that all our pleasures, all our satisfactions, should be purchased by the
sufferings and the lives of our brethren; impossible that we should be ready
at a moment's notice to rush upon each other like wild beasts, one nation
against another, and relentlessly destroy the lives and labor of men, only
because one foolish diplomatist or ruler says or writes something foolish to
another.
It is impossible; and yet all men of our time see that this is what does
happen every day, and all wait for the catastrophe, while the situation grows
more and more strained and painful.
And as a man in his sleep doubts the reality of his dream and longs to
awaken and return to real life, so the average man of our day cannot, in the
bottom of his heart, believe the terrible situation in which he finds himself,
and which is growing worse and worse, to be the reality. He longs to attain
to a higher reality, the consciousness of which is already within him.
And like this sleeper, who has but to make the conscious effort to ask
himself whether it be a dream, in order to transform its seeming
hopelessness into a joyous awakening, our average man has but to make a
conscious effort and ask himself, "Is not all this an illusion?" in order to feel
himself forthwith like the awakened sleeper, transported from an
hypocritical and horrible dream-world into a living, peaceful, and joyous
real one.
And for this he has no need of any heroic achievement; he has only to make
the effort prompted by his moral consciousness.
But is man able to make this effort?
According to the existing theory, one indispensable from the point of view
of hypocrisy, man is not free and may not change his life.
"A man cannot change his life, because he is not a free agent. He is not a
free agent, because his acts are the result of preceding causes. And whatever
he may do, certain it is that preceding causes always determine that a man
Page 295
must act in one way rather than in another; therefore a man is not free to
change his life,"—thus argue the defenders of the metaphysic of hypocrisy.
And they would be perfectly right if man were an unconscious and
stationary being, incapable of apprehending the truth, and unable to
advance to a higher state by means of it. But man is a conscious being, able
to grow more and more in the knowledge of truth. Therefore if he be not
free in his acts, the causes of these acts, which consist in the recognition
simply of such and such truth, are yet within his mastery.
So that if a man is not free to do certain acts, he is yet free to work toward
the suppression of the moral causes which prevent their performance. He
may be likened to the engineer of a locomotive, who, though not at liberty
to change the past or present motion of his engine, is yet free to determine
its future progress.
No matter what an intelligent man may do, he adopts a certain course of
action only because he acknowledges to himself that at the moment that
course alone is the right one; or because he has formerly recognized it as
such, and now continues to act as he does through force of habit, or through
mental inertia.
Whether a man eats or abstains from food, whether he works or rests,
whether he avoids danger or seeks it, he acts as he does because he
considers it to be reasonable at the time, or because previously he saw that
the truth consisted in acting in that way and not in another.
The admission or the denial of a certain truth depends not on outward
causes, but on certain conditions that man finds within himself. Thus
frequently, with all the outward and, as it may seem, favorable conditions
for recognizing the truth, one may reject it, while another may receive it
under the most unfavorable conditions, and without apparent motives. As it
is said in the gospel: "No man can come to me, except the Father which
hath sent me draw him;"—that is to say, the recognition of truth, which is
the cause of all the manifestations of a man's life, does not depend on
outward conditions, but on certain inherent qualities which escape
recognition.
Therefore a man who is not free in his acts still feels himself free in regard
to the cause of his acts; that is, in regard to the recognition or non-
recognition of truth.
change his life,"—thus argue the defenders of the metaphysic of hypocrisy.
And they would be perfectly right if man were an unconscious and
stationary being, incapable of apprehending the truth, and unable to
advance to a higher state by means of it. But man is a conscious being, able
to grow more and more in the knowledge of truth. Therefore if he be not
free in his acts, the causes of these acts, which consist in the recognition
simply of such and such truth, are yet within his mastery.
So that if a man is not free to do certain acts, he is yet free to work toward
the suppression of the moral causes which prevent their performance. He
may be likened to the engineer of a locomotive, who, though not at liberty
to change the past or present motion of his engine, is yet free to determine
its future progress.
No matter what an intelligent man may do, he adopts a certain course of
action only because he acknowledges to himself that at the moment that
course alone is the right one; or because he has formerly recognized it as
such, and now continues to act as he does through force of habit, or through
mental inertia.
Whether a man eats or abstains from food, whether he works or rests,
whether he avoids danger or seeks it, he acts as he does because he
considers it to be reasonable at the time, or because previously he saw that
the truth consisted in acting in that way and not in another.
The admission or the denial of a certain truth depends not on outward
causes, but on certain conditions that man finds within himself. Thus
frequently, with all the outward and, as it may seem, favorable conditions
for recognizing the truth, one may reject it, while another may receive it
under the most unfavorable conditions, and without apparent motives. As it
is said in the gospel: "No man can come to me, except the Father which
hath sent me draw him;"—that is to say, the recognition of truth, which is
the cause of all the manifestations of a man's life, does not depend on
outward conditions, but on certain inherent qualities which escape
recognition.
Therefore a man who is not free in his acts still feels himself free in regard
to the cause of his acts; that is, in regard to the recognition or non-
recognition of truth.
Page 296
Thus a man who, under the influence of passion, has committed a deed
contrary to the truth he knows, still remains free in recognizing or denying
the truth; in other words, denying the truth, he may consider his act
necessary and justify himself in committing it, or, accepting the truth, he
may acknowledge his deed to be evil and himself guilty.
Thus a gambler or a drunkard, who has succumbed to his passion, is free to
acknowledge gambling or drunkenness either as evils, or as amusements
without consequence. In the first instance, if he cannot get rid of his passion
at once, he becomes free from it gradually, according to the depth of his
conviction of its evil. In the second instance, his passion grows and
gradually deprives him of all chance of deliverance.
So, too, with a man who, unable to endure the scorching flames for the
rescue of his friend, himself escapes from a burning house, while he
recognizes the truth that a man should save the life of his fellow-man at the
peril of his own, is yet free to look upon his act as evil, and therefore to
condemn himself for it; or, denying this truth, to judge his act to be both
natural and necessary, and so justify himself in his own opinion. In the first
instance, his recognition of the truth, even though he has not acted in
accordance with it, helps him to prepare for a series of self-sacrificing
actions that will inevitably follow such recognition. In the second instance,
he prepares for a series of actions just as selfish.
I do not say that a man is always free to recognize or not to recognize every
truth. Certain truths there are, long since recognized by men, and
transmitted by tradition, education, and mere force of habit until they have
become second nature; and there are other truths which men perceive as but
dimly and afar. A man is not free not to recognize the first of these; he is not
free to recognize the second. But there is a third category of truths, which
have not as yet become unquestioned motors of his activity, but have
revealed themselves to man so unmistakably that he is unable to disregard
them; he must inevitably consider them, and either accept or reject them. It
is by his relation to these truths that a man's freedom is manifested.
Each man in his perception of truth is like a wayfarer who walks by the aid
of a lantern whose light he casts before him: he does not see what as yet has
not been revealed by its beams, he does not see the path he has left behind,
merged again in the darkness; but at any given point he sees that which the
contrary to the truth he knows, still remains free in recognizing or denying
the truth; in other words, denying the truth, he may consider his act
necessary and justify himself in committing it, or, accepting the truth, he
may acknowledge his deed to be evil and himself guilty.
Thus a gambler or a drunkard, who has succumbed to his passion, is free to
acknowledge gambling or drunkenness either as evils, or as amusements
without consequence. In the first instance, if he cannot get rid of his passion
at once, he becomes free from it gradually, according to the depth of his
conviction of its evil. In the second instance, his passion grows and
gradually deprives him of all chance of deliverance.
So, too, with a man who, unable to endure the scorching flames for the
rescue of his friend, himself escapes from a burning house, while he
recognizes the truth that a man should save the life of his fellow-man at the
peril of his own, is yet free to look upon his act as evil, and therefore to
condemn himself for it; or, denying this truth, to judge his act to be both
natural and necessary, and so justify himself in his own opinion. In the first
instance, his recognition of the truth, even though he has not acted in
accordance with it, helps him to prepare for a series of self-sacrificing
actions that will inevitably follow such recognition. In the second instance,
he prepares for a series of actions just as selfish.
I do not say that a man is always free to recognize or not to recognize every
truth. Certain truths there are, long since recognized by men, and
transmitted by tradition, education, and mere force of habit until they have
become second nature; and there are other truths which men perceive as but
dimly and afar. A man is not free not to recognize the first of these; he is not
free to recognize the second. But there is a third category of truths, which
have not as yet become unquestioned motors of his activity, but have
revealed themselves to man so unmistakably that he is unable to disregard
them; he must inevitably consider them, and either accept or reject them. It
is by his relation to these truths that a man's freedom is manifested.
Each man in his perception of truth is like a wayfarer who walks by the aid
of a lantern whose light he casts before him: he does not see what as yet has
not been revealed by its beams, he does not see the path he has left behind,
merged again in the darkness; but at any given point he sees that which the
Page 297
lantern reveals, and he is always at liberty to choose one side of the road or
the other.
There exist for each man certain concealed truths, as yet unrevealed to his
mental vision; certain others, which he has experienced, assimilated, and
forgotten; and yet others, that rise up before him demanding immediate
recognition from his reason. And it is in the recognition or the disregard of
these truths that what we call freedom becomes evident.
All the apparent difficulty of the question of man's liberty comes from the
fact that those who seek to solve it represent man as stationary in the
presence of the truth.
Undoubtedly he is not free if we look upon him as a stationary being; if we
forget that the life of all humanity is an eternal procession from darkness to
light, from the lower conception of truth to a higher one, from truth mingled
with error to purer truth.
A man would not be free if he were ignorant of all truth; neither would he
be free, nor even have any conception of liberty, if the truth were suddenly
revealed to him in its entire purity and without any admixture of error.
But man is not a stationary being. And as he advances in life, every
individual discovers an ever increasing proportion of truth, and thus
becomes less liable to error.
The relations of man to truth are threefold. Some truths are so familiar to
him that they have become the unconscious springs of action; others have
only been dimly revealed to him; again others, though still unfamiliar, are
revealed to him so plainly that they force themselves upon his attention, and
inevitably, in one way or another, he is obliged to consider them. He cannot
ignore them, but must either recognize or repudiate them.
And it is in the recognition or in the disregard of these truths that man's free
agency is manifested.
A man's freedom does not consist in a faculty of acting independently of his
environment and the various influences it brings to bear upon his life, but in
his power to become, through recognizing and professing the truth that has
been revealed to him, a free and willing laborer at the eternal and infinite
work performed by God and his universe; or, in shutting his eyes to truth, to
the other.
There exist for each man certain concealed truths, as yet unrevealed to his
mental vision; certain others, which he has experienced, assimilated, and
forgotten; and yet others, that rise up before him demanding immediate
recognition from his reason. And it is in the recognition or the disregard of
these truths that what we call freedom becomes evident.
All the apparent difficulty of the question of man's liberty comes from the
fact that those who seek to solve it represent man as stationary in the
presence of the truth.
Undoubtedly he is not free if we look upon him as a stationary being; if we
forget that the life of all humanity is an eternal procession from darkness to
light, from the lower conception of truth to a higher one, from truth mingled
with error to purer truth.
A man would not be free if he were ignorant of all truth; neither would he
be free, nor even have any conception of liberty, if the truth were suddenly
revealed to him in its entire purity and without any admixture of error.
But man is not a stationary being. And as he advances in life, every
individual discovers an ever increasing proportion of truth, and thus
becomes less liable to error.
The relations of man to truth are threefold. Some truths are so familiar to
him that they have become the unconscious springs of action; others have
only been dimly revealed to him; again others, though still unfamiliar, are
revealed to him so plainly that they force themselves upon his attention, and
inevitably, in one way or another, he is obliged to consider them. He cannot
ignore them, but must either recognize or repudiate them.
And it is in the recognition or in the disregard of these truths that man's free
agency is manifested.
A man's freedom does not consist in a faculty of acting independently of his
environment and the various influences it brings to bear upon his life, but in
his power to become, through recognizing and professing the truth that has
been revealed to him, a free and willing laborer at the eternal and infinite
work performed by God and his universe; or, in shutting his eyes to truth, to
Page 298
become a slave and be forced against his will into a way in which he is
loath to go.
Not only does truth point out the direction a man's life should take, but it
opens the only road he can take. Hence, all men will invariably, free or not,
follow the road of truth;—some willingly, doing the work they have set
themselves to do; others involuntarily, by submitting in spite of themselves
to the law of life. It is in the power of choice that a man's freedom lies.
Freedom, in limits so narrow as these, appears to men so insignificant that
they fail to perceive it. The believers in causation prefer to overlook it; the
believers in unlimited free will, keeping in view their own ideal, disdain a
freedom to them so insignificant. Freedom, confined between the limits of
entire ignorance of the truth, or of the knowledge of only a part of it, does
not seem to them to be freedom, the more so that whether a man is or is not
willing to recognize the truth revealed unto him, he will inevitably be
forced to obey it in life.
A horse harnessed to a load in company with other horses is not free to
remain in one place. If he does not pull the load, the load will strike him
and force him to move in the direction it is going, thus compelling him to
advance. Still, in spite of this limitation of freedom, the horse is still free to
pull the load of his own accord, or be pushed forward by it. The same
reasoning can be applied to human freedom.
Be this freedom great or small as compared with the chimerical freedom for
which we sigh, it is the only true freedom, and through it alone is to be
found all the happiness accessible to man. And not only does this freedom
promote the happiness of men, but it is the only means through which the
work of the world can be accomplished.
According to the doctrine of Christ, a man who limits his observation of life
to the sphere in which there is no freedom—to the sphere of effects—that
is, of acts—does not live a true life. He only lives a true life who has
transferred his life into the sphere in which freedom lies,—into the domain
of first causes,—that is to say, by the recognition and practice of the truth
revealed to him.
The man who consecrates his life to sensual acts is ever performing acts
that depend on temporary causes beyond his control. Of himself he does
loath to go.
Not only does truth point out the direction a man's life should take, but it
opens the only road he can take. Hence, all men will invariably, free or not,
follow the road of truth;—some willingly, doing the work they have set
themselves to do; others involuntarily, by submitting in spite of themselves
to the law of life. It is in the power of choice that a man's freedom lies.
Freedom, in limits so narrow as these, appears to men so insignificant that
they fail to perceive it. The believers in causation prefer to overlook it; the
believers in unlimited free will, keeping in view their own ideal, disdain a
freedom to them so insignificant. Freedom, confined between the limits of
entire ignorance of the truth, or of the knowledge of only a part of it, does
not seem to them to be freedom, the more so that whether a man is or is not
willing to recognize the truth revealed unto him, he will inevitably be
forced to obey it in life.
A horse harnessed to a load in company with other horses is not free to
remain in one place. If he does not pull the load, the load will strike him
and force him to move in the direction it is going, thus compelling him to
advance. Still, in spite of this limitation of freedom, the horse is still free to
pull the load of his own accord, or be pushed forward by it. The same
reasoning can be applied to human freedom.
Be this freedom great or small as compared with the chimerical freedom for
which we sigh, it is the only true freedom, and through it alone is to be
found all the happiness accessible to man. And not only does this freedom
promote the happiness of men, but it is the only means through which the
work of the world can be accomplished.
According to the doctrine of Christ, a man who limits his observation of life
to the sphere in which there is no freedom—to the sphere of effects—that
is, of acts—does not live a true life. He only lives a true life who has
transferred his life into the sphere in which freedom lies,—into the domain
of first causes,—that is to say, by the recognition and practice of the truth
revealed to him.
The man who consecrates his life to sensual acts is ever performing acts
that depend on temporary causes beyond his control. Of himself he does
Page 299
nothing; it only seems to him that he is acting independently, whereas in
reality all that he imagines he is doing by himself is done through him by a
superior force; he is not the creator of life, but its slave. But the man who
devotes his life to the acknowledgment and practice of the truth revealed to
him unites himself with the source of universal life, and accomplishes, not
personal, individual acts, that depend on the conditions of time and space,
but acts that have no causes, but are in themselves causes of all else, and
have an endless and unlimited significance.
Because of their setting aside the essence of true life, which consists in the
recognition and practice of the truth, and directing their efforts toward the
improvement of the external conditions of life, men of the pagan life-
conception may be likened to passengers on a steamer, who should, in their
anxiety to reach their destination, extinguish the engine-fires, and instead of
making use of steam and screw, try during a storm to row with oars which
cannot reach the water.
The Kingdom of God is attained by effort, and it is only those who make
the effort that do attain it. It is this effort, which consists in sacrificing
outward conditions for the sake of the truth, by which the Kingdom of God
is attained,—an effort which can and ought to be made now, in our own
epoch.
Men have but to understand this: that they must cease to care for material
and external matters, in which they are not free; let them apply one
hundredth part of the energy now used by them in outward concerns to
those in which they are free,—to the recognition and profession of the truth
that confronts them, to the deliverance of themselves and others from the
falsehood and hypocrisy which conceal the truth,—and then the false
system of life which now torments us, which threatens us with still greater
suffering, will be destroyed at once without struggle. Then the Kingdom of
Heaven, at least in that first stage for which men through the development
of their consciousness are already prepared, will be established.
As one shake is sufficient to precipitate into crystals a liquid saturated with
salt, so at the present time it may be that only the least effort is needed in
order that the truth, already revealed to us, should spread among hundreds,
thousands, millions of men, and a public opinion become established in
reality all that he imagines he is doing by himself is done through him by a
superior force; he is not the creator of life, but its slave. But the man who
devotes his life to the acknowledgment and practice of the truth revealed to
him unites himself with the source of universal life, and accomplishes, not
personal, individual acts, that depend on the conditions of time and space,
but acts that have no causes, but are in themselves causes of all else, and
have an endless and unlimited significance.
Because of their setting aside the essence of true life, which consists in the
recognition and practice of the truth, and directing their efforts toward the
improvement of the external conditions of life, men of the pagan life-
conception may be likened to passengers on a steamer, who should, in their
anxiety to reach their destination, extinguish the engine-fires, and instead of
making use of steam and screw, try during a storm to row with oars which
cannot reach the water.
The Kingdom of God is attained by effort, and it is only those who make
the effort that do attain it. It is this effort, which consists in sacrificing
outward conditions for the sake of the truth, by which the Kingdom of God
is attained,—an effort which can and ought to be made now, in our own
epoch.
Men have but to understand this: that they must cease to care for material
and external matters, in which they are not free; let them apply one
hundredth part of the energy now used by them in outward concerns to
those in which they are free,—to the recognition and profession of the truth
that confronts them, to the deliverance of themselves and others from the
falsehood and hypocrisy which conceal the truth,—and then the false
system of life which now torments us, which threatens us with still greater
suffering, will be destroyed at once without struggle. Then the Kingdom of
Heaven, at least in that first stage for which men through the development
of their consciousness are already prepared, will be established.
As one shake is sufficient to precipitate into crystals a liquid saturated with
salt, so at the present time it may be that only the least effort is needed in
order that the truth, already revealed to us, should spread among hundreds,
thousands, millions of men, and a public opinion become established in
Page 300
conformity with the existing consciousness, and the entire social
organization become transformed. It depends upon us to make this effort.
If only each of us would try to understand and recognize the Christian truth,
which in the most varied forms surrounds us on all sides, pleading to be
admitted into our hearts; if we would cease to lie and pretend that we do not
see this truth, or that we are anxious to fulfil it, excepting in the one thing
that it really demands; if we would only recognize this truth which calls us,
and would fearlessly profess it,—we should find forthwith that hundreds,
thousands, and millions of men are in the same position as ourselves,
fearing like ourselves to stand alone in its recognition, and waiting only to
hear its avowal from others.
If men would only cease to be hypocrites they would perceive at once that
this cruel organization of society, which alone hampers them and yet
appears to them like something immutable, necessary, and sacred,
established by God, is already wavering, and is maintained only by the
hypocrisy and the falsehood of ourselves and our fellow-men.
But if it be true that it depends only on ourselves to change the existing
order of life, have we the right to do it without knowing what we shall put
in its place? What will become of the world if the present system be
destroyed?
"What is there beyond the walls of the world we leave behind us?
"Fear seizes us,—emptiness, space, freedom....—how is one to go on, not
knowing whither? How is one to lose, without the hope of gain?...
"Had Columbus reasoned thus he never would have weighed anchor. It was
madness to attempt to cross an unknown ocean, to set sail for a country
whose very existence was doubtful. But he discovered a new world through
this madness. To be sure, if people had only to move from one furnished
house into another and a more commodious one, it would be an easy matter,
but the trouble lies in there being no one to prepare the new apartments. The
future looks more uncertain still than the ocean,—it promises nothing,—it
will only be what men and circumstances make it.
"If you are content with the old world, try to preserve it; it is sick, and will
not live long. But if you can no longer live in the eternal conflict between
your convictions and life, thinking one way and acting another, take it upon
organization become transformed. It depends upon us to make this effort.
If only each of us would try to understand and recognize the Christian truth,
which in the most varied forms surrounds us on all sides, pleading to be
admitted into our hearts; if we would cease to lie and pretend that we do not
see this truth, or that we are anxious to fulfil it, excepting in the one thing
that it really demands; if we would only recognize this truth which calls us,
and would fearlessly profess it,—we should find forthwith that hundreds,
thousands, and millions of men are in the same position as ourselves,
fearing like ourselves to stand alone in its recognition, and waiting only to
hear its avowal from others.
If men would only cease to be hypocrites they would perceive at once that
this cruel organization of society, which alone hampers them and yet
appears to them like something immutable, necessary, and sacred,
established by God, is already wavering, and is maintained only by the
hypocrisy and the falsehood of ourselves and our fellow-men.
But if it be true that it depends only on ourselves to change the existing
order of life, have we the right to do it without knowing what we shall put
in its place? What will become of the world if the present system be
destroyed?
"What is there beyond the walls of the world we leave behind us?
"Fear seizes us,—emptiness, space, freedom....—how is one to go on, not
knowing whither? How is one to lose, without the hope of gain?...
"Had Columbus reasoned thus he never would have weighed anchor. It was
madness to attempt to cross an unknown ocean, to set sail for a country
whose very existence was doubtful. But he discovered a new world through
this madness. To be sure, if people had only to move from one furnished
house into another and a more commodious one, it would be an easy matter,
but the trouble lies in there being no one to prepare the new apartments. The
future looks more uncertain still than the ocean,—it promises nothing,—it
will only be what men and circumstances make it.
"If you are content with the old world, try to preserve it; it is sick, and will
not live long. But if you can no longer live in the eternal conflict between
your convictions and life, thinking one way and acting another, take it upon
Page 301
yourselves to leave the shelter of the blanched and ruinous arches of the
Middle Ages. I am aware that this is not an easy matter. It is hard to part
with all one has been accustomed to from birth. Men are ready for great
sacrifices, but not those which the new life demands of them. Are they
ready to sacrifice their present civilization, their mode of life, their religion,
their conventional morality? Are they ready to be deprived of all the results
of such prolonged efforts, the results we have boasted of for three centuries,
of all the conveniences and attractions of our existence, to give the
preference to wild youth rather than to civilized senility, to pull down the
palace built by our fathers simply for the pleasure of laying the foundation
of a new house, which, without doubt, will not be completed till long after
our time."[32] Thus wrote, almost half a century ago, a Russian author, who,
with penetrating vision, clearly discerned even at that time what is
recognized by every man to-day who reflects a little,—the impossibility of
continuing life on the former basis, and the necessity of establishing some
new mode of existence.
It is plain from the simplest and most ordinary point of view that it is folly
to remain under a roof that threatens to fall, and that one must leave it.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more miserable situation than that of the
present Christian world, with its nations arrayed in arms one against the
other, with its ever increasing taxes for the purpose of supporting its
growing armaments, with the burning hatred of the working-classes for the
rich, with war suspended above all like the sword of Damocles ready to fall,
as it may, at any moment.
It is doubtful whether any revolution could be more disastrous than the
present social order, or rather disorder, with its perpetual victims of
overwork, misery, drunkenness, dissipation, with all the horrors of
impending war that in one year will sacrifice more lives than all the
revolutions of the present century.
What will become of mankind if each one fulfils that which God demands
through the conscience that is in him. Shall I be safe if, under the orders of
my master, I accomplish in his great workshop the tasks he has set me,
although, ignorant of his final plans, I may think it strange? Nor is it alone
the question of the future that troubles men when they hesitate to do the
master's bidding. They are concerned about the question as to how they are
to live without the familiar conditions which we call science, art,
Middle Ages. I am aware that this is not an easy matter. It is hard to part
with all one has been accustomed to from birth. Men are ready for great
sacrifices, but not those which the new life demands of them. Are they
ready to sacrifice their present civilization, their mode of life, their religion,
their conventional morality? Are they ready to be deprived of all the results
of such prolonged efforts, the results we have boasted of for three centuries,
of all the conveniences and attractions of our existence, to give the
preference to wild youth rather than to civilized senility, to pull down the
palace built by our fathers simply for the pleasure of laying the foundation
of a new house, which, without doubt, will not be completed till long after
our time."[32] Thus wrote, almost half a century ago, a Russian author, who,
with penetrating vision, clearly discerned even at that time what is
recognized by every man to-day who reflects a little,—the impossibility of
continuing life on the former basis, and the necessity of establishing some
new mode of existence.
It is plain from the simplest and most ordinary point of view that it is folly
to remain under a roof that threatens to fall, and that one must leave it.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more miserable situation than that of the
present Christian world, with its nations arrayed in arms one against the
other, with its ever increasing taxes for the purpose of supporting its
growing armaments, with the burning hatred of the working-classes for the
rich, with war suspended above all like the sword of Damocles ready to fall,
as it may, at any moment.
It is doubtful whether any revolution could be more disastrous than the
present social order, or rather disorder, with its perpetual victims of
overwork, misery, drunkenness, dissipation, with all the horrors of
impending war that in one year will sacrifice more lives than all the
revolutions of the present century.
What will become of mankind if each one fulfils that which God demands
through the conscience that is in him. Shall I be safe if, under the orders of
my master, I accomplish in his great workshop the tasks he has set me,
although, ignorant of his final plans, I may think it strange? Nor is it alone
the question of the future that troubles men when they hesitate to do the
master's bidding. They are concerned about the question as to how they are
to live without the familiar conditions which we call science, art,
Page 302
civilization, culture. We feel individually all the burden of our present way
of living; we see that were this order of things to continue, it would
inevitably ruin us; and yet we are anxious to have these conditions continue,
to have our science, our art, our civilization, and culture remain unchanged.
It is as though a man who dwells in an old house, suffering from cold and
discomfort, who is moreover aware that its walls may tumble at any
moment, should consent to the remodeling of it, only on condition that he
may be allowed to remain there, a condition that is equivalent to a refusal to
have his dwelling rebuilt. "What, if I should leave my house," he says, "I
should be temporarily deprived of its comforts; the new house may not be
built after all, or it may be constructed on a new plan, which will lack the
conveniences to which I have been accustomed!" But if the materials and
the workmen are ready, it is probable that the new house will be built, and
in a better manner than the old one; while it is not only probable but certain
that the old house will soon fall into ruins, crushing those who remain
within its walls. In order that the old, everyday conditions of life may
disappear and make room for new and better ones, we must surely leave
behind the old conditions, which are at length become fatal and impossible,
and issue forth to meet the future.
"But science, art, civilization, and culture will cease to be!" But if all these
are only diverse manifestations of truth, the impending change is to be
accomplished for the sake of a further advance toward truth and its
realization. "How, then, can the manifestations of truth disappear, in
consequence of further realization of truth?" The manifestations of truth
will be different, better, loftier, the error that has been in them will perish,
while the verity that is in them will remain and flourish with renewed vigor.
Return to yourselves, sons of men, and have faith in the gospel, and in its
doctrine of eternal happiness! If you heed not this warning, you shall all
perish like the men slain by Pilate, like those upon whom the tower of
Siloam fell; like millions of other men, who slew and were slain, who
executed and suffered execution, who tortured and were tortured; as
perished the man who so foolishly filled his granaries, counting on a long
life, on the very night when his soul was required of him. Return, sons of
men, and believe in the words which Christ uttered 1800 years ago, words
which He repeats to-day with greater force, warning us that the evil day He
of living; we see that were this order of things to continue, it would
inevitably ruin us; and yet we are anxious to have these conditions continue,
to have our science, our art, our civilization, and culture remain unchanged.
It is as though a man who dwells in an old house, suffering from cold and
discomfort, who is moreover aware that its walls may tumble at any
moment, should consent to the remodeling of it, only on condition that he
may be allowed to remain there, a condition that is equivalent to a refusal to
have his dwelling rebuilt. "What, if I should leave my house," he says, "I
should be temporarily deprived of its comforts; the new house may not be
built after all, or it may be constructed on a new plan, which will lack the
conveniences to which I have been accustomed!" But if the materials and
the workmen are ready, it is probable that the new house will be built, and
in a better manner than the old one; while it is not only probable but certain
that the old house will soon fall into ruins, crushing those who remain
within its walls. In order that the old, everyday conditions of life may
disappear and make room for new and better ones, we must surely leave
behind the old conditions, which are at length become fatal and impossible,
and issue forth to meet the future.
"But science, art, civilization, and culture will cease to be!" But if all these
are only diverse manifestations of truth, the impending change is to be
accomplished for the sake of a further advance toward truth and its
realization. "How, then, can the manifestations of truth disappear, in
consequence of further realization of truth?" The manifestations of truth
will be different, better, loftier, the error that has been in them will perish,
while the verity that is in them will remain and flourish with renewed vigor.
Return to yourselves, sons of men, and have faith in the gospel, and in its
doctrine of eternal happiness! If you heed not this warning, you shall all
perish like the men slain by Pilate, like those upon whom the tower of
Siloam fell; like millions of other men, who slew and were slain, who
executed and suffered execution, who tortured and were tortured; as
perished the man who so foolishly filled his granaries, counting on a long
life, on the very night when his soul was required of him. Return, sons of
men, and believe in the words which Christ uttered 1800 years ago, words
which He repeats to-day with greater force, warning us that the evil day He
Page 303
foretold is at hand, and that our life has reached its last descent of folly and
wickedness.
Now, after so many centuries of futile effort to protect ourselves by the
methods of the pagan system of violence, it should be evident to every man
that all such effort, far from insuring our safety, tends only to add a new
element of danger both to individual and social existence.
No matter by what names we may be called, nor what garments we may
wear, nor in the presence of what priest we may be anointed, nor how many
millions our subjects may number, nor how many guards may be posted on
our journey, nor how many policemen may protect our property, nor how
many so-called criminals, revolutionists, or anarchists we may execute; no
matter what exploits we may perform, nor what states we may establish, nor
what fortresses and towers we may erect, from the Tower of Babel to the
Eiffel Tower,—we have before us two ever present and unavoidable
conditions, that deprive our mode of life of all significance: (1) death, that
may overtake each of us at any moment, and (2) the transitory nature of all
our undertakings, that disappear, leaving no trace behind them. No matter
what we may do, found kingdoms, build palaces and monuments, write
poems and songs,—all is but fleeting and leaves no trace behind. Therefore
no matter how much we may attempt to conceal this from ourselves, we
cannot fail to perceive that the true significance of our life lies neither in
our individual, physical existence, subjected to unavoidable suffering and
death, nor in any institution or social organization.
Whoever you are, you who read these lines, reflect upon your position and
your duties, not upon the position of landowner, merchant, judge, emperor,
president, minister, priest, or soldier, which you may assume but for a time,
not upon the imaginary duties which these positions impose upon you, but
upon your actual and eternal position as a being, who, after a whole eternity
of non-existence, is called by the will of Some One from unconsciousness
into life, and who may at any moment return whence he came by the same
will. Consider your duties! Not your imaginary duties of landowner in
regard to your estate, nor of merchant to your capital, nor of emperor,
minister, or governor to the State, but of your real duties, of a being called
forth into life and endowed with love and reason. Do that which He who
has sent you into this world, and to whom you will shortly return, demands
of you. Are you doing what he requires? Are you doing right when, as
wickedness.
Now, after so many centuries of futile effort to protect ourselves by the
methods of the pagan system of violence, it should be evident to every man
that all such effort, far from insuring our safety, tends only to add a new
element of danger both to individual and social existence.
No matter by what names we may be called, nor what garments we may
wear, nor in the presence of what priest we may be anointed, nor how many
millions our subjects may number, nor how many guards may be posted on
our journey, nor how many policemen may protect our property, nor how
many so-called criminals, revolutionists, or anarchists we may execute; no
matter what exploits we may perform, nor what states we may establish, nor
what fortresses and towers we may erect, from the Tower of Babel to the
Eiffel Tower,—we have before us two ever present and unavoidable
conditions, that deprive our mode of life of all significance: (1) death, that
may overtake each of us at any moment, and (2) the transitory nature of all
our undertakings, that disappear, leaving no trace behind them. No matter
what we may do, found kingdoms, build palaces and monuments, write
poems and songs,—all is but fleeting and leaves no trace behind. Therefore
no matter how much we may attempt to conceal this from ourselves, we
cannot fail to perceive that the true significance of our life lies neither in
our individual, physical existence, subjected to unavoidable suffering and
death, nor in any institution or social organization.
Whoever you are, you who read these lines, reflect upon your position and
your duties, not upon the position of landowner, merchant, judge, emperor,
president, minister, priest, or soldier, which you may assume but for a time,
not upon the imaginary duties which these positions impose upon you, but
upon your actual and eternal position as a being, who, after a whole eternity
of non-existence, is called by the will of Some One from unconsciousness
into life, and who may at any moment return whence he came by the same
will. Consider your duties! Not your imaginary duties of landowner in
regard to your estate, nor of merchant to your capital, nor of emperor,
minister, or governor to the State, but of your real duties, of a being called
forth into life and endowed with love and reason. Do that which He who
has sent you into this world, and to whom you will shortly return, demands
of you. Are you doing what he requires? Are you doing right when, as
Page 304
landowner or manufacturer, you take the products of the labor of the poor,
and establish your life on this spoliation; or when, as governor or judge, you
do violence in condemning men to death; or when, as soldier, you prepare
for war, for fighting, robbery, and murder,—are you doing right?
You say that the world is as you find it, that it is inevitable that it should be
as it is, that what you do you are compelled to do. But can it be that, having
so strongly rooted an aversion to the suffering of men, to violence, to
murder; having such a need of loving your fellow-men, and of being loved
by them; seeing clearly, too, that the greatest good possible to men comes
from acknowledging human brotherhood, from one serving another: can it
be that your heart tells you all this, that you are taught it by your reason,
that science repeats it to you, and yet regardless of it, on the strength of
some mysterious and complicated argument, you are forced to contradict it
all in your daily conduct? Is it possible that, being a landowner or a
capitalist, you should establish your life on the oppression of the people;
that, being an emperor or a president, you should command armies, and be
a leader of murderers; that, being a functionary of State, you should take
from the poor their hard-earned money for your own benefit, or for the
benefit of the rich; that, being a judge or juror, you should condemn erring
men to torture and death, because the truth has not been revealed to them;
or, above all, is it possible that you, a youth, should enter the army, doing
that upon which all the evil of the world is founded, that, renouncing your
own will, all your human sympathy, you should engage at the will of others
to murder those whom they bid you murder?
It is impossible!
If you are told that all this is essential for the support of the existing system
of life; that this system, with its pauperism, famine, prisons, executions,
armies, wars, is necessary for society, and that if it were to be abolished
worse evils would follow, you are told so only by those who benefit by this
system; while those who suffer from it,—and their numbers are ten times
greater,—all think and say the opposite. And at the bottom of your heart
you know that this is false,—that the existing system has had its day, and
must inevitably be remodeled on new foundations; and that there is no need
whatsoever to support it by the sacrifice of human life.
and establish your life on this spoliation; or when, as governor or judge, you
do violence in condemning men to death; or when, as soldier, you prepare
for war, for fighting, robbery, and murder,—are you doing right?
You say that the world is as you find it, that it is inevitable that it should be
as it is, that what you do you are compelled to do. But can it be that, having
so strongly rooted an aversion to the suffering of men, to violence, to
murder; having such a need of loving your fellow-men, and of being loved
by them; seeing clearly, too, that the greatest good possible to men comes
from acknowledging human brotherhood, from one serving another: can it
be that your heart tells you all this, that you are taught it by your reason,
that science repeats it to you, and yet regardless of it, on the strength of
some mysterious and complicated argument, you are forced to contradict it
all in your daily conduct? Is it possible that, being a landowner or a
capitalist, you should establish your life on the oppression of the people;
that, being an emperor or a president, you should command armies, and be
a leader of murderers; that, being a functionary of State, you should take
from the poor their hard-earned money for your own benefit, or for the
benefit of the rich; that, being a judge or juror, you should condemn erring
men to torture and death, because the truth has not been revealed to them;
or, above all, is it possible that you, a youth, should enter the army, doing
that upon which all the evil of the world is founded, that, renouncing your
own will, all your human sympathy, you should engage at the will of others
to murder those whom they bid you murder?
It is impossible!
If you are told that all this is essential for the support of the existing system
of life; that this system, with its pauperism, famine, prisons, executions,
armies, wars, is necessary for society, and that if it were to be abolished
worse evils would follow, you are told so only by those who benefit by this
system; while those who suffer from it,—and their numbers are ten times
greater,—all think and say the opposite. And at the bottom of your heart
you know that this is false,—that the existing system has had its day, and
must inevitably be remodeled on new foundations; and that there is no need
whatsoever to support it by the sacrifice of human life.
Page 305
Even supposing that the existing system is necessary, how is it that you
should have to support it by trampling upon all finer feelings? But who has
made you a guardian of this crumbling structure? Neither has the State, nor
society, nor has any one requested you individually to support it by
occupying your position of landowner, merchant, emperor, priest, or soldier,
and you are well aware that you have accepted and are holding it, not for
purposes of self-denial, for the good of your fellow-men, but for your own
selfish interest; for your greed of gain, vainglory, ambition, through your
indolence or your cowardice. If you do not desire this position you should
not persist in doing what is cruel, false, and contemptible in order to retain
it. If you would once refrain from these things which you do continually for
the purpose of retaining it, you would lose it at once. If you are a ruler or an
official, make only an attempt to cease polite lying, cease to take part in
violences and executions; if you are a priest, desist from deceiving; if a
soldier, cease killing; if a land-owner or manufacturer, cease defending your
property by roguery and violence; and forthwith you will lose the position
which, as you say, is forced upon you and seems to you burdensome.
It cannot be that a man should be placed against his will in a position
contrary to conscience.
If you are put in such a position, it is not because it is necessary for some
one to be there, but only because you are willing to accept it. And therefore,
knowing that such a position is directly opposed to the mandates of your
heart, your reason, your faith, and even to the teaching of that science you
believe in, you cannot but pause to consider, if you wish to keep it, and
especially if you try to justify it, if you are doing what you ought to do.
You might run the risk if you had but the time to see your mistake and
correct it, and if you ran the risk for something worth having. But when you
know for certain that you are liable to die at any moment, without the
slightest possibility either for yourself or for those whom you have drawn in
with you of rectifying your mistake; and, moreover, since you know that no
matter what those about you may accomplish in the material organization of
the world, it will all very shortly disappear as certainly as you yourself,
leaving no trace behind,—it is surely obvious that you have no inducement
to run the risk of making a mistake so terrible.
should have to support it by trampling upon all finer feelings? But who has
made you a guardian of this crumbling structure? Neither has the State, nor
society, nor has any one requested you individually to support it by
occupying your position of landowner, merchant, emperor, priest, or soldier,
and you are well aware that you have accepted and are holding it, not for
purposes of self-denial, for the good of your fellow-men, but for your own
selfish interest; for your greed of gain, vainglory, ambition, through your
indolence or your cowardice. If you do not desire this position you should
not persist in doing what is cruel, false, and contemptible in order to retain
it. If you would once refrain from these things which you do continually for
the purpose of retaining it, you would lose it at once. If you are a ruler or an
official, make only an attempt to cease polite lying, cease to take part in
violences and executions; if you are a priest, desist from deceiving; if a
soldier, cease killing; if a land-owner or manufacturer, cease defending your
property by roguery and violence; and forthwith you will lose the position
which, as you say, is forced upon you and seems to you burdensome.
It cannot be that a man should be placed against his will in a position
contrary to conscience.
If you are put in such a position, it is not because it is necessary for some
one to be there, but only because you are willing to accept it. And therefore,
knowing that such a position is directly opposed to the mandates of your
heart, your reason, your faith, and even to the teaching of that science you
believe in, you cannot but pause to consider, if you wish to keep it, and
especially if you try to justify it, if you are doing what you ought to do.
You might run the risk if you had but the time to see your mistake and
correct it, and if you ran the risk for something worth having. But when you
know for certain that you are liable to die at any moment, without the
slightest possibility either for yourself or for those whom you have drawn in
with you of rectifying your mistake; and, moreover, since you know that no
matter what those about you may accomplish in the material organization of
the world, it will all very shortly disappear as certainly as you yourself,
leaving no trace behind,—it is surely obvious that you have no inducement
to run the risk of making a mistake so terrible.
Page 306
This would seem perfectly plain and simple if we did not veil with
hypocrisy the truth that is indubitably revealed to us.
Share what you have with others; do not amass riches; be not vain; do not
rob, torture, or murder men; do not to others what you would not that others
should do to you,—these things have been said not eighteen hundred but
five thousand years ago, and there can be no doubt of the truth of them.
Save for hypocrisy, it would be impossible, even if one did not obey these
rules, not to acknowledge that they ought to be obeyed, and that those who
do not obey them do wrong.
But you say that there is still the general well-being, for the sake of which
one should deviate from these rules. It is allowable for the general well-
being to kill, torture, and rob. "It is better that one man should perish than a
whole nation," you say, like Caiaphas, when you are signing death-
warrants; or you load your gun to shoot your fellow-man, who is to perish
for the general good; or you imprison him or take away his goods.
You say that you do these cruel things because you are a part of society, of
the State, and must serve your government and carry out its laws, as
landowner, judge, emperor, or soldier. But if you are a part of the State and
have duties in consequence, you are also a partaker of the infinite life of
God's universe, and have higher duties in consequence of that.
As your duties to your family or to society are always subject to the higher
duties that depend upon your citizenship in the State, so your duties of
citizenship are subject to the duties arising from your relations to the life of
the universe, from your sonship to God. And as it would be unwise to cut
down telegraph poles in order to furnish fuel for the benefit of a family or a
few people, because this would be breaking the laws that protect the welfare
of the State; so it is equally unwise, in order to promote the welfare of the
State, to execute or murder a man, because this is breaking the immutable
laws which preserve the welfare of the world.
The obligations of citizenship must be subject to the higher and eternal
obligations on your part in the everlasting life of God, and must not
contradict them. As it was said eighteen hundred years ago by the disciples
of Christ, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more
than unto God, judge ye."[33] "We ought to obey God rather than men."[34]
hypocrisy the truth that is indubitably revealed to us.
Share what you have with others; do not amass riches; be not vain; do not
rob, torture, or murder men; do not to others what you would not that others
should do to you,—these things have been said not eighteen hundred but
five thousand years ago, and there can be no doubt of the truth of them.
Save for hypocrisy, it would be impossible, even if one did not obey these
rules, not to acknowledge that they ought to be obeyed, and that those who
do not obey them do wrong.
But you say that there is still the general well-being, for the sake of which
one should deviate from these rules. It is allowable for the general well-
being to kill, torture, and rob. "It is better that one man should perish than a
whole nation," you say, like Caiaphas, when you are signing death-
warrants; or you load your gun to shoot your fellow-man, who is to perish
for the general good; or you imprison him or take away his goods.
You say that you do these cruel things because you are a part of society, of
the State, and must serve your government and carry out its laws, as
landowner, judge, emperor, or soldier. But if you are a part of the State and
have duties in consequence, you are also a partaker of the infinite life of
God's universe, and have higher duties in consequence of that.
As your duties to your family or to society are always subject to the higher
duties that depend upon your citizenship in the State, so your duties of
citizenship are subject to the duties arising from your relations to the life of
the universe, from your sonship to God. And as it would be unwise to cut
down telegraph poles in order to furnish fuel for the benefit of a family or a
few people, because this would be breaking the laws that protect the welfare
of the State; so it is equally unwise, in order to promote the welfare of the
State, to execute or murder a man, because this is breaking the immutable
laws which preserve the welfare of the world.
The obligations of citizenship must be subject to the higher and eternal
obligations on your part in the everlasting life of God, and must not
contradict them. As it was said eighteen hundred years ago by the disciples
of Christ, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more
than unto God, judge ye."[33] "We ought to obey God rather than men."[34]
Page 307
You are told to believe that in order to maintain an ever changing system,
established but yesterday by a few men in a corner of the globe, you should
commit violent deeds that are against the fixed and eternal order established
by God or reason. Can it be possible?
Do not fail, then, to reflect upon your position of land-owner, merchant,
judge, emperor, president, minister, priest, or soldier—associated with
violence, oppression, deceit, torture, and murder; refuse to recognize the
lawfulness of these crimes. I do not mean that if you are a landowner you
should forthwith give your land to the poor; or if a capitalist, your money or
your factory to your workmen; or if a czar, a minister, a magistrate, a judge,
or a general, you should forthwith abdicate all your advantages; or if a
soldier, whose occupation in its very nature is based on violence, you
should at once refuse to continue longer a soldier, despite all the dangers of
such a refusal. Should you do this, it will indeed be an heroic act; but it may
happen—and most probably—that you will not be able to do it. You have
connections, a family, subordinates, chiefs; you may be surrounded by
temptations so strong that you cannot overcome them; but to acknowledge
the truth to be the truth, and not to lie—that you are always able to do. You
can refrain from affirming that you continue to be a landowner or factory-
owner, a merchant, an artist, an author, because you are thus useful to men;
from declaring that you are a governor, an attorney-general, a czar, not
because it is agreeable or you are accustomed to be such, but for the good
of men; from saying that you remain a soldier, not through fear of
punishment, but because you consider the army indispensable for the
protection of men's lives. To keep from speaking thus falsely before
yourself and others—this you are always able to do, and not only able, but
in duty bound to do, because in this alone—in freeing yourself from
falsehood and in working out the truth—lies the highest duty of your life.
And do but this and it will be sufficient for the situation to change at once
of itself.
One only thing in which you are free and all-powerful has been given you;
all others are beyond you. It is this,—to know the truth and to profess it.
And it is only because of other miserable and erring men like yourself that
you have become a soldier, an emperor, a landowner, a capitalist, a priest, or
a general; that you commit evil deeds so obviously contrary to the dictates
of your heart and reason; that you torture, rob, and murder men,
established but yesterday by a few men in a corner of the globe, you should
commit violent deeds that are against the fixed and eternal order established
by God or reason. Can it be possible?
Do not fail, then, to reflect upon your position of land-owner, merchant,
judge, emperor, president, minister, priest, or soldier—associated with
violence, oppression, deceit, torture, and murder; refuse to recognize the
lawfulness of these crimes. I do not mean that if you are a landowner you
should forthwith give your land to the poor; or if a capitalist, your money or
your factory to your workmen; or if a czar, a minister, a magistrate, a judge,
or a general, you should forthwith abdicate all your advantages; or if a
soldier, whose occupation in its very nature is based on violence, you
should at once refuse to continue longer a soldier, despite all the dangers of
such a refusal. Should you do this, it will indeed be an heroic act; but it may
happen—and most probably—that you will not be able to do it. You have
connections, a family, subordinates, chiefs; you may be surrounded by
temptations so strong that you cannot overcome them; but to acknowledge
the truth to be the truth, and not to lie—that you are always able to do. You
can refrain from affirming that you continue to be a landowner or factory-
owner, a merchant, an artist, an author, because you are thus useful to men;
from declaring that you are a governor, an attorney-general, a czar, not
because it is agreeable or you are accustomed to be such, but for the good
of men; from saying that you remain a soldier, not through fear of
punishment, but because you consider the army indispensable for the
protection of men's lives. To keep from speaking thus falsely before
yourself and others—this you are always able to do, and not only able, but
in duty bound to do, because in this alone—in freeing yourself from
falsehood and in working out the truth—lies the highest duty of your life.
And do but this and it will be sufficient for the situation to change at once
of itself.
One only thing in which you are free and all-powerful has been given you;
all others are beyond you. It is this,—to know the truth and to profess it.
And it is only because of other miserable and erring men like yourself that
you have become a soldier, an emperor, a landowner, a capitalist, a priest, or
a general; that you commit evil deeds so obviously contrary to the dictates
of your heart and reason; that you torture, rob, and murder men,
Page 308
establishing your life on their sufferings; and that, above all, instead of
performing your paramount duty of acknowledging and professing the truth
which is known to you, you pretend not to know it, concealing it from
yourself and others, doing the very opposite of what you have been called
to do.
And under what conditions are you doing this? Being liable to die at any
moment, you sign a death-warrant, declare war or take part in it, pass
judgment, torture and rob workmen, live in luxury surrounded by misery,
and teach weak and trusting men that all this is right and for you is a matter
of duty, while all the time you are in danger of your life being destroyed by
a bullet or a bacillus, and you may be deprived forever of the power to
rectify or counteract the evil you have done to others and to yourself;
having wasted a life given you but once in all eternity, having left undone in
it the one thing for which it was given you.
No matter how trite it may appear to state it, nor how we may hypocritically
deceive ourselves, nothing can destroy the certainty of the simple and
obvious truth that external conditions can never render safe this life of ours,
so fraught with unavoidable suffering, and ended infallibly by death, that
human life can have no other meaning than the constant fulfilment of that
for which the Almighty Power has sent us here, and for which He has given
us one sure guide in this life, namely, our conscious reason.
This Power does not require from us what is unreasonable and impossible,
—the organization of our temporal, material life, the life of society, or of
the State. He demands of us only what is reasonable and possible,—to serve
the Kingdom of God, which establishes the unity of mankind, a unity
possible only in the truth; to recognize and profess the truth revealed to us,
which it is always in our power to do.
"Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these
things shall be added unto you."[35]
The only significance of life consists in helping to establish the Kingdom of
God; and this can be done only by means of the acknowledgment and
profession of the truth by each one of us. "The kingdom of God cometh not
with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold the
kingdom of God is within you."[36]
performing your paramount duty of acknowledging and professing the truth
which is known to you, you pretend not to know it, concealing it from
yourself and others, doing the very opposite of what you have been called
to do.
And under what conditions are you doing this? Being liable to die at any
moment, you sign a death-warrant, declare war or take part in it, pass
judgment, torture and rob workmen, live in luxury surrounded by misery,
and teach weak and trusting men that all this is right and for you is a matter
of duty, while all the time you are in danger of your life being destroyed by
a bullet or a bacillus, and you may be deprived forever of the power to
rectify or counteract the evil you have done to others and to yourself;
having wasted a life given you but once in all eternity, having left undone in
it the one thing for which it was given you.
No matter how trite it may appear to state it, nor how we may hypocritically
deceive ourselves, nothing can destroy the certainty of the simple and
obvious truth that external conditions can never render safe this life of ours,
so fraught with unavoidable suffering, and ended infallibly by death, that
human life can have no other meaning than the constant fulfilment of that
for which the Almighty Power has sent us here, and for which He has given
us one sure guide in this life, namely, our conscious reason.
This Power does not require from us what is unreasonable and impossible,
—the organization of our temporal, material life, the life of society, or of
the State. He demands of us only what is reasonable and possible,—to serve
the Kingdom of God, which establishes the unity of mankind, a unity
possible only in the truth; to recognize and profess the truth revealed to us,
which it is always in our power to do.
"Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these
things shall be added unto you."[35]
The only significance of life consists in helping to establish the Kingdom of
God; and this can be done only by means of the acknowledgment and
profession of the truth by each one of us. "The kingdom of God cometh not
with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold the
kingdom of God is within you."[36]
Page 309
Page 310
WHAT IS ART?
Page 311
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
The fundamental thought expressed in this book leads inevitably to
conclusions so new, so unexpected, and so contrary to what is usually
maintained in literary and artistic circles, that although it is clearly and
emphatically expressed (and this I hope has not been lost in translation),
most readers who wish to possess themselves of it will have to read the
work carefully, and to digest it slowly.
Especially the introductory Chapters II., III., IV., and V., need careful
perusal by any who, having adopted one or other of the current theories on
beauty and art, may find it difficult to abandon a preconceived view, and to
clear their minds for a fair appreciation of what is new to them.
The first four chapters raise the problem, and tell us briefly what has been
said by previous writers. Chapter III. gives (in highly condensed form) the
substance of the teaching of some sixty philosophers on this subject, and
since many of them were extremely confused, the chapter cannot, in the
nature of things, be easy reading.
I should like to remark, in passing, that though Tolstoï in this chapter
(presumably for convenience of verification) refers chiefly to the
compilations of Schasler, Kralik, and Knight, he has gone behind these
authorities to the primary sources. To give a single instance: in the
paragraph on Darwin, the foot-note refers us to Knight, but the remark that
the origin of the art of music may be traced back to the call of the males to
the females in the animal world will be found in Darwin, but will not be
found in Knight.
In Chapter V. we come to Tolstoï's definition of art, which definition should
be kept well in mind while reading the rest of the book.
No doubt most of those to whom it is an end in itself, who live by it, or
make it their chief occupation, will read this book (or leave it unread) and
go on in their former way, much as Pharaoh, of old, hardened his heart, and
did not sympathize with what Moses had to say on the labor question. But
for those of us who have felt that art is too valuable a matter to be lost out
The fundamental thought expressed in this book leads inevitably to
conclusions so new, so unexpected, and so contrary to what is usually
maintained in literary and artistic circles, that although it is clearly and
emphatically expressed (and this I hope has not been lost in translation),
most readers who wish to possess themselves of it will have to read the
work carefully, and to digest it slowly.
Especially the introductory Chapters II., III., IV., and V., need careful
perusal by any who, having adopted one or other of the current theories on
beauty and art, may find it difficult to abandon a preconceived view, and to
clear their minds for a fair appreciation of what is new to them.
The first four chapters raise the problem, and tell us briefly what has been
said by previous writers. Chapter III. gives (in highly condensed form) the
substance of the teaching of some sixty philosophers on this subject, and
since many of them were extremely confused, the chapter cannot, in the
nature of things, be easy reading.
I should like to remark, in passing, that though Tolstoï in this chapter
(presumably for convenience of verification) refers chiefly to the
compilations of Schasler, Kralik, and Knight, he has gone behind these
authorities to the primary sources. To give a single instance: in the
paragraph on Darwin, the foot-note refers us to Knight, but the remark that
the origin of the art of music may be traced back to the call of the males to
the females in the animal world will be found in Darwin, but will not be
found in Knight.
In Chapter V. we come to Tolstoï's definition of art, which definition should
be kept well in mind while reading the rest of the book.
No doubt most of those to whom it is an end in itself, who live by it, or
make it their chief occupation, will read this book (or leave it unread) and
go on in their former way, much as Pharaoh, of old, hardened his heart, and
did not sympathize with what Moses had to say on the labor question. But
for those of us who have felt that art is too valuable a matter to be lost out
Page 312
of our lives, and who, in their quest for social justice, have met the reproach
that they were sacrificing the pleasures and advantages of art, this book is
of inestimable value, in that it solves a perplexed question of far-reaching
importance to practical life.
To this class of readers neither the masterly elucidation of the former
theories contained in the opening chapters, nor the explanation of how it has
come about that such great importance is attached to the activity we call art
(Chapters VI. and VII.), nor the explanation and illustrations of the
perversion that art has undergone, nor even the elucidation of the terrible
evils this perversion is producing (XVII.), will equal in significance the
remaining chapters of the book. These show us what to look for in art, how
to distinguish it from counterfeits (XV., XVI., and XVIII.), treat of the true
art of the future (XIX.), and explain how science and art are linked together
in man's life, are directed by his perception of the meaning of life, and
inevitably react on all he thinks and feels.
that they were sacrificing the pleasures and advantages of art, this book is
of inestimable value, in that it solves a perplexed question of far-reaching
importance to practical life.
To this class of readers neither the masterly elucidation of the former
theories contained in the opening chapters, nor the explanation of how it has
come about that such great importance is attached to the activity we call art
(Chapters VI. and VII.), nor the explanation and illustrations of the
perversion that art has undergone, nor even the elucidation of the terrible
evils this perversion is producing (XVII.), will equal in significance the
remaining chapters of the book. These show us what to look for in art, how
to distinguish it from counterfeits (XV., XVI., and XVIII.), treat of the true
art of the future (XIX.), and explain how science and art are linked together
in man's life, are directed by his perception of the meaning of life, and
inevitably react on all he thinks and feels.
Page 313
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
This book of mine, "What is Art?" appears now for the first time in its true
form. More than one edition has already been issued in Russia, but in each
case it has been so mutilated by the "Censor," that I request all who are
interested in my views on art only to judge of them by the work in its
present shape. The causes which led to the publication of the book—with
my name attached to it—in a mutilated form were the following: In
accordance with a decision I arrived at long ago,—not to submit my
writings to the "Censorship" (which I consider to be an immoral and
irrational institution), but to print them only in the shape in which they were
written,—I intended not to attempt to print this work in Russia. However,
my good acquaintance, Professor Grote, editor of a Moscow psychological
magazine, having heard of the contents of my work, asked me to print it in
his magazine, and promised me that he would get the book through the
"Censor's" office unmutilated if I would but agree to a few very
unimportant alterations, merely toning down certain expressions. I was
weak enough to agree to this, and it has resulted in a book appearing under
my name, from which not only have some essential thoughts been excluded,
but into which the thoughts of other men—even thoughts utterly opposed to
my own convictions—have been introduced.
The thing occurred in this way. First, Grote softened my expressions, and in
some cases weakened them. For instance, he replaced the words: always by
sometimes, all by some, Church religion by Roman Catholic religion,
"Mother of God" by Madonna, patriotism by pseudo-patriotism, palaces by
palatii,[37] etc., and I did not consider it necessary to protest. But when the
book was already in type, the Censor required that whole sentences should
be altered, and that instead of what I said about the evil of landed property,
a remark should be substituted on the evils of a landless proletariate.[38] I
agreed to this also, and to some further alterations. It seemed not worth
while to upset the whole affair for the sake of one sentence, and when one
alteration had been agreed to it seemed not worth while to protest against a
second and a third. So, little by little, expressions crept into the book which
altered the sense and attributed things to me that I could not have wished to
This book of mine, "What is Art?" appears now for the first time in its true
form. More than one edition has already been issued in Russia, but in each
case it has been so mutilated by the "Censor," that I request all who are
interested in my views on art only to judge of them by the work in its
present shape. The causes which led to the publication of the book—with
my name attached to it—in a mutilated form were the following: In
accordance with a decision I arrived at long ago,—not to submit my
writings to the "Censorship" (which I consider to be an immoral and
irrational institution), but to print them only in the shape in which they were
written,—I intended not to attempt to print this work in Russia. However,
my good acquaintance, Professor Grote, editor of a Moscow psychological
magazine, having heard of the contents of my work, asked me to print it in
his magazine, and promised me that he would get the book through the
"Censor's" office unmutilated if I would but agree to a few very
unimportant alterations, merely toning down certain expressions. I was
weak enough to agree to this, and it has resulted in a book appearing under
my name, from which not only have some essential thoughts been excluded,
but into which the thoughts of other men—even thoughts utterly opposed to
my own convictions—have been introduced.
The thing occurred in this way. First, Grote softened my expressions, and in
some cases weakened them. For instance, he replaced the words: always by
sometimes, all by some, Church religion by Roman Catholic religion,
"Mother of God" by Madonna, patriotism by pseudo-patriotism, palaces by
palatii,[37] etc., and I did not consider it necessary to protest. But when the
book was already in type, the Censor required that whole sentences should
be altered, and that instead of what I said about the evil of landed property,
a remark should be substituted on the evils of a landless proletariate.[38] I
agreed to this also, and to some further alterations. It seemed not worth
while to upset the whole affair for the sake of one sentence, and when one
alteration had been agreed to it seemed not worth while to protest against a
second and a third. So, little by little, expressions crept into the book which
altered the sense and attributed things to me that I could not have wished to
Page 314
say. So that by the time the book was printed it had been deprived of some
part of its integrity and sincerity. But there was consolation in the thought
that the book, even in this form, if it contains something that is good, would
be of use to Russian readers whom it would otherwise not have reached.
Things, however, turned out otherwise. Nous comptions sans notre hôte.
After the legal term of four days had already elapsed, the book was seized,
and, on instructions received from Petersburg, it was handed over to the
"Spiritual Censor." Then Grote declined all further participation in the
affair, and the "Spiritual Censor" proceeded to do what he would with the
book. The "Spiritual Censorship" is one of the most ignorant, venal, stupid,
and despotic institutions in Russia. Books which disagree in any way with
the recognized state religion of Russia, if once it gets hold of them, are
almost always totally suppressed and burnt; which is what happened to all
my religious works when attempts were made to print them in Russia.
Probably a similar fate would have overtaken this work also, had not the
editors of the magazine employed all means to save it. The result of their
efforts was that the "Spiritual Censor," a priest who probably understands
art and is interested in art as much as I understand or am interested in
church services, but who gets a good salary for destroying whatever is
likely to displease his superiors, struck out all that seemed to him to
endanger his position, and substituted his thoughts for mine wherever he
considered it necessary to do so. For instance, where I speak of Christ going
to the Cross for the sake of the truth He professed, the "Censor" substituted
a statement that Christ died for mankind, i.e. he attributed to me an
assertion of the dogma of the Redemption, which I consider to be one of the
most untrue and harmful of Church dogmas. After correcting the book in
this way, the "Spiritual Censor" allowed it to be printed.
To protest in Russia is impossible—no newspaper would publish such a
protest; and to withdraw my book from the magazine, and place the editor
in an awkward position with the public, was also not possible.
So the matter has remained. A book has appeared under my name
containing thoughts attributed to me which are not mine.
I was persuaded to give my article to a Russian magazine in order that my
thoughts, which may be useful, should become the possession of Russian
readers; and the result has been that my name is affixed to a work from
which it might be assumed that I quite arbitrarily assert things contrary to
part of its integrity and sincerity. But there was consolation in the thought
that the book, even in this form, if it contains something that is good, would
be of use to Russian readers whom it would otherwise not have reached.
Things, however, turned out otherwise. Nous comptions sans notre hôte.
After the legal term of four days had already elapsed, the book was seized,
and, on instructions received from Petersburg, it was handed over to the
"Spiritual Censor." Then Grote declined all further participation in the
affair, and the "Spiritual Censor" proceeded to do what he would with the
book. The "Spiritual Censorship" is one of the most ignorant, venal, stupid,
and despotic institutions in Russia. Books which disagree in any way with
the recognized state religion of Russia, if once it gets hold of them, are
almost always totally suppressed and burnt; which is what happened to all
my religious works when attempts were made to print them in Russia.
Probably a similar fate would have overtaken this work also, had not the
editors of the magazine employed all means to save it. The result of their
efforts was that the "Spiritual Censor," a priest who probably understands
art and is interested in art as much as I understand or am interested in
church services, but who gets a good salary for destroying whatever is
likely to displease his superiors, struck out all that seemed to him to
endanger his position, and substituted his thoughts for mine wherever he
considered it necessary to do so. For instance, where I speak of Christ going
to the Cross for the sake of the truth He professed, the "Censor" substituted
a statement that Christ died for mankind, i.e. he attributed to me an
assertion of the dogma of the Redemption, which I consider to be one of the
most untrue and harmful of Church dogmas. After correcting the book in
this way, the "Spiritual Censor" allowed it to be printed.
To protest in Russia is impossible—no newspaper would publish such a
protest; and to withdraw my book from the magazine, and place the editor
in an awkward position with the public, was also not possible.
So the matter has remained. A book has appeared under my name
containing thoughts attributed to me which are not mine.
I was persuaded to give my article to a Russian magazine in order that my
thoughts, which may be useful, should become the possession of Russian
readers; and the result has been that my name is affixed to a work from
which it might be assumed that I quite arbitrarily assert things contrary to
Page 315
the general opinion, without adducing my reasons; that I only consider false
patriotism bad, but patriotism in general a very good feeling; that I merely
deny the absurdities of the Roman Catholic Church and disbelieve in the
Madonna, but that I believe in the Orthodox Eastern faith and in the
"Mother of God"; that I consider all the writings collected in the Bible to be
holy books, and see the chief importance of Christ's life in the Redemption
of mankind by His death.
I have narrated all this in such detail because it strikingly illustrates the
indubitable truth that all compromise with institutions of which your
conscience disapproves,—compromises which are usually made for the
sake of the general good,—instead of producing the good you expected,
inevitably lead you, not only to acknowledge the institution you disapprove
of, but also to participate in the evil that institution produces.
I am glad to be able by this statement at least to do something to correct the
error into which I was led by my compromise.
I have also to mention that besides reinstating the parts excluded by the
Censor from the Russian editions, other corrections and additions of
importance have been made in this edition.
29th March, 1898.
patriotism bad, but patriotism in general a very good feeling; that I merely
deny the absurdities of the Roman Catholic Church and disbelieve in the
Madonna, but that I believe in the Orthodox Eastern faith and in the
"Mother of God"; that I consider all the writings collected in the Bible to be
holy books, and see the chief importance of Christ's life in the Redemption
of mankind by His death.
I have narrated all this in such detail because it strikingly illustrates the
indubitable truth that all compromise with institutions of which your
conscience disapproves,—compromises which are usually made for the
sake of the general good,—instead of producing the good you expected,
inevitably lead you, not only to acknowledge the institution you disapprove
of, but also to participate in the evil that institution produces.
I am glad to be able by this statement at least to do something to correct the
error into which I was led by my compromise.
I have also to mention that besides reinstating the parts excluded by the
Censor from the Russian editions, other corrections and additions of
importance have been made in this edition.
29th March, 1898.
Page 316
WHAT IS ART?
Page 317
CHAPTER I
Take up any one of our ordinary newspapers, and you will find a part
devoted to the theater and music. In almost every number you will find a
description of some art exhibition, or of some particular picture, and you
will always find reviews of new works of art that have appeared, of
volumes of poems, of short stories, or of novels.
Promptly, and in detail, as soon as it has occurred, an account is published
of how such and such an actress or actor played this or that rôle in such and
such a drama, comedy, or opera; and of the merits of the performance, as
well as of the contents of the new drama, comedy, or opera, with its defects
and merits. With as much care and detail, or even more, we are told how
such and such an artist has sung a certain piece, or has played it on the
piano or violin, and what were the merits and defects of the piece and of the
performance. In every large town there is sure to be at least one, if not more
than one, exhibition of new pictures, the merits and defects of which are
discussed in the utmost detail by critics and connoisseurs.
New novels and poems, in separate volumes or in the magazines, appear
almost every day, and the newspapers consider it their duty to give their
readers detailed accounts of these artistic productions.
For the support of art in Russia (where for the education of the people only
a hundredth part is spent of what would be required to give every one the
opportunity of instruction) the government grants millions of roubles in
subsidies to academies, conservatoires, and theaters. In France twenty
million francs are assigned for art, and similar grants are made in Germany
and England.
In every large town enormous buildings are erected for museums,
academies, conservatoires, dramatic schools, and for performances and
concerts. Hundreds of thousands of workmen—carpenters, masons,
painters, joiners, paperhangers, tailors, hairdressers, jewelers, molders,
type-setters—spend their whole lives in hard labor to satisfy the demands of
art, so that hardly any other department of human activity, except the
military, consumes so much energy as this.
Take up any one of our ordinary newspapers, and you will find a part
devoted to the theater and music. In almost every number you will find a
description of some art exhibition, or of some particular picture, and you
will always find reviews of new works of art that have appeared, of
volumes of poems, of short stories, or of novels.
Promptly, and in detail, as soon as it has occurred, an account is published
of how such and such an actress or actor played this or that rôle in such and
such a drama, comedy, or opera; and of the merits of the performance, as
well as of the contents of the new drama, comedy, or opera, with its defects
and merits. With as much care and detail, or even more, we are told how
such and such an artist has sung a certain piece, or has played it on the
piano or violin, and what were the merits and defects of the piece and of the
performance. In every large town there is sure to be at least one, if not more
than one, exhibition of new pictures, the merits and defects of which are
discussed in the utmost detail by critics and connoisseurs.
New novels and poems, in separate volumes or in the magazines, appear
almost every day, and the newspapers consider it their duty to give their
readers detailed accounts of these artistic productions.
For the support of art in Russia (where for the education of the people only
a hundredth part is spent of what would be required to give every one the
opportunity of instruction) the government grants millions of roubles in
subsidies to academies, conservatoires, and theaters. In France twenty
million francs are assigned for art, and similar grants are made in Germany
and England.
In every large town enormous buildings are erected for museums,
academies, conservatoires, dramatic schools, and for performances and
concerts. Hundreds of thousands of workmen—carpenters, masons,
painters, joiners, paperhangers, tailors, hairdressers, jewelers, molders,
type-setters—spend their whole lives in hard labor to satisfy the demands of
art, so that hardly any other department of human activity, except the
military, consumes so much energy as this.
Page 318
Not only is enormous labor spent on this activity, but in it, as in war, the
very lives of men are sacrificed. Hundreds of thousands of people devote
their lives from childhood to learning to twirl their legs rapidly (dancers), or
to touch notes and strings very rapidly (musicians), or to draw with paint
and represent what they see (artists), or to turn every phrase inside out and
find a rhyme to every word. And these people, often very kind and clever,
and capable of all sorts of useful labor, grow savage over their specialized
and stupefying occupations, and become one-sided and self-complacent
specialists, dull to all the serious phenomena of life, and skilful only at
rapidly twisting their legs, their tongues, or their fingers.
But even this stunting of human life is not the worst. I remember being once
at the rehearsal of one of the most ordinary of the new operas which are
produced at all the opera houses of Europe and America.
I arrived when the first act had already commenced. To reach the
auditorium I had to pass through the stage entrance. By dark entrances and
passages, I was led through the vaults of an enormous building, past
immense machines for changing the scenery and for illuminating; and there
in the gloom and dust I saw workmen busily engaged. One of these men,
pale, haggard, in a dirty blouse, with dirty, work-worn hands and cramped
fingers, evidently tired and out of humor, went past me, angrily scolding
another man. Ascending by a dark stair, I came out on the boards behind the
scenes. Amid various poles and rings and scattered scenery, decorations and
curtains, stood and moved dozens, if not hundreds, of painted and dressed-
up men, in costumes fitting tight to their thighs and calves, and also women,
as usual, as nearly nude as might be. These were all singers, or members of
the chorus, or ballet-dancers, awaiting their turns. My guide led me across
the stage and, by means of a bridge of boards across the orchestra (in which
perhaps a hundred musicians of all kinds, from kettledrum to flute and harp,
were seated), to the dark pit-stalls.
On an elevation, between two lamps with reflectors, and in an arm-chair
placed before a music-stand, sat the director of the musical part, bâton in
hand, managing the orchestra and singers, and, in general, the production of
the whole opera.
The performance had already commenced, and on the stage a procession of
Indians who had brought home a bride was being presented. Besides men
very lives of men are sacrificed. Hundreds of thousands of people devote
their lives from childhood to learning to twirl their legs rapidly (dancers), or
to touch notes and strings very rapidly (musicians), or to draw with paint
and represent what they see (artists), or to turn every phrase inside out and
find a rhyme to every word. And these people, often very kind and clever,
and capable of all sorts of useful labor, grow savage over their specialized
and stupefying occupations, and become one-sided and self-complacent
specialists, dull to all the serious phenomena of life, and skilful only at
rapidly twisting their legs, their tongues, or their fingers.
But even this stunting of human life is not the worst. I remember being once
at the rehearsal of one of the most ordinary of the new operas which are
produced at all the opera houses of Europe and America.
I arrived when the first act had already commenced. To reach the
auditorium I had to pass through the stage entrance. By dark entrances and
passages, I was led through the vaults of an enormous building, past
immense machines for changing the scenery and for illuminating; and there
in the gloom and dust I saw workmen busily engaged. One of these men,
pale, haggard, in a dirty blouse, with dirty, work-worn hands and cramped
fingers, evidently tired and out of humor, went past me, angrily scolding
another man. Ascending by a dark stair, I came out on the boards behind the
scenes. Amid various poles and rings and scattered scenery, decorations and
curtains, stood and moved dozens, if not hundreds, of painted and dressed-
up men, in costumes fitting tight to their thighs and calves, and also women,
as usual, as nearly nude as might be. These were all singers, or members of
the chorus, or ballet-dancers, awaiting their turns. My guide led me across
the stage and, by means of a bridge of boards across the orchestra (in which
perhaps a hundred musicians of all kinds, from kettledrum to flute and harp,
were seated), to the dark pit-stalls.
On an elevation, between two lamps with reflectors, and in an arm-chair
placed before a music-stand, sat the director of the musical part, bâton in
hand, managing the orchestra and singers, and, in general, the production of
the whole opera.
The performance had already commenced, and on the stage a procession of
Indians who had brought home a bride was being presented. Besides men
Page 319
and women in costume, two other men in ordinary clothes bustled and ran
about on the stage; one was the director of the dramatic part, and the other,
who stepped about in soft shoes and ran from place to place with unusual
agility, was the dancing-master, whose salary per month exceeded what ten
laborers earn in a year.
These three directors arranged the singing, the orchestra, and the
procession. The procession, as usual, was enacted by couples, with tinfoil
halberds on their shoulders. They all came from one place, and walked
round and round again, and then stopped. The procession took a long time
to arrange: first the Indians with halberds came on too late; then too soon;
then at the right time, but crowded together at the exit; then they did not
crowd, but arranged themselves badly at the sides of the stage; and each
time the whole performance was stopped and recommenced from the
beginning. The procession was introduced by a recitative, delivered by a
man dressed up like some variety of Turk, who, opening his mouth in a
curious way, sang, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." He sings and waves his arm
(which is of course bare) from under his mantle. The procession
commences, but here the French horn, in the accompaniment of the
recitative, does something wrong; and the director, with a shudder as if
some catastrophe had occurred, raps with his stick on the stand. All is
stopped, and the director, turning to the orchestra, attacks the French horn,
scolding him in the rudest terms, as cabmen abuse each other, for taking the
wrong note. And again the whole thing recommences. The Indians with
their halberds again come on, treading softly in their extraordinary boots;
again the singer sings, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." But here the pairs get
too close together. More raps with the stick, more scolding, and a
recommencement. Again, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," again the same
gesticulation with the bare arm from under the mantle, and again the
couples, treading softly with halberds on their shoulders, some with sad and
serious faces, some talking and smiling, arrange themselves in a circle and
begin to sing. All seems to be going well, but again the stick raps, and the
director, in a distressed and angry voice, begins to scold the men and
women of the chorus. It appears that when singing they had omitted to raise
their hands from time to time in sign of animation. "Are you all dead, or
what? Cows that you are! Are you corpses, that you can't move?" Again
they recommence, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," and again, with sorrowful
faces, the chorus-women sing, first one and then another of them raising
about on the stage; one was the director of the dramatic part, and the other,
who stepped about in soft shoes and ran from place to place with unusual
agility, was the dancing-master, whose salary per month exceeded what ten
laborers earn in a year.
These three directors arranged the singing, the orchestra, and the
procession. The procession, as usual, was enacted by couples, with tinfoil
halberds on their shoulders. They all came from one place, and walked
round and round again, and then stopped. The procession took a long time
to arrange: first the Indians with halberds came on too late; then too soon;
then at the right time, but crowded together at the exit; then they did not
crowd, but arranged themselves badly at the sides of the stage; and each
time the whole performance was stopped and recommenced from the
beginning. The procession was introduced by a recitative, delivered by a
man dressed up like some variety of Turk, who, opening his mouth in a
curious way, sang, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." He sings and waves his arm
(which is of course bare) from under his mantle. The procession
commences, but here the French horn, in the accompaniment of the
recitative, does something wrong; and the director, with a shudder as if
some catastrophe had occurred, raps with his stick on the stand. All is
stopped, and the director, turning to the orchestra, attacks the French horn,
scolding him in the rudest terms, as cabmen abuse each other, for taking the
wrong note. And again the whole thing recommences. The Indians with
their halberds again come on, treading softly in their extraordinary boots;
again the singer sings, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." But here the pairs get
too close together. More raps with the stick, more scolding, and a
recommencement. Again, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," again the same
gesticulation with the bare arm from under the mantle, and again the
couples, treading softly with halberds on their shoulders, some with sad and
serious faces, some talking and smiling, arrange themselves in a circle and
begin to sing. All seems to be going well, but again the stick raps, and the
director, in a distressed and angry voice, begins to scold the men and
women of the chorus. It appears that when singing they had omitted to raise
their hands from time to time in sign of animation. "Are you all dead, or
what? Cows that you are! Are you corpses, that you can't move?" Again
they recommence, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," and again, with sorrowful
faces, the chorus-women sing, first one and then another of them raising
Page 320
their hands. But two chorus-girls speak to each other,—again a more
vehement rapping with the stick. "Have you come here to talk? Can't you
gossip at home? You there in red breeches, come nearer. Look toward me!
Recommence!" Again, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." And so it goes on for
one, two, three hours. The whole of such a rehearsal lasts six hours on end.
Raps with the stick, repetitions, placings, corrections of the singers, of the
orchestra, of the procession, of the dancers,—all seasoned with angry
scolding. I heard the words, "asses," "fools," "idiots," "swine," addressed to
the musicians and singers at least forty times in the course of one hour. And
the unhappy individual to whom the abuse is addressed,—flautist, horn-
blower, or singer,—physically and mentally demoralized, does not reply,
and does what is demanded of him. Twenty times is repeated the one
phrase, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," and twenty times the striding about in
yellow shoes with a halberd over the shoulder. The conductor knows that
these people are so demoralized that they are no longer fit for anything but
to blow trumpets and walk about with halberds and in yellow shoes, and
that they are also accustomed to dainty, easy living, so that they will put up
with anything rather than lose their luxurious life. He therefore gives free
vent to his churlishness, especially as he has seen the same thing done in
Paris and Vienna, and knows that this is the way the best conductors
behave, and that it is a musical tradition of great artists to be so carried
away by the great business of their art that they cannot pause to consider the
feelings of other artists.
It would be difficult to find a more repulsive sight. I have seen one
workman abuse another for not supporting the weight piled upon him when
goods were being unloaded, or, at hay-stacking, the village elder scold a
peasant for not making the rick right, and the man submitted in silence.
And, however unpleasant it was to witness the scene, the unpleasantness
was lessened by the consciousness that the business in hand was needful
and important, and that the fault for which the head man scolded the laborer
was one which might spoil a needful undertaking.
But what was being done here? For what, and for whom? Very likely the
conductor was tired out, like the workman I passed in the vaults; it was
even evident that he was; but who made him tire himself? And for what was
he tiring himself? The opera he was rehearsing was one of the most
ordinary of operas for people who are accustomed to them, but also one of
vehement rapping with the stick. "Have you come here to talk? Can't you
gossip at home? You there in red breeches, come nearer. Look toward me!
Recommence!" Again, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide." And so it goes on for
one, two, three hours. The whole of such a rehearsal lasts six hours on end.
Raps with the stick, repetitions, placings, corrections of the singers, of the
orchestra, of the procession, of the dancers,—all seasoned with angry
scolding. I heard the words, "asses," "fools," "idiots," "swine," addressed to
the musicians and singers at least forty times in the course of one hour. And
the unhappy individual to whom the abuse is addressed,—flautist, horn-
blower, or singer,—physically and mentally demoralized, does not reply,
and does what is demanded of him. Twenty times is repeated the one
phrase, "Home I bring the bri-i-ide," and twenty times the striding about in
yellow shoes with a halberd over the shoulder. The conductor knows that
these people are so demoralized that they are no longer fit for anything but
to blow trumpets and walk about with halberds and in yellow shoes, and
that they are also accustomed to dainty, easy living, so that they will put up
with anything rather than lose their luxurious life. He therefore gives free
vent to his churlishness, especially as he has seen the same thing done in
Paris and Vienna, and knows that this is the way the best conductors
behave, and that it is a musical tradition of great artists to be so carried
away by the great business of their art that they cannot pause to consider the
feelings of other artists.
It would be difficult to find a more repulsive sight. I have seen one
workman abuse another for not supporting the weight piled upon him when
goods were being unloaded, or, at hay-stacking, the village elder scold a
peasant for not making the rick right, and the man submitted in silence.
And, however unpleasant it was to witness the scene, the unpleasantness
was lessened by the consciousness that the business in hand was needful
and important, and that the fault for which the head man scolded the laborer
was one which might spoil a needful undertaking.
But what was being done here? For what, and for whom? Very likely the
conductor was tired out, like the workman I passed in the vaults; it was
even evident that he was; but who made him tire himself? And for what was
he tiring himself? The opera he was rehearsing was one of the most
ordinary of operas for people who are accustomed to them, but also one of
Page 321
the most gigantic absurdities that could possibly be devised. An Indian king
wants to marry; they bring him a bride; he disguises himself as a minstrel;
the bride falls in love with the minstrel and is in despair, but afterwards
discovers that the minstrel is the king, and every one is highly delighted.
That there never were, or could be, such Indians, and that they were not
only unlike Indians, but that what they were doing was unlike anything on
earth except other operas, was beyond all manner of doubt; that people do
not converse in such a way as recitative, and do not place themselves at
fixed distances, in a quartet, waving their arms to express their emotions;
that nowhere, except in theaters, do people walk about in such a manner, in
pairs, with tinfoil halberds and in slippers; that no one ever gets angry in
such a way, or is affected in such a way, or laughs in such a way, or cries in
such a way; and that no one on earth can be moved by such performances;
all this is beyond the possibility of doubt.
Instinctively the question presents itself: For whom is this being done?
Whom can it please? If there are, occasionally, good melodies in the opera,
to which it is pleasant to listen, they could have been sung simply, without
these stupid costumes and all the processions and recitatives and hand-
wavings.
The ballet, in which half-naked women make voluptuous movements,
twisting themselves into various sensual wreathings, is simply a lewd
performance.
So one is quite at a loss as to whom these things are done for. The man of
culture is heartily sick of them, while to a real working-man they are utterly
incomprehensible. If any one can be pleased by these things (which is
doubtful), it can only be some young footman or depraved artisan, who has
contracted the spirit of the upper classes but is not yet satiated with their
amusements, and wishes to show his breeding.
And all this nasty folly is prepared, not simply, nor with kindly merriment,
but with anger and brutal cruelty.
It is said that it is all done for the sake of art, and that art is a very important
thing. But is it true that art is so important that such sacrifices should be
made for its sake? This question is especially urgent, because art, for the
sake of which the labor of millions, the lives of men, and, above all, love
wants to marry; they bring him a bride; he disguises himself as a minstrel;
the bride falls in love with the minstrel and is in despair, but afterwards
discovers that the minstrel is the king, and every one is highly delighted.
That there never were, or could be, such Indians, and that they were not
only unlike Indians, but that what they were doing was unlike anything on
earth except other operas, was beyond all manner of doubt; that people do
not converse in such a way as recitative, and do not place themselves at
fixed distances, in a quartet, waving their arms to express their emotions;
that nowhere, except in theaters, do people walk about in such a manner, in
pairs, with tinfoil halberds and in slippers; that no one ever gets angry in
such a way, or is affected in such a way, or laughs in such a way, or cries in
such a way; and that no one on earth can be moved by such performances;
all this is beyond the possibility of doubt.
Instinctively the question presents itself: For whom is this being done?
Whom can it please? If there are, occasionally, good melodies in the opera,
to which it is pleasant to listen, they could have been sung simply, without
these stupid costumes and all the processions and recitatives and hand-
wavings.
The ballet, in which half-naked women make voluptuous movements,
twisting themselves into various sensual wreathings, is simply a lewd
performance.
So one is quite at a loss as to whom these things are done for. The man of
culture is heartily sick of them, while to a real working-man they are utterly
incomprehensible. If any one can be pleased by these things (which is
doubtful), it can only be some young footman or depraved artisan, who has
contracted the spirit of the upper classes but is not yet satiated with their
amusements, and wishes to show his breeding.
And all this nasty folly is prepared, not simply, nor with kindly merriment,
but with anger and brutal cruelty.
It is said that it is all done for the sake of art, and that art is a very important
thing. But is it true that art is so important that such sacrifices should be
made for its sake? This question is especially urgent, because art, for the
sake of which the labor of millions, the lives of men, and, above all, love
Page 322
between man and man, are being sacrificed,—this very art is becoming
something more and more vague and uncertain to human perception.
Criticism, in which the lovers of art used to find support for their opinions,
has latterly become so self-contradictory, that, if we exclude from the
domain of art all that to which the critics of various schools themselves
deny the title, there is scarcely any art left.
The artists of various sects, like the theologians of the various sects,
mutually exclude and destroy themselves. Listen to the artists of the schools
of our times, and you will find, in all branches, each set of artists disowning
others. In poetry the old romanticists deny the parnassiens and the
decadents; the parnassiens disown the romanticists and the decadents; the
decadents disown all their predecessors and the symbolists; the symbolists
disown all their predecessors and les mages; and les mages disown all, all
their predecessors. Among novelists we have naturalists, psychologists, and
"nature-ists," all rejecting each other. And it is the same in dramatic art, in
painting, and in music. So that art, which demands such tremendous labor-
sacrifices from the people, which stunts human lives and transgresses
against human love, is not only not a thing clearly and firmly defined, but is
understood in such contradictory ways by its own devotees that it is difficult
to say what is meant by art, and especially what is good, useful art,—art for
the sake of which we might condone such sacrifices as are being offered at
its shrine.
something more and more vague and uncertain to human perception.
Criticism, in which the lovers of art used to find support for their opinions,
has latterly become so self-contradictory, that, if we exclude from the
domain of art all that to which the critics of various schools themselves
deny the title, there is scarcely any art left.
The artists of various sects, like the theologians of the various sects,
mutually exclude and destroy themselves. Listen to the artists of the schools
of our times, and you will find, in all branches, each set of artists disowning
others. In poetry the old romanticists deny the parnassiens and the
decadents; the parnassiens disown the romanticists and the decadents; the
decadents disown all their predecessors and the symbolists; the symbolists
disown all their predecessors and les mages; and les mages disown all, all
their predecessors. Among novelists we have naturalists, psychologists, and
"nature-ists," all rejecting each other. And it is the same in dramatic art, in
painting, and in music. So that art, which demands such tremendous labor-
sacrifices from the people, which stunts human lives and transgresses
against human love, is not only not a thing clearly and firmly defined, but is
understood in such contradictory ways by its own devotees that it is difficult
to say what is meant by art, and especially what is good, useful art,—art for
the sake of which we might condone such sacrifices as are being offered at
its shrine.
Page 323
CHAPTER II
For the production of every ballet, circus, opera, operetta, exhibition,
picture, concert, or printed book, the intense and unwilling labor of
thousands and thousands of people is needed at what is often harmful and
humiliating work. It were well if artists made all they require for
themselves, but, as it is, they all need the help of workmen, not only to
produce art, but also for their own usually luxurious maintenance. And, one
way or other, they get it; either through payments from rich people, or
through subsidies given by government (in Russia, for instance, in grants of
millions of roubles to theaters, conservatoires, and academies). This money
is collected from the people, some of whom have to sell their only cow to
pay the tax, and who never get those æsthetic pleasures which art gives.
It was all very well for a Greek or Roman artist, or even for a Russian artist
of the first half of our century (when there were still slaves, and it was
considered right that there should be), with a quiet mind to make people
serve him and his art; but in our day, when in all men there is at least some
dim perception of the equal rights of all, it is impossible to constrain people
to labor unwillingly for art, without first deciding the question whether it is
true that art is so good and so important an affair as to redeem this evil.
If not, we have the terrible probability to consider, that while fearful
sacrifices of the labor and lives of men, and of morality itself, are being
made to art, that same art may be not only useless but even harmful.
And therefore it is necessary for a society in which works of art arise and
are supported, to find out whether all that professes to be art is really art;
whether (as is presupposed in our society) all that which is art is good; and
whether it is important and worth those sacrifices which it necessitates. It is
still more necessary for every conscientious artist to know this, that he may
be sure that all he does has a valid meaning; that it is not merely an
infatuation of the small circle of people among whom he lives which
excites in him the false assurance that he is doing a good work; and that
what he takes from others for the support of his often very luxurious life,
For the production of every ballet, circus, opera, operetta, exhibition,
picture, concert, or printed book, the intense and unwilling labor of
thousands and thousands of people is needed at what is often harmful and
humiliating work. It were well if artists made all they require for
themselves, but, as it is, they all need the help of workmen, not only to
produce art, but also for their own usually luxurious maintenance. And, one
way or other, they get it; either through payments from rich people, or
through subsidies given by government (in Russia, for instance, in grants of
millions of roubles to theaters, conservatoires, and academies). This money
is collected from the people, some of whom have to sell their only cow to
pay the tax, and who never get those æsthetic pleasures which art gives.
It was all very well for a Greek or Roman artist, or even for a Russian artist
of the first half of our century (when there were still slaves, and it was
considered right that there should be), with a quiet mind to make people
serve him and his art; but in our day, when in all men there is at least some
dim perception of the equal rights of all, it is impossible to constrain people
to labor unwillingly for art, without first deciding the question whether it is
true that art is so good and so important an affair as to redeem this evil.
If not, we have the terrible probability to consider, that while fearful
sacrifices of the labor and lives of men, and of morality itself, are being
made to art, that same art may be not only useless but even harmful.
And therefore it is necessary for a society in which works of art arise and
are supported, to find out whether all that professes to be art is really art;
whether (as is presupposed in our society) all that which is art is good; and
whether it is important and worth those sacrifices which it necessitates. It is
still more necessary for every conscientious artist to know this, that he may
be sure that all he does has a valid meaning; that it is not merely an
infatuation of the small circle of people among whom he lives which
excites in him the false assurance that he is doing a good work; and that
what he takes from others for the support of his often very luxurious life,
Page 324
will be compensated for by those productions at which he works. And that
is why answers to the above questions are especially important in our time.
What is this art, which is considered so important and necessary for
humanity that for its sake these sacrifices of labor, of human life, and even
of goodness may be made?
"What is art? What a question! Art is architecture, sculpture, painting,
music, and poetry in all its forms," usually replies the ordinary man, the art
amateur, or even the artist himself, imagining the matter about which he is
talking to be perfectly clear, and uniformly understood by everybody. But in
architecture, one inquires further, are there not simple buildings which are
not objects of art, and buildings with artistic pretensions which are
unsuccessful and ugly and therefore cannot be considered as works of art?
Wherein lies the characteristic sign of a work of art?
It is the same in sculpture, in music, and in poetry. Art, in all its forms, is
bounded on one side by the practically useful, and on the other by
unsuccessful attempts at art. How is art to be marked off from each of
these? The ordinary educated man of our circle, and even the artist who has
not occupied himself especially with æsthetics, will not hesitate at this
question either. He thinks the solution has been found long ago, and is well
known to every one.
"Art is such activity as produces beauty," says such a man.
If art consists in that, then is a ballet or an operetta art? you inquire.
"Yes," says the ordinary man, though with some hesitation, "a good ballet
or a graceful operetta is also art, in so far as it manifests beauty."
But without even asking the ordinary man what differentiates the "good"
ballet and the "graceful" operetta from their opposites (a question he would
have much difficulty in answering), if you ask him whether the activity of
costumiers and hairdressers, who ornament the figures and faces of the
women for the ballet and the operetta, is art; or the activity of Worth, the
dressmaker; of scent-makers and men cooks,—then he will, in most cases,
deny that their activity belongs to the sphere of art. But in this the ordinary
man makes a mistake, just because he is an ordinary man and not a
specialist, and because he has not occupied himself with æsthetic questions.
Had he looked into these matters, he would have seen in the great Renan's
is why answers to the above questions are especially important in our time.
What is this art, which is considered so important and necessary for
humanity that for its sake these sacrifices of labor, of human life, and even
of goodness may be made?
"What is art? What a question! Art is architecture, sculpture, painting,
music, and poetry in all its forms," usually replies the ordinary man, the art
amateur, or even the artist himself, imagining the matter about which he is
talking to be perfectly clear, and uniformly understood by everybody. But in
architecture, one inquires further, are there not simple buildings which are
not objects of art, and buildings with artistic pretensions which are
unsuccessful and ugly and therefore cannot be considered as works of art?
Wherein lies the characteristic sign of a work of art?
It is the same in sculpture, in music, and in poetry. Art, in all its forms, is
bounded on one side by the practically useful, and on the other by
unsuccessful attempts at art. How is art to be marked off from each of
these? The ordinary educated man of our circle, and even the artist who has
not occupied himself especially with æsthetics, will not hesitate at this
question either. He thinks the solution has been found long ago, and is well
known to every one.
"Art is such activity as produces beauty," says such a man.
If art consists in that, then is a ballet or an operetta art? you inquire.
"Yes," says the ordinary man, though with some hesitation, "a good ballet
or a graceful operetta is also art, in so far as it manifests beauty."
But without even asking the ordinary man what differentiates the "good"
ballet and the "graceful" operetta from their opposites (a question he would
have much difficulty in answering), if you ask him whether the activity of
costumiers and hairdressers, who ornament the figures and faces of the
women for the ballet and the operetta, is art; or the activity of Worth, the
dressmaker; of scent-makers and men cooks,—then he will, in most cases,
deny that their activity belongs to the sphere of art. But in this the ordinary
man makes a mistake, just because he is an ordinary man and not a
specialist, and because he has not occupied himself with æsthetic questions.
Had he looked into these matters, he would have seen in the great Renan's
Page 325
book, "Marc Aurele," a dissertation showing that the tailor's work is art, and
that those who do not see in the adornment of woman an affair of the
highest art are very small-minded and dull. "C'est le grand art," says
Renan. Moreover, he would have known that in many æsthetic systems—
for instance, in the æsthetics of the learned Professor Kralik,
"Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Æsthetik, von Richard Kralik,"
and in "Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine," by Guyau—the arts
of costume, of taste, and of touch are included.
"Es Folgt nun ein Fünfblatt von Künsten, die der subjectiven Sinnlichkeit
entkeimen" (There results then a pentafoliate of arts, growing out of the
subjective perceptions), says Kralik (p. 175). "Sie sind die ästhetische
Behandlung der fünf Sinne." (They are the æsthetic treatment of the five
senses.)
These five arts are the following:—
Die Kunst des Geschmacksinns—The art of the sense of taste (p. 175).
Die Kunst des Geruchsinns—The art of the sense of smell (p. 177).
Die Kunst des Tastsinns—The art of the sense of touch (p. 180).
Die Kunst des Gehörsinns—The art of the sense of hearing (p. 182).
Die Kunst des Gesichtsinns—The art of the sense of sight (p. 184).
Of the first of these—die Kunst des Geschmacksinns—he says: "Man hält
zwar gewöhnlich nur zwei oder höchstens drei Sinne für würdig, den Stoff
künstlerischer Behandlung abzugeben, aber ich glaube nur mit bedingtem
Recht. Ich will kein allzugrosses Gewicht darauf legen, dass der gemeine
Sprachgebrauch manch andere Künste, wie zum Beispiel die Kochkunst
kennt."[39]
And further: "Und es ist doch gewiss eine ästhetische Leistung, wenn es der
Kochkunst gelingt ans einem thierischen Kadaver einen Gegenstand des
Geschmacks in jedem Sinne zu machen. Der Grundsatz der Kunst des
Geschmacksinns (die weiter ist als die sogenannte Kochkunst) ist also
dieser: Es soll alles Geniessbare als Sinnbild einer Idee behandelt werden
und in jedesmaligem Einklang zur auszudrückenden Idee."[40]
This author, like Renan, acknowledges a Kostümkunst (Art of Costume) (p.
200), etc.
that those who do not see in the adornment of woman an affair of the
highest art are very small-minded and dull. "C'est le grand art," says
Renan. Moreover, he would have known that in many æsthetic systems—
for instance, in the æsthetics of the learned Professor Kralik,
"Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Æsthetik, von Richard Kralik,"
and in "Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine," by Guyau—the arts
of costume, of taste, and of touch are included.
"Es Folgt nun ein Fünfblatt von Künsten, die der subjectiven Sinnlichkeit
entkeimen" (There results then a pentafoliate of arts, growing out of the
subjective perceptions), says Kralik (p. 175). "Sie sind die ästhetische
Behandlung der fünf Sinne." (They are the æsthetic treatment of the five
senses.)
These five arts are the following:—
Die Kunst des Geschmacksinns—The art of the sense of taste (p. 175).
Die Kunst des Geruchsinns—The art of the sense of smell (p. 177).
Die Kunst des Tastsinns—The art of the sense of touch (p. 180).
Die Kunst des Gehörsinns—The art of the sense of hearing (p. 182).
Die Kunst des Gesichtsinns—The art of the sense of sight (p. 184).
Of the first of these—die Kunst des Geschmacksinns—he says: "Man hält
zwar gewöhnlich nur zwei oder höchstens drei Sinne für würdig, den Stoff
künstlerischer Behandlung abzugeben, aber ich glaube nur mit bedingtem
Recht. Ich will kein allzugrosses Gewicht darauf legen, dass der gemeine
Sprachgebrauch manch andere Künste, wie zum Beispiel die Kochkunst
kennt."[39]
And further: "Und es ist doch gewiss eine ästhetische Leistung, wenn es der
Kochkunst gelingt ans einem thierischen Kadaver einen Gegenstand des
Geschmacks in jedem Sinne zu machen. Der Grundsatz der Kunst des
Geschmacksinns (die weiter ist als die sogenannte Kochkunst) ist also
dieser: Es soll alles Geniessbare als Sinnbild einer Idee behandelt werden
und in jedesmaligem Einklang zur auszudrückenden Idee."[40]
This author, like Renan, acknowledges a Kostümkunst (Art of Costume) (p.
200), etc.
Page 326
Such is also the opinion of the French writer, Guyau, who is highly
esteemed by some authors of our day. In his book, "Les Problèmes de
l'Esthétique Contemporaine," he speaks seriously of touch, taste, and smell
as giving, or being capable of giving, æsthetic impressions: "Si la couleur
manque au toucher, il nous fournit en revanche une notion que l'œil seul ne
peut nous donner, et qui a une valeur esthétique considérable, celle du
doux, du soyeux, du poli. Ce qui caractérise la beauté du velours, c'est sa
douceur au toucher non moins que son brillant. Dans l'idée que nous nous
faisons de la beauté d'une femme, le velouté de sa peau entre comme
élément essentiel."
"Chacun de nous probablement avec un peu d'attention se rappellera des
jouissances du goût, qui ont été de véritables jouissances esthétiques."[41]
And he recounts how a glass of milk drunk by him in the mountains gave
him æsthetic enjoyment.
So it turns out that the conception of art, as consisting in making beauty
manifest, is not at all so simple as it seemed, especially now, when in this
conception of beauty are included our sensations of touch and taste and
smell, as they are by the latest æsthetic writers.
But the ordinary man either does not know, or does not wish to know, all
this, and is firmly convinced that all questions about art may be simply and
clearly solved by acknowledging beauty to be the subject-matter of art. To
him it seems clear and comprehensible that art consists in manifesting
beauty, and that a reference to beauty will serve to explain all questions
about art.
But what is this beauty which forms the subject-matter of art? How is it
defined? What is it?
As is always the case, the more cloudy and confused the conception
conveyed by a word, with the more aplomb and self-assurance do people
use that word, pretending that what is understood by it is so simple and
clear that it is not worth while even to discuss what it actually means.
This is how matters of orthodox religion are usually dealt with, and this is
how people now deal with the conception of beauty. It is taken for granted
that what is meant by the word beauty is known and understood by every
one. And yet not only is this not known, but, after whole mountains of
esteemed by some authors of our day. In his book, "Les Problèmes de
l'Esthétique Contemporaine," he speaks seriously of touch, taste, and smell
as giving, or being capable of giving, æsthetic impressions: "Si la couleur
manque au toucher, il nous fournit en revanche une notion que l'œil seul ne
peut nous donner, et qui a une valeur esthétique considérable, celle du
doux, du soyeux, du poli. Ce qui caractérise la beauté du velours, c'est sa
douceur au toucher non moins que son brillant. Dans l'idée que nous nous
faisons de la beauté d'une femme, le velouté de sa peau entre comme
élément essentiel."
"Chacun de nous probablement avec un peu d'attention se rappellera des
jouissances du goût, qui ont été de véritables jouissances esthétiques."[41]
And he recounts how a glass of milk drunk by him in the mountains gave
him æsthetic enjoyment.
So it turns out that the conception of art, as consisting in making beauty
manifest, is not at all so simple as it seemed, especially now, when in this
conception of beauty are included our sensations of touch and taste and
smell, as they are by the latest æsthetic writers.
But the ordinary man either does not know, or does not wish to know, all
this, and is firmly convinced that all questions about art may be simply and
clearly solved by acknowledging beauty to be the subject-matter of art. To
him it seems clear and comprehensible that art consists in manifesting
beauty, and that a reference to beauty will serve to explain all questions
about art.
But what is this beauty which forms the subject-matter of art? How is it
defined? What is it?
As is always the case, the more cloudy and confused the conception
conveyed by a word, with the more aplomb and self-assurance do people
use that word, pretending that what is understood by it is so simple and
clear that it is not worth while even to discuss what it actually means.
This is how matters of orthodox religion are usually dealt with, and this is
how people now deal with the conception of beauty. It is taken for granted
that what is meant by the word beauty is known and understood by every
one. And yet not only is this not known, but, after whole mountains of
Page 327
books have been written on the subject by the most learned and profound
thinkers during one hundred and fifty years (ever since Baumgarten
founded æsthetics in the year 1750), the question, What is beauty? remains
to this day quite unsolved, and in each new work on æsthetics it is answered
in a new way. One of the last books I read on æsthetics is a not ill-written
booklet by Julius Mithalter, called "Rätsel des Schönen" (The Enigma of
the Beautiful). And that title precisely expresses the position of the
question, What is beauty? After thousands of learned men have discussed it
during one hundred and fifty years, the meaning of the word beauty remains
an enigma still. The Germans answer the question in their manner, though
in a hundred different ways. The physiologist-æstheticians, especially the
Englishmen, Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen, and his school, answer it, each
in his own way; the French eclectics, and the followers of Guyau and Taine,
also each in his own way; and all these people know all the preceding
solutions given by Baumgarten, and Kant, and Schelling, and Schiller, and
Fichte, and Winckelmann, and Lessing, and Hegel, and Schopenhauer, and
Hartmann, and Schasler, and Cousin, and Lévêque, and others.
What is this strange conception "beauty," which seems so simple to those
who talk without thinking, but in defining which all the philosophers of
various tendencies and different nationalities can come to no agreement
during a century and a half? What is this conception of beauty, on which the
dominant doctrine of art rests?
In Russian, by the word krasota (beauty) we mean only that which pleases
the sight. And though latterly people have begun to speak of "an ugly deed,"
or of "beautiful music," it is not good Russian.
A Russian of the common folk, not knowing foreign languages, will not
understand you if you tell him that a man who has given his last coat to
another, or done anything similar, has acted "beautifully," that a man who
has cheated another has done an "ugly" action, or that a song is "beautiful."
In Russian a deed may be kind and good, or unkind and bad. Music may be
pleasant and good, or unpleasant and bad; but there can be no such thing as
"beautiful" or "ugly" music.
Beautiful may relate to a man, a horse, a house, a view, or a movement. Of
actions, thoughts, character, or music, if they please us, we may say that
they are good, or, if they do not please us, that they are not good. But
thinkers during one hundred and fifty years (ever since Baumgarten
founded æsthetics in the year 1750), the question, What is beauty? remains
to this day quite unsolved, and in each new work on æsthetics it is answered
in a new way. One of the last books I read on æsthetics is a not ill-written
booklet by Julius Mithalter, called "Rätsel des Schönen" (The Enigma of
the Beautiful). And that title precisely expresses the position of the
question, What is beauty? After thousands of learned men have discussed it
during one hundred and fifty years, the meaning of the word beauty remains
an enigma still. The Germans answer the question in their manner, though
in a hundred different ways. The physiologist-æstheticians, especially the
Englishmen, Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen, and his school, answer it, each
in his own way; the French eclectics, and the followers of Guyau and Taine,
also each in his own way; and all these people know all the preceding
solutions given by Baumgarten, and Kant, and Schelling, and Schiller, and
Fichte, and Winckelmann, and Lessing, and Hegel, and Schopenhauer, and
Hartmann, and Schasler, and Cousin, and Lévêque, and others.
What is this strange conception "beauty," which seems so simple to those
who talk without thinking, but in defining which all the philosophers of
various tendencies and different nationalities can come to no agreement
during a century and a half? What is this conception of beauty, on which the
dominant doctrine of art rests?
In Russian, by the word krasota (beauty) we mean only that which pleases
the sight. And though latterly people have begun to speak of "an ugly deed,"
or of "beautiful music," it is not good Russian.
A Russian of the common folk, not knowing foreign languages, will not
understand you if you tell him that a man who has given his last coat to
another, or done anything similar, has acted "beautifully," that a man who
has cheated another has done an "ugly" action, or that a song is "beautiful."
In Russian a deed may be kind and good, or unkind and bad. Music may be
pleasant and good, or unpleasant and bad; but there can be no such thing as
"beautiful" or "ugly" music.
Beautiful may relate to a man, a horse, a house, a view, or a movement. Of
actions, thoughts, character, or music, if they please us, we may say that
they are good, or, if they do not please us, that they are not good. But
Page 328
beautiful can be used only concerning that which pleases the sight. So that
the word and conception "good" includes the conception of "beautiful," but
the reverse is not the case; the conception "beauty" does not include the
conception "good." If we say "good" of an article which we value for its
appearance, we thereby say that the article is beautiful; but if we say it is
"beautiful," it does not at all mean that the article is a good one.
Such is the meaning ascribed by the Russian language, and therefore by the
sense of the people, to the words and conceptions "good" and "beautiful."
In all the European languages, i.e. the languages of those nations among
whom the doctrine has spread that beauty is the essential thing in art, the
words "beau," "schön," "beautiful," "bello," etc., while keeping their
meaning of beautiful in form, have come to also express "goodness,"
"kindness," i.e. have come to act as substitutes for the word "good."
So that it has become quite natural in those languages to use such
expressions as "belle ame," "schöne Gedanken," of "beautiful deed." Those
languages no longer have a suitable word wherewith expressly to indicate
beauty of form, and have to use a combination of words such as "beau par
la forme," "beautiful to look at," etc., to convey that idea.
Observation of the divergent meanings which the words "beauty" and
"beautiful" have in Russian on the one hand, and in those European
languages now permeated by this æsthetic theory on the other hand, shows
us that the word "beauty" has, among the latter, acquired a special meaning,
namely, that of "good."
What is remarkable, moreover, is that since we Russians have begun more
and more to adopt the European view of art, the same evolution has begun
to show itself in our language also, and some people speak and write quite
confidently, and without causing surprise, of beautiful music and ugly
actions, or even thoughts; whereas forty years ago, when I was young, the
expressions "beautiful music" and "ugly actions" were not only unusual, but
incomprehensible. Evidently this new meaning given to beauty by
European thought begins to be assimilated by Russian society.
And what really is this meaning? What is this "beauty" as it is understood
by the European peoples?
the word and conception "good" includes the conception of "beautiful," but
the reverse is not the case; the conception "beauty" does not include the
conception "good." If we say "good" of an article which we value for its
appearance, we thereby say that the article is beautiful; but if we say it is
"beautiful," it does not at all mean that the article is a good one.
Such is the meaning ascribed by the Russian language, and therefore by the
sense of the people, to the words and conceptions "good" and "beautiful."
In all the European languages, i.e. the languages of those nations among
whom the doctrine has spread that beauty is the essential thing in art, the
words "beau," "schön," "beautiful," "bello," etc., while keeping their
meaning of beautiful in form, have come to also express "goodness,"
"kindness," i.e. have come to act as substitutes for the word "good."
So that it has become quite natural in those languages to use such
expressions as "belle ame," "schöne Gedanken," of "beautiful deed." Those
languages no longer have a suitable word wherewith expressly to indicate
beauty of form, and have to use a combination of words such as "beau par
la forme," "beautiful to look at," etc., to convey that idea.
Observation of the divergent meanings which the words "beauty" and
"beautiful" have in Russian on the one hand, and in those European
languages now permeated by this æsthetic theory on the other hand, shows
us that the word "beauty" has, among the latter, acquired a special meaning,
namely, that of "good."
What is remarkable, moreover, is that since we Russians have begun more
and more to adopt the European view of art, the same evolution has begun
to show itself in our language also, and some people speak and write quite
confidently, and without causing surprise, of beautiful music and ugly
actions, or even thoughts; whereas forty years ago, when I was young, the
expressions "beautiful music" and "ugly actions" were not only unusual, but
incomprehensible. Evidently this new meaning given to beauty by
European thought begins to be assimilated by Russian society.
And what really is this meaning? What is this "beauty" as it is understood
by the European peoples?
Page 329
In order to answer this question, I must here quote at least a small selection
of those definitions of beauty most generally adopted in existing æsthetic
systems. I especially beg the reader not to be overcome by dullness, but to
read these extracts through, or, still better, to read some one of the erudite
æsthetic authors. Not to mention the voluminous German æstheticians, a
very good book for this purpose would be either the German book by
Kralik, the English work by Knight, or the French one by Lévêque. It is
necessary to read one of the learned æsthetic writers in order to form at
firsthand a conception of the variety in opinion and the frightful obscurity
which reigns in this region of speculation; not, in this important matter,
trusting to another's report.
This, for instance, is what the German æsthetician Schasler says in the
preface to his famous, voluminous, and detailed work on æsthetics:—
"Hardly in any sphere of philosophic science can we find such divergent
methods of investigation and exposition, amounting even to self-
contradiction, as in the sphere of æsthetics. On the one hand, we have
elegant phraseology without any substance, characterized in great part by
most one-sided superficiality; and on the other hand, accompanying
undeniable profundity of investigation and richness of subject-matter, we
get a revolting awkwardness of philosophic terminology, infolding the
simplest thoughts in an apparel of abstract science, as though to render them
worthy to enter the consecrated palace of the system; and finally, between
these two methods of investigation and exposition there is a third, forming,
as it were, the transition from one to the other, a method consisting of
eclecticism, now flaunting an elegant phraseology, and now a pedantic
erudition.... A style of exposition that falls into none of these three defects
but it is truly concrete, and, having important matter, expresses it in clear
and popular philosophic language, can nowhere be found less frequently
than in the domain of æsthetics."[42]
It is only necessary, for instance, to read Schasler's own book to convince
oneself of the justice of this observation of his.
On the same subject the French writer Véron, in the preface to his very
good work on æsthetics, says: "Il n'y a pas de science, qui ait été plus que
l'esthétique livrée aux rêveries des métaphysiciens. Depuis Platon jusqu'aux
doctrines officielles de nos jours, on a fait de l'art je ne sais quel amalgame
of those definitions of beauty most generally adopted in existing æsthetic
systems. I especially beg the reader not to be overcome by dullness, but to
read these extracts through, or, still better, to read some one of the erudite
æsthetic authors. Not to mention the voluminous German æstheticians, a
very good book for this purpose would be either the German book by
Kralik, the English work by Knight, or the French one by Lévêque. It is
necessary to read one of the learned æsthetic writers in order to form at
firsthand a conception of the variety in opinion and the frightful obscurity
which reigns in this region of speculation; not, in this important matter,
trusting to another's report.
This, for instance, is what the German æsthetician Schasler says in the
preface to his famous, voluminous, and detailed work on æsthetics:—
"Hardly in any sphere of philosophic science can we find such divergent
methods of investigation and exposition, amounting even to self-
contradiction, as in the sphere of æsthetics. On the one hand, we have
elegant phraseology without any substance, characterized in great part by
most one-sided superficiality; and on the other hand, accompanying
undeniable profundity of investigation and richness of subject-matter, we
get a revolting awkwardness of philosophic terminology, infolding the
simplest thoughts in an apparel of abstract science, as though to render them
worthy to enter the consecrated palace of the system; and finally, between
these two methods of investigation and exposition there is a third, forming,
as it were, the transition from one to the other, a method consisting of
eclecticism, now flaunting an elegant phraseology, and now a pedantic
erudition.... A style of exposition that falls into none of these three defects
but it is truly concrete, and, having important matter, expresses it in clear
and popular philosophic language, can nowhere be found less frequently
than in the domain of æsthetics."[42]
It is only necessary, for instance, to read Schasler's own book to convince
oneself of the justice of this observation of his.
On the same subject the French writer Véron, in the preface to his very
good work on æsthetics, says: "Il n'y a pas de science, qui ait été plus que
l'esthétique livrée aux rêveries des métaphysiciens. Depuis Platon jusqu'aux
doctrines officielles de nos jours, on a fait de l'art je ne sais quel amalgame
Page 330
de fantaisies quintessenciées, et de mystères transcendantaux qui trouvent
leur expression suprême dans la conception absolue du Beau idéal,
prototype immuable et divin des choses réelles" ("L'Esthétique," 1878, p. 5).
[43]
If the reader will only be at the pains to peruse the following extracts,
defining beauty, taken from the chief writers on æsthetics, he may convince
himself that this censure is thoroughly deserved.
I shall not quote the definitions of beauty attributed to the ancients,—
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., down to Plotinus,—because, in reality, the
ancients had not that conception of beauty separated from goodness which
forms the basis and aim of æsthetics in our time. By referring the judgments
of the ancients on beauty to our conception of it, as is usually done in
æsthetics, we give the words of the ancients a meaning which is not theirs.
[44]
leur expression suprême dans la conception absolue du Beau idéal,
prototype immuable et divin des choses réelles" ("L'Esthétique," 1878, p. 5).
[43]
If the reader will only be at the pains to peruse the following extracts,
defining beauty, taken from the chief writers on æsthetics, he may convince
himself that this censure is thoroughly deserved.
I shall not quote the definitions of beauty attributed to the ancients,—
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., down to Plotinus,—because, in reality, the
ancients had not that conception of beauty separated from goodness which
forms the basis and aim of æsthetics in our time. By referring the judgments
of the ancients on beauty to our conception of it, as is usually done in
æsthetics, we give the words of the ancients a meaning which is not theirs.
[44]
Page 331
CHAPTER III
I begin with the founder of æsthetics, Baumgarten (1714-1762).
According to Baumgarten,[45] the object of logical knowledge is Truth, the
object of æsthetic (i.e. sensuous) knowledge is Beauty. Beauty is the Perfect
(the Absolute) recognized through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived
through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will.
Beauty is defined by Baumgarten as a correspondence, i.e. an order of the
parts in their mutual relations to each other and in their relation to the
whole. The aim of beauty itself is to please and excite a desire,
"Wohlgefallen und Erregung eines Verlangens." (A position precisely the
opposite of Kant's definition of the nature and sign of beauty.)
With reference to the manifestations of beauty, Baumgarten considers that
the highest embodiment of beauty is seen by us in nature, and he therefore
thinks that the highest aim of art is to copy nature. (This position also is
directly contradicted by the conclusions of the latest æstheticians.)
Passing over the unimportant followers of Baumgarten,—Maier,
Eschenburg, and Eberhard,—who only slightly modified the doctrine of
their teacher by dividing the pleasant from the beautiful, I will quote the
definitions given by writers who came immediately after Baumgarten, and
defined beauty quite in another way. These writers were Sulzer,
Mendelssohn, and Moritz. They, in contradiction to Baumgarten's main
position, recognize as the aim of art, not beauty, but goodness. Thus Sulzer
(1720-1777) says that only that can be considered beautiful which contains
goodness. According to his theory, the aim of the whole life of humanity is
welfare in social life. This is attained by the education of the moral feelings,
to which end art should be subservient. Beauty is that which evokes and
educates this feeling.
Beauty is understood almost in the same way by Mendelssohn (1729-1786).
According to him, art is the carrying forward of the beautiful, obscurely
recognized by feeling, till it becomes the true and good. The aim of art is
moral perfection.[46]
I begin with the founder of æsthetics, Baumgarten (1714-1762).
According to Baumgarten,[45] the object of logical knowledge is Truth, the
object of æsthetic (i.e. sensuous) knowledge is Beauty. Beauty is the Perfect
(the Absolute) recognized through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived
through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will.
Beauty is defined by Baumgarten as a correspondence, i.e. an order of the
parts in their mutual relations to each other and in their relation to the
whole. The aim of beauty itself is to please and excite a desire,
"Wohlgefallen und Erregung eines Verlangens." (A position precisely the
opposite of Kant's definition of the nature and sign of beauty.)
With reference to the manifestations of beauty, Baumgarten considers that
the highest embodiment of beauty is seen by us in nature, and he therefore
thinks that the highest aim of art is to copy nature. (This position also is
directly contradicted by the conclusions of the latest æstheticians.)
Passing over the unimportant followers of Baumgarten,—Maier,
Eschenburg, and Eberhard,—who only slightly modified the doctrine of
their teacher by dividing the pleasant from the beautiful, I will quote the
definitions given by writers who came immediately after Baumgarten, and
defined beauty quite in another way. These writers were Sulzer,
Mendelssohn, and Moritz. They, in contradiction to Baumgarten's main
position, recognize as the aim of art, not beauty, but goodness. Thus Sulzer
(1720-1777) says that only that can be considered beautiful which contains
goodness. According to his theory, the aim of the whole life of humanity is
welfare in social life. This is attained by the education of the moral feelings,
to which end art should be subservient. Beauty is that which evokes and
educates this feeling.
Beauty is understood almost in the same way by Mendelssohn (1729-1786).
According to him, art is the carrying forward of the beautiful, obscurely
recognized by feeling, till it becomes the true and good. The aim of art is
moral perfection.[46]
Page 332
For the æstheticians of this school, the ideal of beauty is a beautiful soul in
a beautiful body. So that these æstheticians completely wipe out
Baumgarten's division of the Perfect (the Absolute), into the three forms of
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty; and Beauty is again united with the Good and
the True.
But this conception is not only not maintained by the later æstheticians, but
the æsthetic doctrine of Winckelmann arises, again in complete opposition.
This divides the mission of art from the aim of goodness in the sharpest and
most positive manner, makes external beauty the aim of art, and even limits
it to visible beauty.
According to the celebrated work of Winckelmann (1717-1767), the law
and aim of all art is beauty only, beauty quite separated from and
independent of goodness. There are three kinds of beauty: (1) beauty of
form, (2) beauty of idea, expressing itself in the position of the figure (in
plastic art), (3) beauty of expression, attainable only when the two first
conditions are present. This beauty of expression is the highest aim of art,
and is attained in antique art; modern art should therefore aim at imitating
ancient art.[47]
Art is similarly understood by Lessing, Herder, and afterwards by Goethe
and by all the distinguished æstheticians of Germany till Kant, from whose
day, again, a different conception of art commences.
Native æsthetic theories arose during this period in England, France, Italy,
and Holland, and they, though not taken from the German, were equally
cloudy and contradictory. And all these writers, just like the German
æstheticians, founded their theories on a conception of the Beautiful,
understanding beauty in the sense of a something existing absolutely, and
more or less intermingled with Goodness or having one and the same root.
In England, almost simultaneously with Baumgarten, even a little earlier,
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Home, Burke, Hogarth, and others, wrote on art.
According to Shaftesbury (1670-1713), "That which is beautiful is
harmonious and proportionable, what is harmonious and proportionable is
true, and what is at once both beautiful and true is of consequence agreeable
and good."[48] Beauty, he taught, is recognized by the mind only. God is
fundamental beauty; beauty and goodness proceed from the same fount.
a beautiful body. So that these æstheticians completely wipe out
Baumgarten's division of the Perfect (the Absolute), into the three forms of
Truth, Goodness, and Beauty; and Beauty is again united with the Good and
the True.
But this conception is not only not maintained by the later æstheticians, but
the æsthetic doctrine of Winckelmann arises, again in complete opposition.
This divides the mission of art from the aim of goodness in the sharpest and
most positive manner, makes external beauty the aim of art, and even limits
it to visible beauty.
According to the celebrated work of Winckelmann (1717-1767), the law
and aim of all art is beauty only, beauty quite separated from and
independent of goodness. There are three kinds of beauty: (1) beauty of
form, (2) beauty of idea, expressing itself in the position of the figure (in
plastic art), (3) beauty of expression, attainable only when the two first
conditions are present. This beauty of expression is the highest aim of art,
and is attained in antique art; modern art should therefore aim at imitating
ancient art.[47]
Art is similarly understood by Lessing, Herder, and afterwards by Goethe
and by all the distinguished æstheticians of Germany till Kant, from whose
day, again, a different conception of art commences.
Native æsthetic theories arose during this period in England, France, Italy,
and Holland, and they, though not taken from the German, were equally
cloudy and contradictory. And all these writers, just like the German
æstheticians, founded their theories on a conception of the Beautiful,
understanding beauty in the sense of a something existing absolutely, and
more or less intermingled with Goodness or having one and the same root.
In England, almost simultaneously with Baumgarten, even a little earlier,
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Home, Burke, Hogarth, and others, wrote on art.
According to Shaftesbury (1670-1713), "That which is beautiful is
harmonious and proportionable, what is harmonious and proportionable is
true, and what is at once both beautiful and true is of consequence agreeable
and good."[48] Beauty, he taught, is recognized by the mind only. God is
fundamental beauty; beauty and goodness proceed from the same fount.
Page 333
So that, although Shaftesbury regards beauty as being something separate
from goodness, they again merge into something inseparable.
According to Hutcheson (1694-1747—"Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue"), the aim of art is beauty, the essence of which
consists in evoking in us the perception of uniformity amid variety. In the
recognition of what is art we are guided by "an internal sense." This internal
sense may be in contradiction to the ethical one. So that, according to
Hutcheson, beauty does not always correspond with goodness, but separates
from it and is sometimes contrary to it.[49]
According to Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), beauty is that which is
pleasant. Therefore beauty is defined by taste alone. The standard of true
taste is that the maximum of richness, fullness, strength, and variety of
impression should be contained in the narrowest limits. That is the ideal of a
perfect work of art.
According to Burke (1729-1797—"Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of
our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful"), the sublime and beautiful, which
are the aim of art, have their origin in the promptings of self-preservation
and of society. These feelings, examined in their source, are means for the
maintenance of the race through the individual. The first (self-preservation)
is attained by nourishment, defense, and war; the second (society) by
intercourse and propagation. Therefore self-defense, and war, which is
bound up with it, is the source of the sublime; sociability, and the sex-
instinct, which is bound up with it, is the source of beauty.[50]
Such were the chief English definitions of art and beauty in the eighteenth
century.
During that period, in France, the writers on art were Père André and
Batteux, with Diderot, D'Alembert, and, to some extent, Voltaire, following
later.
According to Père André ("Essai sur le Beau," 1741), there are three kinds
of beauty,—divine beauty, natural beauty, and artificial beauty.[51]
According to Batteux (1713-1780), art consists in imitating the beauty of
nature, its aim being enjoyment.[52] Such is also Diderot's definition of art.
The French writers, like the English, consider that it is taste that decides
what is beautiful. And the laws of taste are not only not laid down, but it is
from goodness, they again merge into something inseparable.
According to Hutcheson (1694-1747—"Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue"), the aim of art is beauty, the essence of which
consists in evoking in us the perception of uniformity amid variety. In the
recognition of what is art we are guided by "an internal sense." This internal
sense may be in contradiction to the ethical one. So that, according to
Hutcheson, beauty does not always correspond with goodness, but separates
from it and is sometimes contrary to it.[49]
According to Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), beauty is that which is
pleasant. Therefore beauty is defined by taste alone. The standard of true
taste is that the maximum of richness, fullness, strength, and variety of
impression should be contained in the narrowest limits. That is the ideal of a
perfect work of art.
According to Burke (1729-1797—"Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of
our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful"), the sublime and beautiful, which
are the aim of art, have their origin in the promptings of self-preservation
and of society. These feelings, examined in their source, are means for the
maintenance of the race through the individual. The first (self-preservation)
is attained by nourishment, defense, and war; the second (society) by
intercourse and propagation. Therefore self-defense, and war, which is
bound up with it, is the source of the sublime; sociability, and the sex-
instinct, which is bound up with it, is the source of beauty.[50]
Such were the chief English definitions of art and beauty in the eighteenth
century.
During that period, in France, the writers on art were Père André and
Batteux, with Diderot, D'Alembert, and, to some extent, Voltaire, following
later.
According to Père André ("Essai sur le Beau," 1741), there are three kinds
of beauty,—divine beauty, natural beauty, and artificial beauty.[51]
According to Batteux (1713-1780), art consists in imitating the beauty of
nature, its aim being enjoyment.[52] Such is also Diderot's definition of art.
The French writers, like the English, consider that it is taste that decides
what is beautiful. And the laws of taste are not only not laid down, but it is
Page 334
granted that they cannot be settled. The same view was held by D'Alembert
and Voltaire.[53]
According to the Italian æsthetician of that period, Pagano, art consists in
uniting the beauties dispersed in nature. The capacity to perceive these
beauties is taste, the capacity to bring them into one whole is artistic genius.
Beauty commingles with goodness, so that beauty is goodness made visible,
and goodness is inner beauty.[54]
According to the opinion of other Italians: Muratori (1672-1750),
—"Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto intorno le science e le arti,"—and
especially Spaletti,[55]—"Saggio sopra la bellezza" (1765),—art amounts to
an egotistical sensation, founded (as with Burke) on the desire for self-
preservation and society.
Among Dutch writers, Hemsterhuis (1720-1790), who had an influence on
the German æstheticians and on Goethe, is remarkable. According to him,
beauty is that which gives most pleasure, and that gives most pleasure
which gives us the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time. Enjoyment
of the beautiful, because it gives the greatest quantity of perceptions in the
shortest time, is the highest notion to which man can attain.[56]
Such were the æsthetic theories outside Germany during the last century. In
Germany, after Winckelmann, there again arose a completely new æsthetic
theory, that of Kant (1724-1804), which, more than all others, clears up
what this conception of beauty, and consequently of art, really amounts to.
The æsthetic teaching of Kant is founded as follows: Man has a knowledge
of nature outside him and of himself in nature. In nature, outside himself, he
seeks for truth; in himself, he seeks for goodness. The first is an affair of
pure reason, the other of practical reason (free will). Besides these two
means of perception, there is yet the judging capacity (Urteilskraft), which
forms judgments without reasonings and produces pleasure without desire
(Urtheil ohne Begriff und Vergnügen ohne Begehren). This capacity is the
basis of æsthetic feeling. Beauty, according to Kant, in its subjective
meaning is that which, in general and necessarily, without reasonings and
without practical advantage, pleases. In its objective meaning it is the form
of a suitable object, in so far as that object is perceived without any
conception of its utility.[57]
and Voltaire.[53]
According to the Italian æsthetician of that period, Pagano, art consists in
uniting the beauties dispersed in nature. The capacity to perceive these
beauties is taste, the capacity to bring them into one whole is artistic genius.
Beauty commingles with goodness, so that beauty is goodness made visible,
and goodness is inner beauty.[54]
According to the opinion of other Italians: Muratori (1672-1750),
—"Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto intorno le science e le arti,"—and
especially Spaletti,[55]—"Saggio sopra la bellezza" (1765),—art amounts to
an egotistical sensation, founded (as with Burke) on the desire for self-
preservation and society.
Among Dutch writers, Hemsterhuis (1720-1790), who had an influence on
the German æstheticians and on Goethe, is remarkable. According to him,
beauty is that which gives most pleasure, and that gives most pleasure
which gives us the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time. Enjoyment
of the beautiful, because it gives the greatest quantity of perceptions in the
shortest time, is the highest notion to which man can attain.[56]
Such were the æsthetic theories outside Germany during the last century. In
Germany, after Winckelmann, there again arose a completely new æsthetic
theory, that of Kant (1724-1804), which, more than all others, clears up
what this conception of beauty, and consequently of art, really amounts to.
The æsthetic teaching of Kant is founded as follows: Man has a knowledge
of nature outside him and of himself in nature. In nature, outside himself, he
seeks for truth; in himself, he seeks for goodness. The first is an affair of
pure reason, the other of practical reason (free will). Besides these two
means of perception, there is yet the judging capacity (Urteilskraft), which
forms judgments without reasonings and produces pleasure without desire
(Urtheil ohne Begriff und Vergnügen ohne Begehren). This capacity is the
basis of æsthetic feeling. Beauty, according to Kant, in its subjective
meaning is that which, in general and necessarily, without reasonings and
without practical advantage, pleases. In its objective meaning it is the form
of a suitable object, in so far as that object is perceived without any
conception of its utility.[57]
Page 335
Beauty is defined in the same way by the followers of Kant, among whom
was Schiller (1759-1805). According to Schiller, who wrote much on
æsthetics, the aim of art is, as with Kant, beauty, the source of which is
pleasure without practical advantage. So that art may be called a game, not
in the sense of an unimportant occupation, but in the sense of a
manifestation of the beauties of life itself without other aim than that of
beauty.[58]
Besides Schiller, the most remarkable of Kant's followers in the sphere of
æsthetics was Wilhelm Humboldt, who, though he added nothing to the
definition of beauty, explained various forms of it,—the drama, music, the
comic, etc.[59]
After Kant, besides the second-rate philosophers, the writers on æsthetics
were Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their followers. Fichte (1762-1814) says
that perception of the beautiful proceeds from this: the world—i.e. nature—
has two sides: it is the sum of our limitations, and it is the sum of our free
idealistic activity. In the first aspect the world is limited, in the second
aspect it is free. In the first aspect every object is limited, distorted,
compressed, confined—and we see deformity; in the second we perceive its
inner completeness, vitality, regeneration—and we see beauty. So that the
deformity or beauty of an object, according to Fichte, depends on the point
of view of the observer. Beauty therefore exists, not in the world, but in the
beautiful soul (schöner Geist). Art is the manifestation of this beautiful soul,
and its aim is the education, not only of the mind—that is the business of
the savant, not only of the heart—that is the affair of the moral preacher,
but of the whole man. And so the characteristic of beauty lies, not in
anything external, but in the presence of a beautiful soul in the artist.[60]
Following Fichte, and in the same direction, Friedrich Schlegel and Adam
Müller also defined beauty. According to Schlegel (1772-1829), beauty in
art is understood too incompletely, one-sidedly, and disconnectedly. Beauty
exists, not only in art, but also in nature and in love; so that the truly
beautiful is expressed by the union of art, nature, and love. Therefore, as
inseparably one with æsthetic art, Schlegel acknowledges moral and
philosophic art.[61]
According to Adam Müller (1779-1829), there are two kinds of beauty: the
one, general beauty, which attracts people as the sun attracts the planet—
was Schiller (1759-1805). According to Schiller, who wrote much on
æsthetics, the aim of art is, as with Kant, beauty, the source of which is
pleasure without practical advantage. So that art may be called a game, not
in the sense of an unimportant occupation, but in the sense of a
manifestation of the beauties of life itself without other aim than that of
beauty.[58]
Besides Schiller, the most remarkable of Kant's followers in the sphere of
æsthetics was Wilhelm Humboldt, who, though he added nothing to the
definition of beauty, explained various forms of it,—the drama, music, the
comic, etc.[59]
After Kant, besides the second-rate philosophers, the writers on æsthetics
were Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their followers. Fichte (1762-1814) says
that perception of the beautiful proceeds from this: the world—i.e. nature—
has two sides: it is the sum of our limitations, and it is the sum of our free
idealistic activity. In the first aspect the world is limited, in the second
aspect it is free. In the first aspect every object is limited, distorted,
compressed, confined—and we see deformity; in the second we perceive its
inner completeness, vitality, regeneration—and we see beauty. So that the
deformity or beauty of an object, according to Fichte, depends on the point
of view of the observer. Beauty therefore exists, not in the world, but in the
beautiful soul (schöner Geist). Art is the manifestation of this beautiful soul,
and its aim is the education, not only of the mind—that is the business of
the savant, not only of the heart—that is the affair of the moral preacher,
but of the whole man. And so the characteristic of beauty lies, not in
anything external, but in the presence of a beautiful soul in the artist.[60]
Following Fichte, and in the same direction, Friedrich Schlegel and Adam
Müller also defined beauty. According to Schlegel (1772-1829), beauty in
art is understood too incompletely, one-sidedly, and disconnectedly. Beauty
exists, not only in art, but also in nature and in love; so that the truly
beautiful is expressed by the union of art, nature, and love. Therefore, as
inseparably one with æsthetic art, Schlegel acknowledges moral and
philosophic art.[61]
According to Adam Müller (1779-1829), there are two kinds of beauty: the
one, general beauty, which attracts people as the sun attracts the planet—
Page 336
this is found chiefly in antique art; and the other, individual beauty, which
results from the observer himself becoming a sun, attracting beauty—this is
the beauty of modern art. A world in which all contradictions are
harmonized is the highest beauty. Every work of art is a reproduction of this
universal harmony.[62] The highest art is the art of life.[63]
Next after Fichte and his followers came a contemporary of his, the
philosopher Schelling (1775-1854), who has had a great influence on the
æsthetic conceptions of our times. According to Schelling's philosophy, art
is the production or result of that conception of things by which the subject
becomes its own object, or the object its own subject. Beauty is the
perception of the infinite in the finite. And the chief characteristic of works
of art is unconscious infinity. Art is the uniting of the subjective with the
objective, of nature with reason, of the unconscious with the conscious, and
therefore art is the highest means of knowledge. Beauty is the
contemplation of things in themselves as they exist in the prototype (In den
Urbildern). It is not the artist who by his knowledge or skill produces the
beautiful, but the idea of beauty in him itself produces it.[64]
Of Schelling's followers the most noticeable was Solger (1780-1819
—"Vorlesungen über Æsthetik"). According to him, the idea of beauty is the
fundamental idea of everything. In the world we see only distortions of the
fundamental idea, but art, by imagination, may lift itself to the height of this
idea. Art is therefore akin to creation.[65]
According to another follower of Schelling, Krause (1781-1832), true,
positive beauty is the manifestation of the Idea in an individual form; art is
the actualization of the beauty existing in the sphere of man's free spirit.
The highest stage of art is the art of life, which directs its activity toward
the adornment of life so that it may be a beautiful abode for a beautiful
man.[66]
After Schelling and his followers came the new æsthetic doctrine of Hegel,
which is held to this day, consciously by many, but by the majority
unconsciously. This teaching is not only no clearer or better defined than
the preceding ones, but is, if possible, even more cloudy and mystical.
According to Hegel (1770-1831), God manifests himself in nature and in art
in the form of beauty. God expresses himself in two ways: in the object and
in the subject, in nature and in spirit. Beauty is the shining of the Idea
results from the observer himself becoming a sun, attracting beauty—this is
the beauty of modern art. A world in which all contradictions are
harmonized is the highest beauty. Every work of art is a reproduction of this
universal harmony.[62] The highest art is the art of life.[63]
Next after Fichte and his followers came a contemporary of his, the
philosopher Schelling (1775-1854), who has had a great influence on the
æsthetic conceptions of our times. According to Schelling's philosophy, art
is the production or result of that conception of things by which the subject
becomes its own object, or the object its own subject. Beauty is the
perception of the infinite in the finite. And the chief characteristic of works
of art is unconscious infinity. Art is the uniting of the subjective with the
objective, of nature with reason, of the unconscious with the conscious, and
therefore art is the highest means of knowledge. Beauty is the
contemplation of things in themselves as they exist in the prototype (In den
Urbildern). It is not the artist who by his knowledge or skill produces the
beautiful, but the idea of beauty in him itself produces it.[64]
Of Schelling's followers the most noticeable was Solger (1780-1819
—"Vorlesungen über Æsthetik"). According to him, the idea of beauty is the
fundamental idea of everything. In the world we see only distortions of the
fundamental idea, but art, by imagination, may lift itself to the height of this
idea. Art is therefore akin to creation.[65]
According to another follower of Schelling, Krause (1781-1832), true,
positive beauty is the manifestation of the Idea in an individual form; art is
the actualization of the beauty existing in the sphere of man's free spirit.
The highest stage of art is the art of life, which directs its activity toward
the adornment of life so that it may be a beautiful abode for a beautiful
man.[66]
After Schelling and his followers came the new æsthetic doctrine of Hegel,
which is held to this day, consciously by many, but by the majority
unconsciously. This teaching is not only no clearer or better defined than
the preceding ones, but is, if possible, even more cloudy and mystical.
According to Hegel (1770-1831), God manifests himself in nature and in art
in the form of beauty. God expresses himself in two ways: in the object and
in the subject, in nature and in spirit. Beauty is the shining of the Idea
Page 337
through matter. Only the soul, and what pertains to it, is truly beautiful; and
therefore the beauty of nature is only the reflection of the natural beauty of
the spirit—the beautiful has only a spiritual content. But the spiritual must
appear in sensuous form. The sensuous manifestation of spirit is only
appearance (schein), and this appearance is the only reality of the beautiful.
Art is thus the production of this appearance of the Idea, and is a means,
together with religion and philosophy, of bringing to consciousness and of
expressing the deepest problems of humanity and the highest truths of the
spirit.
Truth and beauty, according to Hegel, are one and the same thing; the
difference being only that truth is the Idea itself as it exists in itself, and is
thinkable. The Idea, manifested externally, becomes to the apprehension not
only true but beautiful. The beautiful is the manifestation of the Idea.[67]
Following Hegel came his many adherents, Weisse, Arnold Ruge,
Rosenkrantz, Theodor Vischer, and others.
According to Weisse (1801-1867), art is the introduction (Einbildung) of the
absolute spiritual reality of beauty into external, dead, indifferent matter, the
perception of which latter, apart from the beauty brought into it, presents
the negation of all existence in itself (Negation alles Fürsichseins).
In the idea of truth, Weisse explains, lies a contradiction between the
subjective and the objective sides of knowledge, in that an individual I
discerns the Universal. This contradiction can be removed by a conception
that should unite into one the universal and the individual, which fall
asunder in our conceptions of truth. Such a conception would be reconciled
(aufgehoben) truth. Beauty is such a reconciled truth.[68]
According to Ruge (1802-1880), a strict follower of Hegel, beauty is the
Idea expressing itself. The spirit, contemplating itself, either finds itself
expressed completely, and then that full expression of itself is beauty; or
incompletely, and then it feels the need to alter this imperfect expression of
itself, and becomes creative art.[69]
According to Vischer (1807-1887), beauty is the Idea in the form of a finite
phenomenon. The Idea itself is not indivisible, but forms a system of ideas,
which may be represented by ascending and descending lines. The higher
the idea, the more beauty it contains; but even the lowest contains beauty,
therefore the beauty of nature is only the reflection of the natural beauty of
the spirit—the beautiful has only a spiritual content. But the spiritual must
appear in sensuous form. The sensuous manifestation of spirit is only
appearance (schein), and this appearance is the only reality of the beautiful.
Art is thus the production of this appearance of the Idea, and is a means,
together with religion and philosophy, of bringing to consciousness and of
expressing the deepest problems of humanity and the highest truths of the
spirit.
Truth and beauty, according to Hegel, are one and the same thing; the
difference being only that truth is the Idea itself as it exists in itself, and is
thinkable. The Idea, manifested externally, becomes to the apprehension not
only true but beautiful. The beautiful is the manifestation of the Idea.[67]
Following Hegel came his many adherents, Weisse, Arnold Ruge,
Rosenkrantz, Theodor Vischer, and others.
According to Weisse (1801-1867), art is the introduction (Einbildung) of the
absolute spiritual reality of beauty into external, dead, indifferent matter, the
perception of which latter, apart from the beauty brought into it, presents
the negation of all existence in itself (Negation alles Fürsichseins).
In the idea of truth, Weisse explains, lies a contradiction between the
subjective and the objective sides of knowledge, in that an individual I
discerns the Universal. This contradiction can be removed by a conception
that should unite into one the universal and the individual, which fall
asunder in our conceptions of truth. Such a conception would be reconciled
(aufgehoben) truth. Beauty is such a reconciled truth.[68]
According to Ruge (1802-1880), a strict follower of Hegel, beauty is the
Idea expressing itself. The spirit, contemplating itself, either finds itself
expressed completely, and then that full expression of itself is beauty; or
incompletely, and then it feels the need to alter this imperfect expression of
itself, and becomes creative art.[69]
According to Vischer (1807-1887), beauty is the Idea in the form of a finite
phenomenon. The Idea itself is not indivisible, but forms a system of ideas,
which may be represented by ascending and descending lines. The higher
the idea, the more beauty it contains; but even the lowest contains beauty,
Page 338
because it forms an essential link of the system. The highest form of the
Idea is personality, and therefore the highest art is that which has for its
subject-matter the highest personality.[70]
Such were the theories of the German æstheticians in the Hegelian
direction, but they did not monopolize æsthetic dissertations. In Germany,
side by side and simultaneously with the Hegelian theories, there appeared
theories of beauty not only independent of Hegel's position (that beauty is
the manifestation of the Idea), but directly contrary to this view, denying
and ridiculing it. Such was the line taken by Herbart and, more particularly,
by Schopenhauer.
According to Herbart (1776-1841), there is not, and cannot be, any such
thing as beauty existing in itself. What does exist is only our opinion, and it
is necessary to find the base of this opinion (Ästhetisches Elementarurtheil).
Such bases are connected with our impressions. There are certain relations
which we term beautiful; and art consists in finding these relations, which
are simultaneous in painting, the plastic art, and architecture, successive and
simultaneous in music, and purely successive in poetry. In contradiction to
the former æstheticians, Herbart holds that objects are often beautiful which
express nothing at all, as, for instance, the rainbow, which is beautiful for its
lines and colors, and not for its mythological connection with Iris or Noah's
rainbow.[71]
Another opponent of Hegel was Schopenhauer, who denied Hegel's whole
system, his æsthetics included.
According to Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Will objectivizes itself in the
world on various planes; and although the higher the plane on which it is
objectivized the more beautiful it is, yet each plane has its own beauty.
Renunciation of one's individuality and contemplation of one of these
planes of manifestation of Will gives us a perception of beauty. All men,
says Schopenhauer, possess the capacity to objectivize the Idea on different
planes. The genius of the artist has this capacity in a higher degree, and
therefore makes a higher beauty manifest.[72]
After these more eminent writers there followed, in Germany, less original
and less influential ones, such as Hartmann, Kirkmann, Schnasse, and, to
some extent, Helmholtz (as an æsthetician), Bergmann, Jungmann, and an
innumerable host of others.
Idea is personality, and therefore the highest art is that which has for its
subject-matter the highest personality.[70]
Such were the theories of the German æstheticians in the Hegelian
direction, but they did not monopolize æsthetic dissertations. In Germany,
side by side and simultaneously with the Hegelian theories, there appeared
theories of beauty not only independent of Hegel's position (that beauty is
the manifestation of the Idea), but directly contrary to this view, denying
and ridiculing it. Such was the line taken by Herbart and, more particularly,
by Schopenhauer.
According to Herbart (1776-1841), there is not, and cannot be, any such
thing as beauty existing in itself. What does exist is only our opinion, and it
is necessary to find the base of this opinion (Ästhetisches Elementarurtheil).
Such bases are connected with our impressions. There are certain relations
which we term beautiful; and art consists in finding these relations, which
are simultaneous in painting, the plastic art, and architecture, successive and
simultaneous in music, and purely successive in poetry. In contradiction to
the former æstheticians, Herbart holds that objects are often beautiful which
express nothing at all, as, for instance, the rainbow, which is beautiful for its
lines and colors, and not for its mythological connection with Iris or Noah's
rainbow.[71]
Another opponent of Hegel was Schopenhauer, who denied Hegel's whole
system, his æsthetics included.
According to Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Will objectivizes itself in the
world on various planes; and although the higher the plane on which it is
objectivized the more beautiful it is, yet each plane has its own beauty.
Renunciation of one's individuality and contemplation of one of these
planes of manifestation of Will gives us a perception of beauty. All men,
says Schopenhauer, possess the capacity to objectivize the Idea on different
planes. The genius of the artist has this capacity in a higher degree, and
therefore makes a higher beauty manifest.[72]
After these more eminent writers there followed, in Germany, less original
and less influential ones, such as Hartmann, Kirkmann, Schnasse, and, to
some extent, Helmholtz (as an æsthetician), Bergmann, Jungmann, and an
innumerable host of others.
Page 339
According to Hartmann (1842), beauty lies, not in the external world, nor in
"the thing in itself," neither does it reside in the soul of man, but it lies in
the "seeming" (Schein) produced by the artist. The thing in itself is not
beautiful, but is transformed into beauty by the artist.[73]
According to Schnasse (1798-1875), there is no perfect beauty in the world.
In nature there is only an approach toward it. Art gives what nature cannot
give. In the energy of the free ego, conscious of harmony not found in
nature, beauty is disclosed.[74]
Kirkmann wrote on experimental æsthetics. All aspects of history in his
system are joined by pure chance. Thus, according to Kirkmann (1802-
1884), there are six realms of history: The realm of Knowledge, of Wealth,
of Morality, of Faith, of Politics, and of Beauty; and activity in the last-
named realm is art.[75]
According to Helmholtz (1821), who wrote on beauty as it relates to music,
beauty in musical productions is attained only by following unalterable
laws. These laws are not known to the artist; so that beauty is manifested by
the artist unconsciously, and cannot be subjected to analysis.[76]
According to Bergmann (1840) ("Ueber das Schöne," 1887), to define
beauty objectively is impossible. Beauty is only perceived subjectively, and
therefore the problem of æsthetics is to define what pleases whom.[77]
According to Jungmann (d. 1885), firstly, beauty is a suprasensible quality
of things; secondly, beauty produces in us pleasure by merely being
contemplated; and, thirdly, beauty is the foundation of love.[78]
The æsthetic theories of the chief representatives of France, England, and
other nations in recent times have been the following:—
In France, during this period, the prominent writers on æsthetics were
Cousin, Jouffroy, Pictet, Ravaisson, Lévêque.
Cousin (1792-1867) was an eclectic, and a follower of the German idealists.
According to his theory, beauty always has a moral foundation. He disputes
the doctrine that art is imitation and that the beautiful is what pleases. He
affirms that beauty may be defined objectively, and that it essentially
consists in variety in unity.[79]
"the thing in itself," neither does it reside in the soul of man, but it lies in
the "seeming" (Schein) produced by the artist. The thing in itself is not
beautiful, but is transformed into beauty by the artist.[73]
According to Schnasse (1798-1875), there is no perfect beauty in the world.
In nature there is only an approach toward it. Art gives what nature cannot
give. In the energy of the free ego, conscious of harmony not found in
nature, beauty is disclosed.[74]
Kirkmann wrote on experimental æsthetics. All aspects of history in his
system are joined by pure chance. Thus, according to Kirkmann (1802-
1884), there are six realms of history: The realm of Knowledge, of Wealth,
of Morality, of Faith, of Politics, and of Beauty; and activity in the last-
named realm is art.[75]
According to Helmholtz (1821), who wrote on beauty as it relates to music,
beauty in musical productions is attained only by following unalterable
laws. These laws are not known to the artist; so that beauty is manifested by
the artist unconsciously, and cannot be subjected to analysis.[76]
According to Bergmann (1840) ("Ueber das Schöne," 1887), to define
beauty objectively is impossible. Beauty is only perceived subjectively, and
therefore the problem of æsthetics is to define what pleases whom.[77]
According to Jungmann (d. 1885), firstly, beauty is a suprasensible quality
of things; secondly, beauty produces in us pleasure by merely being
contemplated; and, thirdly, beauty is the foundation of love.[78]
The æsthetic theories of the chief representatives of France, England, and
other nations in recent times have been the following:—
In France, during this period, the prominent writers on æsthetics were
Cousin, Jouffroy, Pictet, Ravaisson, Lévêque.
Cousin (1792-1867) was an eclectic, and a follower of the German idealists.
According to his theory, beauty always has a moral foundation. He disputes
the doctrine that art is imitation and that the beautiful is what pleases. He
affirms that beauty may be defined objectively, and that it essentially
consists in variety in unity.[79]
Page 340
After Cousin came Jouffroy (1796-1842), who was a pupil of Cousin's and
also a follower of the German æstheticians. According to his definition,
beauty is the expression of the invisible by those natural signs which
manifest it. The visible world is the garment by means of which we see
beauty.[80]
The Swiss writer Pictet repeated Hegel and Plato, supposing beauty to exist
in the direct and free manifestation of the divine Idea revealing itself in
sense forms.[81]
Lévêque was a follower of Schelling and Hegel. He holds that beauty is
something invisible behind nature—a force or spirit revealing itself in
ordered energy.[82]
Similar vague opinions about the nature of beauty were expressed by the
French metaphysician Ravaisson, who considered beauty to be the ultimate
aim and purpose of the world. "La beauté la plus divine et principalement
la plus parfaite contient le secret du monde."[83] And again, "Le monde
entier est l'œuvre d'une beauté absolue, qui n'est la cause des choses que
par l'amour qu'elle met en elles."
I purposely abstain from translating these metaphysical expressions,
because, however cloudy the Germans may be, the French, once they
absorb the theories of the Germans and take to imitating them, far surpass
them in uniting heterogeneous conceptions into one expression, and putting
forward one meaning or another indiscriminately. For instance, the French
philosopher Renouvier, when discussing beauty, says, "Ne craignons pas de
dire qu'une vérité qui ne serait pas belle, ne serait qu'un jeu logique de
notre esprit et que la seule vérité solide et digne de ce nom c'est la beauté."
[84]
Besides the æsthetic idealists who wrote and still write under the influence
of German philosophy, the following recent writers have also influenced the
comprehension of art and beauty in France: Taine, Guyau, Cherbuliez,
Coster, and Véron.
According to Taine (1828-1893), beauty is the manifestation of the essential
characteristic of any important idea more completely than it is expressed in
reality.[85]
also a follower of the German æstheticians. According to his definition,
beauty is the expression of the invisible by those natural signs which
manifest it. The visible world is the garment by means of which we see
beauty.[80]
The Swiss writer Pictet repeated Hegel and Plato, supposing beauty to exist
in the direct and free manifestation of the divine Idea revealing itself in
sense forms.[81]
Lévêque was a follower of Schelling and Hegel. He holds that beauty is
something invisible behind nature—a force or spirit revealing itself in
ordered energy.[82]
Similar vague opinions about the nature of beauty were expressed by the
French metaphysician Ravaisson, who considered beauty to be the ultimate
aim and purpose of the world. "La beauté la plus divine et principalement
la plus parfaite contient le secret du monde."[83] And again, "Le monde
entier est l'œuvre d'une beauté absolue, qui n'est la cause des choses que
par l'amour qu'elle met en elles."
I purposely abstain from translating these metaphysical expressions,
because, however cloudy the Germans may be, the French, once they
absorb the theories of the Germans and take to imitating them, far surpass
them in uniting heterogeneous conceptions into one expression, and putting
forward one meaning or another indiscriminately. For instance, the French
philosopher Renouvier, when discussing beauty, says, "Ne craignons pas de
dire qu'une vérité qui ne serait pas belle, ne serait qu'un jeu logique de
notre esprit et que la seule vérité solide et digne de ce nom c'est la beauté."
[84]
Besides the æsthetic idealists who wrote and still write under the influence
of German philosophy, the following recent writers have also influenced the
comprehension of art and beauty in France: Taine, Guyau, Cherbuliez,
Coster, and Véron.
According to Taine (1828-1893), beauty is the manifestation of the essential
characteristic of any important idea more completely than it is expressed in
reality.[85]
Page 341
Guyau (1854-1888) taught that beauty is not something exterior to the
object itself,—is not, as it were, a parasitic growth on it,—but is itself the
very blossoming forth of that on which it appears. Art is the expression of
reasonable and conscious life, evoking in us both the deepest consciousness
of existence and the highest feelings and loftiest thoughts. Art lifts man
from his personal life into the universal life by means, not only of
participation in the same ideas and beliefs, but also by means of similarity
in feeling.[86]
According to Cherbuliez, art is an activity, (1) satisfying our innate love of
forms (apparences), (2) endowing these forms with ideas, (3) affording
pleasure alike to our senses, heart, and reason. Beauty is not inherent in
objects, but is an act of our souls. Beauty is an illusion; there is no absolute
beauty. But what we consider characteristic and harmonious appears
beautiful to us.
Coster held that the ideas of the beautiful, the good, and the true are innate.
These ideas illuminate our minds and are identical with God, who is
Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. The idea of Beauty includes unity of essence,
variety of constitutive elements, and order, which brings unity into the
various manifestations of life.[87]
For the sake of completeness, I will further cite some of the very latest
writings upon art.
"La Psychologie du Beau et de l'Art, par Mario Pilo" (1895), says that
beauty is a product of our physical feelings. The aim of art is pleasure, but
this pleasure (for some reason) he considers to be necessarily highly moral.
The "Essai sur l'Art Contemporain, par Fierens Gevaert" (1897), says that
art rests on its connection with the past, and on the religious ideal of the
present which the artist holds when giving to his work the form of his
individuality.
Then again, Sar Peladan's "L'Art Idealiste et Mystique" (1894), says that
beauty is one of the manifestations of God. "Il n'y a pas d'autre Réalité que
Dieu, il n'y a pas d'autre Vérité que Dieu, il n'y a pas d'autre Beauté que
Dieu" (p. 33). This book is very fantastic and very illiterate, but is
characteristic in the positions it takes up, and noticeable on account of a
certain success it is having with the younger generation in France.
object itself,—is not, as it were, a parasitic growth on it,—but is itself the
very blossoming forth of that on which it appears. Art is the expression of
reasonable and conscious life, evoking in us both the deepest consciousness
of existence and the highest feelings and loftiest thoughts. Art lifts man
from his personal life into the universal life by means, not only of
participation in the same ideas and beliefs, but also by means of similarity
in feeling.[86]
According to Cherbuliez, art is an activity, (1) satisfying our innate love of
forms (apparences), (2) endowing these forms with ideas, (3) affording
pleasure alike to our senses, heart, and reason. Beauty is not inherent in
objects, but is an act of our souls. Beauty is an illusion; there is no absolute
beauty. But what we consider characteristic and harmonious appears
beautiful to us.
Coster held that the ideas of the beautiful, the good, and the true are innate.
These ideas illuminate our minds and are identical with God, who is
Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. The idea of Beauty includes unity of essence,
variety of constitutive elements, and order, which brings unity into the
various manifestations of life.[87]
For the sake of completeness, I will further cite some of the very latest
writings upon art.
"La Psychologie du Beau et de l'Art, par Mario Pilo" (1895), says that
beauty is a product of our physical feelings. The aim of art is pleasure, but
this pleasure (for some reason) he considers to be necessarily highly moral.
The "Essai sur l'Art Contemporain, par Fierens Gevaert" (1897), says that
art rests on its connection with the past, and on the religious ideal of the
present which the artist holds when giving to his work the form of his
individuality.
Then again, Sar Peladan's "L'Art Idealiste et Mystique" (1894), says that
beauty is one of the manifestations of God. "Il n'y a pas d'autre Réalité que
Dieu, il n'y a pas d'autre Vérité que Dieu, il n'y a pas d'autre Beauté que
Dieu" (p. 33). This book is very fantastic and very illiterate, but is
characteristic in the positions it takes up, and noticeable on account of a
certain success it is having with the younger generation in France.
Page 342
All the æsthetics diffused in France up to the present time are similar in
kind, but among them Véron's "L'Esthétique" (1878) forms an exception,
being reasonable and clear. That work, though it does not give an exact
definition of art, at least rids æsthetics of the cloudy conception of an
absolute beauty.
According to Véron (1825-1889), art is the manifestation of emotion
transmitted externally by a combination of lines, forms, colors, or by a
succession of movements, sounds, or words subjected to certain rhythms.[88]
In England, during this period, the writers on æsthetics define beauty more
and more frequently, not by its own qualities, but by taste; and the
discussion about beauty is superseded by a discussion on taste.
After Reid (1704-1796), who acknowledged beauty as being entirely
dependent on the spectator, Alison, in his "Essay on the Nature and
Principles of Taste" (1790), proved the same thing. From another side this
was also asserted by Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the grandfather of the
celebrated Charles Darwin.
He says that we consider beautiful that which is connected in our
conception with what we love. Richard Knight's work, "An Analytical
Inquiry into the Principles of Taste," also tends in the same direction.
Most of the English theories of æsthetics are on the same lines. The
prominent writers on æsthetics in England during the present century have
been Charles Darwin (to some extent), Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen, Ker,
and Knight.
According to Charles Darwin (1809-1882—"Descent of Man," 1871),
beauty is a feeling natural not only to man, but also to animals, and
consequently to the ancestors of man. Birds adorn their nests and esteem
beauty in their mates. Beauty has an influence on marriages. Beauty
includes a variety of diverse conceptions. The origin of the art of music is
the call of the males to the females.[89]
According to Herbert Spencer (b. 1820), the origin of art is play, a thought
previously expressed by Schiller. In the lower animals all the energy of life
is expended in life-maintenance and race-maintenance; in man, however,
there remains, after these needs are satisfied, some superfluous strength.
This excess is used in play, which passes over into art. Play is an imitation
kind, but among them Véron's "L'Esthétique" (1878) forms an exception,
being reasonable and clear. That work, though it does not give an exact
definition of art, at least rids æsthetics of the cloudy conception of an
absolute beauty.
According to Véron (1825-1889), art is the manifestation of emotion
transmitted externally by a combination of lines, forms, colors, or by a
succession of movements, sounds, or words subjected to certain rhythms.[88]
In England, during this period, the writers on æsthetics define beauty more
and more frequently, not by its own qualities, but by taste; and the
discussion about beauty is superseded by a discussion on taste.
After Reid (1704-1796), who acknowledged beauty as being entirely
dependent on the spectator, Alison, in his "Essay on the Nature and
Principles of Taste" (1790), proved the same thing. From another side this
was also asserted by Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the grandfather of the
celebrated Charles Darwin.
He says that we consider beautiful that which is connected in our
conception with what we love. Richard Knight's work, "An Analytical
Inquiry into the Principles of Taste," also tends in the same direction.
Most of the English theories of æsthetics are on the same lines. The
prominent writers on æsthetics in England during the present century have
been Charles Darwin (to some extent), Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen, Ker,
and Knight.
According to Charles Darwin (1809-1882—"Descent of Man," 1871),
beauty is a feeling natural not only to man, but also to animals, and
consequently to the ancestors of man. Birds adorn their nests and esteem
beauty in their mates. Beauty has an influence on marriages. Beauty
includes a variety of diverse conceptions. The origin of the art of music is
the call of the males to the females.[89]
According to Herbert Spencer (b. 1820), the origin of art is play, a thought
previously expressed by Schiller. In the lower animals all the energy of life
is expended in life-maintenance and race-maintenance; in man, however,
there remains, after these needs are satisfied, some superfluous strength.
This excess is used in play, which passes over into art. Play is an imitation
Page 343
of real activity; so is art. The sources of æsthetic pleasure are threefold: (1)
That "which exercises the faculties affected in the most complete ways,
with the fewest drawbacks from exercise," (2) "the difference of a stimulus
in large amount, which awakens a glow of agreeable feeling," (3) the partial
revival of the same, with special combinations.[90]
In Todhunter's "Theory of the Beautiful" (1872), beauty is infinite
loveliness, which we apprehend both by reason and by the enthusiasm of
love. The recognition of beauty as being such depends on taste; there can be
no criterion for it. The only approach to a definition is found in culture.
(What culture is, is not defined.) Intrinsically, art—that which affects us
through lines, colors, sounds, or words—is not the product of blind forces,
but of reasonable ones, working, with mutual helpfulness toward a
reasonable aim. Beauty is the reconciliation of contradictions.[91]
Grant Allen is a follower of Spencer, and in his "Physiological Æsthetics"
(1877) he says that beauty has a physical origin. Æsthetic pleasures come
from the contemplation of the beautiful, but the conception of beauty is
obtained by a physiological process. The origin of art is play; when there is
a superfluity of physical strength man gives himself to play; when there is a
superfluity of receptive power man gives himself to art. The beautiful is that
which affords the maximum of stimulation with the minimum of waste.
Differences in the estimation of beauty proceed from taste. Taste can be
educated. We must have faith in the judgments "of the finest-nurtured and
most discriminative" men. These people form the taste of the next
generation.[92]
According to Ker's "Essay on the Philosophy of Art" (1883), beauty enables
us to make part of the objective world intelligible to ourselves without
being troubled by reference to other parts of it, as is inevitable for science.
So that art destroys the opposition between the one and the many, between
the law and its manifestation, between the subject and its object, by uniting
them. Art is the revelation and vindication of freedom, because it is free
from the darkness and incomprehensibility of finite things.[93]
According to Knight's "Philosophy of the Beautiful," Part II. (1893), beauty
is (as with Schelling) the union of object and subject, the drawing forth
from nature of that which is cognate to man, and the recognition in oneself
of that which is common to all nature.
That "which exercises the faculties affected in the most complete ways,
with the fewest drawbacks from exercise," (2) "the difference of a stimulus
in large amount, which awakens a glow of agreeable feeling," (3) the partial
revival of the same, with special combinations.[90]
In Todhunter's "Theory of the Beautiful" (1872), beauty is infinite
loveliness, which we apprehend both by reason and by the enthusiasm of
love. The recognition of beauty as being such depends on taste; there can be
no criterion for it. The only approach to a definition is found in culture.
(What culture is, is not defined.) Intrinsically, art—that which affects us
through lines, colors, sounds, or words—is not the product of blind forces,
but of reasonable ones, working, with mutual helpfulness toward a
reasonable aim. Beauty is the reconciliation of contradictions.[91]
Grant Allen is a follower of Spencer, and in his "Physiological Æsthetics"
(1877) he says that beauty has a physical origin. Æsthetic pleasures come
from the contemplation of the beautiful, but the conception of beauty is
obtained by a physiological process. The origin of art is play; when there is
a superfluity of physical strength man gives himself to play; when there is a
superfluity of receptive power man gives himself to art. The beautiful is that
which affords the maximum of stimulation with the minimum of waste.
Differences in the estimation of beauty proceed from taste. Taste can be
educated. We must have faith in the judgments "of the finest-nurtured and
most discriminative" men. These people form the taste of the next
generation.[92]
According to Ker's "Essay on the Philosophy of Art" (1883), beauty enables
us to make part of the objective world intelligible to ourselves without
being troubled by reference to other parts of it, as is inevitable for science.
So that art destroys the opposition between the one and the many, between
the law and its manifestation, between the subject and its object, by uniting
them. Art is the revelation and vindication of freedom, because it is free
from the darkness and incomprehensibility of finite things.[93]
According to Knight's "Philosophy of the Beautiful," Part II. (1893), beauty
is (as with Schelling) the union of object and subject, the drawing forth
from nature of that which is cognate to man, and the recognition in oneself
of that which is common to all nature.
Page 344
The opinions on beauty and on art here mentioned are far from exhausting
what has been written on the subject. And every day fresh writers on
æsthetics arise, in whose disquisitions appear the same enchanted confusion
and contradictoriness in defining beauty. Some, by inertia, continue the
mystical æsthetics of Baumgarten and Hegel with sundry variations; others
transfer the question to the region of subjectivity, and seek for the
foundation of the beautiful in questions of taste; others—the æstheticians of
the very latest formation—seek the origin of beauty in the laws of
physiology; and finally, others again investigate the question quite
independently of the conception of beauty. Thus Sully, in his "Sensation and
Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics" (1874), dismisses the
conception of beauty altogether, art, by his definition, being the production
of some permanent object or passing action fitted to supply active
enjoyment to the producer, and a pleasurable impression to a number of
spectators or listeners, quite apart from any personal advantage derived
from it.[94]
what has been written on the subject. And every day fresh writers on
æsthetics arise, in whose disquisitions appear the same enchanted confusion
and contradictoriness in defining beauty. Some, by inertia, continue the
mystical æsthetics of Baumgarten and Hegel with sundry variations; others
transfer the question to the region of subjectivity, and seek for the
foundation of the beautiful in questions of taste; others—the æstheticians of
the very latest formation—seek the origin of beauty in the laws of
physiology; and finally, others again investigate the question quite
independently of the conception of beauty. Thus Sully, in his "Sensation and
Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics" (1874), dismisses the
conception of beauty altogether, art, by his definition, being the production
of some permanent object or passing action fitted to supply active
enjoyment to the producer, and a pleasurable impression to a number of
spectators or listeners, quite apart from any personal advantage derived
from it.[94]
Page 345
CHAPTER IV
To what do these definitions of beauty amount? Not reckoning the
thoroughly inaccurate definitions of beauty which fail to cover the
conception of art, and which suppose beauty to consist either in utility, or in
adjustment to a purpose, or in symmetry, or in order, or in proportion, or in
smoothness, or in harmony of the parts, or in unity amid variety, or in
various combinations of these—not reckoning these unsatisfactory attempts
at objective definition, all the æsthetic definitions of beauty lead to two
fundamental conceptions. The first is that beauty is something having an
independent existence (existing in itself), that it is one of the manifestations
of the absolutely Perfect, of the Idea, of the Spirit, of Will, or of God; the
other is that beauty is a kind of pleasure received by us, not having personal
advantage for its object.
The first of these definitions was accepted by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,
Schopenhauer, and the philosophizing Frenchmen, Cousin, Jouffroy,
Ravaisson, and others, not to enumerate the second-rate æsthetic
philosophers. And this same objective-mystical definition of beauty is held
by a majority of the educated people of our day. It is a conception very
widely spread, especially among the elder generation.
The second view, that beauty is a certain kind of pleasure received by us,
not having personal advantage for its aim, finds favor chiefly among the
English æsthetic writers, and is shared by the other part of our society,
principally by the younger generation.
So there are (and it could not be otherwise) only two definitions of beauty:
the one objective, mystical, merging this conception into that of the highest
perfection, God—a fantastic definition, founded on nothing; the other, on
the contrary, a very simple and intelligible subjective one, which considers
beauty to be that which pleases (I do not add to the word "pleases" the
words "without the aim of advantage," because "pleases" naturally
presupposes the absence of the idea of profit).
On the one hand, beauty is viewed as something mystical and very elevated,
but unfortunately at the same time very indefinite, and consequently
To what do these definitions of beauty amount? Not reckoning the
thoroughly inaccurate definitions of beauty which fail to cover the
conception of art, and which suppose beauty to consist either in utility, or in
adjustment to a purpose, or in symmetry, or in order, or in proportion, or in
smoothness, or in harmony of the parts, or in unity amid variety, or in
various combinations of these—not reckoning these unsatisfactory attempts
at objective definition, all the æsthetic definitions of beauty lead to two
fundamental conceptions. The first is that beauty is something having an
independent existence (existing in itself), that it is one of the manifestations
of the absolutely Perfect, of the Idea, of the Spirit, of Will, or of God; the
other is that beauty is a kind of pleasure received by us, not having personal
advantage for its object.
The first of these definitions was accepted by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,
Schopenhauer, and the philosophizing Frenchmen, Cousin, Jouffroy,
Ravaisson, and others, not to enumerate the second-rate æsthetic
philosophers. And this same objective-mystical definition of beauty is held
by a majority of the educated people of our day. It is a conception very
widely spread, especially among the elder generation.
The second view, that beauty is a certain kind of pleasure received by us,
not having personal advantage for its aim, finds favor chiefly among the
English æsthetic writers, and is shared by the other part of our society,
principally by the younger generation.
So there are (and it could not be otherwise) only two definitions of beauty:
the one objective, mystical, merging this conception into that of the highest
perfection, God—a fantastic definition, founded on nothing; the other, on
the contrary, a very simple and intelligible subjective one, which considers
beauty to be that which pleases (I do not add to the word "pleases" the
words "without the aim of advantage," because "pleases" naturally
presupposes the absence of the idea of profit).
On the one hand, beauty is viewed as something mystical and very elevated,
but unfortunately at the same time very indefinite, and consequently
Page 346
embracing philosophy, religion, and life itself (as in the theories of
Schelling and Hegel, and their German and French followers); or, on the
other hand (as necessarily follows from the definition of Kant and his
adherents), beauty is simply a certain kind of disinterested pleasure received
by us. And this conception of beauty, although it seems very clear is,
unfortunately, again inexact; for it widens out on the other side, i.e. it
includes the pleasure derived from drink, from food, from touching a
delicate skin, etc., as is acknowledged by Guyau, Kralik, and others.
It is true that, following the development of the æsthetic doctrines on
beauty, we may notice that, though at first (in the times when the
foundations of the science of æsthetics were being laid) the metaphysical
definition of beauty prevailed, yet the nearer we get to our own times the
more does an experimental definition (recently assuming a physiological
form) come to the front, so that at last we even meet with such æstheticians
as Véron and Sully, who try to escape entirely from the conception of
beauty. But such æstheticians have very little success, and with the majority
of the public, as well as of artists and the learned, a conception of beauty is
firmly held which agrees with the definitions contained in most of the
æsthetic treatises, i.e. which regards beauty either as something mystical or
metaphysical, or as a special kind of enjoyment.
What, then, is this conception of beauty, so stubbornly held to by people of
our circle and day as furnishing a definition of art?
In the subjective aspect, we call beauty that which supplies us with a
particular kind of pleasure.
In the objective aspect, we call beauty something absolutely perfect, and we
acknowledge it to be so only because we receive, from the manifestation of
this absolute perfection, a certain kind of pleasure; so that this objective
definition is nothing but the subjective conception differently expressed. In
reality both conceptions of beauty amount to one and the same thing;
namely, the reception by us of a certain kind of pleasure; i.e. we call
"beauty" that which pleases us without evoking in us desire.
Such being the position of affairs, it would seem only natural that the
science of art should decline to content itself with a definition of art based
on beauty (i.e. on that which pleases), and seek a general definition, which
should apply to all artistic productions, and by reference to which we might
Schelling and Hegel, and their German and French followers); or, on the
other hand (as necessarily follows from the definition of Kant and his
adherents), beauty is simply a certain kind of disinterested pleasure received
by us. And this conception of beauty, although it seems very clear is,
unfortunately, again inexact; for it widens out on the other side, i.e. it
includes the pleasure derived from drink, from food, from touching a
delicate skin, etc., as is acknowledged by Guyau, Kralik, and others.
It is true that, following the development of the æsthetic doctrines on
beauty, we may notice that, though at first (in the times when the
foundations of the science of æsthetics were being laid) the metaphysical
definition of beauty prevailed, yet the nearer we get to our own times the
more does an experimental definition (recently assuming a physiological
form) come to the front, so that at last we even meet with such æstheticians
as Véron and Sully, who try to escape entirely from the conception of
beauty. But such æstheticians have very little success, and with the majority
of the public, as well as of artists and the learned, a conception of beauty is
firmly held which agrees with the definitions contained in most of the
æsthetic treatises, i.e. which regards beauty either as something mystical or
metaphysical, or as a special kind of enjoyment.
What, then, is this conception of beauty, so stubbornly held to by people of
our circle and day as furnishing a definition of art?
In the subjective aspect, we call beauty that which supplies us with a
particular kind of pleasure.
In the objective aspect, we call beauty something absolutely perfect, and we
acknowledge it to be so only because we receive, from the manifestation of
this absolute perfection, a certain kind of pleasure; so that this objective
definition is nothing but the subjective conception differently expressed. In
reality both conceptions of beauty amount to one and the same thing;
namely, the reception by us of a certain kind of pleasure; i.e. we call
"beauty" that which pleases us without evoking in us desire.
Such being the position of affairs, it would seem only natural that the
science of art should decline to content itself with a definition of art based
on beauty (i.e. on that which pleases), and seek a general definition, which
should apply to all artistic productions, and by reference to which we might
Page 347
decide whether a certain article belonged to the realm of art or not. But no
such definition is supplied, as the reader may see from those summaries of
the æsthetic theories which I have given, and as he may discover even more
clearly from the original æsthetic works, if he will be at the pains to read
them. All attempts to define absolute beauty in itself—whether as an
imitation of nature, or as suitability to its object, or as a correspondence of
parts, or as symmetry, or as harmony, or as unity in variety, etc.—either
define nothing at all, or define only some traits of some artistic productions,
and are far from including all that everybody has always held, and still
holds, to be art.
There is no objective definition of beauty. The existing definitions (both the
metaphysical and the experimental) amount only to one and the same
subjective definition, which (strange as it seems to say so) is, that art is that
which makes beauty manifest, and beauty is that which pleases (without
exciting desire). Many æstheticians have felt the insufficiency and
instability of such a definition, and, in order to give it a firm basis, have
asked themselves why a thing pleases. And they have converted the
discussion on beauty into a question concerning taste, as did Hutcheson,
Voltaire, Diderot, and others. But all attempts to define what taste is must
lead to nothing, as the reader may see both from the history of æsthetics and
experimentally. There is and can be no explanation of why one thing
pleases one man and displeases another, or vice versa. So that the whole
existing science of æsthetics fails to do what we might expect from it, being
a mental activity calling itself a science; namely, it does not define the
qualities and laws of art, or of the beautiful (if that be the content of art), or
the nature of taste (if taste decides the question of art and its merit), and
then, on the basis of such definitions, acknowledge as art those productions
which correspond to these laws, and reject those which do not come under
them. But this science of æsthetics consists in first acknowledging a certain
set of productions to be art (because they please us), and then framing such
a theory of art that all those productions which please a certain circle of
people should fit into it. There exists an art canon, according to which
certain productions favored by our circle are acknowledged as being art,—
Phidias, Sophocles, Homer, Titian, Raphael, Bach, Beethoven, Dante,
Shakespear, Goethe, and others,—and the æsthetic laws must be such as to
embrace all these productions. In æsthetic literature you will incessantly
meet with opinions on the merit and importance of art, founded not on any
such definition is supplied, as the reader may see from those summaries of
the æsthetic theories which I have given, and as he may discover even more
clearly from the original æsthetic works, if he will be at the pains to read
them. All attempts to define absolute beauty in itself—whether as an
imitation of nature, or as suitability to its object, or as a correspondence of
parts, or as symmetry, or as harmony, or as unity in variety, etc.—either
define nothing at all, or define only some traits of some artistic productions,
and are far from including all that everybody has always held, and still
holds, to be art.
There is no objective definition of beauty. The existing definitions (both the
metaphysical and the experimental) amount only to one and the same
subjective definition, which (strange as it seems to say so) is, that art is that
which makes beauty manifest, and beauty is that which pleases (without
exciting desire). Many æstheticians have felt the insufficiency and
instability of such a definition, and, in order to give it a firm basis, have
asked themselves why a thing pleases. And they have converted the
discussion on beauty into a question concerning taste, as did Hutcheson,
Voltaire, Diderot, and others. But all attempts to define what taste is must
lead to nothing, as the reader may see both from the history of æsthetics and
experimentally. There is and can be no explanation of why one thing
pleases one man and displeases another, or vice versa. So that the whole
existing science of æsthetics fails to do what we might expect from it, being
a mental activity calling itself a science; namely, it does not define the
qualities and laws of art, or of the beautiful (if that be the content of art), or
the nature of taste (if taste decides the question of art and its merit), and
then, on the basis of such definitions, acknowledge as art those productions
which correspond to these laws, and reject those which do not come under
them. But this science of æsthetics consists in first acknowledging a certain
set of productions to be art (because they please us), and then framing such
a theory of art that all those productions which please a certain circle of
people should fit into it. There exists an art canon, according to which
certain productions favored by our circle are acknowledged as being art,—
Phidias, Sophocles, Homer, Titian, Raphael, Bach, Beethoven, Dante,
Shakespear, Goethe, and others,—and the æsthetic laws must be such as to
embrace all these productions. In æsthetic literature you will incessantly
meet with opinions on the merit and importance of art, founded not on any
Page 348
certain laws by which this or that is held to be good or bad, but merely on
the consideration whether this art tallies with the art canon we have drawn
up.
The other day I was reading a far from ill-written book by Folgeldt.
Discussing the demand for morality in works of art, the author plainly says
that we must not demand morality in art. And in proof of this he advances
the fact that if we admit such a demand, Shakespear's "Romeo and Juliet,"
and Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister," would not fit into the definition of good
art; but since both these books are included in our canon of art, he
concludes that the demand is unjust. And therefore it is necessary to find a
definition of art which shall fit the works; and instead of a demand for
morality, Folgeldt postulates as the basis of art a demand for the important
(Bedeutungsvolles).
All the existing æsthetic standards are built on this plan. Instead of giving a
definition of true art, and then deciding what is and what is not good art by
judging whether a work conforms or does not conform to the definition, a
certain class of works, which for some reason please a certain circle of
people, is accepted as being art, and a definition of art is then devised to
cover all these productions. I recently came upon a remarkable instance of
this method in a very good German work, "The History of Art in the
Nineteenth Century," by Muther. Describing the pre-Raphaelites, the
Decadents and the Symbolists (who are already included in the canon of
art), he not only does not venture to blame their tendency, but earnestly
endeavors to widen his standard so that it may include them all, they
appearing to him to represent a legitimate reaction from the excesses of
realism. No matter what insanities appear in art, when once they find
acceptance among the upper classes of our society, a theory is quickly
invented to explain and sanction them; just as if there had never been
periods in history when certain special circles of people recognized and
approved false, deformed, and insensate art which subsequently left no
trace and has been utterly forgotten. And to what lengths the insanity and
deformity of art may go, especially when, as in our days, it knows that it is
considered infallible, may be seen by what is being done in the art of our
circle to-day.
So that the theory of art, founded on beauty, expounded by æsthetics, and,
in dim outline, professed by the public, is nothing but the setting up as good
the consideration whether this art tallies with the art canon we have drawn
up.
The other day I was reading a far from ill-written book by Folgeldt.
Discussing the demand for morality in works of art, the author plainly says
that we must not demand morality in art. And in proof of this he advances
the fact that if we admit such a demand, Shakespear's "Romeo and Juliet,"
and Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister," would not fit into the definition of good
art; but since both these books are included in our canon of art, he
concludes that the demand is unjust. And therefore it is necessary to find a
definition of art which shall fit the works; and instead of a demand for
morality, Folgeldt postulates as the basis of art a demand for the important
(Bedeutungsvolles).
All the existing æsthetic standards are built on this plan. Instead of giving a
definition of true art, and then deciding what is and what is not good art by
judging whether a work conforms or does not conform to the definition, a
certain class of works, which for some reason please a certain circle of
people, is accepted as being art, and a definition of art is then devised to
cover all these productions. I recently came upon a remarkable instance of
this method in a very good German work, "The History of Art in the
Nineteenth Century," by Muther. Describing the pre-Raphaelites, the
Decadents and the Symbolists (who are already included in the canon of
art), he not only does not venture to blame their tendency, but earnestly
endeavors to widen his standard so that it may include them all, they
appearing to him to represent a legitimate reaction from the excesses of
realism. No matter what insanities appear in art, when once they find
acceptance among the upper classes of our society, a theory is quickly
invented to explain and sanction them; just as if there had never been
periods in history when certain special circles of people recognized and
approved false, deformed, and insensate art which subsequently left no
trace and has been utterly forgotten. And to what lengths the insanity and
deformity of art may go, especially when, as in our days, it knows that it is
considered infallible, may be seen by what is being done in the art of our
circle to-day.
So that the theory of art, founded on beauty, expounded by æsthetics, and,
in dim outline, professed by the public, is nothing but the setting up as good
Page 349
of that which has pleased and pleases us, i.e. pleases a certain class of
people.
In order to define any human activity, it is necessary to understand its sense
and importance. And, in order to do that, it is primarily necessary to
examine that activity in itself, in its dependence on its causes, and in
connection with its effects, and not merely in relation to the pleasure we can
get from it.
If we say that the aim of any activity is merely our pleasure, and define it
solely by that pleasure, our definition will evidently be a false one. But this
is precisely what has occurred in the efforts to define art. Now, if we
consider the food question, it will not occur to anyone to affirm that the
importance of food consists in the pleasure we receive when eating it. Every
one understands that the satisfaction of our taste cannot serve as a basis for
our definition of the merits of food, and that we have therefore no right to
presuppose that the dinners with cayenne pepper, Limburg cheese, alcohol,
etc., to which we are accustomed and which please us, form the very best
human food.
And in the same way, beauty, or that which pleases us, can in no sense serve
as the basis for the definition of art; nor can a series of objects which afford
us pleasure serve as the model of what art should be.
To see the aim and purpose of art in the pleasure we get from it, is like
assuming (as is done by people of the lowest moral development, e.g. by
savages) that the purpose and aim of food is the pleasure derived when
consuming it.
Just as people who conceive the aim and purpose of food to be pleasure
cannot recognize the real meaning of eating, so people who consider the
aim of art to be pleasure cannot realize its true meaning and purpose,
because they attribute to an activity, the meaning of which lies in its
connection with other phenomena of life, the false and exceptional aim of
pleasure. People come to understand that the meaning of eating lies in the
nourishment of the body only when they cease to consider that the object of
that activity is pleasure. And it is the same with regard to art. People will
come to understand the meaning of art only when they cease to consider
that the aim of that activity is beauty, i.e. pleasure. The acknowledgment of
beauty (i.e. of a certain kind of pleasure received from art) as being the aim
people.
In order to define any human activity, it is necessary to understand its sense
and importance. And, in order to do that, it is primarily necessary to
examine that activity in itself, in its dependence on its causes, and in
connection with its effects, and not merely in relation to the pleasure we can
get from it.
If we say that the aim of any activity is merely our pleasure, and define it
solely by that pleasure, our definition will evidently be a false one. But this
is precisely what has occurred in the efforts to define art. Now, if we
consider the food question, it will not occur to anyone to affirm that the
importance of food consists in the pleasure we receive when eating it. Every
one understands that the satisfaction of our taste cannot serve as a basis for
our definition of the merits of food, and that we have therefore no right to
presuppose that the dinners with cayenne pepper, Limburg cheese, alcohol,
etc., to which we are accustomed and which please us, form the very best
human food.
And in the same way, beauty, or that which pleases us, can in no sense serve
as the basis for the definition of art; nor can a series of objects which afford
us pleasure serve as the model of what art should be.
To see the aim and purpose of art in the pleasure we get from it, is like
assuming (as is done by people of the lowest moral development, e.g. by
savages) that the purpose and aim of food is the pleasure derived when
consuming it.
Just as people who conceive the aim and purpose of food to be pleasure
cannot recognize the real meaning of eating, so people who consider the
aim of art to be pleasure cannot realize its true meaning and purpose,
because they attribute to an activity, the meaning of which lies in its
connection with other phenomena of life, the false and exceptional aim of
pleasure. People come to understand that the meaning of eating lies in the
nourishment of the body only when they cease to consider that the object of
that activity is pleasure. And it is the same with regard to art. People will
come to understand the meaning of art only when they cease to consider
that the aim of that activity is beauty, i.e. pleasure. The acknowledgment of
beauty (i.e. of a certain kind of pleasure received from art) as being the aim
Page 350
of art, not only fails to assist us in finding a definition of what art is, but, on
the contrary, by transferring the question into a region quite foreign to art
(into metaphysical, psychological, physiological, and even historical
discussions as to why such a production pleases one person, and such
another displeases or pleases some one else), it renders such definition
impossible. And since discussions as to why one man likes pears and
another prefers meat do not help toward finding a definition of what is
essential in nourishment, so the solution of questions of taste in art (to
which the discussions on art involuntarily come), not only does not help to
make clear what this particular human activity which we call art really
consists in, but renders such elucidation quite impossible, until we rid
ourselves of a conception which justifies every kind of art, at the cost of
confusing the whole matter.
To the question, What is this art, to which is offered up the labor of
millions, the very lives of men, and even morality itself? we have extracted
replies from the existing æsthetics, which all amount to this that the aim of
art is beauty, that beauty is recognized by the enjoyment it gives, and that
artistic enjoyment is a good and important thing, because it is enjoyment. In
a word, that enjoyment is good because it is enjoyment. Thus, what is
considered the definition of art is no definition at all, but only a shuffle to
justify existing art. Therefore, however strange it may seem to say so, in
spite of the mountains of books written about art, no exact definition of art
has been constructed. And the reason of this is that the conception of art has
been based on the conception of beauty.
the contrary, by transferring the question into a region quite foreign to art
(into metaphysical, psychological, physiological, and even historical
discussions as to why such a production pleases one person, and such
another displeases or pleases some one else), it renders such definition
impossible. And since discussions as to why one man likes pears and
another prefers meat do not help toward finding a definition of what is
essential in nourishment, so the solution of questions of taste in art (to
which the discussions on art involuntarily come), not only does not help to
make clear what this particular human activity which we call art really
consists in, but renders such elucidation quite impossible, until we rid
ourselves of a conception which justifies every kind of art, at the cost of
confusing the whole matter.
To the question, What is this art, to which is offered up the labor of
millions, the very lives of men, and even morality itself? we have extracted
replies from the existing æsthetics, which all amount to this that the aim of
art is beauty, that beauty is recognized by the enjoyment it gives, and that
artistic enjoyment is a good and important thing, because it is enjoyment. In
a word, that enjoyment is good because it is enjoyment. Thus, what is
considered the definition of art is no definition at all, but only a shuffle to
justify existing art. Therefore, however strange it may seem to say so, in
spite of the mountains of books written about art, no exact definition of art
has been constructed. And the reason of this is that the conception of art has
been based on the conception of beauty.
Page 351
CHAPTER V
What is art, if we put aside the conception of beauty, which confuses the
whole matter? The latest and most comprehensible definitions of art, apart
from the conception of beauty, are the following: (1 a) Art is an activity
arising even in the animal kingdom, and springing from sexual desire and
the propensity to play (Schiller, Darwin, Spencer), and (1 b) accompanied
by a pleasurable excitement of the nervous system (Grant Allen). This is the
physiological-evolutionary definition. (2) Art is the external manifestation,
by means of lines, colors, movements, sounds, or words, of emotions felt by
man (Véron). This is the experimental definition. According to the very
latest definition (Sully), (3) Art is "the production of some permanent object
or passing action, which is fitted, not only to supply an active enjoyment to
the producer, but to convey a pleasurable impression to a number of
spectators or listeners, quite apart from any personal advantage to be
derived from it."
Notwithstanding the superiority of these definitions to the metaphysical
definitions which depended on the conception of beauty, they are yet far
from exact. (1 a) The first, the physiological-evolutionary definition, is
inexact, because, instead of speaking about the artistic activity itself, which
is the real matter in hand, it treats of the derivation of art. The modification
of it (1 b), based on the physiological effects on the human organism, is
inexact, because within the limits of such definition many other human
activities can be included, as has occurred in the neo-æsthetic theories,
which reckon as art the preparation of handsome clothes, pleasant scents,
and even of victuals.
The experimental definition (2), which makes art consist in the expression
of emotions, is inexact, because a man may express his emotions by means
of lines, colors, sounds, or words, and yet may not act on others by such
expression; and then the manifestation of his emotions is not art.
The third definition (that of Sully) is inexact, because in the production of
objects or actions affording pleasure to the producer and a pleasant emotion
to the spectators or hearers apart from personal advantage may be included
What is art, if we put aside the conception of beauty, which confuses the
whole matter? The latest and most comprehensible definitions of art, apart
from the conception of beauty, are the following: (1 a) Art is an activity
arising even in the animal kingdom, and springing from sexual desire and
the propensity to play (Schiller, Darwin, Spencer), and (1 b) accompanied
by a pleasurable excitement of the nervous system (Grant Allen). This is the
physiological-evolutionary definition. (2) Art is the external manifestation,
by means of lines, colors, movements, sounds, or words, of emotions felt by
man (Véron). This is the experimental definition. According to the very
latest definition (Sully), (3) Art is "the production of some permanent object
or passing action, which is fitted, not only to supply an active enjoyment to
the producer, but to convey a pleasurable impression to a number of
spectators or listeners, quite apart from any personal advantage to be
derived from it."
Notwithstanding the superiority of these definitions to the metaphysical
definitions which depended on the conception of beauty, they are yet far
from exact. (1 a) The first, the physiological-evolutionary definition, is
inexact, because, instead of speaking about the artistic activity itself, which
is the real matter in hand, it treats of the derivation of art. The modification
of it (1 b), based on the physiological effects on the human organism, is
inexact, because within the limits of such definition many other human
activities can be included, as has occurred in the neo-æsthetic theories,
which reckon as art the preparation of handsome clothes, pleasant scents,
and even of victuals.
The experimental definition (2), which makes art consist in the expression
of emotions, is inexact, because a man may express his emotions by means
of lines, colors, sounds, or words, and yet may not act on others by such
expression; and then the manifestation of his emotions is not art.
The third definition (that of Sully) is inexact, because in the production of
objects or actions affording pleasure to the producer and a pleasant emotion
to the spectators or hearers apart from personal advantage may be included
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the showing of conjuring tricks or gymnastic exercises, and other activities
which are not art. And, further, many things, the production of which does
not afford pleasure to the producer, and the sensation received from which
is unpleasant, such as gloomy, heartrending scenes in a poetic description or
a play, may nevertheless be undoubted works of art.
The inaccuracy of all these definitions arises from the fact that in them all
(as also in the metaphysical definitions) the object considered is the
pleasure art may give, and not the purpose it may serve in the life of man
and of humanity.
In order correctly to define art, it is necessary, first of all, to cease to
consider it as a means to pleasure, and to consider it as one of the
conditions of human life. Viewing it in this way, we cannot fail to observe
that art is one of the means of intercourse between man and man.
Every work of art causes the receiver to enter into a certain kind of
relationship both with him who produced, or is producing, the art, and with
all those who, simultaneously, previously, or subsequently, receive the same
artistic impression.
Speech, transmitting the thoughts and experiences of men, serves as a
means of union among them, and art acts in a similar manner. The
peculiarity of this latter means of intercourse, distinguishing it from
intercourse by means of words, consists in this, that whereas by words a
man transmits his thoughts to another, by means of art he transmits his
feelings.
The activity of art is based on the fact that a man, receiving through his
sense of hearing or sight another man's expression of feeling, is capable of
experiencing the emotion which moved the man who expressed it. To take
the simplest example: one man laughs, and another, who hears, becomes
merry; or a man weeps, and another, who hears, feels sorrow. A man is
excited or irritated, and another man, seeing him, comes to a similar state of
mind. By his movements, or by the sounds of his voice, a man expresses
courage and determination, or sadness and calmness, and this state of mind
passes on to others. A man suffers, expressing his sufferings by groans and
spasms, and this suffering transmits itself to other people; a man expresses
his feeling of admiration, devotion, fear, respect, or love to certain objects,
persons, or phenomena, and others are infected by the same feelings of
which are not art. And, further, many things, the production of which does
not afford pleasure to the producer, and the sensation received from which
is unpleasant, such as gloomy, heartrending scenes in a poetic description or
a play, may nevertheless be undoubted works of art.
The inaccuracy of all these definitions arises from the fact that in them all
(as also in the metaphysical definitions) the object considered is the
pleasure art may give, and not the purpose it may serve in the life of man
and of humanity.
In order correctly to define art, it is necessary, first of all, to cease to
consider it as a means to pleasure, and to consider it as one of the
conditions of human life. Viewing it in this way, we cannot fail to observe
that art is one of the means of intercourse between man and man.
Every work of art causes the receiver to enter into a certain kind of
relationship both with him who produced, or is producing, the art, and with
all those who, simultaneously, previously, or subsequently, receive the same
artistic impression.
Speech, transmitting the thoughts and experiences of men, serves as a
means of union among them, and art acts in a similar manner. The
peculiarity of this latter means of intercourse, distinguishing it from
intercourse by means of words, consists in this, that whereas by words a
man transmits his thoughts to another, by means of art he transmits his
feelings.
The activity of art is based on the fact that a man, receiving through his
sense of hearing or sight another man's expression of feeling, is capable of
experiencing the emotion which moved the man who expressed it. To take
the simplest example: one man laughs, and another, who hears, becomes
merry; or a man weeps, and another, who hears, feels sorrow. A man is
excited or irritated, and another man, seeing him, comes to a similar state of
mind. By his movements, or by the sounds of his voice, a man expresses
courage and determination, or sadness and calmness, and this state of mind
passes on to others. A man suffers, expressing his sufferings by groans and
spasms, and this suffering transmits itself to other people; a man expresses
his feeling of admiration, devotion, fear, respect, or love to certain objects,
persons, or phenomena, and others are infected by the same feelings of
Page 353
admiration, devotion, fear, respect, or love to the same objects, persons, and
phenomena.
And it is on this capacity of man to receive another man's expression of
feeling, and experience those feelings himself, that the activity of art is
based.
If a man infects another or others, directly, immediately, by his appearance,
or by the sounds he gives vent to at the very time he experiences the
feeling; if he causes another man to yawn when he himself cannot help
yawning, or to laugh or cry when he himself is obliged to laugh or cry, or to
suffer when he himself is suffering—that does not amount to art.
Art begins when one person, with the object of joining another or others to
himself in one and the same feeling, expresses that feeling by certain
external indications. To take the simplest example: a boy, having
experienced, let us say, fear on encountering a wolf, relates that encounter;
and, in order to evoke in others the feeling he has experienced, describes
himself, his condition before the encounter, the surroundings, the wood, his
own light-heartedness, and then the wolf's appearance, its movements, the
distance between himself and the wolf, etc. All this, if only the boy, when
telling the story, again experiences the feelings he had lived through and
infects the hearers and compels them to feel what the narrator had
experienced, is art. If even the boy had not seen a wolf but had frequently
been afraid of one, and if, wishing to evoke in others the fear he had felt, he
invented an encounter with a wolf, and recounted it so as to make his
hearers share the feelings he experienced when he feared the wolf, that also
would be art. And just in the same way it is art if a man, having experienced
either the fear of suffering or the attraction of enjoyment (whether in reality
or in imagination), expresses these feelings on canvas or in marble so that
others are infected by them. And it is also art if a man feels or imagines to
himself feelings of delight, gladness, sorrow, despair, courage, or
despondency, and the transition from one to another of these feelings, and
expresses these feelings by sounds, so that the hearers are infected by them,
and experience them as they were experienced by the composer.
The feelings with which the artist infects others may be most various,—
very strong or very weak, very important or very insignificant, very bad or
very good: feelings of love for native land, self-devotion and submission to
phenomena.
And it is on this capacity of man to receive another man's expression of
feeling, and experience those feelings himself, that the activity of art is
based.
If a man infects another or others, directly, immediately, by his appearance,
or by the sounds he gives vent to at the very time he experiences the
feeling; if he causes another man to yawn when he himself cannot help
yawning, or to laugh or cry when he himself is obliged to laugh or cry, or to
suffer when he himself is suffering—that does not amount to art.
Art begins when one person, with the object of joining another or others to
himself in one and the same feeling, expresses that feeling by certain
external indications. To take the simplest example: a boy, having
experienced, let us say, fear on encountering a wolf, relates that encounter;
and, in order to evoke in others the feeling he has experienced, describes
himself, his condition before the encounter, the surroundings, the wood, his
own light-heartedness, and then the wolf's appearance, its movements, the
distance between himself and the wolf, etc. All this, if only the boy, when
telling the story, again experiences the feelings he had lived through and
infects the hearers and compels them to feel what the narrator had
experienced, is art. If even the boy had not seen a wolf but had frequently
been afraid of one, and if, wishing to evoke in others the fear he had felt, he
invented an encounter with a wolf, and recounted it so as to make his
hearers share the feelings he experienced when he feared the wolf, that also
would be art. And just in the same way it is art if a man, having experienced
either the fear of suffering or the attraction of enjoyment (whether in reality
or in imagination), expresses these feelings on canvas or in marble so that
others are infected by them. And it is also art if a man feels or imagines to
himself feelings of delight, gladness, sorrow, despair, courage, or
despondency, and the transition from one to another of these feelings, and
expresses these feelings by sounds, so that the hearers are infected by them,
and experience them as they were experienced by the composer.
The feelings with which the artist infects others may be most various,—
very strong or very weak, very important or very insignificant, very bad or
very good: feelings of love for native land, self-devotion and submission to
Page 354
fate or to God expressed in a drama, raptures of lovers described in a novel,
feelings of voluptuousness expressed in a picture, courage expressed in a
triumphal march, merriment evoked by a dance, humor evoked by a funny
story, the feeling of quietness transmitted by an evening landscape or by a
lullaby, or the feeling of admiration evoked by a beautiful arabesque—it is
all art.
If only the spectators or auditors are infected by the feelings which the
author has felt, it is art.
To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced, and having evoked
it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds, or forms
expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience
the same feeling—this is the activity of art.
Art is a human activity, consisting in this, that one man consciously, by
means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived
through, and that other people are infected by these feelings, and also
experience them.
Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious
Idea of beauty, or God; it is not, as the æsthetical physiologists say, a game
in which man lets off his excess of stored-up energy; it is not the expression
of man's emotions by external signs; it is not the production of pleasing
objects; and, above all, it is not pleasure; but it is a means of union among
men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the
life and progress toward well-being of individuals and of humanity.
As, thanks to man's capacity to express thoughts by words, every man may
know all that has been done for him in the realms of thought by all
humanity before his day, and can, in the present, thanks to this capacity to
understand the thoughts of others, become a sharer in their activity, and can
himself hand on to his contemporaries and descendants the thoughts he has
assimilated from others, as well as those which have arisen within himself;
so, thanks to man's capacity to be infected with the feelings of others by
means of art, all that is being lived through by his contemporaries is
accessible to him, as well as the feelings experienced by men thousands of
years ago, and he has also the possibility of transmitting his own feelings to
others.
feelings of voluptuousness expressed in a picture, courage expressed in a
triumphal march, merriment evoked by a dance, humor evoked by a funny
story, the feeling of quietness transmitted by an evening landscape or by a
lullaby, or the feeling of admiration evoked by a beautiful arabesque—it is
all art.
If only the spectators or auditors are infected by the feelings which the
author has felt, it is art.
To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced, and having evoked
it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds, or forms
expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience
the same feeling—this is the activity of art.
Art is a human activity, consisting in this, that one man consciously, by
means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived
through, and that other people are infected by these feelings, and also
experience them.
Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious
Idea of beauty, or God; it is not, as the æsthetical physiologists say, a game
in which man lets off his excess of stored-up energy; it is not the expression
of man's emotions by external signs; it is not the production of pleasing
objects; and, above all, it is not pleasure; but it is a means of union among
men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the
life and progress toward well-being of individuals and of humanity.
As, thanks to man's capacity to express thoughts by words, every man may
know all that has been done for him in the realms of thought by all
humanity before his day, and can, in the present, thanks to this capacity to
understand the thoughts of others, become a sharer in their activity, and can
himself hand on to his contemporaries and descendants the thoughts he has
assimilated from others, as well as those which have arisen within himself;
so, thanks to man's capacity to be infected with the feelings of others by
means of art, all that is being lived through by his contemporaries is
accessible to him, as well as the feelings experienced by men thousands of
years ago, and he has also the possibility of transmitting his own feelings to
others.
Page 355
If people lacked this capacity to receive the thoughts conceived by the men
who preceded them, and to pass on to others their own thoughts, men would
be like wild beasts, or like Kaspar Hauser.[95]
And if men lacked this other capacity of being infected by art, people might
be almost more savage still, and, above all, more separated from, and more
hostile to, one another.
And therefore the activity of art is a most important one, as important as the
activity of speech itself, and as generally diffused.
We are accustomed to understand art to be only what we hear and see in
theaters, concerts, and exhibitions; together with buildings, statues, poems,
novels.... But all this is but the smallest part of the art by which we
communicate with each other in life. All human life is filled with works of
art of every kind,—from cradle-song, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of
houses, dress, and utensils, up to church services, buildings, monuments,
and triumphal processions. It is all artistic activity. So that by art, in the
limited sense of the word, we do not mean all human activity transmitting
feelings, but only that part which we for some reason select from it and to
which we attach special importance.
This special importance has always been given by all men to that part of
this activity which transmits feelings flowing from their religious
perception, and this small part of art they have specifically called art,
attaching to it the full meaning of the word.
That was how men of old—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—looked on art.
Thus did the Hebrew prophets and the ancient Christians regard art; thus it
was, and still is, understood by the Mahommedans, and thus is it still
understood by religious folk among our own peasantry.
Some teachers of mankind—as Plato in his "Republic," and people such as
the primitive Christians, the strict Mahommedans, and the Buddhists—have
gone so far as to repudiate all art.
People viewing art in this way (in contradiction to the prevalent view of to-
day, which regards any art as good if only it affords pleasure) considered,
and consider, that art (as contrasted with speech, which need not be listened
to) is so highly dangerous in its power to infect people against their wills,
who preceded them, and to pass on to others their own thoughts, men would
be like wild beasts, or like Kaspar Hauser.[95]
And if men lacked this other capacity of being infected by art, people might
be almost more savage still, and, above all, more separated from, and more
hostile to, one another.
And therefore the activity of art is a most important one, as important as the
activity of speech itself, and as generally diffused.
We are accustomed to understand art to be only what we hear and see in
theaters, concerts, and exhibitions; together with buildings, statues, poems,
novels.... But all this is but the smallest part of the art by which we
communicate with each other in life. All human life is filled with works of
art of every kind,—from cradle-song, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of
houses, dress, and utensils, up to church services, buildings, monuments,
and triumphal processions. It is all artistic activity. So that by art, in the
limited sense of the word, we do not mean all human activity transmitting
feelings, but only that part which we for some reason select from it and to
which we attach special importance.
This special importance has always been given by all men to that part of
this activity which transmits feelings flowing from their religious
perception, and this small part of art they have specifically called art,
attaching to it the full meaning of the word.
That was how men of old—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—looked on art.
Thus did the Hebrew prophets and the ancient Christians regard art; thus it
was, and still is, understood by the Mahommedans, and thus is it still
understood by religious folk among our own peasantry.
Some teachers of mankind—as Plato in his "Republic," and people such as
the primitive Christians, the strict Mahommedans, and the Buddhists—have
gone so far as to repudiate all art.
People viewing art in this way (in contradiction to the prevalent view of to-
day, which regards any art as good if only it affords pleasure) considered,
and consider, that art (as contrasted with speech, which need not be listened
to) is so highly dangerous in its power to infect people against their wills,
Page 356
that mankind will lose far less by banishing all art than by tolerating each
and every art.
Evidently such people were wrong in repudiating all art, for they denied
that which cannot be denied,—one of the indispensable means of
communication, without which mankind could not exist. But not less wrong
are the people of civilized European society of our class and day, in
favoring any art if it but serves beauty, i.e. gives people pleasure.
Formerly, people feared lest among the works of art there might chance to
be some causing corruption, and they prohibited art altogether. Now, they
only fear lest they should be deprived of any enjoyment art can afford, and
patronize any art. And I think the last error is much grosser than the first,
and that its consequences are far more harmful.
and every art.
Evidently such people were wrong in repudiating all art, for they denied
that which cannot be denied,—one of the indispensable means of
communication, without which mankind could not exist. But not less wrong
are the people of civilized European society of our class and day, in
favoring any art if it but serves beauty, i.e. gives people pleasure.
Formerly, people feared lest among the works of art there might chance to
be some causing corruption, and they prohibited art altogether. Now, they
only fear lest they should be deprived of any enjoyment art can afford, and
patronize any art. And I think the last error is much grosser than the first,
and that its consequences are far more harmful.
Page 357
CHAPTER VI
But how could it happen that that very art, which in ancient times was
merely tolerated (if tolerated at all), should have come, in our times, to be
invariably considered a good thing if only it affords pleasure?
It has resulted from the following causes. The estimation of the value of art
(i.e. of the feelings it transmits) depends on men's perception of the
meaning of life; depends on what they consider to be the good and the evil
of life. And what is good and what is evil is defined by what are termed
religions.
Humanity unceasingly moves forward from a lower, more partial, and
obscure understanding of life, to one more general and more lucid. And in
this, as in every movement, there are leaders,—those who have understood
the meaning of life more clearly than others,—and of these advanced men
there is always one who has, in his words and by his life, expressed this
meaning more clearly, accessibly, and strongly than others. This man's
expression of the meaning of life, together with those superstitions,
traditions, and ceremonies which usually form themselves round the
memory of such a man, is what is called a religion. Religions are the
exponents of the highest comprehension of life accessible to the best and
foremost men at a given time in a given society; a comprehension toward
which, inevitably and irresistibly, all the rest of that society must advance.
And therefore only religions have always served, and still serve, as bases
for the valuation of human sentiments. If feelings bring men nearer the ideal
their religion indicates, if they are in harmony with it and do not contradict
it, they are good; if they estrange men from it and oppose it, they are bad.
If the religion places the meaning of life in worshiping one God and
fulfilling what is regarded as His will, as was the case among the Jews, then
the feelings flowing from love to that God, and to His law, successfully
transmitted through the art of poetry by the prophets, by the psalms, or by
the epic of the book of Genesis, is good, high art. All opposing that, as, for
instance, the transmission of feelings of devotion to strange gods, or of
feelings incompatible with the law of God, would be considered bad art. Or
But how could it happen that that very art, which in ancient times was
merely tolerated (if tolerated at all), should have come, in our times, to be
invariably considered a good thing if only it affords pleasure?
It has resulted from the following causes. The estimation of the value of art
(i.e. of the feelings it transmits) depends on men's perception of the
meaning of life; depends on what they consider to be the good and the evil
of life. And what is good and what is evil is defined by what are termed
religions.
Humanity unceasingly moves forward from a lower, more partial, and
obscure understanding of life, to one more general and more lucid. And in
this, as in every movement, there are leaders,—those who have understood
the meaning of life more clearly than others,—and of these advanced men
there is always one who has, in his words and by his life, expressed this
meaning more clearly, accessibly, and strongly than others. This man's
expression of the meaning of life, together with those superstitions,
traditions, and ceremonies which usually form themselves round the
memory of such a man, is what is called a religion. Religions are the
exponents of the highest comprehension of life accessible to the best and
foremost men at a given time in a given society; a comprehension toward
which, inevitably and irresistibly, all the rest of that society must advance.
And therefore only religions have always served, and still serve, as bases
for the valuation of human sentiments. If feelings bring men nearer the ideal
their religion indicates, if they are in harmony with it and do not contradict
it, they are good; if they estrange men from it and oppose it, they are bad.
If the religion places the meaning of life in worshiping one God and
fulfilling what is regarded as His will, as was the case among the Jews, then
the feelings flowing from love to that God, and to His law, successfully
transmitted through the art of poetry by the prophets, by the psalms, or by
the epic of the book of Genesis, is good, high art. All opposing that, as, for
instance, the transmission of feelings of devotion to strange gods, or of
feelings incompatible with the law of God, would be considered bad art. Or
Page 358
if, as was the case among the Greeks, the religion places the meaning of life
in earthly happiness, in beauty and in strength, then art successfully
transmitting the joy and energy of life would be considered good art, but art
which transmitted feelings of effeminacy or despondency would be bad art.
If the meaning of life is seen in the well-being of one's nation, or in
honoring one's ancestors and continuing the mode of life led by them, as
was the case among the Romans and the Chinese respectively, then art
transmitting feelings of joy at sacrificing one's personal well-being for the
common weal, or at exalting one's ancestors and maintaining their
traditions, would be considered good art, but art expressing feelings
contrary to this would be regarded as bad. If the meaning of life is seen in
freeing oneself from the yoke of animalism, as is the case among the
Buddhists, then art successfully transmitting feelings that elevate the soul
and humble the flesh will be good art, and all that transmits feelings
strengthening the bodily passions will be bad art.
In every age, and in every human society, there exists a religious sense,
common to that whole society, of what is good and what is bad, and it is
this religious conception that decides the value of the feelings transmitted
by art. And therefore, among all nations, art which transmitted feelings
considered to be good by this general religious sense was recognized as
being good and was encouraged; but art which transmitted feelings
considered to be bad by this general religious conception, was recognized
as being bad, and was rejected. All the rest of the immense field of art by
means of which people communicate one with another, was not esteemed at
all, and was only noticed when it ran counter to the religious conception of
its age, and then merely to be repudiated. Thus it was among all nations,—
Greeks, Jews, Indians, Egyptians, and Chinese,—and so it was when
Christianity appeared.
The Christianity of the first centuries recognized as productions of good art
only legends, lives of saints, sermons, prayers, and hymn-singing, evoking
love of Christ, emotion at His life, desire to follow His example,
renunciation of worldly life, humility, and the love of others; all productions
transmitting feelings of personal enjoyment they considered to be bad, and
therefore rejected: for instance, tolerating plastic representations only when
they were symbolical, they rejected all the pagan sculptures.
in earthly happiness, in beauty and in strength, then art successfully
transmitting the joy and energy of life would be considered good art, but art
which transmitted feelings of effeminacy or despondency would be bad art.
If the meaning of life is seen in the well-being of one's nation, or in
honoring one's ancestors and continuing the mode of life led by them, as
was the case among the Romans and the Chinese respectively, then art
transmitting feelings of joy at sacrificing one's personal well-being for the
common weal, or at exalting one's ancestors and maintaining their
traditions, would be considered good art, but art expressing feelings
contrary to this would be regarded as bad. If the meaning of life is seen in
freeing oneself from the yoke of animalism, as is the case among the
Buddhists, then art successfully transmitting feelings that elevate the soul
and humble the flesh will be good art, and all that transmits feelings
strengthening the bodily passions will be bad art.
In every age, and in every human society, there exists a religious sense,
common to that whole society, of what is good and what is bad, and it is
this religious conception that decides the value of the feelings transmitted
by art. And therefore, among all nations, art which transmitted feelings
considered to be good by this general religious sense was recognized as
being good and was encouraged; but art which transmitted feelings
considered to be bad by this general religious conception, was recognized
as being bad, and was rejected. All the rest of the immense field of art by
means of which people communicate one with another, was not esteemed at
all, and was only noticed when it ran counter to the religious conception of
its age, and then merely to be repudiated. Thus it was among all nations,—
Greeks, Jews, Indians, Egyptians, and Chinese,—and so it was when
Christianity appeared.
The Christianity of the first centuries recognized as productions of good art
only legends, lives of saints, sermons, prayers, and hymn-singing, evoking
love of Christ, emotion at His life, desire to follow His example,
renunciation of worldly life, humility, and the love of others; all productions
transmitting feelings of personal enjoyment they considered to be bad, and
therefore rejected: for instance, tolerating plastic representations only when
they were symbolical, they rejected all the pagan sculptures.
Page 359
This was so among the Christians of the first centuries, who accepted
Christ's teaching, if not quite in its true form, at least not in the perverted,
paganized form in which it was accepted subsequently.
But besides this Christianity, from the time of the wholesale conversion of
nations by order of the authorities, as in the days of Constantine,
Charlemagne, and Vladimir, there appeared another, a Church Christianity,
which was nearer to paganism than to Christ's teaching. And this Church
Christianity, in accordance with its own teaching, estimated quite otherwise
the feelings of people and the productions of art which transmitted those
feelings.
This Church Christianity not only did not acknowledge the fundamental and
essential positions of true Christianity,—the immediate relationship of each
man to the Father, the consequent brotherhood and equality of all men, and
the substitution of humility and love in place of every kind of violence,—
but, on the contrary, having set up a heavenly hierarchy similar to the pagan
mythology, and having introduced the worship of Christ, of the Virgin, of
angels, of apostles, of saints, and of martyrs, and not only of these divinities
themselves, but also of their images, it made blind faith in the Church and
its ordinances the essential point of its teaching.
However foreign this teaching may have been to true Christianity; however
degraded, not only in comparison with true Christianity, but even with the
life-conception of Romans such as Julian and others,—it was, for all that, to
the barbarians who accepted it, a higher doctrine than their former adoration
of gods, heroes, and good and bad spirits. And therefore this teaching was a
religion to them, and on the basis of that religion the art of the time was
assessed. And art transmitting pious adoration of the Virgin, Jesus, the
saints and the angels, a blind faith in and submission to the Church, fear of
torments and hope of blessedness in a life beyond the grave, was considered
good; all art opposed to this was considered bad.
The teaching on the basis of which this art arose was a perversion of
Christ's teaching, but the art which sprang up on this perverted teaching was
nevertheless a true art, because it corresponded to the religious view of life
held by the people among whom it arose.
The artists of the Middle Ages, vitalized by the same source of feeling—
religion—as the mass of the people, and transmitting, in architecture,
Christ's teaching, if not quite in its true form, at least not in the perverted,
paganized form in which it was accepted subsequently.
But besides this Christianity, from the time of the wholesale conversion of
nations by order of the authorities, as in the days of Constantine,
Charlemagne, and Vladimir, there appeared another, a Church Christianity,
which was nearer to paganism than to Christ's teaching. And this Church
Christianity, in accordance with its own teaching, estimated quite otherwise
the feelings of people and the productions of art which transmitted those
feelings.
This Church Christianity not only did not acknowledge the fundamental and
essential positions of true Christianity,—the immediate relationship of each
man to the Father, the consequent brotherhood and equality of all men, and
the substitution of humility and love in place of every kind of violence,—
but, on the contrary, having set up a heavenly hierarchy similar to the pagan
mythology, and having introduced the worship of Christ, of the Virgin, of
angels, of apostles, of saints, and of martyrs, and not only of these divinities
themselves, but also of their images, it made blind faith in the Church and
its ordinances the essential point of its teaching.
However foreign this teaching may have been to true Christianity; however
degraded, not only in comparison with true Christianity, but even with the
life-conception of Romans such as Julian and others,—it was, for all that, to
the barbarians who accepted it, a higher doctrine than their former adoration
of gods, heroes, and good and bad spirits. And therefore this teaching was a
religion to them, and on the basis of that religion the art of the time was
assessed. And art transmitting pious adoration of the Virgin, Jesus, the
saints and the angels, a blind faith in and submission to the Church, fear of
torments and hope of blessedness in a life beyond the grave, was considered
good; all art opposed to this was considered bad.
The teaching on the basis of which this art arose was a perversion of
Christ's teaching, but the art which sprang up on this perverted teaching was
nevertheless a true art, because it corresponded to the religious view of life
held by the people among whom it arose.
The artists of the Middle Ages, vitalized by the same source of feeling—
religion—as the mass of the people, and transmitting, in architecture,
Page 360
sculpture, painting, music, poetry or drama, the feelings and states of mind
they experienced, were true artists; and their activity, founded on the
highest conceptions accessible to their age and common to the entire
people, though, for our times a mean art, was, nevertheless a true one,
shared by the whole community.
And this was the state of things until, in the upper, rich, more educated
classes of European society, doubt arose as to the truth of that
understanding of life which was expressed by Church Christianity. When,
after the Crusades and the maximum development of papal power and its
abuses, people of the rich classes became acquainted with the wisdom of
the classics, and saw, on the one hand, the reasonable lucidity of the
teaching of the ancient sages, and, on the other hand, the incompatibility of
the Church doctrine with the teaching of Christ, they lost all possibility of
continuing to believe the Church teaching.
If, in externals, they still kept to the forms of Church teaching, they could
no longer believe in it, and held to it only by inertia and for the sake of
influencing the masses, who continued to believe blindly in Church
doctrine, and whom the upper classes, for their own advantage, considered
it necessary to support in those beliefs.
So that a time came when Church Christianity ceased to be the general
religious doctrine of all Christian people; some—the masses—continued
blindly to believe in it, but the upper classes—those in whose hands lay the
power and wealth, and therefore the leisure to produce art and the means to
stimulate it—ceased to believe in that teaching.
In respect to religion, the upper circles of the Middle Ages found
themselves in the same position in which the educated Romans were before
Christianity arose, i.e. they no longer believed in the religion of the masses,
but had no beliefs to put in place of the worn-out Church doctrine which for
them had lost its meaning.
There was only this difference: that whereas for the Romans, who lost faith
in their emperor-gods and household-gods, it was impossible to extract
anything further from all the complex mythology they had borrowed from
all the conquered nations, and it was consequently necessary to find a
completely new conception of life, the people of the Middle Ages, when
they doubted the truth of the Church teaching, had no need to seek a fresh
they experienced, were true artists; and their activity, founded on the
highest conceptions accessible to their age and common to the entire
people, though, for our times a mean art, was, nevertheless a true one,
shared by the whole community.
And this was the state of things until, in the upper, rich, more educated
classes of European society, doubt arose as to the truth of that
understanding of life which was expressed by Church Christianity. When,
after the Crusades and the maximum development of papal power and its
abuses, people of the rich classes became acquainted with the wisdom of
the classics, and saw, on the one hand, the reasonable lucidity of the
teaching of the ancient sages, and, on the other hand, the incompatibility of
the Church doctrine with the teaching of Christ, they lost all possibility of
continuing to believe the Church teaching.
If, in externals, they still kept to the forms of Church teaching, they could
no longer believe in it, and held to it only by inertia and for the sake of
influencing the masses, who continued to believe blindly in Church
doctrine, and whom the upper classes, for their own advantage, considered
it necessary to support in those beliefs.
So that a time came when Church Christianity ceased to be the general
religious doctrine of all Christian people; some—the masses—continued
blindly to believe in it, but the upper classes—those in whose hands lay the
power and wealth, and therefore the leisure to produce art and the means to
stimulate it—ceased to believe in that teaching.
In respect to religion, the upper circles of the Middle Ages found
themselves in the same position in which the educated Romans were before
Christianity arose, i.e. they no longer believed in the religion of the masses,
but had no beliefs to put in place of the worn-out Church doctrine which for
them had lost its meaning.
There was only this difference: that whereas for the Romans, who lost faith
in their emperor-gods and household-gods, it was impossible to extract
anything further from all the complex mythology they had borrowed from
all the conquered nations, and it was consequently necessary to find a
completely new conception of life, the people of the Middle Ages, when
they doubted the truth of the Church teaching, had no need to seek a fresh
Page 361
one. That Christian teaching which they professed in a perverted form as
Church doctrine had mapped out the path of human progress so far ahead
that they had but to rid themselves of those perversions which hid the
teaching announced by Christ, and to adopt its real meaning—if not
completely, then at least in some greater degree than that in which the
Church had held it. And this was partially done, not only in the reformations
of Wyclif, Huss, Luther, and Calvin, but by all that current of non-Church
Christianity represented in earlier times by the Paulicians, the Bogomili,[96]
and, afterward, by the Waldenses and the other non-Church Christians who
were called heretics. But this could be, and was, done chiefly by poor
people—who did not rule. A few of the rich and strong, like Francis of
Assisi and others, accepted the Christian teaching in its full significance,
even though it undermined their privileged positions. But most people of
the upper classes (though in the depth of their souls they had lost faith in the
Church teaching) could not or would not act thus, because the essence of
that Christian view of life, which stood ready to be adopted when once they
rejected the Church faith, was a teaching of the brotherhood (and therefore
the equality) of man, and this negatived those privileges on which they
lived, in which they had grown up and been educated, and to which they
were accustomed. Not, in the depth of their hearts, believing in the Church
teaching,—which had outlived its age and had no longer any true meaning
for them,—and not being strong enough to accept true Christianity, men of
these rich, governing classes—popes, kings, dukes, and all the great ones of
the earth—were left without any religion, with but the external forms of
one, which they supported as being profitable and even necessary for
themselves, since these forms screened a teaching which justified those
privileges which they made use of. In reality, these people believed in
nothing, just as the Romans of the first centuries of our era believed in
nothing. But at the same time these were the people who had the power and
the wealth, and these were the people who rewarded art and directed it.
And, let it be noticed, it was just among these people that there grew up an
art esteemed, not according to its success in expressing men's religious
feelings, but in proportion to its beauty,—in other words, according to the
enjoyment it gave.
No longer able to believe in the Church religion, whose falsehood they had
detected, and incapable of accepting true Christian teaching, which
Church doctrine had mapped out the path of human progress so far ahead
that they had but to rid themselves of those perversions which hid the
teaching announced by Christ, and to adopt its real meaning—if not
completely, then at least in some greater degree than that in which the
Church had held it. And this was partially done, not only in the reformations
of Wyclif, Huss, Luther, and Calvin, but by all that current of non-Church
Christianity represented in earlier times by the Paulicians, the Bogomili,[96]
and, afterward, by the Waldenses and the other non-Church Christians who
were called heretics. But this could be, and was, done chiefly by poor
people—who did not rule. A few of the rich and strong, like Francis of
Assisi and others, accepted the Christian teaching in its full significance,
even though it undermined their privileged positions. But most people of
the upper classes (though in the depth of their souls they had lost faith in the
Church teaching) could not or would not act thus, because the essence of
that Christian view of life, which stood ready to be adopted when once they
rejected the Church faith, was a teaching of the brotherhood (and therefore
the equality) of man, and this negatived those privileges on which they
lived, in which they had grown up and been educated, and to which they
were accustomed. Not, in the depth of their hearts, believing in the Church
teaching,—which had outlived its age and had no longer any true meaning
for them,—and not being strong enough to accept true Christianity, men of
these rich, governing classes—popes, kings, dukes, and all the great ones of
the earth—were left without any religion, with but the external forms of
one, which they supported as being profitable and even necessary for
themselves, since these forms screened a teaching which justified those
privileges which they made use of. In reality, these people believed in
nothing, just as the Romans of the first centuries of our era believed in
nothing. But at the same time these were the people who had the power and
the wealth, and these were the people who rewarded art and directed it.
And, let it be noticed, it was just among these people that there grew up an
art esteemed, not according to its success in expressing men's religious
feelings, but in proportion to its beauty,—in other words, according to the
enjoyment it gave.
No longer able to believe in the Church religion, whose falsehood they had
detected, and incapable of accepting true Christian teaching, which
Page 362
denounced their whole manner of life, these rich and powerful people,
stranded without any religious conception of life, involuntarily returned to
that pagan view of things which places life's meaning in personal
enjoyment. And then took place among the upper classes what is called the
"Renaissance of science and art," and which was really not only a denial of
every religion, but also an assertion that religion is unnecessary.
The Church doctrine is so coherent a system that it cannot be altered or
corrected without destroying it altogether. As soon as doubt arose with
regard to the infallibility of the Pope (and this doubt was then in the minds
of all educated people), doubt inevitably followed as to the truth of
tradition. But doubt as to the truth of tradition is fatal not only to popery
and Catholicism, but also to the whole Church creed, with all its dogmas:
the divinity of Christ, the resurrection, and the Trinity; and it destroys the
authority of the Scriptures, since they were considered to be inspired only
because the tradition of the Church decided it so.
So that the majority of the highest classes of that age, even the popes and
the ecclesiastics, really believed in nothing at all. In the Church doctrine
these people did not believe, for they saw its insolvency; but neither could
they follow Francis of Assisi, Keltchitsky,[97] and most of the heretics, in
acknowledging the moral, social teaching of Christ, for that teaching
undermined their social position. And so these people remained without any
religious view of life. And, having none, they could have no standard
wherewith to estimate what was good and what was bad art but that of
personal enjoyment. And, having acknowledged their criterion of what was
good to be pleasure, i.e. beauty, these people of the upper classes of
European society went back in their comprehension of art to the gross
conception of the primitive Greeks which Plato had already condemned.
And conformably to this understanding of life, a theory of art was
formulated.
stranded without any religious conception of life, involuntarily returned to
that pagan view of things which places life's meaning in personal
enjoyment. And then took place among the upper classes what is called the
"Renaissance of science and art," and which was really not only a denial of
every religion, but also an assertion that religion is unnecessary.
The Church doctrine is so coherent a system that it cannot be altered or
corrected without destroying it altogether. As soon as doubt arose with
regard to the infallibility of the Pope (and this doubt was then in the minds
of all educated people), doubt inevitably followed as to the truth of
tradition. But doubt as to the truth of tradition is fatal not only to popery
and Catholicism, but also to the whole Church creed, with all its dogmas:
the divinity of Christ, the resurrection, and the Trinity; and it destroys the
authority of the Scriptures, since they were considered to be inspired only
because the tradition of the Church decided it so.
So that the majority of the highest classes of that age, even the popes and
the ecclesiastics, really believed in nothing at all. In the Church doctrine
these people did not believe, for they saw its insolvency; but neither could
they follow Francis of Assisi, Keltchitsky,[97] and most of the heretics, in
acknowledging the moral, social teaching of Christ, for that teaching
undermined their social position. And so these people remained without any
religious view of life. And, having none, they could have no standard
wherewith to estimate what was good and what was bad art but that of
personal enjoyment. And, having acknowledged their criterion of what was
good to be pleasure, i.e. beauty, these people of the upper classes of
European society went back in their comprehension of art to the gross
conception of the primitive Greeks which Plato had already condemned.
And conformably to this understanding of life, a theory of art was
formulated.
Page 363
CHAPTER VII
From the time that people of the upper classes lost faith in Church
Christianity, beauty (i.e. the pleasure received from art) became their
standard of good and bad art. And, in accordance with that view, an æsthetic
theory naturally sprang up among those upper classes justifying such a
conception,—a theory according to which the aim of art is to exhibit beauty.
The partizans of this æsthetic theory, in confirmation of its truth, affirmed
that it was no invention of their own, but that it existed in the nature of
things, and was recognized even by the ancient Greeks. But this assertion
was quite arbitrary, and has no foundation other than the fact that among the
ancient Greeks, in consequence of the low grade of their moral ideal (as
compared with the Christian), their conception of the good, τὸ ἀγαθόν, was
not yet sharply divided from their conception of the beautiful, τὸ καλὸν.
That highest perfection of goodness (not only not identical with beauty, but,
for the most part, contrasting with it) which was discerned by the Jews even
in the times of Isaiah, and fully expressed by Christianity, was quite
unknown to the Greeks. They supposed that the beautiful must necessarily
also be the good. It is true that their foremost thinkers—Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle—felt that goodness may happen not to coincide with beauty.
Socrates expressly subordinated beauty to goodness; Plato, to unite the two
conceptions, spoke of spiritual beauty; while Aristotle demanded from art
that it should have a moral influence on people (κάθαρσις). But,
notwithstanding all this, they could not quite dismiss the notion that beauty
and goodness coincide.
And consequently, in the language of that period, a compound word (καλο-
κἀγαθία, beauty-goodness) came into use to express that notion.
Evidently the Greek sages began to draw near to that perception of
goodness which is expressed in Buddhism and in Christianity, and they got
entangled in defining the relation between goodness and beauty. Plato's
reasonings about beauty and goodness are full of contradictions. And it was
just this confusion of ideas that those Europeans of a later age, who had lost
all faith, tried to elevate into a law. They tried to prove that this union of
From the time that people of the upper classes lost faith in Church
Christianity, beauty (i.e. the pleasure received from art) became their
standard of good and bad art. And, in accordance with that view, an æsthetic
theory naturally sprang up among those upper classes justifying such a
conception,—a theory according to which the aim of art is to exhibit beauty.
The partizans of this æsthetic theory, in confirmation of its truth, affirmed
that it was no invention of their own, but that it existed in the nature of
things, and was recognized even by the ancient Greeks. But this assertion
was quite arbitrary, and has no foundation other than the fact that among the
ancient Greeks, in consequence of the low grade of their moral ideal (as
compared with the Christian), their conception of the good, τὸ ἀγαθόν, was
not yet sharply divided from their conception of the beautiful, τὸ καλὸν.
That highest perfection of goodness (not only not identical with beauty, but,
for the most part, contrasting with it) which was discerned by the Jews even
in the times of Isaiah, and fully expressed by Christianity, was quite
unknown to the Greeks. They supposed that the beautiful must necessarily
also be the good. It is true that their foremost thinkers—Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle—felt that goodness may happen not to coincide with beauty.
Socrates expressly subordinated beauty to goodness; Plato, to unite the two
conceptions, spoke of spiritual beauty; while Aristotle demanded from art
that it should have a moral influence on people (κάθαρσις). But,
notwithstanding all this, they could not quite dismiss the notion that beauty
and goodness coincide.
And consequently, in the language of that period, a compound word (καλο-
κἀγαθία, beauty-goodness) came into use to express that notion.
Evidently the Greek sages began to draw near to that perception of
goodness which is expressed in Buddhism and in Christianity, and they got
entangled in defining the relation between goodness and beauty. Plato's
reasonings about beauty and goodness are full of contradictions. And it was
just this confusion of ideas that those Europeans of a later age, who had lost
all faith, tried to elevate into a law. They tried to prove that this union of
Page 364
beauty and goodness is inherent in the very essence of things; that beauty
and goodness must coincide; and that the word and conception καλο-
κἀγαθία (which had a meaning for Greeks, but has none at all for
Christians) represents the highest ideal of humanity. On this
misunderstanding the new science of æsthetics was built up. And, to justify
its existence, the teachings of the ancients on art were so twisted as to make
it appear that this invented science of æsthetics had existed among the
Greeks.
In reality, the reasoning of the ancients on art was quite unlike ours. As
Benard, in his book on the æsthetics of Aristotle, quite justly remarks,
"Pour qui veut y regarder de près, la théorie du beau et celle de l'art sont
tout à fait séparées dans Aristote, comme elles le sont dans Platon et chez
tous leurs successeurs" ("L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses Successeurs,"
Paris, 1889, p. 28).[98] And indeed the reasoning of the ancients on art not
only does not confirm our science of æsthetics, but rather contradicts its
doctrine of beauty. But nevertheless all the æsthetic guides, from Schasler
to Knight, declare that the science of the beautiful—æsthetic science—was
commenced by the ancients, by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; and was
continued, they say, partially by the Epicureans and Stoics: by Seneca and
Plutarch, down to Plotinus. But it is supposed that this science, by some
unfortunate accident, suddenly vanished in the fourth century, and stayed
away for about 1500 years, and only after these 1500 years had passed did it
revive in Germany, 1750 A.D., in Baumgarten's doctrine.
After Plotinus, says Schasler, fifteen centuries passed away during which
there was not the slightest scientific interest felt for the world of beauty and
art. These one and a half thousand years, says he, have been lost to
æsthetics, and have contributed nothing toward the erection of the learned
edifice of this science.[99]
In reality nothing of the kind happened. The science of æsthetics, the
science of the beautiful, neither did nor could vanish, because it never
existed. Simply, the Greeks (just like everybody else, always and
everywhere) considered art (like everything else) good only when it served
goodness (as they understood goodness), and bad when it was in opposition
to that goodness. And the Greeks themselves were so little developed
morally, that goodness and beauty seemed to them to coincide. On that
obsolete Greek view of life was erected the science of æsthetics, invented
and goodness must coincide; and that the word and conception καλο-
κἀγαθία (which had a meaning for Greeks, but has none at all for
Christians) represents the highest ideal of humanity. On this
misunderstanding the new science of æsthetics was built up. And, to justify
its existence, the teachings of the ancients on art were so twisted as to make
it appear that this invented science of æsthetics had existed among the
Greeks.
In reality, the reasoning of the ancients on art was quite unlike ours. As
Benard, in his book on the æsthetics of Aristotle, quite justly remarks,
"Pour qui veut y regarder de près, la théorie du beau et celle de l'art sont
tout à fait séparées dans Aristote, comme elles le sont dans Platon et chez
tous leurs successeurs" ("L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses Successeurs,"
Paris, 1889, p. 28).[98] And indeed the reasoning of the ancients on art not
only does not confirm our science of æsthetics, but rather contradicts its
doctrine of beauty. But nevertheless all the æsthetic guides, from Schasler
to Knight, declare that the science of the beautiful—æsthetic science—was
commenced by the ancients, by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; and was
continued, they say, partially by the Epicureans and Stoics: by Seneca and
Plutarch, down to Plotinus. But it is supposed that this science, by some
unfortunate accident, suddenly vanished in the fourth century, and stayed
away for about 1500 years, and only after these 1500 years had passed did it
revive in Germany, 1750 A.D., in Baumgarten's doctrine.
After Plotinus, says Schasler, fifteen centuries passed away during which
there was not the slightest scientific interest felt for the world of beauty and
art. These one and a half thousand years, says he, have been lost to
æsthetics, and have contributed nothing toward the erection of the learned
edifice of this science.[99]
In reality nothing of the kind happened. The science of æsthetics, the
science of the beautiful, neither did nor could vanish, because it never
existed. Simply, the Greeks (just like everybody else, always and
everywhere) considered art (like everything else) good only when it served
goodness (as they understood goodness), and bad when it was in opposition
to that goodness. And the Greeks themselves were so little developed
morally, that goodness and beauty seemed to them to coincide. On that
obsolete Greek view of life was erected the science of æsthetics, invented
Page 365
by men of the eighteenth century, and especially shaped and mounted in
Baumgarten's theory. The Greeks (as any one may see who will read
Benard's admirable book on Aristotle and his successors and Walter's work
on Plato) never had a science of æsthetics.
Æsthetic theories arose about one hundred and fifty years ago among the
wealthy classes of the Christian European world, and arose simultaneously
among different nations,—German, Italian, Dutch, French, and English.
The founder and organizer of it, who gave it a scientific, theoretic form, was
Baumgarten.
With a characteristically German, external exactitude, pedantry, and
symmetry, he devised and expounded this extraordinary theory. And,
notwithstanding its obvious insolidity, nobody else's theory so pleased the
cultured crowd, or was accepted so readily and with such an absence of
criticism. It so suited the people of the upper classes, that to this day,
notwithstanding its entirely fantastic character and the arbitrary nature of its
assertions, it is repeated by learned and unlearned as though it were
something indubitable and self-evident.
Habent sua fata libelli pro capite lectoris, and so, or even more so, theories
habent sua fata according to the condition of error in which that society is
living, among whom and for whom the theories are invented. If a theory
justifies the false position in which a certain part of a society is living, then,
however unfounded or even obviously false the theory may be, it is
accepted, and becomes an article of faith to that section of society. Such, for
instance, was the celebrated and unfounded theory, expounded by Malthus,
of the tendency of that population of the world to increase in geometrical
progression, but of the means of sustenance to increase only in arithmetical
progression, and of the consequent over-population of the world; such, also,
was the theory (an outgrowth of the Malthusian) of selection and struggle
for existence as the basis of human progress. Such, again, is Marx's theory,
which regards the gradual destruction of small private production by large
capitalistic production, now going on around us, as an inevitable decree of
fate. However unfounded such theories are, however contrary to all that is
known and confessed by humanity, and however obviously immoral they
may be, they are accepted with credulity, pass uncriticized, and are
preached, perchance for centuries, until the conditions are destroyed which
they served to justify, or until their absurdity has become too evident. To
Baumgarten's theory. The Greeks (as any one may see who will read
Benard's admirable book on Aristotle and his successors and Walter's work
on Plato) never had a science of æsthetics.
Æsthetic theories arose about one hundred and fifty years ago among the
wealthy classes of the Christian European world, and arose simultaneously
among different nations,—German, Italian, Dutch, French, and English.
The founder and organizer of it, who gave it a scientific, theoretic form, was
Baumgarten.
With a characteristically German, external exactitude, pedantry, and
symmetry, he devised and expounded this extraordinary theory. And,
notwithstanding its obvious insolidity, nobody else's theory so pleased the
cultured crowd, or was accepted so readily and with such an absence of
criticism. It so suited the people of the upper classes, that to this day,
notwithstanding its entirely fantastic character and the arbitrary nature of its
assertions, it is repeated by learned and unlearned as though it were
something indubitable and self-evident.
Habent sua fata libelli pro capite lectoris, and so, or even more so, theories
habent sua fata according to the condition of error in which that society is
living, among whom and for whom the theories are invented. If a theory
justifies the false position in which a certain part of a society is living, then,
however unfounded or even obviously false the theory may be, it is
accepted, and becomes an article of faith to that section of society. Such, for
instance, was the celebrated and unfounded theory, expounded by Malthus,
of the tendency of that population of the world to increase in geometrical
progression, but of the means of sustenance to increase only in arithmetical
progression, and of the consequent over-population of the world; such, also,
was the theory (an outgrowth of the Malthusian) of selection and struggle
for existence as the basis of human progress. Such, again, is Marx's theory,
which regards the gradual destruction of small private production by large
capitalistic production, now going on around us, as an inevitable decree of
fate. However unfounded such theories are, however contrary to all that is
known and confessed by humanity, and however obviously immoral they
may be, they are accepted with credulity, pass uncriticized, and are
preached, perchance for centuries, until the conditions are destroyed which
they served to justify, or until their absurdity has become too evident. To
Page 366
this class belongs this astonishing theory of the Baumgartenian Trinity,—
Goodness, Beauty, and Truth,—according to which it appears that the very
best that can be done by the art of nations after 1900 years of Christian
teaching, is to choose as the ideal of their life the ideal that was held by a
small, semi-savage, slave-holding people who lived 2000 years ago, who
imitated the nude human body extremely well, and erected buildings
pleasant to look at. All these incompatibilities pass completely unnoticed.
Learned people write long, cloudy treatises on beauty as a member of the
æsthetic trinity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness: das Schöne, das Wahre, das
Gute; le Beau, le Vrai, le Bon, are repeated, with capital letters, by
philosophers, æstheticians, and artists, by private individuals, by novelists,
and by feuilletonistes, and they all think, when pronouncing these
sacrosanct words, that they speak of something quite definite and solid—
something on which they can base their opinions. In reality, these words not
only have no definite meaning, but they hinder us in attaching any definite
meaning to existing art; they are wanted only for the purpose of justifying
the false importance we attribute to an art that transmits every kind of
feeling, if only those feelings afford us pleasure.
Goodness, Beauty, and Truth,—according to which it appears that the very
best that can be done by the art of nations after 1900 years of Christian
teaching, is to choose as the ideal of their life the ideal that was held by a
small, semi-savage, slave-holding people who lived 2000 years ago, who
imitated the nude human body extremely well, and erected buildings
pleasant to look at. All these incompatibilities pass completely unnoticed.
Learned people write long, cloudy treatises on beauty as a member of the
æsthetic trinity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness: das Schöne, das Wahre, das
Gute; le Beau, le Vrai, le Bon, are repeated, with capital letters, by
philosophers, æstheticians, and artists, by private individuals, by novelists,
and by feuilletonistes, and they all think, when pronouncing these
sacrosanct words, that they speak of something quite definite and solid—
something on which they can base their opinions. In reality, these words not
only have no definite meaning, but they hinder us in attaching any definite
meaning to existing art; they are wanted only for the purpose of justifying
the false importance we attribute to an art that transmits every kind of
feeling, if only those feelings afford us pleasure.
Page 367
CHAPTER VIII
But if art is a human activity having for its purpose the transmission to
others of the highest and best feelings to which men have risen, how could
it be that humanity for a certain rather considerable period of its existence
(from the time people ceased to believe in Church doctrine down to the
present day) should exist without this important activity, and, instead of it,
should put up with an insignificant artistic activity only affording pleasure?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary, first of all, to correct the
current error people make in attributing to our art the significance of true,
universal art. We are so accustomed, not only naïvely to consider the
Circassian family the best stock of people, but also the Anglo-Saxon race
the best race if we are Englishmen or Americans, or the Teutonic if we are
Germans, or the Gallo-Latin if we are French, or the Slavonic if we are
Russians, that, when speaking of our own art, we feel fully convinced, not
only that our art is true art, but even that it is the best and only true art. But
in reality our art is not only not the only art (as the Bible once was held to
be the only book), but it is not even the art of the whole of Christendom—
only of a small section of that part of humanity. It was correct to speak of a
national Jewish, Grecian, or Egyptian art, and one may speak of a now-
existing Chinese, Japanese, or Indian art shared in by a whole people. Such
art, common to a whole nation, existed in Russia till Peter the First's time,
and existed in the rest of Europe until the thirteenth or fourteenth century;
but since the upper classes of European society, having lost faith in the
Church teaching, did not accept real Christianity but remained without any
faith, one can no longer speak of an art of the Christian nations in the sense
of the whole of art. Since the upper classes of the Christian nations lost faith
in Church Christianity, the art of those upper classes has separated itself
from the art of the rest of the people, and there have been two arts,—the art
of the people and genteel art. And therefore the answer to the question, How
it could occur that humanity lived for a certain period without real art,
replacing it by art which served enjoyment only? is, that not all humanity,
nor even any considerable portion of it, lived without real art, but only the
highest classes of European Christian society, and even they only for a
But if art is a human activity having for its purpose the transmission to
others of the highest and best feelings to which men have risen, how could
it be that humanity for a certain rather considerable period of its existence
(from the time people ceased to believe in Church doctrine down to the
present day) should exist without this important activity, and, instead of it,
should put up with an insignificant artistic activity only affording pleasure?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary, first of all, to correct the
current error people make in attributing to our art the significance of true,
universal art. We are so accustomed, not only naïvely to consider the
Circassian family the best stock of people, but also the Anglo-Saxon race
the best race if we are Englishmen or Americans, or the Teutonic if we are
Germans, or the Gallo-Latin if we are French, or the Slavonic if we are
Russians, that, when speaking of our own art, we feel fully convinced, not
only that our art is true art, but even that it is the best and only true art. But
in reality our art is not only not the only art (as the Bible once was held to
be the only book), but it is not even the art of the whole of Christendom—
only of a small section of that part of humanity. It was correct to speak of a
national Jewish, Grecian, or Egyptian art, and one may speak of a now-
existing Chinese, Japanese, or Indian art shared in by a whole people. Such
art, common to a whole nation, existed in Russia till Peter the First's time,
and existed in the rest of Europe until the thirteenth or fourteenth century;
but since the upper classes of European society, having lost faith in the
Church teaching, did not accept real Christianity but remained without any
faith, one can no longer speak of an art of the Christian nations in the sense
of the whole of art. Since the upper classes of the Christian nations lost faith
in Church Christianity, the art of those upper classes has separated itself
from the art of the rest of the people, and there have been two arts,—the art
of the people and genteel art. And therefore the answer to the question, How
it could occur that humanity lived for a certain period without real art,
replacing it by art which served enjoyment only? is, that not all humanity,
nor even any considerable portion of it, lived without real art, but only the
highest classes of European Christian society, and even they only for a
Page 368
comparatively short time,—from the commencement of the Renaissance
down to our own day.
And the consequence of this absence of true art showed itself, inevitably, in
the corruption of that class which nourished itself on the false art. All the
confused, unintelligible theories of art, all the false and contradictory
judgments on art, and particularly the self-confident stagnation of our art in
its false path, all arise from the assertion, which has come into common use
and is accepted as an unquestioned truth, but is yet amazingly and palpably
false, the assertion, namely, that the art of our upper classes[100] is the whole
of art, the true, the only, the universal art. And although this assertion
(which is precisely similar to the assertion made by religious people of the
various Churches who consider that theirs is the only true religion) is quite
arbitrary and obviously unjust, yet it is calmly repeated by all the people of
our circle with full faith in its infallibility.
The art we have is the whole of art, the real, the only art, and yet two-thirds
of the human race (all the peoples of Asia and Africa) live and die knowing
nothing of this sole and supreme art. And even in our Christian society
hardly one per cent of the people make use of this art which we speak of as
being the whole of art; the remaining ninety-nine per cent live and die,
generation after generation, crushed by toil, and never tasting this art,
which, moreover, is of such a nature that, if they could get it, they would
not understand anything of it. We, according to the current æsthetic theory,
acknowledge art as one of the highest manifestations of the Idea, God,
Beauty, or as the highest spiritual enjoyment; furthermore, we hold that all
people have equal rights, if not to material, at any rate to spiritual well-
being; and yet ninety-nine per cent of our European population live and die,
generation after generation, crushed by toil, much of which toil is necessary
for the production of our art which they never use, and we, nevertheless,
calmly assert that the art which we produce is the real, true, only art—all of
art!
To the remark that if our art is the true art every one should have the benefit
of it, the usual reply is that if not everybody at present makes use of
existing art, the fault lies, not in the art, but in the false organization of
society; that one can imagine to oneself, in the future, a state of things in
which physical labor will be partly superseded by machinery, partly
lightened by its just distribution, and that labor for the production of art will
down to our own day.
And the consequence of this absence of true art showed itself, inevitably, in
the corruption of that class which nourished itself on the false art. All the
confused, unintelligible theories of art, all the false and contradictory
judgments on art, and particularly the self-confident stagnation of our art in
its false path, all arise from the assertion, which has come into common use
and is accepted as an unquestioned truth, but is yet amazingly and palpably
false, the assertion, namely, that the art of our upper classes[100] is the whole
of art, the true, the only, the universal art. And although this assertion
(which is precisely similar to the assertion made by religious people of the
various Churches who consider that theirs is the only true religion) is quite
arbitrary and obviously unjust, yet it is calmly repeated by all the people of
our circle with full faith in its infallibility.
The art we have is the whole of art, the real, the only art, and yet two-thirds
of the human race (all the peoples of Asia and Africa) live and die knowing
nothing of this sole and supreme art. And even in our Christian society
hardly one per cent of the people make use of this art which we speak of as
being the whole of art; the remaining ninety-nine per cent live and die,
generation after generation, crushed by toil, and never tasting this art,
which, moreover, is of such a nature that, if they could get it, they would
not understand anything of it. We, according to the current æsthetic theory,
acknowledge art as one of the highest manifestations of the Idea, God,
Beauty, or as the highest spiritual enjoyment; furthermore, we hold that all
people have equal rights, if not to material, at any rate to spiritual well-
being; and yet ninety-nine per cent of our European population live and die,
generation after generation, crushed by toil, much of which toil is necessary
for the production of our art which they never use, and we, nevertheless,
calmly assert that the art which we produce is the real, true, only art—all of
art!
To the remark that if our art is the true art every one should have the benefit
of it, the usual reply is that if not everybody at present makes use of
existing art, the fault lies, not in the art, but in the false organization of
society; that one can imagine to oneself, in the future, a state of things in
which physical labor will be partly superseded by machinery, partly
lightened by its just distribution, and that labor for the production of art will
Page 369
be taken in turns; that there is no need for some people always to sit below
the stage moving the decorations, winding up the machinery, working at the
piano or French horn, and setting type and printing books, but that the
people who do all this work might be engaged only a few hours per day,
and in their leisure time might enjoy all the blessings of art.
That is what the defenders of our exclusive art say. But I think they do not
themselves believe it. They cannot help knowing that fine art can arise only
on the slavery of the masses of the people, and can continue only as long as
that slavery lasts, and they cannot help knowing that only under conditions
of intense labor for the workers, can specialists—writers, musicians,
dancers, and actors—arrive at that fine degree of perfection to which they
do attain, or produce their refined works of art; and only under the same
conditions can there be a fine public to esteem such productions. Free the
slaves of capital, and it will be impossible to produce such refined art.
But even were we to admit the inadmissible, and say that means may be
found by which art (that art which among us is considered to be art) may be
accessible to the whole people, another consideration presents itself
showing that fashionable art cannot be the whole of art, viz., the fact that it
is completely unintelligible to the people. Formerly men wrote poems in
Latin, but now their artistic productions are as unintelligible to the common
folk as if they were written in Sanscrit. The usual reply to this is, that if the
people do not now understand this art of ours, it only proves that they are
undeveloped, and that this has been so at each fresh step forward made by
art. First it was not understood, but afterward people got accustomed to it.
"It will be the same with our present art; it will be understood when
everybody is as well educated as we are—the people of the upper classes—
who produce this art," say the defenders of our art. But this assertion is
evidently even more unjust than the former; for we know that the majority
of the productions of the art of the upper classes, such as various odes,
poems, dramas, cantatas, pastorals, pictures, etc., which delighted the
people of the upper classes when they were produced, never were afterward
either understood or valued by the great masses of mankind, but have
remained, what they were at first, a mere pastime for rich people of their
time, for whom alone they ever were of any importance. It is also often
urged, in proof of the assertion that the people will some day understand our
art, that some productions of so-called "classical" poetry, music, or painting,
the stage moving the decorations, winding up the machinery, working at the
piano or French horn, and setting type and printing books, but that the
people who do all this work might be engaged only a few hours per day,
and in their leisure time might enjoy all the blessings of art.
That is what the defenders of our exclusive art say. But I think they do not
themselves believe it. They cannot help knowing that fine art can arise only
on the slavery of the masses of the people, and can continue only as long as
that slavery lasts, and they cannot help knowing that only under conditions
of intense labor for the workers, can specialists—writers, musicians,
dancers, and actors—arrive at that fine degree of perfection to which they
do attain, or produce their refined works of art; and only under the same
conditions can there be a fine public to esteem such productions. Free the
slaves of capital, and it will be impossible to produce such refined art.
But even were we to admit the inadmissible, and say that means may be
found by which art (that art which among us is considered to be art) may be
accessible to the whole people, another consideration presents itself
showing that fashionable art cannot be the whole of art, viz., the fact that it
is completely unintelligible to the people. Formerly men wrote poems in
Latin, but now their artistic productions are as unintelligible to the common
folk as if they were written in Sanscrit. The usual reply to this is, that if the
people do not now understand this art of ours, it only proves that they are
undeveloped, and that this has been so at each fresh step forward made by
art. First it was not understood, but afterward people got accustomed to it.
"It will be the same with our present art; it will be understood when
everybody is as well educated as we are—the people of the upper classes—
who produce this art," say the defenders of our art. But this assertion is
evidently even more unjust than the former; for we know that the majority
of the productions of the art of the upper classes, such as various odes,
poems, dramas, cantatas, pastorals, pictures, etc., which delighted the
people of the upper classes when they were produced, never were afterward
either understood or valued by the great masses of mankind, but have
remained, what they were at first, a mere pastime for rich people of their
time, for whom alone they ever were of any importance. It is also often
urged, in proof of the assertion that the people will some day understand our
art, that some productions of so-called "classical" poetry, music, or painting,
Page 370
which formerly did not please the masses, do—now that they have been
offered to them from all sides—begin to please these same masses; but this
only shows that the crowd, especially the half-spoilt town crowd, can easily
(its taste having been perverted) be accustomed to any sort of art. Moreover,
this art is not produced by these masses, nor even chosen by them, but is
energetically thrust upon them in those public places in which art is
accessible to the people. For the great majority of working-people, our art,
besides being inaccessible on account of its costliness, is strange in its very
nature, transmitting, as it does, the feelings of people far removed from
those conditions of laborious life which are natural to the great body of
humanity. That which is enjoyment to a man of the rich classes is
incomprehensible, as a pleasure, to a working-man, and evokes in him,
either no feeling at all, or only a feeling quite contrary to that which it
evokes in an idle and satiated man. Such feelings as form the chief subjects
of present-day art—say, for instance, honor,[101] patriotism, and amorousness
—evoke in a working-man only bewilderment and contempt, or
indignation. So that even if a possibility were given to the laboring classes,
in their free time, to see, to read, and to hear all that forms the flower of
contemporary art (as is done to some extent, in towns, by means of picture
galleries, popular concerts, and libraries), the working-man (to the extent to
which he is a laborer, and has not begun to pass into the ranks of those
perverted by idleness) would be able to make nothing of our fine art, and if
he did understand it, that which he understood would not elevate his soul,
but would certainly, in most cases, pervert it. To thoughtful and sincere
people there can, therefore, be no doubt that the art of our upper classes
never can be the art of the whole people. But if art is an important matter, a
spiritual blessing, essential for all men ("like religion," as the devotees of
art are fond of saying), then it should be accessible to every one. And if, as
in our day, it is not accessible to all men, then one of two things: either art is
not the vital matter it is represented to be, or that art which we call art is not
the real thing.
The dilemma is inevitable, and therefore clever and immoral people avoid it
by denying one side of it, viz., denying that the common people have a right
to art. These people simply and boldly speak out (what lies at the heart of
the matter), and say that the participators in and utilizers of what, in their
esteem, is highly beautiful art, i.e. art furnishing the greatest enjoyment, can
only be "schöne Geister," "the elect," as the romanticists called them, the
offered to them from all sides—begin to please these same masses; but this
only shows that the crowd, especially the half-spoilt town crowd, can easily
(its taste having been perverted) be accustomed to any sort of art. Moreover,
this art is not produced by these masses, nor even chosen by them, but is
energetically thrust upon them in those public places in which art is
accessible to the people. For the great majority of working-people, our art,
besides being inaccessible on account of its costliness, is strange in its very
nature, transmitting, as it does, the feelings of people far removed from
those conditions of laborious life which are natural to the great body of
humanity. That which is enjoyment to a man of the rich classes is
incomprehensible, as a pleasure, to a working-man, and evokes in him,
either no feeling at all, or only a feeling quite contrary to that which it
evokes in an idle and satiated man. Such feelings as form the chief subjects
of present-day art—say, for instance, honor,[101] patriotism, and amorousness
—evoke in a working-man only bewilderment and contempt, or
indignation. So that even if a possibility were given to the laboring classes,
in their free time, to see, to read, and to hear all that forms the flower of
contemporary art (as is done to some extent, in towns, by means of picture
galleries, popular concerts, and libraries), the working-man (to the extent to
which he is a laborer, and has not begun to pass into the ranks of those
perverted by idleness) would be able to make nothing of our fine art, and if
he did understand it, that which he understood would not elevate his soul,
but would certainly, in most cases, pervert it. To thoughtful and sincere
people there can, therefore, be no doubt that the art of our upper classes
never can be the art of the whole people. But if art is an important matter, a
spiritual blessing, essential for all men ("like religion," as the devotees of
art are fond of saying), then it should be accessible to every one. And if, as
in our day, it is not accessible to all men, then one of two things: either art is
not the vital matter it is represented to be, or that art which we call art is not
the real thing.
The dilemma is inevitable, and therefore clever and immoral people avoid it
by denying one side of it, viz., denying that the common people have a right
to art. These people simply and boldly speak out (what lies at the heart of
the matter), and say that the participators in and utilizers of what, in their
esteem, is highly beautiful art, i.e. art furnishing the greatest enjoyment, can
only be "schöne Geister," "the elect," as the romanticists called them, the
Page 371
"Uebermenschen," as they are called by the followers of Nietzsche; the
remaining vulgar herd, incapable of experiencing these pleasures, must
serve the exalted pleasures of this superior breed of people. The people who
express these views at least do not pretend, and do not try, to combine the
incombinable, but frankly admit, what is the case, that our art is an art of
the upper classes only. So essentially art has been, and is, understood by
every one engaged on it in our society.
remaining vulgar herd, incapable of experiencing these pleasures, must
serve the exalted pleasures of this superior breed of people. The people who
express these views at least do not pretend, and do not try, to combine the
incombinable, but frankly admit, what is the case, that our art is an art of
the upper classes only. So essentially art has been, and is, understood by
every one engaged on it in our society.
Page 372
CHAPTER IX
The unbelief of the upper classes of the European world had this effect—
that instead of an artistic activity aiming at transmitting the highest feelings
to which humanity has attained,—those flowing from religious perception,
—we have an activity which aims at affording the greatest enjoyment to a
certain class of society. And of all the immense domain of art, that part has
been fenced off, and is alone called art, which affords enjoyment to the
people of this particular circle.
Apart from the moral effects on European society of such a selection from
the whole sphere of art of what did not deserve such a valuation, and the
acknowledgment of it as important art, this perversion of art has weakened
art itself, and well-nigh destroyed it. The first great result was that art was
deprived of the infinite, varied, and profound religious subject-matter
proper to it. The second result was that having only a small circle of people
in view, it lost its beauty of form and became affected and obscure; and the
third and chief result was that it ceased to be either natural or even sincere,
and became thoroughly artificial and brain-spun.
The first result—the impoverishment of subject-matter—followed because
only that is a true work of art which transmits fresh feelings not before
experienced by man. As thought-product is only then real thought-product
when it transmits new conceptions and thoughts, and does not merely repeat
what was known before, so also an art-product is only then a genuine art-
product when it brings a new feeling (however insignificant) into the
current of human life. This explains why children and youths are so
strongly impressed by those works of art which first transmit to them
feelings they had not before experienced.
The same powerful impression is made on people by feelings which are
quite new, and have never before been expressed by man. And it is the
source from which such feelings flow of which the art of the upper classes
has deprived itself by estimating feelings, not in conformity with religious
perception, but according to the degree of enjoyment they afford. There is
nothing older and more hackneyed than enjoyment, and there is nothing
The unbelief of the upper classes of the European world had this effect—
that instead of an artistic activity aiming at transmitting the highest feelings
to which humanity has attained,—those flowing from religious perception,
—we have an activity which aims at affording the greatest enjoyment to a
certain class of society. And of all the immense domain of art, that part has
been fenced off, and is alone called art, which affords enjoyment to the
people of this particular circle.
Apart from the moral effects on European society of such a selection from
the whole sphere of art of what did not deserve such a valuation, and the
acknowledgment of it as important art, this perversion of art has weakened
art itself, and well-nigh destroyed it. The first great result was that art was
deprived of the infinite, varied, and profound religious subject-matter
proper to it. The second result was that having only a small circle of people
in view, it lost its beauty of form and became affected and obscure; and the
third and chief result was that it ceased to be either natural or even sincere,
and became thoroughly artificial and brain-spun.
The first result—the impoverishment of subject-matter—followed because
only that is a true work of art which transmits fresh feelings not before
experienced by man. As thought-product is only then real thought-product
when it transmits new conceptions and thoughts, and does not merely repeat
what was known before, so also an art-product is only then a genuine art-
product when it brings a new feeling (however insignificant) into the
current of human life. This explains why children and youths are so
strongly impressed by those works of art which first transmit to them
feelings they had not before experienced.
The same powerful impression is made on people by feelings which are
quite new, and have never before been expressed by man. And it is the
source from which such feelings flow of which the art of the upper classes
has deprived itself by estimating feelings, not in conformity with religious
perception, but according to the degree of enjoyment they afford. There is
nothing older and more hackneyed than enjoyment, and there is nothing
Page 373
fresher than the feelings springing from the religious consciousness of each
age. It could not be otherwise: man's enjoyment has limits established by
his nature, but the movement forward of humanity, that which is voiced by
religious perception, has no limits. At every forward step taken by humanity
—and such steps are taken in consequence of the greater and greater
elucidation of religious perception—men experience new and fresh
feelings. And therefore only on the basis of religious perception (which
shows the highest level of life-comprehension reached by the men of a
certain period) can fresh emotion, never before felt by man, arise. From the
religious perception of the ancient Greeks flowed the really new, important,
and endlessly varied feelings expressed by Homer and the tragic writers. It
was the same among the Jews, who attained the religious conception of a
single God,—from that perception flowed all those new and important
emotions expressed by the prophets. It was the same for the poets of the
Middle Ages, who if they believed in a heavenly hierarchy, believed also in
the Catholic commune; and it is the same for a man of to-day who has
grasped the religious conception of true Christianity,—the brotherhood of
man.
The variety of fresh feelings flowing from religious perception is endless,
and they are all new; for religious perception is nothing else than the first
indication of that which is coming into existence, viz., the new relation of
man to the world around him. But the feelings flowing from the desire for
enjoyment are, on the contrary, not only limited, but were long ago
experienced and expressed. And therefore the lack of belief of the upper
classes of Europe has left them with an art fed on the poorest subject-
matter.
The impoverishment of the subject-matter of upper-class art was further
increased by the fact that, ceasing to be religious, it ceased also to be
popular, and this again diminished the range of feelings which it
transmitted. For the range of feelings experienced by the powerful and the
rich, who have no experience of labor for the support of life, is far poorer,
more limited, and more insignificant than the range of feelings natural to
working-people.
People of our circle, æstheticians, usually think and say just the contrary of
this. I remember how Gontchareff, the author, a very clever and educated
man, but a thorough townsman and an æsthetician, said to me that after
age. It could not be otherwise: man's enjoyment has limits established by
his nature, but the movement forward of humanity, that which is voiced by
religious perception, has no limits. At every forward step taken by humanity
—and such steps are taken in consequence of the greater and greater
elucidation of religious perception—men experience new and fresh
feelings. And therefore only on the basis of religious perception (which
shows the highest level of life-comprehension reached by the men of a
certain period) can fresh emotion, never before felt by man, arise. From the
religious perception of the ancient Greeks flowed the really new, important,
and endlessly varied feelings expressed by Homer and the tragic writers. It
was the same among the Jews, who attained the religious conception of a
single God,—from that perception flowed all those new and important
emotions expressed by the prophets. It was the same for the poets of the
Middle Ages, who if they believed in a heavenly hierarchy, believed also in
the Catholic commune; and it is the same for a man of to-day who has
grasped the religious conception of true Christianity,—the brotherhood of
man.
The variety of fresh feelings flowing from religious perception is endless,
and they are all new; for religious perception is nothing else than the first
indication of that which is coming into existence, viz., the new relation of
man to the world around him. But the feelings flowing from the desire for
enjoyment are, on the contrary, not only limited, but were long ago
experienced and expressed. And therefore the lack of belief of the upper
classes of Europe has left them with an art fed on the poorest subject-
matter.
The impoverishment of the subject-matter of upper-class art was further
increased by the fact that, ceasing to be religious, it ceased also to be
popular, and this again diminished the range of feelings which it
transmitted. For the range of feelings experienced by the powerful and the
rich, who have no experience of labor for the support of life, is far poorer,
more limited, and more insignificant than the range of feelings natural to
working-people.
People of our circle, æstheticians, usually think and say just the contrary of
this. I remember how Gontchareff, the author, a very clever and educated
man, but a thorough townsman and an æsthetician, said to me that after
Page 374
Tourgenieff's "Memoirs of a Sportsman" there was nothing left to write
about in peasant life. It was all used up. The life of working-people seemed
to him so simple that Tourgenieff's peasant stories had used up all there was
to describe. The life of our wealthy people, with their love-affairs and
dissatisfaction with themselves, seemed to him full of inexhaustible subject-
matter. One hero kissed his lady on her palm, another on her elbow, and a
third somewhere else. One man is discontented through idleness, and
another because people don't love him. And Gontchareff thought that in this
sphere there is no end of variety. And this opinion—that the life of working-
people is poor in subject-matter, but that our life, the life of the idle, is full
of interest—is shared by very many people in our society. The life of a
laboring man, with its endlessly varied forms of labor, and the dangers
connected with this labor on sea and underground; his migrations, the
intercourse with his employers, overseers, and companions, and with men
of other religions and other nationalities; his struggles with nature and with
wild beasts, the associations with domestic animals, the work in the forest,
on the steppe, in the field, the garden, the orchard; his intercourse with wife
and children, not only as with people near and dear to him, but as with co-
workers and helpers in labor, replacing him in time of need; his concern in
all economic questions, not as matters of display or discussion, but as
problems of life for himself and his family; his pride in self-suppression and
service to others, his pleasures of refreshment; and with all these interests
permeated by a religious attitude toward these occurrences—all this to us,
who have not these interests and possess no religious perception, seems
monotonous in comparison with those small enjoyments and insignificant
cares of our life,—a life, not of labor nor of production, but of consumption
and destruction of that which others have produced for us. We think the
feelings experienced by people of our day and our class are very important
and varied; but in reality almost all the feelings of people of our class
amount to but three very insignificant and simple feelings,—the feeling of
pride, the feeling of sexual desire, and the feeling of weariness of life.
These three feelings, with their outgrowths, form almost the only subject-
matter of the art of the rich classes.
At first, at the very beginning of the separation of the exclusive art of the
upper classes from universal art, its chief subject-matter was the feeling of
pride. It was so at the time of the Renaissance and after it, when the chief
subject of works of art was the laudation of the strong,—popes, kings, and
about in peasant life. It was all used up. The life of working-people seemed
to him so simple that Tourgenieff's peasant stories had used up all there was
to describe. The life of our wealthy people, with their love-affairs and
dissatisfaction with themselves, seemed to him full of inexhaustible subject-
matter. One hero kissed his lady on her palm, another on her elbow, and a
third somewhere else. One man is discontented through idleness, and
another because people don't love him. And Gontchareff thought that in this
sphere there is no end of variety. And this opinion—that the life of working-
people is poor in subject-matter, but that our life, the life of the idle, is full
of interest—is shared by very many people in our society. The life of a
laboring man, with its endlessly varied forms of labor, and the dangers
connected with this labor on sea and underground; his migrations, the
intercourse with his employers, overseers, and companions, and with men
of other religions and other nationalities; his struggles with nature and with
wild beasts, the associations with domestic animals, the work in the forest,
on the steppe, in the field, the garden, the orchard; his intercourse with wife
and children, not only as with people near and dear to him, but as with co-
workers and helpers in labor, replacing him in time of need; his concern in
all economic questions, not as matters of display or discussion, but as
problems of life for himself and his family; his pride in self-suppression and
service to others, his pleasures of refreshment; and with all these interests
permeated by a religious attitude toward these occurrences—all this to us,
who have not these interests and possess no religious perception, seems
monotonous in comparison with those small enjoyments and insignificant
cares of our life,—a life, not of labor nor of production, but of consumption
and destruction of that which others have produced for us. We think the
feelings experienced by people of our day and our class are very important
and varied; but in reality almost all the feelings of people of our class
amount to but three very insignificant and simple feelings,—the feeling of
pride, the feeling of sexual desire, and the feeling of weariness of life.
These three feelings, with their outgrowths, form almost the only subject-
matter of the art of the rich classes.
At first, at the very beginning of the separation of the exclusive art of the
upper classes from universal art, its chief subject-matter was the feeling of
pride. It was so at the time of the Renaissance and after it, when the chief
subject of works of art was the laudation of the strong,—popes, kings, and
Page 375
dukes: odes and madrigals were written in their honor, and they were
extolled in cantatas and hymns; their portraits were painted, and their
statues carved, in various adulatory ways. Next, the element of sexual
desire began more and more to enter into art, and (with very few
exceptions, and in novels and dramas almost without exception) it has now
become an essential feature of every art-product of the rich classes.
The third feeling transmitted by the art of the rich—that of discontent with
life—appeared yet later in modern art. This feeling, which, at the
commencement of the present century, was expressed only by exceptional
men: by Byron, by Leopardi, and afterward by Heine, has latterly become
fashionable, and is expressed by most ordinary and empty people. Most
justly does the French critic Doumic characterize the works of the new
writers: "C'est la lassitude de vivre, le mépris de l'époque présente, le regret
d'un autre temps aperçu à travers l'illusion de l'art, le goût du paradoxe, le
besoin de se singulariser, une aspiration de raffinés vers la simplicité,
l'adoration enfantine du merveilleux, la séduction maladive de la rêverie,
l'ébranlement des nerfs,—surtout l'appel exaspéré de la sensualité" ("Les
Jeunes," René Doumic).[102] And, as a matter of fact, of these three feelings
it is sensuality, the lowest (accessible not only to all men, but even to all
animals), which forms the chief subject-matter of works of art of recent
times.
From Boccaccio to Marcel Prévost, all the novels, poems, and verses
invariably transmit the feeling of sexual love in its different forms. Adultery
is not only the favorite, but almost the only theme of all the novels. A
performance is not a performance unless, under some pretense, women
appear with naked busts and limbs. Songs and romances—all are
expressions of lust, idealized in various degrees.
A majority of the pictures by French artists represent female nakedness in
various forms. In recent French literature there is hardly a page or a poem in
which nakedness is not described, and in which, relevantly or irrelevantly,
their favorite thought and word nu is not repeated a couple of times. There
is a certain writer, René de Gourmond, who gets printed, and is considered
talented. To get an idea of the new writers, I read his novel, "Les Chevaux
de Diomède." It is a consecutive and detailed account of the sexual
connections some gentleman had with various women. Every page contains
lust-kindling descriptions. It is the same in Pierre Louÿs' book, "Aphrodite,"
extolled in cantatas and hymns; their portraits were painted, and their
statues carved, in various adulatory ways. Next, the element of sexual
desire began more and more to enter into art, and (with very few
exceptions, and in novels and dramas almost without exception) it has now
become an essential feature of every art-product of the rich classes.
The third feeling transmitted by the art of the rich—that of discontent with
life—appeared yet later in modern art. This feeling, which, at the
commencement of the present century, was expressed only by exceptional
men: by Byron, by Leopardi, and afterward by Heine, has latterly become
fashionable, and is expressed by most ordinary and empty people. Most
justly does the French critic Doumic characterize the works of the new
writers: "C'est la lassitude de vivre, le mépris de l'époque présente, le regret
d'un autre temps aperçu à travers l'illusion de l'art, le goût du paradoxe, le
besoin de se singulariser, une aspiration de raffinés vers la simplicité,
l'adoration enfantine du merveilleux, la séduction maladive de la rêverie,
l'ébranlement des nerfs,—surtout l'appel exaspéré de la sensualité" ("Les
Jeunes," René Doumic).[102] And, as a matter of fact, of these three feelings
it is sensuality, the lowest (accessible not only to all men, but even to all
animals), which forms the chief subject-matter of works of art of recent
times.
From Boccaccio to Marcel Prévost, all the novels, poems, and verses
invariably transmit the feeling of sexual love in its different forms. Adultery
is not only the favorite, but almost the only theme of all the novels. A
performance is not a performance unless, under some pretense, women
appear with naked busts and limbs. Songs and romances—all are
expressions of lust, idealized in various degrees.
A majority of the pictures by French artists represent female nakedness in
various forms. In recent French literature there is hardly a page or a poem in
which nakedness is not described, and in which, relevantly or irrelevantly,
their favorite thought and word nu is not repeated a couple of times. There
is a certain writer, René de Gourmond, who gets printed, and is considered
talented. To get an idea of the new writers, I read his novel, "Les Chevaux
de Diomède." It is a consecutive and detailed account of the sexual
connections some gentleman had with various women. Every page contains
lust-kindling descriptions. It is the same in Pierre Louÿs' book, "Aphrodite,"
Page 376
which met with success; it is the same in a book I lately chanced upon,
Huysmans' "Certains," and, with but few exceptions, it is the same in all the
French novels. They are all the productions of people suffering from erotic
mania. And these people are evidently convinced that as their whole life, in
consequence of their diseased condition, is concentrated on amplifying
various sexual abominations, therefore the life of all the world is similarly
concentrated. And these people, suffering from erotic mania, are imitated
throughout the whole artistic world of Europe and America.
Thus in consequence of the lack of belief and the exceptional manner of life
of the wealthy classes, the art of those classes became impoverished in its
subject-matter, and has sunk to the transmission of the feelings of pride,
discontent with life, and, above all, of sexual desire.
Huysmans' "Certains," and, with but few exceptions, it is the same in all the
French novels. They are all the productions of people suffering from erotic
mania. And these people are evidently convinced that as their whole life, in
consequence of their diseased condition, is concentrated on amplifying
various sexual abominations, therefore the life of all the world is similarly
concentrated. And these people, suffering from erotic mania, are imitated
throughout the whole artistic world of Europe and America.
Thus in consequence of the lack of belief and the exceptional manner of life
of the wealthy classes, the art of those classes became impoverished in its
subject-matter, and has sunk to the transmission of the feelings of pride,
discontent with life, and, above all, of sexual desire.
Page 377
CHAPTER X
In consequence of their unbelief, the art of the upper classes became poor in
subject-matter. But besides that, becoming continually more and more
exclusive, it became at the same time continually more and more involved,
affected, and obscure.
When a universal artist (such as were some of the Grecian artists or the
Jewish prophets) composed his work, he naturally strove to say what he had
to say in such a manner that his production should be intelligible to all men.
But when an artist composed for a small circle of people placed in
exceptional conditions, or even for a single individual and his courtiers,—
for popes, cardinals, kings, dukes, queens, or for a king's mistress,—he
naturally only aimed at influencing these people, who were well known to
him, and lived in exceptional conditions familiar to him. And this was an
easier task, and the artist was involuntarily drawn to express himself by
allusions comprehensible only to the initiated, and obscure to every one
else. In the first place, more could be said in this way; and secondly, there is
(for the initiated) even a certain charm in the cloudiness of such a manner
of expression. This method, which showed itself both in euphemism and in
mythological and historical allusions, came more and more into use, until it
has, apparently, at last reached its utmost limits in the so-called art of the
Decadents. It has come, finally, to this: that not only is haziness,
mysteriousness, obscurity, and exclusiveness (shutting out the masses)
elevated to the rank of a merit and a condition of poetic art, but even
incorrectness, indefiniteness, and lack of eloquence are held in esteem.
Théophile Gautier, in his preface to the celebrated "Fleurs du Mal," says
that Baudelaire, as far as possible, banished from poetry eloquence, passion,
and truth too strictly copied ("l'éloquence, la passion, et la vérité calquée
trop exactement").
And Baudelaire not only expressed this, but maintained his thesis in his
verses, and yet more strikingly in the prose of his "Petits Poèmes en Prose,"
the meanings of which have to be guessed like a rebus, and remain for the
most part undiscovered.
In consequence of their unbelief, the art of the upper classes became poor in
subject-matter. But besides that, becoming continually more and more
exclusive, it became at the same time continually more and more involved,
affected, and obscure.
When a universal artist (such as were some of the Grecian artists or the
Jewish prophets) composed his work, he naturally strove to say what he had
to say in such a manner that his production should be intelligible to all men.
But when an artist composed for a small circle of people placed in
exceptional conditions, or even for a single individual and his courtiers,—
for popes, cardinals, kings, dukes, queens, or for a king's mistress,—he
naturally only aimed at influencing these people, who were well known to
him, and lived in exceptional conditions familiar to him. And this was an
easier task, and the artist was involuntarily drawn to express himself by
allusions comprehensible only to the initiated, and obscure to every one
else. In the first place, more could be said in this way; and secondly, there is
(for the initiated) even a certain charm in the cloudiness of such a manner
of expression. This method, which showed itself both in euphemism and in
mythological and historical allusions, came more and more into use, until it
has, apparently, at last reached its utmost limits in the so-called art of the
Decadents. It has come, finally, to this: that not only is haziness,
mysteriousness, obscurity, and exclusiveness (shutting out the masses)
elevated to the rank of a merit and a condition of poetic art, but even
incorrectness, indefiniteness, and lack of eloquence are held in esteem.
Théophile Gautier, in his preface to the celebrated "Fleurs du Mal," says
that Baudelaire, as far as possible, banished from poetry eloquence, passion,
and truth too strictly copied ("l'éloquence, la passion, et la vérité calquée
trop exactement").
And Baudelaire not only expressed this, but maintained his thesis in his
verses, and yet more strikingly in the prose of his "Petits Poèmes en Prose,"
the meanings of which have to be guessed like a rebus, and remain for the
most part undiscovered.
Page 378
The poet Verlaine (who followed next after Baudelaire, and was also
esteemed great) even wrote an "Art Poétique," in which he advises this style
of composition:—
De la musique avant toute chose,
Et pour cela préfère l'Impair
Plus vague et plus soluble dans l'air,
Sans rien en lui qui pèse ou qui pose.
Il faut aussi que tu n'ailles point
Choisir tes mots sans quelque méprise:
Rien de plus cher que la chanson grise
Où l'Indécis au Précis se joint.
* * * *
And again:—
De la musique encore et toujours!
Que ton vers soit la chose envolée
Qu'on sent qui fuit d'une âme en allée
Vers d'autres cieux à d'autres amours.
Que ton vers soit la bonne aventure
Eparse au vent crispé du matin,
Qui va fleurant la menthe et le thym....
Et tout le reste est littérature.[103]
After these two comes Mallarmé, considered the most important of the
young poets, and he plainly says that the charm of poetry lies in our having
to guess its meaning—that in poetry there should always be a puzzle:—
Je pense qu'il faut qu'il n'y ait qu'allusion, says he. La contemplation des
objets, l'image s'envolant des rêveries suscitées par eux, sont le chant: les
Parnassiens, eux, prennent la chose entièrement et la montrent; par là ils
manquent de mystère; ils retirent aux esprits cette joie délicieuse de croire
qu'ils créent. Nommer un objet, c'est supprimer les trois quarts de la
jouissance du poème, qui est faite du bonheur de deviner peu à peu: le
suggérer, voilà le rêve. C'est le par fait usage de ce mystère qui constitue le
esteemed great) even wrote an "Art Poétique," in which he advises this style
of composition:—
De la musique avant toute chose,
Et pour cela préfère l'Impair
Plus vague et plus soluble dans l'air,
Sans rien en lui qui pèse ou qui pose.
Il faut aussi que tu n'ailles point
Choisir tes mots sans quelque méprise:
Rien de plus cher que la chanson grise
Où l'Indécis au Précis se joint.
* * * *
And again:—
De la musique encore et toujours!
Que ton vers soit la chose envolée
Qu'on sent qui fuit d'une âme en allée
Vers d'autres cieux à d'autres amours.
Que ton vers soit la bonne aventure
Eparse au vent crispé du matin,
Qui va fleurant la menthe et le thym....
Et tout le reste est littérature.[103]
After these two comes Mallarmé, considered the most important of the
young poets, and he plainly says that the charm of poetry lies in our having
to guess its meaning—that in poetry there should always be a puzzle:—
Je pense qu'il faut qu'il n'y ait qu'allusion, says he. La contemplation des
objets, l'image s'envolant des rêveries suscitées par eux, sont le chant: les
Parnassiens, eux, prennent la chose entièrement et la montrent; par là ils
manquent de mystère; ils retirent aux esprits cette joie délicieuse de croire
qu'ils créent. Nommer un objet, c'est supprimer les trois quarts de la
jouissance du poème, qui est faite du bonheur de deviner peu à peu: le
suggérer, voilà le rêve. C'est le par fait usage de ce mystère qui constitue le
Page 379
symbole: évoquer petit à petit un objet pour montrer un état d'âme, ou,
inversement, choisir un objet et en dégager un état d'âme, par une sèrie de
déchiffrements.
.... Si un être d'une intelligence moyenne, et d'une préparation littéraire
insuffisante, ouvre par hasard un livre ainsi fait et prétend en jouir, il y a
malentendu, il faut remettre les choses à leur place. Il doit y avoir toujours
énigme en poèsie, et c'est le but de la littérature, il n'y en a pas d'autre,—
d'évoquer les objets.—"Enquête sur l'Évolution Littéraire," Jules Huret, pp.
60, 61.[104]
Thus is obscurity elevated into a dogma among the new poets. As the
French critic Doumic (who has not yet accepted the dogma) quite correctly
says:—
"Il serait temps aussi d'en finir avec cette fameuse 'théorie de l'obscurite'
que la nouvelle école a élevée, en effet, à la hauteur d'un dogme."—"Les
Jeunes, par René Doumic."[105]
But it is not French writers only who think thus. The poets of all other
countries think and act in the same way: German, and Scandinavian, and
Italian, and Russian, and English. So also do the artists of the new period in
all branches of art: in painting, in sculpture, and in music. Relying on
Nietzsche and Wagner, the artists of the new age conclude that it is
unnecessary for them to be intelligible to the vulgar crowd; it is enough for
them to evoke poetic emotion in "the finest nurtured," to borrow a phrase
from an English æsthetician.
In order that what I am saying may not seem to be mere assertion, I will
quote at least a few examples from the French poets who have led this
movement. The name of these poets is legion. I have taken French writers,
because they, more decidedly than any others, indicate the new direction of
art, and are imitated by most European writers.
Besides those whose names are already considered famous, such as
Baudelaire and Verlaine, here are the names of a few of them: Jean Moréas,
Charles Morice, Henri de Régnier, Charles Vignier, Adrien Remacle, René
Ghil, Maurice Maeterlinck, G. Albert Aurier, Rémy de Gourmont, Saint-
Pol-Roux-le-Magnifique, Georges Rodenbach, le comte Robert de
inversement, choisir un objet et en dégager un état d'âme, par une sèrie de
déchiffrements.
.... Si un être d'une intelligence moyenne, et d'une préparation littéraire
insuffisante, ouvre par hasard un livre ainsi fait et prétend en jouir, il y a
malentendu, il faut remettre les choses à leur place. Il doit y avoir toujours
énigme en poèsie, et c'est le but de la littérature, il n'y en a pas d'autre,—
d'évoquer les objets.—"Enquête sur l'Évolution Littéraire," Jules Huret, pp.
60, 61.[104]
Thus is obscurity elevated into a dogma among the new poets. As the
French critic Doumic (who has not yet accepted the dogma) quite correctly
says:—
"Il serait temps aussi d'en finir avec cette fameuse 'théorie de l'obscurite'
que la nouvelle école a élevée, en effet, à la hauteur d'un dogme."—"Les
Jeunes, par René Doumic."[105]
But it is not French writers only who think thus. The poets of all other
countries think and act in the same way: German, and Scandinavian, and
Italian, and Russian, and English. So also do the artists of the new period in
all branches of art: in painting, in sculpture, and in music. Relying on
Nietzsche and Wagner, the artists of the new age conclude that it is
unnecessary for them to be intelligible to the vulgar crowd; it is enough for
them to evoke poetic emotion in "the finest nurtured," to borrow a phrase
from an English æsthetician.
In order that what I am saying may not seem to be mere assertion, I will
quote at least a few examples from the French poets who have led this
movement. The name of these poets is legion. I have taken French writers,
because they, more decidedly than any others, indicate the new direction of
art, and are imitated by most European writers.
Besides those whose names are already considered famous, such as
Baudelaire and Verlaine, here are the names of a few of them: Jean Moréas,
Charles Morice, Henri de Régnier, Charles Vignier, Adrien Remacle, René
Ghil, Maurice Maeterlinck, G. Albert Aurier, Rémy de Gourmont, Saint-
Pol-Roux-le-Magnifique, Georges Rodenbach, le comte Robert de
Page 380
Montesquiou-Fezensac. These are Symbolists and Decadents. Next we have
the "Magi": Joséphin Péladan, Paul Adam, Jules Bois, M. Papus, and others.
Besides these, there are yet one hundred and forty-one others, whom
Doumic mentions in the book referred to above.
Here are some examples from the work of those of them who are
considered to be the best, beginning with that most celebrated man,
acknowledged to be a great artist worthy of a monument—Baudelaire. This
is a poem from his celebrated "Fleurs du Mal":—
No. XXIV
Je t'adore à l'égal de la voûte nocturne,
O vase de tristesse, ô grande taciturne,
Et t'aime d'autant plus, belle, que tu me fuis,
Et que tu me parais, ornement de mes nuits,
Plus ironiquement accumuler les lieues
Qui séparent mes bras des immensités bleues.
Je m'avance à l'attaque, et je grimpe aux assauts,
Comme après un cadavre un chœur de vermisseaux,
Et je chéris, ô bête implacable et cruelle,
Jusqu'à cette froideur par où tu m'es plus belle![106]
And this is another by the same writer:—
No. XXXVI
DUELLUM
Deux guerriers ont couru l'un sur l'autre; leurs armes
Ont éclaboussé l'air de lueurs et de sang.
Ces jeux, ces cliquetis du fer sont les vacarmes
D'une jeunesse en proie à l'amour vagissant.
the "Magi": Joséphin Péladan, Paul Adam, Jules Bois, M. Papus, and others.
Besides these, there are yet one hundred and forty-one others, whom
Doumic mentions in the book referred to above.
Here are some examples from the work of those of them who are
considered to be the best, beginning with that most celebrated man,
acknowledged to be a great artist worthy of a monument—Baudelaire. This
is a poem from his celebrated "Fleurs du Mal":—
No. XXIV
Je t'adore à l'égal de la voûte nocturne,
O vase de tristesse, ô grande taciturne,
Et t'aime d'autant plus, belle, que tu me fuis,
Et que tu me parais, ornement de mes nuits,
Plus ironiquement accumuler les lieues
Qui séparent mes bras des immensités bleues.
Je m'avance à l'attaque, et je grimpe aux assauts,
Comme après un cadavre un chœur de vermisseaux,
Et je chéris, ô bête implacable et cruelle,
Jusqu'à cette froideur par où tu m'es plus belle![106]
And this is another by the same writer:—
No. XXXVI
DUELLUM
Deux guerriers ont couru l'un sur l'autre; leurs armes
Ont éclaboussé l'air de lueurs et de sang.
Ces jeux, ces cliquetis du fer sont les vacarmes
D'une jeunesse en proie à l'amour vagissant.
Page 381
Les glaives sont brisés! comme notre jeunesse,
Ma chère! Mais les dents, les ongles acérés,
Vengent bientôt l'épée et la dague traîtresse.
O fureur des cœurs mûrs par l'amour ulcérés!
Dans le ravin hanté des chats-pards et des onces
Nos héros, s'étreignant méchamment, ont roulé,
Et leur peau fleurira l'aridité des ronces.
Ce gouffre, c'est l'enfer, de nos amis peuplé!
Roulons-y sans remords, amazone inhumaine,
Afin d'éterniser l'ardeur de notre haine![107]
To be exact, I should mention that the collection contains verses less
comprehensible than these, but not one poem which is plain and can be
understood without a certain effort—an effort seldom rewarded; for the
feelings which the poet transmits are evil and very low ones. And these
feelings are always, and purposely, expressed by him with eccentricity and
lack of clearness. This premeditated obscurity is especially noticeable in his
prose, where the author could, if he liked, speak plainly.
Take, for instance, the first piece from his "Petits Poèmes":—
L'ETRANGER
Qui aimes-tu le mieux, homme énigmatique, dis? ton père, ta mère, ta
sœur, ou ton frère?
Je n'ai ni père, ni mère, ni sœur, ni frère.
Tes amis?
Vous vous servez là d'une parole dont le sens m'est restê jusqu'à ce
jour inconnu.
Ta patrie?
J'ignore sous quelle latitude elle est située.
La beauté?
Ma chère! Mais les dents, les ongles acérés,
Vengent bientôt l'épée et la dague traîtresse.
O fureur des cœurs mûrs par l'amour ulcérés!
Dans le ravin hanté des chats-pards et des onces
Nos héros, s'étreignant méchamment, ont roulé,
Et leur peau fleurira l'aridité des ronces.
Ce gouffre, c'est l'enfer, de nos amis peuplé!
Roulons-y sans remords, amazone inhumaine,
Afin d'éterniser l'ardeur de notre haine![107]
To be exact, I should mention that the collection contains verses less
comprehensible than these, but not one poem which is plain and can be
understood without a certain effort—an effort seldom rewarded; for the
feelings which the poet transmits are evil and very low ones. And these
feelings are always, and purposely, expressed by him with eccentricity and
lack of clearness. This premeditated obscurity is especially noticeable in his
prose, where the author could, if he liked, speak plainly.
Take, for instance, the first piece from his "Petits Poèmes":—
L'ETRANGER
Qui aimes-tu le mieux, homme énigmatique, dis? ton père, ta mère, ta
sœur, ou ton frère?
Je n'ai ni père, ni mère, ni sœur, ni frère.
Tes amis?
Vous vous servez là d'une parole dont le sens m'est restê jusqu'à ce
jour inconnu.
Ta patrie?
J'ignore sous quelle latitude elle est située.
La beauté?
Page 382
Je l'aimerais volontiers, desse et immortelle.
L'or?
Je le hais comme vous haïssez Dieu.
Et qu'aimes-tu donc, extraordinaire étranger?
J'aime les nuages .... les nuages qui passent .... là bas, .... les
merveilleux nuages![108]
The piece called "La Soupe et les Nuages" is probably intended to express
the unintelligibility of the poet even to her whom he loves. This is the piece
in question:—
Ma petite folle bien-aimée me donnait à dîner, et par la fenêtre ouverte
de la salle à manger je contemplais les mouvantes architectures que
Dieu fait avec les vapeurs, les merveilleuses constructions de
l'impalpable. Et je me disais, à travers ma contemplation: "Toutes ces
fantasmagories sont presque aussi belles que les yeux de ma belle
bien-aimée, la petite folle monstrueuse aux yeux verts."
Et tout à coup je reçus un violent coup de poing dans le dos, et
j'entendis une voix rauque et charmante, une voix hystérique et comme
enrouée par l'eau-de-vie, la voix de ma chère petite bien-aimée, qui me
disait, "Allez-vous bientôt manger votre soupe, s.... b.... de marchand
de nuages?"[108]
However artificial these two pieces may be, it is still possible, with some
effort, to guess at what the author meant them to express, but some of the
pieces are absolutely incomprehensible—at least to me. "Le Galant Tireur"
is a piece I was quite unable to understand.
LE GALANT TIREUR
Comme la voiture traversait le bois, il la fit arrêter dans le voisinage
d'un tir, disant qu'il lui serait agréable de tirer quelques balles pour
tuer le Temps. Tuer ce monstre-là, n'est-ce pas l'occupation la plus
ordinaire et la plus légitime de chacun?—Et il offrit galamment la
L'or?
Je le hais comme vous haïssez Dieu.
Et qu'aimes-tu donc, extraordinaire étranger?
J'aime les nuages .... les nuages qui passent .... là bas, .... les
merveilleux nuages![108]
The piece called "La Soupe et les Nuages" is probably intended to express
the unintelligibility of the poet even to her whom he loves. This is the piece
in question:—
Ma petite folle bien-aimée me donnait à dîner, et par la fenêtre ouverte
de la salle à manger je contemplais les mouvantes architectures que
Dieu fait avec les vapeurs, les merveilleuses constructions de
l'impalpable. Et je me disais, à travers ma contemplation: "Toutes ces
fantasmagories sont presque aussi belles que les yeux de ma belle
bien-aimée, la petite folle monstrueuse aux yeux verts."
Et tout à coup je reçus un violent coup de poing dans le dos, et
j'entendis une voix rauque et charmante, une voix hystérique et comme
enrouée par l'eau-de-vie, la voix de ma chère petite bien-aimée, qui me
disait, "Allez-vous bientôt manger votre soupe, s.... b.... de marchand
de nuages?"[108]
However artificial these two pieces may be, it is still possible, with some
effort, to guess at what the author meant them to express, but some of the
pieces are absolutely incomprehensible—at least to me. "Le Galant Tireur"
is a piece I was quite unable to understand.
LE GALANT TIREUR
Comme la voiture traversait le bois, il la fit arrêter dans le voisinage
d'un tir, disant qu'il lui serait agréable de tirer quelques balles pour
tuer le Temps. Tuer ce monstre-là, n'est-ce pas l'occupation la plus
ordinaire et la plus légitime de chacun?—Et il offrit galamment la
Page 383
main à sa chère, délicieuse et exécrable femme, à cette mystérieuse
femme à laquelle il doit tant de plaisirs, tant de douleurs, et peut-être
aussi une grande partie de son génie.
Plusieurs balles frappèrent loin du but proposè, l'une d'elles s'enfonça
même dans le plafond; et comme la charmante créature riait follement,
se moquant de la maladresse de son époux, celui-ci se tourna
brusquement vers elle, et lui dit: "Observez cette poupée, là-bas, à
droite, qui porte le nez en l'air et qui a la mine si hautaine. Eh bien!
cher ange, je me figure que c'est vous." Et il ferma les yeux et il lâcha
la détente. La poupée fut nettement décapitée.
Alors s'inclinant vers sa chère, sa délicieuse, son exécrable femme, son
inévitable et impitoyable Muse, et lui baisant respectueusement la
main, il ajouta: "Ah! mon cher ange, combien je vous remercie de mon
adresse!"[109]
The productions of another celebrity, Verlaine, are not less affected and
unintelligible. This, for instance, is the first poem in the section called
"Ariettes Oubliés."
femme à laquelle il doit tant de plaisirs, tant de douleurs, et peut-être
aussi une grande partie de son génie.
Plusieurs balles frappèrent loin du but proposè, l'une d'elles s'enfonça
même dans le plafond; et comme la charmante créature riait follement,
se moquant de la maladresse de son époux, celui-ci se tourna
brusquement vers elle, et lui dit: "Observez cette poupée, là-bas, à
droite, qui porte le nez en l'air et qui a la mine si hautaine. Eh bien!
cher ange, je me figure que c'est vous." Et il ferma les yeux et il lâcha
la détente. La poupée fut nettement décapitée.
Alors s'inclinant vers sa chère, sa délicieuse, son exécrable femme, son
inévitable et impitoyable Muse, et lui baisant respectueusement la
main, il ajouta: "Ah! mon cher ange, combien je vous remercie de mon
adresse!"[109]
The productions of another celebrity, Verlaine, are not less affected and
unintelligible. This, for instance, is the first poem in the section called
"Ariettes Oubliés."
Page 384
"Le vent dans la plaine
Suspend son haleine."—Favart.
C'est l'extase langoureuse,
C'est la fatigue amoureuse,
C'est tous les frissons des bois
Parmi l'étreinte des brises,
C'est, vers les ramures grises,
Le chœur des petites voix.
O le frêle et frais murmure!
Cela gazouille et susurre,
Cela ressemble au cri doux
Que l'herbe agitée expire....
Tu dirais, sous l'eau qui vire,
Le roulis sourd des cailloux.
Cette âme qui se lamente
En cette plainte dormante
C'est la nôtre, n'est-ce pas?
La mienne, dis, et la tienne,
Dont s'exhale l'humble antienne
Par ce tiède soir, tout bas?[110]
What "chœur des petites voix"? and what "cri doux que l'herbe agitée
expire"? and what it all means, remains altogether unintelligible to me.
And here is another "Ariette":—
VIII
Dans l'interminable
Ennui de la plaine,
La neige incertaine
Luit comme du sable.
Le ciel est de cuivre,
Sans lueur aucune.
Suspend son haleine."—Favart.
C'est l'extase langoureuse,
C'est la fatigue amoureuse,
C'est tous les frissons des bois
Parmi l'étreinte des brises,
C'est, vers les ramures grises,
Le chœur des petites voix.
O le frêle et frais murmure!
Cela gazouille et susurre,
Cela ressemble au cri doux
Que l'herbe agitée expire....
Tu dirais, sous l'eau qui vire,
Le roulis sourd des cailloux.
Cette âme qui se lamente
En cette plainte dormante
C'est la nôtre, n'est-ce pas?
La mienne, dis, et la tienne,
Dont s'exhale l'humble antienne
Par ce tiède soir, tout bas?[110]
What "chœur des petites voix"? and what "cri doux que l'herbe agitée
expire"? and what it all means, remains altogether unintelligible to me.
And here is another "Ariette":—
VIII
Dans l'interminable
Ennui de la plaine,
La neige incertaine
Luit comme du sable.
Le ciel est de cuivre,
Sans lueur aucune.
Page 385
On croirait voir vivre
Et mourir la lune.
Comme des nuées
Flottent gris les chênes
Des forêts prochaines
Parmi les buées.
Le ciel est de cuivre,
Sans lueur aucune.
On croirait voir vivre
Et mourir la lune.
Corneille poussive
Et vous, les loups maigres,
Par ces bises aigres
Quoi donc vous arrive?
Dans l'interminable
Ennui de la plaine,
La neige incertaine
Luit comme du sable.[111]
How does the moon seem to live and die in a copper heaven? And how can
snow shine like sand? The whole thing is not merely unintelligible, but,
under pretense of conveying an impression, it passes off a string of
incorrect comparisons and words.
Besides these artificial and obscure poems there are others which are
intelligible, but which make up for it by being altogether bad, both in form
and in subject. Such are all the poems under the heading "La Sagesse." The
chief place in these verses is occupied by a very poor expression of the
most commonplace Roman Catholic and patriotic sentiments. For instance,
one meets with verses such as this:—
Je ne veux plus penser qu'à ma mère Marie,
Siège de la sagesse et source de pardons,
Mère de France aussi de qui nous attendons
Inébranlablement l'honneur de la patrie.[112]
Et mourir la lune.
Comme des nuées
Flottent gris les chênes
Des forêts prochaines
Parmi les buées.
Le ciel est de cuivre,
Sans lueur aucune.
On croirait voir vivre
Et mourir la lune.
Corneille poussive
Et vous, les loups maigres,
Par ces bises aigres
Quoi donc vous arrive?
Dans l'interminable
Ennui de la plaine,
La neige incertaine
Luit comme du sable.[111]
How does the moon seem to live and die in a copper heaven? And how can
snow shine like sand? The whole thing is not merely unintelligible, but,
under pretense of conveying an impression, it passes off a string of
incorrect comparisons and words.
Besides these artificial and obscure poems there are others which are
intelligible, but which make up for it by being altogether bad, both in form
and in subject. Such are all the poems under the heading "La Sagesse." The
chief place in these verses is occupied by a very poor expression of the
most commonplace Roman Catholic and patriotic sentiments. For instance,
one meets with verses such as this:—
Je ne veux plus penser qu'à ma mère Marie,
Siège de la sagesse et source de pardons,
Mère de France aussi de qui nous attendons
Inébranlablement l'honneur de la patrie.[112]
Page 386
Before citing examples from other poets, I must pause to note the amazing
celebrity of these two versifiers, Baudelaire and Verlaine, who are now
accepted as being great poets. How the French, who had Chénier, Musset,
Lamartine, and, above all, Hugo,—and among whom quite recently
flourished the so-called Parnassiens: Leconte de Lisle, Sully-Prudhomme,
etc.,—could attribute such importance to these two versifiers, who were far
from skilful in form and most contemptible and commonplace in subject-
matter, is to me incomprehensible. The conception of life of one of them,
Baudelaire, consisted in elevating gross egotism into a theory, and replacing
morality by a cloudy conception of beauty, and especially artificial beauty.
Baudelaire had a preference, which he expressed, for a woman's face
painted rather than showing its natural color, and for metal trees and a
theatrical imitation of water rather than real trees and real water.
The life-conception of the other, Verlaine, consisted in weak profligacy,
confession of his moral impotence, and, as an antidote to that impotence, in
the grossest Roman Catholic idolatry. Both, moreover, were quite lacking in
naïveté, sincerity, and simplicity, and both overflowed with artificiality,
forced originality and self-assurance. So that in their least bad productions
one sees more of M. Baudelaire or M. Verlaine than of what they were
describing. But these two indifferent versifiers form a school, and lead
hundreds of followers after them.
There is only one explanation of this fact: it is that the art of the society in
which these versifiers lived is not a serious, important matter of life, but is a
mere amusement. And all amusements grow wearisome by repetition. And,
in order to make wearisome amusement again tolerable, it is necessary to
find some means to freshen it up. When, at cards, ombre grows stale, whist
is introduced; when whist grows stale, écarté is substituted; when écarté
grows stale, some other novelty is invented, and so on. The substance of the
matter remains the same, only its form is changed. And so it is with this
kind of art. The subject-matter of the art of the upper classes growing
continually more and more limited, it has come at last to this, that to the
artists of these exclusive classes it seems as if everything has already been
said, and that to find anything new to say is impossible. And therefore, to
freshen up this art, they look out for fresh forms.
Baudelaire and Verlaine invent such a new form, furbish it up, moreover,
with hitherto unused pornographic details, and—the critics and the public of
celebrity of these two versifiers, Baudelaire and Verlaine, who are now
accepted as being great poets. How the French, who had Chénier, Musset,
Lamartine, and, above all, Hugo,—and among whom quite recently
flourished the so-called Parnassiens: Leconte de Lisle, Sully-Prudhomme,
etc.,—could attribute such importance to these two versifiers, who were far
from skilful in form and most contemptible and commonplace in subject-
matter, is to me incomprehensible. The conception of life of one of them,
Baudelaire, consisted in elevating gross egotism into a theory, and replacing
morality by a cloudy conception of beauty, and especially artificial beauty.
Baudelaire had a preference, which he expressed, for a woman's face
painted rather than showing its natural color, and for metal trees and a
theatrical imitation of water rather than real trees and real water.
The life-conception of the other, Verlaine, consisted in weak profligacy,
confession of his moral impotence, and, as an antidote to that impotence, in
the grossest Roman Catholic idolatry. Both, moreover, were quite lacking in
naïveté, sincerity, and simplicity, and both overflowed with artificiality,
forced originality and self-assurance. So that in their least bad productions
one sees more of M. Baudelaire or M. Verlaine than of what they were
describing. But these two indifferent versifiers form a school, and lead
hundreds of followers after them.
There is only one explanation of this fact: it is that the art of the society in
which these versifiers lived is not a serious, important matter of life, but is a
mere amusement. And all amusements grow wearisome by repetition. And,
in order to make wearisome amusement again tolerable, it is necessary to
find some means to freshen it up. When, at cards, ombre grows stale, whist
is introduced; when whist grows stale, écarté is substituted; when écarté
grows stale, some other novelty is invented, and so on. The substance of the
matter remains the same, only its form is changed. And so it is with this
kind of art. The subject-matter of the art of the upper classes growing
continually more and more limited, it has come at last to this, that to the
artists of these exclusive classes it seems as if everything has already been
said, and that to find anything new to say is impossible. And therefore, to
freshen up this art, they look out for fresh forms.
Baudelaire and Verlaine invent such a new form, furbish it up, moreover,
with hitherto unused pornographic details, and—the critics and the public of
Page 387
the upper classes hail them as great writers.
This is the only explanation of the success, not of Baudelaire and Verlaine
only, but of all the Decadents.
For instance, there are poems by Mallarmé and Maeterlinck which have no
meaning, and yet for all that, or perhaps on that very account, are printed by
tens of thousands, not only in various publications, but even in collections
of the best works of the younger poets.
This, for example, is a sonnet by Mallarmé:—
A la nue accablante tu
Basse de basalte et de laves
A même les échos esclaves
Par une trompe sans vertu.
Quel sépulcral naufrage (tu
Le soir, écume, mais y baves)
Suprême une entre les épaves
Abolit le mât dévêtu.
Ou cela que furibond faute
De quelque perdition haute
Tout l'abîme vain éployé
Dans le si blanc cheveu qui traîne
Avarement aura noyé
Le flanc enfant d'une sirène.[113]
("Pan," 1895, No. 1.)
This poem is not exceptional in its incomprehensibility. I have read several
poems by Mallarmé, and they also had no meaning whatever. I give a
sample of his prose in Appendix I. There is a whole volume of this prose
called "Divagations." It is impossible to understand any of it. And that is
evidently what the author intended.
And here is a song by Maeterlinck, another celebrated author of to-day:—
Quand il est sorti,
(J'entendis la porte)
This is the only explanation of the success, not of Baudelaire and Verlaine
only, but of all the Decadents.
For instance, there are poems by Mallarmé and Maeterlinck which have no
meaning, and yet for all that, or perhaps on that very account, are printed by
tens of thousands, not only in various publications, but even in collections
of the best works of the younger poets.
This, for example, is a sonnet by Mallarmé:—
A la nue accablante tu
Basse de basalte et de laves
A même les échos esclaves
Par une trompe sans vertu.
Quel sépulcral naufrage (tu
Le soir, écume, mais y baves)
Suprême une entre les épaves
Abolit le mât dévêtu.
Ou cela que furibond faute
De quelque perdition haute
Tout l'abîme vain éployé
Dans le si blanc cheveu qui traîne
Avarement aura noyé
Le flanc enfant d'une sirène.[113]
("Pan," 1895, No. 1.)
This poem is not exceptional in its incomprehensibility. I have read several
poems by Mallarmé, and they also had no meaning whatever. I give a
sample of his prose in Appendix I. There is a whole volume of this prose
called "Divagations." It is impossible to understand any of it. And that is
evidently what the author intended.
And here is a song by Maeterlinck, another celebrated author of to-day:—
Quand il est sorti,
(J'entendis la porte)
Page 388
Quand il est sorti
Elle avait souri ....
Mais quand il entra
(J'entendis la lampe)
Mais quand il entra
Une autre était là ....
Et j'ai vu la mort,
(J'entendis son âme)
Et j'ai vu la mort
Qui l'attend encore ....
On est venu dire,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
On est venu dire
Qu'il allait partir ....
Ma lampe allumée,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
Ma lampe allumée
Me suis approchée ....
A la première porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la première porte,
La flamme a tremblé ....
A la seconde porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la seconde porte,
La flamme a parlé ....
A la troisième porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la troisième porte,
La lumière est morte ....
Elle avait souri ....
Mais quand il entra
(J'entendis la lampe)
Mais quand il entra
Une autre était là ....
Et j'ai vu la mort,
(J'entendis son âme)
Et j'ai vu la mort
Qui l'attend encore ....
On est venu dire,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
On est venu dire
Qu'il allait partir ....
Ma lampe allumée,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
Ma lampe allumée
Me suis approchée ....
A la première porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la première porte,
La flamme a tremblé ....
A la seconde porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la seconde porte,
La flamme a parlé ....
A la troisième porte,
(Mon enfant j'ai peur)
A la troisième porte,
La lumière est morte ....
Page 389
Et s'il revenait un jour
Que faut-il lui dire?
Dites-lui qu'on l'attendit
Jusqu'à s'en mourir ....
Et s'il demande où vous êtes
Que faut-il répondre?
Donnez-lui mon anneau d'or
Sans rien lui répondre ....
Et s'il m'interroge alors
Sur la dernière heure?
Dites lui que j'ai souri
De peur qu'il ne pleure ....
Et s'il m'interroge encore
Sans me reconnaître?
Parlez-lui comme une sœur,
Il souffre peut-être ....
Et s'il veut savoir pourquoi
La salle est déserte?
Montrez lui la lampe éteinte
Et la porte ouverte ....[114]
("Pan," 1895, No. 2.)
Who went out? Who came in? Who is speaking? Who died?
I beg the reader to be at the pains of reading through the samples I cite in
Appendix II. of the celebrated and esteemed young poets—Griffin,
Verhaeren, Moréas, and Montesquiou. It is important to do so in order to
form a clear conception of the present position of art, and not to suppose, as
many do, that Decadentism is an accidental and transitory phenomenon. To
avoid the reproach of having selected the worst verses, I have copied out of
each volume the poem which happened to stand on page 28.
All the other productions of these poets are equally unintelligible, or can
only be understood with great difficulty, and then not fully. All the
productions of those hundreds of poets, of whom I have named a few, are
Que faut-il lui dire?
Dites-lui qu'on l'attendit
Jusqu'à s'en mourir ....
Et s'il demande où vous êtes
Que faut-il répondre?
Donnez-lui mon anneau d'or
Sans rien lui répondre ....
Et s'il m'interroge alors
Sur la dernière heure?
Dites lui que j'ai souri
De peur qu'il ne pleure ....
Et s'il m'interroge encore
Sans me reconnaître?
Parlez-lui comme une sœur,
Il souffre peut-être ....
Et s'il veut savoir pourquoi
La salle est déserte?
Montrez lui la lampe éteinte
Et la porte ouverte ....[114]
("Pan," 1895, No. 2.)
Who went out? Who came in? Who is speaking? Who died?
I beg the reader to be at the pains of reading through the samples I cite in
Appendix II. of the celebrated and esteemed young poets—Griffin,
Verhaeren, Moréas, and Montesquiou. It is important to do so in order to
form a clear conception of the present position of art, and not to suppose, as
many do, that Decadentism is an accidental and transitory phenomenon. To
avoid the reproach of having selected the worst verses, I have copied out of
each volume the poem which happened to stand on page 28.
All the other productions of these poets are equally unintelligible, or can
only be understood with great difficulty, and then not fully. All the
productions of those hundreds of poets, of whom I have named a few, are
Page 390
the same in kind. And among the Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, Italians,
and us Russians, similar verses are printed. And such productions are
printed and made up into book form, if not by the million, then by the
hundred thousand (some of these works sell in tens of thousands). For type-
setting, paging, printing, and binding these books, millions and millions of
working days are spent—not less, I think, than went to build the great
pyramid. And this is not all. The same is going on in all the other arts:
millions and millions of working days are being spent on the production of
equally incomprehensible works in painting, in music, and in the drama.
Painting not only does not lag behind poetry in this matter, but rather
outstrips it. Here is an extract from the diary of an amateur of art, written
when visiting the Paris exhibitions in 1894:—
"I was to-day at three exhibitions: the Symbolists', the Impressionists', and
the Neo-Impressionists'. I looked at the pictures conscientiously and
carefully, but again felt the same stupefaction and ultimate indignation. The
first exhibition, that of Camille Pissarro, was comparatively the most
comprehensible, though the pictures were out of drawing, had no subject,
and the colorings were most improbable. The drawing was so indefinite that
you were sometimes unable to make out which way an arm or a head was
turned. The subject was generally 'effets'—Effet de brouillard, Effet du soir,
Soleil couchant. There were some pictures with figures, but without
subjects.
"In the coloring, bright blue and bright green predominated. And each
picture had its special color, with which the whole picture was, as it were,
splashed. For instance, in 'A Girl Guarding Geese,' the special color is vert
de gris, and dots of it were splashed about everywhere; on the face, the hair,
the hands, and the clothes. In the same gallery—'Durand Ruel'—were other
pictures by Puvis de Chavannes, Manet, Monet, Renoir, Sisley—who are all
Impressionists. One of them, whose name I could not make out,—it was
something like Redon,—had painted a blue face in profile. On the whole
face there is only this blue tone, with white-of-lead. Pissarro has a water-
color all done in dots. In the foreground is a cow, entirely painted with
various-colored dots. The general color cannot be distinguished, however
much one stands back from, or draws near to, the picture. From there I went
to see the Symbolists. I looked at them long without asking any one for an
explanation, trying to guess the meaning; but it is beyond human
and us Russians, similar verses are printed. And such productions are
printed and made up into book form, if not by the million, then by the
hundred thousand (some of these works sell in tens of thousands). For type-
setting, paging, printing, and binding these books, millions and millions of
working days are spent—not less, I think, than went to build the great
pyramid. And this is not all. The same is going on in all the other arts:
millions and millions of working days are being spent on the production of
equally incomprehensible works in painting, in music, and in the drama.
Painting not only does not lag behind poetry in this matter, but rather
outstrips it. Here is an extract from the diary of an amateur of art, written
when visiting the Paris exhibitions in 1894:—
"I was to-day at three exhibitions: the Symbolists', the Impressionists', and
the Neo-Impressionists'. I looked at the pictures conscientiously and
carefully, but again felt the same stupefaction and ultimate indignation. The
first exhibition, that of Camille Pissarro, was comparatively the most
comprehensible, though the pictures were out of drawing, had no subject,
and the colorings were most improbable. The drawing was so indefinite that
you were sometimes unable to make out which way an arm or a head was
turned. The subject was generally 'effets'—Effet de brouillard, Effet du soir,
Soleil couchant. There were some pictures with figures, but without
subjects.
"In the coloring, bright blue and bright green predominated. And each
picture had its special color, with which the whole picture was, as it were,
splashed. For instance, in 'A Girl Guarding Geese,' the special color is vert
de gris, and dots of it were splashed about everywhere; on the face, the hair,
the hands, and the clothes. In the same gallery—'Durand Ruel'—were other
pictures by Puvis de Chavannes, Manet, Monet, Renoir, Sisley—who are all
Impressionists. One of them, whose name I could not make out,—it was
something like Redon,—had painted a blue face in profile. On the whole
face there is only this blue tone, with white-of-lead. Pissarro has a water-
color all done in dots. In the foreground is a cow, entirely painted with
various-colored dots. The general color cannot be distinguished, however
much one stands back from, or draws near to, the picture. From there I went
to see the Symbolists. I looked at them long without asking any one for an
explanation, trying to guess the meaning; but it is beyond human
Page 391
comprehension. One of the first things to catch my eye was a wooden haut-
relief, wretchedly executed, representing a woman (naked) who with both
hands is squeezing from her two breasts streams of blood. The blood flows
down, becoming lilac in color. Her hair first descends, and then rises again,
and turns into trees. The figure is all colored yellow, and the hair is brown.
"Next—a picture: a yellow sea, on which swims something which is neither
a ship nor a heart; on the horizon is a profile with a halo and yellow hair,
which changes into a sea, in which it is lost. Some of the painters lay on
their colors so thickly that the effect is something between painting and
sculpture. A third exhibit was even less comprehensible: a man's profile;
before him a flame and black stripes—leeches, as I was afterwards told. At
last I asked a gentleman who was there what it meant, and he explained to
me that the haut-relief was a symbol, and that it represented 'La Terre.' The
heart swimming in a yellow sea was 'Illusion perdue,' and the gentleman
with the leeches 'Le Mal.' There were also some Impressionist pictures:
elementary profiles, holding some sort of flowers in their hands: in
monotone, out of drawing, and either quite blurred or else marked out with
wide black outlines."
This was in 1894; the same tendency is now even more strongly defined,
and we have Böcklin, Stuck, Klinger, Sasha Schneider, and others.
The same thing is taking place in the drama. The play-writers give us an
architect who, for some reason, has not fulfilled his former high intentions,
and who consequently climbs on to the roof of a house he has erected, and
tumbles down head foremost; or an incomprehensible old woman (who
exterminates rats), and who, for an unintelligible reason, takes a poetic
child to the sea, and there drowns him; or some blind men who, sitting on
the seashore, for some reason always repeat one and the same thing; or a
bell of some kind, which flies into a lake, and there rings.
And the same is happening in music—in that art which, more than any
other, one would have thought, should be intelligible to everybody.
An acquaintance of yours, a musician of repute, sits down to the piano and
plays you what he says is a new composition of his own, or of one of the
new composers. You hear the strange, loud sounds, and admire the
gymnastic exercises performed by his fingers; and you see that the
performer wishes to impress upon you that the sounds he is producing
relief, wretchedly executed, representing a woman (naked) who with both
hands is squeezing from her two breasts streams of blood. The blood flows
down, becoming lilac in color. Her hair first descends, and then rises again,
and turns into trees. The figure is all colored yellow, and the hair is brown.
"Next—a picture: a yellow sea, on which swims something which is neither
a ship nor a heart; on the horizon is a profile with a halo and yellow hair,
which changes into a sea, in which it is lost. Some of the painters lay on
their colors so thickly that the effect is something between painting and
sculpture. A third exhibit was even less comprehensible: a man's profile;
before him a flame and black stripes—leeches, as I was afterwards told. At
last I asked a gentleman who was there what it meant, and he explained to
me that the haut-relief was a symbol, and that it represented 'La Terre.' The
heart swimming in a yellow sea was 'Illusion perdue,' and the gentleman
with the leeches 'Le Mal.' There were also some Impressionist pictures:
elementary profiles, holding some sort of flowers in their hands: in
monotone, out of drawing, and either quite blurred or else marked out with
wide black outlines."
This was in 1894; the same tendency is now even more strongly defined,
and we have Böcklin, Stuck, Klinger, Sasha Schneider, and others.
The same thing is taking place in the drama. The play-writers give us an
architect who, for some reason, has not fulfilled his former high intentions,
and who consequently climbs on to the roof of a house he has erected, and
tumbles down head foremost; or an incomprehensible old woman (who
exterminates rats), and who, for an unintelligible reason, takes a poetic
child to the sea, and there drowns him; or some blind men who, sitting on
the seashore, for some reason always repeat one and the same thing; or a
bell of some kind, which flies into a lake, and there rings.
And the same is happening in music—in that art which, more than any
other, one would have thought, should be intelligible to everybody.
An acquaintance of yours, a musician of repute, sits down to the piano and
plays you what he says is a new composition of his own, or of one of the
new composers. You hear the strange, loud sounds, and admire the
gymnastic exercises performed by his fingers; and you see that the
performer wishes to impress upon you that the sounds he is producing
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express various poetic strivings of the soul. You see his intention, but no
feeling whatever is transmitted to you except weariness. The execution lasts
long, or at least it seems very long to you, because you do not receive any
clear impression, and involuntarily you remember the words of Alphonse
Karr, "Plus ça va vite, plus ça dure longtemps."[115] And it occurs to you that
perhaps it is all a mystification; perhaps the performer is trying you—just
throwing his hands and fingers wildly about the keyboard in the hope that
you will fall into the trap and praise him, and then he will laugh and confess
that he only wanted to see if he could hoax you. But when at last the piece
does finish, and the perspiring and agitated musician rises from the piano
evidently anticipating praise, you see that it was all done in earnest.
The same thing takes place at all the concerts, with pieces by Liszt, Wagner,
Berlioz, Brahms, and (newest of all) Richard Strauss, and the numberless
other composers of the new school, who unceasingly produce opera after
opera, symphony after symphony, piece after piece.
The same is occurring in a domain in which it seemed hard to be
unintelligible,—in the sphere of novels and short stories.
Read "Là Bas," by Huysmans, or some of Kipling's short stories, or
"L'Annonciateur," by Villiers de l'Isle Adam in his "Contes Cruels," etc.,
and you will find them not only "abscons" (to use a word adopted by the
new writers), but absolutely unintelligible both in form and in substance.
Such, again, is the work by E. Morel, "Terre Promise," now appearing in the
Revue Blanche, and such are most of the new novels. The style is very high-
flown, the feelings seem to be most elevated, but you can't make out what is
happening, to whom it is happening, and where it is happening. And such is
the bulk of the young art of our time.
People who grew up in the first half of this century, admiring Goethe,
Schiller, Musset, Hugo, Dickens, Beethoven, Chopin, Raphael, da Vinci,
Michael Angelo, Delaroche, being unable to make head or tail of this new
art, simply attribute its productions to tasteless insanity, and wish to ignore
them. But such an attitude toward this new art is quite unjustifiable,
because, in the first place, that art is spreading more and more, and has
already conquered for itself a firm position in society, similar to the one
occupied by the Romanticists in the third decade of this century; and,
secondly and chiefly, because, if it is permissible to judge in this way of the
feeling whatever is transmitted to you except weariness. The execution lasts
long, or at least it seems very long to you, because you do not receive any
clear impression, and involuntarily you remember the words of Alphonse
Karr, "Plus ça va vite, plus ça dure longtemps."[115] And it occurs to you that
perhaps it is all a mystification; perhaps the performer is trying you—just
throwing his hands and fingers wildly about the keyboard in the hope that
you will fall into the trap and praise him, and then he will laugh and confess
that he only wanted to see if he could hoax you. But when at last the piece
does finish, and the perspiring and agitated musician rises from the piano
evidently anticipating praise, you see that it was all done in earnest.
The same thing takes place at all the concerts, with pieces by Liszt, Wagner,
Berlioz, Brahms, and (newest of all) Richard Strauss, and the numberless
other composers of the new school, who unceasingly produce opera after
opera, symphony after symphony, piece after piece.
The same is occurring in a domain in which it seemed hard to be
unintelligible,—in the sphere of novels and short stories.
Read "Là Bas," by Huysmans, or some of Kipling's short stories, or
"L'Annonciateur," by Villiers de l'Isle Adam in his "Contes Cruels," etc.,
and you will find them not only "abscons" (to use a word adopted by the
new writers), but absolutely unintelligible both in form and in substance.
Such, again, is the work by E. Morel, "Terre Promise," now appearing in the
Revue Blanche, and such are most of the new novels. The style is very high-
flown, the feelings seem to be most elevated, but you can't make out what is
happening, to whom it is happening, and where it is happening. And such is
the bulk of the young art of our time.
People who grew up in the first half of this century, admiring Goethe,
Schiller, Musset, Hugo, Dickens, Beethoven, Chopin, Raphael, da Vinci,
Michael Angelo, Delaroche, being unable to make head or tail of this new
art, simply attribute its productions to tasteless insanity, and wish to ignore
them. But such an attitude toward this new art is quite unjustifiable,
because, in the first place, that art is spreading more and more, and has
already conquered for itself a firm position in society, similar to the one
occupied by the Romanticists in the third decade of this century; and,
secondly and chiefly, because, if it is permissible to judge in this way of the
Page 393
productions of the latest form of art, called by us Decadent art, merely
because we do not understand it, then remember there are an enormous
number of people,—all the laborers, and many of the non-laboring folk,—
who, in just the same way, do not comprehend those productions of art
which we consider admirable: the verses of our favorite artists—Goethe,
Schiller, and Hugo; the novels of Dickens, the music of Beethoven and
Chopin, the pictures of Raphael, Michael Angelo, da Vinci, etc.
If I have a right to think that great masses of people do not understand and
do not like what I consider undoubtedly good because they are not
sufficiently developed, then I have no right to deny that perhaps the reason
why I cannot understand and cannot like the new productions of art is
merely that I am still insufficiently developed to understand them. If I have
a right to say that I, and the majority of people who are in sympathy with
me, do not understand the productions of the new art, simply because there
is nothing in it to understand, and because it is bad art, then, with just the
same right, the still larger majority, the whole laboring mass, who do not
understand what I consider admirable art, can say that what I reckon as
good art is bad art, and there is nothing in it to understand.
I once saw the injustice of such condemnation of the new art with especial
clearness, when, in my presence, a certain poet, who writes
incomprehensible verses, ridiculed incomprehensible music with gay self-
assurance; and, shortly afterwards, a certain musician, who composes
incomprehensible symphonies, laughed at incomprehensible poetry with
equal self-confidence. I have no right, and no authority, to condemn the new
art on the ground that I (a man educated in the first half of the century) do
not understand it; I can only say that it is incomprehensible to me. The only
advantage the art I acknowledge has over the Decadent art, lies in the fact
that the art I recognize is comprehensible to a somewhat larger number of
people than the present-day art.
The fact that I am accustomed to a certain exclusive art, and can understand
it, but am unable to understand another still more exclusive art, does not
give me a right to conclude that my art is the real true art, and that the other
one, which I do not understand, is an unreal, a bad art. I can only conclude
that art, becoming ever more and more exclusive, has become more and
more incomprehensible to an ever increasing number of people, and that, in
this its progress toward greater and greater incomprehensibility (on one
because we do not understand it, then remember there are an enormous
number of people,—all the laborers, and many of the non-laboring folk,—
who, in just the same way, do not comprehend those productions of art
which we consider admirable: the verses of our favorite artists—Goethe,
Schiller, and Hugo; the novels of Dickens, the music of Beethoven and
Chopin, the pictures of Raphael, Michael Angelo, da Vinci, etc.
If I have a right to think that great masses of people do not understand and
do not like what I consider undoubtedly good because they are not
sufficiently developed, then I have no right to deny that perhaps the reason
why I cannot understand and cannot like the new productions of art is
merely that I am still insufficiently developed to understand them. If I have
a right to say that I, and the majority of people who are in sympathy with
me, do not understand the productions of the new art, simply because there
is nothing in it to understand, and because it is bad art, then, with just the
same right, the still larger majority, the whole laboring mass, who do not
understand what I consider admirable art, can say that what I reckon as
good art is bad art, and there is nothing in it to understand.
I once saw the injustice of such condemnation of the new art with especial
clearness, when, in my presence, a certain poet, who writes
incomprehensible verses, ridiculed incomprehensible music with gay self-
assurance; and, shortly afterwards, a certain musician, who composes
incomprehensible symphonies, laughed at incomprehensible poetry with
equal self-confidence. I have no right, and no authority, to condemn the new
art on the ground that I (a man educated in the first half of the century) do
not understand it; I can only say that it is incomprehensible to me. The only
advantage the art I acknowledge has over the Decadent art, lies in the fact
that the art I recognize is comprehensible to a somewhat larger number of
people than the present-day art.
The fact that I am accustomed to a certain exclusive art, and can understand
it, but am unable to understand another still more exclusive art, does not
give me a right to conclude that my art is the real true art, and that the other
one, which I do not understand, is an unreal, a bad art. I can only conclude
that art, becoming ever more and more exclusive, has become more and
more incomprehensible to an ever increasing number of people, and that, in
this its progress toward greater and greater incomprehensibility (on one
Page 394
level of which I am standing, with the art familiar to me), it has reached a
point where it is understood by a very small number of the elect, and the
number of these chosen people is ever becoming smaller and smaller.
As soon as ever the art of the upper classes separated itself from universal
art, a conviction arose that art may be art and yet be incomprehensible to
the masses. And as soon as this position was admitted, it had inevitably to
be admitted also that art may be intelligible only to the very smallest
number of the elect, and, eventually, to two, or to one, of our nearest
friends, or to oneself alone. Which is practically what is being said by
modern artists: "I create and understand myself, and if any one does not
understand me, so much the worse for him."
The assertion that art may be good art, and at the same time
incomprehensible to a great number of people, is extremely unjust, and its
consequences are ruinous to art itself; but at the same time it is so common
and has so eaten into our conceptions, that it is impossible sufficiently to
elucidate all the absurdity of it.
Nothing is more common than to hear it said of reputed works of art, that
they are very good but very difficult to understand. We are quite used to
such assertions, and yet to say that a work of art is good, but
incomprehensible to the majority of men, is the same as saying of some
kind of food that it is very good, but that most people can't eat it. The
majority of men may not like rotten cheese or putrefying grouse—dishes
esteemed by people with perverted tastes; but bread and fruit are only good
when they please the majority of men. And it is the same with art. Perverted
art may not please the majority of men, but good art always pleases every
one.
It is said that the very best works of art are such that they cannot be
understood by the mass, but are accessible only to the elect who are
prepared to understand these great works. But if the majority of men do not
understand, the knowledge necessary to enable them to understand should
be taught and explained to them. But it turns out that there is no such
knowledge, that the works cannot be explained, and that those who say the
majority do not understand good works of art, still do not explain those
works, but only tell us that, in order to understand them, one must read, and
see, and hear these same works over and over again. But this is not to
point where it is understood by a very small number of the elect, and the
number of these chosen people is ever becoming smaller and smaller.
As soon as ever the art of the upper classes separated itself from universal
art, a conviction arose that art may be art and yet be incomprehensible to
the masses. And as soon as this position was admitted, it had inevitably to
be admitted also that art may be intelligible only to the very smallest
number of the elect, and, eventually, to two, or to one, of our nearest
friends, or to oneself alone. Which is practically what is being said by
modern artists: "I create and understand myself, and if any one does not
understand me, so much the worse for him."
The assertion that art may be good art, and at the same time
incomprehensible to a great number of people, is extremely unjust, and its
consequences are ruinous to art itself; but at the same time it is so common
and has so eaten into our conceptions, that it is impossible sufficiently to
elucidate all the absurdity of it.
Nothing is more common than to hear it said of reputed works of art, that
they are very good but very difficult to understand. We are quite used to
such assertions, and yet to say that a work of art is good, but
incomprehensible to the majority of men, is the same as saying of some
kind of food that it is very good, but that most people can't eat it. The
majority of men may not like rotten cheese or putrefying grouse—dishes
esteemed by people with perverted tastes; but bread and fruit are only good
when they please the majority of men. And it is the same with art. Perverted
art may not please the majority of men, but good art always pleases every
one.
It is said that the very best works of art are such that they cannot be
understood by the mass, but are accessible only to the elect who are
prepared to understand these great works. But if the majority of men do not
understand, the knowledge necessary to enable them to understand should
be taught and explained to them. But it turns out that there is no such
knowledge, that the works cannot be explained, and that those who say the
majority do not understand good works of art, still do not explain those
works, but only tell us that, in order to understand them, one must read, and
see, and hear these same works over and over again. But this is not to
Page 395
explain, it is only to habituate! And people may habituate themselves to
anything, even to the very worst things. As people may habituate
themselves to bad food, to spirits, tobacco, and opium, just in the same way
they may habituate themselves to bad art—and that is exactly what is being
done.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the majority of people lack the taste to
esteem the highest works of art. The majority always have understood, and
still understand, what we also recognize as being the very best art: the epic
of Genesis, the gospel parables, folk-legends, fairy-tales, and folk-songs,
are understood by all. How can it be that the majority has suddenly lost its
capacity to understand what is high in our art?
Of a speech it may be said that it is admirable, but incomprehensible to
those who do not know the language in which it is delivered. A speech
delivered in Chinese may be excellent, and may yet remain
incomprehensible to me if I do not know Chinese; but what distinguishes a
work of art from all other mental activity is just the fact that its language is
understood by all, and that it infects all without distinction. The tears and
laughter of a Chinese infect me just as the laughter and tears of a Russian;
and it is the same with painting and music and poetry, when it is translated
into a language I understand. The songs of a Kirghiz or of a Japanese touch
me, though in a lesser degree than they touch a Kirghiz or a Japanese. I am
also touched by Japanese painting, Indian architecture, and Arabian stories.
If I am but little touched by a Japanese song and a Chinese novel, it is not
that I do not understand these productions, but that I know and am
accustomed to higher works of art. It is not because their art is above me.
Great works of art are only great because they are accessible and
comprehensible to every one. The story of Joseph, translated into the
Chinese language, touches a Chinese. The story of Sakya Muni touches us.
And there are, and must be, buildings, pictures, statues, and music of
similar power. So that, if art fails to move men, it cannot be said that this is
due to the spectators' or hearers' lack of understanding; but the conclusion
to be drawn may and should be, that such art is either bad art, or is not art at
all.
Art is differentiated from activity of the understanding, which demands
preparation and a certain sequence of knowledge (so that one cannot learn
trigonometry before knowing geometry), by the fact that it acts on people
anything, even to the very worst things. As people may habituate
themselves to bad food, to spirits, tobacco, and opium, just in the same way
they may habituate themselves to bad art—and that is exactly what is being
done.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the majority of people lack the taste to
esteem the highest works of art. The majority always have understood, and
still understand, what we also recognize as being the very best art: the epic
of Genesis, the gospel parables, folk-legends, fairy-tales, and folk-songs,
are understood by all. How can it be that the majority has suddenly lost its
capacity to understand what is high in our art?
Of a speech it may be said that it is admirable, but incomprehensible to
those who do not know the language in which it is delivered. A speech
delivered in Chinese may be excellent, and may yet remain
incomprehensible to me if I do not know Chinese; but what distinguishes a
work of art from all other mental activity is just the fact that its language is
understood by all, and that it infects all without distinction. The tears and
laughter of a Chinese infect me just as the laughter and tears of a Russian;
and it is the same with painting and music and poetry, when it is translated
into a language I understand. The songs of a Kirghiz or of a Japanese touch
me, though in a lesser degree than they touch a Kirghiz or a Japanese. I am
also touched by Japanese painting, Indian architecture, and Arabian stories.
If I am but little touched by a Japanese song and a Chinese novel, it is not
that I do not understand these productions, but that I know and am
accustomed to higher works of art. It is not because their art is above me.
Great works of art are only great because they are accessible and
comprehensible to every one. The story of Joseph, translated into the
Chinese language, touches a Chinese. The story of Sakya Muni touches us.
And there are, and must be, buildings, pictures, statues, and music of
similar power. So that, if art fails to move men, it cannot be said that this is
due to the spectators' or hearers' lack of understanding; but the conclusion
to be drawn may and should be, that such art is either bad art, or is not art at
all.
Art is differentiated from activity of the understanding, which demands
preparation and a certain sequence of knowledge (so that one cannot learn
trigonometry before knowing geometry), by the fact that it acts on people
Page 396
independently of their state of development and education, that the charm
of a picture, sounds, or of forms, infects any man whatever his plane of
development.
The business of art lies just in this,—to make that understood and felt
which, in the form of an argument, might be incomprehensible and
inaccessible. Usually it seems to the recipient of a truly artistic impression
that he knew the thing before but had been unable to express it.
And such has always been the nature of good, supreme art; the "Iliad," the
"Odyssey," the stories of Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, the Hebrew prophets, the
psalms, the gospel parables, the story of Sakya Muni, and the hymns of the
Vedas: all transmit very elevated feelings, and are nevertheless quite
comprehensible now to us, educated or uneducated, as they were
comprehensible to the men of those times, long ago, who were even less
educated than our laborers. People talk about incomprehensibility; but if art
is the transmission of feelings flowing from man's religious perception, how
can a feeling be incomprehensible which is founded on religion, i.e. on
man's relation to God? Such art should be, and has actually always been,
comprehensible to everybody, because every man's relation to God is one
and the same. And therefore the churches and the images in them were
always comprehensible to every one. The hindrance to understanding the
best and highest feelings (as is said in the gospel) does not at all lie in
deficiency of development or learning, but, on the contrary, in false
development and false learning. A good and lofty work of art may be
incomprehensible, but not to simple, unperverted peasant laborers (all that
is highest is understood by them)—it may be, and often is, unintelligible to
erudite, perverted people destitute of religion. And this continually occurs
in our society, in which the highest feelings are simply not understood. For
instance, I know people who consider themselves most refined, and who
say that they do not understand the poetry of love to one's neighbor, of self-
sacrifice, or of chastity.
So that good, great, universal, religious art may be incomprehensible to a
small circle of spoilt people, but certainly not to any large number of plain
men.
Art cannot be incomprehensible to the great masses only because it is very
good—as artists of our day are fond of telling us. Rather we are bound to
of a picture, sounds, or of forms, infects any man whatever his plane of
development.
The business of art lies just in this,—to make that understood and felt
which, in the form of an argument, might be incomprehensible and
inaccessible. Usually it seems to the recipient of a truly artistic impression
that he knew the thing before but had been unable to express it.
And such has always been the nature of good, supreme art; the "Iliad," the
"Odyssey," the stories of Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, the Hebrew prophets, the
psalms, the gospel parables, the story of Sakya Muni, and the hymns of the
Vedas: all transmit very elevated feelings, and are nevertheless quite
comprehensible now to us, educated or uneducated, as they were
comprehensible to the men of those times, long ago, who were even less
educated than our laborers. People talk about incomprehensibility; but if art
is the transmission of feelings flowing from man's religious perception, how
can a feeling be incomprehensible which is founded on religion, i.e. on
man's relation to God? Such art should be, and has actually always been,
comprehensible to everybody, because every man's relation to God is one
and the same. And therefore the churches and the images in them were
always comprehensible to every one. The hindrance to understanding the
best and highest feelings (as is said in the gospel) does not at all lie in
deficiency of development or learning, but, on the contrary, in false
development and false learning. A good and lofty work of art may be
incomprehensible, but not to simple, unperverted peasant laborers (all that
is highest is understood by them)—it may be, and often is, unintelligible to
erudite, perverted people destitute of religion. And this continually occurs
in our society, in which the highest feelings are simply not understood. For
instance, I know people who consider themselves most refined, and who
say that they do not understand the poetry of love to one's neighbor, of self-
sacrifice, or of chastity.
So that good, great, universal, religious art may be incomprehensible to a
small circle of spoilt people, but certainly not to any large number of plain
men.
Art cannot be incomprehensible to the great masses only because it is very
good—as artists of our day are fond of telling us. Rather we are bound to
Page 397
conclude that this art is unintelligible to the great masses only because it is
very bad art, or even is not art at all. So that the favorite argument (naïvely
accepted by the cultured crowd), that in order to feel art one has first to
understand it (which really only means habituate oneself to it), is the truest
indication that what we are asked to understand by such a method is either
very bad, exclusive art, or is not art at all.
People say that works of art do not please the people because they are
incapable of understanding them. But if the aim of works of art is to infect
people with the emotion the artist has experienced, how can one talk about
not understanding?
A man of the people reads a book, sees a picture, hears a play or a
symphony, and is touched by no feeling. He is told that this is because he
cannot understand. People promise to let a man see a certain show; he
enters and sees nothing. He is told that this is because his sight is not
prepared for this show. But the man well knows that he sees quite well, and
if he does not see what people promised to show him, he only concludes (as
is quite just) that those who undertook to show him the spectacle have not
fulfilled their engagement. And it is perfectly just for a man who does feel
the influence of some works of art to come to this conclusion concerning
artists who do not, by their works, evoke feeling in him. To say that the
reason a man is not touched by my art is because he is still too stupid,
besides being very self-conceited and also rude, is to reverse the rôles, and
for the sick to send the hale to bed.
Voltaire said that "Tous les genres sont bons, hors le genre ennuyeux;"[116]
but with even more right one may say of art that Tous les genres sont bons,
hors celui qu'on ne comprend pas, or qui ne produit pas son effet,[117] for of
what value is an article which fails to do that for which it was intended?
Mark this above all: if only it be admitted that art may be art and yet be
unintelligible to any one of sound mind, there is no reason why any circle of
perverted people should not compose works tickling their own perverted
feelings and comprehensible to no one but themselves, and call it "art," as is
actually being done by the so-called Decadents.
The direction art has taken may be compared to placing on a large circle
other circles, smaller and smaller, until a cone is formed, the apex of which
is no longer a circle at all. That is what has happened to the art of our times.
very bad art, or even is not art at all. So that the favorite argument (naïvely
accepted by the cultured crowd), that in order to feel art one has first to
understand it (which really only means habituate oneself to it), is the truest
indication that what we are asked to understand by such a method is either
very bad, exclusive art, or is not art at all.
People say that works of art do not please the people because they are
incapable of understanding them. But if the aim of works of art is to infect
people with the emotion the artist has experienced, how can one talk about
not understanding?
A man of the people reads a book, sees a picture, hears a play or a
symphony, and is touched by no feeling. He is told that this is because he
cannot understand. People promise to let a man see a certain show; he
enters and sees nothing. He is told that this is because his sight is not
prepared for this show. But the man well knows that he sees quite well, and
if he does not see what people promised to show him, he only concludes (as
is quite just) that those who undertook to show him the spectacle have not
fulfilled their engagement. And it is perfectly just for a man who does feel
the influence of some works of art to come to this conclusion concerning
artists who do not, by their works, evoke feeling in him. To say that the
reason a man is not touched by my art is because he is still too stupid,
besides being very self-conceited and also rude, is to reverse the rôles, and
for the sick to send the hale to bed.
Voltaire said that "Tous les genres sont bons, hors le genre ennuyeux;"[116]
but with even more right one may say of art that Tous les genres sont bons,
hors celui qu'on ne comprend pas, or qui ne produit pas son effet,[117] for of
what value is an article which fails to do that for which it was intended?
Mark this above all: if only it be admitted that art may be art and yet be
unintelligible to any one of sound mind, there is no reason why any circle of
perverted people should not compose works tickling their own perverted
feelings and comprehensible to no one but themselves, and call it "art," as is
actually being done by the so-called Decadents.
The direction art has taken may be compared to placing on a large circle
other circles, smaller and smaller, until a cone is formed, the apex of which
is no longer a circle at all. That is what has happened to the art of our times.
Page 398
Page 399
CHAPTER XI
Becoming ever poorer and poorer in subject-matter, and more and more
unintelligible in form, the art of the upper classes, in its latest productions,
has even lost all the characteristics of art, and has been replaced by
imitations of art. Not only has upper-class art, in consequence of its
separation from universal art, become poor in subject-matter, and bad in
form, i.e. ever more and more unintelligible, it has, in course of time,
ceased even to be art at all, and has been replaced by counterfeits.
This has resulted from the following causes: Universal art arises only when
some one of the people, having experienced a strong emotion, feels the
necessity of transmitting it to others. The art of the rich classes, on the other
hand, arises not from the artist's inner impulse, but chiefly because people
of the upper classes demand amusement and pay well for it. They demand
from art the transmission of feelings that please them, and this demand
artists try to meet. But it is a very difficult task; for people of the wealthy
classes, spending their lives in idleness and luxury, desire to be continually
diverted by art; and art, even the lowest, cannot be produced at will, but has
to generate spontaneously in the artist's inner self. And therefore, to satisfy
the demands of people of the upper classes, artists have had to devise
methods of producing imitations of art. And such methods have been
devised.
These methods are those of (1) borrowing, (2) imitating, (3) striking
(effects), and (4) interesting.
The first method consists in borrowing whole subjects, or merely separate
features, from former works recognized by every one as being poetical, and
in so re-shaping them, with sundry additions, that they should have an
appearance of novelty.
Such works, evoking in people of a certain class memories of artistic
feelings formerly experienced, produce an impression similar to art, and,
provided only that they conform to other needful conditions, they pass for
art among those who seek for pleasure from art. Subjects borrowed from
previous works of art are usually called poetical subjects. Objects and
Becoming ever poorer and poorer in subject-matter, and more and more
unintelligible in form, the art of the upper classes, in its latest productions,
has even lost all the characteristics of art, and has been replaced by
imitations of art. Not only has upper-class art, in consequence of its
separation from universal art, become poor in subject-matter, and bad in
form, i.e. ever more and more unintelligible, it has, in course of time,
ceased even to be art at all, and has been replaced by counterfeits.
This has resulted from the following causes: Universal art arises only when
some one of the people, having experienced a strong emotion, feels the
necessity of transmitting it to others. The art of the rich classes, on the other
hand, arises not from the artist's inner impulse, but chiefly because people
of the upper classes demand amusement and pay well for it. They demand
from art the transmission of feelings that please them, and this demand
artists try to meet. But it is a very difficult task; for people of the wealthy
classes, spending their lives in idleness and luxury, desire to be continually
diverted by art; and art, even the lowest, cannot be produced at will, but has
to generate spontaneously in the artist's inner self. And therefore, to satisfy
the demands of people of the upper classes, artists have had to devise
methods of producing imitations of art. And such methods have been
devised.
These methods are those of (1) borrowing, (2) imitating, (3) striking
(effects), and (4) interesting.
The first method consists in borrowing whole subjects, or merely separate
features, from former works recognized by every one as being poetical, and
in so re-shaping them, with sundry additions, that they should have an
appearance of novelty.
Such works, evoking in people of a certain class memories of artistic
feelings formerly experienced, produce an impression similar to art, and,
provided only that they conform to other needful conditions, they pass for
art among those who seek for pleasure from art. Subjects borrowed from
previous works of art are usually called poetical subjects. Objects and
Page 400
people thus borrowed are called poetical objects and people. Thus, in our
circle, all sorts of legends, sagas, and ancient traditions are considered
poetical subjects. Among poetical people and objects we reckon maidens,
warriors, shepherds, hermits, angels, devils of all sorts, moonlight, thunder,
mountains, the sea, precipices, flowers, long hair, lions, lambs, doves, and
nightingales. In general, all those objects are considered poetical which
have been most frequently used by former artists in their productions.
Some forty years ago a stupid but highly cultured—ayant beaucoup
d'acquis—lady (since deceased) asked me to listen to a novel written by
herself. It began with a heroine who, in a poetic white dress, and with
poetically flowing hair, was reading poetry near some water in a poetic
wood. The scene was in Russia, but suddenly from behind the bushes the
hero appears, wearing a hat with a feather à la Guillaume Tell (the book
specially mentioned this) and accompanied by two poetical white dogs. The
authoress deemed all this highly poetical, and it might have passed muster if
only it had not been necessary for the hero to speak. But as soon as the
gentleman in the hat à la Guillaume Tell began to converse with the maiden
in the white dress, it became obvious that the authoress had nothing to say,
but had merely been moved by poetic memories of other works, and
imagined that by ringing the changes on those memories she could produce
an artistic impression. But an artistic impression, i.e. infection, is only
received when an author has, in the manner peculiar to himself, experienced
the feeling which he transmits, and not when he passes on another man's
feeling previously transmitted to him. Such poetry from poetry cannot
infect people, it can only simulate a work of art, and even that only to
people of perverted æsthetic taste. The lady in question being very stupid
and devoid of talent, it was at once apparent how the case stood; but when
such borrowing is resorted to by people who are erudite and talented and
have cultivated the technique of their art, we get those borrowings from the
Greek, the antique, the Christian or mythological world which have become
so numerous, and which, particularly in our day, continue to increase and
multiply, and are accepted by the public as works of art, if only the
borrowings are well mounted by means of the technique of the particular art
to which they belong.
As a characteristic example of such counterfeits of art in the realm of
poetry, take Rostand's "Princesse Lointaine," in which there is not a spark
circle, all sorts of legends, sagas, and ancient traditions are considered
poetical subjects. Among poetical people and objects we reckon maidens,
warriors, shepherds, hermits, angels, devils of all sorts, moonlight, thunder,
mountains, the sea, precipices, flowers, long hair, lions, lambs, doves, and
nightingales. In general, all those objects are considered poetical which
have been most frequently used by former artists in their productions.
Some forty years ago a stupid but highly cultured—ayant beaucoup
d'acquis—lady (since deceased) asked me to listen to a novel written by
herself. It began with a heroine who, in a poetic white dress, and with
poetically flowing hair, was reading poetry near some water in a poetic
wood. The scene was in Russia, but suddenly from behind the bushes the
hero appears, wearing a hat with a feather à la Guillaume Tell (the book
specially mentioned this) and accompanied by two poetical white dogs. The
authoress deemed all this highly poetical, and it might have passed muster if
only it had not been necessary for the hero to speak. But as soon as the
gentleman in the hat à la Guillaume Tell began to converse with the maiden
in the white dress, it became obvious that the authoress had nothing to say,
but had merely been moved by poetic memories of other works, and
imagined that by ringing the changes on those memories she could produce
an artistic impression. But an artistic impression, i.e. infection, is only
received when an author has, in the manner peculiar to himself, experienced
the feeling which he transmits, and not when he passes on another man's
feeling previously transmitted to him. Such poetry from poetry cannot
infect people, it can only simulate a work of art, and even that only to
people of perverted æsthetic taste. The lady in question being very stupid
and devoid of talent, it was at once apparent how the case stood; but when
such borrowing is resorted to by people who are erudite and talented and
have cultivated the technique of their art, we get those borrowings from the
Greek, the antique, the Christian or mythological world which have become
so numerous, and which, particularly in our day, continue to increase and
multiply, and are accepted by the public as works of art, if only the
borrowings are well mounted by means of the technique of the particular art
to which they belong.
As a characteristic example of such counterfeits of art in the realm of
poetry, take Rostand's "Princesse Lointaine," in which there is not a spark
Page 401
of art, but which seems very poetical to many people, and probably also to
its author.
The second method of imparting a semblance of art is that which I have
called imitating. The essence of this method consists in supplying details
accompanying the thing described or depicted. In literary art this method
consists in describing, in the minutest details, the external appearance, the
faces, the clothes, the gestures, the tones, and the habitations of the
characters represented, with all the occurrences met with in life. For
instance, in novels and stories, when one of the characters speaks, we are
told in what voice he spoke, and what he was doing at the time. And the
things said are not given so that they should have as much sense as possible,
but, as they are in life, disconnectedly, and with interruptions and
omissions. In dramatic art, besides such imitation of real speech, this
method consists in having all the accessories and all the people just like
those in real life. In painting, this method assimilates painting to
photography, and destroys the difference between them. And, strange to say,
this method is used also in music: music tries to imitate, not only by its
rhythm but also by its very sounds, the sounds which in real life accompany
the thing it wishes to represent.
The third method is by action, often purely physical, on the outer senses.
Work of this kind is said to be "striking," "effectful." In all arts these effects
consist chiefly in contrasts; in bringing together the terrible and the tender,
the beautiful and the hideous, the loud and the soft, darkness and light, the
most ordinary and the most extraordinary. In verbal art, besides effects of
contrast, there are also effects consisting in the description of things that
have never before been described. These are usually pornographic details
evoking sexual desire, or details of suffering and death evoking feelings of
horror, as, for instance, when describing a murder, to give a detailed
medical account of the lacerated tissues, of the swellings, of the smell,
quantity, and appearance of the blood. It is the same in painting: besides all
kinds of other contrasts, one is coming into vogue which consists in giving
careful finish to one object and being careless about all the rest. The chief
and usual effects in painting are effects of light and the depiction of the
horrible. In the drama, the most common effects, besides contrasts, are
tempests, thunder, moonlight, scenes at sea or by the seashore, changes of
costume, exposure of the female body, madness, murders, and death
its author.
The second method of imparting a semblance of art is that which I have
called imitating. The essence of this method consists in supplying details
accompanying the thing described or depicted. In literary art this method
consists in describing, in the minutest details, the external appearance, the
faces, the clothes, the gestures, the tones, and the habitations of the
characters represented, with all the occurrences met with in life. For
instance, in novels and stories, when one of the characters speaks, we are
told in what voice he spoke, and what he was doing at the time. And the
things said are not given so that they should have as much sense as possible,
but, as they are in life, disconnectedly, and with interruptions and
omissions. In dramatic art, besides such imitation of real speech, this
method consists in having all the accessories and all the people just like
those in real life. In painting, this method assimilates painting to
photography, and destroys the difference between them. And, strange to say,
this method is used also in music: music tries to imitate, not only by its
rhythm but also by its very sounds, the sounds which in real life accompany
the thing it wishes to represent.
The third method is by action, often purely physical, on the outer senses.
Work of this kind is said to be "striking," "effectful." In all arts these effects
consist chiefly in contrasts; in bringing together the terrible and the tender,
the beautiful and the hideous, the loud and the soft, darkness and light, the
most ordinary and the most extraordinary. In verbal art, besides effects of
contrast, there are also effects consisting in the description of things that
have never before been described. These are usually pornographic details
evoking sexual desire, or details of suffering and death evoking feelings of
horror, as, for instance, when describing a murder, to give a detailed
medical account of the lacerated tissues, of the swellings, of the smell,
quantity, and appearance of the blood. It is the same in painting: besides all
kinds of other contrasts, one is coming into vogue which consists in giving
careful finish to one object and being careless about all the rest. The chief
and usual effects in painting are effects of light and the depiction of the
horrible. In the drama, the most common effects, besides contrasts, are
tempests, thunder, moonlight, scenes at sea or by the seashore, changes of
costume, exposure of the female body, madness, murders, and death
Page 402
generally: the dying person exhibiting in detail all the phases of agony. In
music the most usual effects are a crescendo, passing from the softest and
simplest sounds to the loudest and most complex crash of the full orchestra;
a repetition of the same sounds arpeggio in all the octaves and on various
instruments; or that the harmony, tone, and rhythm be not at all those
naturally flowing from the course of the musical thought, but such as strike
one by their unexpectedness. Besides these, the commonest effects in music
are produced in a purely physical manner by strength of sound, especially in
an orchestra.
Such are some of the most usual effects in the various arts, but there yet
remains one common to them all; namely, to convey by means of one art
what it would be natural to convey by another: for instance, to make music
describe (as is done by the programme music of Wagner and his followers),
or to make painting, the drama, or poetry, induce a frame of mind (as is
aimed at by all the Decadent art).
The fourth method is that of interesting (that is, absorbing the mind) in
connection with works of art. The interest may lie in an intricate plot—a
method till quite recently much employed in English novels and French
plays, but now going out of fashion and being replaced by authenticity, i.e.
by detailed description of some historical period or some branch of
contemporary life. For example, in a novel, interestingness may consist in a
description of Egyptian or Roman life, the life of miners, or that of the
clerks in a large shop. The reader becomes interested and mistakes this
interest for an artistic impression. The interest may also depend on the very
method of expression; a kind of interest that has now come much into use.
Both verse and prose, as well as pictures, plays, and music, are constructed
so that they must be guessed like riddles, and this process of guessing again
affords pleasure and gives a semblance of the feeling received from art.
It is very often said that a work of art is very good because it is poetic, or
realistic, or striking, or interesting; whereas not only can neither the first,
nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth of these attributes supply a
standard of excellence in art, but they have not even anything in common
with art.
Poetic—means borrowed. All borrowing merely recalls to the reader,
spectator, or listener some dim recollection of artistic impressions they have
music the most usual effects are a crescendo, passing from the softest and
simplest sounds to the loudest and most complex crash of the full orchestra;
a repetition of the same sounds arpeggio in all the octaves and on various
instruments; or that the harmony, tone, and rhythm be not at all those
naturally flowing from the course of the musical thought, but such as strike
one by their unexpectedness. Besides these, the commonest effects in music
are produced in a purely physical manner by strength of sound, especially in
an orchestra.
Such are some of the most usual effects in the various arts, but there yet
remains one common to them all; namely, to convey by means of one art
what it would be natural to convey by another: for instance, to make music
describe (as is done by the programme music of Wagner and his followers),
or to make painting, the drama, or poetry, induce a frame of mind (as is
aimed at by all the Decadent art).
The fourth method is that of interesting (that is, absorbing the mind) in
connection with works of art. The interest may lie in an intricate plot—a
method till quite recently much employed in English novels and French
plays, but now going out of fashion and being replaced by authenticity, i.e.
by detailed description of some historical period or some branch of
contemporary life. For example, in a novel, interestingness may consist in a
description of Egyptian or Roman life, the life of miners, or that of the
clerks in a large shop. The reader becomes interested and mistakes this
interest for an artistic impression. The interest may also depend on the very
method of expression; a kind of interest that has now come much into use.
Both verse and prose, as well as pictures, plays, and music, are constructed
so that they must be guessed like riddles, and this process of guessing again
affords pleasure and gives a semblance of the feeling received from art.
It is very often said that a work of art is very good because it is poetic, or
realistic, or striking, or interesting; whereas not only can neither the first,
nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth of these attributes supply a
standard of excellence in art, but they have not even anything in common
with art.
Poetic—means borrowed. All borrowing merely recalls to the reader,
spectator, or listener some dim recollection of artistic impressions they have
Page 403
received from previous works of art, and does not infect them with feeling
which the artist has himself experienced. A work founded on something
borrowed, like Goethe's "Faust," for instance, may be very well executed
and be full of mind and every beauty, but because it lacks the chief
characteristic of a work of art—completeness, oneness, the inseparable
unity of form and contents expressing the feeling the artist has experienced
—it cannot produce a really artistic impression. In availing himself of this
method, the artist only transmits the feeling received by him from a
previous work of art; therefore every borrowing, whether it be of whole
subjects, or of various scenes, situations, or descriptions, is but a reflection
of art, a simulation of it, but not art itself. And therefore, to say that a
certain production is good because it is poetic—i.e. resembles a work of art
—is like saying of a coin that it is good because it resembles real money.
Equally little can imitation, realism, serve, as many people think, as a
measure of the quality of art. Imitation cannot be such a measure; for the
chief characteristic of art is the infection of others with the feelings the
artist has experienced, and infection with a feeling is not only not identical
with description of the accessories of what is transmitted, but is usually
hindered by superfluous details. The attention of the receiver of the artistic
impression is diverted by all these well-observed details, and they hinder
the transmission of feeling even when it exists.
To value a work of art by the degree of its realism, by the accuracy of the
details reproduced, is as strange as to judge of the nutritive quality of food
by its external appearance. When we appraise a work according to its
realism, we only show that we are talking, not of a work of art, but of its
counterfeit.
Neither does the third method of imitating art—by the use of what is
striking or effectual—coincide with real art any better than the two former
methods; for in effectfulness—the effects of novelty, of the unexpected, of
contrasts, of the horrible—there is no transmission of feeling, but only an
action on the nerves. If an artist were to paint a bloody wound admirably,
the sight of the wound would strike me, but it would not be art. One
prolonged note on a powerful organ will produce a striking impression, will
often even cause tears, but there is no music in it, because no feeling is
transmitted. Yet such physiological effects are constantly mistaken for art
by people of our circle, and this not only in music, but also in poetry,
which the artist has himself experienced. A work founded on something
borrowed, like Goethe's "Faust," for instance, may be very well executed
and be full of mind and every beauty, but because it lacks the chief
characteristic of a work of art—completeness, oneness, the inseparable
unity of form and contents expressing the feeling the artist has experienced
—it cannot produce a really artistic impression. In availing himself of this
method, the artist only transmits the feeling received by him from a
previous work of art; therefore every borrowing, whether it be of whole
subjects, or of various scenes, situations, or descriptions, is but a reflection
of art, a simulation of it, but not art itself. And therefore, to say that a
certain production is good because it is poetic—i.e. resembles a work of art
—is like saying of a coin that it is good because it resembles real money.
Equally little can imitation, realism, serve, as many people think, as a
measure of the quality of art. Imitation cannot be such a measure; for the
chief characteristic of art is the infection of others with the feelings the
artist has experienced, and infection with a feeling is not only not identical
with description of the accessories of what is transmitted, but is usually
hindered by superfluous details. The attention of the receiver of the artistic
impression is diverted by all these well-observed details, and they hinder
the transmission of feeling even when it exists.
To value a work of art by the degree of its realism, by the accuracy of the
details reproduced, is as strange as to judge of the nutritive quality of food
by its external appearance. When we appraise a work according to its
realism, we only show that we are talking, not of a work of art, but of its
counterfeit.
Neither does the third method of imitating art—by the use of what is
striking or effectual—coincide with real art any better than the two former
methods; for in effectfulness—the effects of novelty, of the unexpected, of
contrasts, of the horrible—there is no transmission of feeling, but only an
action on the nerves. If an artist were to paint a bloody wound admirably,
the sight of the wound would strike me, but it would not be art. One
prolonged note on a powerful organ will produce a striking impression, will
often even cause tears, but there is no music in it, because no feeling is
transmitted. Yet such physiological effects are constantly mistaken for art
by people of our circle, and this not only in music, but also in poetry,
Page 404
painting, and the drama. It is said that art has become refined. On the
contrary, thanks to the pursuit of effectfulness, it has become very coarse. A
new piece is brought out and accepted all over Europe, such, for instance,
as "Hannele," in which play the author wishes to transmit to the spectators
pity for a persecuted girl. To evoke this feeling in the audience by means of
art, the author should either make one of the characters express this pity in
such a way as to infect every one, or he should describe the girl's feelings
correctly. But he cannot, or will not, do this, and chooses another way, more
complicated in stage management, but easier for the author. He makes the
girl die on the stage; and, still further to increase the physiological effect on
the spectators, he extinguishes the lights in the theater, leaving the audience
in the dark, and to the sound of dismal music he shows how the girl is
pursued and beaten by her drunken father. The girl shrinks—screams—
groans—and falls. Angels appear and carry her away. And the audience,
experiencing some excitement while this is going on, are fully convinced
that this is true æsthetic feeling. But there is nothing æsthetic in such
excitement; for there is no infecting of man by man, but only a mingled
feeling of pity for another, and of self-congratulation that it is not I who am
suffering: it is like what we feel at the sight of an execution, or what the
Romans felt in their circuses.
The substitution of effectfulness for æsthetic feeling is particularly
noticeable in musical art—that art which by its nature has an immediate
physiological action on the nerves. Instead of transmitting by means of a
melody the feelings he has experienced, a composer of the new school
accumulates and complicates sounds, and by now strengthening, now
weakening them, he produces on the audience a physiological effect of a
kind that can be measured by an apparatus invented for the purpose.[118] And
the public mistake this physiological effect for the effect of art.
As to the fourth method—that of interesting—it also is frequently
confounded with art. One often hears it said, not only of a poem, a novel, or
a picture, but even of a musical work, that it is interesting. What does this
mean? To speak of an interesting work of art means either that we receive
from a work of art information new to us, or that the work is not fully
intelligible, and that little by little, and with effort, we arrive at its meaning,
and experience a certain pleasure in this process of guessing it. In neither
case has the interest anything in common with artistic impression. Art aims
contrary, thanks to the pursuit of effectfulness, it has become very coarse. A
new piece is brought out and accepted all over Europe, such, for instance,
as "Hannele," in which play the author wishes to transmit to the spectators
pity for a persecuted girl. To evoke this feeling in the audience by means of
art, the author should either make one of the characters express this pity in
such a way as to infect every one, or he should describe the girl's feelings
correctly. But he cannot, or will not, do this, and chooses another way, more
complicated in stage management, but easier for the author. He makes the
girl die on the stage; and, still further to increase the physiological effect on
the spectators, he extinguishes the lights in the theater, leaving the audience
in the dark, and to the sound of dismal music he shows how the girl is
pursued and beaten by her drunken father. The girl shrinks—screams—
groans—and falls. Angels appear and carry her away. And the audience,
experiencing some excitement while this is going on, are fully convinced
that this is true æsthetic feeling. But there is nothing æsthetic in such
excitement; for there is no infecting of man by man, but only a mingled
feeling of pity for another, and of self-congratulation that it is not I who am
suffering: it is like what we feel at the sight of an execution, or what the
Romans felt in their circuses.
The substitution of effectfulness for æsthetic feeling is particularly
noticeable in musical art—that art which by its nature has an immediate
physiological action on the nerves. Instead of transmitting by means of a
melody the feelings he has experienced, a composer of the new school
accumulates and complicates sounds, and by now strengthening, now
weakening them, he produces on the audience a physiological effect of a
kind that can be measured by an apparatus invented for the purpose.[118] And
the public mistake this physiological effect for the effect of art.
As to the fourth method—that of interesting—it also is frequently
confounded with art. One often hears it said, not only of a poem, a novel, or
a picture, but even of a musical work, that it is interesting. What does this
mean? To speak of an interesting work of art means either that we receive
from a work of art information new to us, or that the work is not fully
intelligible, and that little by little, and with effort, we arrive at its meaning,
and experience a certain pleasure in this process of guessing it. In neither
case has the interest anything in common with artistic impression. Art aims
Page 405
at infecting people with feeling experienced by the artist. But the mental
effort necessary to enable the spectator, listener, or reader to assimilate the
new information contained in the work, or to guess the puzzles propounded,
by distracting him, hinders the infection. And therefore the interestingness
of a work, not only has nothing to do with its excellence as a work of art,
but rather hinders than assists artistic impression.
We may, in a work of art, meet with what is poetic, and realistic, and
striking, and interesting, but these things cannot replace the essential of art,
—feeling experienced by the artist. Latterly, in upper-class art, most of the
objects given out as being works of art are of the kind which only resemble
art, and are devoid of its essential quality,—feeling experienced by the
artist. And, for the diversion of the rich, such objects are continually being
produced in enormous quantities by the artisans of art.
Many conditions must be fulfilled to enable a man to produce a real work of
art. It is necessary that he should stand on the level of the highest life-
conception of his time, that he should experience feeling and have the
desire and capacity to transmit it, and that he should, moreover, have a
talent for some one of the forms of art. It is very seldom that all these
conditions necessary to the production of true art are combined. But in
order—aided by the customary methods of borrowing, imitating,
introducing effects, and interesting—unceasingly to produce counterfeits of
art which pass for art in our society and are well paid for, it is only
necessary to have a talent for some branch of art; and this is very often to be
met with. By talent I mean ability: in literary art, the ability to express one's
thoughts and impressions easily and to notice and remember characteristic
details; in the depictive arts, to distinguish and remember lines, forms, and
colors; in music, to distinguish the intervals, and to remember and transmit
the sequence of sounds. And a man, in our times, if only he possesses such
a talent and selects some specialty, may, after learning the methods of
counterfeiting used in his branch of art,—if he has patience and if his
æsthetic feeling (which would render such productions revolting to him) be
atrophied,—unceasingly, till the end of his life, turn out works which will
pass for art in our society.
To produce such counterfeits, definite rules or recipes exist in each branch
of art. So that the talented man, having assimilated them, may produce such
works à froid, cold drawn, without any feeling.
effort necessary to enable the spectator, listener, or reader to assimilate the
new information contained in the work, or to guess the puzzles propounded,
by distracting him, hinders the infection. And therefore the interestingness
of a work, not only has nothing to do with its excellence as a work of art,
but rather hinders than assists artistic impression.
We may, in a work of art, meet with what is poetic, and realistic, and
striking, and interesting, but these things cannot replace the essential of art,
—feeling experienced by the artist. Latterly, in upper-class art, most of the
objects given out as being works of art are of the kind which only resemble
art, and are devoid of its essential quality,—feeling experienced by the
artist. And, for the diversion of the rich, such objects are continually being
produced in enormous quantities by the artisans of art.
Many conditions must be fulfilled to enable a man to produce a real work of
art. It is necessary that he should stand on the level of the highest life-
conception of his time, that he should experience feeling and have the
desire and capacity to transmit it, and that he should, moreover, have a
talent for some one of the forms of art. It is very seldom that all these
conditions necessary to the production of true art are combined. But in
order—aided by the customary methods of borrowing, imitating,
introducing effects, and interesting—unceasingly to produce counterfeits of
art which pass for art in our society and are well paid for, it is only
necessary to have a talent for some branch of art; and this is very often to be
met with. By talent I mean ability: in literary art, the ability to express one's
thoughts and impressions easily and to notice and remember characteristic
details; in the depictive arts, to distinguish and remember lines, forms, and
colors; in music, to distinguish the intervals, and to remember and transmit
the sequence of sounds. And a man, in our times, if only he possesses such
a talent and selects some specialty, may, after learning the methods of
counterfeiting used in his branch of art,—if he has patience and if his
æsthetic feeling (which would render such productions revolting to him) be
atrophied,—unceasingly, till the end of his life, turn out works which will
pass for art in our society.
To produce such counterfeits, definite rules or recipes exist in each branch
of art. So that the talented man, having assimilated them, may produce such
works à froid, cold drawn, without any feeling.
Page 406
In order to write poems a man of literary talent needs only these
qualifications: to acquire the knack, conformably with the requirements of
rhyme and rhythm, of using, instead of the one really suitable word, ten
others meaning approximately the same; to learn how to take any phrase
which, to be clear, has but one natural order of words, and despite all
possible dislocations still to retain some sense in it; and lastly, to be able,
guided by the words required for the rhymes, to devise some semblance of
thoughts, feelings, or descriptions to suit these words. Having acquired
these qualifications, he may unceasingly produce poems—short or long,
religious, amatory, or patriotic, according to the demand.
If a man of literary talent wishes to write a story or novel, he need only
form his style—i.e. learn how to describe all that he sees—and accustom
himself to remember or note down details. When he has accustomed
himself to this, he can, according to his inclination or the demand,
unceasingly produce novels or stories—historical, naturalistic, social,
erotic, psychological, or even religious, for which latter kind a demand and
fashion begins to show itself. He can take subjects from books or from the
events of life, and can copy the characters of the people in his book from
his acquaintances.
And such novels and stories, if only they are decked out with well-observed
and carefully noted details, preferably erotic ones, will be considered works
of art, even though they may not contain a spark of feeling experienced.
To produce art in dramatic form, a talented man, in addition to all that is
required for novels and stories, must also learn to furnish his characters
with as many smart and witty sentences as possible, must know how to
utilize theatrical effects, and how to entwine the action of his characters so
that there should not be any long conversations, but as much bustle and
movement on the stage as possible. If the writer is able to do this, he may
produce dramatic works one after another without stopping, selecting his
subjects from the reports of the law courts, or from the latest society topic,
such as hypnotism, heredity, etc., or from deep antiquity, or even from the
realms of fancy.
In the sphere of painting and sculpture it is still easier for the talented man
to produce imitations of art. He need only learn to draw, paint, and model—
especially naked bodies. Thus equipped he can continue to paint pictures, or
qualifications: to acquire the knack, conformably with the requirements of
rhyme and rhythm, of using, instead of the one really suitable word, ten
others meaning approximately the same; to learn how to take any phrase
which, to be clear, has but one natural order of words, and despite all
possible dislocations still to retain some sense in it; and lastly, to be able,
guided by the words required for the rhymes, to devise some semblance of
thoughts, feelings, or descriptions to suit these words. Having acquired
these qualifications, he may unceasingly produce poems—short or long,
religious, amatory, or patriotic, according to the demand.
If a man of literary talent wishes to write a story or novel, he need only
form his style—i.e. learn how to describe all that he sees—and accustom
himself to remember or note down details. When he has accustomed
himself to this, he can, according to his inclination or the demand,
unceasingly produce novels or stories—historical, naturalistic, social,
erotic, psychological, or even religious, for which latter kind a demand and
fashion begins to show itself. He can take subjects from books or from the
events of life, and can copy the characters of the people in his book from
his acquaintances.
And such novels and stories, if only they are decked out with well-observed
and carefully noted details, preferably erotic ones, will be considered works
of art, even though they may not contain a spark of feeling experienced.
To produce art in dramatic form, a talented man, in addition to all that is
required for novels and stories, must also learn to furnish his characters
with as many smart and witty sentences as possible, must know how to
utilize theatrical effects, and how to entwine the action of his characters so
that there should not be any long conversations, but as much bustle and
movement on the stage as possible. If the writer is able to do this, he may
produce dramatic works one after another without stopping, selecting his
subjects from the reports of the law courts, or from the latest society topic,
such as hypnotism, heredity, etc., or from deep antiquity, or even from the
realms of fancy.
In the sphere of painting and sculpture it is still easier for the talented man
to produce imitations of art. He need only learn to draw, paint, and model—
especially naked bodies. Thus equipped he can continue to paint pictures, or
Page 407
model statues, one after another, choosing subjects according to his bent—
mythological, or religious, or fantastic, or symbolical; or he may depict
what is written about in the papers—a coronation, a strike, the Turko-
Grecian war, famine scenes; or, commonest of all, he may just copy
anything he thinks beautiful—from naked women to copper basins.
For the production of musical art the talented man needs still less of what
constitutes the essence of art, i.e. feeling wherewith to infect others: but on
the other hand, he requires more physical, gymnastic labor than for any
other art, unless it be dancing. To produce works of musical art, he must
first learn to move his fingers on some instrument as rapidly as those who
have reached the highest perfection; next, he must know how in former
times polyphonic music was written, must study what are called
counterpoint and fugue; and, furthermore, he must learn orchestration, i.e.
how to utilize the effects of the instruments. But once he has learned all
this, the composer may unceasingly produce one work after another;
whether programme-music, opera, or song (devising sounds more or less
corresponding to the words), or chamber music, i.e. he may take another
man's themes and work them up into definite forms by means of
counterpoint and fugue; or, what is commonest of all, he may compose
fantastic music, i.e. he may take a conjunction of sounds which happens to
come to hand, and pile every sort of complication and ornamentation on to
this chance combination.
Thus, in all realms of art, counterfeits of art are manufactured to a ready-
made, prearranged recipe, and these counterfeits the public of our upper
classes accept for real art.
And this substitution of counterfeits for real works of art was the third and
most important consequence of the separation of the art of the upper classes
from universal art.
mythological, or religious, or fantastic, or symbolical; or he may depict
what is written about in the papers—a coronation, a strike, the Turko-
Grecian war, famine scenes; or, commonest of all, he may just copy
anything he thinks beautiful—from naked women to copper basins.
For the production of musical art the talented man needs still less of what
constitutes the essence of art, i.e. feeling wherewith to infect others: but on
the other hand, he requires more physical, gymnastic labor than for any
other art, unless it be dancing. To produce works of musical art, he must
first learn to move his fingers on some instrument as rapidly as those who
have reached the highest perfection; next, he must know how in former
times polyphonic music was written, must study what are called
counterpoint and fugue; and, furthermore, he must learn orchestration, i.e.
how to utilize the effects of the instruments. But once he has learned all
this, the composer may unceasingly produce one work after another;
whether programme-music, opera, or song (devising sounds more or less
corresponding to the words), or chamber music, i.e. he may take another
man's themes and work them up into definite forms by means of
counterpoint and fugue; or, what is commonest of all, he may compose
fantastic music, i.e. he may take a conjunction of sounds which happens to
come to hand, and pile every sort of complication and ornamentation on to
this chance combination.
Thus, in all realms of art, counterfeits of art are manufactured to a ready-
made, prearranged recipe, and these counterfeits the public of our upper
classes accept for real art.
And this substitution of counterfeits for real works of art was the third and
most important consequence of the separation of the art of the upper classes
from universal art.
Page 408
CHAPTER XII
In our society three conditions coöperate to cause the production of objects
of counterfeit art. They are—(1) the considerable remuneration of artists for
their productions, and the professionalization of artists which this has
produced, (2) art criticism, and (3) schools of art.
While art was as yet undivided, and only religious art was valued and
rewarded while indiscriminate art was left unrewarded, there were no
counterfeits of art, or, if any existed, being exposed to the criticism of the
whole people, they quickly disappeared. But as soon as that division
occurred, and the upper classes acclaaimed every kind of art as good if only
it afforded them pleasure, and began to reward such art more highly than
any other social activity, immediately a large number of people devoted
themselves to this activity, and art assumed quite a different character, and
became a profession.
And as soon as this occurred, the chief and most precious quality of art—its
sincerity—was at once greatly weakened and eventually quite destroyed.
The professional artist lives by his art, and has continually to invent
subjects for his works, and does invent them. And it is obvious how great a
difference must exist between works of art produced on the one hand by
men such as the Jewish prophets, the authors of the Psalms, Francis of
Assisi, the authors of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey," of folk-stories, legends,
and folk-songs, many of whom not only received no remuneration for their
work, but did not even attach their names to it; and, on the other hand,
works produced by court poets, dramatists and musicians receiving honors
and remuneration; and later on by professional artists, who lived by the
trade, receiving remuneration from newspaper editors, publishers,
impresarios, and in general from those agents who come between the artists
and the town public—the consumers of art.
Professionalism is the first condition of the diffusion of false, counterfeit
art.
In our society three conditions coöperate to cause the production of objects
of counterfeit art. They are—(1) the considerable remuneration of artists for
their productions, and the professionalization of artists which this has
produced, (2) art criticism, and (3) schools of art.
While art was as yet undivided, and only religious art was valued and
rewarded while indiscriminate art was left unrewarded, there were no
counterfeits of art, or, if any existed, being exposed to the criticism of the
whole people, they quickly disappeared. But as soon as that division
occurred, and the upper classes acclaaimed every kind of art as good if only
it afforded them pleasure, and began to reward such art more highly than
any other social activity, immediately a large number of people devoted
themselves to this activity, and art assumed quite a different character, and
became a profession.
And as soon as this occurred, the chief and most precious quality of art—its
sincerity—was at once greatly weakened and eventually quite destroyed.
The professional artist lives by his art, and has continually to invent
subjects for his works, and does invent them. And it is obvious how great a
difference must exist between works of art produced on the one hand by
men such as the Jewish prophets, the authors of the Psalms, Francis of
Assisi, the authors of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey," of folk-stories, legends,
and folk-songs, many of whom not only received no remuneration for their
work, but did not even attach their names to it; and, on the other hand,
works produced by court poets, dramatists and musicians receiving honors
and remuneration; and later on by professional artists, who lived by the
trade, receiving remuneration from newspaper editors, publishers,
impresarios, and in general from those agents who come between the artists
and the town public—the consumers of art.
Professionalism is the first condition of the diffusion of false, counterfeit
art.
Page 409
The second condition is the growth, in recent times, of artistic criticism, i.e.
the valuation of art, not by everybody, and, above all, not by plain men, but
by erudite, that is, by perverted and at the same time self-confident
individuals.
A friend of mine, speaking of the relation of critics to artists, half jokingly
defined it thus: "Critics are the stupid who discuss the wise." However
partial, inexact, and rude this definition may be, it is yet partly true, and is
incomparably juster than the definition which considers critics to be men
who can explain works of art.
"Critics explain!" What do they explain?
The artist, if a real artist, has by his work transmitted to others the feeling
he experienced. What is there, then, to explain?
If a work be good as art, then the feeling expressed by the artist—be it
moral or immoral—transmits itself to other people. If transmitted to others,
then they feel it, and all interpretations are superfluous. If the work does not
infect people, no explanation can make it contagious. An artist's work
cannot be interpreted. Had it been possible to explain in words what he
wished to convey, the artist would have expressed himself in words. He
expressed it by his art only because the feeling he experienced could not be
otherwise transmitted. The interpretation of works of art by words only
indicates that the interpreter is himself incapable of feeling the infection of
art. And this is actually the case; for, however strange it may seem to say so,
critics have always been people less susceptible than other men to the
contagion of art. For the most part they are able writers, educated and
clever, but with their capacity of being infected by art quite perverted or
atrophied. And therefore their writings have always largely contributed, and
still contribute, to the perversion of the taste of that public which reads
them and trusts them.
Artistic criticism did not exist—could not and cannot exist—in societies
where art is undivided, and where, consequently, it is appraised by the
religious understanding of life common to the whole people. Art criticism
grew, and could grow, only on the art of the upper classes, who did not
acknowledge the religious perception of their time.
the valuation of art, not by everybody, and, above all, not by plain men, but
by erudite, that is, by perverted and at the same time self-confident
individuals.
A friend of mine, speaking of the relation of critics to artists, half jokingly
defined it thus: "Critics are the stupid who discuss the wise." However
partial, inexact, and rude this definition may be, it is yet partly true, and is
incomparably juster than the definition which considers critics to be men
who can explain works of art.
"Critics explain!" What do they explain?
The artist, if a real artist, has by his work transmitted to others the feeling
he experienced. What is there, then, to explain?
If a work be good as art, then the feeling expressed by the artist—be it
moral or immoral—transmits itself to other people. If transmitted to others,
then they feel it, and all interpretations are superfluous. If the work does not
infect people, no explanation can make it contagious. An artist's work
cannot be interpreted. Had it been possible to explain in words what he
wished to convey, the artist would have expressed himself in words. He
expressed it by his art only because the feeling he experienced could not be
otherwise transmitted. The interpretation of works of art by words only
indicates that the interpreter is himself incapable of feeling the infection of
art. And this is actually the case; for, however strange it may seem to say so,
critics have always been people less susceptible than other men to the
contagion of art. For the most part they are able writers, educated and
clever, but with their capacity of being infected by art quite perverted or
atrophied. And therefore their writings have always largely contributed, and
still contribute, to the perversion of the taste of that public which reads
them and trusts them.
Artistic criticism did not exist—could not and cannot exist—in societies
where art is undivided, and where, consequently, it is appraised by the
religious understanding of life common to the whole people. Art criticism
grew, and could grow, only on the art of the upper classes, who did not
acknowledge the religious perception of their time.
Page 410
Universal art has a definite and indubitable internal criterion,—religious
perception; upper-class art lacks this, and therefore the appreciators of that
art are obliged to cling to some external criterion. And they find it in "the
judgments of the finest-nurtured," as an English æsthetician has phrased it,
that is, in the authority of the people who are considered educated, nor in
this alone, but also in a tradition of such authorities. This tradition is
extremely misleading, both because the opinions of "the finest-nurtured" are
often mistaken, and also because judgments which were valid once cease to
be so with the lapse of time. But the critics, having no basis for their
judgments, never cease to repeat their traditions. The classical tragedians
were once considered good, and therefore criticism considers them to be so
still. Dante was esteemed a great poet, Raphael a great painter, Bach a great
musician—and the critics, lacking a standard by which to separate good art
from bad, not only consider these artists great, but regard all their
productions as admirable and worthy of imitation. Nothing has contributed,
and still contributes, so much to the perversion of art as these authorities set
up by criticism. A man produces a work of art, like every true artist
expressing in his own peculiar manner a feeling he has experienced. Most
people are infected by the artist's feeling; and his work becomes known.
Then criticism, discussing the artist, says that the work is not bad, but all
the same the artist is not a Dante, nor a Shakespear, nor a Goethe, nor a
Raphael, nor what Beethoven was in his last period. And the young artist
sets to work to copy those who are held up for his imitation, and he
produces not only feeble works, but false works,—counterfeits of art.
Thus, for instance, our Pushkin writes his short poems, "Evgeniy Onegin,"
"The Gipsies," and his stories—works all varying in quality, but all true art.
But then, under the influence of false criticism extolling Shakespear, he
writes "Boris Godunoff," a cold, brain-spun work, and this production is
lauded by the critics, set up as a model, and imitations of it appear: "Minin,"
by Ostrovsky, and "Tsar Boris," by Alexée Tolstoï, and such imitations of
imitations as crowd all literatures with insignificant productions. The chief
harm done by the critics is this,—that themselves lacking the capacity to be
infected by art (and that is the characteristic of all critics; for did they not
lack this they could not attempt the impossible—the interpretation of works
of art), they pay most attention to, and eulogize, brain-spun, invented
works, and set these up as models worthy of imitation. That is the reason
they so confidently extol, in literature, the Greek tragedians, Dante, Tasso,
perception; upper-class art lacks this, and therefore the appreciators of that
art are obliged to cling to some external criterion. And they find it in "the
judgments of the finest-nurtured," as an English æsthetician has phrased it,
that is, in the authority of the people who are considered educated, nor in
this alone, but also in a tradition of such authorities. This tradition is
extremely misleading, both because the opinions of "the finest-nurtured" are
often mistaken, and also because judgments which were valid once cease to
be so with the lapse of time. But the critics, having no basis for their
judgments, never cease to repeat their traditions. The classical tragedians
were once considered good, and therefore criticism considers them to be so
still. Dante was esteemed a great poet, Raphael a great painter, Bach a great
musician—and the critics, lacking a standard by which to separate good art
from bad, not only consider these artists great, but regard all their
productions as admirable and worthy of imitation. Nothing has contributed,
and still contributes, so much to the perversion of art as these authorities set
up by criticism. A man produces a work of art, like every true artist
expressing in his own peculiar manner a feeling he has experienced. Most
people are infected by the artist's feeling; and his work becomes known.
Then criticism, discussing the artist, says that the work is not bad, but all
the same the artist is not a Dante, nor a Shakespear, nor a Goethe, nor a
Raphael, nor what Beethoven was in his last period. And the young artist
sets to work to copy those who are held up for his imitation, and he
produces not only feeble works, but false works,—counterfeits of art.
Thus, for instance, our Pushkin writes his short poems, "Evgeniy Onegin,"
"The Gipsies," and his stories—works all varying in quality, but all true art.
But then, under the influence of false criticism extolling Shakespear, he
writes "Boris Godunoff," a cold, brain-spun work, and this production is
lauded by the critics, set up as a model, and imitations of it appear: "Minin,"
by Ostrovsky, and "Tsar Boris," by Alexée Tolstoï, and such imitations of
imitations as crowd all literatures with insignificant productions. The chief
harm done by the critics is this,—that themselves lacking the capacity to be
infected by art (and that is the characteristic of all critics; for did they not
lack this they could not attempt the impossible—the interpretation of works
of art), they pay most attention to, and eulogize, brain-spun, invented
works, and set these up as models worthy of imitation. That is the reason
they so confidently extol, in literature, the Greek tragedians, Dante, Tasso,
Page 411
Milton, Shakespear, Goethe (almost all he wrote), and, among recent
writers, Zola and Ibsen; in music, Beethoven's last period, and Wagner. To
justify their praise of these brain-spun, invented works, they devise entire
theories (of which the famous theory of beauty is one); and not only dull
but also talented people compose works in strict deference to these theories;
and often even real artists, doing violence to their genius, submit to them.
Every false work extolled by the critics serves as a door through which the
hypocrites of art at once crowd in.
It is solely due to the critics, who in our times still praise rude, savage, and,
for us, often meaningless works of the ancient Greeks: Sophocles,
Euripides, Æschylus, and especially Aristophanes; or, of modern writers,
Dante, Tasso, Milton, Shakespear; in painting, all of Raphael, all of Michael
Angelo, including his absurd "Last Judgment"; in music, the whole of Bach,
and the whole of Beethoven, including his last period,—thanks only to them
have the Ibsens, Maeterlincks, Verlaines, Mallarmés, Puvis de Chavannes,
Klingers, Böcklins, Stucks, Schneiders; in music, the Wagners, Liszts,
Berliozes, Brahmses, and Richard Strausses, etc., and all that immense mass
of good-for-nothing imitators of these imitators, become possible in our
day.
As a good illustration of the harmful influence of criticism, take its relation
to Beethoven. Among his innumerable hasty productions written to order,
there are, notwithstanding their artificiality of form, works of true art. But
he grows deaf, cannot hear, and begins to write invented, unfinished works,
which are consequently often meaningless and musically unintelligible. I
know that musicians can imagine sounds vividly enough, and can almost
hear what they read, but imaginary sounds can never replace real ones, and
every composer must hear his production in order to perfect it. Beethoven,
however, could not hear, could not perfect his work, and consequently
published productions which are artistic ravings. But criticism, having once
acknowledged him to be a great composer, seizes on just these abnormal
works with special gusto, and searches for extraordinary beauties in them.
And, to justify its laudations (perverting the very meaning of musical art), it
attributed to music the property of describing what it cannot describe. And
imitators appear—an innumerable host of imitators of these abnormal
attempts at artistic productions which Beethoven wrote when he was deaf.
writers, Zola and Ibsen; in music, Beethoven's last period, and Wagner. To
justify their praise of these brain-spun, invented works, they devise entire
theories (of which the famous theory of beauty is one); and not only dull
but also talented people compose works in strict deference to these theories;
and often even real artists, doing violence to their genius, submit to them.
Every false work extolled by the critics serves as a door through which the
hypocrites of art at once crowd in.
It is solely due to the critics, who in our times still praise rude, savage, and,
for us, often meaningless works of the ancient Greeks: Sophocles,
Euripides, Æschylus, and especially Aristophanes; or, of modern writers,
Dante, Tasso, Milton, Shakespear; in painting, all of Raphael, all of Michael
Angelo, including his absurd "Last Judgment"; in music, the whole of Bach,
and the whole of Beethoven, including his last period,—thanks only to them
have the Ibsens, Maeterlincks, Verlaines, Mallarmés, Puvis de Chavannes,
Klingers, Böcklins, Stucks, Schneiders; in music, the Wagners, Liszts,
Berliozes, Brahmses, and Richard Strausses, etc., and all that immense mass
of good-for-nothing imitators of these imitators, become possible in our
day.
As a good illustration of the harmful influence of criticism, take its relation
to Beethoven. Among his innumerable hasty productions written to order,
there are, notwithstanding their artificiality of form, works of true art. But
he grows deaf, cannot hear, and begins to write invented, unfinished works,
which are consequently often meaningless and musically unintelligible. I
know that musicians can imagine sounds vividly enough, and can almost
hear what they read, but imaginary sounds can never replace real ones, and
every composer must hear his production in order to perfect it. Beethoven,
however, could not hear, could not perfect his work, and consequently
published productions which are artistic ravings. But criticism, having once
acknowledged him to be a great composer, seizes on just these abnormal
works with special gusto, and searches for extraordinary beauties in them.
And, to justify its laudations (perverting the very meaning of musical art), it
attributed to music the property of describing what it cannot describe. And
imitators appear—an innumerable host of imitators of these abnormal
attempts at artistic productions which Beethoven wrote when he was deaf.
Page 412
Then Wagner appears, who at first in critical articles praises just
Beethoven's last period, and connects this music with Schopenhauer's
mystical theory that music is the expression of Will—not of separate
manifestations of will objectivized on various planes, but its very essence—
which is in itself as absurd as this music of Beethoven. And afterward he
composes music of his own on this theory, in conjunction with another still
more erroneous system of the union of all the arts. After Wagner yet new
imitators appear, diverging yet further from art: Brahms, Richard Strauss,
and others.
Such are the results of criticism. But the third condition of the perversion of
art, namely, art schools, is almost more harmful still.
As soon as art became, not art for the whole people, but for a rich class, it
became a profession; as soon as it became a profession, methods were
devised to teach it; people who chose this profession of art began to learn
these methods, and thus professional schools sprang up: classes of rhetoric
or literature in the public schools, academies for painting, conservatoires for
music, schools for dramatic art.
In these schools art is taught! But art is the transmission to others of a
special feeling experienced by the artist. How can this be taught in schools?
No school can evoke feeling in a man, and still less can it teach him how to
manifest it in the one particular manner natural to him alone. But the
essence of art lies in these things.
The one thing these schools can teach is how to transmit feelings
experienced by other artists in the way those other artists transmitted them.
And this is just what the professional schools do teach; and such instruction
not only does not assist the spread of true art, but, on the contrary, by
diffusing counterfeits of art, does more than anything else to deprive people
of the capacity to understand true art.
In literary art people are taught how, without having anything they wish to
say, to write a many-paged composition on a theme about which they have
never thought, and, moreover, to write it so that it should resemble the work
of an author admitted to be celebrated. This is taught in schools.
In painting, the chief training consists in learning to draw and paint from
copies and models, the naked body chiefly (the very thing that is never
Beethoven's last period, and connects this music with Schopenhauer's
mystical theory that music is the expression of Will—not of separate
manifestations of will objectivized on various planes, but its very essence—
which is in itself as absurd as this music of Beethoven. And afterward he
composes music of his own on this theory, in conjunction with another still
more erroneous system of the union of all the arts. After Wagner yet new
imitators appear, diverging yet further from art: Brahms, Richard Strauss,
and others.
Such are the results of criticism. But the third condition of the perversion of
art, namely, art schools, is almost more harmful still.
As soon as art became, not art for the whole people, but for a rich class, it
became a profession; as soon as it became a profession, methods were
devised to teach it; people who chose this profession of art began to learn
these methods, and thus professional schools sprang up: classes of rhetoric
or literature in the public schools, academies for painting, conservatoires for
music, schools for dramatic art.
In these schools art is taught! But art is the transmission to others of a
special feeling experienced by the artist. How can this be taught in schools?
No school can evoke feeling in a man, and still less can it teach him how to
manifest it in the one particular manner natural to him alone. But the
essence of art lies in these things.
The one thing these schools can teach is how to transmit feelings
experienced by other artists in the way those other artists transmitted them.
And this is just what the professional schools do teach; and such instruction
not only does not assist the spread of true art, but, on the contrary, by
diffusing counterfeits of art, does more than anything else to deprive people
of the capacity to understand true art.
In literary art people are taught how, without having anything they wish to
say, to write a many-paged composition on a theme about which they have
never thought, and, moreover, to write it so that it should resemble the work
of an author admitted to be celebrated. This is taught in schools.
In painting, the chief training consists in learning to draw and paint from
copies and models, the naked body chiefly (the very thing that is never
Page 413
seen, and which a man occupied with real art hardly ever has to depict), and
to draw and paint as former masters drew and painted. The composition of
pictures is taught by giving out themes similar to those which have been
treated by former acknowledged celebrities.
So also in dramatic schools, the pupils are taught to recite monologues just
as tragedians, considered celebrated, declaimed them.
It is the same in music. The whole theory of music is nothing but a
disconnected repetition of those methods which the acknowledged masters
of composition made use of.
I have elsewhere quoted the profound remark of the Russian artist Bruloff
on art, but I cannot here refrain from repeating it, because nothing better
illustrates what can and what cannot be taught in the schools. Once when
correcting a pupil's study, Bruloff just touched it in a few places, and the
poor dead study immediately became animated. "Why, you only touched it
a wee bit, and it is quite another thing!" said one of the pupils. "Art begins
where the wee bit begins," replied Bruloff, indicating by these words just
what is most characteristic of art. The remark is true of all the arts, but its
justice is particularly noticeable in the performance of music. That musical
execution should be artistic, should be art, i.e. should infect, three chief
conditions must be observed,—there are many others needed for musical
perfection; the transition from one sound to another must be interrupted or
continuous; the sound must increase or diminish steadily; it must be
blended with one and not with another sound; the sound must have this or
that timbre, and much besides,—but take the three chief conditions; the
pitch, the time, and the strength of the sound. Musical execution is only
then art, only then infects, when the sound is neither higher nor lower than
it should be, that is, when exactly the infinitely small center of the required
note is taken; when that note is continued exactly as long as is needed; and
when the strength of the sound is neither more nor less than is required. The
slightest deviation of pitch in either direction, the slightest increase or
decrease in time, or the slightest strengthening or weakening of the sound
beyond what is needed, destroys the perfection and, consequently, the
infectiousness of the work. So that the feeling of infection by the art of
music, which seems so simple and so easily obtained, is a thing we receive
only when the performer finds those infinitely minute degrees which are
necessary to perfection in music. It is the same in all arts: a wee bit lighter,
to draw and paint as former masters drew and painted. The composition of
pictures is taught by giving out themes similar to those which have been
treated by former acknowledged celebrities.
So also in dramatic schools, the pupils are taught to recite monologues just
as tragedians, considered celebrated, declaimed them.
It is the same in music. The whole theory of music is nothing but a
disconnected repetition of those methods which the acknowledged masters
of composition made use of.
I have elsewhere quoted the profound remark of the Russian artist Bruloff
on art, but I cannot here refrain from repeating it, because nothing better
illustrates what can and what cannot be taught in the schools. Once when
correcting a pupil's study, Bruloff just touched it in a few places, and the
poor dead study immediately became animated. "Why, you only touched it
a wee bit, and it is quite another thing!" said one of the pupils. "Art begins
where the wee bit begins," replied Bruloff, indicating by these words just
what is most characteristic of art. The remark is true of all the arts, but its
justice is particularly noticeable in the performance of music. That musical
execution should be artistic, should be art, i.e. should infect, three chief
conditions must be observed,—there are many others needed for musical
perfection; the transition from one sound to another must be interrupted or
continuous; the sound must increase or diminish steadily; it must be
blended with one and not with another sound; the sound must have this or
that timbre, and much besides,—but take the three chief conditions; the
pitch, the time, and the strength of the sound. Musical execution is only
then art, only then infects, when the sound is neither higher nor lower than
it should be, that is, when exactly the infinitely small center of the required
note is taken; when that note is continued exactly as long as is needed; and
when the strength of the sound is neither more nor less than is required. The
slightest deviation of pitch in either direction, the slightest increase or
decrease in time, or the slightest strengthening or weakening of the sound
beyond what is needed, destroys the perfection and, consequently, the
infectiousness of the work. So that the feeling of infection by the art of
music, which seems so simple and so easily obtained, is a thing we receive
only when the performer finds those infinitely minute degrees which are
necessary to perfection in music. It is the same in all arts: a wee bit lighter,
Page 414
a wee bit darker, a wee bit higher, lower, to the right or the left—in
painting; a wee bit weaker or stronger in intonation, or a wee bit sooner or
later—in dramatic art; a wee bit omitted, over-emphasized, or exaggerated
—in poetry, and there is no contagion. Infection is only obtained when an
artist finds those infinitely minute degrees of which a work of art consists,
and only to the extent to which he finds them. And it is quite impossible to
teach people by external means to find these minute degrees; they can only
be found when a man yields to his feeling. No instruction can make a
dancer catch just the tact of the music, or a singer or a fiddler take exactly
the infinitely minute center of his note, or a sketcher draw of all possible
lines the only right one, or a poet find the only meet arrangement of the
only suitable words. All this is found only by feeling. And therefore schools
may teach what is necessary in order to produce something resembling art,
but not art itself.
The teaching of the schools stops there where the wee bit begins—
consequently where art begins.
Accustoming people to something resembling art, disaccustoms them to the
comprehension of real art. And that is how it comes about that none are
more dull to art than those who have passed through the professional
schools and been most successful in them. Professional schools produce an
hypocrisy of art precisely akin to that hypocrisy of religion which is
produced by theological colleges for training priests, pastors, and religious
teachers generally. As it is impossible in a school to train a man so as to
make a religious teacher of him, so it is impossible to teach a man how to
become an artist.
Art schools are thus doubly destructive of art: first, in that they destroy the
capacity to produce real art in those who have the misfortune to enter them
and go through a seven or eight years' course; secondly, in that they
generate enormous quantities of that counterfeit art which perverts the taste
of the masses and overflows our world. In order that born artists may know
the methods of the various arts elaborated by former artists, there should
exist in all elementary schools such classes for drawing and music (singing)
that, after passing through them, every talented scholar may, by using
existing models accessible to all, be able to perfect himself in his art
independently.
painting; a wee bit weaker or stronger in intonation, or a wee bit sooner or
later—in dramatic art; a wee bit omitted, over-emphasized, or exaggerated
—in poetry, and there is no contagion. Infection is only obtained when an
artist finds those infinitely minute degrees of which a work of art consists,
and only to the extent to which he finds them. And it is quite impossible to
teach people by external means to find these minute degrees; they can only
be found when a man yields to his feeling. No instruction can make a
dancer catch just the tact of the music, or a singer or a fiddler take exactly
the infinitely minute center of his note, or a sketcher draw of all possible
lines the only right one, or a poet find the only meet arrangement of the
only suitable words. All this is found only by feeling. And therefore schools
may teach what is necessary in order to produce something resembling art,
but not art itself.
The teaching of the schools stops there where the wee bit begins—
consequently where art begins.
Accustoming people to something resembling art, disaccustoms them to the
comprehension of real art. And that is how it comes about that none are
more dull to art than those who have passed through the professional
schools and been most successful in them. Professional schools produce an
hypocrisy of art precisely akin to that hypocrisy of religion which is
produced by theological colleges for training priests, pastors, and religious
teachers generally. As it is impossible in a school to train a man so as to
make a religious teacher of him, so it is impossible to teach a man how to
become an artist.
Art schools are thus doubly destructive of art: first, in that they destroy the
capacity to produce real art in those who have the misfortune to enter them
and go through a seven or eight years' course; secondly, in that they
generate enormous quantities of that counterfeit art which perverts the taste
of the masses and overflows our world. In order that born artists may know
the methods of the various arts elaborated by former artists, there should
exist in all elementary schools such classes for drawing and music (singing)
that, after passing through them, every talented scholar may, by using
existing models accessible to all, be able to perfect himself in his art
independently.
Page 415
These three conditions—the professionalization of artists, art criticism, and
art schools—have had this effect: that most people in our times are quite
unable even to understand what art is, and accept as art the grossest
counterfeits of it.
art schools—have had this effect: that most people in our times are quite
unable even to understand what art is, and accept as art the grossest
counterfeits of it.
Page 416
CHAPTER XIII
To what an extent people of our circle and time have lost the capacity to
receive real art, and have become accustomed to accept as art things that
have nothing in common with it, is best seen from the works of Richard
Wagner, which have latterly come to be more and more esteemed, not only
by the Germans, but also by the French and the English, as the very highest
art, revealing new horizons to us.
The peculiarity of Wagner's music, as is known, consists in this,—that he
considered that music should serve poetry, expressing all the shades of a
poetical work.
The union of the drama with music, devised in the fifteenth century in Italy
for the revival of what they imagined to have been the ancient Greek drama
with music, is an artificial form which had, and has, success only among the
upper classes, and that only when gifted composers, such as Mozart, Weber,
Rossini, and others, drawing inspiration from a dramatic subject, yielded
freely to the inspiration and subordinated the text to the music, so that in
their operas the important thing to the audience was merely the music on a
certain text, and not the text at all, which latter, even when it was utterly
absurd, as, for instance, in the "Magic Flute," still did not prevent the music
from producing an artistic impression.
Wagner wishes to correct the opera by letting music submit to the demands
of poetry and unite with it. But each art has its own definite realm, which is
not identical with the realm of other arts, but merely comes in contact with
them; and therefore, if the manifestation of, I will not say several, but even
of two arts—the dramatic and the musical—be united in one complete
production, then the demands of the one art will make it impossible to fulfil
the demands of the other, as has always occurred in the ordinary operas,
where the dramatic art has submitted to, or rather yielded place to, the
musical. Wagner wishes that musical art should submit to dramatic art, and
that both should appear in full strength. But this is impossible; for every
work of art, if it be a true one, is an expression of intimate feelings of the
artist, which are quite exceptional, and not like anything else. Such is a
To what an extent people of our circle and time have lost the capacity to
receive real art, and have become accustomed to accept as art things that
have nothing in common with it, is best seen from the works of Richard
Wagner, which have latterly come to be more and more esteemed, not only
by the Germans, but also by the French and the English, as the very highest
art, revealing new horizons to us.
The peculiarity of Wagner's music, as is known, consists in this,—that he
considered that music should serve poetry, expressing all the shades of a
poetical work.
The union of the drama with music, devised in the fifteenth century in Italy
for the revival of what they imagined to have been the ancient Greek drama
with music, is an artificial form which had, and has, success only among the
upper classes, and that only when gifted composers, such as Mozart, Weber,
Rossini, and others, drawing inspiration from a dramatic subject, yielded
freely to the inspiration and subordinated the text to the music, so that in
their operas the important thing to the audience was merely the music on a
certain text, and not the text at all, which latter, even when it was utterly
absurd, as, for instance, in the "Magic Flute," still did not prevent the music
from producing an artistic impression.
Wagner wishes to correct the opera by letting music submit to the demands
of poetry and unite with it. But each art has its own definite realm, which is
not identical with the realm of other arts, but merely comes in contact with
them; and therefore, if the manifestation of, I will not say several, but even
of two arts—the dramatic and the musical—be united in one complete
production, then the demands of the one art will make it impossible to fulfil
the demands of the other, as has always occurred in the ordinary operas,
where the dramatic art has submitted to, or rather yielded place to, the
musical. Wagner wishes that musical art should submit to dramatic art, and
that both should appear in full strength. But this is impossible; for every
work of art, if it be a true one, is an expression of intimate feelings of the
artist, which are quite exceptional, and not like anything else. Such is a
Page 417
musical production, and such is a dramatic work, if they be true art. And
therefore, in order that a production in the one branch of art should coincide
with a production in the other branch, it is necessary that the impossible
should happen: that two works from different realms of art should be
absolutely exceptional, unlike anything that existed before, and yet should
coincide, and be exactly alike.
And this cannot be, just as there cannot be two men, or even two leaves on
a tree, exactly alike. Still less can two works from different realms of art,
the musical and the literary, be absolutely alike. If they coincide, then either
one is a work of art and the other a counterfeit, or both are counterfeits.
Two live leaves cannot be exactly alike, but two artificial leaves may be.
And so it is with works of art. They can only coincide completely when
neither the one nor the other is art, but only cunningly devised semblances
of it.
If poetry and music may be joined, as occurs in hymns, songs, and
romances—(though even in these the music does not follow the changes of
each verse of the text, as Wagner wants to, but the song and the music
merely produce a coincident effect on the mind)—this occurs only because
lyrical poetry and music have, to some extent, one and the same aim: to
produce a mental condition and the conditions produced by lyrical poetry
and by music can, more or less, coincide. But even in these conjunctions the
center of gravity always lies in one of the two productions, so that it is one
of them that produces the artistic impression while the other remains
unregarded. And still less is it possible for such union to exist between epic
or dramatic poetry and music.
Moreover, one of the chief conditions of artistic creation is the complete
freedom of the artist from every kind of preconceived demand. And the
necessity of adjusting his musical work to a work from another realm of art
is a preconceived demand of such a kind as to destroy all possibility of
creative power; and therefore works of this kind, adjusted to one another,
are, and must be, as has always happened, not works of art, but only
imitations of art, like the music of a melodrama, signatures to pictures,
illustrations, and librettos to operas.
And such are Wagner's productions. And a confirmation of this is to be seen
in the fact that Wagner's new music lacks the chief characteristic of every
therefore, in order that a production in the one branch of art should coincide
with a production in the other branch, it is necessary that the impossible
should happen: that two works from different realms of art should be
absolutely exceptional, unlike anything that existed before, and yet should
coincide, and be exactly alike.
And this cannot be, just as there cannot be two men, or even two leaves on
a tree, exactly alike. Still less can two works from different realms of art,
the musical and the literary, be absolutely alike. If they coincide, then either
one is a work of art and the other a counterfeit, or both are counterfeits.
Two live leaves cannot be exactly alike, but two artificial leaves may be.
And so it is with works of art. They can only coincide completely when
neither the one nor the other is art, but only cunningly devised semblances
of it.
If poetry and music may be joined, as occurs in hymns, songs, and
romances—(though even in these the music does not follow the changes of
each verse of the text, as Wagner wants to, but the song and the music
merely produce a coincident effect on the mind)—this occurs only because
lyrical poetry and music have, to some extent, one and the same aim: to
produce a mental condition and the conditions produced by lyrical poetry
and by music can, more or less, coincide. But even in these conjunctions the
center of gravity always lies in one of the two productions, so that it is one
of them that produces the artistic impression while the other remains
unregarded. And still less is it possible for such union to exist between epic
or dramatic poetry and music.
Moreover, one of the chief conditions of artistic creation is the complete
freedom of the artist from every kind of preconceived demand. And the
necessity of adjusting his musical work to a work from another realm of art
is a preconceived demand of such a kind as to destroy all possibility of
creative power; and therefore works of this kind, adjusted to one another,
are, and must be, as has always happened, not works of art, but only
imitations of art, like the music of a melodrama, signatures to pictures,
illustrations, and librettos to operas.
And such are Wagner's productions. And a confirmation of this is to be seen
in the fact that Wagner's new music lacks the chief characteristic of every
Page 418
true work of art; namely, such entirety and completeness that the smallest
alteration in its form would disturb the meaning of the whole work. In a true
work of art—poem, drama, picture, song, or symphony—it is impossible to
extract one line, one scene, one figure, or one bar from its place and put it in
another, without infringing the significance of the whole work; just as it is
impossible, without infringing the life of an organic being, to extract an
organ from one place and insert it in another. But in the music of Wagner's
last period, with the exception of certain parts of little importance which
have an independent musical meaning, it is possible to make all kinds of
transpositions, putting what was in front behind, and vice versa, without
altering the musical sense. And the reason why these transpositions do not
alter the sense of Wagner's music is because the sense lies in the words and
not in the music.
The musical score of Wagner's later operas is like what the result would be
should one of those versifiers—of whom there are now many, with tongues
so broken that they can write verses on any theme to any rhymes in any
rhythm, which sound as if they had a meaning—conceive the idea of
illustrating by his verses some symphony or sonata of Beethoven, or some
ballade of Chopin, in the following manner. To the first bars, of one
character, he writes verses corresponding in his opinion to those first bars.
Next come some bars of a different character, and he also writes verses
corresponding in his opinion to them, but with no internal connection with
the first verses, and, moreover, without rhymes and without rhythm. Such a
production, without the music, would be exactly parallel in poetry to what
Wagner's operas are in music, if heard without the words.
But Wagner is not only a musician, he is also a poet, or both together; and
therefore, to judge of Wagner, one must know his poetry also—that same
poetry which the music has to subserve. The chief poetical production of
Wagner is "The Nibelung's Ring." This work has attained such enormous
importance in our time, and has such influence on all that now professes to
be art, that it is necessary for every one to-day to have some idea of it. I
have carefully read through the four booklets which contain this work, and
have drawn up a brief summary of it, which I give in Appendix III. I would
strongly advise the reader (if he has not perused the poem itself, which
would be the best thing to do) at least to read my account of it, so as to have
alteration in its form would disturb the meaning of the whole work. In a true
work of art—poem, drama, picture, song, or symphony—it is impossible to
extract one line, one scene, one figure, or one bar from its place and put it in
another, without infringing the significance of the whole work; just as it is
impossible, without infringing the life of an organic being, to extract an
organ from one place and insert it in another. But in the music of Wagner's
last period, with the exception of certain parts of little importance which
have an independent musical meaning, it is possible to make all kinds of
transpositions, putting what was in front behind, and vice versa, without
altering the musical sense. And the reason why these transpositions do not
alter the sense of Wagner's music is because the sense lies in the words and
not in the music.
The musical score of Wagner's later operas is like what the result would be
should one of those versifiers—of whom there are now many, with tongues
so broken that they can write verses on any theme to any rhymes in any
rhythm, which sound as if they had a meaning—conceive the idea of
illustrating by his verses some symphony or sonata of Beethoven, or some
ballade of Chopin, in the following manner. To the first bars, of one
character, he writes verses corresponding in his opinion to those first bars.
Next come some bars of a different character, and he also writes verses
corresponding in his opinion to them, but with no internal connection with
the first verses, and, moreover, without rhymes and without rhythm. Such a
production, without the music, would be exactly parallel in poetry to what
Wagner's operas are in music, if heard without the words.
But Wagner is not only a musician, he is also a poet, or both together; and
therefore, to judge of Wagner, one must know his poetry also—that same
poetry which the music has to subserve. The chief poetical production of
Wagner is "The Nibelung's Ring." This work has attained such enormous
importance in our time, and has such influence on all that now professes to
be art, that it is necessary for every one to-day to have some idea of it. I
have carefully read through the four booklets which contain this work, and
have drawn up a brief summary of it, which I give in Appendix III. I would
strongly advise the reader (if he has not perused the poem itself, which
would be the best thing to do) at least to read my account of it, so as to have
Page 419
an idea of this extraordinary work. It is a model work of counterfeit art, so
gross as to be even ridiculous.
But we are told that it is impossible to judge of Wagner's works without
seeing them on the stage. The Second Day of this drama, which, as I was
told, is the best part of the whole work, was given in Moscow last winter,
and I went to see the performance.
When I arrived the enormous theater was already filled from top to bottom.
There were grand dukes, and the flower of the aristocracy, of the merchant
class, of the learned, and of the middle-class official public. Most of them
held the libretto, fathoming its meaning. Musicians—some of them elderly,
gray-haired men—followed the music, score in hand. Evidently the
performance of this work was an event of importance.
I was rather late, but I was told that the short prelude, with which the act
begins, was of little importance, and that it did not matter having missed it.
When I arrived, an actor sat on the stage amid decorations intended to
represent a cave, and before something which was meant to represent a
smith's forge. He was dressed in trico-tights, with a cloak of skins, wore a
wig and an artificial beard, and with white, weak genteel hands (his easy
movements, and especially the shape of his stomach and his lack of muscle
revealed the actor) beat an impossible sword with an unnatural hammer in a
way in which no one ever uses a hammer; and at the same time, opening his
mouth in a strange way, he sang something incomprehensible. The music of
various instruments accompanied the strange sounds which he emitted.
From the libretto one was able to gather that the actor had to represent a
powerful gnome, who lived in the cave, and who was forging a sword for
Siegfried, whom he had reared. One could tell he was a gnome by the fact
that the actor walked all the time bending the knees of his trico-covered
legs. This gnome, still opening his mouth in the same strange way, long
continued to sing or shout. The music meanwhile runs over something
strange, like beginnings which are not continued and do not get finished.
From the libretto one could learn that the gnome is telling himself about a
ring which a giant had obtained, and which the gnome wishes to procure
through Siegfried's aid, while Siegfried wants a good sword, on the forging
of which the gnome is occupied. After this conversation or singing to
himself has gone on rather a long time, other sounds are heard in the
orchestra, also like something beginning and not finishing, and another
gross as to be even ridiculous.
But we are told that it is impossible to judge of Wagner's works without
seeing them on the stage. The Second Day of this drama, which, as I was
told, is the best part of the whole work, was given in Moscow last winter,
and I went to see the performance.
When I arrived the enormous theater was already filled from top to bottom.
There were grand dukes, and the flower of the aristocracy, of the merchant
class, of the learned, and of the middle-class official public. Most of them
held the libretto, fathoming its meaning. Musicians—some of them elderly,
gray-haired men—followed the music, score in hand. Evidently the
performance of this work was an event of importance.
I was rather late, but I was told that the short prelude, with which the act
begins, was of little importance, and that it did not matter having missed it.
When I arrived, an actor sat on the stage amid decorations intended to
represent a cave, and before something which was meant to represent a
smith's forge. He was dressed in trico-tights, with a cloak of skins, wore a
wig and an artificial beard, and with white, weak genteel hands (his easy
movements, and especially the shape of his stomach and his lack of muscle
revealed the actor) beat an impossible sword with an unnatural hammer in a
way in which no one ever uses a hammer; and at the same time, opening his
mouth in a strange way, he sang something incomprehensible. The music of
various instruments accompanied the strange sounds which he emitted.
From the libretto one was able to gather that the actor had to represent a
powerful gnome, who lived in the cave, and who was forging a sword for
Siegfried, whom he had reared. One could tell he was a gnome by the fact
that the actor walked all the time bending the knees of his trico-covered
legs. This gnome, still opening his mouth in the same strange way, long
continued to sing or shout. The music meanwhile runs over something
strange, like beginnings which are not continued and do not get finished.
From the libretto one could learn that the gnome is telling himself about a
ring which a giant had obtained, and which the gnome wishes to procure
through Siegfried's aid, while Siegfried wants a good sword, on the forging
of which the gnome is occupied. After this conversation or singing to
himself has gone on rather a long time, other sounds are heard in the
orchestra, also like something beginning and not finishing, and another
Page 420
actor appears, with a horn slung over his shoulder, and accompanied by a
man running on all fours dressed up as a bear, whom he sets at the smith-
gnome. The latter runs away without unbending the knees of his trico-
covered legs. This actor with the horn represented the hero, Siegfried. The
sounds which were emitted in the orchestra on the entrance of this actor
were intended to represent Siegfried's character, and are called Siegfried's
leit-motiv. And these sounds are repeated each time Siegfried appears.
There is one fixed combination of sounds, or leit-motiv, for each character,
and this leit-motiv is repeated every time the person whom it represents
appears; and when any one is mentioned the motiv is heard which relates to
that person. Moreover, each article also has its own leit-motiv or chord.
There is a motiv of the ring, a motiv of the helmet, a motiv of the apple, a
motiv of fire, spear, sword, water, etc.; and as soon as the ring, helmet, or
apple is mentioned, the motiv or chord of the ring, helmet, or apple is heard.
The actor with the horn opens his mouth as unnaturally as the gnome, and
long continues in a chanting voice to shout some words, and in a similar
chant Mime (that is the gnome's name) answers something or other to him.
The meaning of this conversation can only be discovered from the libretto;
and it is that Siegfried was brought up by the gnome, and therefore, for
some reason, hates him and always wishes to kill him. The gnome has
forged a sword for Siegfried, but Siegfried is dissatisfied with it. From a
ten-page conversation (by the libretto), lasting half an hour and conducted
with the same strange openings of the mouth, and chantings, it appears that
Siegfried's mother gave birth to him in the wood, and that concerning his
father all that is known is that he had a sword which was broken, the pieces
of which are in Mime's possession, and that Siegfried does not know fear
and wishes to go out of the wood. Mime, however, does not want to let him
go. During the conversation the music never omits, at the mention of father,
sword, etc., to sound the motiv of these people and things. After these
conversations fresh sounds are heard—those of the god Wotan—and a
wanderer appears. This wanderer is the god Wotan. Also dressed up in a
wig, and also in tights, this god Wotan, standing in a stupid pose with a
spear, thinks proper to recount what Mime must have known before, but
what it is necessary to tell the audience. He does not tell it simply, but in the
form of riddles which he orders himself to guess, staking his head (one does
not know why) that he will guess right. Moreover, whenever the wanderer
strikes his spear on the ground, fire comes out of the ground, and in the
man running on all fours dressed up as a bear, whom he sets at the smith-
gnome. The latter runs away without unbending the knees of his trico-
covered legs. This actor with the horn represented the hero, Siegfried. The
sounds which were emitted in the orchestra on the entrance of this actor
were intended to represent Siegfried's character, and are called Siegfried's
leit-motiv. And these sounds are repeated each time Siegfried appears.
There is one fixed combination of sounds, or leit-motiv, for each character,
and this leit-motiv is repeated every time the person whom it represents
appears; and when any one is mentioned the motiv is heard which relates to
that person. Moreover, each article also has its own leit-motiv or chord.
There is a motiv of the ring, a motiv of the helmet, a motiv of the apple, a
motiv of fire, spear, sword, water, etc.; and as soon as the ring, helmet, or
apple is mentioned, the motiv or chord of the ring, helmet, or apple is heard.
The actor with the horn opens his mouth as unnaturally as the gnome, and
long continues in a chanting voice to shout some words, and in a similar
chant Mime (that is the gnome's name) answers something or other to him.
The meaning of this conversation can only be discovered from the libretto;
and it is that Siegfried was brought up by the gnome, and therefore, for
some reason, hates him and always wishes to kill him. The gnome has
forged a sword for Siegfried, but Siegfried is dissatisfied with it. From a
ten-page conversation (by the libretto), lasting half an hour and conducted
with the same strange openings of the mouth, and chantings, it appears that
Siegfried's mother gave birth to him in the wood, and that concerning his
father all that is known is that he had a sword which was broken, the pieces
of which are in Mime's possession, and that Siegfried does not know fear
and wishes to go out of the wood. Mime, however, does not want to let him
go. During the conversation the music never omits, at the mention of father,
sword, etc., to sound the motiv of these people and things. After these
conversations fresh sounds are heard—those of the god Wotan—and a
wanderer appears. This wanderer is the god Wotan. Also dressed up in a
wig, and also in tights, this god Wotan, standing in a stupid pose with a
spear, thinks proper to recount what Mime must have known before, but
what it is necessary to tell the audience. He does not tell it simply, but in the
form of riddles which he orders himself to guess, staking his head (one does
not know why) that he will guess right. Moreover, whenever the wanderer
strikes his spear on the ground, fire comes out of the ground, and in the
Page 421
orchestra the sounds of spear and of fire are heard. The orchestra
accompanies the conversation, and the motiv of the people and things
spoken of are always artfully intermingled. Besides this the music expresses
feelings in the most naïve manner: the terrible by sounds in the bass, the
frivolous by rapid touches in the treble, etc.
The riddles have no meaning except to tell the audience what the nibelungs
are, what the giants are, what the gods are, and what has happened before.
This conversation also is chanted with strangely opened mouths and
continues for eight libretto pages, and correspondingly long on the stage.
After this the wanderer departs, and Siegfried returns and talks with Mime
for thirteen pages more. There is not a single melody the whole of this time,
but merely intertwinings of the leit-motiv of the people and things
mentioned. The conversation tells that Mime wishes to teach Siegfried fear,
and that Siegfried does not know what fear is. Having finished this
conversation, Siegfried seizes one of the pieces of what is meant to
represent the broken sword, saws it up, puts it on what is meant to represent
the forge, melts it, and then forges it and sings: Heiho! heiho! heiho! Ho!
ho! Aha! oho! aha! Heiaho! heiaho! heiaho! Ho! ho! Hahei! hoho! hahei!
and Act I. finishes.
As far as the question I had come to the theater to decide was concerned,
my mind was fully made up, as surely as on the question of the merits of
my lady acquaintance's novel when she read me the scene between the
loose-haired maiden in the white dress and the hero with two white dogs
and a hat with a feather à la Guillaume Tell.
From an author who could compose such spurious scenes, outraging all
æsthetic feeling, as those which I had witnessed, there was nothing to be
hoped; it may safely be decided that all that such an author can write will be
bad, because he evidently does not know what a true work of art is. I
wished to leave, but the friends I was with asked me to remain, declaring
that one could not form an opinion by that one act, and that the second
would be better. So I stopped for the second act.
Act II., night. Afterward, dawn. In general, the whole piece is crammed
with lights, clouds, moonlight, darkness, magic fires, thunder, etc.
The scene represents a wood, and in the wood there is a cave. At the
entrance of the cave sits a third actor in tights, representing another gnome.
accompanies the conversation, and the motiv of the people and things
spoken of are always artfully intermingled. Besides this the music expresses
feelings in the most naïve manner: the terrible by sounds in the bass, the
frivolous by rapid touches in the treble, etc.
The riddles have no meaning except to tell the audience what the nibelungs
are, what the giants are, what the gods are, and what has happened before.
This conversation also is chanted with strangely opened mouths and
continues for eight libretto pages, and correspondingly long on the stage.
After this the wanderer departs, and Siegfried returns and talks with Mime
for thirteen pages more. There is not a single melody the whole of this time,
but merely intertwinings of the leit-motiv of the people and things
mentioned. The conversation tells that Mime wishes to teach Siegfried fear,
and that Siegfried does not know what fear is. Having finished this
conversation, Siegfried seizes one of the pieces of what is meant to
represent the broken sword, saws it up, puts it on what is meant to represent
the forge, melts it, and then forges it and sings: Heiho! heiho! heiho! Ho!
ho! Aha! oho! aha! Heiaho! heiaho! heiaho! Ho! ho! Hahei! hoho! hahei!
and Act I. finishes.
As far as the question I had come to the theater to decide was concerned,
my mind was fully made up, as surely as on the question of the merits of
my lady acquaintance's novel when she read me the scene between the
loose-haired maiden in the white dress and the hero with two white dogs
and a hat with a feather à la Guillaume Tell.
From an author who could compose such spurious scenes, outraging all
æsthetic feeling, as those which I had witnessed, there was nothing to be
hoped; it may safely be decided that all that such an author can write will be
bad, because he evidently does not know what a true work of art is. I
wished to leave, but the friends I was with asked me to remain, declaring
that one could not form an opinion by that one act, and that the second
would be better. So I stopped for the second act.
Act II., night. Afterward, dawn. In general, the whole piece is crammed
with lights, clouds, moonlight, darkness, magic fires, thunder, etc.
The scene represents a wood, and in the wood there is a cave. At the
entrance of the cave sits a third actor in tights, representing another gnome.
Page 422
It dawns. Enter the god Wotan, again with a spear, and again in the guise of
a wanderer. Again his sounds, together with fresh sounds of the deepest
bass that can be produced. These latter indicate that the dragon is speaking.
Wotan awakens the dragon. The same bass sounds are repeated, growing yet
deeper and deeper. First the dragon says, "I want to sleep," but afterward he
crawls out of the cave. The dragon is represented by two men; it is dressed
in a green, scaly skin, waves a tail at one end, while at the other it opens a
kind of crocodile's jaw that is fastened on, and from which flames appear.
The dragon (who is meant to be dreadful, and may appear so to five-year-
old children) speaks some words in a terribly bass voice. This is all so
stupid, so like what is done in a booth at a fair, that it is surprising that
people over seven years of age can witness it seriously; yet thousands of
quasi-cultured people sit and attentively hear and see it, and are delighted.
Siegfried, with his horn, reappears, as does Mime also. In the orchestra the
sounds denoting them are emitted, and they talk about whether Siegfried
does or does not know what fear is. Mime goes away, and a scene
commences which is intended to be most poetical. Siegfried, in his tights,
lies down in a would-be beautiful pose, and alternately keeps silent and
talks to himself. He ponders, listens to the song of birds, and wishes to
imitate them. For this purpose he cuts a reed with his sword and makes a
pipe. The dawn grows brighter and brighter; the birds sing. Siegfried tries to
imitate the birds. In the orchestra is heard the imitation of birds, alternating
with sounds corresponding to the words he speaks. But Siegfried does not
succeed with his pipe-playing, so he plays on his horn instead. This scene is
unendurable. Of music, i.e. of art serving as a means to transmit a state of
mind experienced by the author, there is not even a suggestion. There is
something that is absolutely unintelligible musically. In a musical sense a
hope is continually experienced, followed by disappointment, as if a
musical thought were commenced only to be broken off. If there are
something like musical commencements, these commencements are so
short, so encumbered with complications of harmony and orchestration and
with effects of contrast, are so obscure and unfinished, and what is
happening on the stage meanwhile is so abominably false, that it is difficult
even to perceive these musical snatches, let alone to be infected by them.
Above all, from the very beginning to the very end, and in each note, the
author's purpose is so audible and visible that one sees and hears neither
Siegfried nor the birds, but only a limited, self-opinionated German, of bad
a wanderer. Again his sounds, together with fresh sounds of the deepest
bass that can be produced. These latter indicate that the dragon is speaking.
Wotan awakens the dragon. The same bass sounds are repeated, growing yet
deeper and deeper. First the dragon says, "I want to sleep," but afterward he
crawls out of the cave. The dragon is represented by two men; it is dressed
in a green, scaly skin, waves a tail at one end, while at the other it opens a
kind of crocodile's jaw that is fastened on, and from which flames appear.
The dragon (who is meant to be dreadful, and may appear so to five-year-
old children) speaks some words in a terribly bass voice. This is all so
stupid, so like what is done in a booth at a fair, that it is surprising that
people over seven years of age can witness it seriously; yet thousands of
quasi-cultured people sit and attentively hear and see it, and are delighted.
Siegfried, with his horn, reappears, as does Mime also. In the orchestra the
sounds denoting them are emitted, and they talk about whether Siegfried
does or does not know what fear is. Mime goes away, and a scene
commences which is intended to be most poetical. Siegfried, in his tights,
lies down in a would-be beautiful pose, and alternately keeps silent and
talks to himself. He ponders, listens to the song of birds, and wishes to
imitate them. For this purpose he cuts a reed with his sword and makes a
pipe. The dawn grows brighter and brighter; the birds sing. Siegfried tries to
imitate the birds. In the orchestra is heard the imitation of birds, alternating
with sounds corresponding to the words he speaks. But Siegfried does not
succeed with his pipe-playing, so he plays on his horn instead. This scene is
unendurable. Of music, i.e. of art serving as a means to transmit a state of
mind experienced by the author, there is not even a suggestion. There is
something that is absolutely unintelligible musically. In a musical sense a
hope is continually experienced, followed by disappointment, as if a
musical thought were commenced only to be broken off. If there are
something like musical commencements, these commencements are so
short, so encumbered with complications of harmony and orchestration and
with effects of contrast, are so obscure and unfinished, and what is
happening on the stage meanwhile is so abominably false, that it is difficult
even to perceive these musical snatches, let alone to be infected by them.
Above all, from the very beginning to the very end, and in each note, the
author's purpose is so audible and visible that one sees and hears neither
Siegfried nor the birds, but only a limited, self-opinionated German, of bad
Page 423
taste and bad style, who has a most false conception of poetry, and who, in
the rudest and most primitive manner, wishes to transmit to me these false
and mistaken conceptions of his.
Every one knows the feeling of distrust and resistance which is always
evoked by an author's evident predetermination. A narrator need only say in
advance, Prepare to cry or to laugh, and you are sure neither to cry nor to
laugh. But when you see that an author prescribes emotion at what is not
touching, but only laughable or disgusting, and when you see, moreover,
that the author is fully assured that he has captivated you, a painfully
tormenting feeling results, similar to what one would feel if an old,
deformed woman put on a ball-dress, and smilingly coquetted before you,
confident of your approbation. This impression was strengthened by the fact
that around me I saw a crowd of three thousand people, who not only
patiently witnessed all this absurd nonsense, but even considered it their
duty to be delighted with it.
I somehow managed to sit out the next scene also, in which the monster
appears, to the accompaniment of his bass notes intermingled with the
motiv of Siegfried; but after the fight with the monster, and all the roars,
fires, and sword-wavings, I could stand no more of it, and escaped from the
theater with a feeling of repulsion which, even now, I cannot forget.
Listening to this opera, I involuntarily thought of a respected, wise,
educated country laborer,—one, for instance, of those wise and truly
religious men whom I know among the peasants,—and I pictured to myself
the terrible perplexity such a man would be in were he to witness what I
was seeing that evening.
What would he think if he knew of all the labor spent on such a
performance, and saw that audience, those great ones of the earth,—old,
bald-headed, gray-bearded men, whom he had been accustomed to respect,
—sit silent and attentive, listening to and looking at all these stupidities for
five hours on end? Not to speak of an adult laborer, one can hardly imagine
even a child of over seven occupying himself with such a stupid, incoherent
fairy tale.
And yet an enormous audience, the cream of the cultured upper classes, sits
out five hours of this insane performance, and goes away imagining that by
the rudest and most primitive manner, wishes to transmit to me these false
and mistaken conceptions of his.
Every one knows the feeling of distrust and resistance which is always
evoked by an author's evident predetermination. A narrator need only say in
advance, Prepare to cry or to laugh, and you are sure neither to cry nor to
laugh. But when you see that an author prescribes emotion at what is not
touching, but only laughable or disgusting, and when you see, moreover,
that the author is fully assured that he has captivated you, a painfully
tormenting feeling results, similar to what one would feel if an old,
deformed woman put on a ball-dress, and smilingly coquetted before you,
confident of your approbation. This impression was strengthened by the fact
that around me I saw a crowd of three thousand people, who not only
patiently witnessed all this absurd nonsense, but even considered it their
duty to be delighted with it.
I somehow managed to sit out the next scene also, in which the monster
appears, to the accompaniment of his bass notes intermingled with the
motiv of Siegfried; but after the fight with the monster, and all the roars,
fires, and sword-wavings, I could stand no more of it, and escaped from the
theater with a feeling of repulsion which, even now, I cannot forget.
Listening to this opera, I involuntarily thought of a respected, wise,
educated country laborer,—one, for instance, of those wise and truly
religious men whom I know among the peasants,—and I pictured to myself
the terrible perplexity such a man would be in were he to witness what I
was seeing that evening.
What would he think if he knew of all the labor spent on such a
performance, and saw that audience, those great ones of the earth,—old,
bald-headed, gray-bearded men, whom he had been accustomed to respect,
—sit silent and attentive, listening to and looking at all these stupidities for
five hours on end? Not to speak of an adult laborer, one can hardly imagine
even a child of over seven occupying himself with such a stupid, incoherent
fairy tale.
And yet an enormous audience, the cream of the cultured upper classes, sits
out five hours of this insane performance, and goes away imagining that by
Page 424
paying tribute to this nonsense it has acquired a fresh right to esteem itself
advanced and enlightened.
I speak of the Moscow public. But what is the Moscow public? It is but a
hundredth part of that public which, while considering itself most highly
enlightened, esteems it a merit to have so lost the capacity of being infected
by art, that not only can it witness this stupid sham without being revolted,
but can even take delight in it.
In Bayreuth, where these performances were first given, people who
consider themselves finely cultured assembled from the ends of the earth,
spent, say one hundred pounds each, to see this performance, and for four
days running they went to see and hear this nonsensical rubbish, sitting it
out for six hours each day.
But why did people go, and why do they still go to these performances, and
why do they admire them? The question naturally presents itself: How is the
success of Wagner's works to be explained?
That success I explain to myself in this way: thanks to his exceptional
position in having at his disposal the resources of a king, Wagner was able
to command all the methods for counterfeiting art which have been
developed by long usage, and, employing these methods with great ability,
he produced a model work of counterfeit art. The reason why I have
selected his work for my illustration is, that in no other counterfeit of art
known to me are all the methods by which art is counterfeited—namely,
borrowings, imitation, effects, and interestingness—so ably and powerfully
united.
From the subject, borrowed from antiquity, to the clouds and the risings of
the sun and moon, Wagner, in this work, has made use of all that is
considered poetical. We have here the sleeping beauty, and nymphs, and
subterranean fires, and gnomes, and battles, and swords, and love, and
incest, and a monster, and singing-birds—the whole arsenal of the poetical
is brought into action.
Moreover, everything is imitative; the decorations are imitated, and the
costumes are imitated. All are just as, according to the data supplied by
archæology, they would have been in antiquity. The very sounds are
imitative; for Wagner, who was not destitute of musical talent, invented just
advanced and enlightened.
I speak of the Moscow public. But what is the Moscow public? It is but a
hundredth part of that public which, while considering itself most highly
enlightened, esteems it a merit to have so lost the capacity of being infected
by art, that not only can it witness this stupid sham without being revolted,
but can even take delight in it.
In Bayreuth, where these performances were first given, people who
consider themselves finely cultured assembled from the ends of the earth,
spent, say one hundred pounds each, to see this performance, and for four
days running they went to see and hear this nonsensical rubbish, sitting it
out for six hours each day.
But why did people go, and why do they still go to these performances, and
why do they admire them? The question naturally presents itself: How is the
success of Wagner's works to be explained?
That success I explain to myself in this way: thanks to his exceptional
position in having at his disposal the resources of a king, Wagner was able
to command all the methods for counterfeiting art which have been
developed by long usage, and, employing these methods with great ability,
he produced a model work of counterfeit art. The reason why I have
selected his work for my illustration is, that in no other counterfeit of art
known to me are all the methods by which art is counterfeited—namely,
borrowings, imitation, effects, and interestingness—so ably and powerfully
united.
From the subject, borrowed from antiquity, to the clouds and the risings of
the sun and moon, Wagner, in this work, has made use of all that is
considered poetical. We have here the sleeping beauty, and nymphs, and
subterranean fires, and gnomes, and battles, and swords, and love, and
incest, and a monster, and singing-birds—the whole arsenal of the poetical
is brought into action.
Moreover, everything is imitative; the decorations are imitated, and the
costumes are imitated. All are just as, according to the data supplied by
archæology, they would have been in antiquity. The very sounds are
imitative; for Wagner, who was not destitute of musical talent, invented just
Page 425
such sounds as imitate the strokes of a hammer, the hissing of molten iron,
the singing of birds, etc.
Furthermore, in this work everything is in the highest degree striking in its
effects and in its peculiarities: its monsters, its magic fires, and its scenes
under water; the darkness in which the audience sit, the invisibility of the
orchestra, and the hitherto unemployed combinations of harmony.
And besides, it is all interesting. The interest lies not only in the question
who will kill whom, and who will marry whom, and who is whose son, and
what will happen next?—the interest lies also in the relation of the music to
the text. The rolling waves of the Rhine—now how is that to be expressed
in music? An evil gnome appears—how is the music to express an evil
gnome?—and how is it to express the sensuality of this gnome? How will
bravery, fire, or apples be expressed in music? How are the leit-motiv of the
people speaking to be interwoven with the leit-motiv of the people and
objects about whom they speak? Besides, the music has a further interest. It
diverges from all formerly accepted laws, and most unexpected and totally
new modulations crop up (as is not only possible, but even easy in music
having no inner law of its being); the dissonances are new, and are allowed
in a new way—and this, too, is interesting.
And it is this poeticality, imitativeness, effectfulness, and interestingness
which, thanks to the peculiarities of Wagner's talent, and to the
advantageous position in which he was placed, are in these productions
carried to the highest pitch of perfection, that so act on the spectator,
hypnotizing him as one would be hypnotized who should listen for several
consecutive hours to the ravings of a maniac pronounced with great
oratorical power.
People say: "You cannot judge without having seen Wagner performed at
Bayreuth: in the dark, where the orchestra is out of sight concealed under
the stage, and where the performance is brought to the highest perfection."
And this just proves that we have here no question of art, but one of
hypnotism. It is just what the spiritualists say. To convince you of the reality
of their apparitions they usually say, "You cannot judge; you must try it, be
present at several séances," i.e. come and sit silent in the dark for hours
together in the same room with semi-sane people, and repeat this some ten
times over, and you shall see all that we see.
the singing of birds, etc.
Furthermore, in this work everything is in the highest degree striking in its
effects and in its peculiarities: its monsters, its magic fires, and its scenes
under water; the darkness in which the audience sit, the invisibility of the
orchestra, and the hitherto unemployed combinations of harmony.
And besides, it is all interesting. The interest lies not only in the question
who will kill whom, and who will marry whom, and who is whose son, and
what will happen next?—the interest lies also in the relation of the music to
the text. The rolling waves of the Rhine—now how is that to be expressed
in music? An evil gnome appears—how is the music to express an evil
gnome?—and how is it to express the sensuality of this gnome? How will
bravery, fire, or apples be expressed in music? How are the leit-motiv of the
people speaking to be interwoven with the leit-motiv of the people and
objects about whom they speak? Besides, the music has a further interest. It
diverges from all formerly accepted laws, and most unexpected and totally
new modulations crop up (as is not only possible, but even easy in music
having no inner law of its being); the dissonances are new, and are allowed
in a new way—and this, too, is interesting.
And it is this poeticality, imitativeness, effectfulness, and interestingness
which, thanks to the peculiarities of Wagner's talent, and to the
advantageous position in which he was placed, are in these productions
carried to the highest pitch of perfection, that so act on the spectator,
hypnotizing him as one would be hypnotized who should listen for several
consecutive hours to the ravings of a maniac pronounced with great
oratorical power.
People say: "You cannot judge without having seen Wagner performed at
Bayreuth: in the dark, where the orchestra is out of sight concealed under
the stage, and where the performance is brought to the highest perfection."
And this just proves that we have here no question of art, but one of
hypnotism. It is just what the spiritualists say. To convince you of the reality
of their apparitions they usually say, "You cannot judge; you must try it, be
present at several séances," i.e. come and sit silent in the dark for hours
together in the same room with semi-sane people, and repeat this some ten
times over, and you shall see all that we see.
Page 426
Yes, naturally! Only place yourself in such conditions, and you may see
what you will. But this can be still more quickly attained by getting drunk
or smoking opium. It is the same when listening to an opera of Wagner's. Sit
in the dark for four days in company with people who are not quite normal,
and, through the auditory nerves, subject your brain to the strongest action
of the sounds best adapted to excite it, and you will no doubt be reduced to
an abnormal condition, and be enchanted by absurdities. But to attain this
end you do not even need four days; the five hours during which one "day"
is enacted, as in Moscow, are quite enough. Nor are five hours needed; even
one hour is enough for people who have no clear conception of what art
should be, and who have come to the conclusion in advance that what they
are going to see is excellent, and that indifference or dissatisfaction with
this work will serve as a proof of their inferiority and lack of culture.
I observed the audience present at this representation. The people who led
the whole audience and gave the tone to it were those who had previously
been hypnotized, and who again succumbed to the hypnotic influence to
which they were accustomed. These hypnotized people, being in an
abnormal condition, were perfectly enraptured. Moreover, all the art critics,
who lack the capacity to be infected by art and therefore always especially
prize works like Wagner's opera where it is all an affair of the intellect, also,
with much profundity, expressed their approval of a work affording such
ample material for ratiocination. And following these two groups went that
large city crowd (indifferent to art, with their capacity to be infected by it
perverted and partly atrophied), headed by the princes, millionaires, and art
patrons, who, like sorry harriers, keep close to those who most loudly and
decidedly express their opinion.
"Oh, yes, certainly! What poetry! Marvelous! Especially the birds!" "Yes,
yes! I am quite vanquished!" exclaim these people, repeating in various
tones what they have just heard from men whose opinion appears to them
authoritative.
If some people do feel insulted by the absurdity and spuriousness of the
whole thing, they are timidly silent, as sober men are timid and silent when
surrounded by tipsy ones.
And thus, thanks to the masterly skill with which it counterfeits art while
having nothing in common with it, a meaningless, coarse, spurious
what you will. But this can be still more quickly attained by getting drunk
or smoking opium. It is the same when listening to an opera of Wagner's. Sit
in the dark for four days in company with people who are not quite normal,
and, through the auditory nerves, subject your brain to the strongest action
of the sounds best adapted to excite it, and you will no doubt be reduced to
an abnormal condition, and be enchanted by absurdities. But to attain this
end you do not even need four days; the five hours during which one "day"
is enacted, as in Moscow, are quite enough. Nor are five hours needed; even
one hour is enough for people who have no clear conception of what art
should be, and who have come to the conclusion in advance that what they
are going to see is excellent, and that indifference or dissatisfaction with
this work will serve as a proof of their inferiority and lack of culture.
I observed the audience present at this representation. The people who led
the whole audience and gave the tone to it were those who had previously
been hypnotized, and who again succumbed to the hypnotic influence to
which they were accustomed. These hypnotized people, being in an
abnormal condition, were perfectly enraptured. Moreover, all the art critics,
who lack the capacity to be infected by art and therefore always especially
prize works like Wagner's opera where it is all an affair of the intellect, also,
with much profundity, expressed their approval of a work affording such
ample material for ratiocination. And following these two groups went that
large city crowd (indifferent to art, with their capacity to be infected by it
perverted and partly atrophied), headed by the princes, millionaires, and art
patrons, who, like sorry harriers, keep close to those who most loudly and
decidedly express their opinion.
"Oh, yes, certainly! What poetry! Marvelous! Especially the birds!" "Yes,
yes! I am quite vanquished!" exclaim these people, repeating in various
tones what they have just heard from men whose opinion appears to them
authoritative.
If some people do feel insulted by the absurdity and spuriousness of the
whole thing, they are timidly silent, as sober men are timid and silent when
surrounded by tipsy ones.
And thus, thanks to the masterly skill with which it counterfeits art while
having nothing in common with it, a meaningless, coarse, spurious
Page 427
production finds acceptance all over the world, costs millions of roubles to
produce, and assists more and more to pervert the taste of people of the
upper classes and their conception of what is art.
produce, and assists more and more to pervert the taste of people of the
upper classes and their conception of what is art.
Page 428
CHAPTER XIV
I know that most men—not only those considered clever, but even those
who are very clever, and capable of understanding most difficult scientific,
mathematical, or philosophic problems—can very seldom discern even the
simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as to oblige them to admit the
falsity of conclusions they have formed, perhaps with much difficulty—
conclusions of which they are proud, which they have taught to others, and
on which they have built their lives. And therefore I have little hope that
what I adduce as to the perversion of art and taste in our society will be
accepted or even seriously considered. Nevertheless, I must state fully the
inevitable conclusion to which my investigation into the question of art has
brought me. This investigation has brought me to the conviction that almost
all that our society considers to be art, good art, and the whole of art, far
from being real and good art, and the whole of art, is not even art at all, but
only a counterfeit of it. This position, I know, will seem very strange and
paradoxical; but if we once acknowledge art to be a human activity by
means of which some people transmit their feelings to others (and not a
service of Beauty, nor a manifestation of the Idea, and so forth), we shall
inevitably have to admit this further conclusion also. If it is true that art is
an activity by means of which one man, having experienced a feeling,
intentionally transmits it to others, then we have inevitably to admit further,
that of all that among us is termed the art of the upper classes—of all those
novels, stories, dramas, comedies, pictures, sculptures, symphonies, operas,
operettas, ballets, etc., which profess to be works of art—scarcely one in a
hundred thousand proceeds from an emotion felt by its author, all the rest
being but manufactured counterfeits of art, in which borrowing, imitating,
effects, and interestingness replace the contagion of feeling. That the
proportion of real productions of art is to the counterfeits as one to some
hundreds of thousands or even more, may be seen by the following
calculation. I have read somewhere that the artist painters in Paris alone
number 30,000; there will probably be as many in England, as many in
Germany, and as many in Russia, Italy, and the smaller states combined. So
that in all there will be in Europe, say, 120,000 painters; and there are
I know that most men—not only those considered clever, but even those
who are very clever, and capable of understanding most difficult scientific,
mathematical, or philosophic problems—can very seldom discern even the
simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as to oblige them to admit the
falsity of conclusions they have formed, perhaps with much difficulty—
conclusions of which they are proud, which they have taught to others, and
on which they have built their lives. And therefore I have little hope that
what I adduce as to the perversion of art and taste in our society will be
accepted or even seriously considered. Nevertheless, I must state fully the
inevitable conclusion to which my investigation into the question of art has
brought me. This investigation has brought me to the conviction that almost
all that our society considers to be art, good art, and the whole of art, far
from being real and good art, and the whole of art, is not even art at all, but
only a counterfeit of it. This position, I know, will seem very strange and
paradoxical; but if we once acknowledge art to be a human activity by
means of which some people transmit their feelings to others (and not a
service of Beauty, nor a manifestation of the Idea, and so forth), we shall
inevitably have to admit this further conclusion also. If it is true that art is
an activity by means of which one man, having experienced a feeling,
intentionally transmits it to others, then we have inevitably to admit further,
that of all that among us is termed the art of the upper classes—of all those
novels, stories, dramas, comedies, pictures, sculptures, symphonies, operas,
operettas, ballets, etc., which profess to be works of art—scarcely one in a
hundred thousand proceeds from an emotion felt by its author, all the rest
being but manufactured counterfeits of art, in which borrowing, imitating,
effects, and interestingness replace the contagion of feeling. That the
proportion of real productions of art is to the counterfeits as one to some
hundreds of thousands or even more, may be seen by the following
calculation. I have read somewhere that the artist painters in Paris alone
number 30,000; there will probably be as many in England, as many in
Germany, and as many in Russia, Italy, and the smaller states combined. So
that in all there will be in Europe, say, 120,000 painters; and there are
Page 429
probably as many musicians and as many literary artists. If these 360,000
individuals produce three works a year each (and many of them produce ten
or more), then each year yields over a million so-called works of art. How
many, then, must have been produced in the last ten years, and how many in
the whole time since upper-class art broke off from the art of the whole
people? Evidently millions. Yet who of all the connoisseurs of art has
received impressions from all these pseudo works of art? Not to mention all
the laboring classes who have no conception of these productions, even
people of the upper classes cannot know one in a thousand of them all, and
cannot remember those they have known. These works all appear under the
guise of art, produce no impression on any one (except when they serve as
pastimes for the idle crowd of rich people), and vanish utterly.
In reply to this it is usually said that without this enormous number of
unsuccessful attempts we should not have the real works of art. But such
reasoning is as though a baker, in reply to a reproach that his bread was bad,
were to say that if it were not for the hundreds of spoiled loaves there would
not be any well-baked ones. It is true that where there is gold there is also
much sand; but that cannot serve as a reason for talking a lot of nonsense in
order to say something wise.
We are surrounded by productions considered artistic. Thousands of verses,
thousands of poems, thousands of novels, thousands of dramas, thousands
of pictures, thousands of musical pieces, follow one after another. All the
verses describe love, or nature, or the author's state of mind, and in all of
them rhyme and rhythm are observed. All the dramas and comedies are
splendidly mounted and are performed by admirably trained actors. All the
novels are divided into chapters; all of them describe love, contain effective
situations, and correctly describe the details of life. All the symphonies
contain allegro, andante, scherzo, and finale; all consist of modulations and
chords, and are played by highly trained musicians. All the pictures, in gold
frames, saliently depict faces and sundry accessories. But among these
productions in the various branches of art, there is in each branch one
among hundreds of thousands, not only somewhat better than the rest, but
differing from them as a diamond differs from paste. The one is priceless,
the others not only have no value, but are worse than valueless, for they
deceive and pervert taste. And yet, externally, they are, to a man of
perverted or atrophied artistic perception, precisely alike.
individuals produce three works a year each (and many of them produce ten
or more), then each year yields over a million so-called works of art. How
many, then, must have been produced in the last ten years, and how many in
the whole time since upper-class art broke off from the art of the whole
people? Evidently millions. Yet who of all the connoisseurs of art has
received impressions from all these pseudo works of art? Not to mention all
the laboring classes who have no conception of these productions, even
people of the upper classes cannot know one in a thousand of them all, and
cannot remember those they have known. These works all appear under the
guise of art, produce no impression on any one (except when they serve as
pastimes for the idle crowd of rich people), and vanish utterly.
In reply to this it is usually said that without this enormous number of
unsuccessful attempts we should not have the real works of art. But such
reasoning is as though a baker, in reply to a reproach that his bread was bad,
were to say that if it were not for the hundreds of spoiled loaves there would
not be any well-baked ones. It is true that where there is gold there is also
much sand; but that cannot serve as a reason for talking a lot of nonsense in
order to say something wise.
We are surrounded by productions considered artistic. Thousands of verses,
thousands of poems, thousands of novels, thousands of dramas, thousands
of pictures, thousands of musical pieces, follow one after another. All the
verses describe love, or nature, or the author's state of mind, and in all of
them rhyme and rhythm are observed. All the dramas and comedies are
splendidly mounted and are performed by admirably trained actors. All the
novels are divided into chapters; all of them describe love, contain effective
situations, and correctly describe the details of life. All the symphonies
contain allegro, andante, scherzo, and finale; all consist of modulations and
chords, and are played by highly trained musicians. All the pictures, in gold
frames, saliently depict faces and sundry accessories. But among these
productions in the various branches of art, there is in each branch one
among hundreds of thousands, not only somewhat better than the rest, but
differing from them as a diamond differs from paste. The one is priceless,
the others not only have no value, but are worse than valueless, for they
deceive and pervert taste. And yet, externally, they are, to a man of
perverted or atrophied artistic perception, precisely alike.
Page 430
In our society the difficulty of recognizing real works of art is further
increased by the fact that the external quality of the work in false
productions is not only no worse, but often better, than in real ones; the
counterfeit is often more effective than the real, and its subject more
interesting. How is one to discriminate? How is one to find a production in
no way distinguished in externals from hundreds of thousands of others
intentionally made to imitate it precisely?
For a country peasant of unperverted taste this is as easy as it is for an
animal of unspoilt scent to follow the trace he needs among a thousand
others in wood or forest. The animal unerringly finds what he needs. So
also the man, if only his natural qualities have not been perverted, will,
without fail, select from among thousands of objects the real work of art he
requires,—that infecting him with the feeling experienced by the artist. But
it is not so with those whose taste has been perverted by their education and
life. The receptive feeling for art of these people is atrophied, and in valuing
artistic productions they must be guided by discussion and study, which
discussion and study completely confuse them. So that most people in our
society are quite unable to distinguish a work of art from the grossest
counterfeit. People sit for whole hours in concert-rooms and theaters
listening to the new composers, consider it a duty to read the novels of the
famous modern novelists, and to look at pictures representing either
something incomprehensible, or just the very things they see much better in
real life; and, above all, they consider it incumbent on them to be
enraptured by all this, imagining it all to be art, while at the same time they
will pass real works of art by, not only without attention, but even with
contempt, merely because, in their circle, these works are not included in
the list of works of art.
A few days ago I was returning home from a walk feeling depressed, as
occurs sometimes. On nearing the house I heard the loud singing of a large
choir of peasant women. They were welcoming my daughter, celebrating
her return home after her marriage. In this singing, with its cries and
clanging of scythes, such a definite feeling of joy, cheerfulness, and energy
was expressed, that, without noticing how it infected me, I continued my
way toward the house in a better mood, and reached home smiling, and
quite in good spirits. That same evening, a visitor, an admirable musician,
famed for his execution of classical music, and particularly of Beethoven,
increased by the fact that the external quality of the work in false
productions is not only no worse, but often better, than in real ones; the
counterfeit is often more effective than the real, and its subject more
interesting. How is one to discriminate? How is one to find a production in
no way distinguished in externals from hundreds of thousands of others
intentionally made to imitate it precisely?
For a country peasant of unperverted taste this is as easy as it is for an
animal of unspoilt scent to follow the trace he needs among a thousand
others in wood or forest. The animal unerringly finds what he needs. So
also the man, if only his natural qualities have not been perverted, will,
without fail, select from among thousands of objects the real work of art he
requires,—that infecting him with the feeling experienced by the artist. But
it is not so with those whose taste has been perverted by their education and
life. The receptive feeling for art of these people is atrophied, and in valuing
artistic productions they must be guided by discussion and study, which
discussion and study completely confuse them. So that most people in our
society are quite unable to distinguish a work of art from the grossest
counterfeit. People sit for whole hours in concert-rooms and theaters
listening to the new composers, consider it a duty to read the novels of the
famous modern novelists, and to look at pictures representing either
something incomprehensible, or just the very things they see much better in
real life; and, above all, they consider it incumbent on them to be
enraptured by all this, imagining it all to be art, while at the same time they
will pass real works of art by, not only without attention, but even with
contempt, merely because, in their circle, these works are not included in
the list of works of art.
A few days ago I was returning home from a walk feeling depressed, as
occurs sometimes. On nearing the house I heard the loud singing of a large
choir of peasant women. They were welcoming my daughter, celebrating
her return home after her marriage. In this singing, with its cries and
clanging of scythes, such a definite feeling of joy, cheerfulness, and energy
was expressed, that, without noticing how it infected me, I continued my
way toward the house in a better mood, and reached home smiling, and
quite in good spirits. That same evening, a visitor, an admirable musician,
famed for his execution of classical music, and particularly of Beethoven,
Page 431
played us Beethoven's sonata, Opus 101. For the benefit of those who might
otherwise attribute my judgment of that sonata of Beethoven to non-
comprehension of it, I should mention that, whatever other people
understand of that sonata and of other productions of Beethoven's later
period, I, being very susceptible to music, equally understood. For a long
time I used to attune myself so as to delight in those shapeless
improvisations which form the subject-matter of the works of Beethoven's
later period, but I had only to consider the question of art seriously, and to
compare the impression I received from Beethoven's later works with those
pleasant, clear, and strong musical impressions which are transmitted, for
instance, by the melodies of Bach (his arias), Haydn, Mozart, Chopin,
(when his melodies are not overloaded with complications and
ornamentation), and of Beethoven himself in his earlier period, and, above
all, with the impressions produced by folk-songs,—Italian, Norwegian, or
Russian,—by the Hungarian tzardas, and other such simple, clear, and
powerful music, and the obscure, almost unhealthy excitement from
Beethoven's later pieces that I had artificially evoked in myself was
immediately destroyed.
On the completion of the performance (though it was noticeable that every
one had become dull) those present, in the accepted manner, warmly praised
Beethoven's profound production, and did not forget to add that formerly
they had not been able to understand that last period of his, but that they
now saw that he was really then at his very best. And when I ventured to
compare the impression made on me by the singing of the peasant women
—an impression which had been shared by all who heard it—with the effect
of this sonata, the admirers of Beethoven only smiled contemptuously, not
considering it necessary to reply to such strange remarks.
But, for all that, the song of the peasant women was real art, transmitting a
definite and strong feeling; while the 101st sonata of Beethoven was only
an unsuccessful attempt at art, containing no definite feeling, and therefore
not infectious.
For my work on art I have this winter read diligently, though with great
effort, the celebrated novels and stories, praised by all Europe, written by
Zola, Bourget, Huysmans, and Kipling. At the same time I chanced on a
story in a child's magazine, and by a quite unknown writer, which told of
the Easter preparations in a poor widow's family. The story tells how the
otherwise attribute my judgment of that sonata of Beethoven to non-
comprehension of it, I should mention that, whatever other people
understand of that sonata and of other productions of Beethoven's later
period, I, being very susceptible to music, equally understood. For a long
time I used to attune myself so as to delight in those shapeless
improvisations which form the subject-matter of the works of Beethoven's
later period, but I had only to consider the question of art seriously, and to
compare the impression I received from Beethoven's later works with those
pleasant, clear, and strong musical impressions which are transmitted, for
instance, by the melodies of Bach (his arias), Haydn, Mozart, Chopin,
(when his melodies are not overloaded with complications and
ornamentation), and of Beethoven himself in his earlier period, and, above
all, with the impressions produced by folk-songs,—Italian, Norwegian, or
Russian,—by the Hungarian tzardas, and other such simple, clear, and
powerful music, and the obscure, almost unhealthy excitement from
Beethoven's later pieces that I had artificially evoked in myself was
immediately destroyed.
On the completion of the performance (though it was noticeable that every
one had become dull) those present, in the accepted manner, warmly praised
Beethoven's profound production, and did not forget to add that formerly
they had not been able to understand that last period of his, but that they
now saw that he was really then at his very best. And when I ventured to
compare the impression made on me by the singing of the peasant women
—an impression which had been shared by all who heard it—with the effect
of this sonata, the admirers of Beethoven only smiled contemptuously, not
considering it necessary to reply to such strange remarks.
But, for all that, the song of the peasant women was real art, transmitting a
definite and strong feeling; while the 101st sonata of Beethoven was only
an unsuccessful attempt at art, containing no definite feeling, and therefore
not infectious.
For my work on art I have this winter read diligently, though with great
effort, the celebrated novels and stories, praised by all Europe, written by
Zola, Bourget, Huysmans, and Kipling. At the same time I chanced on a
story in a child's magazine, and by a quite unknown writer, which told of
the Easter preparations in a poor widow's family. The story tells how the
Page 432
mother managed with difficulty to obtain some wheat-flour, which she
poured on the table ready to knead. She then went out to procure some
yeast, telling the children not to leave the hut, and to take care of the flour.
When the mother had gone, some other children ran shouting near the
window, calling those in the hut to come to play. The children forgot their
mother's warning, ran into the street, and were soon engrossed in the game.
The mother, on her return with the yeast, finds a hen on the table throwing
the last of the flour to her chickens, who were busily picking it out of the
dust of the earthen floor. The mother, in despair, scolds the children, who
cry bitterly. And the mother begins to feel pity for them—but the white
flour has all gone. So to mend matters she decides to make the Easter cake
with sifted rye-flour, brushing it over with white of egg, and surrounding it
with eggs. "Rye-bread which we bake is akin to any cake," says the mother,
using a rhyming proverb to console the children for not having an Easter
cake made with white flour. And the children, quickly passing from despair
to rapture, repeat the proverb and await the Easter cake more merrily even
than before.
Well! the reading of the novels and stories by Zola, Bourget, Huysmans,
Kipling, and others, handling the most harrowing subjects, did not touch me
for one moment, and I was provoked with the authors all the while, as one
is provoked with a man who considers you so naïve that he does not even
conceal the trick by which he intends to take you in. From the first lines you
see the intention with which the book is written, and the details all become
superfluous, and one feels dull. Above all, one knows that the author had no
other feeling all the time than a desire to write a story or a novel, and so one
receives no artistic impression. On the other hand, I could not tear myself
away from the unknown author's tale of the children and the chickens,
because I was at once infected by the feeling which the author had evidently
experienced, reëvoked in himself, and transmitted.
Vasnetsoff is one of our Russian painters. He has painted ecclesiastical
pictures in Kieff Cathedral, and every one praises him as the founder of
some new, elevated kind of Christian art. He worked at those pictures for
ten years, was paid tens of thousands of roubles for them, and they are all
simply bad imitations of imitations of imitations, destitute of any spark of
feeling. And this same Vasnetsoff drew a picture for Tourgenieff's story,
"The Quail" (in which it is told how, in his son's presence, a father killed a
poured on the table ready to knead. She then went out to procure some
yeast, telling the children not to leave the hut, and to take care of the flour.
When the mother had gone, some other children ran shouting near the
window, calling those in the hut to come to play. The children forgot their
mother's warning, ran into the street, and were soon engrossed in the game.
The mother, on her return with the yeast, finds a hen on the table throwing
the last of the flour to her chickens, who were busily picking it out of the
dust of the earthen floor. The mother, in despair, scolds the children, who
cry bitterly. And the mother begins to feel pity for them—but the white
flour has all gone. So to mend matters she decides to make the Easter cake
with sifted rye-flour, brushing it over with white of egg, and surrounding it
with eggs. "Rye-bread which we bake is akin to any cake," says the mother,
using a rhyming proverb to console the children for not having an Easter
cake made with white flour. And the children, quickly passing from despair
to rapture, repeat the proverb and await the Easter cake more merrily even
than before.
Well! the reading of the novels and stories by Zola, Bourget, Huysmans,
Kipling, and others, handling the most harrowing subjects, did not touch me
for one moment, and I was provoked with the authors all the while, as one
is provoked with a man who considers you so naïve that he does not even
conceal the trick by which he intends to take you in. From the first lines you
see the intention with which the book is written, and the details all become
superfluous, and one feels dull. Above all, one knows that the author had no
other feeling all the time than a desire to write a story or a novel, and so one
receives no artistic impression. On the other hand, I could not tear myself
away from the unknown author's tale of the children and the chickens,
because I was at once infected by the feeling which the author had evidently
experienced, reëvoked in himself, and transmitted.
Vasnetsoff is one of our Russian painters. He has painted ecclesiastical
pictures in Kieff Cathedral, and every one praises him as the founder of
some new, elevated kind of Christian art. He worked at those pictures for
ten years, was paid tens of thousands of roubles for them, and they are all
simply bad imitations of imitations of imitations, destitute of any spark of
feeling. And this same Vasnetsoff drew a picture for Tourgenieff's story,
"The Quail" (in which it is told how, in his son's presence, a father killed a
Page 433
quail and felt pity for it), showing the boy asleep with pouting upper lip,
and above him, as a dream, the quail. And this picture is a true work of art.
In the English Academy of 1897 two pictures were exhibited together; one
of which, by J. C. Dolman, was the temptation of St. Anthony. The saint is
on his knees praying. Behind him stands a naked woman and animals of
some kind. It is apparent that the naked woman pleased the artist very
much, but that Anthony did not concern him at all; and that, so far from the
temptation being terrible to him (the artist) it is highly agreeable. And
therefore if there be any art in this picture, it is very nasty and false. Next in
the same book of academy pictures comes a picture by Langley, showing a
stray beggar-boy, who has evidently been called in by a woman who has
taken pity on him. The boy, pitifully drawing his bare feet under the bench,
is eating; the woman is looking on, probably considering whether he will
not want some more; and a girl of about seven, leaning on her arm, is
carefully and seriously looking on, not taking her eyes from the hungry boy,
and evidently understanding for the first time what poverty is, and what
inequality among people is, and asking herself why she has everything
provided for her while this boy goes barefoot and hungry? She feels sorry,
and yet pleased. And she loves both the boy and goodness.... And one feels
that the artist loved this girl, and that she too loves. And this picture, by an
artist who, I think, is not very widely known, is an admirable and true work
of art.
I remember seeing a performance of "Hamlet" by Rossi. Both the tragedy
itself and the performer who took the chief part are considered by our critics
to represent the climax of supreme dramatic art. And yet, both from the
subject-matter of the drama and from the performance, I experienced all the
time that peculiar suffering which is caused by false imitations of works of
art. And I lately read of a theatrical performance among the savage tribe, the
Voguls. A spectator describes the play. A big Vogul and a little one, both
dressed in reindeer skins, represent a reindeer-doe and its young. A third
Vogul, with a bow, represents a huntsman on snow-shoes, and a fourth
imitates with his voice a bird that warns the reindeer of their danger. The
play is that the huntsman follows the track that the doe with its young one
has traveled. The deer run off the scene, and again reappear. (Such
performances take place in a small tent-house.) The huntsman gains more
and more on the pursued. The little deer is tired, and presses against its
and above him, as a dream, the quail. And this picture is a true work of art.
In the English Academy of 1897 two pictures were exhibited together; one
of which, by J. C. Dolman, was the temptation of St. Anthony. The saint is
on his knees praying. Behind him stands a naked woman and animals of
some kind. It is apparent that the naked woman pleased the artist very
much, but that Anthony did not concern him at all; and that, so far from the
temptation being terrible to him (the artist) it is highly agreeable. And
therefore if there be any art in this picture, it is very nasty and false. Next in
the same book of academy pictures comes a picture by Langley, showing a
stray beggar-boy, who has evidently been called in by a woman who has
taken pity on him. The boy, pitifully drawing his bare feet under the bench,
is eating; the woman is looking on, probably considering whether he will
not want some more; and a girl of about seven, leaning on her arm, is
carefully and seriously looking on, not taking her eyes from the hungry boy,
and evidently understanding for the first time what poverty is, and what
inequality among people is, and asking herself why she has everything
provided for her while this boy goes barefoot and hungry? She feels sorry,
and yet pleased. And she loves both the boy and goodness.... And one feels
that the artist loved this girl, and that she too loves. And this picture, by an
artist who, I think, is not very widely known, is an admirable and true work
of art.
I remember seeing a performance of "Hamlet" by Rossi. Both the tragedy
itself and the performer who took the chief part are considered by our critics
to represent the climax of supreme dramatic art. And yet, both from the
subject-matter of the drama and from the performance, I experienced all the
time that peculiar suffering which is caused by false imitations of works of
art. And I lately read of a theatrical performance among the savage tribe, the
Voguls. A spectator describes the play. A big Vogul and a little one, both
dressed in reindeer skins, represent a reindeer-doe and its young. A third
Vogul, with a bow, represents a huntsman on snow-shoes, and a fourth
imitates with his voice a bird that warns the reindeer of their danger. The
play is that the huntsman follows the track that the doe with its young one
has traveled. The deer run off the scene, and again reappear. (Such
performances take place in a small tent-house.) The huntsman gains more
and more on the pursued. The little deer is tired, and presses against its
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mother. The doe stops to draw breath. The hunter comes up with them and
draws his bow. But just then the bird sounds its note, warning the deer of
their danger. They escape. Again there is a chase, and again the hunter gains
on them, catches them, and lets fly his arrow. The arrow strikes the young
deer. Unable to run, the little one presses against its mother. The mother
licks its wound. The hunter draws another arrow. The audience, as the eye-
witness describes them, are paralyzed with suspense; deep groans and even
weeping is heard among them. And, from the mere description, I felt that
this was a true work of art.
What I am saying will be considered irrational paradox, at which one can
only be amazed; but for all that I must say what I think; namely, that people
of our circle, of whom some compose verses, stories, novels, operas,
symphonies, and sonatas, paint all kinds of pictures and make statues, while
others hear and look at these things, and again others appraise and criticize
it all, discuss, condemn, triumph, and raise monuments to one another,
generation after generation,—that all these people, with very few
exceptions, artists, and public, and critics, have never (except in childhood
and earliest youth, before hearing any discussions on art) experienced that
simple feeling familiar to the plainest man and even to a child, that sense of
infection with another's feeling,—compelling us to joy in another's
gladness, to sorrow at another's grief, and to mingle souls with another,—
which is the very essence of art. And therefore these people not only cannot
distinguish true works of art from counterfeits, but continually mistake for
real art the worst and most artificial, while they do not even perceive works
of real art, because the counterfeits are always more ornate, while true art is
modest.
draws his bow. But just then the bird sounds its note, warning the deer of
their danger. They escape. Again there is a chase, and again the hunter gains
on them, catches them, and lets fly his arrow. The arrow strikes the young
deer. Unable to run, the little one presses against its mother. The mother
licks its wound. The hunter draws another arrow. The audience, as the eye-
witness describes them, are paralyzed with suspense; deep groans and even
weeping is heard among them. And, from the mere description, I felt that
this was a true work of art.
What I am saying will be considered irrational paradox, at which one can
only be amazed; but for all that I must say what I think; namely, that people
of our circle, of whom some compose verses, stories, novels, operas,
symphonies, and sonatas, paint all kinds of pictures and make statues, while
others hear and look at these things, and again others appraise and criticize
it all, discuss, condemn, triumph, and raise monuments to one another,
generation after generation,—that all these people, with very few
exceptions, artists, and public, and critics, have never (except in childhood
and earliest youth, before hearing any discussions on art) experienced that
simple feeling familiar to the plainest man and even to a child, that sense of
infection with another's feeling,—compelling us to joy in another's
gladness, to sorrow at another's grief, and to mingle souls with another,—
which is the very essence of art. And therefore these people not only cannot
distinguish true works of art from counterfeits, but continually mistake for
real art the worst and most artificial, while they do not even perceive works
of real art, because the counterfeits are always more ornate, while true art is
modest.
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CHAPTER XV
Art, in our society, has been so perverted that not only has bad art come to
be considered good, but even the very perception of what art really is has
been lost. In order to be able to speak about the art of our society, it is,
therefore, first of all necessary to distinguish art from counterfeit art.
There is one indubitable indication distinguishing real art from its
counterfeit, namely, the infectiousness of art. If a man, without exercising
effort and without altering his standpoint, on reading, hearing, or seeing
another man's work, experiences a mental condition which unites him with
that man and with other people who also partake of that work of art, then
the object evoking that condition is a work of art. And however poetical,
realistic, effectful, or interesting a work may be, it is not a work of art if it
does not evoke that feeling (quite distinct from all other feelings) of joy,
and of spiritual union with another (the author) and with others (those who
are also infected by it).
It is true that this indication is an internal one, and that there are people
who have forgotten what the action of real art is, who expect something else
from art (in our society the great majority are in this state), and that
therefore such people may mistake for this æsthetic feeling the feeling of
divertisement and a certain excitement which they receive from counterfeits
of art. But though it is impossible to undeceive these people, just as it is
impossible to convince a man suffering from "Daltonism" that green is not
red, yet, for all that, this indication remains perfectly definite to those
whose feeling for art is neither perverted nor atrophied, and it clearly
distinguishes the feeling produced by art from all other feelings.
The chief peculiarity of this feeling is that the receiver of a true artistic
impression is so united to the artist that he feels as if the work were his own
and not some one else's,—as if what it expresses were just what he had long
been wishing to express. A real work of art destroys, in the consciousness of
the receiver, the separation between himself and the artist; nor that alone,
but also between himself and all whose minds receive this work of art. In
this freeing of our personality from its separation and isolation, in this
Art, in our society, has been so perverted that not only has bad art come to
be considered good, but even the very perception of what art really is has
been lost. In order to be able to speak about the art of our society, it is,
therefore, first of all necessary to distinguish art from counterfeit art.
There is one indubitable indication distinguishing real art from its
counterfeit, namely, the infectiousness of art. If a man, without exercising
effort and without altering his standpoint, on reading, hearing, or seeing
another man's work, experiences a mental condition which unites him with
that man and with other people who also partake of that work of art, then
the object evoking that condition is a work of art. And however poetical,
realistic, effectful, or interesting a work may be, it is not a work of art if it
does not evoke that feeling (quite distinct from all other feelings) of joy,
and of spiritual union with another (the author) and with others (those who
are also infected by it).
It is true that this indication is an internal one, and that there are people
who have forgotten what the action of real art is, who expect something else
from art (in our society the great majority are in this state), and that
therefore such people may mistake for this æsthetic feeling the feeling of
divertisement and a certain excitement which they receive from counterfeits
of art. But though it is impossible to undeceive these people, just as it is
impossible to convince a man suffering from "Daltonism" that green is not
red, yet, for all that, this indication remains perfectly definite to those
whose feeling for art is neither perverted nor atrophied, and it clearly
distinguishes the feeling produced by art from all other feelings.
The chief peculiarity of this feeling is that the receiver of a true artistic
impression is so united to the artist that he feels as if the work were his own
and not some one else's,—as if what it expresses were just what he had long
been wishing to express. A real work of art destroys, in the consciousness of
the receiver, the separation between himself and the artist; nor that alone,
but also between himself and all whose minds receive this work of art. In
this freeing of our personality from its separation and isolation, in this
Page 436
uniting of it with others, lies the chief characteristic and the great attractive
force of art.
If a man is infected by the author's condition of soul, if he feels this emotion
and this union with others, then the object which has effected this is art; but
if there be no such infection, if there be not this union with the author and
with others who are moved by the same work—then it is not art. And not
only is infection a sure sign of art, but the degree of infectiousness is also
the sole measure of excellence in art.
The stronger the infection the better is the art; as art, speaking now apart
from its subject-matter, i.e. not considering the quality of the feelings it
transmits.
And the degree of the infectiousness of art depends on three conditions:—
(1) On the greater or lesser individuality of the feeling transmitted; (2) on
the greater or lesser clearness with which the feeling is transmitted; (3) on
the sincerity of the artist, i.e. on the greater or lesser force with which the
artist himself feels the emotion he transmits.
The more individual the feeling transmitted the more strongly does it act on
the receiver; the more individual the state of soul into which he is
transferred the more pleasure does the receiver obtain, and therefore the
more readily and strongly does he join in it.
The clearness of expression assists infection, because the receiver, who
mingles in consciousness with the author, is the better satisfied the more
clearly the feeling is transmitted, which, as it seems to him, he has long
known and felt, and for which he has only now found expression.
But most of all is the degree of infectiousness of art increased by the degree
of sincerity in the artist. As soon as the spectator, hearer, or reader feels that
the artist is infected by his own production, and writes, sings, or plays for
himself, and not merely to act on others, this mental condition of the artist
infects the receiver; and, contrariwise, as soon as the spectator, reader, or
hearer feels that the author is not writing, singing, or playing for his own
satisfaction,—does not himself feel what he wishes to express,—but is
doing it for him, the receiver, a resistance immediately springs up, and the
most individual and the newest feelings and the cleverest technique not only
fail to produce any infection, but actually repel.
force of art.
If a man is infected by the author's condition of soul, if he feels this emotion
and this union with others, then the object which has effected this is art; but
if there be no such infection, if there be not this union with the author and
with others who are moved by the same work—then it is not art. And not
only is infection a sure sign of art, but the degree of infectiousness is also
the sole measure of excellence in art.
The stronger the infection the better is the art; as art, speaking now apart
from its subject-matter, i.e. not considering the quality of the feelings it
transmits.
And the degree of the infectiousness of art depends on three conditions:—
(1) On the greater or lesser individuality of the feeling transmitted; (2) on
the greater or lesser clearness with which the feeling is transmitted; (3) on
the sincerity of the artist, i.e. on the greater or lesser force with which the
artist himself feels the emotion he transmits.
The more individual the feeling transmitted the more strongly does it act on
the receiver; the more individual the state of soul into which he is
transferred the more pleasure does the receiver obtain, and therefore the
more readily and strongly does he join in it.
The clearness of expression assists infection, because the receiver, who
mingles in consciousness with the author, is the better satisfied the more
clearly the feeling is transmitted, which, as it seems to him, he has long
known and felt, and for which he has only now found expression.
But most of all is the degree of infectiousness of art increased by the degree
of sincerity in the artist. As soon as the spectator, hearer, or reader feels that
the artist is infected by his own production, and writes, sings, or plays for
himself, and not merely to act on others, this mental condition of the artist
infects the receiver; and, contrariwise, as soon as the spectator, reader, or
hearer feels that the author is not writing, singing, or playing for his own
satisfaction,—does not himself feel what he wishes to express,—but is
doing it for him, the receiver, a resistance immediately springs up, and the
most individual and the newest feelings and the cleverest technique not only
fail to produce any infection, but actually repel.
Page 437
I have mentioned three conditions of contagiousness in art, but they may be
all summed up into one, the last, sincerity, i.e. that the artist should be
impelled by an inner need to express his feeling. That condition includes the
first; for if the artist is sincere he will express the feeling as he experienced
it. And as each man is different from every one else, his feeling will be
individual for every one else; and the more individual it is,—the more the
artist has drawn it from the depths of his nature,—the more sympathetic and
sincere will it be. And this same sincerity will impel the artist to find a clear
expression of the feeling which he wishes to transmit.
Therefore this third condition—sincerity—is the most important of the
three. It is always complied with in peasant art, and this explains why such
art always acts so powerfully; but it is a condition almost entirely absent
from our upper-class art, which is continually produced by artists actuated
by personal aims of covetousness or vanity.
Such are the three conditions which divide art from its counterfeits, and
which also decide the quality of every work of art apart from its subject-
matter.
The absence of any one of these conditions excludes a work from the
category of art and relegates it to that of art's counterfeits. If the work does
not transmit the artist's peculiarity of feeling, and is therefore not individual,
if it is unintelligibly expressed, or if it has not proceeded from the author's
inner need for expression—it is not a work of art. If all these conditions are
present, even in the smallest degree, then the work, even if a weak one, is
yet a work of art.
The presence in various degrees of these three conditions—individuality,
clearness, and sincerity—decides the merit of a work of art, as art, apart
from subject-matter. All works of art take rank of merit according to the
degree in which they fulfil the first, the second, and the third of these
conditions. In one the individuality of the feeling transmitted may
predominate; in another, clearness of expression; in a third, sincerity; while
a fourth may have sincerity and individuality, but be deficient in clearness;
a fifth, individuality and clearness, but less sincerity; and so forth, in all
possible degrees and combinations.
Thus is art divided from not art, and thus is the quality of art, as art,
decided, independently of its subject-matter, i.e. apart from whether the
all summed up into one, the last, sincerity, i.e. that the artist should be
impelled by an inner need to express his feeling. That condition includes the
first; for if the artist is sincere he will express the feeling as he experienced
it. And as each man is different from every one else, his feeling will be
individual for every one else; and the more individual it is,—the more the
artist has drawn it from the depths of his nature,—the more sympathetic and
sincere will it be. And this same sincerity will impel the artist to find a clear
expression of the feeling which he wishes to transmit.
Therefore this third condition—sincerity—is the most important of the
three. It is always complied with in peasant art, and this explains why such
art always acts so powerfully; but it is a condition almost entirely absent
from our upper-class art, which is continually produced by artists actuated
by personal aims of covetousness or vanity.
Such are the three conditions which divide art from its counterfeits, and
which also decide the quality of every work of art apart from its subject-
matter.
The absence of any one of these conditions excludes a work from the
category of art and relegates it to that of art's counterfeits. If the work does
not transmit the artist's peculiarity of feeling, and is therefore not individual,
if it is unintelligibly expressed, or if it has not proceeded from the author's
inner need for expression—it is not a work of art. If all these conditions are
present, even in the smallest degree, then the work, even if a weak one, is
yet a work of art.
The presence in various degrees of these three conditions—individuality,
clearness, and sincerity—decides the merit of a work of art, as art, apart
from subject-matter. All works of art take rank of merit according to the
degree in which they fulfil the first, the second, and the third of these
conditions. In one the individuality of the feeling transmitted may
predominate; in another, clearness of expression; in a third, sincerity; while
a fourth may have sincerity and individuality, but be deficient in clearness;
a fifth, individuality and clearness, but less sincerity; and so forth, in all
possible degrees and combinations.
Thus is art divided from not art, and thus is the quality of art, as art,
decided, independently of its subject-matter, i.e. apart from whether the
Page 438
feelings it transmits are good or bad.
But how are we to define good and bad art with reference to its subject-
matter?
But how are we to define good and bad art with reference to its subject-
matter?
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CHAPTER XVI
How in art are we to decide what is good and what is bad in subject-matter?
Art, like speech, is a means of communication, and therefore of progress,
i.e. of the movement of humanity forward toward perfection. Speech
renders accessible to men of the latest generations all the knowledge
discovered by the experience and reflection, both of preceding generations
and of the best and foremost men of their own times; art renders accessible
to men of the latest generations all the feelings experienced by their
predecessors, and those also which are being felt by their best and foremost
contemporaries. And as the evolution of knowledge proceeds by truer and
more necessary knowledge dislodging and replacing what is mistaken and
unnecessary, so the evolution of feeling proceeds through art,—feelings less
kind and less needful for the well-being of mankind are replaced by others
kinder and more needful for that end. That is the purpose of art. And,
speaking now of its subject-matter, the more art fulfils that purpose the
better the art, and the less it fulfils it the worse the art.
And the appraisement of feelings (i.e. the acknowledgment of these or those
feelings as being more or less good, more or less necessary for the well-
being of mankind) is made by the religious perception of the age.
In every period of history, and in every human society, there exists an
understanding of the meaning of life which represents the highest level to
which men of that society have attained,—an understanding defining the
highest good at which that society aims. And this understanding is the
religious perception of the given time and society. And this religious
perception is always clearly expressed by some advanced men, and more or
less vividly perceived by all the members of the society. Such a religious
perception and its corresponding expression exists always in every society.
If it appears to us that in our society there is no religious perception, this is
not because there really is none, but only because we do not want to see it.
And we often wish not to see it because it exposes the fact that our life is
inconsistent with that religious perception.
How in art are we to decide what is good and what is bad in subject-matter?
Art, like speech, is a means of communication, and therefore of progress,
i.e. of the movement of humanity forward toward perfection. Speech
renders accessible to men of the latest generations all the knowledge
discovered by the experience and reflection, both of preceding generations
and of the best and foremost men of their own times; art renders accessible
to men of the latest generations all the feelings experienced by their
predecessors, and those also which are being felt by their best and foremost
contemporaries. And as the evolution of knowledge proceeds by truer and
more necessary knowledge dislodging and replacing what is mistaken and
unnecessary, so the evolution of feeling proceeds through art,—feelings less
kind and less needful for the well-being of mankind are replaced by others
kinder and more needful for that end. That is the purpose of art. And,
speaking now of its subject-matter, the more art fulfils that purpose the
better the art, and the less it fulfils it the worse the art.
And the appraisement of feelings (i.e. the acknowledgment of these or those
feelings as being more or less good, more or less necessary for the well-
being of mankind) is made by the religious perception of the age.
In every period of history, and in every human society, there exists an
understanding of the meaning of life which represents the highest level to
which men of that society have attained,—an understanding defining the
highest good at which that society aims. And this understanding is the
religious perception of the given time and society. And this religious
perception is always clearly expressed by some advanced men, and more or
less vividly perceived by all the members of the society. Such a religious
perception and its corresponding expression exists always in every society.
If it appears to us that in our society there is no religious perception, this is
not because there really is none, but only because we do not want to see it.
And we often wish not to see it because it exposes the fact that our life is
inconsistent with that religious perception.
Page 440
Religious perception in a society is like the direction of a flowing river. If
the river flows at all, it must have a direction. If a society lives, there must
be a religious perception indicating the direction in which, more or less
consciously, all its members tend.
And so there always has been, and there is, a religious perception in every
society. And it is by the standard of this religious perception that the
feelings transmitted by art have always been estimated. Only on the basis of
this religious perception of their age have men always chosen from the
endlessly varied spheres of art that art which transmitted feelings making
religious perception operative in actual life. And such art has always been
highly valued and encouraged; while art transmitting feelings already
outlived, flowing from the antiquated religious perceptions of a former age,
has always been condemned and despised. All the rest of art, transmitting
those most diverse feelings by means of which people commune together,
was not condemned, and was tolerated, if only it did not transmit feelings
contrary to religious perception. Thus, for instance, among the Greeks, art
transmitting the feeling of beauty, strength, and courage (Hesiod, Homer,
Phidias) was chosen, approved, and encouraged; while art transmitting
feelings of rude sensuality, despondency, and effeminacy was condemned
and despised. Among the Jews, art transmitting feelings of devotion and
submission to the God of the Hebrews and to His will (the epic of Genesis,
the prophets, the Psalms) was chosen and encouraged, while art
transmitting feelings of idolatry (the golden calf) was condemned and
despised. All the rest of art—stories, songs, dances, ornamentation of
houses, of utensils, and of clothes—which was not contrary to religious
perception, was neither distinguished nor discussed. Thus, in regard to its
subject-matter, has art been appraised always and everywhere, and thus it
should be appraised; for this attitude toward art proceeds from the
fundamental characteristics of human nature, and those characteristics do
not change.
I know that according to an opinion current in our times religion is a
superstition which humanity has outgrown, and that it is therefore assumed
that no such thing exists as a religious perception, common to us all, by
which art, in our time, can be estimated. I know that this is the opinion
current in the pseudo-cultured circles of to-day. People who do not
acknowledge Christianity in its true meaning because it undermines all their
the river flows at all, it must have a direction. If a society lives, there must
be a religious perception indicating the direction in which, more or less
consciously, all its members tend.
And so there always has been, and there is, a religious perception in every
society. And it is by the standard of this religious perception that the
feelings transmitted by art have always been estimated. Only on the basis of
this religious perception of their age have men always chosen from the
endlessly varied spheres of art that art which transmitted feelings making
religious perception operative in actual life. And such art has always been
highly valued and encouraged; while art transmitting feelings already
outlived, flowing from the antiquated religious perceptions of a former age,
has always been condemned and despised. All the rest of art, transmitting
those most diverse feelings by means of which people commune together,
was not condemned, and was tolerated, if only it did not transmit feelings
contrary to religious perception. Thus, for instance, among the Greeks, art
transmitting the feeling of beauty, strength, and courage (Hesiod, Homer,
Phidias) was chosen, approved, and encouraged; while art transmitting
feelings of rude sensuality, despondency, and effeminacy was condemned
and despised. Among the Jews, art transmitting feelings of devotion and
submission to the God of the Hebrews and to His will (the epic of Genesis,
the prophets, the Psalms) was chosen and encouraged, while art
transmitting feelings of idolatry (the golden calf) was condemned and
despised. All the rest of art—stories, songs, dances, ornamentation of
houses, of utensils, and of clothes—which was not contrary to religious
perception, was neither distinguished nor discussed. Thus, in regard to its
subject-matter, has art been appraised always and everywhere, and thus it
should be appraised; for this attitude toward art proceeds from the
fundamental characteristics of human nature, and those characteristics do
not change.
I know that according to an opinion current in our times religion is a
superstition which humanity has outgrown, and that it is therefore assumed
that no such thing exists as a religious perception, common to us all, by
which art, in our time, can be estimated. I know that this is the opinion
current in the pseudo-cultured circles of to-day. People who do not
acknowledge Christianity in its true meaning because it undermines all their
Page 441
social privileges, and who, therefore, invent all kinds of philosophic and
æsthetic theories to hide from themselves the meaninglessness and
wrongness of their lives, cannot think otherwise. These people intentionally,
or sometimes unintentionally, confusing the conception of a religious cult
with the conception of religious perception, think that by denying the cult
they get rid of religious perception. But even the very attacks on religion,
and the attempts to establish a life-conception contrary to the religious
perception of our times, most clearly demonstrate the existence of a
religious perception condemning the lives that are not in harmony with it.
If humanity progresses, i.e. moves forward, there must inevitably be a guide
to the direction of that movement. And religions have always furnished that
guide. All history shows that the progress of humanity is accomplished not
otherwise than under the guidance of religion. But if the race cannot
progress without the guidance of religion,—and progress is always going
on, and consequently also in our own times,—then there must be a religion
of our times. So that, whether it pleases or displeases the so-called cultured
people of to-day, they must admit the existence of religion,—not of a
religious cult, Catholic, Protestant, or another, but of religious perception,—
which, even in our times, is the guide always present where there is any
progress. And if a religious perception exists amongst us, then our art
should be appraised on the basis of that religious perception; and, as has
always and everywhere been the case, art transmitting feelings flowing
from the religious perception of our time should be chosen from all the
indifferent art, should be acknowledged, highly esteemed, and encouraged;
while art running counter to that perception should be condemned and
despised, and all the remaining indifferent art should neither be
distinguished nor encouraged.
The religious perception of our time, in its widest and most practical
application, is the consciousness that our well-being, both material and
spiritual, individual and collective, temporal and eternal, lies in the growth
of brotherhood among all men—in their loving harmony with one another.
This perception is not only expressed by Christ and all the best men of past
ages, it is not only repeated in the most varied forms and from most diverse
sides by the best men of our own times, but it already serves as a clue to all
the complex labor of humanity, consisting as this labor does, on the one
hand, in the destruction of physical and moral obstacles to the union of
æsthetic theories to hide from themselves the meaninglessness and
wrongness of their lives, cannot think otherwise. These people intentionally,
or sometimes unintentionally, confusing the conception of a religious cult
with the conception of religious perception, think that by denying the cult
they get rid of religious perception. But even the very attacks on religion,
and the attempts to establish a life-conception contrary to the religious
perception of our times, most clearly demonstrate the existence of a
religious perception condemning the lives that are not in harmony with it.
If humanity progresses, i.e. moves forward, there must inevitably be a guide
to the direction of that movement. And religions have always furnished that
guide. All history shows that the progress of humanity is accomplished not
otherwise than under the guidance of religion. But if the race cannot
progress without the guidance of religion,—and progress is always going
on, and consequently also in our own times,—then there must be a religion
of our times. So that, whether it pleases or displeases the so-called cultured
people of to-day, they must admit the existence of religion,—not of a
religious cult, Catholic, Protestant, or another, but of religious perception,—
which, even in our times, is the guide always present where there is any
progress. And if a religious perception exists amongst us, then our art
should be appraised on the basis of that religious perception; and, as has
always and everywhere been the case, art transmitting feelings flowing
from the religious perception of our time should be chosen from all the
indifferent art, should be acknowledged, highly esteemed, and encouraged;
while art running counter to that perception should be condemned and
despised, and all the remaining indifferent art should neither be
distinguished nor encouraged.
The religious perception of our time, in its widest and most practical
application, is the consciousness that our well-being, both material and
spiritual, individual and collective, temporal and eternal, lies in the growth
of brotherhood among all men—in their loving harmony with one another.
This perception is not only expressed by Christ and all the best men of past
ages, it is not only repeated in the most varied forms and from most diverse
sides by the best men of our own times, but it already serves as a clue to all
the complex labor of humanity, consisting as this labor does, on the one
hand, in the destruction of physical and moral obstacles to the union of
Page 442
men, and, on the other hand, in establishing the principles common to all
men which can and should unite them into one universal brotherhood. And
it is on the basis of this perception that we should appraise all the
phenomena of our life, and, among the rest, our art also; choosing from all
its realms whatever transmits feelings flowing from this religious
perception, highly prizing and encouraging such art, rejecting whatever is
contrary to this perception, and not attributing to the rest of art an
importance not properly pertaining to it.
The chief mistake made by people of the upper classes of the time of the so-
called Renaissance—a mistake which we still perpetuate—was not that they
ceased to value and to attach importance to religious art (people of that
period could not attach importance to it, because, like our own upper
classes, they could not believe in what the majority considered to be
religion), but their mistake was that they set up in place of religious art,
which was lacking, an insignificant art which aimed only at giving pleasure,
i.e. they began to choose, to value, and to encourage, in place of religious
art, something which, in any case, did not deserve such esteem and
encouragement.
One of the Fathers of the Church said that the great evil is, not that men do
not know God, but that they have set up, instead of God, that which is not
God. So also with art. The great misfortune of the people of the upper
classes of our time is not so much that they are without a religious art, as
that, instead of a supreme religious art, chosen from all the rest as being
specially important and valuable, they have chosen a most insignificant and,
usually, harmful art, which aims at pleasing certain people, and which,
therefore, if only by its exclusive nature, stands in contradiction to that
Christian principle of universal union which forms the religious perception
of our time. Instead of religious art, an empty and often vicious art is set up,
and this hides from men's notice the need of that true religious art which
should be present in life in order to improve it.
It is true that art which satisfies the demands of the religious perception of
our time is quite unlike former art, but, notwithstanding this dissimilarity, to
a man who does not intentionally hide the truth from himself, it is very clear
and definite what does form the religious art of our age. In former times,
when the highest religious perception united only some people (who, even
if they formed a large society, were yet but one society surrounded by
men which can and should unite them into one universal brotherhood. And
it is on the basis of this perception that we should appraise all the
phenomena of our life, and, among the rest, our art also; choosing from all
its realms whatever transmits feelings flowing from this religious
perception, highly prizing and encouraging such art, rejecting whatever is
contrary to this perception, and not attributing to the rest of art an
importance not properly pertaining to it.
The chief mistake made by people of the upper classes of the time of the so-
called Renaissance—a mistake which we still perpetuate—was not that they
ceased to value and to attach importance to religious art (people of that
period could not attach importance to it, because, like our own upper
classes, they could not believe in what the majority considered to be
religion), but their mistake was that they set up in place of religious art,
which was lacking, an insignificant art which aimed only at giving pleasure,
i.e. they began to choose, to value, and to encourage, in place of religious
art, something which, in any case, did not deserve such esteem and
encouragement.
One of the Fathers of the Church said that the great evil is, not that men do
not know God, but that they have set up, instead of God, that which is not
God. So also with art. The great misfortune of the people of the upper
classes of our time is not so much that they are without a religious art, as
that, instead of a supreme religious art, chosen from all the rest as being
specially important and valuable, they have chosen a most insignificant and,
usually, harmful art, which aims at pleasing certain people, and which,
therefore, if only by its exclusive nature, stands in contradiction to that
Christian principle of universal union which forms the religious perception
of our time. Instead of religious art, an empty and often vicious art is set up,
and this hides from men's notice the need of that true religious art which
should be present in life in order to improve it.
It is true that art which satisfies the demands of the religious perception of
our time is quite unlike former art, but, notwithstanding this dissimilarity, to
a man who does not intentionally hide the truth from himself, it is very clear
and definite what does form the religious art of our age. In former times,
when the highest religious perception united only some people (who, even
if they formed a large society, were yet but one society surrounded by
Page 443
others—Jews, or Athenian or Roman citizens), the feelings transmitted by
the art of that time flowed from a desire for the might, greatness, glory, and
prosperity of that society, and the heroes of art might be people who
contributed to that prosperity by strength, by craft, by fraud, or by cruelty
(Ulysses, Jacob, David, Samson, Hercules, and all the heroes). But the
religious perception of our times does not select any one society of men; on
the contrary, it demands the union of all,—absolutely of all people without
exception,—and above every other virtue it sets brotherly love to all men.
And, therefore, the feelings transmitted by the art of our time not only
cannot coincide with the feelings transmitted by former art, but must run
counter to them.
Christian, truly Christian, art has been so long in establishing itself, and has
not yet established itself, just because the Christian religious perception was
not one of those small steps by which humanity advances regularly, but was
an enormous revolution, which, if it has not already altered, must inevitably
alter the entire life-conception of mankind, and, consequently, the whole
internal organization of their life. It is true that the life of humanity, like that
of an individual, moves regularly; but in that regular movement come, as it
were, turning-points, which sharply divide the preceding from the
subsequent life. Christianity was such a turning-point; such, at least, it must
appear to us who live by the Christian perception of life. Christian
perception gave another, a new, direction to all human feelings, and
therefore completely altered both the contents and the significance of art.
The Greeks could make use of Persian art and the Romans could use Greek
art, or, similarly, the Jews could use Egyptian art,—the fundamental ideals
were one and the same. Now the ideal was the greatness and prosperity of
the Persians, now the greatness and prosperity of the Greeks, now that of
the Romans. The same art was transferred into other conditions, and served
new nations. But the Christian ideal changed and reversed everything, so
that, as the gospel puts it, "That which was exalted among men has become
an abomination in the sight of God." The ideal is no longer the greatness of
Pharaoh or of a Roman emperor, not the beauty of a Greek, nor the wealth
of Phœnicia, but humility, purity, compassion, love. The hero is no longer
Dives, but Lazarus the beggar; not Mary Magdalene in the day of her
beauty, but in the day of her repentance; not those who acquire wealth, but
those who have abandoned it; not those who dwell in palaces, but those
who dwell in catacombs and huts; not those who rule over others, but those
the art of that time flowed from a desire for the might, greatness, glory, and
prosperity of that society, and the heroes of art might be people who
contributed to that prosperity by strength, by craft, by fraud, or by cruelty
(Ulysses, Jacob, David, Samson, Hercules, and all the heroes). But the
religious perception of our times does not select any one society of men; on
the contrary, it demands the union of all,—absolutely of all people without
exception,—and above every other virtue it sets brotherly love to all men.
And, therefore, the feelings transmitted by the art of our time not only
cannot coincide with the feelings transmitted by former art, but must run
counter to them.
Christian, truly Christian, art has been so long in establishing itself, and has
not yet established itself, just because the Christian religious perception was
not one of those small steps by which humanity advances regularly, but was
an enormous revolution, which, if it has not already altered, must inevitably
alter the entire life-conception of mankind, and, consequently, the whole
internal organization of their life. It is true that the life of humanity, like that
of an individual, moves regularly; but in that regular movement come, as it
were, turning-points, which sharply divide the preceding from the
subsequent life. Christianity was such a turning-point; such, at least, it must
appear to us who live by the Christian perception of life. Christian
perception gave another, a new, direction to all human feelings, and
therefore completely altered both the contents and the significance of art.
The Greeks could make use of Persian art and the Romans could use Greek
art, or, similarly, the Jews could use Egyptian art,—the fundamental ideals
were one and the same. Now the ideal was the greatness and prosperity of
the Persians, now the greatness and prosperity of the Greeks, now that of
the Romans. The same art was transferred into other conditions, and served
new nations. But the Christian ideal changed and reversed everything, so
that, as the gospel puts it, "That which was exalted among men has become
an abomination in the sight of God." The ideal is no longer the greatness of
Pharaoh or of a Roman emperor, not the beauty of a Greek, nor the wealth
of Phœnicia, but humility, purity, compassion, love. The hero is no longer
Dives, but Lazarus the beggar; not Mary Magdalene in the day of her
beauty, but in the day of her repentance; not those who acquire wealth, but
those who have abandoned it; not those who dwell in palaces, but those
who dwell in catacombs and huts; not those who rule over others, but those
Page 444
who acknowledge no authority but God's. And the greatest work of art is no
longer a cathedral of victory[119] with statues of conquerors, but the
representation of a human soul so transformed by love that a man who is
tormented and murdered yet pities and loves his persecutors.
And the change is so great that men of the Christian world find it difficult to
resist the inertia of the heathen art to which they have been accustomed all
their lives. The subject-matter of Christian religious art is so new to them,
so unlike the subject-matter of former art, that it seems to them as though
Christian art were a denial of art, and they cling desperately to the old art.
But this old art, having no longer, in our day, any source in religious
perception, has lost its meaning, and we shall have to abandon it whether
we wish to or not.
The essence of the Christian perception consists in the recognition by every
man of his sonship to God, and of the consequent union of men with God
and with one another, as is said in the gospel (John xvii. 21[120]). Therefore
the subject-matter of Christian art is such feeling as can unite men with God
and with one another.
The expression unite men with God and with one another may seem
obscure to people accustomed to the misuse of these words which is so
customary, but the words have a perfectly clear meaning nevertheless. They
indicate that the Christian union of man (in contradiction to the partial,
exclusive union of only some men) is that which unites all without
exception.
Art, all art, has this characteristic, that it unites people. Every art causes
those to whom the artist's feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the
artist, and also with all who receive the same impression. But non-Christian
art, while uniting some people together, makes that very union a cause of
separation between these united people and others; so that union of this
kind is often a source, not only of division, but even of enmity toward
others. Such is all patriotic art, with its anthems, poems, and monuments;
such is all Church art, i.e. the art of certain cults, with their images, statues,
processions, and other local ceremonies. Such art is belated and non-
Christian art, uniting the people of one cult only to separate them yet more
sharply from the members of other cults, and even to place them in relations
of hostility to each other. Christian art is only such as tends to unite all
longer a cathedral of victory[119] with statues of conquerors, but the
representation of a human soul so transformed by love that a man who is
tormented and murdered yet pities and loves his persecutors.
And the change is so great that men of the Christian world find it difficult to
resist the inertia of the heathen art to which they have been accustomed all
their lives. The subject-matter of Christian religious art is so new to them,
so unlike the subject-matter of former art, that it seems to them as though
Christian art were a denial of art, and they cling desperately to the old art.
But this old art, having no longer, in our day, any source in religious
perception, has lost its meaning, and we shall have to abandon it whether
we wish to or not.
The essence of the Christian perception consists in the recognition by every
man of his sonship to God, and of the consequent union of men with God
and with one another, as is said in the gospel (John xvii. 21[120]). Therefore
the subject-matter of Christian art is such feeling as can unite men with God
and with one another.
The expression unite men with God and with one another may seem
obscure to people accustomed to the misuse of these words which is so
customary, but the words have a perfectly clear meaning nevertheless. They
indicate that the Christian union of man (in contradiction to the partial,
exclusive union of only some men) is that which unites all without
exception.
Art, all art, has this characteristic, that it unites people. Every art causes
those to whom the artist's feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the
artist, and also with all who receive the same impression. But non-Christian
art, while uniting some people together, makes that very union a cause of
separation between these united people and others; so that union of this
kind is often a source, not only of division, but even of enmity toward
others. Such is all patriotic art, with its anthems, poems, and monuments;
such is all Church art, i.e. the art of certain cults, with their images, statues,
processions, and other local ceremonies. Such art is belated and non-
Christian art, uniting the people of one cult only to separate them yet more
sharply from the members of other cults, and even to place them in relations
of hostility to each other. Christian art is only such as tends to unite all
Page 445
without exception, either by evoking in them the perception that each man
and all men stand in like relation toward God and toward their neighbor, or
by evoking in them identical feelings, which may even be the very simplest,
provided only that they are not repugnant to Christianity and are natural to
every one without exception.
Good Christian art of our time may be unintelligible to people because of
imperfections in its form, or because men are inattentive to it, but it must be
such that all men can experience the feelings it transmits. It must be the art,
not of some one group of people, nor of one class, nor of one nationality,
nor of one religious cult; that is, it must not transmit feelings which are
accessible only to a man educated in a certain way, or only to an aristocrat,
or a merchant, or only to a Russian, or a native of Japan, or a Roman
Catholic, or a Buddhist, etc., but it must transmit feelings accessible to
every one. Only art of this kind can be acknowledged in our time to be good
art, worthy of being chosen out from all the rest of art and encouraged.
Christian art, i.e. the art of our time, should be catholic in the original
meaning of the word, i.e. universal, and therefore it should unite all men.
And only two kinds of feeling do unite all men: first, feelings flowing from
the perception of our sonship to God and of the brotherhood of man; and
next, the simple feelings of common life, accessible to every one without
exception—such as the feeling of merriment, of pity, of cheerfulness, of
tranquillity, etc. Only these two kinds of feelings can now supply material
for art good in its subject-matter.
And the action of these two kinds of art, apparently so dissimilar, is one and
the same. The feelings flowing from perception of our sonship to God and
of the brotherhood of man—such as a feeling of sureness in truth, devotion
to the will of God, self-sacrifice, respect for and love of man—evoked by
Christian religious perception; and the simplest feelings—such as a
softened or a merry mood caused by a song or an amusing jest intelligible
to every one, or by a touching story, or a drawing, or a little doll: both alike
produce one and the same effect,—the loving union of man with man.
Sometimes people who are together are, if not hostile to one another, at
least estranged in mood and feeling, till perchance a story, a performance, a
picture, or even a building, but oftenest of all, music, unites them all as by
an electric flash, and, in place of their former isolation or even enmity, they
are all conscious of union and mutual love. Each is glad that another feels
and all men stand in like relation toward God and toward their neighbor, or
by evoking in them identical feelings, which may even be the very simplest,
provided only that they are not repugnant to Christianity and are natural to
every one without exception.
Good Christian art of our time may be unintelligible to people because of
imperfections in its form, or because men are inattentive to it, but it must be
such that all men can experience the feelings it transmits. It must be the art,
not of some one group of people, nor of one class, nor of one nationality,
nor of one religious cult; that is, it must not transmit feelings which are
accessible only to a man educated in a certain way, or only to an aristocrat,
or a merchant, or only to a Russian, or a native of Japan, or a Roman
Catholic, or a Buddhist, etc., but it must transmit feelings accessible to
every one. Only art of this kind can be acknowledged in our time to be good
art, worthy of being chosen out from all the rest of art and encouraged.
Christian art, i.e. the art of our time, should be catholic in the original
meaning of the word, i.e. universal, and therefore it should unite all men.
And only two kinds of feeling do unite all men: first, feelings flowing from
the perception of our sonship to God and of the brotherhood of man; and
next, the simple feelings of common life, accessible to every one without
exception—such as the feeling of merriment, of pity, of cheerfulness, of
tranquillity, etc. Only these two kinds of feelings can now supply material
for art good in its subject-matter.
And the action of these two kinds of art, apparently so dissimilar, is one and
the same. The feelings flowing from perception of our sonship to God and
of the brotherhood of man—such as a feeling of sureness in truth, devotion
to the will of God, self-sacrifice, respect for and love of man—evoked by
Christian religious perception; and the simplest feelings—such as a
softened or a merry mood caused by a song or an amusing jest intelligible
to every one, or by a touching story, or a drawing, or a little doll: both alike
produce one and the same effect,—the loving union of man with man.
Sometimes people who are together are, if not hostile to one another, at
least estranged in mood and feeling, till perchance a story, a performance, a
picture, or even a building, but oftenest of all, music, unites them all as by
an electric flash, and, in place of their former isolation or even enmity, they
are all conscious of union and mutual love. Each is glad that another feels
Page 446
what he feels; glad of the communion established, not only between him
and all present, but also with all now living who will yet share the same
impression; and more than that, he feels the mysterious gladness of a
communion which, reaching beyond the grave, unites us with all men of the
past who have been moved by the same feelings, and with all men of the
future who will yet be touched by them. And this effect is produced both by
the religious art which transmits feelings of love to God and one's neighbor,
and by universal art, transmitting the very simplest feelings common to all
men.
The art of our time should be appraised differently from former art chiefly
in this, that the art of our time, i.e. Christian art (basing itself on a religious
perception which demands the union of man), excludes from the domain of
art good in subject-matter everything transmitting exclusive feelings, which
do not unite but divide men. It relegates such work to the category of art
bad in its subject-matter, while, on the other hand, it includes in the
category of art good in subject-matter a section not formerly admitted to
deserve to be chosen out and respected, namely, universal art, transmitting
even the most trifling and simple feelings if only they are accessible to all
men without exception, and therefore unite them. Such art cannot, in our
time, but be esteemed good, for it attains the end which the religious
perception of our time, i.e. Christianity, sets before humanity.
Christian art either evokes in men those feelings which, through love of
God and of one's neighbor, draw them to greater and ever greater union, and
make them ready for and capable of such union; or evokes in them those
feelings which show them that they are already united in the joys and
sorrows of life. And therefore the Christian art of our time can be and is of
two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception
of man's position in the world in relation to God and to his neighbor—
religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the
simplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible to all
men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—
universal art. Only these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our
time.
The first, religious art,—transmitting both positive feelings of love to God
and one's neighbor, and negative feelings of indignation and horror at the
violation of love,—manifests itself chiefly in the form of words, and to
and all present, but also with all now living who will yet share the same
impression; and more than that, he feels the mysterious gladness of a
communion which, reaching beyond the grave, unites us with all men of the
past who have been moved by the same feelings, and with all men of the
future who will yet be touched by them. And this effect is produced both by
the religious art which transmits feelings of love to God and one's neighbor,
and by universal art, transmitting the very simplest feelings common to all
men.
The art of our time should be appraised differently from former art chiefly
in this, that the art of our time, i.e. Christian art (basing itself on a religious
perception which demands the union of man), excludes from the domain of
art good in subject-matter everything transmitting exclusive feelings, which
do not unite but divide men. It relegates such work to the category of art
bad in its subject-matter, while, on the other hand, it includes in the
category of art good in subject-matter a section not formerly admitted to
deserve to be chosen out and respected, namely, universal art, transmitting
even the most trifling and simple feelings if only they are accessible to all
men without exception, and therefore unite them. Such art cannot, in our
time, but be esteemed good, for it attains the end which the religious
perception of our time, i.e. Christianity, sets before humanity.
Christian art either evokes in men those feelings which, through love of
God and of one's neighbor, draw them to greater and ever greater union, and
make them ready for and capable of such union; or evokes in them those
feelings which show them that they are already united in the joys and
sorrows of life. And therefore the Christian art of our time can be and is of
two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception
of man's position in the world in relation to God and to his neighbor—
religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the
simplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible to all
men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—
universal art. Only these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our
time.
The first, religious art,—transmitting both positive feelings of love to God
and one's neighbor, and negative feelings of indignation and horror at the
violation of love,—manifests itself chiefly in the form of words, and to
Page 447
some extent also in painting and sculpture: the second kind (universal art),
transmitting feelings accessible to all, manifests itself in words, in painting,
in sculpture, in dances, in architecture, and, most of all, in music.
If I were asked to give modern examples of each of these kinds of art, then,
as examples of the highest art, flowing from love of God and man (both of
the higher, positive, and of the lower, negative kind), in literature I should
name, "The Robbers," by Schiller; Victor Hugo's "Les Pauvres Gens" and
"Les Misérables"; the novels and stories of Dickens,—"The Tale of Two
Cities," "The Christmas Carol," "The Chimes," and others; "Uncle Tom's
Cabin;" Dostoievsky's works—especially his "Memoirs from the House of
Death"; and "Adam Bede," by George Eliot.
In modern painting, strange to say, works of this kind, directly transmitting
the Christian feeling of love of God and of one's neighbor, are hardly to be
found, especially among the works of the celebrated painters. There are
plenty of pictures treating of the gospel stories; they, however, depict
historical events with great wealth of detail, but do not, and cannot, transmit
religious feeling not possessed by their painters. There are many pictures
treating of the personal feelings of various people, but of pictures
representing great deeds of self-sacrifice and of Christian love there are
very few, and what there are, are principally by artists who are not
celebrated, and are, for the most part, not pictures, but merely sketches.
Such, for instance, is the drawing by Kramskoy (worth many of his finished
pictures), showing a drawing-room with a balcony, past which troops are
marching in triumph on their return from the war. On the balcony stands a
wet-nurse holding a baby and a boy. They are admiring the procession of
the troops, but the mother, covering her face with a handkerchief, has fallen
back on the sofa, sobbing. Such also is the picture by Walter Langley, to
which I have already referred, and such again is a picture by the French
artist Morlon, depicting a lifeboat hastening, in a heavy storm, to the relief
of a steamer that is being wrecked. Approaching these in kind are pictures
which represent the hard-working peasant with respect and love. Such are
the pictures by Millet, and, particularly, his drawing, "The Man with the
Hoe"; also pictures in this style by Jules Breton, L'Hermitte, Defregger, and
others. As examples of pictures evoking indignation and horror at the
violation of love to God and man, Gay's picture, "Judgment," may serve,
and also Leizen-Mayer's, "Signing the Death Warrant." But there are also
transmitting feelings accessible to all, manifests itself in words, in painting,
in sculpture, in dances, in architecture, and, most of all, in music.
If I were asked to give modern examples of each of these kinds of art, then,
as examples of the highest art, flowing from love of God and man (both of
the higher, positive, and of the lower, negative kind), in literature I should
name, "The Robbers," by Schiller; Victor Hugo's "Les Pauvres Gens" and
"Les Misérables"; the novels and stories of Dickens,—"The Tale of Two
Cities," "The Christmas Carol," "The Chimes," and others; "Uncle Tom's
Cabin;" Dostoievsky's works—especially his "Memoirs from the House of
Death"; and "Adam Bede," by George Eliot.
In modern painting, strange to say, works of this kind, directly transmitting
the Christian feeling of love of God and of one's neighbor, are hardly to be
found, especially among the works of the celebrated painters. There are
plenty of pictures treating of the gospel stories; they, however, depict
historical events with great wealth of detail, but do not, and cannot, transmit
religious feeling not possessed by their painters. There are many pictures
treating of the personal feelings of various people, but of pictures
representing great deeds of self-sacrifice and of Christian love there are
very few, and what there are, are principally by artists who are not
celebrated, and are, for the most part, not pictures, but merely sketches.
Such, for instance, is the drawing by Kramskoy (worth many of his finished
pictures), showing a drawing-room with a balcony, past which troops are
marching in triumph on their return from the war. On the balcony stands a
wet-nurse holding a baby and a boy. They are admiring the procession of
the troops, but the mother, covering her face with a handkerchief, has fallen
back on the sofa, sobbing. Such also is the picture by Walter Langley, to
which I have already referred, and such again is a picture by the French
artist Morlon, depicting a lifeboat hastening, in a heavy storm, to the relief
of a steamer that is being wrecked. Approaching these in kind are pictures
which represent the hard-working peasant with respect and love. Such are
the pictures by Millet, and, particularly, his drawing, "The Man with the
Hoe"; also pictures in this style by Jules Breton, L'Hermitte, Defregger, and
others. As examples of pictures evoking indignation and horror at the
violation of love to God and man, Gay's picture, "Judgment," may serve,
and also Leizen-Mayer's, "Signing the Death Warrant." But there are also
Page 448
very few of this kind. Anxiety about the technique and the beauty of the
picture for the most part obscures the feeling. For instance, Gérôme's
"Pollice Verso" expresses, not so much horror at what is being perpetrated
as attraction by the beauty of the spectacle.[121]
To give examples, from the modern art of our upper classes, of art of the
second kind, good universal art or even of the art of a whole people, is yet
more difficult, especially in literary art and music. If there are some works
which by their inner contents might be assigned to this class (such as "Don
Quixote," Molière's comedies, "David Copperfield" and "The Pickwick
Papers" by Dickens, Gogol's and Pushkin's tales, and some things of
Maupassant's), these works are for the most part—from the exceptional
nature of the feelings they transmit, and the superfluity of special details of
time and locality, and, above all, on account of the poverty of their subject-
matter in comparison with examples of universal ancient art (such, for
instance, as the story of Joseph)—comprehensible only to people of their
own circle. That Joseph's brethren, being jealous of his father's affection,
sell him to the merchants; that Potiphar's wife wishes to tempt the youth;
that having attained the highest station, he takes pity on his brothers,
including Benjamin, the favorite,—these and all the rest are feelings
accessible alike to a Russian peasant, a Chinese, an African, a child, or an
old man, educated or uneducated; and it is all written with such restraint, is
so free from any superfluous detail, that the story may be told to any circle
and will be equally comprehensible and touching to every one. But not such
are the feelings of Don Quixote or of Molière's heroes (though Molière is
perhaps the most universal, and therefore the most excellent, artist of
modern times), nor of Pickwick and his friends. These feelings are not
common to all men, but very exceptional; and therefore, to make them
infectious, the authors have surrounded them with abundant details of time
and place. And this abundance of detail makes the stories difficult of
comprehension to all people not living within reach of the conditions
described by the author.
The author of the novel of Joseph did not need to describe in detail, as
would be done nowadays, the blood-stained coat of Joseph, the dwelling
and dress of Jacob, the pose and attire of Potiphar's wife, and how, adjusting
the bracelet on her left arm, she said, "Come to me," and so on, because the
subject-matter of feelings in this novel is so strong that all details, except
picture for the most part obscures the feeling. For instance, Gérôme's
"Pollice Verso" expresses, not so much horror at what is being perpetrated
as attraction by the beauty of the spectacle.[121]
To give examples, from the modern art of our upper classes, of art of the
second kind, good universal art or even of the art of a whole people, is yet
more difficult, especially in literary art and music. If there are some works
which by their inner contents might be assigned to this class (such as "Don
Quixote," Molière's comedies, "David Copperfield" and "The Pickwick
Papers" by Dickens, Gogol's and Pushkin's tales, and some things of
Maupassant's), these works are for the most part—from the exceptional
nature of the feelings they transmit, and the superfluity of special details of
time and locality, and, above all, on account of the poverty of their subject-
matter in comparison with examples of universal ancient art (such, for
instance, as the story of Joseph)—comprehensible only to people of their
own circle. That Joseph's brethren, being jealous of his father's affection,
sell him to the merchants; that Potiphar's wife wishes to tempt the youth;
that having attained the highest station, he takes pity on his brothers,
including Benjamin, the favorite,—these and all the rest are feelings
accessible alike to a Russian peasant, a Chinese, an African, a child, or an
old man, educated or uneducated; and it is all written with such restraint, is
so free from any superfluous detail, that the story may be told to any circle
and will be equally comprehensible and touching to every one. But not such
are the feelings of Don Quixote or of Molière's heroes (though Molière is
perhaps the most universal, and therefore the most excellent, artist of
modern times), nor of Pickwick and his friends. These feelings are not
common to all men, but very exceptional; and therefore, to make them
infectious, the authors have surrounded them with abundant details of time
and place. And this abundance of detail makes the stories difficult of
comprehension to all people not living within reach of the conditions
described by the author.
The author of the novel of Joseph did not need to describe in detail, as
would be done nowadays, the blood-stained coat of Joseph, the dwelling
and dress of Jacob, the pose and attire of Potiphar's wife, and how, adjusting
the bracelet on her left arm, she said, "Come to me," and so on, because the
subject-matter of feelings in this novel is so strong that all details, except
Page 449
the most essential,—such as that Joseph went out into another room to
weep,—are superfluous, and would only hinder the transmission of
feelings. And therefore this novel is accessible to all men, touches people of
all nations and classes, young and old, and has lasted to our times, and will
yet last for thousands of years to come. But strip the best novels of our
times of their details, and what will remain?
It is therefore impossible in modern literature to indicate works fully
satisfying the demands of universality. Such works as exist are, to a great
extent, spoilt by what is usually called "realism," but would be better
termed "provincialism," in art.
In music the same occurs as in verbal art, and for similar reasons. In
consequence of the poorness of the feeling they contain, the melodies of the
modern composers are amazingly empty and insignificant. And to
strengthen the impression produced by these empty melodies, the new
musicians pile complex modulations on to each trivial melody, not only in
their own national manner, but also in the way characteristic of their own
exclusive circle and particular musical school. Melody—every melody—is
free, and may be understood of all men; but as soon as it is bound up with a
particular harmony, it ceases to be accessible except to people trained to
such harmony, and it becomes strange, not only to common men of another
nationality, but to all who do not belong to the circle whose members have
accustomed themselves to certain forms of harmonization. So that music,
like poetry, travels in a vicious circle. Trivial and exclusive melodies, in
order to make them attractive, are laden with harmonic, rhythmic, and
orchestral complications, and thus become yet more exclusive; and, far
from being universal, are not even national, i.e. they are not comprehensible
to the whole people but only to some people.
In music, besides marches and dances by various composers, which satisfy
the demands of universal art, one can indicate very few works of this class:
Bach's famous violin aria, Chopin's nocturne in E-flat major, and perhaps a
dozen bits (not whole pieces, but parts) selected from the works of Haydn,
Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven, and Chopin.[122]
Although in painting the same thing is repeated as in poetry and music,—
namely, that in order to make them more interesting, works weak in
conception are surrounded by minutely studied accessories of time and
weep,—are superfluous, and would only hinder the transmission of
feelings. And therefore this novel is accessible to all men, touches people of
all nations and classes, young and old, and has lasted to our times, and will
yet last for thousands of years to come. But strip the best novels of our
times of their details, and what will remain?
It is therefore impossible in modern literature to indicate works fully
satisfying the demands of universality. Such works as exist are, to a great
extent, spoilt by what is usually called "realism," but would be better
termed "provincialism," in art.
In music the same occurs as in verbal art, and for similar reasons. In
consequence of the poorness of the feeling they contain, the melodies of the
modern composers are amazingly empty and insignificant. And to
strengthen the impression produced by these empty melodies, the new
musicians pile complex modulations on to each trivial melody, not only in
their own national manner, but also in the way characteristic of their own
exclusive circle and particular musical school. Melody—every melody—is
free, and may be understood of all men; but as soon as it is bound up with a
particular harmony, it ceases to be accessible except to people trained to
such harmony, and it becomes strange, not only to common men of another
nationality, but to all who do not belong to the circle whose members have
accustomed themselves to certain forms of harmonization. So that music,
like poetry, travels in a vicious circle. Trivial and exclusive melodies, in
order to make them attractive, are laden with harmonic, rhythmic, and
orchestral complications, and thus become yet more exclusive; and, far
from being universal, are not even national, i.e. they are not comprehensible
to the whole people but only to some people.
In music, besides marches and dances by various composers, which satisfy
the demands of universal art, one can indicate very few works of this class:
Bach's famous violin aria, Chopin's nocturne in E-flat major, and perhaps a
dozen bits (not whole pieces, but parts) selected from the works of Haydn,
Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven, and Chopin.[122]
Although in painting the same thing is repeated as in poetry and music,—
namely, that in order to make them more interesting, works weak in
conception are surrounded by minutely studied accessories of time and
Page 450
place, which give them a temporary and local interest but make them less
universal,—still, in painting, more than in the other spheres of art, may be
found works satisfying the demands of universal Christian art; that is to say,
there are more works expressing feelings in which all men may participate.
In the arts of painting and sculpture, all pictures and statues in so-called
genre style, depictions of animals, landscapes and caricatures with subjects
comprehensible to every one, and also all kinds of ornaments, are universal
in subject-matter. Such productions in painting and sculpture are very
numerous (e.g. china dolls), but for the most part such objects (for instance,
ornaments of all kinds) are either not considered to be art or are considered
to be art of a low quality. In reality all such objects, if only they transmit a
true feeling experienced by the artist and comprehensible to every one
(however insignificant it may seem to us to be) are works of real good
Christian art.
I fear it will here be urged against me that having denied that the conception
of beauty can supply a standard for works of art, I contradict myself by
acknowledging ornaments to be works of good art. The reproach is unjust,
for the subject-matter of all kinds of ornamentation consists not in the
beauty, but in the feeling (of admiration of, and delight in, the combination
of lines and colors) which the artist has experienced and with which he
infects the spectator. Art remains what it was and what it must be: nothing
but the infection by one man of another, or of others, with the feelings
experienced by the infector. Among those feelings is the feeling of delight
at what pleases the sight. Objects pleasing the sight may be such as please a
small or a large number of people, or such as please all men. And ornaments
for the most part are of the latter kind. A landscape representing a very
unusual view, or a genre picture of a special subject, may not please every
one, but ornaments, from Yakutsk ornaments to Greek ones, are intelligible
to every one and evoke a similar feeling of admiration in all, and therefore
this despised kind of art should, in Christian society, be esteemed far above
exceptional, pretentious pictures and sculptures.
So that there are only two kinds of good Christian art: all the rest of art not
comprised in these two divisions should be acknowledged to be bad art,
deserving not to be encouraged, but to be driven out, denied, and despised,
as being art not uniting but dividing people. Such, in literary art, are all
novels and poems which transmit Church or patriotic feelings, and also
universal,—still, in painting, more than in the other spheres of art, may be
found works satisfying the demands of universal Christian art; that is to say,
there are more works expressing feelings in which all men may participate.
In the arts of painting and sculpture, all pictures and statues in so-called
genre style, depictions of animals, landscapes and caricatures with subjects
comprehensible to every one, and also all kinds of ornaments, are universal
in subject-matter. Such productions in painting and sculpture are very
numerous (e.g. china dolls), but for the most part such objects (for instance,
ornaments of all kinds) are either not considered to be art or are considered
to be art of a low quality. In reality all such objects, if only they transmit a
true feeling experienced by the artist and comprehensible to every one
(however insignificant it may seem to us to be) are works of real good
Christian art.
I fear it will here be urged against me that having denied that the conception
of beauty can supply a standard for works of art, I contradict myself by
acknowledging ornaments to be works of good art. The reproach is unjust,
for the subject-matter of all kinds of ornamentation consists not in the
beauty, but in the feeling (of admiration of, and delight in, the combination
of lines and colors) which the artist has experienced and with which he
infects the spectator. Art remains what it was and what it must be: nothing
but the infection by one man of another, or of others, with the feelings
experienced by the infector. Among those feelings is the feeling of delight
at what pleases the sight. Objects pleasing the sight may be such as please a
small or a large number of people, or such as please all men. And ornaments
for the most part are of the latter kind. A landscape representing a very
unusual view, or a genre picture of a special subject, may not please every
one, but ornaments, from Yakutsk ornaments to Greek ones, are intelligible
to every one and evoke a similar feeling of admiration in all, and therefore
this despised kind of art should, in Christian society, be esteemed far above
exceptional, pretentious pictures and sculptures.
So that there are only two kinds of good Christian art: all the rest of art not
comprised in these two divisions should be acknowledged to be bad art,
deserving not to be encouraged, but to be driven out, denied, and despised,
as being art not uniting but dividing people. Such, in literary art, are all
novels and poems which transmit Church or patriotic feelings, and also
Page 451
exclusive feelings pertaining only to the class of the idle rich; such as
aristocratic honor, satiety, spleen, pessimism, and refined and vicious
feelings flowing from sex-love—quite incomprehensible to the great
majority of mankind.
In painting we must similarly place in the class of bad art all the Church,
patriotic, and exclusive pictures; all the pictures representing the
amusements and allurements of a rich and idle life; all the so-called
symbolic pictures, in which the very meaning of the symbol is
comprehensible only to the people of a certain circle; and, above all,
pictures with voluptuous subjects—all that odious female nudity which fills
all the exhibitions and galleries. And to this class belongs almost all the
chamber and opera music of our times,—beginning especially from
Beethoven (Schumann, Berlioz, Liszt, Wagner), by its subject-matter
devoted to the expression of feelings accessible only to people who have
developed in themselves an unhealthy, nervous irritation evoked by this
exclusive, artificial, and complex music.
"What! the 'Ninth Symphony' not a good work of art!" I hear exclaimed by
indignant voices.
And I reply, Most certainly it is not. All that I have written I have written
with the sole purpose of finding a clear and reasonable criterion by which to
judge the merits of works of art. And this criterion, coinciding with the
indications of plain and sane sense, indubitably shows me that that
symphony by Beethoven is not a good work of art. Of course, to people
educated in the adoration of certain productions and of their authors, to
people whose taste has been perverted just by being educated in such
adoration, the acknowledgment that such a celebrated work is bad is
amazing and strange. But how are we to escape the indications of reason
and of common sense?
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" is considered a great work of art. To verify
its claim to be such, I must first ask myself whether this work transmits the
highest religious feeling? I reply in the negative, for music in itself cannot
transmit those feelings; and therefore I ask myself next, Since this work
does not belong to the highest kind of religious art, has it the other
characteristic of the good art of our time,—the quality of uniting all men in
one common feeling: does it rank as Christian universal art? And again I
aristocratic honor, satiety, spleen, pessimism, and refined and vicious
feelings flowing from sex-love—quite incomprehensible to the great
majority of mankind.
In painting we must similarly place in the class of bad art all the Church,
patriotic, and exclusive pictures; all the pictures representing the
amusements and allurements of a rich and idle life; all the so-called
symbolic pictures, in which the very meaning of the symbol is
comprehensible only to the people of a certain circle; and, above all,
pictures with voluptuous subjects—all that odious female nudity which fills
all the exhibitions and galleries. And to this class belongs almost all the
chamber and opera music of our times,—beginning especially from
Beethoven (Schumann, Berlioz, Liszt, Wagner), by its subject-matter
devoted to the expression of feelings accessible only to people who have
developed in themselves an unhealthy, nervous irritation evoked by this
exclusive, artificial, and complex music.
"What! the 'Ninth Symphony' not a good work of art!" I hear exclaimed by
indignant voices.
And I reply, Most certainly it is not. All that I have written I have written
with the sole purpose of finding a clear and reasonable criterion by which to
judge the merits of works of art. And this criterion, coinciding with the
indications of plain and sane sense, indubitably shows me that that
symphony by Beethoven is not a good work of art. Of course, to people
educated in the adoration of certain productions and of their authors, to
people whose taste has been perverted just by being educated in such
adoration, the acknowledgment that such a celebrated work is bad is
amazing and strange. But how are we to escape the indications of reason
and of common sense?
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" is considered a great work of art. To verify
its claim to be such, I must first ask myself whether this work transmits the
highest religious feeling? I reply in the negative, for music in itself cannot
transmit those feelings; and therefore I ask myself next, Since this work
does not belong to the highest kind of religious art, has it the other
characteristic of the good art of our time,—the quality of uniting all men in
one common feeling: does it rank as Christian universal art? And again I
Page 452
have no option but to reply in the negative; for not only do I not see how the
feelings transmitted by this work could unite people not specially trained to
submit themselves to its complex hypnotism, but I am unable to imagine to
myself a crowd of normal people who could understand anything of this
long, confused, and artificial production, except short snatches which are
lost in a sea of what is incomprehensible. And therefore, whether I like it or
not, I am compelled to conclude that this work belongs to the rank of bad
art. It is curious to note in this connection, that attached to the end of this
very symphony is a poem of Schiller's which (though somewhat obscurely)
expresses this very thought, namely, that feeling (Schiller speaks only of the
feeling of gladness) unites people and evokes love in them. But though this
poem is sung at the end of the symphony, the music does not accord with
the thought expressed in the verses; for the music is exclusive and does not
unite all men, but unites only a few, dividing them off from the rest of
mankind.
And just in this same way, in all branches of art, many and many works
considered great by the upper classes of our society will have to be judged.
By this one sure criterion we shall have to judge the celebrated "Divine
Comedy" and "Jerusalem Delivered," and a great part of Shakespear's and
Goethe's works, and in painting every representation of miracles, including
Raphael's "Transfiguration," etc.
Whatever the work may be and however it may have been extolled, we
have first to ask whether this work is one of real art or a counterfeit. Having
acknowledged, on the basis of the indication of its infectiousness even to a
small class of people, that a certain production belongs to the realm of art, it
is necessary, on the basis of the indication of its accessibility, to decide the
next question, Does this work belong to the category of bad, exclusive art,
opposed to religious perception, or to Christian art, uniting people? And
having acknowledged an article to belong to real Christian art, we must
then, according to whether it transmits the feelings flowing from love to
God and man, or merely the simple feelings uniting all men, assign it a
place in the ranks of religious art or in those of universal art.
Only on the basis of such verification shall we find it possible to select from
the whole mass of what, in our society, claims to be art, those works which
form real, important, necessary spiritual food, and to separate them from all
the harmful and useless art, and from the counterfeits of art which surround
feelings transmitted by this work could unite people not specially trained to
submit themselves to its complex hypnotism, but I am unable to imagine to
myself a crowd of normal people who could understand anything of this
long, confused, and artificial production, except short snatches which are
lost in a sea of what is incomprehensible. And therefore, whether I like it or
not, I am compelled to conclude that this work belongs to the rank of bad
art. It is curious to note in this connection, that attached to the end of this
very symphony is a poem of Schiller's which (though somewhat obscurely)
expresses this very thought, namely, that feeling (Schiller speaks only of the
feeling of gladness) unites people and evokes love in them. But though this
poem is sung at the end of the symphony, the music does not accord with
the thought expressed in the verses; for the music is exclusive and does not
unite all men, but unites only a few, dividing them off from the rest of
mankind.
And just in this same way, in all branches of art, many and many works
considered great by the upper classes of our society will have to be judged.
By this one sure criterion we shall have to judge the celebrated "Divine
Comedy" and "Jerusalem Delivered," and a great part of Shakespear's and
Goethe's works, and in painting every representation of miracles, including
Raphael's "Transfiguration," etc.
Whatever the work may be and however it may have been extolled, we
have first to ask whether this work is one of real art or a counterfeit. Having
acknowledged, on the basis of the indication of its infectiousness even to a
small class of people, that a certain production belongs to the realm of art, it
is necessary, on the basis of the indication of its accessibility, to decide the
next question, Does this work belong to the category of bad, exclusive art,
opposed to religious perception, or to Christian art, uniting people? And
having acknowledged an article to belong to real Christian art, we must
then, according to whether it transmits the feelings flowing from love to
God and man, or merely the simple feelings uniting all men, assign it a
place in the ranks of religious art or in those of universal art.
Only on the basis of such verification shall we find it possible to select from
the whole mass of what, in our society, claims to be art, those works which
form real, important, necessary spiritual food, and to separate them from all
the harmful and useless art, and from the counterfeits of art which surround
Page 453
us. Only on the basis of such verification shall we be able to rid ourselves
of the pernicious results of harmful art, and to avail ourselves of that
beneficent action which is the purpose of true and good art, and which is
indispensable for the spiritual life of man and of humanity.
of the pernicious results of harmful art, and to avail ourselves of that
beneficent action which is the purpose of true and good art, and which is
indispensable for the spiritual life of man and of humanity.
Page 454
CHAPTER XVII
Art is one of two organs of human progress. By words man interchanges
thoughts, by the forms of art he interchanges feelings, and this with all men,
not only of the present time, but also of the past and the future. It is natural
to human beings to employ both these organs of intercommunication, and
therefore the perversion of either of them must cause evil results to the
society in which it occurs. And these results will be of two kinds: first, the
absence, in that society, of the work which should be performed by the
organ; and secondly, the harmful activity of the perverted organ. And just
these results have shown themselves in our society. The organ of art has
been perverted, and therefore the upper classes of society have, to a great
extent, been deprived of the work that it should have performed. The
diffusion in our society of enormous quantities of, on the one hand, those
counterfeits of art which only serve to amuse and corrupt people, and, on
the other hand, of works of insignificant, exclusive art, mistaken for the
highest art, have perverted most men's capacity to be infected by true works
of art, and have thus deprived them of the possibility of experiencing the
highest feelings to which mankind has attained, and which can only be
transmitted from man to man by art.
All the best that has been done in art by man remains strange to people who
lack the capacity to be infected by art, and is replaced either by spurious
counterfeits of art or by insignificant art, which they mistake for real art.
People of our time and of our society are delighted with Baudelaires,
Verlaines, Moréases, Ibsens, and Maeterlincks in poetry; with Monets,
Manets, Puvis de Chavannes, Burne-Joneses, Stucks, and Böcklins in
painting; with Wagners, Liszts, Richard Strausses, in music; and they are no
longer capable of comprehending either the highest or the simplest art.
In the upper classes, in consequence of this loss of capacity to be infected
by works of art, people grow up, are educated, and live, lacking the
fertilizing, improving influence of art, and therefore not only do not
advance toward perfection, do not become kinder, but, on the contrary,
Art is one of two organs of human progress. By words man interchanges
thoughts, by the forms of art he interchanges feelings, and this with all men,
not only of the present time, but also of the past and the future. It is natural
to human beings to employ both these organs of intercommunication, and
therefore the perversion of either of them must cause evil results to the
society in which it occurs. And these results will be of two kinds: first, the
absence, in that society, of the work which should be performed by the
organ; and secondly, the harmful activity of the perverted organ. And just
these results have shown themselves in our society. The organ of art has
been perverted, and therefore the upper classes of society have, to a great
extent, been deprived of the work that it should have performed. The
diffusion in our society of enormous quantities of, on the one hand, those
counterfeits of art which only serve to amuse and corrupt people, and, on
the other hand, of works of insignificant, exclusive art, mistaken for the
highest art, have perverted most men's capacity to be infected by true works
of art, and have thus deprived them of the possibility of experiencing the
highest feelings to which mankind has attained, and which can only be
transmitted from man to man by art.
All the best that has been done in art by man remains strange to people who
lack the capacity to be infected by art, and is replaced either by spurious
counterfeits of art or by insignificant art, which they mistake for real art.
People of our time and of our society are delighted with Baudelaires,
Verlaines, Moréases, Ibsens, and Maeterlincks in poetry; with Monets,
Manets, Puvis de Chavannes, Burne-Joneses, Stucks, and Böcklins in
painting; with Wagners, Liszts, Richard Strausses, in music; and they are no
longer capable of comprehending either the highest or the simplest art.
In the upper classes, in consequence of this loss of capacity to be infected
by works of art, people grow up, are educated, and live, lacking the
fertilizing, improving influence of art, and therefore not only do not
advance toward perfection, do not become kinder, but, on the contrary,
Page 455
possessing highly developed external means of civilization, they yet tend to
become continually more savage, more coarse, and more cruel.
Such is the result of the absence from our society of the activity of that
essential organ—art. But the consequences of the perverted activity of that
organ are yet more harmful. And they are numerous.
The first consequence, plain for all to see, is the enormous expenditure of
the labor of working people on things which are not only useless, but
which, for the most part, are harmful; and more than that, the waste of
priceless human lives on this unnecessary and harmful business. It is
terrible to consider with what intensity, and amid what privations, millions
of people—who lack time and opportunity to attend to what they and their
families urgently require—labor for 10, 12, or 14 hours on end, and even at
night, setting the type for pseudo-artistic books which spread vice among
mankind, or working for theaters, concerts, exhibitions, and picture-
galleries, which, for the most part, also serve vice; but it is yet more terrible
to reflect that lively, kindly children, capable of all that is good, are devoted
from their early years to such tasks as these: that for 6, 8, or 10 hours a day,
and for 10 or 15 years, some of them should play scales and exercises;
others should twist their limbs, walk on their toes, and lift their legs above
their heads; a third set should sing solfeggios; a fourth set, showing
themselves off in all manner of ways, should pronounce verses; a fifth set
should draw from busts or from nude models and paint studies; a sixth set
should write compositions according to the rules of certain periods; and that
in these occupations, unworthy of a human being, which are often
continued long after full maturity, they should waste their physical and
mental strength and lose all perception of the meaning of life. It is often
said that it is horrible and pitiful to see little acrobats putting their legs over
their necks, but it is not less pitiful to see children of 10 giving concerts,
and it is still worse to see school-boys of 10 who, as a preparation for
literary work, have learnt by heart the exceptions to the Latin grammar.
These people not only grow physically and mentally deformed, but also
morally deformed, and become incapable of doing anything really needed
by man. Occupying in society the rôle of amusers of the rich, they lose their
sense of human dignity, and develop in themselves such a passion for public
applause that they are always a prey to an inflated and unsatisfied vanity
which grows in them to diseased dimensions, and they expend their mental
become continually more savage, more coarse, and more cruel.
Such is the result of the absence from our society of the activity of that
essential organ—art. But the consequences of the perverted activity of that
organ are yet more harmful. And they are numerous.
The first consequence, plain for all to see, is the enormous expenditure of
the labor of working people on things which are not only useless, but
which, for the most part, are harmful; and more than that, the waste of
priceless human lives on this unnecessary and harmful business. It is
terrible to consider with what intensity, and amid what privations, millions
of people—who lack time and opportunity to attend to what they and their
families urgently require—labor for 10, 12, or 14 hours on end, and even at
night, setting the type for pseudo-artistic books which spread vice among
mankind, or working for theaters, concerts, exhibitions, and picture-
galleries, which, for the most part, also serve vice; but it is yet more terrible
to reflect that lively, kindly children, capable of all that is good, are devoted
from their early years to such tasks as these: that for 6, 8, or 10 hours a day,
and for 10 or 15 years, some of them should play scales and exercises;
others should twist their limbs, walk on their toes, and lift their legs above
their heads; a third set should sing solfeggios; a fourth set, showing
themselves off in all manner of ways, should pronounce verses; a fifth set
should draw from busts or from nude models and paint studies; a sixth set
should write compositions according to the rules of certain periods; and that
in these occupations, unworthy of a human being, which are often
continued long after full maturity, they should waste their physical and
mental strength and lose all perception of the meaning of life. It is often
said that it is horrible and pitiful to see little acrobats putting their legs over
their necks, but it is not less pitiful to see children of 10 giving concerts,
and it is still worse to see school-boys of 10 who, as a preparation for
literary work, have learnt by heart the exceptions to the Latin grammar.
These people not only grow physically and mentally deformed, but also
morally deformed, and become incapable of doing anything really needed
by man. Occupying in society the rôle of amusers of the rich, they lose their
sense of human dignity, and develop in themselves such a passion for public
applause that they are always a prey to an inflated and unsatisfied vanity
which grows in them to diseased dimensions, and they expend their mental
Page 456
strength in efforts to obtain satisfaction for this passion. And what is most
tragic of all is that these people, who for the sake of art are spoilt for life,
not only do not render service to this art, but, on the contrary, inflict the
greatest harm on it. They are taught in academies, schools, and
conservatoires how to counterfeit art, and by learning this they so pervert
themselves that they quite lose the capacity to produce works of real art,
and become purveyors of that counterfeit, or trivial, or depraved art which
floods our society. This is the first obvious consequence of the perversion of
the organ of art.
The second consequence is that the productions of amusement-art, which
are prepared in such terrific quantities by the armies of professional artists,
enable the rich people of our times to live the lives they do, lives not only
unnatural, but in contradiction to the humane principles these people
themselves profess. To live as do the rich, idle people, especially the
women, far from nature and from animals, in artificial conditions, with
muscles atrophied or misdeveloped by gymnastics, and with enfeebled vital
energy, would be impossible were it not for what is called art—for this
occupation and amusement which hides from them the meaninglessness of
their lives, and saves them from the dullness that oppresses them. Take from
all these people the theaters, concerts, exhibitions, piano-playing, songs,
and novels with which they now fill their time, in full confidence that
occupation with these things is a very refined, æsthetical, and therefore
good occupation; take from the patrons of art who buy pictures, assist
musicians, and are acquainted with writers, their rôle of protectors of that
important matter art, and they will not be able to continue such a life, but
will all be eaten up by ennui and spleen, and will become conscious of the
meaninglessness and wrongness of their present mode of life. Only
occupation with what, among them, is considered art renders it possible for
them to continue to live on, infringing all natural conditions, without
perceiving the emptiness and cruelty of their lives. And this support
afforded to the false manner of life pursued by the rich is the second
consequence, and a serious one, of the perversion of art.
The third consequence of the perversion of art is the perplexity produced in
the minds of children and of plain folk. Among people not perverted by the
false theories of our society, among workers and children, there exists a
very definite conception of what people may be respected and praised for.
tragic of all is that these people, who for the sake of art are spoilt for life,
not only do not render service to this art, but, on the contrary, inflict the
greatest harm on it. They are taught in academies, schools, and
conservatoires how to counterfeit art, and by learning this they so pervert
themselves that they quite lose the capacity to produce works of real art,
and become purveyors of that counterfeit, or trivial, or depraved art which
floods our society. This is the first obvious consequence of the perversion of
the organ of art.
The second consequence is that the productions of amusement-art, which
are prepared in such terrific quantities by the armies of professional artists,
enable the rich people of our times to live the lives they do, lives not only
unnatural, but in contradiction to the humane principles these people
themselves profess. To live as do the rich, idle people, especially the
women, far from nature and from animals, in artificial conditions, with
muscles atrophied or misdeveloped by gymnastics, and with enfeebled vital
energy, would be impossible were it not for what is called art—for this
occupation and amusement which hides from them the meaninglessness of
their lives, and saves them from the dullness that oppresses them. Take from
all these people the theaters, concerts, exhibitions, piano-playing, songs,
and novels with which they now fill their time, in full confidence that
occupation with these things is a very refined, æsthetical, and therefore
good occupation; take from the patrons of art who buy pictures, assist
musicians, and are acquainted with writers, their rôle of protectors of that
important matter art, and they will not be able to continue such a life, but
will all be eaten up by ennui and spleen, and will become conscious of the
meaninglessness and wrongness of their present mode of life. Only
occupation with what, among them, is considered art renders it possible for
them to continue to live on, infringing all natural conditions, without
perceiving the emptiness and cruelty of their lives. And this support
afforded to the false manner of life pursued by the rich is the second
consequence, and a serious one, of the perversion of art.
The third consequence of the perversion of art is the perplexity produced in
the minds of children and of plain folk. Among people not perverted by the
false theories of our society, among workers and children, there exists a
very definite conception of what people may be respected and praised for.
Page 457
In the minds of peasants and children the ground for praise or eulogy can
only be either physical strength: Hercules, the heroes and conquerors; or
moral, spiritual, strength: Sakya Muni giving up a beautiful wife and a
kingdom to save mankind, Christ going to the cross for the truth he
professed, and all the martyrs and the saints. Both are understood by
peasants and children. They understand that physical strength must be
respected, for it compels respect; and the moral strength of goodness an
unperverted man cannot fail to respect, because all his spiritual being draws
him toward it. But these people, children, and peasants, suddenly perceive
that besides those praised, respected, and rewarded for physical or moral
strength, there are others who are praised, extolled, and rewarded much
more than the heroes of strength and virtue, merely because they sing well,
compose verses, or dance. They see that singers, composers, painters,
ballet-dancers, earn millions of roubles and receive more honor than the
saints do: and peasants and children are perplexed.
When fifty years had elapsed after Pushkin's death, and, simultaneously, the
cheap edition of his works began to circulate among the people and a
monument was erected to him in Moscow, I received more than a dozen
letters from different peasants asking why Pushkin was raised to such
dignity. And only the other day a literate[123] man from Saratoff called on me
who had evidently gone out of his mind over this very question. He was on
his way to Moscow to expose the clergy for having taken part in raising a
"monament" to Mr. Pushkin.
Indeed, one need only imagine to oneself what the state of mind of such a
man of the people must be when he learns, from such rumors and
newspapers as reach him, that the clergy, the Government officials, and all
the best people in Russia are triumphantly unveiling a statue to a great man,
the benefactor, the pride of Russia—Pushkin, of whom till then he had
never heard. From all sides he reads or hears about this, and he naturally
supposes that if such honors are rendered to any one, then without doubt he
must have done something extraordinary—either some feat of strength or of
goodness. He tries to learn who Pushkin was, and having discovered that
Pushkin was neither a hero nor a general, but was a private person and a
writer, he comes to the conclusion that Pushkin must have been a holy man
and a teacher of goodness, and he hastens to read or to hear his life and
works. But what must be his perplexity when he learns that Pushkin was a
only be either physical strength: Hercules, the heroes and conquerors; or
moral, spiritual, strength: Sakya Muni giving up a beautiful wife and a
kingdom to save mankind, Christ going to the cross for the truth he
professed, and all the martyrs and the saints. Both are understood by
peasants and children. They understand that physical strength must be
respected, for it compels respect; and the moral strength of goodness an
unperverted man cannot fail to respect, because all his spiritual being draws
him toward it. But these people, children, and peasants, suddenly perceive
that besides those praised, respected, and rewarded for physical or moral
strength, there are others who are praised, extolled, and rewarded much
more than the heroes of strength and virtue, merely because they sing well,
compose verses, or dance. They see that singers, composers, painters,
ballet-dancers, earn millions of roubles and receive more honor than the
saints do: and peasants and children are perplexed.
When fifty years had elapsed after Pushkin's death, and, simultaneously, the
cheap edition of his works began to circulate among the people and a
monument was erected to him in Moscow, I received more than a dozen
letters from different peasants asking why Pushkin was raised to such
dignity. And only the other day a literate[123] man from Saratoff called on me
who had evidently gone out of his mind over this very question. He was on
his way to Moscow to expose the clergy for having taken part in raising a
"monament" to Mr. Pushkin.
Indeed, one need only imagine to oneself what the state of mind of such a
man of the people must be when he learns, from such rumors and
newspapers as reach him, that the clergy, the Government officials, and all
the best people in Russia are triumphantly unveiling a statue to a great man,
the benefactor, the pride of Russia—Pushkin, of whom till then he had
never heard. From all sides he reads or hears about this, and he naturally
supposes that if such honors are rendered to any one, then without doubt he
must have done something extraordinary—either some feat of strength or of
goodness. He tries to learn who Pushkin was, and having discovered that
Pushkin was neither a hero nor a general, but was a private person and a
writer, he comes to the conclusion that Pushkin must have been a holy man
and a teacher of goodness, and he hastens to read or to hear his life and
works. But what must be his perplexity when he learns that Pushkin was a
Page 458
man of more than easy morals, who was killed in a duel, i.e. when
attempting to murder another man, and that all his service consisted in
writing verses about love, which were often very indecent.
That a hero, or Alexander the Great, or Genghis Khan, or Napoleon were
great, he understands, because any one of them could have crushed him and
a thousand like him; that Buddha, Socrates, and Christ were great he also
understands, for he knows and feels that he and all men should be such as
they were; but why a man should be great because he wrote verses about
the love of women he cannot make out.
A similar perplexity must trouble the brain of a Breton or Norman peasant
who hears that a monument, "une statue" (as to the Madonna), is being
erected to Baudelaire, and reads, or is told, what the contents of his "Fleurs
du Mal" are; or, more amazing still, to Verlaine, when he learns the story of
that man's wretched, vicious life, and reads his verses. And what confusion
it must cause in the brains of peasants when they learn that some Patti or
Taglioni is paid £10,000 for a season, or that a painter gets as much for a
picture, or that authors of novels describing love-scenes have received even
more than that.
And it is the same with children. I remember how I passed through this
stage of amazement and stupefaction, and only reconciled myself to this
exaltation of artists to the level of heroes and saints by lowering in my own
estimation the importance of moral excellence, and by attributing a false,
unnatural meaning to works of art. And a similar confusion must occur in
the soul of each child and each man of the people when he learns of the
strange honors and rewards that are lavished on artists. This is the third
consequence of the false relation in which our society stands toward art.
The fourth consequence is that people of the upper classes, more and more
frequently encountering the contradictions between beauty and goodness,
put the ideal of beauty first, thus freeing themselves from the demands of
morality. These people, reversing the rôles, instead of admitting, as is really
the case, that the art they serve is an antiquated affair, allege that morality is
an antiquated affair, which can have no importance for people situated on
that high plane of development on which they opine that they are situated.
This result of the false relation to art showed itself in our society long ago;
but recently, with its prophet Nietzsche and his adherents, and with the
attempting to murder another man, and that all his service consisted in
writing verses about love, which were often very indecent.
That a hero, or Alexander the Great, or Genghis Khan, or Napoleon were
great, he understands, because any one of them could have crushed him and
a thousand like him; that Buddha, Socrates, and Christ were great he also
understands, for he knows and feels that he and all men should be such as
they were; but why a man should be great because he wrote verses about
the love of women he cannot make out.
A similar perplexity must trouble the brain of a Breton or Norman peasant
who hears that a monument, "une statue" (as to the Madonna), is being
erected to Baudelaire, and reads, or is told, what the contents of his "Fleurs
du Mal" are; or, more amazing still, to Verlaine, when he learns the story of
that man's wretched, vicious life, and reads his verses. And what confusion
it must cause in the brains of peasants when they learn that some Patti or
Taglioni is paid £10,000 for a season, or that a painter gets as much for a
picture, or that authors of novels describing love-scenes have received even
more than that.
And it is the same with children. I remember how I passed through this
stage of amazement and stupefaction, and only reconciled myself to this
exaltation of artists to the level of heroes and saints by lowering in my own
estimation the importance of moral excellence, and by attributing a false,
unnatural meaning to works of art. And a similar confusion must occur in
the soul of each child and each man of the people when he learns of the
strange honors and rewards that are lavished on artists. This is the third
consequence of the false relation in which our society stands toward art.
The fourth consequence is that people of the upper classes, more and more
frequently encountering the contradictions between beauty and goodness,
put the ideal of beauty first, thus freeing themselves from the demands of
morality. These people, reversing the rôles, instead of admitting, as is really
the case, that the art they serve is an antiquated affair, allege that morality is
an antiquated affair, which can have no importance for people situated on
that high plane of development on which they opine that they are situated.
This result of the false relation to art showed itself in our society long ago;
but recently, with its prophet Nietzsche and his adherents, and with the
Page 459
decadents and certain English æsthetes who coincide with him, it is being
expressed with especial impudence. The decadents, and æsthetes of the type
at one time represented by Oscar Wilde, select as a theme for their
productions the denial of morality and the laudation of vice.
This art has partly generated, and partly coincides with, a similar
philosophic theory. I recently received from America a book entitled, "The
Survival of the Fittest: Philosophy of Power," 1896, by Ragnar Redbeard,
Chicago. The substance of this book, as it is expressed in the editor's
preface, is that to measure "right" by the false philosophy of the Hebrew
prophets and "weepful" Messiahs is madness. Right is not the offspring of
doctrine, but of power. All laws, commandments, or doctrines as to not
doing to another what you do not wish done to you, have no inherent
authority whatever, but receive it only from the club, the gallows, and the
sword. A man truly free is under no obligation to obey any injunction,
human or divine. Obedience is the sign of the degenerate. Disobedience is
the stamp of the hero. Men should not be bound by moral rules invented by
their foes. The whole world is a slippery battlefield. Ideal justice demands
that the vanquished should be exploited, emasculated, and scorned. The free
and brave may seize the world. And, therefore, there should be eternal war
for life, for land, for love, for women, for power, and for gold. (Something
similar was said a few years ago by the celebrated and refined academician,
Vogüé.) The earth and its treasures is "booty for the bold."
The author has evidently by himself, independently of Nietzsche, come to
the same conclusions which are professed by the new artists.
Expressed in the form of a doctrine these positions startle us. In reality they
are implied in the ideal of art serving beauty. The art of our upper classes
has educated people in this ideal of the over-man,[124]—which is, in reality,
the old ideal of Nero, Stenka Razin,[125] Genghis Khan, Robert Macaire,[126]
or Napoleon, and all their accomplices, assistants, and adulators—and it
supports this ideal with all its might.
It is this supplanting of the ideal of what is right by the ideal of what is
beautiful, i.e. of what is pleasant, that is the fourth consequence, and a
terrible one, of the perversion of art in our society. It is fearful to think of
what would befall humanity were such art to spread among the masses of
the people. And it already begins to spread.
expressed with especial impudence. The decadents, and æsthetes of the type
at one time represented by Oscar Wilde, select as a theme for their
productions the denial of morality and the laudation of vice.
This art has partly generated, and partly coincides with, a similar
philosophic theory. I recently received from America a book entitled, "The
Survival of the Fittest: Philosophy of Power," 1896, by Ragnar Redbeard,
Chicago. The substance of this book, as it is expressed in the editor's
preface, is that to measure "right" by the false philosophy of the Hebrew
prophets and "weepful" Messiahs is madness. Right is not the offspring of
doctrine, but of power. All laws, commandments, or doctrines as to not
doing to another what you do not wish done to you, have no inherent
authority whatever, but receive it only from the club, the gallows, and the
sword. A man truly free is under no obligation to obey any injunction,
human or divine. Obedience is the sign of the degenerate. Disobedience is
the stamp of the hero. Men should not be bound by moral rules invented by
their foes. The whole world is a slippery battlefield. Ideal justice demands
that the vanquished should be exploited, emasculated, and scorned. The free
and brave may seize the world. And, therefore, there should be eternal war
for life, for land, for love, for women, for power, and for gold. (Something
similar was said a few years ago by the celebrated and refined academician,
Vogüé.) The earth and its treasures is "booty for the bold."
The author has evidently by himself, independently of Nietzsche, come to
the same conclusions which are professed by the new artists.
Expressed in the form of a doctrine these positions startle us. In reality they
are implied in the ideal of art serving beauty. The art of our upper classes
has educated people in this ideal of the over-man,[124]—which is, in reality,
the old ideal of Nero, Stenka Razin,[125] Genghis Khan, Robert Macaire,[126]
or Napoleon, and all their accomplices, assistants, and adulators—and it
supports this ideal with all its might.
It is this supplanting of the ideal of what is right by the ideal of what is
beautiful, i.e. of what is pleasant, that is the fourth consequence, and a
terrible one, of the perversion of art in our society. It is fearful to think of
what would befall humanity were such art to spread among the masses of
the people. And it already begins to spread.
Page 460
Finally, the fifth and chief result is, that the art which flourishes in the upper
classes of European society has a directly vitiating influence, infecting
people with the worst feelings and with those most harmful to humanity,—
superstition, patriotism, and, above all, sensuality.
Look carefully into the causes of the ignorance of the masses, and you may
see that the chief cause does not at all lie in the lack of schools and libraries,
as we are accustomed to suppose, but in those superstitions, both
ecclesiastical and patriotic, with which the people are saturated, and which
are unceasingly generated by all the methods of art. Church superstitions
are supported and produced by the poetry of prayers, hymns, painting, by
the sculpture of images and of statues, by singing, by organs, by music, by
architecture, and even by dramatic art in religious ceremonies. Patriotic
superstitions are supported and produced by verses and stories, which are
supplied even in schools, by music, by songs, by triumphal processions, by
royal meetings, by martial pictures, and by monuments.
Were it not for this continual activity in all departments of art, perpetuating
the ecclesiastical and patriotic intoxication and embitterment of the people,
the masses would long ere this have attained to true enlightenment.
But it is not only in Church matters and patriotic matters that art depraves;
it is art in our time that serves as the chief cause of the perversion of people
in the most important question of social life,—in their sexual relations. We
nearly all know by our own experience, and those who are fathers and
mothers know in the case of their grown-up children also, what fearful
mental and physical suffering, what useless waste of strength, people suffer
merely as a consequence of dissoluteness in sexual desire.
Since the world began, since the Trojan war, which sprang from that same
sexual dissoluteness, down to and including the suicides and murders of
lovers described in almost every newspaper, a great proportion of the
sufferings of the human race have come from this source.
And what is art doing? All art, real and counterfeit, with very few
exceptions, is devoted to describing, depicting, and inflaming sexual love in
every shape and form. When one remembers all those novels and their lust-
kindling descriptions of love, from the most refined to the grossest, with
which the literature of our society overflows; if one only remembers all
those pictures and statues representing women's naked bodies, and all sorts
classes of European society has a directly vitiating influence, infecting
people with the worst feelings and with those most harmful to humanity,—
superstition, patriotism, and, above all, sensuality.
Look carefully into the causes of the ignorance of the masses, and you may
see that the chief cause does not at all lie in the lack of schools and libraries,
as we are accustomed to suppose, but in those superstitions, both
ecclesiastical and patriotic, with which the people are saturated, and which
are unceasingly generated by all the methods of art. Church superstitions
are supported and produced by the poetry of prayers, hymns, painting, by
the sculpture of images and of statues, by singing, by organs, by music, by
architecture, and even by dramatic art in religious ceremonies. Patriotic
superstitions are supported and produced by verses and stories, which are
supplied even in schools, by music, by songs, by triumphal processions, by
royal meetings, by martial pictures, and by monuments.
Were it not for this continual activity in all departments of art, perpetuating
the ecclesiastical and patriotic intoxication and embitterment of the people,
the masses would long ere this have attained to true enlightenment.
But it is not only in Church matters and patriotic matters that art depraves;
it is art in our time that serves as the chief cause of the perversion of people
in the most important question of social life,—in their sexual relations. We
nearly all know by our own experience, and those who are fathers and
mothers know in the case of their grown-up children also, what fearful
mental and physical suffering, what useless waste of strength, people suffer
merely as a consequence of dissoluteness in sexual desire.
Since the world began, since the Trojan war, which sprang from that same
sexual dissoluteness, down to and including the suicides and murders of
lovers described in almost every newspaper, a great proportion of the
sufferings of the human race have come from this source.
And what is art doing? All art, real and counterfeit, with very few
exceptions, is devoted to describing, depicting, and inflaming sexual love in
every shape and form. When one remembers all those novels and their lust-
kindling descriptions of love, from the most refined to the grossest, with
which the literature of our society overflows; if one only remembers all
those pictures and statues representing women's naked bodies, and all sorts
Page 461
of abominations which are reproduced in illustrations and advertisements; if
one only remembers all the filthy operas and operettas, songs, and
romances with which our world teems, involuntarily it seems as if existing
art had but one definite aim,—to disseminate vice as widely as possible.
Such, though not all, are the most direct consequences of that perversion of
art which has occurred in our society. So that what in our society is called
art not only does not conduce to the progress of mankind, but, more than
almost anything else, hinders the attainment of goodness in our lives.
And therefore the question which involuntarily presents itself to every man
free from artistic activity and therefore not bound to existing art by self-
interest, the question asked by me at the beginning of this work: Is it just
that to what we call art, to a something belonging to but a small section of
society, should be offered up such sacrifices of human labor, of human
lives, and of goodness as are now being offered up? receives the natural
reply: No; it is unjust, and these things should not be! So also replies sound
sense and unperverted moral feeling. Not only should these things not be,
not only should no sacrifices be offered up to what among us is called art,
but, on the contrary, the efforts of those who wish to live rightly should be
directed toward the destruction of this art, for it is one of the most cruel of
the evils that harass our section of humanity. So that, were the question put:
Would it be preferable for our Christian world to be deprived of all that is
now esteemed to be art, and, together with the false, to lose all that is good
in it? I think that every reasonable and moral man would again decide the
question as Plato decided it for his "Republic," and as all the Church
Christian and Mohammedan teachers of mankind decided it, i.e. would say,
"Rather let there be no art at all than continue the depraving art, or
simulation of art, which now exists." Happily, no one has to face this
question, and no one need adopt either solution. All that man can do, and
that we—the so-called educated people, who are so placed that we have the
possibility of understanding the meaning of the phenomena of our life—can
and should do, is to understand the error we are involved in, and not harden
our hearts in it, but seek for a way of escape.
one only remembers all the filthy operas and operettas, songs, and
romances with which our world teems, involuntarily it seems as if existing
art had but one definite aim,—to disseminate vice as widely as possible.
Such, though not all, are the most direct consequences of that perversion of
art which has occurred in our society. So that what in our society is called
art not only does not conduce to the progress of mankind, but, more than
almost anything else, hinders the attainment of goodness in our lives.
And therefore the question which involuntarily presents itself to every man
free from artistic activity and therefore not bound to existing art by self-
interest, the question asked by me at the beginning of this work: Is it just
that to what we call art, to a something belonging to but a small section of
society, should be offered up such sacrifices of human labor, of human
lives, and of goodness as are now being offered up? receives the natural
reply: No; it is unjust, and these things should not be! So also replies sound
sense and unperverted moral feeling. Not only should these things not be,
not only should no sacrifices be offered up to what among us is called art,
but, on the contrary, the efforts of those who wish to live rightly should be
directed toward the destruction of this art, for it is one of the most cruel of
the evils that harass our section of humanity. So that, were the question put:
Would it be preferable for our Christian world to be deprived of all that is
now esteemed to be art, and, together with the false, to lose all that is good
in it? I think that every reasonable and moral man would again decide the
question as Plato decided it for his "Republic," and as all the Church
Christian and Mohammedan teachers of mankind decided it, i.e. would say,
"Rather let there be no art at all than continue the depraving art, or
simulation of art, which now exists." Happily, no one has to face this
question, and no one need adopt either solution. All that man can do, and
that we—the so-called educated people, who are so placed that we have the
possibility of understanding the meaning of the phenomena of our life—can
and should do, is to understand the error we are involved in, and not harden
our hearts in it, but seek for a way of escape.
Page 462
CHAPTER XVIII
The cause of the lie into which the art of our society has fallen was that
people of the upper classes, having ceased to believe in the Church teaching
(called Christian), did not resolve to accept true Christian teaching in its
real and fundamental principles of sonship to God and brotherhood to man,
but continued to live on without any belief, endeavoring to make up for the
absence of belief—some by hypocrisy, pretending still to believe in the
nonsense of the Church creeds; others by boldly asserting their disbelief;
others by refined agnosticism; and others, again, by returning to the Greek
worship of beauty, proclaiming egotism to be right, and elevating it to the
rank of a religious doctrine.
The cause of the malady was the non-acceptance of Christ's teaching in its
real, i.e. its full, meaning. And the only cure for the illness lies in
acknowledging that teaching in its full meaning. And such acknowledgment
in our time is not only possible, but inevitable. Already to-day a man,
standing on the height of the knowledge of our age, whether he be
nominally a Catholic or a Protestant, cannot say that he really believes in
the dogmas of the Church: in God being a Trinity, in Christ being God, in
the scheme of redemption, and so forth; nor can he satisfy himself by
proclaiming his unbelief or skepticism, nor by relapsing into the worship of
beauty and egotism. Above all, he can no longer say that we do not know
the real meaning of Christ's teaching. That meaning has not only become
accessible to all men of our times, but the whole life of man to-day is
permeated by the spirit of that teaching, and, consciously or unconsciously,
is guided by it.
However differently in form people belonging to our Christian world may
define the destiny of man; whether they see it in human progress in
whatever sense of the words, in the union of all men in a socialistic realm,
or in the establishment of a commune; whether they look forward to the
union of mankind under the guidance of one universal Church, or to the
federation of the world,—however various in form their definitions of the
destination of human life may be, all men in our times already admit that
The cause of the lie into which the art of our society has fallen was that
people of the upper classes, having ceased to believe in the Church teaching
(called Christian), did not resolve to accept true Christian teaching in its
real and fundamental principles of sonship to God and brotherhood to man,
but continued to live on without any belief, endeavoring to make up for the
absence of belief—some by hypocrisy, pretending still to believe in the
nonsense of the Church creeds; others by boldly asserting their disbelief;
others by refined agnosticism; and others, again, by returning to the Greek
worship of beauty, proclaiming egotism to be right, and elevating it to the
rank of a religious doctrine.
The cause of the malady was the non-acceptance of Christ's teaching in its
real, i.e. its full, meaning. And the only cure for the illness lies in
acknowledging that teaching in its full meaning. And such acknowledgment
in our time is not only possible, but inevitable. Already to-day a man,
standing on the height of the knowledge of our age, whether he be
nominally a Catholic or a Protestant, cannot say that he really believes in
the dogmas of the Church: in God being a Trinity, in Christ being God, in
the scheme of redemption, and so forth; nor can he satisfy himself by
proclaiming his unbelief or skepticism, nor by relapsing into the worship of
beauty and egotism. Above all, he can no longer say that we do not know
the real meaning of Christ's teaching. That meaning has not only become
accessible to all men of our times, but the whole life of man to-day is
permeated by the spirit of that teaching, and, consciously or unconsciously,
is guided by it.
However differently in form people belonging to our Christian world may
define the destiny of man; whether they see it in human progress in
whatever sense of the words, in the union of all men in a socialistic realm,
or in the establishment of a commune; whether they look forward to the
union of mankind under the guidance of one universal Church, or to the
federation of the world,—however various in form their definitions of the
destination of human life may be, all men in our times already admit that
Page 463
the highest well-being attainable by men is to be reached by their union
with one another.
However people of our upper classes (feeling that their ascendancy can only
be maintained as long as they separate themselves—the rich and learned—
from the laborers, the poor, and the unlearned) may seek to devise new
conceptions of life by which their privileges may be perpetuated,—now the
ideal of returning to antiquity, now mysticism, now Hellenism, now the cult
of the superior person (over-man-ism),—they have, willingly or
unwillingly, to admit the truth which is elucidating itself from all sides,
voluntarily and involuntarily, namely, that our welfare lies only in the
unification and the brotherhood of man.
Unconsciously this truth is confirmed by the construction of means of
communication,—telegraphs, telephones, the press, and the ever increasing
attainability of material well-being for every one,—and consciously it is
affirmed by the destruction of superstitions which divide men, by the
diffusion of the truths of knowledge, and by the expression of the ideal of
the brotherhood of man in the best works of art of our time.
Art is a spiritual organ of human life which cannot be destroyed, and
therefore, notwithstanding all the efforts made by people of the upper
classes to conceal the religious ideal by which humanity lives, that ideal is
more and more clearly recognized by man, and even in our perverted
society is more and more often partially expressed by science and by art.
During the present century works of the higher kind of religious art have
appeared more and more frequently, both in literature and in painting,
permeated by a truly Christian spirit, as also works of the universal art of
common life, accessible to all. So that even art knows the true ideal of our
times, and tends toward it. On the one hand, the best works of art of our
times transmit religious feelings urging toward the union and the
brotherhood of man (such are the works of Dickens, Hugo, Dostoievsky;
and in painting, of Millet, Bastien Lepage, Jules Breton, L'Hermitte, and
others); on the other hand, they strive toward the transmission, not of
feelings which are natural to people of the upper classes only, but of such
feelings as may unite every one without exception. There are as yet few
such works, but the need of them is already acknowledged. In recent times
we also meet more and more frequently with attempts at publications,
pictures, concerts, and theaters for the people. All this is still very far from
with one another.
However people of our upper classes (feeling that their ascendancy can only
be maintained as long as they separate themselves—the rich and learned—
from the laborers, the poor, and the unlearned) may seek to devise new
conceptions of life by which their privileges may be perpetuated,—now the
ideal of returning to antiquity, now mysticism, now Hellenism, now the cult
of the superior person (over-man-ism),—they have, willingly or
unwillingly, to admit the truth which is elucidating itself from all sides,
voluntarily and involuntarily, namely, that our welfare lies only in the
unification and the brotherhood of man.
Unconsciously this truth is confirmed by the construction of means of
communication,—telegraphs, telephones, the press, and the ever increasing
attainability of material well-being for every one,—and consciously it is
affirmed by the destruction of superstitions which divide men, by the
diffusion of the truths of knowledge, and by the expression of the ideal of
the brotherhood of man in the best works of art of our time.
Art is a spiritual organ of human life which cannot be destroyed, and
therefore, notwithstanding all the efforts made by people of the upper
classes to conceal the religious ideal by which humanity lives, that ideal is
more and more clearly recognized by man, and even in our perverted
society is more and more often partially expressed by science and by art.
During the present century works of the higher kind of religious art have
appeared more and more frequently, both in literature and in painting,
permeated by a truly Christian spirit, as also works of the universal art of
common life, accessible to all. So that even art knows the true ideal of our
times, and tends toward it. On the one hand, the best works of art of our
times transmit religious feelings urging toward the union and the
brotherhood of man (such are the works of Dickens, Hugo, Dostoievsky;
and in painting, of Millet, Bastien Lepage, Jules Breton, L'Hermitte, and
others); on the other hand, they strive toward the transmission, not of
feelings which are natural to people of the upper classes only, but of such
feelings as may unite every one without exception. There are as yet few
such works, but the need of them is already acknowledged. In recent times
we also meet more and more frequently with attempts at publications,
pictures, concerts, and theaters for the people. All this is still very far from
Page 464
accomplishing what should be done, but already the direction in which
good art instinctively presses forward to regain the path natural to it can be
discerned.
The religious perception of our time—which consists in acknowledging that
the aim of life (both collective and individual) is the union of mankind—is
already so sufficiently distinct that people have now only to reject the false
theory of beauty, according to which enjoyment is considered to be the
purpose of art, and religious perception will naturally take its place as the
guide of the art of our time.
And as soon as the religious perception, which already unconsciously
directs the life of man, is consciously acknowledged, then immediately and
naturally the division of art, into art for the lower and art for the upper
classes, will disappear. There will be one common, brotherly, universal art;
and first, that art will naturally be rejected which transmits feelings
incompatible with the religious perception of our time,—feelings which do
not unite, but divide men,—and then that insignificant, exclusive art will be
rejected to which an importance is now attached to which it has no right.
And as soon as this occurs, art will immediately cease to be what it has
been in recent times,—a means of making people coarser and more vicious;
and it will become, what it always used to be and should be, a means by
which humanity progresses toward unity and blessedness.
Strange as the comparison may sound, what has happened to the art of our
circle and time is what happens to a woman who sells her womanly
attractiveness, intended for maternity, for the pleasure of those who desire
such pleasures.
The art of our time and of our circle has become a prostitute. And this
comparison holds good even in minute details. Like her it is not limited to
certain times, like her it is always adorned, like her it is always salable, and
like her it is enticing and ruinous.
A real work of art can only arise in the soul of an artist occasionally as the
fruit of the life he has lived, just as a child is conceived by its mother. But
counterfeit art is produced by artisans and handicraftsmen continually, if
only consumers can be found.
good art instinctively presses forward to regain the path natural to it can be
discerned.
The religious perception of our time—which consists in acknowledging that
the aim of life (both collective and individual) is the union of mankind—is
already so sufficiently distinct that people have now only to reject the false
theory of beauty, according to which enjoyment is considered to be the
purpose of art, and religious perception will naturally take its place as the
guide of the art of our time.
And as soon as the religious perception, which already unconsciously
directs the life of man, is consciously acknowledged, then immediately and
naturally the division of art, into art for the lower and art for the upper
classes, will disappear. There will be one common, brotherly, universal art;
and first, that art will naturally be rejected which transmits feelings
incompatible with the religious perception of our time,—feelings which do
not unite, but divide men,—and then that insignificant, exclusive art will be
rejected to which an importance is now attached to which it has no right.
And as soon as this occurs, art will immediately cease to be what it has
been in recent times,—a means of making people coarser and more vicious;
and it will become, what it always used to be and should be, a means by
which humanity progresses toward unity and blessedness.
Strange as the comparison may sound, what has happened to the art of our
circle and time is what happens to a woman who sells her womanly
attractiveness, intended for maternity, for the pleasure of those who desire
such pleasures.
The art of our time and of our circle has become a prostitute. And this
comparison holds good even in minute details. Like her it is not limited to
certain times, like her it is always adorned, like her it is always salable, and
like her it is enticing and ruinous.
A real work of art can only arise in the soul of an artist occasionally as the
fruit of the life he has lived, just as a child is conceived by its mother. But
counterfeit art is produced by artisans and handicraftsmen continually, if
only consumers can be found.
Page 465
Real art, like the wife of an affectionate husband, needs no ornaments. But
counterfeit art, like a prostitute, must always be decked out.
The cause of the production of real art is the artist's inner need to express a
feeling that has accumulated, just as for a mother the cause of sexual
conception is love. The cause of counterfeit art, as of prostitution, is gain.
The consequence of true art is the introduction of a new feeling into the
intercourse of life, as the consequence of a wife's love is the birth of a new
man into life.
The consequences of counterfeit art are the perversion of man, pleasure
which never satisfies, and the weakening of man's spiritual strength.
And this is what people of our day and of our circle should understand, in
order to avoid the filthy torrent of depraved and prostituted art with which
we are deluged.
counterfeit art, like a prostitute, must always be decked out.
The cause of the production of real art is the artist's inner need to express a
feeling that has accumulated, just as for a mother the cause of sexual
conception is love. The cause of counterfeit art, as of prostitution, is gain.
The consequence of true art is the introduction of a new feeling into the
intercourse of life, as the consequence of a wife's love is the birth of a new
man into life.
The consequences of counterfeit art are the perversion of man, pleasure
which never satisfies, and the weakening of man's spiritual strength.
And this is what people of our day and of our circle should understand, in
order to avoid the filthy torrent of depraved and prostituted art with which
we are deluged.
Page 466
CHAPTER XIX
People talk of the art of the future, meaning by "art of the future" some
especially refined, new art, which, as they imagine, will be developed out of
that exclusive art of one class which is now considered the highest art. But
no such new art of the future can or will be found. Our exclusive art, that of
the upper classes of Christendom, has found its way into a blind alley. The
direction in which it has been going leads nowhere. Having once let go of
that which is most essential for art (namely, the guidance given by religious
perception), that art has become ever more and more exclusive, and
therefore ever more and more perverted, until, finally, it has come to
nothing. The art of the future, that which is really coming, will not be a
development of present-day art, but will arise on completely other and new
foundations, having nothing in common with those by which our present art
of the upper classes is guided.
Art of the future, that is to say, such part of art as will be chosen from
among all the art diffused among mankind, will consist, not in transmitting
feelings accessible only to members of the rich classes, as is the case to-day,
but in transmitting such feelings as embody the highest religious perception
of our times. Only those productions will be considered art which transmit
feelings drawing men together in brotherly union, or such universal feelings
as can unite all men. Only such art will be chosen, tolerated, approved, and
diffused. But art transmitting feelings flowing from antiquated, worn-out
religious teaching,—Church art, patriotic art, voluptuous art, transmitting
feelings of superstitious fear, of pride, of vanity, of ecstatic admiration of
national heroes,—art exciting exclusive love of one's own people, or
sensuality, will be considered bad, harmful art, and will be censured and
despised by public opinion. All the rest of art, transmitting feelings
accessible only to a section of people, will be considered unimportant, and
will be neither blamed nor praised. And the appraisement of art in general
will devolve, not, as is now the case, on a separate class of rich people, but
on the whole people; so that for a work to be esteemed good, and to be
approved of and diffused, it will have to satisfy the demands, not of a few
people living in identical and often unnatural conditions, but it will have to
People talk of the art of the future, meaning by "art of the future" some
especially refined, new art, which, as they imagine, will be developed out of
that exclusive art of one class which is now considered the highest art. But
no such new art of the future can or will be found. Our exclusive art, that of
the upper classes of Christendom, has found its way into a blind alley. The
direction in which it has been going leads nowhere. Having once let go of
that which is most essential for art (namely, the guidance given by religious
perception), that art has become ever more and more exclusive, and
therefore ever more and more perverted, until, finally, it has come to
nothing. The art of the future, that which is really coming, will not be a
development of present-day art, but will arise on completely other and new
foundations, having nothing in common with those by which our present art
of the upper classes is guided.
Art of the future, that is to say, such part of art as will be chosen from
among all the art diffused among mankind, will consist, not in transmitting
feelings accessible only to members of the rich classes, as is the case to-day,
but in transmitting such feelings as embody the highest religious perception
of our times. Only those productions will be considered art which transmit
feelings drawing men together in brotherly union, or such universal feelings
as can unite all men. Only such art will be chosen, tolerated, approved, and
diffused. But art transmitting feelings flowing from antiquated, worn-out
religious teaching,—Church art, patriotic art, voluptuous art, transmitting
feelings of superstitious fear, of pride, of vanity, of ecstatic admiration of
national heroes,—art exciting exclusive love of one's own people, or
sensuality, will be considered bad, harmful art, and will be censured and
despised by public opinion. All the rest of art, transmitting feelings
accessible only to a section of people, will be considered unimportant, and
will be neither blamed nor praised. And the appraisement of art in general
will devolve, not, as is now the case, on a separate class of rich people, but
on the whole people; so that for a work to be esteemed good, and to be
approved of and diffused, it will have to satisfy the demands, not of a few
people living in identical and often unnatural conditions, but it will have to
Page 467
satisfy the demands of all those great masses of people who are situated in
the natural conditions of laborious life.
And the artists producing art will also not be, as now, merely a few people
selected from a small section of the nation, members of the upper classes or
their hangers-on, but will consist of all those gifted members of the whole
people who prove capable of, and are inclined toward, artistic activity.
Artistic activity will then be accessible to all men. It will become accessible
to the whole people, because, in the first place, in the art of the future, not
only will that complex technique, which deforms the productions of the art
of to-day and requires so great an effort and expenditure of time, not be
demanded, but, on the contrary, the demand will be for clearness, simplicity,
and brevity—conditions mastered, not by mechanical exercises, but by the
education of taste. And secondly, artistic activity will become accessible to
all men of the people because, instead of the present professional schools
which only some can enter, all will learn music and depictive art (singing
and drawing) equally with letters in the elementary schools, and in such a
way that every man, having received the first principles of drawing and
music, and feeling a capacity for, and a call to, one or other of the arts, will
be able to perfect himself in it.
People think that if there are no special art schools the technique of art will
deteriorate. Undoubtedly, if by technique we understand those
complications of art which are now considered an excellence, it will
deteriorate; but if by technique is understood clearness, beauty, simplicity,
and compression in works of art, then, even if the elements of drawing and
music were not to be taught in the national schools, the technique will not
only not deteriorate, but, as is shown by all peasant art, will be a hundred
times better. It will be improved, because all the artists of genius now
hidden among the masses will become producers of art and will give
models of excellence, which (as has always been the case) will be the best
schools of technique for their successors. For every true artist, even now,
learns his technique, chiefly, not in the schools, but in life, from the
examples of the great masters; then—when the producers of art will be the
best artists of the whole nation, and there will be more such examples, and
they will be more accessible—such part of the school training as the future
artist will lose will be a hundredfold compensated for by the training he will
receive from the numerous examples of good art diffused in society.
the natural conditions of laborious life.
And the artists producing art will also not be, as now, merely a few people
selected from a small section of the nation, members of the upper classes or
their hangers-on, but will consist of all those gifted members of the whole
people who prove capable of, and are inclined toward, artistic activity.
Artistic activity will then be accessible to all men. It will become accessible
to the whole people, because, in the first place, in the art of the future, not
only will that complex technique, which deforms the productions of the art
of to-day and requires so great an effort and expenditure of time, not be
demanded, but, on the contrary, the demand will be for clearness, simplicity,
and brevity—conditions mastered, not by mechanical exercises, but by the
education of taste. And secondly, artistic activity will become accessible to
all men of the people because, instead of the present professional schools
which only some can enter, all will learn music and depictive art (singing
and drawing) equally with letters in the elementary schools, and in such a
way that every man, having received the first principles of drawing and
music, and feeling a capacity for, and a call to, one or other of the arts, will
be able to perfect himself in it.
People think that if there are no special art schools the technique of art will
deteriorate. Undoubtedly, if by technique we understand those
complications of art which are now considered an excellence, it will
deteriorate; but if by technique is understood clearness, beauty, simplicity,
and compression in works of art, then, even if the elements of drawing and
music were not to be taught in the national schools, the technique will not
only not deteriorate, but, as is shown by all peasant art, will be a hundred
times better. It will be improved, because all the artists of genius now
hidden among the masses will become producers of art and will give
models of excellence, which (as has always been the case) will be the best
schools of technique for their successors. For every true artist, even now,
learns his technique, chiefly, not in the schools, but in life, from the
examples of the great masters; then—when the producers of art will be the
best artists of the whole nation, and there will be more such examples, and
they will be more accessible—such part of the school training as the future
artist will lose will be a hundredfold compensated for by the training he will
receive from the numerous examples of good art diffused in society.
Page 468
Such will be one difference between present and future art. Another
difference will be that art will not be produced by professional artists
receiving payment for their work and engaged on nothing else besides their
art. The art of the future will be produced by all the members of the
community who feel the need of such activity, but they will occupy
themselves with art only when they feel such need.
In our society people think that an artist will work better, and produce more,
if he has a secured maintenance. And this opinion would serve once more to
show clearly, were such demonstration still needed, that what among us is
considered art is not art, but only its counterfeit. It is quite true that for the
production of boots or loaves division of labor is very advantageous, and
that the bootmaker or baker who need not prepare his own dinner or fetch
his own fuel will make more boots or loaves than if he had to busy himself
about these matters. But art is not a handicraft; it is the transmission of
feeling the artist has experienced. And sound feeling can only be
engendered in a man when he is living on all its sides the life natural and
proper to mankind. And therefore security of maintenance is a condition
most harmful to an artist's true productiveness, since it removes him from
the condition natural to all men,—that of struggle with nature for the
maintenance of both his own life and that of others,—and thus deprives him
of opportunity and possibility to experience the most important and natural
feelings of man. There is no position more injurious to an artist's
productiveness than that position of complete security and luxury in which
artists usually live in our society.
The artist of the future will live the common life of man, earning his
subsistence by some kind of labor. The fruits of that highest spiritual
strength which passes through him he will try to share with the greatest
possible number of people, for in such transmission to others of the feelings
that have arisen in him he will find his happiness and his reward. The artist
of the future will be unable to understand how an artist, whose chief delight
is in the wide diffusion of his works, could give them only in exchange for a
certain payment.
Until the dealers are driven out, the temple of art will not be a temple. But
the art of the future will drive them out.
difference will be that art will not be produced by professional artists
receiving payment for their work and engaged on nothing else besides their
art. The art of the future will be produced by all the members of the
community who feel the need of such activity, but they will occupy
themselves with art only when they feel such need.
In our society people think that an artist will work better, and produce more,
if he has a secured maintenance. And this opinion would serve once more to
show clearly, were such demonstration still needed, that what among us is
considered art is not art, but only its counterfeit. It is quite true that for the
production of boots or loaves division of labor is very advantageous, and
that the bootmaker or baker who need not prepare his own dinner or fetch
his own fuel will make more boots or loaves than if he had to busy himself
about these matters. But art is not a handicraft; it is the transmission of
feeling the artist has experienced. And sound feeling can only be
engendered in a man when he is living on all its sides the life natural and
proper to mankind. And therefore security of maintenance is a condition
most harmful to an artist's true productiveness, since it removes him from
the condition natural to all men,—that of struggle with nature for the
maintenance of both his own life and that of others,—and thus deprives him
of opportunity and possibility to experience the most important and natural
feelings of man. There is no position more injurious to an artist's
productiveness than that position of complete security and luxury in which
artists usually live in our society.
The artist of the future will live the common life of man, earning his
subsistence by some kind of labor. The fruits of that highest spiritual
strength which passes through him he will try to share with the greatest
possible number of people, for in such transmission to others of the feelings
that have arisen in him he will find his happiness and his reward. The artist
of the future will be unable to understand how an artist, whose chief delight
is in the wide diffusion of his works, could give them only in exchange for a
certain payment.
Until the dealers are driven out, the temple of art will not be a temple. But
the art of the future will drive them out.
Page 469
And therefore the subject-matter of the art of the future, as I imagine it to
myself, will be totally unlike that of to-day. It will consist, not in the
expression of exclusive feelings: pride, spleen, satiety, and all possible
forms of voluptuousness, available and interesting only to people who, by
force, have freed themselves from the labor natural to human beings; but it
will consist in the expression of feelings experienced by a man living the
life natural to all men and flowing from the religious perception of our
times, or of such feelings as are open to all men without exception.
To people of our circle who do not know and cannot or will not understand
the feelings which will form the subject-matter of the art of the future, such
subject-matter appears very poor in comparison with those subtleties of
exclusive art with which they are now occupied. "What is there fresh to be
said in the sphere of the Christian feeling of love of one's fellow-man? The
feelings common to every one are so insignificant and monotonous," think
they. And yet, in our time, the really fresh feelings can only be religious,
Christian feelings, and such as are open, accessible, to all. The feelings
flowing from the religious perception of our times, Christian feelings, are
infinitely new and varied, only not in the sense some people imagine,—not
that they can be evoked by the depiction of Christ and of gospel episodes,
or by repeating in new forms the Christian truths of unity, brotherhood,
equality, and love,—but in that all the oldest, commonest, and most
hackneyed phenomena of life evoke the newest, most unexpected, and
touching emotions as soon as a man regards them from the Christian point
of view.
What can be older than the relations between married couples, of parents to
children, of children to parents; the relations of men to their fellow-
countrymen and to foreigners, to an invasion, to defense, to property, to the
land, or to animals? But as soon as a man regards these matters from the
Christian point of view, endlessly varied, fresh, complex, and strong
emotions immediately arise.
And, in the same way, that realm of subject-matter for the art of the future
which relates to the simplest feelings of common life open to all will not be
narrowed, but widened. In our former art only the expression of feelings
natural to people of a certain exceptional position was considered worthy of
being transmitted by art, and even then only on condition that these feelings
were transmitted in a most refined manner, incomprehensible to the
myself, will be totally unlike that of to-day. It will consist, not in the
expression of exclusive feelings: pride, spleen, satiety, and all possible
forms of voluptuousness, available and interesting only to people who, by
force, have freed themselves from the labor natural to human beings; but it
will consist in the expression of feelings experienced by a man living the
life natural to all men and flowing from the religious perception of our
times, or of such feelings as are open to all men without exception.
To people of our circle who do not know and cannot or will not understand
the feelings which will form the subject-matter of the art of the future, such
subject-matter appears very poor in comparison with those subtleties of
exclusive art with which they are now occupied. "What is there fresh to be
said in the sphere of the Christian feeling of love of one's fellow-man? The
feelings common to every one are so insignificant and monotonous," think
they. And yet, in our time, the really fresh feelings can only be religious,
Christian feelings, and such as are open, accessible, to all. The feelings
flowing from the religious perception of our times, Christian feelings, are
infinitely new and varied, only not in the sense some people imagine,—not
that they can be evoked by the depiction of Christ and of gospel episodes,
or by repeating in new forms the Christian truths of unity, brotherhood,
equality, and love,—but in that all the oldest, commonest, and most
hackneyed phenomena of life evoke the newest, most unexpected, and
touching emotions as soon as a man regards them from the Christian point
of view.
What can be older than the relations between married couples, of parents to
children, of children to parents; the relations of men to their fellow-
countrymen and to foreigners, to an invasion, to defense, to property, to the
land, or to animals? But as soon as a man regards these matters from the
Christian point of view, endlessly varied, fresh, complex, and strong
emotions immediately arise.
And, in the same way, that realm of subject-matter for the art of the future
which relates to the simplest feelings of common life open to all will not be
narrowed, but widened. In our former art only the expression of feelings
natural to people of a certain exceptional position was considered worthy of
being transmitted by art, and even then only on condition that these feelings
were transmitted in a most refined manner, incomprehensible to the
Page 470
majority of men; all the immense realm of folk-art, and children's art—jests,
proverbs, riddles, songs, dances, children's games, and mimicry—was not
esteemed a domain worthy of art.
The artist of the future will understand that to compose a fairy-tale, a little
song which will touch, a lullaby or a riddle which will entertain, a jest
which will amuse, or to draw a sketch which will delight dozens of
generations or millions of children and adults, is incomparably more
important and more fruitful than to compose a novel or a symphony, or
paint a picture which will divert some members of the wealthy classes for a
short time, and then be forever forgotten. The region of this art of the
simple feelings accessible to all is enormous, and it is as yet almost
untouched.
The art of the future, therefore, will not be poorer, but infinitely richer in
subject-matter. And the form of the art of the future will also not be inferior
to the present forms of art, but infinitely superior to them. Superior, not in
the sense of having a refined and complex technique, but in the sense of the
capacity briefly, simply, and clearly to transmit, without any superfluities,
the feeling which the artist has experienced and wishes to transmit.
I remember once speaking to a famous astronomer who had given public
lectures on the spectrum analysis of the stars of the Milky Way, and saying
it would be a good thing if, with his knowledge and masterly delivery, he
would give a lecture merely on the formation and movements of the earth,
for certainly there were many people at his lecture on the spectrum analysis
of the stars of the Milky Way, especially among the women, who did not
well know why night follows day and summer follows winter. The wise
astronomer smiled as he answered, "Yes, it would be a good thing, but it
would be very difficult. To lecture on the spectrum analysis of the Milky
Way is far easier."
And so it is in art. To write a rhymed poem dealing with the times of
Cleopatra, or paint a picture of Nero burning Rome, or compose a
symphony in the manner of Brahms or Richard Strauss, or an opera like
Wagner's, is far easier than to tell a simple story without any unnecessary
details, yet so that it should transmit the feelings of the narrator, or to draw
a pencil-sketch which should touch or amuse the beholder, or to compose
proverbs, riddles, songs, dances, children's games, and mimicry—was not
esteemed a domain worthy of art.
The artist of the future will understand that to compose a fairy-tale, a little
song which will touch, a lullaby or a riddle which will entertain, a jest
which will amuse, or to draw a sketch which will delight dozens of
generations or millions of children and adults, is incomparably more
important and more fruitful than to compose a novel or a symphony, or
paint a picture which will divert some members of the wealthy classes for a
short time, and then be forever forgotten. The region of this art of the
simple feelings accessible to all is enormous, and it is as yet almost
untouched.
The art of the future, therefore, will not be poorer, but infinitely richer in
subject-matter. And the form of the art of the future will also not be inferior
to the present forms of art, but infinitely superior to them. Superior, not in
the sense of having a refined and complex technique, but in the sense of the
capacity briefly, simply, and clearly to transmit, without any superfluities,
the feeling which the artist has experienced and wishes to transmit.
I remember once speaking to a famous astronomer who had given public
lectures on the spectrum analysis of the stars of the Milky Way, and saying
it would be a good thing if, with his knowledge and masterly delivery, he
would give a lecture merely on the formation and movements of the earth,
for certainly there were many people at his lecture on the spectrum analysis
of the stars of the Milky Way, especially among the women, who did not
well know why night follows day and summer follows winter. The wise
astronomer smiled as he answered, "Yes, it would be a good thing, but it
would be very difficult. To lecture on the spectrum analysis of the Milky
Way is far easier."
And so it is in art. To write a rhymed poem dealing with the times of
Cleopatra, or paint a picture of Nero burning Rome, or compose a
symphony in the manner of Brahms or Richard Strauss, or an opera like
Wagner's, is far easier than to tell a simple story without any unnecessary
details, yet so that it should transmit the feelings of the narrator, or to draw
a pencil-sketch which should touch or amuse the beholder, or to compose
Page 471
four bars of clear and simple melody, without any accompaniment, which
should convey an impression and be remembered by those who hear it.
"It is impossible for us, with our culture, to return to a primitive state," say
the artists of our time. "It is impossible for us now to write such stories as
that of Joseph or the 'Odyssey,' to produce such statues as the Venus of
Milo, or to compose such music as the folk-songs."
And indeed, for the artists of our society and day, it is impossible, but not
for the future artist, who will be free from all the perversion of technical
improvements hiding the absence of subject-matter, and who, not being a
professional artist and receiving no payment for his activity, will only
produce art when he feels impelled to do so by an irresistible inner impulse.
The art of the future will thus be completely distinct, both in subject-matter
and in form, from what is now called art. The only subject-matter of the art
of the future will be either feelings drawing men toward union, or such as
already unite them; and the forms of art will be such as will be open to
every one. And therefore, the ideal of excellence in the future will not be
the exclusiveness of feeling, accessible only to some, but, on the contrary,
its universality. And not bulkiness, obscurity, and complexity of form, as is
now esteemed, but, on the contrary, brevity, clearness, and simplicity of
expression. Only when art has attained to that, will art neither divert nor
deprave men as it does now, calling on them to expend their best strength
on it, but be what it should be,—a vehicle wherewith to transmit religious,
Christian perception from the realm of reason and intellect into that of
feeling, and really drawing people in actual life nearer to that perfection and
unity indicated to them by their religious perception.
should convey an impression and be remembered by those who hear it.
"It is impossible for us, with our culture, to return to a primitive state," say
the artists of our time. "It is impossible for us now to write such stories as
that of Joseph or the 'Odyssey,' to produce such statues as the Venus of
Milo, or to compose such music as the folk-songs."
And indeed, for the artists of our society and day, it is impossible, but not
for the future artist, who will be free from all the perversion of technical
improvements hiding the absence of subject-matter, and who, not being a
professional artist and receiving no payment for his activity, will only
produce art when he feels impelled to do so by an irresistible inner impulse.
The art of the future will thus be completely distinct, both in subject-matter
and in form, from what is now called art. The only subject-matter of the art
of the future will be either feelings drawing men toward union, or such as
already unite them; and the forms of art will be such as will be open to
every one. And therefore, the ideal of excellence in the future will not be
the exclusiveness of feeling, accessible only to some, but, on the contrary,
its universality. And not bulkiness, obscurity, and complexity of form, as is
now esteemed, but, on the contrary, brevity, clearness, and simplicity of
expression. Only when art has attained to that, will art neither divert nor
deprave men as it does now, calling on them to expend their best strength
on it, but be what it should be,—a vehicle wherewith to transmit religious,
Christian perception from the realm of reason and intellect into that of
feeling, and really drawing people in actual life nearer to that perfection and
unity indicated to them by their religious perception.
Page 472
CHAPTER XX
THE CONCLUSION
I have accomplished, to the best of my ability, this work which has
occupied me for fifteen years, on a subject near to me—that of art. By
saying that this subject has occupied me for fifteen years, I do not mean that
I have been writing this book fifteen years, but only that I began to write on
art fifteen years ago, thinking that when once I undertook the task I should
be able to accomplish it without a break. It proved, however, that my views
on the matter then were so far from clear that I could not arrange them in a
way that satisfied me. From that time I have never ceased to think on the
subject, and I have recommenced to write on it six or seven times; but each
time, after writing a considerable part of it, I have found myself unable to
bring the work to a satisfactory conclusion, and have had to put it aside.
Now I have finished it; and however badly I may have performed the task,
my hope is that my fundamental thought as to the false direction the art of
our society has taken and is following, as to the reasons of this, and as to
the real destination of art, is correct, and that therefore my work will not be
without avail. But that this should come to pass, and that art should really
abandon its false path and take the new direction, it is necessary that
another equally important human spiritual activity,—science,—in intimate
dependence on which art always rests, should abandon the false path which
it too, like art, is following.
Science and art are as closely bound together as the lungs and the heart, so
that if one organ is vitiated the other cannot act rightly.
True science investigates and brings to human perception such truths and
such knowledge as the people of a given time and society consider most
important. Art transmits these truths from the region of perception to the
region of emotion. Therefore, if the path chosen by science be false, so also
will be the path taken by art. Science and art are like a certain kind of barge
with kedge-anchors which used to ply on our rivers. Science, like the boats
which took the anchors up-stream and made them secure, gives direction to
THE CONCLUSION
I have accomplished, to the best of my ability, this work which has
occupied me for fifteen years, on a subject near to me—that of art. By
saying that this subject has occupied me for fifteen years, I do not mean that
I have been writing this book fifteen years, but only that I began to write on
art fifteen years ago, thinking that when once I undertook the task I should
be able to accomplish it without a break. It proved, however, that my views
on the matter then were so far from clear that I could not arrange them in a
way that satisfied me. From that time I have never ceased to think on the
subject, and I have recommenced to write on it six or seven times; but each
time, after writing a considerable part of it, I have found myself unable to
bring the work to a satisfactory conclusion, and have had to put it aside.
Now I have finished it; and however badly I may have performed the task,
my hope is that my fundamental thought as to the false direction the art of
our society has taken and is following, as to the reasons of this, and as to
the real destination of art, is correct, and that therefore my work will not be
without avail. But that this should come to pass, and that art should really
abandon its false path and take the new direction, it is necessary that
another equally important human spiritual activity,—science,—in intimate
dependence on which art always rests, should abandon the false path which
it too, like art, is following.
Science and art are as closely bound together as the lungs and the heart, so
that if one organ is vitiated the other cannot act rightly.
True science investigates and brings to human perception such truths and
such knowledge as the people of a given time and society consider most
important. Art transmits these truths from the region of perception to the
region of emotion. Therefore, if the path chosen by science be false, so also
will be the path taken by art. Science and art are like a certain kind of barge
with kedge-anchors which used to ply on our rivers. Science, like the boats
which took the anchors up-stream and made them secure, gives direction to
Page 473
the forward movement; while art, like the windlass worked on the barge to
draw it toward the anchor, causes the actual progression. And thus a false
activity of science inevitably causes a correspondingly false activity of art.
As art in general is the transmission of every kind of feeling, but in the
limited sense of the word we only call that art which transmits feelings
acknowledged by us to be important, so also science in general is the
transmission of all possible knowledge; but in the limited sense of the word
we call science that which transmits knowledge acknowledged by us to be
important.
And the degree of importance, both of the feelings transmitted by art and of
the information transmitted by science, is decided by the religious
perception of the given time and society, i.e. by the common understanding
of the purpose of their lives possessed by the people of that time or society.
That which most of all contributes to the fulfilment of that purpose will be
studied most; that which contributes less will be studied less; that which
does not contribute at all to the fulfilment of the purpose of human life will
be entirely neglected, or, if studied, such study will not be accounted
science. So it always has been, and so it should be now; for such is the
nature of human knowledge and of human life. But the science of the upper
classes of our time, which not only does not acknowledge any religion, but
considers every religion to be mere superstition, could not and cannot make
such distinctions.
Scientists of our day affirm that they study everything impartially; but as
everything is too much (is in fact an infinite number of objects), and as it is
impossible to study all alike, this is only said in the theory, while in practice
not everything is studied, and study is applied far from impartially, only that
being studied which, on the one hand, is most wanted by, and on the other
hand, is pleasantest to, those people who occupy themselves with science.
And what the people, belonging to the upper classes, who are occupying
themselves with science most want is the maintenance of the system under
which those classes retain their privileges; and what is pleasantest are such
things as satisfy idle curiosity, do not demand great mental efforts, and can
be practically applied.
And therefore one side of science, including theology and philosophy
adapted to the existing order, as also history and political economy of the
draw it toward the anchor, causes the actual progression. And thus a false
activity of science inevitably causes a correspondingly false activity of art.
As art in general is the transmission of every kind of feeling, but in the
limited sense of the word we only call that art which transmits feelings
acknowledged by us to be important, so also science in general is the
transmission of all possible knowledge; but in the limited sense of the word
we call science that which transmits knowledge acknowledged by us to be
important.
And the degree of importance, both of the feelings transmitted by art and of
the information transmitted by science, is decided by the religious
perception of the given time and society, i.e. by the common understanding
of the purpose of their lives possessed by the people of that time or society.
That which most of all contributes to the fulfilment of that purpose will be
studied most; that which contributes less will be studied less; that which
does not contribute at all to the fulfilment of the purpose of human life will
be entirely neglected, or, if studied, such study will not be accounted
science. So it always has been, and so it should be now; for such is the
nature of human knowledge and of human life. But the science of the upper
classes of our time, which not only does not acknowledge any religion, but
considers every religion to be mere superstition, could not and cannot make
such distinctions.
Scientists of our day affirm that they study everything impartially; but as
everything is too much (is in fact an infinite number of objects), and as it is
impossible to study all alike, this is only said in the theory, while in practice
not everything is studied, and study is applied far from impartially, only that
being studied which, on the one hand, is most wanted by, and on the other
hand, is pleasantest to, those people who occupy themselves with science.
And what the people, belonging to the upper classes, who are occupying
themselves with science most want is the maintenance of the system under
which those classes retain their privileges; and what is pleasantest are such
things as satisfy idle curiosity, do not demand great mental efforts, and can
be practically applied.
And therefore one side of science, including theology and philosophy
adapted to the existing order, as also history and political economy of the
Page 474
same sort, are chiefly occupied in proving that the existing order is the very
one which ought to exist; that it has come into existence and continues to
exist by the operation of immutable laws not amenable to human will, and
that all efforts to change it are therefore harmful and wrong. The other part,
experimental science,—including mathematics, astronomy, chemistry,
physics, botany, and all the natural sciences,—is exclusively occupied with
things that have no direct relation to human life: with what is curious, and
with things of which practical application advantageous to people of the
upper classes can be made. And to justify that selection of objects of study
which (in conformity to their own position) the men of science of our times
have made, they have devised a theory of science for science's sake, quite
similar to the theory of art for art's sake.
As by the theory of art for art's sake it appears that occupation with all those
things that please us—is art, so, by the theory of science for science's sake,
the study of that which interests us—is science.
So that one side of science, instead of studying how people should live in
order to fulfil their mission in life, demonstrates the righteousness and
immutability of the bad and false arrangements of life which exist around
us; while the other part, experimental science, occupies itself with questions
of simple curiosity or with technical improvements.
The first of these divisions of science is harmful, not only because it
confuses people's perceptions and gives false decisions, but also because it
exists, and occupies the ground which should belong to true science. It does
this harm, that each man, in order to approach the study of the most
important questions of life, must first refute these erections of lies which
have during ages been piled around each of the most essential questions of
human life, and which are propped up by all the strength of human
ingenuity.
The second division—the one of which modern science is so particularly
proud, and which is considered by many people to be the only real science
—is harmful in that it diverts attention from the really important subjects to
insignificant subjects, and is also directly harmful in that, under the evil
system of society which the first division of science justifies and supports, a
great part of the technical gains of science are turned, not to the advantage,
but to the injury of mankind.
one which ought to exist; that it has come into existence and continues to
exist by the operation of immutable laws not amenable to human will, and
that all efforts to change it are therefore harmful and wrong. The other part,
experimental science,—including mathematics, astronomy, chemistry,
physics, botany, and all the natural sciences,—is exclusively occupied with
things that have no direct relation to human life: with what is curious, and
with things of which practical application advantageous to people of the
upper classes can be made. And to justify that selection of objects of study
which (in conformity to their own position) the men of science of our times
have made, they have devised a theory of science for science's sake, quite
similar to the theory of art for art's sake.
As by the theory of art for art's sake it appears that occupation with all those
things that please us—is art, so, by the theory of science for science's sake,
the study of that which interests us—is science.
So that one side of science, instead of studying how people should live in
order to fulfil their mission in life, demonstrates the righteousness and
immutability of the bad and false arrangements of life which exist around
us; while the other part, experimental science, occupies itself with questions
of simple curiosity or with technical improvements.
The first of these divisions of science is harmful, not only because it
confuses people's perceptions and gives false decisions, but also because it
exists, and occupies the ground which should belong to true science. It does
this harm, that each man, in order to approach the study of the most
important questions of life, must first refute these erections of lies which
have during ages been piled around each of the most essential questions of
human life, and which are propped up by all the strength of human
ingenuity.
The second division—the one of which modern science is so particularly
proud, and which is considered by many people to be the only real science
—is harmful in that it diverts attention from the really important subjects to
insignificant subjects, and is also directly harmful in that, under the evil
system of society which the first division of science justifies and supports, a
great part of the technical gains of science are turned, not to the advantage,
but to the injury of mankind.
Page 475
Indeed, it is only to those who are devoting their lives to such study that it
seems as if all the inventions which are made in the sphere of natural
science were very important and useful things. And to these people it seems
so only when they do not look around them and do not see what is really
important. They only need tear themselves away from the psychological
microscope under which they examine the objects of their study, and look
about them, in order to see how insignificant is all that has afforded them
such naïve pride, all that knowledge not only of geometry of n-dimensions,
spectrum analysis of the Milky Way, the form of atoms, dimensions of
human skulls of the Stone Age, and similar trifles, but even our knowledge
of micro-organisms, X-rays, etc., in comparison with such knowledge as we
have thrown aside and handed over to the perversions of the professors of
theology, jurisprudence, political economy, financial science, etc. We need
only look around us to perceive that the activity proper to real science is not
the study of whatever happens to interest us, but the study of how man's life
should be established,—the study of those questions of religion, morality,
and social life, without the solution of which all our knowledge of nature
will be harmful or insignificant.
We are highly delighted and very proud that our science renders it possible
to utilize the energy of a waterfall and make it work in factories, or that we
have pierced tunnels through mountains, and so forth. But the pity of it is
that we make the force of the waterfall labor, not for the benefit of the
workmen, but to enrich capitalists who produce articles of luxury or
weapons of man-destroying war. The same dynamite with which we blast
the mountains to pierce tunnels we use for wars, from which latter we not
only do not intend to abstain, but which we consider inevitable, and for
which we unceasingly prepare.
If we are now able to inoculate preventatively with diphtheritic microbes, to
find a needle in a body by means of X-rays, to straighten a hunched-back,
cure syphilis, and perform wonderful operations, we should not be proud of
these acquisitions either (even were they all established beyond dispute) if
we fully understood the true purpose of real science. If but one-tenth of the
efforts now spent on objects of pure curiosity or of merely practical
application were expended on real science organizing the life of man, more
than half the people now sick would not have the illnesses from which a
small minority of them now get cured in hospitals. There would be no poor-
seems as if all the inventions which are made in the sphere of natural
science were very important and useful things. And to these people it seems
so only when they do not look around them and do not see what is really
important. They only need tear themselves away from the psychological
microscope under which they examine the objects of their study, and look
about them, in order to see how insignificant is all that has afforded them
such naïve pride, all that knowledge not only of geometry of n-dimensions,
spectrum analysis of the Milky Way, the form of atoms, dimensions of
human skulls of the Stone Age, and similar trifles, but even our knowledge
of micro-organisms, X-rays, etc., in comparison with such knowledge as we
have thrown aside and handed over to the perversions of the professors of
theology, jurisprudence, political economy, financial science, etc. We need
only look around us to perceive that the activity proper to real science is not
the study of whatever happens to interest us, but the study of how man's life
should be established,—the study of those questions of religion, morality,
and social life, without the solution of which all our knowledge of nature
will be harmful or insignificant.
We are highly delighted and very proud that our science renders it possible
to utilize the energy of a waterfall and make it work in factories, or that we
have pierced tunnels through mountains, and so forth. But the pity of it is
that we make the force of the waterfall labor, not for the benefit of the
workmen, but to enrich capitalists who produce articles of luxury or
weapons of man-destroying war. The same dynamite with which we blast
the mountains to pierce tunnels we use for wars, from which latter we not
only do not intend to abstain, but which we consider inevitable, and for
which we unceasingly prepare.
If we are now able to inoculate preventatively with diphtheritic microbes, to
find a needle in a body by means of X-rays, to straighten a hunched-back,
cure syphilis, and perform wonderful operations, we should not be proud of
these acquisitions either (even were they all established beyond dispute) if
we fully understood the true purpose of real science. If but one-tenth of the
efforts now spent on objects of pure curiosity or of merely practical
application were expended on real science organizing the life of man, more
than half the people now sick would not have the illnesses from which a
small minority of them now get cured in hospitals. There would be no poor-
Page 476
blooded and deformed children growing up in factories, no death-rates, as
now, of fifty per cent among children, no deterioration of whole
generations, no prostitution, no syphilis, and no murdering of hundreds of
thousands in wars, nor those horrors of folly and of misery which our
present science considers a necessary condition of human life.
We have so perverted the conception of science that it seems strange to men
of our day to allude to sciences which should prevent the mortality of
children, prostitution, syphilis, the deterioration of whole generations, and
the wholesale murder of men. It seems to us that science is only then real
science when a man in a laboratory pours liquids from one jar into another,
or analyzes the spectrum, or cuts up frogs and porpoises, or weaves in a
specialized, scientific jargon an obscure network of conventional phrases—
theological, philosophical, historical, juridical, or politico-economical—
semi-intelligible to the man himself, and intended to demonstrate that what
now is, is what should be.
But science, true science,—such science as would really deserve the respect
which is now claimed by the followers of one (the least important) part of
science,—is not at all such as this: real science lies in knowing what we
should and what we should not believe, in knowing how the associated life
of man should and should not be constituted; how to treat sexual relations,
how to educate children, how to use the land, how to cultivate it oneself
without oppressing other people, how to treat foreigners, how to treat
animals, and much more that is important for the life of man.
Such has true science ever been and such it should be. And such science is
springing up in our times; but, on the one hand, such true science is denied
and refuted by all those scientific people who defend the existing order of
society, and, on the other hand, it is considered empty, unnecessary,
unscientific science by those who are engrossed in experimental science.
For instance, books and sermons appear, demonstrating the antiquatedness
and absurdity of Church dogmas, as well as the necessity of establishing a
reasonable religious perception suitable to our times, and all the theology
that is considered to be real science is only engaged in refuting these works
and in exercising human intelligence again and again to find support and
justification for superstitions long since outlived, and which have now
become quite meaningless. Or a sermon appears showing that land should
now, of fifty per cent among children, no deterioration of whole
generations, no prostitution, no syphilis, and no murdering of hundreds of
thousands in wars, nor those horrors of folly and of misery which our
present science considers a necessary condition of human life.
We have so perverted the conception of science that it seems strange to men
of our day to allude to sciences which should prevent the mortality of
children, prostitution, syphilis, the deterioration of whole generations, and
the wholesale murder of men. It seems to us that science is only then real
science when a man in a laboratory pours liquids from one jar into another,
or analyzes the spectrum, or cuts up frogs and porpoises, or weaves in a
specialized, scientific jargon an obscure network of conventional phrases—
theological, philosophical, historical, juridical, or politico-economical—
semi-intelligible to the man himself, and intended to demonstrate that what
now is, is what should be.
But science, true science,—such science as would really deserve the respect
which is now claimed by the followers of one (the least important) part of
science,—is not at all such as this: real science lies in knowing what we
should and what we should not believe, in knowing how the associated life
of man should and should not be constituted; how to treat sexual relations,
how to educate children, how to use the land, how to cultivate it oneself
without oppressing other people, how to treat foreigners, how to treat
animals, and much more that is important for the life of man.
Such has true science ever been and such it should be. And such science is
springing up in our times; but, on the one hand, such true science is denied
and refuted by all those scientific people who defend the existing order of
society, and, on the other hand, it is considered empty, unnecessary,
unscientific science by those who are engrossed in experimental science.
For instance, books and sermons appear, demonstrating the antiquatedness
and absurdity of Church dogmas, as well as the necessity of establishing a
reasonable religious perception suitable to our times, and all the theology
that is considered to be real science is only engaged in refuting these works
and in exercising human intelligence again and again to find support and
justification for superstitions long since outlived, and which have now
become quite meaningless. Or a sermon appears showing that land should
Page 477
not be an object of private possession, and that the institution of private
property in land is a chief cause of the poverty of the masses. Apparently
science, real science, should welcome such a sermon and draw further
deductions from this position. But the science of our times does nothing of
the kind: on the contrary, political economy demonstrates the opposite
position; namely, that landed property, like every other form of property,
must be more and more concentrated in the hands of a small number of
owners. Again, in the same way, one would suppose it to be the business of
real science to demonstrate the irrationality, unprofitableness, and
immorality of war and of executions; or the inhumanity and harmfulness of
prostitution; or the absurdity, harmfulness, and immorality of using
narcotics or of eating animals; or the irrationality, harmfulness, and
antiquatedness of patriotism. And such works exist, but are all considered
unscientific; while works to prove that all these things ought to continue,
and works intended to satisfy an idle thirst for knowledge lacking any
relation to human life, are considered to be scientific.
The deviation of the science of our time from its true purpose is strikingly
illustrated by those ideals which are put forward by some scientists, and are
not denied, but admitted, by the majority of scientific men.
These ideals are expressed not only in stupid, fashionable books, describing
the world as it will be in 1000 or 3000 years' time, but also by sociologists
who consider themselves serious men of science. These ideals are that food,
instead of being obtained from the land by agriculture, will be prepared in
laboratories by chemical means, and that human labor will be almost
entirely superseded by the utilization of natural forces.
Man will not, as now, eat an egg laid by a hen he has kept, or bread grown
on his field, or an apple from a tree he has reared and which has blossomed
and matured in his sight; but he will eat tasty, nutritious, food which will be
prepared in laboratories by the conjoint labor of many people in which he
will take a small part. Man will hardly need to labor, so that all men will be
able to yield to idleness as the upper, ruling classes now yield to it.
Nothing shows more plainly than these ideals to what a degree the science
of our times has deviated from the true path.
The great majority of men in our times lack good and sufficient food (as
well as dwellings and clothes and all the first necessaries of life). And this
property in land is a chief cause of the poverty of the masses. Apparently
science, real science, should welcome such a sermon and draw further
deductions from this position. But the science of our times does nothing of
the kind: on the contrary, political economy demonstrates the opposite
position; namely, that landed property, like every other form of property,
must be more and more concentrated in the hands of a small number of
owners. Again, in the same way, one would suppose it to be the business of
real science to demonstrate the irrationality, unprofitableness, and
immorality of war and of executions; or the inhumanity and harmfulness of
prostitution; or the absurdity, harmfulness, and immorality of using
narcotics or of eating animals; or the irrationality, harmfulness, and
antiquatedness of patriotism. And such works exist, but are all considered
unscientific; while works to prove that all these things ought to continue,
and works intended to satisfy an idle thirst for knowledge lacking any
relation to human life, are considered to be scientific.
The deviation of the science of our time from its true purpose is strikingly
illustrated by those ideals which are put forward by some scientists, and are
not denied, but admitted, by the majority of scientific men.
These ideals are expressed not only in stupid, fashionable books, describing
the world as it will be in 1000 or 3000 years' time, but also by sociologists
who consider themselves serious men of science. These ideals are that food,
instead of being obtained from the land by agriculture, will be prepared in
laboratories by chemical means, and that human labor will be almost
entirely superseded by the utilization of natural forces.
Man will not, as now, eat an egg laid by a hen he has kept, or bread grown
on his field, or an apple from a tree he has reared and which has blossomed
and matured in his sight; but he will eat tasty, nutritious, food which will be
prepared in laboratories by the conjoint labor of many people in which he
will take a small part. Man will hardly need to labor, so that all men will be
able to yield to idleness as the upper, ruling classes now yield to it.
Nothing shows more plainly than these ideals to what a degree the science
of our times has deviated from the true path.
The great majority of men in our times lack good and sufficient food (as
well as dwellings and clothes and all the first necessaries of life). And this
Page 478
great majority of men is compelled, to the injury of its well-being, to labor
continually beyond its strength. Both these evils can easily be removed by
abolishing mutual strife, luxury, and the unrighteous distribution of wealth,
in a word, by the abolition of a false and harmful order and the
establishment of a reasonable, human manner of life. But science considers
the existing order of things to be as immutable as the movements of the
planets, and therefore assumes that the purpose of science is—not to
elucidate the falseness of this order and to arrange a new, reasonable way of
life—but, under the existing order of things, to feed everybody and enable
all to be as idle as the ruling classes, who live a depraved life, now are.
And, meanwhile, it is forgotten that nourishment with corn, vegetables, and
fruit raised from the soil by one's own labor is the pleasantest, healthiest,
easiest, and most natural nourishment, and that the work of using one's
muscles is as necessary a condition of life as is the oxidation of the blood
by breathing.
To invent means whereby people might, while continuing our false division
of property and labor, be well nourished by means of chemically prepared
food, and might make the forces of nature work for them, is like inventing
means to pump oxygen into the lungs of a man kept in a closed chamber,
the air of which is bad, when all that is needed is to cease to confine the
man in the closed chamber.
In the vegetable and animal kingdoms a laboratory for the production of
food has been arranged, such as can be surpassed by no professors, and to
enjoy the fruits of this laboratory, and to participate in it, man has only to
yield to that ever joyful impulse to labor, without which man's life is a
torment. And lo and behold! the scientists of our times, instead of
employing all their strength to abolish whatever hinders man from utilizing
the good things prepared for him, acknowledge the conditions under which
man is deprived of these blessings to be unalterable, and instead of
arranging the life of man so that he might work joyfully and be fed from the
soil, they devise methods which will cause him to become an artificial
abortion. It is like not helping a man out of confinement into the fresh air,
but devising means, instead, to pump into him the necessary quantity of
oxygen and arranging so that he may live in a stifling cellar instead of
living at home.
continually beyond its strength. Both these evils can easily be removed by
abolishing mutual strife, luxury, and the unrighteous distribution of wealth,
in a word, by the abolition of a false and harmful order and the
establishment of a reasonable, human manner of life. But science considers
the existing order of things to be as immutable as the movements of the
planets, and therefore assumes that the purpose of science is—not to
elucidate the falseness of this order and to arrange a new, reasonable way of
life—but, under the existing order of things, to feed everybody and enable
all to be as idle as the ruling classes, who live a depraved life, now are.
And, meanwhile, it is forgotten that nourishment with corn, vegetables, and
fruit raised from the soil by one's own labor is the pleasantest, healthiest,
easiest, and most natural nourishment, and that the work of using one's
muscles is as necessary a condition of life as is the oxidation of the blood
by breathing.
To invent means whereby people might, while continuing our false division
of property and labor, be well nourished by means of chemically prepared
food, and might make the forces of nature work for them, is like inventing
means to pump oxygen into the lungs of a man kept in a closed chamber,
the air of which is bad, when all that is needed is to cease to confine the
man in the closed chamber.
In the vegetable and animal kingdoms a laboratory for the production of
food has been arranged, such as can be surpassed by no professors, and to
enjoy the fruits of this laboratory, and to participate in it, man has only to
yield to that ever joyful impulse to labor, without which man's life is a
torment. And lo and behold! the scientists of our times, instead of
employing all their strength to abolish whatever hinders man from utilizing
the good things prepared for him, acknowledge the conditions under which
man is deprived of these blessings to be unalterable, and instead of
arranging the life of man so that he might work joyfully and be fed from the
soil, they devise methods which will cause him to become an artificial
abortion. It is like not helping a man out of confinement into the fresh air,
but devising means, instead, to pump into him the necessary quantity of
oxygen and arranging so that he may live in a stifling cellar instead of
living at home.
Page 479
Such false ideals could not exist if science were not on a false path.
And yet the feelings transmitted by art grow up on the bases supplied by
science.
But what feelings can such misdirected science evoke? One side of this
science evokes antiquated feelings, which humanity has used up, and
which, in our times, are bad and exclusive. The other side, occupied with
the study of subjects unrelated to the conduct of human life, by its very
nature cannot serve as a basis for art.
So that art in our times, to be art, must either open up its own road
independently of science, or must take direction from the unrecognized
science which is denounced by the orthodox section of science. And this is
what art, when it even partially fulfils its mission, is doing.
It is to be hoped that the work I have tried to perform concerning art will be
performed also for science—that the falseness of the theory of science for
science's sake will be demonstrated; that the necessity of acknowledging
Christian teaching in its true meaning will be clearly shown, that on the
basis of that teaching a reappraisement will be made of the knowledge we
possess, and of which we are so proud; that the secondariness and
insignificance of experimental science, and the primacy and importance of
religious, moral, and social knowledge will be established; and that such
knowledge will not, as now, be left to the guidance of the upper classes
only, but will form a chief interest of all free, truth-loving men, such as
those who, not in agreement with the upper classes, but in their despite,
have always forwarded the real science of life.
Astronomical, physical, chemical, and biological science, as also technical
and medical science, will be studied only in so far as they can help to free
mankind from religious, juridical, or social deceptions, or can serve to
promote the well-being of all men, and not of any single class.
Only then will science cease to be what it is now,—on the one hand a
system of sophistries, needed for the maintenance of the existing worn-out
order of society, and, on the other hand, a shapeless mass of miscellaneous
knowledge, for the most part good for little or nothing,—and become a
shapely and organic whole, having a definite and reasonable purpose
comprehensible to all men; namely, the purpose of bringing to the
And yet the feelings transmitted by art grow up on the bases supplied by
science.
But what feelings can such misdirected science evoke? One side of this
science evokes antiquated feelings, which humanity has used up, and
which, in our times, are bad and exclusive. The other side, occupied with
the study of subjects unrelated to the conduct of human life, by its very
nature cannot serve as a basis for art.
So that art in our times, to be art, must either open up its own road
independently of science, or must take direction from the unrecognized
science which is denounced by the orthodox section of science. And this is
what art, when it even partially fulfils its mission, is doing.
It is to be hoped that the work I have tried to perform concerning art will be
performed also for science—that the falseness of the theory of science for
science's sake will be demonstrated; that the necessity of acknowledging
Christian teaching in its true meaning will be clearly shown, that on the
basis of that teaching a reappraisement will be made of the knowledge we
possess, and of which we are so proud; that the secondariness and
insignificance of experimental science, and the primacy and importance of
religious, moral, and social knowledge will be established; and that such
knowledge will not, as now, be left to the guidance of the upper classes
only, but will form a chief interest of all free, truth-loving men, such as
those who, not in agreement with the upper classes, but in their despite,
have always forwarded the real science of life.
Astronomical, physical, chemical, and biological science, as also technical
and medical science, will be studied only in so far as they can help to free
mankind from religious, juridical, or social deceptions, or can serve to
promote the well-being of all men, and not of any single class.
Only then will science cease to be what it is now,—on the one hand a
system of sophistries, needed for the maintenance of the existing worn-out
order of society, and, on the other hand, a shapeless mass of miscellaneous
knowledge, for the most part good for little or nothing,—and become a
shapely and organic whole, having a definite and reasonable purpose
comprehensible to all men; namely, the purpose of bringing to the
Page 480
consciousness of men the truths that flow from the religious perception of
our times.
And only then will art, which is always dependent on science, be what it
might and should be, an organ co-equally important with science for the life
and progress of mankind.
Art is not a pleasure, a solace, or an amusement; art is a great matter. Art is
an organ of human life, transmitting man's reasonable perception into
feeling. In our age the common religious perception of men is the
consciousness of the brotherhood of man—we know that the well-being of
man lies in union with his fellow-men. True science should indicate the
various methods of applying this consciousness to life. Art should transform
this perception into feeling.
The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art, aided by
science guided by religion, that peaceful coöperation of man which is now
obtained by external means—by our law-courts, police, charitable
institutions, factory inspection, etc.—should be obtained by man's free and
joyous activity. Art should cause violence to be set aside.
And it is only art that can accomplish this.
All that now, independently of the fear of violence and punishment, makes
the social life of man possible (and already now this is an enormous part of
the order of our lives)—all this has been brought about by art. If by art it
has been inculcated how people should treat religious objects, their parents,
their children, their wives, their relations, strangers, foreigners; how to
conduct themselves to their elders, their superiors, to those who suffer, to
their enemies, and to animals; and if this has been obeyed through
generations by millions of people, not only unenforced by any violence, but
so that the force of such customs can be shaken in no way but by means of
art—then, by the same art, other customs, more in accord with the religious
perception of our time, may be evoked. If art has been able to convey the
sentiment of reverence for images, for the eucharist, and for the king's
person; of shame at betraying a comrade, devotion to a flag, the necessity of
revenge for an insult, the need to sacrifice one's labor for the erection and
adornment of churches, the duty of defending one's honor or the glory of
one's native land—then that same art can also evoke reverence for the
dignity of every man and for the life of every animal; can make men
our times.
And only then will art, which is always dependent on science, be what it
might and should be, an organ co-equally important with science for the life
and progress of mankind.
Art is not a pleasure, a solace, or an amusement; art is a great matter. Art is
an organ of human life, transmitting man's reasonable perception into
feeling. In our age the common religious perception of men is the
consciousness of the brotherhood of man—we know that the well-being of
man lies in union with his fellow-men. True science should indicate the
various methods of applying this consciousness to life. Art should transform
this perception into feeling.
The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art, aided by
science guided by religion, that peaceful coöperation of man which is now
obtained by external means—by our law-courts, police, charitable
institutions, factory inspection, etc.—should be obtained by man's free and
joyous activity. Art should cause violence to be set aside.
And it is only art that can accomplish this.
All that now, independently of the fear of violence and punishment, makes
the social life of man possible (and already now this is an enormous part of
the order of our lives)—all this has been brought about by art. If by art it
has been inculcated how people should treat religious objects, their parents,
their children, their wives, their relations, strangers, foreigners; how to
conduct themselves to their elders, their superiors, to those who suffer, to
their enemies, and to animals; and if this has been obeyed through
generations by millions of people, not only unenforced by any violence, but
so that the force of such customs can be shaken in no way but by means of
art—then, by the same art, other customs, more in accord with the religious
perception of our time, may be evoked. If art has been able to convey the
sentiment of reverence for images, for the eucharist, and for the king's
person; of shame at betraying a comrade, devotion to a flag, the necessity of
revenge for an insult, the need to sacrifice one's labor for the erection and
adornment of churches, the duty of defending one's honor or the glory of
one's native land—then that same art can also evoke reverence for the
dignity of every man and for the life of every animal; can make men
Page 481
ashamed of luxury, of violence, of revenge, or of using for their pleasure
that of which others are in need; can compel people freely, gladly, and
without noticing it, to sacrifice themselves in the service of man.
The task for art to accomplish is to make that feeling of brotherhood and
love of one's neighbor, now attained only by the best members of society,
the customary feeling and the instinct of all men. By evoking, under
imaginary conditions, the feeling of brotherhood and love, religious art will
train men to experience those same feelings under similar circumstances in
actual life; it will lay in the souls of men the rails along which the actions of
those whom art thus educates will naturally pass. And universal art, by
uniting the most different people in one common feeling, by destroying
separation, will educate people to union, will show them, not by reason, but
by life itself, the joy of universal union reaching beyond the bounds set by
life.
The destiny of art in our time is to transmit from the realm of reason to the
realm of feeling the truth that well-being for men consists in being united
together, and to set up, in place of the existing reign of force, that kingdom
of God, i.e. of love, which we all recognize to be the highest aim of human
life.
Possibly, in the future, science may reveal to art yet newer and higher
ideals, which art may realize; but, in our time, the destiny of art is clear and
definite. The task for Christian art is to establish brotherly union among
men.
that of which others are in need; can compel people freely, gladly, and
without noticing it, to sacrifice themselves in the service of man.
The task for art to accomplish is to make that feeling of brotherhood and
love of one's neighbor, now attained only by the best members of society,
the customary feeling and the instinct of all men. By evoking, under
imaginary conditions, the feeling of brotherhood and love, religious art will
train men to experience those same feelings under similar circumstances in
actual life; it will lay in the souls of men the rails along which the actions of
those whom art thus educates will naturally pass. And universal art, by
uniting the most different people in one common feeling, by destroying
separation, will educate people to union, will show them, not by reason, but
by life itself, the joy of universal union reaching beyond the bounds set by
life.
The destiny of art in our time is to transmit from the realm of reason to the
realm of feeling the truth that well-being for men consists in being united
together, and to set up, in place of the existing reign of force, that kingdom
of God, i.e. of love, which we all recognize to be the highest aim of human
life.
Possibly, in the future, science may reveal to art yet newer and higher
ideals, which art may realize; but, in our time, the destiny of art is clear and
definite. The task for Christian art is to establish brotherly union among
men.
Page 482
APPENDIX I
This is the first page of Mallarmé's book, "Divagations":—
LE PHÉNOMÈNE FUTUR
Un ciel pâle, sur le monde qui finit de décrépitude, va peut-être partir
avec les nuages: les lambeaux de la pourpre usée des couchants
déteignent dans une rivière dormant à l'horizon submergé de rayons et
d'eau. Les arbres s'ennuient, et, sous leur feuillage blanchi (de la
poussière du temps plutôt que celle des chemins) monte la maison en
toile de Montreur de choses Passées: maint réverbère attend le
crépuscule et ravive les visages d'une malheureuse foule, vaincue par
la maladie immortelle et le péché des siècles, d'hommes près de leurs
chétives complices enceintes des fruits misérables avec lesquels périra
la terre. Dans le silence inquiet de tous les yeux suppliant là-bas le
soleil qui, sous l'eau, s'enfonce avec le désespoir d'un cri, voici le
simple boniment: "Nulle enseigne ne vous régale du spectacle
intérieur, car il n'est pas maintenant un peintre capable d'en donner une
ombre triste. J'apporte, vivante (et préservée à travers les ans par la
science souveraine) une Femme d'autrefois. Quelque folie, originelle et
naïve, une extase d'or, je ne sais quoi! par elle nommé sa chevelure, se
ploie avec la grâce des étoffes autour d'un visage qu' éclaire la nudité
sanglante de ses lèvres. A la place du vêtement vain, elle a un corps; et
les yeux, semblables aux pierres rares! ne valent pas ce regard qui sort
de sa chair heureuse: des seins levés comme s'ils étaient pleins d'un lait
éternel, la pointe vers le ciel, les jambes lisses qui gardent le sel de la
mer première." Se rappelant leurs pauvres épouses, chauves, morbides
et pleines d'horreur, les maris se pressent: elles aussi par curiosité,
mélancoliques, veulent voir.
Quand tous auront contemplé la noble créature, vestige de quelque
époque déjà maudite, les uns indifférents, car ils n'auront pas eu la
This is the first page of Mallarmé's book, "Divagations":—
LE PHÉNOMÈNE FUTUR
Un ciel pâle, sur le monde qui finit de décrépitude, va peut-être partir
avec les nuages: les lambeaux de la pourpre usée des couchants
déteignent dans une rivière dormant à l'horizon submergé de rayons et
d'eau. Les arbres s'ennuient, et, sous leur feuillage blanchi (de la
poussière du temps plutôt que celle des chemins) monte la maison en
toile de Montreur de choses Passées: maint réverbère attend le
crépuscule et ravive les visages d'une malheureuse foule, vaincue par
la maladie immortelle et le péché des siècles, d'hommes près de leurs
chétives complices enceintes des fruits misérables avec lesquels périra
la terre. Dans le silence inquiet de tous les yeux suppliant là-bas le
soleil qui, sous l'eau, s'enfonce avec le désespoir d'un cri, voici le
simple boniment: "Nulle enseigne ne vous régale du spectacle
intérieur, car il n'est pas maintenant un peintre capable d'en donner une
ombre triste. J'apporte, vivante (et préservée à travers les ans par la
science souveraine) une Femme d'autrefois. Quelque folie, originelle et
naïve, une extase d'or, je ne sais quoi! par elle nommé sa chevelure, se
ploie avec la grâce des étoffes autour d'un visage qu' éclaire la nudité
sanglante de ses lèvres. A la place du vêtement vain, elle a un corps; et
les yeux, semblables aux pierres rares! ne valent pas ce regard qui sort
de sa chair heureuse: des seins levés comme s'ils étaient pleins d'un lait
éternel, la pointe vers le ciel, les jambes lisses qui gardent le sel de la
mer première." Se rappelant leurs pauvres épouses, chauves, morbides
et pleines d'horreur, les maris se pressent: elles aussi par curiosité,
mélancoliques, veulent voir.
Quand tous auront contemplé la noble créature, vestige de quelque
époque déjà maudite, les uns indifférents, car ils n'auront pas eu la
Page 483
force de comprendre, mais d'autres navrés et la paupière humide de
larmes résignées, se regarderont; tandis que les poètes de ces temps,
sentant se rallumer leur yeux éteints, s'achemineront vers leur lampe,
le cerveau ivre un instant d'une gloire confuse, hantés du Rythme et
dans l'oubli d'exister à une époque qui survit à la beauté.
THE FUTURE PHENOMENON—by Mallarmé.
A pale sky, above the world that is ending through decrepitude, going,
perhaps, to pass away with the clouds: shreds of worn-out purple of the
sunsets wash off their color in a river sleeping on the horizon,
submerged with rays and water. The trees are weary and, beneath their
foliage, whitened (by the dust of time rather than that of the roads),
rises the canvas house of "Showman of things Past." Many a lamp
awaits the gloaming, and brightens the faces of a miserable crowd
vanquished by the immortal illness and the sin of ages, of men by the
sides of their puny accomplices pregnant with the miserable fruit with
which the world will perish. In the anxious silence of all the eyes
supplicating the sun there, which sinks under the water with the
desperation of a cry, this is the plain announcement: "No sign-board
now regales you with the spectacle that is inside, for there is no painter
now capable of giving even a shadow of it. I bring living (and
preserved by sovereign science through the years) a Woman of other
days. Some kind of folly, naïve and original, an ecstasy of gold, I know
not what, by her called her hair, clings with the grace of some material
round a face brightened by the blood-red nudity of her lips. In place of
vain clothing, she has a body; and her eyes, resembling precious
stones! are not worth that look, which comes from her happy flesh:
breasts raised as if full of eternal milk, the points toward the sky; the
smooth legs, that keep the salt of the first sea." Remembering their
poor spouses, bald, morbid, and full of horrors, the husbands press
forward: the women, too, from curiosity, gloomily wish to see.
When all shall have contemplated the noble creature, vestige of some
epoch already damned, some indifferently, for they will not have had
strength to understand, but others, broken-hearted, and with eyelids
larmes résignées, se regarderont; tandis que les poètes de ces temps,
sentant se rallumer leur yeux éteints, s'achemineront vers leur lampe,
le cerveau ivre un instant d'une gloire confuse, hantés du Rythme et
dans l'oubli d'exister à une époque qui survit à la beauté.
THE FUTURE PHENOMENON—by Mallarmé.
A pale sky, above the world that is ending through decrepitude, going,
perhaps, to pass away with the clouds: shreds of worn-out purple of the
sunsets wash off their color in a river sleeping on the horizon,
submerged with rays and water. The trees are weary and, beneath their
foliage, whitened (by the dust of time rather than that of the roads),
rises the canvas house of "Showman of things Past." Many a lamp
awaits the gloaming, and brightens the faces of a miserable crowd
vanquished by the immortal illness and the sin of ages, of men by the
sides of their puny accomplices pregnant with the miserable fruit with
which the world will perish. In the anxious silence of all the eyes
supplicating the sun there, which sinks under the water with the
desperation of a cry, this is the plain announcement: "No sign-board
now regales you with the spectacle that is inside, for there is no painter
now capable of giving even a shadow of it. I bring living (and
preserved by sovereign science through the years) a Woman of other
days. Some kind of folly, naïve and original, an ecstasy of gold, I know
not what, by her called her hair, clings with the grace of some material
round a face brightened by the blood-red nudity of her lips. In place of
vain clothing, she has a body; and her eyes, resembling precious
stones! are not worth that look, which comes from her happy flesh:
breasts raised as if full of eternal milk, the points toward the sky; the
smooth legs, that keep the salt of the first sea." Remembering their
poor spouses, bald, morbid, and full of horrors, the husbands press
forward: the women, too, from curiosity, gloomily wish to see.
When all shall have contemplated the noble creature, vestige of some
epoch already damned, some indifferently, for they will not have had
strength to understand, but others, broken-hearted, and with eyelids
Page 484
wet with tears of resignation, will look at each other; while the poets of
those times, feeling their dim eyes rekindled, will make their way
toward their lamp, their brain for an instant drunk with confused glory,
haunted by Rhythm, and forgetful that they exist at an epoch which has
survived beauty.
those times, feeling their dim eyes rekindled, will make their way
toward their lamp, their brain for an instant drunk with confused glory,
haunted by Rhythm, and forgetful that they exist at an epoch which has
survived beauty.
Page 485
APPENDIX II[127]
No. 1
The following verses are by Vielé-Griffin, from page 28 of a volume of his
Poems:—
OISEAU BLEU COULEUR DU TEMPS
1
Sait-tu l'oubli
D'un vain doux rêve,
Oiseau moqueur
De la forêt?
Le jour pâlit,
La nuit se lève,
Et dans mon cœur
L'ombre a pleuré;
2
O chante-moi
Ta folle gamme,
Car j'ai dormi
Ce jour durant;
Le lâche emoi
Où fut mon âme
Sanglote ennui
Le jour mourant....
3
Sais-tu le chant
No. 1
The following verses are by Vielé-Griffin, from page 28 of a volume of his
Poems:—
OISEAU BLEU COULEUR DU TEMPS
1
Sait-tu l'oubli
D'un vain doux rêve,
Oiseau moqueur
De la forêt?
Le jour pâlit,
La nuit se lève,
Et dans mon cœur
L'ombre a pleuré;
2
O chante-moi
Ta folle gamme,
Car j'ai dormi
Ce jour durant;
Le lâche emoi
Où fut mon âme
Sanglote ennui
Le jour mourant....
3
Sais-tu le chant
Page 486
De sa parole
Et de sa voix,
Toi qui redis
Dans le couchant
Ton air frivole
Comme autrefois
Sous les midis?
4
O chante alors
La mélodie
De son amour,
Mon fol espoir,
Parmi les ors
Et l'incendie
Du vain doux jour
Qui meurt ce soir.
Francis Vielé-Griffin.
BLUE BIRD
1
Canst thou forget,
In dreams so vain,
Oh, mocking bird
Of forest deep?
The day doth set,
Night comes again,
My heart has heard
The shadows weep;
2
Et de sa voix,
Toi qui redis
Dans le couchant
Ton air frivole
Comme autrefois
Sous les midis?
4
O chante alors
La mélodie
De son amour,
Mon fol espoir,
Parmi les ors
Et l'incendie
Du vain doux jour
Qui meurt ce soir.
Francis Vielé-Griffin.
BLUE BIRD
1
Canst thou forget,
In dreams so vain,
Oh, mocking bird
Of forest deep?
The day doth set,
Night comes again,
My heart has heard
The shadows weep;
2
Page 487
Thy tones let flow
In maddening scale,
For I have slept
The livelong day;
Emotions low
In me now wail,
My soul they've kept:
Light dies away....
3
That music sweet,
Ah, do you know
Her voice and speech?
Your airs so light
You who repeat
In sunset's glow,
As you sang, each,
At noonday's height.
4
Of my desire,
My hope so bold,
Her love—up, sing,
Sing, 'neath this light,
This flaming fire,
And all the gold
The eve doth bring
Ere comes the night.
No. 2
And here are some verses by the esteemed young poet Verhaeren, which I
also take from page 28 of his Works:—
ATTIRANCES
In maddening scale,
For I have slept
The livelong day;
Emotions low
In me now wail,
My soul they've kept:
Light dies away....
3
That music sweet,
Ah, do you know
Her voice and speech?
Your airs so light
You who repeat
In sunset's glow,
As you sang, each,
At noonday's height.
4
Of my desire,
My hope so bold,
Her love—up, sing,
Sing, 'neath this light,
This flaming fire,
And all the gold
The eve doth bring
Ere comes the night.
No. 2
And here are some verses by the esteemed young poet Verhaeren, which I
also take from page 28 of his Works:—
ATTIRANCES
Page 488
Lointainement, et si étrangement pareils,
De grands masques d'argent que la brume recule,
Vaguent, au jour tombant, autour des vieux soleils.
Les doux lointaines!—et comme, au fond du crépuscule,
Ils nous fixent le cœur, immensément le cœur,
Avec les yeux défunts de leur visage d'âme.
C'est toujours du silence, à moins, dans la pâleur
Du soir, un jet de feu soudain, un cri de flamme,
Un départ de lumière inattendu vers Dieu.
On se laisse charmer et troubler de mystère,
Et l'on dirait des morts qui taisent un adieu
Trop mystique, pour être écouté par la terre!
Sont-ils le souvenir matériel et clair
Des éphèbes chrétiens couchés aux catacombes
Parmi les lys? Sont-ils leur regard et leur chair?
Ou seul, ce qui survit de merveilleux aux tombes
De ceux qui sont partis, vers leurs rêves, un soir,
Conquérir la folie à l'assaut des nuées?
Lointainement, combien nous les sentons vouloir
Un peu d'amour pour leurs œuvres destituées,
Pour leur errance et leur tristesse aux horizons.
Toujours! aux horizons du cœur et des pensées,
Alors que les vieux soirs éclatent en blasons
Soudains, pour les gloires noires et angoissées.
Émile Verhaeren,
Poèmes.
ATTRACTIONS
De grands masques d'argent que la brume recule,
Vaguent, au jour tombant, autour des vieux soleils.
Les doux lointaines!—et comme, au fond du crépuscule,
Ils nous fixent le cœur, immensément le cœur,
Avec les yeux défunts de leur visage d'âme.
C'est toujours du silence, à moins, dans la pâleur
Du soir, un jet de feu soudain, un cri de flamme,
Un départ de lumière inattendu vers Dieu.
On se laisse charmer et troubler de mystère,
Et l'on dirait des morts qui taisent un adieu
Trop mystique, pour être écouté par la terre!
Sont-ils le souvenir matériel et clair
Des éphèbes chrétiens couchés aux catacombes
Parmi les lys? Sont-ils leur regard et leur chair?
Ou seul, ce qui survit de merveilleux aux tombes
De ceux qui sont partis, vers leurs rêves, un soir,
Conquérir la folie à l'assaut des nuées?
Lointainement, combien nous les sentons vouloir
Un peu d'amour pour leurs œuvres destituées,
Pour leur errance et leur tristesse aux horizons.
Toujours! aux horizons du cœur et des pensées,
Alors que les vieux soirs éclatent en blasons
Soudains, pour les gloires noires et angoissées.
Émile Verhaeren,
Poèmes.
ATTRACTIONS
Page 489
Large masks of silver, by mists drawn away,
So strangely alike, yet so far apart.
Float round the old suns when faileth the day.
They transfix our heart, so immensely our heart,
Those distances mild, in the twilight deep,
Looking out of dead faces with their spirit eyes.
All around is now silence, except when there leap
In the pallor of evening, with fiery cries,
Some fountains of flame that God-ward do fly.
Mysterious trouble and charms us infold,
You might think that the dead spoke a silent good-by,
Oh! too mystical far on earth to be told!
Are they the memories, material and bright,
Of the Christian youths that in catacombs sleep
'Mid the lilies? Are they their flesh or their sight?
Or the marvel alone that survives, in the deep,
Of those that, one night, returned to their dream
Of conquering folly by assaulting the skies?
For their destitute works—we feel it seems,
For a little love their longing cries
From horizons far—for their errings and pain.
In horizons ever of heart and thought,
While the evenings old in bright blaze wane
Suddenly, for black glories anguish fraught.
No. 3
And the following is a poem by Moréas, evidently an admirer of Greek
beauty. It is from page 28 of a volume of his Poems:—
So strangely alike, yet so far apart.
Float round the old suns when faileth the day.
They transfix our heart, so immensely our heart,
Those distances mild, in the twilight deep,
Looking out of dead faces with their spirit eyes.
All around is now silence, except when there leap
In the pallor of evening, with fiery cries,
Some fountains of flame that God-ward do fly.
Mysterious trouble and charms us infold,
You might think that the dead spoke a silent good-by,
Oh! too mystical far on earth to be told!
Are they the memories, material and bright,
Of the Christian youths that in catacombs sleep
'Mid the lilies? Are they their flesh or their sight?
Or the marvel alone that survives, in the deep,
Of those that, one night, returned to their dream
Of conquering folly by assaulting the skies?
For their destitute works—we feel it seems,
For a little love their longing cries
From horizons far—for their errings and pain.
In horizons ever of heart and thought,
While the evenings old in bright blaze wane
Suddenly, for black glories anguish fraught.
No. 3
And the following is a poem by Moréas, evidently an admirer of Greek
beauty. It is from page 28 of a volume of his Poems:—
Page 490
ENONE AU CLAIR VISAGE
Enone, j'avais cru qu'en aimant ta beauté
Où l'âme avec le corps trouvent leur unité,
J'allais, m'affermissant et le cœur et l'esprit,
Monter jusqu'à cela qui jamais ne périt,
N'ayant été crée, qui n'est froideur ou feu,
Qui n'est beau quelque part et laid en autre lieu;
Et me flattais encor' d'une belle harmonie
Que j'eusse composé du meilleur et du pire,
Ainsi que le chanteur qui chérit Polimnie,
En accordant le grave avec l'aigu, retire
Un son bien élevé sur les nerfs de sa lyre.
Mais mon courage, hélas! se pâmant comme mort,
M'enseigna que le trait qui m'avait fait amant
Ne fut pas de cet arc que courbe sans effort
La Vénus qui naquit du mâle seulement,
Mais que j'avais souffert cette Vénus dernière,
Qui a le cœur couard, né d'une faible mère.
Et pourtant, ce mauvais garçon, chasseur habile,
Qui charge son carquois de sagette subtile,
Qui secoue en riant sa torche, pour un jour,
Qui ne pose jamais que sur de tendres fleurs,
C'est sur un teint charmant qu'il essuie les pleurs,
Et c'est encore un Dieu, Enone, cet Amour.
Mais, laisse, les oiseaux du printemps sont partis,
Et je vois les rayons du soleil amortis.
Enone, ma douleur, harmonieux visage,
Superbe humilité, doux honnête langage,
Hier me remirant dans cet étang glacé
Qui au bout du jardin se couvre de feuillage,
Sur ma face je vis que les jours ont passé.
Jean Moréas.
ENONE
Enone, in loving thy beauty, I thought,
Enone, j'avais cru qu'en aimant ta beauté
Où l'âme avec le corps trouvent leur unité,
J'allais, m'affermissant et le cœur et l'esprit,
Monter jusqu'à cela qui jamais ne périt,
N'ayant été crée, qui n'est froideur ou feu,
Qui n'est beau quelque part et laid en autre lieu;
Et me flattais encor' d'une belle harmonie
Que j'eusse composé du meilleur et du pire,
Ainsi que le chanteur qui chérit Polimnie,
En accordant le grave avec l'aigu, retire
Un son bien élevé sur les nerfs de sa lyre.
Mais mon courage, hélas! se pâmant comme mort,
M'enseigna que le trait qui m'avait fait amant
Ne fut pas de cet arc que courbe sans effort
La Vénus qui naquit du mâle seulement,
Mais que j'avais souffert cette Vénus dernière,
Qui a le cœur couard, né d'une faible mère.
Et pourtant, ce mauvais garçon, chasseur habile,
Qui charge son carquois de sagette subtile,
Qui secoue en riant sa torche, pour un jour,
Qui ne pose jamais que sur de tendres fleurs,
C'est sur un teint charmant qu'il essuie les pleurs,
Et c'est encore un Dieu, Enone, cet Amour.
Mais, laisse, les oiseaux du printemps sont partis,
Et je vois les rayons du soleil amortis.
Enone, ma douleur, harmonieux visage,
Superbe humilité, doux honnête langage,
Hier me remirant dans cet étang glacé
Qui au bout du jardin se couvre de feuillage,
Sur ma face je vis que les jours ont passé.
Jean Moréas.
ENONE
Enone, in loving thy beauty, I thought,
Page 491
Where the soul and the body to union are brought,
That mounting by steadying my heart and my mind,
In that which can't perish, myself I should find.
For it ne'er was created, is not ugly and fair;
Is not coldness in one part, while on fire it is there.
Yes, I flattered myself that a harmony fine
I'd succeed to compose of the worst and the best,
Like the bard who adores Polyhymnia divine,
And mingling sounds different from the nerves of his lyre,
From the grave and the smart draws melodies higher.
But, alas! my courage, so faint and nigh spent,
The dart that has struck me proves without fail
Not to be from that bow which is easily bent
By the Venus that's born alone of the male.
No, 'twas that other Venus that caused me to smart,
Born of frail mother with cowardly heart.
And yet that naughty lad, that little hunter bold,
Who laughs and shakes his flowery torch just for a day,
Who never rests but upon tender flowers and gay,
On sweetest skin who dries the tears his eyes that fill,
Yet oh, Enone mine, a God's that Cupid still.
Let it pass; for the birds of the Spring are away,
And dying I see the sun's lingering ray.
Enone, my sorrow, oh, harmonious face,
Humility grand, words of virtue and grace,
I looked yestere'en in the pond frozen fast,
Strewn with leaves at the end of the garden's fair space,
And I read in my face that those days are now past.
No. 4
And this is also from page 28 of a thick book, full of similar poems, by M.
Montesquiou.
That mounting by steadying my heart and my mind,
In that which can't perish, myself I should find.
For it ne'er was created, is not ugly and fair;
Is not coldness in one part, while on fire it is there.
Yes, I flattered myself that a harmony fine
I'd succeed to compose of the worst and the best,
Like the bard who adores Polyhymnia divine,
And mingling sounds different from the nerves of his lyre,
From the grave and the smart draws melodies higher.
But, alas! my courage, so faint and nigh spent,
The dart that has struck me proves without fail
Not to be from that bow which is easily bent
By the Venus that's born alone of the male.
No, 'twas that other Venus that caused me to smart,
Born of frail mother with cowardly heart.
And yet that naughty lad, that little hunter bold,
Who laughs and shakes his flowery torch just for a day,
Who never rests but upon tender flowers and gay,
On sweetest skin who dries the tears his eyes that fill,
Yet oh, Enone mine, a God's that Cupid still.
Let it pass; for the birds of the Spring are away,
And dying I see the sun's lingering ray.
Enone, my sorrow, oh, harmonious face,
Humility grand, words of virtue and grace,
I looked yestere'en in the pond frozen fast,
Strewn with leaves at the end of the garden's fair space,
And I read in my face that those days are now past.
No. 4
And this is also from page 28 of a thick book, full of similar poems, by M.
Montesquiou.
Page 492
BERCEUSE D'OMBRE
Des formes, des formes, des formes
Blanche, bleue, et rose, et d'or
Descendront du haut des ormes
Sur l'enfant qui se rendort.
Des formes!
Des plumes, des plumes, des plumes
Pour composer un doux nid.
Midi sonne: les enclumes
Cessent; la rumeur finit....
Des plumes!
Des roses, des roses, des roses
Pour embaumer son sommeil,
Vos pétales sont moroses
Près du sourire vermeil.
O roses!
Des ailes, des ailes, des ailes
Pour bourdonner à sont front,
Abeilles et demoiselles,
Des rythmes qui berceront.
Des ailes!
Des branches, des branches, des branches
Pour tresser un pavillon,
Par où des clartés moins franches
Descendront sur l'oisillon.
Des branches!
Des songes, des songes, des songes
Dans ses pensers entr' ouverts
Glissez un peu de mensonges
A voir le vie au travers
Des songes!
Des formes, des formes, des formes
Blanche, bleue, et rose, et d'or
Descendront du haut des ormes
Sur l'enfant qui se rendort.
Des formes!
Des plumes, des plumes, des plumes
Pour composer un doux nid.
Midi sonne: les enclumes
Cessent; la rumeur finit....
Des plumes!
Des roses, des roses, des roses
Pour embaumer son sommeil,
Vos pétales sont moroses
Près du sourire vermeil.
O roses!
Des ailes, des ailes, des ailes
Pour bourdonner à sont front,
Abeilles et demoiselles,
Des rythmes qui berceront.
Des ailes!
Des branches, des branches, des branches
Pour tresser un pavillon,
Par où des clartés moins franches
Descendront sur l'oisillon.
Des branches!
Des songes, des songes, des songes
Dans ses pensers entr' ouverts
Glissez un peu de mensonges
A voir le vie au travers
Des songes!
Page 493
Des fées, des fées, des fées
Pour filer leurs écheveaux
Des mirages, de bouffées
Dans tous ces petits cerveaux.
Des fées!
Des anges, des anges, des anges
Pour emporter dans l'éther
Les petits enfants étranges
Qui ne veulent pas rester....
Nos anges!
Comte Robert de Montesquiou-Fezensac,
Les Hortensias Bleus.
THE SHADOW LULLABY
Oh forms, oh forms, oh forms
White, blue, and gold, and red
Descending from the elm trees,
On sleeping baby's head.
Oh forms!
Oh feathers, feathers, feathers
To make a cozy nest.
Twelve striking: stops the clamor;
The anvils are at rest....
Oh feathers!
Oh roses, roses, roses
To scent his sleep awhile,
Pale are your fragrant petals
Beside his ruby smile.
Oh roses!
Oh wings, oh wings, oh wings
Pour filer leurs écheveaux
Des mirages, de bouffées
Dans tous ces petits cerveaux.
Des fées!
Des anges, des anges, des anges
Pour emporter dans l'éther
Les petits enfants étranges
Qui ne veulent pas rester....
Nos anges!
Comte Robert de Montesquiou-Fezensac,
Les Hortensias Bleus.
THE SHADOW LULLABY
Oh forms, oh forms, oh forms
White, blue, and gold, and red
Descending from the elm trees,
On sleeping baby's head.
Oh forms!
Oh feathers, feathers, feathers
To make a cozy nest.
Twelve striking: stops the clamor;
The anvils are at rest....
Oh feathers!
Oh roses, roses, roses
To scent his sleep awhile,
Pale are your fragrant petals
Beside his ruby smile.
Oh roses!
Oh wings, oh wings, oh wings
Page 494
Of bees and dragon-flies,
To hum around his forehead,
And lull him with your sighs.
Oh wings!
Branches, branches, branches
A shady bower to twine,
Through which, oh daylight, faintly
Descend on birdie mine.
Branches!
Oh dreams, oh dreams, oh dreams
Into his opening mind,
Let in a little falsehood
With sights of life behind.
Dreams!
Oh fairies, fairies, fairies
To twine and twist their threads
With puffs of phantom visions
Into these little heads.
Fairies!
Angels, angels, angels
To the ether far away,
Those children strange to carry
That here don't wish to stay....
Our angels!
To hum around his forehead,
And lull him with your sighs.
Oh wings!
Branches, branches, branches
A shady bower to twine,
Through which, oh daylight, faintly
Descend on birdie mine.
Branches!
Oh dreams, oh dreams, oh dreams
Into his opening mind,
Let in a little falsehood
With sights of life behind.
Dreams!
Oh fairies, fairies, fairies
To twine and twist their threads
With puffs of phantom visions
Into these little heads.
Fairies!
Angels, angels, angels
To the ether far away,
Those children strange to carry
That here don't wish to stay....
Our angels!
Page 495
APPENDIX III
These are the contents of "The Nibelung's Ring":—
The first part tells that the nymphs, the daughters of the Rhine, for some
reason guard gold in the Rhine, and sing: Weia, Waga, Woge du Welle,
Walle zur Wiege, Wagala-weia, Wallala, Weiala, Weia, and so forth.
These singing nymphs are pursued by a gnome (a nibelung) who desires to
seize them. The gnome cannot catch any of them. Then the nymphs
guarding the gold tell the gnome just what they ought to keep secret,
namely, that whoever renounces love will be able to steal the gold they are
guarding. And the gnome renounces love, and steals the gold. This ends the
first scene.
In the second scene a god and a goddess lie in a field in sight of a castle
which giants have built for them. Presently they wake up and are pleased
with the castle, and they relate that in payment for this work they must give
the goddess Freia to the giants. The giants come for their pay. But the god
Wotan objects to parting with Freia. The giants get angry. The gods hear
that the gnome has stolen the gold, promise to confiscate it, and to pay the
giants with it. But the giants won't trust them, and seize the goddess Freia in
pledge.
The third scene takes place underground. The gnome Alberich, who stole
the gold, for some reason beats a gnome, Mime, and takes from him a
helmet which has the power both of making people invisible and of turning
them into other animals. The gods, Wotan and others, appear and quarrel
with one another and with the gnomes, and wish to take the gold, but
Alberich won't give it up, and (like everybody all through the piece)
behaves in a way to insure his own ruin. He puts on the helmet, and
becomes first a dragon and then a toad. The gods catch the toad, take the
helmet off it, and carry Alberich away with them.
Scene IV. The gods bring Alberich to their home, and order him to
command his gnomes to bring them all the gold. The gnomes bring it.
Alberich gives up the gold, but keeps a magic ring. The gods take the ring.
These are the contents of "The Nibelung's Ring":—
The first part tells that the nymphs, the daughters of the Rhine, for some
reason guard gold in the Rhine, and sing: Weia, Waga, Woge du Welle,
Walle zur Wiege, Wagala-weia, Wallala, Weiala, Weia, and so forth.
These singing nymphs are pursued by a gnome (a nibelung) who desires to
seize them. The gnome cannot catch any of them. Then the nymphs
guarding the gold tell the gnome just what they ought to keep secret,
namely, that whoever renounces love will be able to steal the gold they are
guarding. And the gnome renounces love, and steals the gold. This ends the
first scene.
In the second scene a god and a goddess lie in a field in sight of a castle
which giants have built for them. Presently they wake up and are pleased
with the castle, and they relate that in payment for this work they must give
the goddess Freia to the giants. The giants come for their pay. But the god
Wotan objects to parting with Freia. The giants get angry. The gods hear
that the gnome has stolen the gold, promise to confiscate it, and to pay the
giants with it. But the giants won't trust them, and seize the goddess Freia in
pledge.
The third scene takes place underground. The gnome Alberich, who stole
the gold, for some reason beats a gnome, Mime, and takes from him a
helmet which has the power both of making people invisible and of turning
them into other animals. The gods, Wotan and others, appear and quarrel
with one another and with the gnomes, and wish to take the gold, but
Alberich won't give it up, and (like everybody all through the piece)
behaves in a way to insure his own ruin. He puts on the helmet, and
becomes first a dragon and then a toad. The gods catch the toad, take the
helmet off it, and carry Alberich away with them.
Scene IV. The gods bring Alberich to their home, and order him to
command his gnomes to bring them all the gold. The gnomes bring it.
Alberich gives up the gold, but keeps a magic ring. The gods take the ring.
Page 496
So Alberich curses the ring, and says it is to bring misfortune on any one
who has it. The giants appear; they bring the goddess Freia, and demand her
ransom. They stick up staves of Freia's height, and gold is poured in
between these staves: this is to be the ransom. There is not enough gold, so
the helmet is thrown in, and they also demand the ring. Wotan refuses to
give it up, but the goddess Erda appears and commands him to do so,
because it brings misfortune. Wotan gives it up. Freia is released. The
giants, having received the ring, fight, and one of them kills the other. This
ends the Prelude, and we come to the First Day.
The scene shows a house in a tree. Siegmund runs in tired, and lies down.
Sieglinda, the mistress of the house (and wife of Hunding), gives him a
drugged draught, and they fall in love with each other. Sieglinda's husband
comes home, learns that Siegmund belongs to a hostile race, and wishes to
fight him next day; but Sieglinda drugs her husband, and comes to
Siegmund. Siegmund discovers that Sieglinda is his sister, and that his
father drove a sword into the tree so that no one can get it out. Siegmund
pulls the sword out, and commits incest with his sister.
Act II. Siegmund is to fight with Hunding. The gods discuss the question to
whom they shall award the victory. Wotan, approving of Siegmund's incest
with his sister, wishes to spare him, but, under pressure from his wife,
Fricka, he orders the Valkyrie Brünnhilda to kill Siegmund. Siegmund goes
to fight; Sieglinda faints. Brünnhilda appears and wishes to slay Siegmund.
Siegmund wishes to kill Sieglinda also, but Brünnhilda does not allow it; so
he fights with Hunding. Brünnhilda defends Siegmund, but Wotan defends
Hunding. Siegmund's sword breaks, and he is killed. Sieglinda runs away.
Act III. The Valkyries (divine Amazons) are on the stage. The Valkyrie
Brünnhilda arrives on horseback, bringing Siegmund's body. She is flying
from Wotan, who is chasing her for her disobedience. Wotan catches her,
and as a punishment dismisses her from her post as a Valkyrie. He casts a
spell on her, so that she has to go to sleep and to continue asleep until a man
wakes her. When some one wakes her she will fall in love with him. Wotan
kisses her; she falls asleep. He lets off fire, which surrounds her.
We now come to the Second Day. The gnome Mime forges a sword in a
wood. Siegfried appears. He is a son born from the incest of brother with
sister (Siegmund with Sieglinda), and has been brought up in this wood by
who has it. The giants appear; they bring the goddess Freia, and demand her
ransom. They stick up staves of Freia's height, and gold is poured in
between these staves: this is to be the ransom. There is not enough gold, so
the helmet is thrown in, and they also demand the ring. Wotan refuses to
give it up, but the goddess Erda appears and commands him to do so,
because it brings misfortune. Wotan gives it up. Freia is released. The
giants, having received the ring, fight, and one of them kills the other. This
ends the Prelude, and we come to the First Day.
The scene shows a house in a tree. Siegmund runs in tired, and lies down.
Sieglinda, the mistress of the house (and wife of Hunding), gives him a
drugged draught, and they fall in love with each other. Sieglinda's husband
comes home, learns that Siegmund belongs to a hostile race, and wishes to
fight him next day; but Sieglinda drugs her husband, and comes to
Siegmund. Siegmund discovers that Sieglinda is his sister, and that his
father drove a sword into the tree so that no one can get it out. Siegmund
pulls the sword out, and commits incest with his sister.
Act II. Siegmund is to fight with Hunding. The gods discuss the question to
whom they shall award the victory. Wotan, approving of Siegmund's incest
with his sister, wishes to spare him, but, under pressure from his wife,
Fricka, he orders the Valkyrie Brünnhilda to kill Siegmund. Siegmund goes
to fight; Sieglinda faints. Brünnhilda appears and wishes to slay Siegmund.
Siegmund wishes to kill Sieglinda also, but Brünnhilda does not allow it; so
he fights with Hunding. Brünnhilda defends Siegmund, but Wotan defends
Hunding. Siegmund's sword breaks, and he is killed. Sieglinda runs away.
Act III. The Valkyries (divine Amazons) are on the stage. The Valkyrie
Brünnhilda arrives on horseback, bringing Siegmund's body. She is flying
from Wotan, who is chasing her for her disobedience. Wotan catches her,
and as a punishment dismisses her from her post as a Valkyrie. He casts a
spell on her, so that she has to go to sleep and to continue asleep until a man
wakes her. When some one wakes her she will fall in love with him. Wotan
kisses her; she falls asleep. He lets off fire, which surrounds her.
We now come to the Second Day. The gnome Mime forges a sword in a
wood. Siegfried appears. He is a son born from the incest of brother with
sister (Siegmund with Sieglinda), and has been brought up in this wood by
Page 497
the gnome. In general the motives of the actions of everybody in this
production are quite unintelligible. Siegfried learns his own origin, and that
the broken sword was his father's. He orders Mime to reforge it, and then
goes off. Wotan comes in the guise of a wanderer, and relates what will
happen: that he who has not learnt to fear will forge the sword, and will
defeat everybody. The gnome conjectures that this is Siegfried, and wants to
poison him. Siegfried returns, forges his father's sword, and runs off,
shouting, Heiho! heiho! heiho! Ho! ho! Aha! oho! aha! Heiaho! heiaho!
heiaho! Ho! ho! Hahei! hoho! hahei!
And we get to Act II. Alberich sits guarding a giant, who, in form of a
dragon, guards the gold he has received. Wotan appears, and for some
unknown reason foretells that Siegfried will come and kill the dragon.
Alberich wakes the dragon, and asks him for the ring, promising to defend
him from Siegfried. The dragon won't give up the ring. Exit Alberich. Mime
and Siegfried appear. Mime hopes the dragon will teach Siegfried to fear.
But Siegfried does not fear. He drives Mime away and kills the dragon,
after which he puts his finger, smeared with the dragon's blood, to his lips.
This enables him to know men's secret thoughts, as well as the language of
birds. The birds tell him where the treasure and the ring are, and also that
Mime wishes to poison him. Mime returns, and says out loud that he wishes
to poison Siegfried. This is meant to signify that Siegfried, having tasted
dragon's blood, understands people's secret thoughts. Siegfried, having
learnt Mime's intentions, kills him. The birds tell Siegfried where
Brünnhilda is, and he goes to find her.
Act III. Wotan calls up Erda. Erda prophesies to Wotan, and gives him
advice. Siegfried appears, quarrels with Wotan, and they fight. Suddenly
Siegfried's sword breaks Wotan's spear, which had been more powerful than
anything else. Siegfried goes into the fire to Brünnhilda: kisses her; she
wakes up, abandons her divinity, and throws herself into Siegfried's arms.
Third Day. Prelude. Three Norns plait a golden rope, and talk about the
future. They go away. Siegfried and Brünnhilda appear. Siegfried takes
leave of her, gives her the ring, and goes away.
Act I. By the Rhine. A king wants to get married, and also to give his sister
in marriage. Hagen, the king's wicked brother, advises him to marry
Brünnhilda and to give his sister to Siegfried. Siegfried appears; they give
production are quite unintelligible. Siegfried learns his own origin, and that
the broken sword was his father's. He orders Mime to reforge it, and then
goes off. Wotan comes in the guise of a wanderer, and relates what will
happen: that he who has not learnt to fear will forge the sword, and will
defeat everybody. The gnome conjectures that this is Siegfried, and wants to
poison him. Siegfried returns, forges his father's sword, and runs off,
shouting, Heiho! heiho! heiho! Ho! ho! Aha! oho! aha! Heiaho! heiaho!
heiaho! Ho! ho! Hahei! hoho! hahei!
And we get to Act II. Alberich sits guarding a giant, who, in form of a
dragon, guards the gold he has received. Wotan appears, and for some
unknown reason foretells that Siegfried will come and kill the dragon.
Alberich wakes the dragon, and asks him for the ring, promising to defend
him from Siegfried. The dragon won't give up the ring. Exit Alberich. Mime
and Siegfried appear. Mime hopes the dragon will teach Siegfried to fear.
But Siegfried does not fear. He drives Mime away and kills the dragon,
after which he puts his finger, smeared with the dragon's blood, to his lips.
This enables him to know men's secret thoughts, as well as the language of
birds. The birds tell him where the treasure and the ring are, and also that
Mime wishes to poison him. Mime returns, and says out loud that he wishes
to poison Siegfried. This is meant to signify that Siegfried, having tasted
dragon's blood, understands people's secret thoughts. Siegfried, having
learnt Mime's intentions, kills him. The birds tell Siegfried where
Brünnhilda is, and he goes to find her.
Act III. Wotan calls up Erda. Erda prophesies to Wotan, and gives him
advice. Siegfried appears, quarrels with Wotan, and they fight. Suddenly
Siegfried's sword breaks Wotan's spear, which had been more powerful than
anything else. Siegfried goes into the fire to Brünnhilda: kisses her; she
wakes up, abandons her divinity, and throws herself into Siegfried's arms.
Third Day. Prelude. Three Norns plait a golden rope, and talk about the
future. They go away. Siegfried and Brünnhilda appear. Siegfried takes
leave of her, gives her the ring, and goes away.
Act I. By the Rhine. A king wants to get married, and also to give his sister
in marriage. Hagen, the king's wicked brother, advises him to marry
Brünnhilda and to give his sister to Siegfried. Siegfried appears; they give
Page 498
him a drugged draught, which makes him forget all the past and fall in love
with the king's sister, Gutrune. So he rides off with Gunther, the king, to get
Brünnhilda to be the king's bride. The scene changes. Brünnhilda sits with
the ring. A Valkyrie comes to her and tells her that Wotan's spear is broken,
and advises her to give the ring to the Rhine nymphs. Siegfried comes, and
by means of the magic helmet turns himself into Gunther, demands the ring
from Brünnhilda, seizes it, and drags her off to sleep with him.
Act II. By the Rhine. Alberich and Hagen discuss how to get the ring.
Siegfried comes, tells how he has obtained a bride for Gunther and spent
the night with her, but put a sword between himself and her. Brünnhilda
rides up, recognizes the ring on Siegfried's hand, and declares that it was he,
and not Gunther, who was with her. Hagen stirs everybody up against
Siegfried, and decides to kill him next day when hunting.
Act III. Again the nymphs in the Rhine relate what has happened. Siegfried,
who has lost his way, appears. The nymphs ask him for the ring, but he
won't give it up. Hunters appear. Siegfried tells the story of his life. Hagen
then gives him a draught, which causes his memory to return to him.
Siegfried relates how he aroused and obtained Brünnhilda, and every one is
astonished. Hagen stabs him in the back, and the scene is changed. Gutrune
meets the corpse of Siegfried. Gunther and Hagen quarrel about the ring,
and Hagen kills Gunther. Brünnhilda cries. Hagen wishes to take the ring
from Siegfried's hand, but the hand of the corpse raises itself threateningly.
Brünnhilda takes the ring from Siegfried's hand, and when Siegfried's
corpse is carried to the pyre, she gets on to a horse and leaps into the fire.
The Rhine rises, and the waves reach the pyre. In the river are three
nymphs. Hagen throws himself into the fire to get the ring, but the nymphs
seize him and carry him off. One of them holds the ring; and that is the end
of the matter.
The impression obtainable from my recapitulation is, of course, incomplete.
But however incomplete it may be, it is certainly infinitely more favorable
than the impression which results from reading the four booklets in which
the work is printed.
with the king's sister, Gutrune. So he rides off with Gunther, the king, to get
Brünnhilda to be the king's bride. The scene changes. Brünnhilda sits with
the ring. A Valkyrie comes to her and tells her that Wotan's spear is broken,
and advises her to give the ring to the Rhine nymphs. Siegfried comes, and
by means of the magic helmet turns himself into Gunther, demands the ring
from Brünnhilda, seizes it, and drags her off to sleep with him.
Act II. By the Rhine. Alberich and Hagen discuss how to get the ring.
Siegfried comes, tells how he has obtained a bride for Gunther and spent
the night with her, but put a sword between himself and her. Brünnhilda
rides up, recognizes the ring on Siegfried's hand, and declares that it was he,
and not Gunther, who was with her. Hagen stirs everybody up against
Siegfried, and decides to kill him next day when hunting.
Act III. Again the nymphs in the Rhine relate what has happened. Siegfried,
who has lost his way, appears. The nymphs ask him for the ring, but he
won't give it up. Hunters appear. Siegfried tells the story of his life. Hagen
then gives him a draught, which causes his memory to return to him.
Siegfried relates how he aroused and obtained Brünnhilda, and every one is
astonished. Hagen stabs him in the back, and the scene is changed. Gutrune
meets the corpse of Siegfried. Gunther and Hagen quarrel about the ring,
and Hagen kills Gunther. Brünnhilda cries. Hagen wishes to take the ring
from Siegfried's hand, but the hand of the corpse raises itself threateningly.
Brünnhilda takes the ring from Siegfried's hand, and when Siegfried's
corpse is carried to the pyre, she gets on to a horse and leaps into the fire.
The Rhine rises, and the waves reach the pyre. In the river are three
nymphs. Hagen throws himself into the fire to get the ring, but the nymphs
seize him and carry him off. One of them holds the ring; and that is the end
of the matter.
The impression obtainable from my recapitulation is, of course, incomplete.
But however incomplete it may be, it is certainly infinitely more favorable
than the impression which results from reading the four booklets in which
the work is printed.
Page 499
APPENDIX IV
Translations of French poems and prose quoted in Chapter X.
BAUDELAIRE'S "FLOWERS OF EVIL"
No. XXIV
I adore thee as much as the vaults of night,
O vase full of grief, taciturnity great,
And I love thee the more because of thy flight.
It seemeth, my night's beautifier, that you
Still heap up those leagues—yes! ironically heap!
That divide from my arms the immensity blue.
I advance to attack, I climb to assault,
Like a choir of young worms at a corpse in the vault;
Thy coldness, oh cruel, implacable beast!
Yet heightens thy beauty, on which my eyes feast!
BAUDELAIRE'S "FLOWERS OF EVIL"
No. XXXVI
DUELLUM
Two warriors come running, to fight they begin,
With gleaming and blood they bespatter the air;
These games, and this clatter of arms, is the din
Of youth that's a prey to the surgings of love.
The rapiers are broken! and so is our youth,
But the dagger's avenged, dear! and so is the sword,
Translations of French poems and prose quoted in Chapter X.
BAUDELAIRE'S "FLOWERS OF EVIL"
No. XXIV
I adore thee as much as the vaults of night,
O vase full of grief, taciturnity great,
And I love thee the more because of thy flight.
It seemeth, my night's beautifier, that you
Still heap up those leagues—yes! ironically heap!
That divide from my arms the immensity blue.
I advance to attack, I climb to assault,
Like a choir of young worms at a corpse in the vault;
Thy coldness, oh cruel, implacable beast!
Yet heightens thy beauty, on which my eyes feast!
BAUDELAIRE'S "FLOWERS OF EVIL"
No. XXXVI
DUELLUM
Two warriors come running, to fight they begin,
With gleaming and blood they bespatter the air;
These games, and this clatter of arms, is the din
Of youth that's a prey to the surgings of love.
The rapiers are broken! and so is our youth,
But the dagger's avenged, dear! and so is the sword,
Page 500
By the nail that is steeled and the hardened tooth.
Oh, the fury of hearts aged and ulcered by love!
In the ditch, where the ounce and the pard have their lair,
Our heroes have rolled in an angry embrace;
Their skin blooms on brambles that erewhile were bare.
That ravine is a friend-inhabited hell!
Then let us roll in, oh woman inhuman,
To immortalize hatred that nothing can quell!
FROM BAUDELAIRE'S PROSE WORK ENTITLED "LITTLE POEMS"
THE STRANGER
Whom dost thou love best? say, enigmatical man—thy father, thy mother,
thy brother, or thy sister?
"I have neither father, nor mother, nor sister, nor brother."
Thy friends?
"You there use an expression the meaning of which till now remains
unknown to me."
Thy country?
"I ignore in what latitude it is situated."
Beauty?
"I would gladly love her, goddess and immortal."
Gold?
"I hate it as you hate God."
Then what do you love, extraordinary stranger?
"I love the clouds ... the clouds that pass ... there ... the marvelous clouds!"
Oh, the fury of hearts aged and ulcered by love!
In the ditch, where the ounce and the pard have their lair,
Our heroes have rolled in an angry embrace;
Their skin blooms on brambles that erewhile were bare.
That ravine is a friend-inhabited hell!
Then let us roll in, oh woman inhuman,
To immortalize hatred that nothing can quell!
FROM BAUDELAIRE'S PROSE WORK ENTITLED "LITTLE POEMS"
THE STRANGER
Whom dost thou love best? say, enigmatical man—thy father, thy mother,
thy brother, or thy sister?
"I have neither father, nor mother, nor sister, nor brother."
Thy friends?
"You there use an expression the meaning of which till now remains
unknown to me."
Thy country?
"I ignore in what latitude it is situated."
Beauty?
"I would gladly love her, goddess and immortal."
Gold?
"I hate it as you hate God."
Then what do you love, extraordinary stranger?
"I love the clouds ... the clouds that pass ... there ... the marvelous clouds!"
Page 501
BAUDELAIRE'S PROSE POEM
THE SOUP AND THE CLOUDS
My beloved little silly was giving me my dinner, and I was contemplating,
through the open window of the dining-room, those moving architectures
which God makes out of vapors, the marvelous constructions of the
impalpable. And I said to myself, amid my contemplations, "All these
phantasmagoria are almost as beautiful as the eyes of my beautiful beloved,
the monstrous little silly with the green eyes."
Suddenly I felt the violent blow of a fist on my back, and I heard a harsh,
charming voice, an hysterical voice, as it were hoarse with brandy, the voice
of my dear little well-beloved, saying, "Are you going to eat your soup
soon, you d—— b—— of a dealer in clouds?"
BAUDELAIRE'S PROSE POEM
THE GALLANT MARKSMAN
As the carriage was passing through the forest, he ordered it to be stopped
near a shooting-gallery, saying that he wished to shoot off a few bullets to
kill Time. To kill this monster, is it not the most ordinary and the most
legitimate occupation of every one? And he gallantly offered his arm to his
dear, delicious, and execrable wife—that mysterious woman to whom he
owed so much pleasure, so much pain, and perhaps also a large part of his
genius.
Several bullets struck far from the intended mark—one even penetrated the
ceiling; and as the charming creature laughed madly, mocking her husband's
awkwardness, he turned abruptly toward her and said, "Look at that doll
there on the right with the haughty mien and her nose in the air; well, dear
angel, I imagine to myself that it is you!" And he closed his eyes and pulled
the trigger. The doll was neatly decapitated.
Then, bowing toward his dear one, his delightful, execrable wife, his
inevitable pitiless muse, and kissing her hand respectfully, he added, "Ah!
my dear angel, how I thank you for my skill!"
THE SOUP AND THE CLOUDS
My beloved little silly was giving me my dinner, and I was contemplating,
through the open window of the dining-room, those moving architectures
which God makes out of vapors, the marvelous constructions of the
impalpable. And I said to myself, amid my contemplations, "All these
phantasmagoria are almost as beautiful as the eyes of my beautiful beloved,
the monstrous little silly with the green eyes."
Suddenly I felt the violent blow of a fist on my back, and I heard a harsh,
charming voice, an hysterical voice, as it were hoarse with brandy, the voice
of my dear little well-beloved, saying, "Are you going to eat your soup
soon, you d—— b—— of a dealer in clouds?"
BAUDELAIRE'S PROSE POEM
THE GALLANT MARKSMAN
As the carriage was passing through the forest, he ordered it to be stopped
near a shooting-gallery, saying that he wished to shoot off a few bullets to
kill Time. To kill this monster, is it not the most ordinary and the most
legitimate occupation of every one? And he gallantly offered his arm to his
dear, delicious, and execrable wife—that mysterious woman to whom he
owed so much pleasure, so much pain, and perhaps also a large part of his
genius.
Several bullets struck far from the intended mark—one even penetrated the
ceiling; and as the charming creature laughed madly, mocking her husband's
awkwardness, he turned abruptly toward her and said, "Look at that doll
there on the right with the haughty mien and her nose in the air; well, dear
angel, I imagine to myself that it is you!" And he closed his eyes and pulled
the trigger. The doll was neatly decapitated.
Then, bowing toward his dear one, his delightful, execrable wife, his
inevitable pitiless muse, and kissing her hand respectfully, he added, "Ah!
my dear angel, how I thank you for my skill!"
Page 502
VERLAINE'S "FORGOTTEN AIRS"
No. I
"The wind in the plain
Suspends its breath."—Favart.
'Tis ecstasy languishing,
Amorous fatigue,
Of woods all the shudderings
Embraced by the breeze,
'Tis the choir of small voices
Toward the gray trees.
Oh, the frail and fresh murmuring!
The twitter and buzz,
The soft cry resembling
That's expired by the grass....
Oh, the roll of the pebbles
'Neath waters that pass!
Oh, this soul that is groaning
In sleepy complaint!
In us is it moaning?
In me and in you?
Low anthem exhaling
While soft falls the dew.
VERLAINE'S "FORGOTTEN AIRS"
No. VIII
In the unending
Dullness of this land,
Uncertain the snow
Is gleaming like sand.
No. I
"The wind in the plain
Suspends its breath."—Favart.
'Tis ecstasy languishing,
Amorous fatigue,
Of woods all the shudderings
Embraced by the breeze,
'Tis the choir of small voices
Toward the gray trees.
Oh, the frail and fresh murmuring!
The twitter and buzz,
The soft cry resembling
That's expired by the grass....
Oh, the roll of the pebbles
'Neath waters that pass!
Oh, this soul that is groaning
In sleepy complaint!
In us is it moaning?
In me and in you?
Low anthem exhaling
While soft falls the dew.
VERLAINE'S "FORGOTTEN AIRS"
No. VIII
In the unending
Dullness of this land,
Uncertain the snow
Is gleaming like sand.
Page 503
No kind of brightness
In copper-hued sky,
The moon you might see
Now live and now die.
Gray float the oak trees—
Cloudlike they seem—
Of neighboring forests,
The mists in between.
Wolves hungry and lean,
And famishing crow,
What happens to you
When acid winds blow?
In the unending
Dullness of this land,
Uncertain the snow
Is gleaming like sand.
SONG BY MAETERLINCK
When he went away,
(Then I heard the door)
When he went away,
On her lips a smile there lay....
Back he came to her,
(Then I heard the lamp)
Back he came to her,
Someone else was there....
It was death I met,
(And I heard her soul)
It was death I met,
For her he's waiting yet....
In copper-hued sky,
The moon you might see
Now live and now die.
Gray float the oak trees—
Cloudlike they seem—
Of neighboring forests,
The mists in between.
Wolves hungry and lean,
And famishing crow,
What happens to you
When acid winds blow?
In the unending
Dullness of this land,
Uncertain the snow
Is gleaming like sand.
SONG BY MAETERLINCK
When he went away,
(Then I heard the door)
When he went away,
On her lips a smile there lay....
Back he came to her,
(Then I heard the lamp)
Back he came to her,
Someone else was there....
It was death I met,
(And I heard her soul)
It was death I met,
For her he's waiting yet....
Page 504
Someone came to say,
(Child, I am afraid)
Someone came to say
That he would go away....
With my lamp alight,
(Child, I am afraid)
With my lamp alight,
Approached I in affright....
To one door I came,
(Child, I am afraid)
To one door I came,
A shudder shook the flame....
At the second door,
(Child, I am afraid)
At the second door
Forth words of flame did pour....
To the third I came,
(Child, I am afraid)
To the third I came,
Then died the little flame....
Should he one day return
Then what shall we say?
Waiting, tell him, one
And dying for him lay....
If he asks for you,
Say what answer then?
Give him my gold ring
And answer not a thing....
Should he question me
Concerning the last hour?
Say I smiled for fear
(Child, I am afraid)
Someone came to say
That he would go away....
With my lamp alight,
(Child, I am afraid)
With my lamp alight,
Approached I in affright....
To one door I came,
(Child, I am afraid)
To one door I came,
A shudder shook the flame....
At the second door,
(Child, I am afraid)
At the second door
Forth words of flame did pour....
To the third I came,
(Child, I am afraid)
To the third I came,
Then died the little flame....
Should he one day return
Then what shall we say?
Waiting, tell him, one
And dying for him lay....
If he asks for you,
Say what answer then?
Give him my gold ring
And answer not a thing....
Should he question me
Concerning the last hour?
Say I smiled for fear
Page 505
That he should shed a tear....
Should he question more
Without knowing me?
Like a sister speak;
Suffering he may be....
Should he question why
Empty is the hall?
Show the gaping door,
The lamp alight no more....
FOOTNOTES:
[1] From the Russian version, which Count Tolstoï calls a free translation made
with some omissions. After diligent search and inquiry I have been unable to
find this catechism among Ballou's works.—Tr.
[2] I know of but one criticism, or rather essay, for it can hardly be termed
criticism, in the strict sense of the word, which treats of the same subject, having
my book in view. It is a pamphlet by Troïtzky, called "The Sermon on the
Mount" (printed in Kazan). Evidently the author acknowledges the doctrine of
Christ in the fullness of its meaning. He declares that the commandment of non-
resistance to evil means what it says, and the same with the commandment as to
taking an oath. He does not deny, as others have done, the meaning of Christ's
teaching, but unfortunately neither does he draw those inevitable conclusions
which must result from a conception such as his own of Christ's doctrine. If one
is not to resist evil by violence, nor to take an oath, it is but natural to ask: Then
what is the duty of a soldier? And what is to be done about taking the oath of
allegiance? But to these questions the author makes no reply, and surely a reply
should have been given. If he had none to make, it would have been better to
have said nothing at all.
[3] The Church is the society of the faithful, established by our Lord Jesus
Christ, diffused throughout the world, subject to the authority of its lawful
pastors and our holy father the Pope.
[4] The definition of Homiakov, which had a certain success among the
Russians, does not help the case, if one believes with him that the Orthodox is
the only true Church. Homiakov asserts that a church is a society of men
(without distinction between the ecclesiastics and the laity) united by love, and
to whom the truth is revealed ("Let us love one another, that we may
unanimously profess," etc.), and that such a church is, in the first place, one that
professes the Nicene creed, and, secondly, one which, after the division of the
churches, refused to recognize the authority of the Pope and the new dogmas.
With such a definition as this, the difficulty of identifying a church which is
united by love with a church professing the Nicene creed, and the accuracy of
Should he question more
Without knowing me?
Like a sister speak;
Suffering he may be....
Should he question why
Empty is the hall?
Show the gaping door,
The lamp alight no more....
FOOTNOTES:
[1] From the Russian version, which Count Tolstoï calls a free translation made
with some omissions. After diligent search and inquiry I have been unable to
find this catechism among Ballou's works.—Tr.
[2] I know of but one criticism, or rather essay, for it can hardly be termed
criticism, in the strict sense of the word, which treats of the same subject, having
my book in view. It is a pamphlet by Troïtzky, called "The Sermon on the
Mount" (printed in Kazan). Evidently the author acknowledges the doctrine of
Christ in the fullness of its meaning. He declares that the commandment of non-
resistance to evil means what it says, and the same with the commandment as to
taking an oath. He does not deny, as others have done, the meaning of Christ's
teaching, but unfortunately neither does he draw those inevitable conclusions
which must result from a conception such as his own of Christ's doctrine. If one
is not to resist evil by violence, nor to take an oath, it is but natural to ask: Then
what is the duty of a soldier? And what is to be done about taking the oath of
allegiance? But to these questions the author makes no reply, and surely a reply
should have been given. If he had none to make, it would have been better to
have said nothing at all.
[3] The Church is the society of the faithful, established by our Lord Jesus
Christ, diffused throughout the world, subject to the authority of its lawful
pastors and our holy father the Pope.
[4] The definition of Homiakov, which had a certain success among the
Russians, does not help the case, if one believes with him that the Orthodox is
the only true Church. Homiakov asserts that a church is a society of men
(without distinction between the ecclesiastics and the laity) united by love, and
to whom the truth is revealed ("Let us love one another, that we may
unanimously profess," etc.), and that such a church is, in the first place, one that
professes the Nicene creed, and, secondly, one which, after the division of the
churches, refused to recognize the authority of the Pope and the new dogmas.
With such a definition as this, the difficulty of identifying a church which is
united by love with a church professing the Nicene creed, and the accuracy of
Page 506
Photius, as Homiakov would have it, is still greater. Hence the statement of
Homiakov that this church united by love, and therefore holy, is the same as that
of the Greek hierarchy, is still more arbitrary than the assertions of the Catholics
and the old Greek Orthodox believers. If we admit the existence of the Church
according to the idea of Homiakov, that is, as a society of men united by love
and truth, then all that any man can say in regard to it, is that it would be most
desirable to be a member of that society,—if such an one exists,—that is, to live
in the spirit of love and truth; but there are no outward manifestations by which
one could either acknowledge one's self, or recognize others as members of this
holy society, or exclude one's self from it, for there is no outward institution to
be found which corresponds to that idea.
[5] Who are those outside the Church? The infidels, heretics, and schismatics.
[6] Thereby may be the true Church known that in it the word of God is taught
plainly and clearly, without human additions, and that sacraments are
administered faithfully according to the teaching of Christ.
[7] The ikon of the Virgin which stands in a chapel in the heart of Moscow, and
which is the object of a special veneration to the Russians.—Tr.
[8] The unity of this social and pagan life-conception is by no means destroyed
by the numerous and varied systems which grow out of it, such as the existence
of the family, of the nation, and of the State, and even of that life of humanity
conceived according to the theory of the Positivists.
These multifarious systems of life are based upon the fundamental idea of the
insignificance of the individual, and the assurance that the meaning of life is to
be sought and found only in humanity, taken in its broadest sense.—Author.
[9] Here, for example, is a characteristic expression of opinion in the American
periodical, The Arena, for November, 1890, from an article entitled "New Basis
of Church Life." Discussing the significance of the Sermon on the Mount, and
especially the doctrine of non-resistance to evil, the author, having no reason for
obscuring its meaning as the ecclesiastics do, says:—
"Devout common sense must gradually come to look upon Christ as a
philanthropic teacher, who, like every enthusiast who ever taught, went to an
Utopian extreme in his own philosophy. Every great agitation for the betterment
of the world has been led by men who beheld their own mission with such
absorbing intensity that they could see little else. It is no reproach to Christ to
say that he had the typical reformer's temperament; that his precepts cannot be
literally accepted as a complete philosophy of life; and that men are to analyze
them reverently, but, at the same time, in the spirit of ordinary truth-seeking
criticism," etc.
"Christ did in fact preach absolute communism and anarchy; but," and so on.
Christ would have been glad to have expressed Himself in more fitting terms,
but He did not possess our critical faculty in the use of exact definitions,
therefore we will set Him right. All He said concerning meekness, sacrifice,
poverty, and of taking no thought for the morrow, were but haphazard utterances,
because of His ignorance of scientific phraseology.
[10] The book was published a year ago, and since then dozens of new weapons
and smokeless powder have been invented for the annihilation of mankind.—
Homiakov that this church united by love, and therefore holy, is the same as that
of the Greek hierarchy, is still more arbitrary than the assertions of the Catholics
and the old Greek Orthodox believers. If we admit the existence of the Church
according to the idea of Homiakov, that is, as a society of men united by love
and truth, then all that any man can say in regard to it, is that it would be most
desirable to be a member of that society,—if such an one exists,—that is, to live
in the spirit of love and truth; but there are no outward manifestations by which
one could either acknowledge one's self, or recognize others as members of this
holy society, or exclude one's self from it, for there is no outward institution to
be found which corresponds to that idea.
[5] Who are those outside the Church? The infidels, heretics, and schismatics.
[6] Thereby may be the true Church known that in it the word of God is taught
plainly and clearly, without human additions, and that sacraments are
administered faithfully according to the teaching of Christ.
[7] The ikon of the Virgin which stands in a chapel in the heart of Moscow, and
which is the object of a special veneration to the Russians.—Tr.
[8] The unity of this social and pagan life-conception is by no means destroyed
by the numerous and varied systems which grow out of it, such as the existence
of the family, of the nation, and of the State, and even of that life of humanity
conceived according to the theory of the Positivists.
These multifarious systems of life are based upon the fundamental idea of the
insignificance of the individual, and the assurance that the meaning of life is to
be sought and found only in humanity, taken in its broadest sense.—Author.
[9] Here, for example, is a characteristic expression of opinion in the American
periodical, The Arena, for November, 1890, from an article entitled "New Basis
of Church Life." Discussing the significance of the Sermon on the Mount, and
especially the doctrine of non-resistance to evil, the author, having no reason for
obscuring its meaning as the ecclesiastics do, says:—
"Devout common sense must gradually come to look upon Christ as a
philanthropic teacher, who, like every enthusiast who ever taught, went to an
Utopian extreme in his own philosophy. Every great agitation for the betterment
of the world has been led by men who beheld their own mission with such
absorbing intensity that they could see little else. It is no reproach to Christ to
say that he had the typical reformer's temperament; that his precepts cannot be
literally accepted as a complete philosophy of life; and that men are to analyze
them reverently, but, at the same time, in the spirit of ordinary truth-seeking
criticism," etc.
"Christ did in fact preach absolute communism and anarchy; but," and so on.
Christ would have been glad to have expressed Himself in more fitting terms,
but He did not possess our critical faculty in the use of exact definitions,
therefore we will set Him right. All He said concerning meekness, sacrifice,
poverty, and of taking no thought for the morrow, were but haphazard utterances,
because of His ignorance of scientific phraseology.
[10] The book was published a year ago, and since then dozens of new weapons
and smokeless powder have been invented for the annihilation of mankind.—
Page 507
Author.
[11] La Revue des Revues, "La guerre, état de la question, jugé par nos grands
hommes contemporains."—Tr.
[12] Words taken from Victor Hugo's "Notre Dame," where he says that printing
will kill architecture.—Author.
[13] That the abuse of authority exists in America, despite the small number of
troops, by no means refutes our argument; on the contrary, it serves rather as a
testimony in its favor. In America there are fewer troops than in other States, and
nowhere do we find less oppression of the downtrodden classes, and nowhere
have men come so near to the abolition of governmental abuses, and even of
government itself. However, it is in America that, owing to the growing unity
among the working-men, voices have been heard, more and more frequently of
late, calling for an increase of troops, and this when no foreign invasion
threatens the States. The ruling classes are fully aware that an army of 50,000
men is insufficient, and, having lost confidence in Pinkerton's forces, they
believe that their salvation can only be secured by the increase of the army.
[14] The fact that some nations, like the English and American, have no general
conscription system (although one hears already voices in its favor), but a
system of recruiting and hiring soldiers, nowise alters the case as regards the
slavery of the citizens under the government. In the former system every man
must go himself to kill or be killed; in the latter, he must give the proceeds of his
labor to employ and drill murderers.
[15] Matthew xii. 19, 20.
[16] John viii. 32.
[17] Petty rural police.—Tr.
[18] The details of this case are authentic.
[19] Such declarations on the part of Russian authorities, who are noted for their
oppression of foreign nationalities,—the Poles, the Germans of the Baltic
provinces, and the Jews,—strike one as both amusing and artless. The Russian
government, which has oppressed its own subjects for centuries, and which has
never protected the Malo-Russians in Poland, the Latishi in the Baltic provinces,
nor the Russian peasants, of whom all sorts of people have taken advantage for
hundreds of years, suddenly becomes a champion of the oppressed, of the very
same people whom it still continues to oppress.
[20] Matt. xxiv. 3-28.
[21] Matt. xxiv. 36.
[22] Matt. xxiv. 43; xxv. 1—13, 14-30.
[23] 1892.—Tr.
[24] 1893.
[25] Attorney-General.
[26] House of the rural communal government.
[27] Elders.
[11] La Revue des Revues, "La guerre, état de la question, jugé par nos grands
hommes contemporains."—Tr.
[12] Words taken from Victor Hugo's "Notre Dame," where he says that printing
will kill architecture.—Author.
[13] That the abuse of authority exists in America, despite the small number of
troops, by no means refutes our argument; on the contrary, it serves rather as a
testimony in its favor. In America there are fewer troops than in other States, and
nowhere do we find less oppression of the downtrodden classes, and nowhere
have men come so near to the abolition of governmental abuses, and even of
government itself. However, it is in America that, owing to the growing unity
among the working-men, voices have been heard, more and more frequently of
late, calling for an increase of troops, and this when no foreign invasion
threatens the States. The ruling classes are fully aware that an army of 50,000
men is insufficient, and, having lost confidence in Pinkerton's forces, they
believe that their salvation can only be secured by the increase of the army.
[14] The fact that some nations, like the English and American, have no general
conscription system (although one hears already voices in its favor), but a
system of recruiting and hiring soldiers, nowise alters the case as regards the
slavery of the citizens under the government. In the former system every man
must go himself to kill or be killed; in the latter, he must give the proceeds of his
labor to employ and drill murderers.
[15] Matthew xii. 19, 20.
[16] John viii. 32.
[17] Petty rural police.—Tr.
[18] The details of this case are authentic.
[19] Such declarations on the part of Russian authorities, who are noted for their
oppression of foreign nationalities,—the Poles, the Germans of the Baltic
provinces, and the Jews,—strike one as both amusing and artless. The Russian
government, which has oppressed its own subjects for centuries, and which has
never protected the Malo-Russians in Poland, the Latishi in the Baltic provinces,
nor the Russian peasants, of whom all sorts of people have taken advantage for
hundreds of years, suddenly becomes a champion of the oppressed, of the very
same people whom it still continues to oppress.
[20] Matt. xxiv. 3-28.
[21] Matt. xxiv. 36.
[22] Matt. xxiv. 43; xxv. 1—13, 14-30.
[23] 1892.—Tr.
[24] 1893.
[25] Attorney-General.
[26] House of the rural communal government.
[27] Elders.
Page 508
[28] In Moscow.
[29] Chiefs of rural police.
[30] 1892.
[31] See vol. iv. of the works of Jukovsky (a Russian poet).
[32] Herzen, vol. v., p. 55.
[33] Acts iv. 19.
[34] Acts v. 29.
[35] Matt. vi. 33.
[36] Luke xvii. 20, 21.
[37] Tolstoï's remarks on Church religion were re-worded so as to seem to relate
only to the Western Church, and his disapproval of luxurious life was made to
apply, not, say, to Queen Victoria or Nicholas II., but to the Cæsars or the
Pharaohs.—Tr.
[38] The Russian peasant is usually a member of a village commune, and has
therefore a right to a share in the land belonging to the village. Tolstoï
disapproves of the order of society which allows less land for the support of a
village full of people than is sometimes owned by a single landed proprietor. The
"Censor" will not allow disapproval of this state of things to be expressed, but is
prepared to admit that the laws and customs, say, of England—where a yet more
extreme form of landed property exists, and the men who actually labor on the
land usually possess none of it—deserve criticism.—Tr.
[39] Only two, or at most three, senses are generally held worthy to supply
matter for artistic treatment, but I think this opinion is only conditionally correct.
I will not lay too much stress on the fact that our common speech recognizes
many other arts, as, for instance, the art of cookery.
[40] And yet it is certainly an æsthetic achievement when the art of cooking
succeeds in making of an animal's corpse an object in all respects tasteful. The
principle of the Art of Taste (which goes beyond the so-called Art of Cookery) is
therefore this: All that is eatable should be treated as the symbol of some Idea,
and always in harmony with the Idea to be expressed.
[41] If the sense of touch lacks color, it gives us, on the other hand, a notion
which the eye alone cannot afford, and one of considerable æsthetic value,
namely, that of softness, silkiness, polish. The beauty of velvet is characterized
not less by its softness to the touch than by its luster. In the idea we form of a
woman's beauty, the softness of her skin enters as an essential element.
Each of us, probably, with a little attention, can recall pleasures of taste which
have been real æsthetic pleasures.
[42] M. Schasler, "Kritische Geschichte der Æsthetik," 1872, vol. i., p. 13.
[43] There is no science which, more than æsthetics, has been handed over to the
reveries of the metaphysicians. From Plato down to the received doctrines of our
day, people have made of art a strange amalgam of quintessential fancies and
transcendental mysteries, which find their supreme expression in the conception
of an absolute ideal Beauty, immutable and divine prototype of actual things.
[29] Chiefs of rural police.
[30] 1892.
[31] See vol. iv. of the works of Jukovsky (a Russian poet).
[32] Herzen, vol. v., p. 55.
[33] Acts iv. 19.
[34] Acts v. 29.
[35] Matt. vi. 33.
[36] Luke xvii. 20, 21.
[37] Tolstoï's remarks on Church religion were re-worded so as to seem to relate
only to the Western Church, and his disapproval of luxurious life was made to
apply, not, say, to Queen Victoria or Nicholas II., but to the Cæsars or the
Pharaohs.—Tr.
[38] The Russian peasant is usually a member of a village commune, and has
therefore a right to a share in the land belonging to the village. Tolstoï
disapproves of the order of society which allows less land for the support of a
village full of people than is sometimes owned by a single landed proprietor. The
"Censor" will not allow disapproval of this state of things to be expressed, but is
prepared to admit that the laws and customs, say, of England—where a yet more
extreme form of landed property exists, and the men who actually labor on the
land usually possess none of it—deserve criticism.—Tr.
[39] Only two, or at most three, senses are generally held worthy to supply
matter for artistic treatment, but I think this opinion is only conditionally correct.
I will not lay too much stress on the fact that our common speech recognizes
many other arts, as, for instance, the art of cookery.
[40] And yet it is certainly an æsthetic achievement when the art of cooking
succeeds in making of an animal's corpse an object in all respects tasteful. The
principle of the Art of Taste (which goes beyond the so-called Art of Cookery) is
therefore this: All that is eatable should be treated as the symbol of some Idea,
and always in harmony with the Idea to be expressed.
[41] If the sense of touch lacks color, it gives us, on the other hand, a notion
which the eye alone cannot afford, and one of considerable æsthetic value,
namely, that of softness, silkiness, polish. The beauty of velvet is characterized
not less by its softness to the touch than by its luster. In the idea we form of a
woman's beauty, the softness of her skin enters as an essential element.
Each of us, probably, with a little attention, can recall pleasures of taste which
have been real æsthetic pleasures.
[42] M. Schasler, "Kritische Geschichte der Æsthetik," 1872, vol. i., p. 13.
[43] There is no science which, more than æsthetics, has been handed over to the
reveries of the metaphysicians. From Plato down to the received doctrines of our
day, people have made of art a strange amalgam of quintessential fancies and
transcendental mysteries, which find their supreme expression in the conception
of an absolute ideal Beauty, immutable and divine prototype of actual things.
Page 509
[44] See on this matter Benard's admirable book, "L'Esthétique d'Aristote," also
Walter's "Geschichte der Æsthetik in Altertum."
[45] Schasler, p. 361.
[46] Schasler, p. 369.
[47] Schasler, pp. 388-390.
[48] Knight, "Philosophy of the Beautiful," i., pp. 165, 166.
[49] Schasler, p. 289. Knight, pp. 168, 169.
[50] R. Kralik, "Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Æsthetik," pp. 304-
306.
[51] Knight, p. 101.
[52] Schasler, p. 316.
[53] Knight, pp. 102-104.
[54] R. Kralik, p. 124.
[55] Spaletti, Schasler, p. 328.
[56] Schasler, pp. 331-333.
[57] Schasler, pp. 525-528.
[58] Knight, pp. 61-63.
[59] Schasler, pp. 740-743.
[60] Schasler, pp, 769-771.
[61] Schasler, pp. 786, 787.
[62] Kralik, p. 148.
[63] Kralik, p. 820.
[64] Schasler, pp. 828, 829, 834-841.
[65] Schasler, p. 891.
[66] Schasler, p. 917.
[67] Schasler, pp. 946, 1085, 984, 985, 990.
[68] Schasler, pp. 966, 655, 956.
[69] Schasler, p. 1017.
[70] Schasler, pp. 1065, 1066.
[71] Schasler, pp. 1097-1100.
[72] Schasler, pp. 1124, 1107.
[73] Knight, pp. 81, 82.
[74] Knight, p. 83.
[75] Schasler, p. 1121.
[76] Knight, pp. 85, 86.
Walter's "Geschichte der Æsthetik in Altertum."
[45] Schasler, p. 361.
[46] Schasler, p. 369.
[47] Schasler, pp. 388-390.
[48] Knight, "Philosophy of the Beautiful," i., pp. 165, 166.
[49] Schasler, p. 289. Knight, pp. 168, 169.
[50] R. Kralik, "Weltschönheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen Æsthetik," pp. 304-
306.
[51] Knight, p. 101.
[52] Schasler, p. 316.
[53] Knight, pp. 102-104.
[54] R. Kralik, p. 124.
[55] Spaletti, Schasler, p. 328.
[56] Schasler, pp. 331-333.
[57] Schasler, pp. 525-528.
[58] Knight, pp. 61-63.
[59] Schasler, pp. 740-743.
[60] Schasler, pp, 769-771.
[61] Schasler, pp. 786, 787.
[62] Kralik, p. 148.
[63] Kralik, p. 820.
[64] Schasler, pp. 828, 829, 834-841.
[65] Schasler, p. 891.
[66] Schasler, p. 917.
[67] Schasler, pp. 946, 1085, 984, 985, 990.
[68] Schasler, pp. 966, 655, 956.
[69] Schasler, p. 1017.
[70] Schasler, pp. 1065, 1066.
[71] Schasler, pp. 1097-1100.
[72] Schasler, pp. 1124, 1107.
[73] Knight, pp. 81, 82.
[74] Knight, p. 83.
[75] Schasler, p. 1121.
[76] Knight, pp. 85, 86.
Page 510
[77] Knight, p. 88.
[78] Knight, p. 88.
[79] Knight, p. 112.
[80] Knight, p. 116.
[81] Knight, pp. 118, 119.
[82] Knight, pp. 123, 124.
[83] "La Philosophie en France," p. 232.
[84] "Du Fondement de l'Induction."
[85] "Philosophie de l'Art," vol. i., 1893, p. 47.
[86] Knight, pp. 139-141.
[87] Knight, p. 134.
[88] "L'Esthétique," p. 106.
[89] Knight, p. 238.
[90] Knight, pp. 239, 240.
[91] Knight, pp. 240-243.
[92] Knight, pp. 250-252.
[93] Knight, pp. 258, 259.
[94] Knight, p. 243.
[95] "The foundling of Nuremberg," found in the market-place of that town on
26th May, 1828, apparently some sixteen years old. He spoke little, and was
almost totally ignorant even of common objects. He subsequently explained that
he had been brought up in confinement underground, and visited by only one
man, whom he saw but seldom.—Tr.
[96] Eastern sects well known in early Church history, who rejected the Church's
rendering of Christ's teaching, and were cruelly persecuted.—Tr.
[97] Keltchitsky, a Bohemian of the fifteenth century, was the author of a
remarkable book, "The Net of Faith," directed against Church and State. It is
mentioned in Tolstoï's "The Kingdom of God is Within You."—Tr.
[98] Any one examining closely may see that the theory of beauty and that of art
are quite separated in Aristotle as they are in Plato and in all their successors.
[99] Die Lücke von fünf Jahrhunderten, welche zwischen den Kunst-
philosophischen Betrachtungen des Plato und Aristoteles und die des Plotins
fällt, kann zwar auffällig erscheinen; dennoch kann man eigentlich nicht sagen,
dass in dieser Zwischenzeit überhaupt von ästhetischen Dingen nicht die Rede
gewesen; oder dass gar ein völliger Mangel an Zusammenhang zwischen den
Kunst-anschauungen des letztgenannten Philosophen und denen der ersteren
existire. Freilich wurde die von Aristoteles begründete Wissenschaft in Nichts
dadurch gefördert; immerhin aber zeigt sich in jener Zwischenzeit noch ein
gewisses Interesse für ästhetische Fragen. Nach Plotin aber, die wenigen, ihm in
der Zeit nahestehenden Philosophen, wie Longin, Augustin, u. s. f. kommen, wie
[78] Knight, p. 88.
[79] Knight, p. 112.
[80] Knight, p. 116.
[81] Knight, pp. 118, 119.
[82] Knight, pp. 123, 124.
[83] "La Philosophie en France," p. 232.
[84] "Du Fondement de l'Induction."
[85] "Philosophie de l'Art," vol. i., 1893, p. 47.
[86] Knight, pp. 139-141.
[87] Knight, p. 134.
[88] "L'Esthétique," p. 106.
[89] Knight, p. 238.
[90] Knight, pp. 239, 240.
[91] Knight, pp. 240-243.
[92] Knight, pp. 250-252.
[93] Knight, pp. 258, 259.
[94] Knight, p. 243.
[95] "The foundling of Nuremberg," found in the market-place of that town on
26th May, 1828, apparently some sixteen years old. He spoke little, and was
almost totally ignorant even of common objects. He subsequently explained that
he had been brought up in confinement underground, and visited by only one
man, whom he saw but seldom.—Tr.
[96] Eastern sects well known in early Church history, who rejected the Church's
rendering of Christ's teaching, and were cruelly persecuted.—Tr.
[97] Keltchitsky, a Bohemian of the fifteenth century, was the author of a
remarkable book, "The Net of Faith," directed against Church and State. It is
mentioned in Tolstoï's "The Kingdom of God is Within You."—Tr.
[98] Any one examining closely may see that the theory of beauty and that of art
are quite separated in Aristotle as they are in Plato and in all their successors.
[99] Die Lücke von fünf Jahrhunderten, welche zwischen den Kunst-
philosophischen Betrachtungen des Plato und Aristoteles und die des Plotins
fällt, kann zwar auffällig erscheinen; dennoch kann man eigentlich nicht sagen,
dass in dieser Zwischenzeit überhaupt von ästhetischen Dingen nicht die Rede
gewesen; oder dass gar ein völliger Mangel an Zusammenhang zwischen den
Kunst-anschauungen des letztgenannten Philosophen und denen der ersteren
existire. Freilich wurde die von Aristoteles begründete Wissenschaft in Nichts
dadurch gefördert; immerhin aber zeigt sich in jener Zwischenzeit noch ein
gewisses Interesse für ästhetische Fragen. Nach Plotin aber, die wenigen, ihm in
der Zeit nahestehenden Philosophen, wie Longin, Augustin, u. s. f. kommen, wie
Page 511
wir gesehen, kaum in Betracht und schliessen sich übrigens in ihrer
Anschauungsweise an ihn an,—vergehen nicht fünf, sondern fünfzehn
Jahrhunderte, in denen von irgend einer wissenschaftlichen Interesse für die
Welt des Schönen und der Kunst nichts zu spüren ist.
Diese anderthalbtausend Jahre, innerhalb deren der Weltgeist durch die
mannigfachsten Kämpfe hindurch zu einer völlig neuen Gestaltung des Lebens
sich durcharbeitete, sind für die Aesthetik, hinsichtlich des weiteren Ausbaus
dieser Wissenschaft verloren.—Max Schasler.
[100] The contrast made is between the classes and the masses; between those
who do not and those who do earn their bread by productive manual labor; the
middle classes being taken as an offshoot of the upper classes.—Tr.
[101] Dueling is still customary among the higher circles in Russia, as in other
continental countries.—Tr.
[102] It is the weariness of life, contempt for the present epoch, regret for
another age seen through the illusion of art, a taste for paradox, a desire to be
singular, a sentimental aspiration after simplicity, an infantine adoration of the
marvelous, a sickly tendency toward reverie, a shattered condition of nerves,
and, above all, the exasperated demand of sensuality.
[103]
Music, music before all things
The eccentric still prefer,
Vague in air, and nothing weighty,
Soluble. Yet do not err,
Choosing words; still do it lightly,
Do it too with some contempt;
Dearest is the song that's tipsy,
Clearness, dimness not exempt.
* * * *
Music always, now and ever
Be thy verse the thing that flies
From a soul that's gone, escaping,
Gone to other loves and skies.
Gone to other loves and regions,
Following fortunes that allure,
Mint and thyme and morning crispness....
All the rest's mere literature.
[104] I think there should be nothing but allusions. The contemplation of
objects, the flying image of reveries evoked by them, are the song. The
Parnassiens state the thing completely, and show it, and thereby lack mystery;
they deprive the mind of that delicious joy of imagining that it creates. To name
an object is to take three-quarters from the enjoyment of the poem, which
consists in the happiness of guessing little by little: to suggest, that is the dream.
It is the perfect use of this mystery that constitutes the symbol: little by little, to
Anschauungsweise an ihn an,—vergehen nicht fünf, sondern fünfzehn
Jahrhunderte, in denen von irgend einer wissenschaftlichen Interesse für die
Welt des Schönen und der Kunst nichts zu spüren ist.
Diese anderthalbtausend Jahre, innerhalb deren der Weltgeist durch die
mannigfachsten Kämpfe hindurch zu einer völlig neuen Gestaltung des Lebens
sich durcharbeitete, sind für die Aesthetik, hinsichtlich des weiteren Ausbaus
dieser Wissenschaft verloren.—Max Schasler.
[100] The contrast made is between the classes and the masses; between those
who do not and those who do earn their bread by productive manual labor; the
middle classes being taken as an offshoot of the upper classes.—Tr.
[101] Dueling is still customary among the higher circles in Russia, as in other
continental countries.—Tr.
[102] It is the weariness of life, contempt for the present epoch, regret for
another age seen through the illusion of art, a taste for paradox, a desire to be
singular, a sentimental aspiration after simplicity, an infantine adoration of the
marvelous, a sickly tendency toward reverie, a shattered condition of nerves,
and, above all, the exasperated demand of sensuality.
[103]
Music, music before all things
The eccentric still prefer,
Vague in air, and nothing weighty,
Soluble. Yet do not err,
Choosing words; still do it lightly,
Do it too with some contempt;
Dearest is the song that's tipsy,
Clearness, dimness not exempt.
* * * *
Music always, now and ever
Be thy verse the thing that flies
From a soul that's gone, escaping,
Gone to other loves and skies.
Gone to other loves and regions,
Following fortunes that allure,
Mint and thyme and morning crispness....
All the rest's mere literature.
[104] I think there should be nothing but allusions. The contemplation of
objects, the flying image of reveries evoked by them, are the song. The
Parnassiens state the thing completely, and show it, and thereby lack mystery;
they deprive the mind of that delicious joy of imagining that it creates. To name
an object is to take three-quarters from the enjoyment of the poem, which
consists in the happiness of guessing little by little: to suggest, that is the dream.
It is the perfect use of this mystery that constitutes the symbol: little by little, to
Page 512
evoke an object in order to show a state of the soul; or, inversely, to choose an
object, and from it to disengage a state of the soul by a series of decipherings.
.... If a being of mediocre intelligence and insufficient literary preparation
chance to open a book made in this way and pretends to enjoy it, there is a
misunderstanding—things must be returned to their places. There should always
be an enigma in poetry, and the aim of literature—it has no other—is to evoke
objects.
[105] It were time also to have done with this famous "theory of obscurity,"
which the new school have practically raised to the height of a dogma.
[106] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[107] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[108] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[109] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[110] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[111] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[112]
I do not wish to think any more, except about my mother Mary,
Seat of wisdom and source of pardon,
Also Mother of France, from whom we
Steadfastly expect the honor of our country.
[113] This sonnet seems too unintelligible for translation.—Tr.
[114] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[115] The quicker it goes the longer it lasts.
[116] All styles are good except the wearisome style.
[117] All styles are good except that which is not understood, or which fails to
produce its effect.
[118] An apparatus exists by means of which a very sensitive arrow, in
dependence on the tension of a muscle of the arm, will indicate the physiological
action of music on the nerves and muscles.
[119] There is in Moscow a magnificent "Cathedral of our Saviour," erected to
commemorate the defeat of the French in the war of 1812.—Tr.
[120] "That they may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that
they also may be in us."
[121] In this picture the spectators in the Roman Amphitheater are turning down
their thumbs to show that they wish the vanquished gladiator to be killed.—Tr.
[122] While offering as examples of art those that seem to me the best, I attach
no special importance to my selection; for, besides being insufficiently informed
in all branches of art, I belong to the class of people whose taste has, by false
training, been perverted. And therefore my old, inured habits may cause me to
err, and I may mistake for absolute merit the impression a work produced on me
in my youth. My only purpose in mentioning examples of works of this or that
object, and from it to disengage a state of the soul by a series of decipherings.
.... If a being of mediocre intelligence and insufficient literary preparation
chance to open a book made in this way and pretends to enjoy it, there is a
misunderstanding—things must be returned to their places. There should always
be an enigma in poetry, and the aim of literature—it has no other—is to evoke
objects.
[105] It were time also to have done with this famous "theory of obscurity,"
which the new school have practically raised to the height of a dogma.
[106] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[107] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[108] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[109] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[110] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[111] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[112]
I do not wish to think any more, except about my mother Mary,
Seat of wisdom and source of pardon,
Also Mother of France, from whom we
Steadfastly expect the honor of our country.
[113] This sonnet seems too unintelligible for translation.—Tr.
[114] For translation, see Appendix IV.
[115] The quicker it goes the longer it lasts.
[116] All styles are good except the wearisome style.
[117] All styles are good except that which is not understood, or which fails to
produce its effect.
[118] An apparatus exists by means of which a very sensitive arrow, in
dependence on the tension of a muscle of the arm, will indicate the physiological
action of music on the nerves and muscles.
[119] There is in Moscow a magnificent "Cathedral of our Saviour," erected to
commemorate the defeat of the French in the war of 1812.—Tr.
[120] "That they may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that
they also may be in us."
[121] In this picture the spectators in the Roman Amphitheater are turning down
their thumbs to show that they wish the vanquished gladiator to be killed.—Tr.
[122] While offering as examples of art those that seem to me the best, I attach
no special importance to my selection; for, besides being insufficiently informed
in all branches of art, I belong to the class of people whose taste has, by false
training, been perverted. And therefore my old, inured habits may cause me to
err, and I may mistake for absolute merit the impression a work produced on me
in my youth. My only purpose in mentioning examples of works of this or that
Page 513
class is to make my meaning clearer, and to show how, with my present views, I
understand excellence in art in relation to its subject-matter. I must, moreover,
mention that I consign my own artistic productions to the category of bad art,
excepting the story "God sees the Truth," which seeks a place in the first class,
and "The Prisoner of the Caucasus," which belongs to the second.
[123] In Russian it is customary to make a distinction between literate and
illiterate people, i.e. between those who can and those who cannot read. Literate
in this sense does not imply that the man would speak or write correctly.—Tr.
[124]The over-man (Uebermensch), in the Nietzschean philosophy, is that
superior type of man whom the struggle for existence is to evolve, and who will
seek only his own power and pleasure, will know nothing of pity, and will have
the right, because he will possess the power, to make ordinary people serve him.
—Tr.
[125] Stenka Razin was by origin a common Cossack. His brother was hung for
a breach of military discipline, and to this event Stenka Razin's hatred of the
governing classes has been attributed. He formed a robber band, and
subsequently headed a formidable rebellion, declaring himself in favor of
freedom for the serfs, religious toleration, and the abolition of taxes. Like the
government he opposed, he relied on force, and, though he used it largely in
defense of the poor against the rich, he still held to
"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
Like Robin Hood, he is favorably treated in popular legends.—Tr.
[126] Robert Macaire is a modern type of adroit and audacious rascality. He was
the hero of a popular play produced in Paris in 1834.—Tr.
[127] The translations in Appendices I., II., and IV., are by Louise Maude. The
aim of these renderings has been to keep as close to the originals as the obscurity
of meaning allowed. The sense (or absence of sense) has therefore been more
considered than the form of the verses.
understand excellence in art in relation to its subject-matter. I must, moreover,
mention that I consign my own artistic productions to the category of bad art,
excepting the story "God sees the Truth," which seeks a place in the first class,
and "The Prisoner of the Caucasus," which belongs to the second.
[123] In Russian it is customary to make a distinction between literate and
illiterate people, i.e. between those who can and those who cannot read. Literate
in this sense does not imply that the man would speak or write correctly.—Tr.
[124]The over-man (Uebermensch), in the Nietzschean philosophy, is that
superior type of man whom the struggle for existence is to evolve, and who will
seek only his own power and pleasure, will know nothing of pity, and will have
the right, because he will possess the power, to make ordinary people serve him.
—Tr.
[125] Stenka Razin was by origin a common Cossack. His brother was hung for
a breach of military discipline, and to this event Stenka Razin's hatred of the
governing classes has been attributed. He formed a robber band, and
subsequently headed a formidable rebellion, declaring himself in favor of
freedom for the serfs, religious toleration, and the abolition of taxes. Like the
government he opposed, he relied on force, and, though he used it largely in
defense of the poor against the rich, he still held to
"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
Like Robin Hood, he is favorably treated in popular legends.—Tr.
[126] Robert Macaire is a modern type of adroit and audacious rascality. He was
the hero of a popular play produced in Paris in 1834.—Tr.
[127] The translations in Appendices I., II., and IV., are by Louise Maude. The
aim of these renderings has been to keep as close to the originals as the obscurity
of meaning allowed. The sense (or absence of sense) has therefore been more
considered than the form of the verses.
Page 514
Transcriber's note:
Variations in spelling, punctuation and
hyphenation have been retained except
in obvious cases of typographical error.
Page 5: The transcriber has completed
the word "meeting". "In 1838, on the
occasion of a meet- of the Society for
the Promotion of Peace" ...
Page 372: Footnote 86, "Knight, pp.
139-141." The number the transcriber
has rendered as 139 is unclear.
Variations in spelling, punctuation and
hyphenation have been retained except
in obvious cases of typographical error.
Page 5: The transcriber has completed
the word "meeting". "In 1838, on the
occasion of a meet- of the Society for
the Promotion of Peace" ...
Page 372: Footnote 86, "Knight, pp.
139-141." The number the transcriber
has rendered as 139 is unclear.
Page 515
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