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Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)

Author: George Grote

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF
GREECE, VOLUME 10 (OF 12) ***

Transcriber's note
Table of Contents

HISTORY OF GREECE

BY
GEORGE GROTE, Esq.

VOL. X.

REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.

PREFACE TO VOL. X.

The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of
pages; yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient
moment, midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius.
To carry that reign to its close, one more chapter will be required,
which must be reserved for the succeeding volume.
The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it
does a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians,
Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval between
409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and the
death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us by
authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very
judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary
witnesses. And it includes some of the most prominent and
impressive characters of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion
with Plato as instructor, and Timoleon.
I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this
important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that
inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time
I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of
Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of
Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional
matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present
volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my
next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of

Chæroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I
trust, appear without any long interval of time.
G. G.
London, Feb. 15, 1852.

CONTENTS.
VOL. X.

PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXXVI.
FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
SPARTA.

Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character. Separate partnership between Sparta and
Persia. — Degradation in the form of the convention — an edict drawn up, issued, and enforced,
by Persia upon Greece. — Gradual loss of Pan-hellenic dignity, and increased submission towards
Persia as a means of purchasing Persian help — on the part of Sparta. — Her first application
before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent applications. — Active partnership between Sparta and
Persia against Athens, after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. Athens is ready to follow her
example. — The Persian force aids Athens against Sparta, and breaks up her maritime empire. —
No excuse for the subservience of Sparta to the Persians. Evidence that Hellenic independence was
not destined to last much longer. — Promise of universal autonomy — popular to the Grecian ear
— how carried out. — The Spartans never intended to grant, nor ever really granted, general
autonomy. — Immediate point made against Corinth and Thebes — isolation of Athens. — Persian
affairs — unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer Egypt. — Evagoras, despot of Salamis
in Cyprus. — Descent of Evagoras — condition of the island of Cyprus. — Greek princes of
Salamis are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty. — Evagoras dethrones the Phœnician, and
becomes despot of Salamis. — Able and beneficent government of Evagoras. — His anxiety to
revive Hellenism in Cyprus — he looks to the aid of Athens. — Relations of Evagoras with Athens
during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. — Evagoras at war with the Persians — he
receives aid both from Athens and from Egypt — he is at first very successful, so as even to
capture Tyre. — Struggle of Evagoras against the whole force of the Persian empire after the peace
of Antalkidas. — Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, is reduced, but obtains an honorable peace,
mainly owing to the dispute between the two satraps jointly commanding. — Assassination of
Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave of Nikokreon. — Nikoklês, son of
Evagoras, becomes despot of Salamis. Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of
Antalkidas. She becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the Corinthian isthmus. Miso-Theban
tendencies of Sparta — especially of Agesilaus. — The Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of
Sparta towards Platæa. — Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa. A politic step, as likely to sever

Thebes from Athens. — Platæa becomes a dependency and outpost of Sparta. Main object of
Sparta to prevent the reconstitution of the Bœotiad federation — Spartan policy at this time
directed by the partisan spirit of Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis. — Oppressive
behavior of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the walls of the city to be demolished. —
Agesipolis blockades the city, and forces it to surrender, by damming up the river Ophis. The
Mantineans are forced to break up their city into villages. — Democratical leaders of Mantinea —
owed their lives to the mediation of the exiled king Pausanias. — Mantinea is pulled down and
distributed into five villages. — High-handed despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea — signal
partiality of Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the various cities, as partisans for
the purposes of Sparta — case of Phlius. — Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at
sea. Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a maritime confederacy. — Ideas
entertained by some of the Spartan leaders, of acting against the Persians for the rescue of the
Asiatic Greeks. — Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates. — State of Macedonia and Chalkidikê —
growth of Macedonian power during the last years of the Peloponnesian war. — Perdikkas and
Archelaus — energy and ability of the latter. — Contrast of Macedonia and Athens. — Succeeding
Macedonian kings — Orestes, Æropus, Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination frequent. — Amyntas
is expelled from Macedonia by the Illyrians. — Chalkidians of Olynthus — they take into their
protection the Macedonian cities on the coast, when Amyntas runs away before the Illyrians.
Commencement of the Olynthian confederacy. — Equal and liberal principles on which the
confederacy was framed from the beginning. Accepted willingly by the Macedonian and Greco-
Macedonian cities. — The Olynthians extend their confederacy among the Grecian cities in
Chalkidic Thrace — their liberal procedure — several cities join. — Akanthus and Apollonia resist
the proposition. Olynthus menaces. They then solicit Spartan intervention against her. — Speech
of Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta. — Envoys from Amyntas at Sparta. — The Spartan
Eudamidas is sent against Olynthus at once, with such force as could be got ready. He checks the
career of the Olynthians. — Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, remains behind to collect fresh
force, and march to join his brother in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near
Thebes. — Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in Thebes, to betray the town
and citadel to Phœbidas. — The opposing leaders — Leontiades and Ismenias — were both
Polemarchs. — Leontiades overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and the leading
friends of Ismenias go into exile. — Phœbidas in the Kadmeia — terror and submission at Thebes.
— Mixed feelings at Sparta — great importance of the acquisition to Spartan interests. —
Displeasure at Sparta more pretended than real, against Phœbidas; Agesilaus defends him. —
Leontiades at Sparta — his humble protestations and assurances — the ephors decide that they will
retain the Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas. — The Lacedæmonians cause Ismenias to
be tried and put to death. Iniquity of this proceeding. — Vigorous action of the Spartans against
Olynthus — Teleutias is sent there with a large force, including a considerable Theban contingent.
Derdas coöperates with him. — Teleutias being at first successful, and having become over-
confident, sustains a terrible defeat from the Olynthians under the walls of their city. — Agesipolis
is sent to Olynthus from Sparta with a reinforcement. He dies of a fever. — Polybiades succeeds
Agesipolis as commander — he reduces Olynthus to submission — extinction of the Olynthian
federation. Olynthus and the other cities are enrolled as allies of Sparta. — Intervention of Sparta
with the government of Phlius. — Agesilaus marches an army against Phlius — reduces the town
by blockade, after a long resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy the acropolis, naming a council
of one hundred as governors.
1-72

CHAPTER LXXVII.

FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.

Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 B.C. — Sparta is now feared as the great despot of
Greece. — Strong complaint of the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the Olympic festival of 384 B.C. —
Panegyrical oration of Isokrates. — Censure upon Sparta pronounced by the philo-Laconian
Xenophon. — His manner of marking the point of transition in his history — from Spartan glory
to Spartan disgrace. — Thebes under Leontiades and the philo-Spartan oligarchy, with the Spartan
garrison in the Kadmeia — oppressive and tyrannical government. — Discontent at Thebes,
though under compression. Theban exiles at Athens. — The Theban exiles at Athens, after waiting
some time in hopes of a rising at Thebes, resolve to begin a movement themselves. — Pelopidas
takes the lead — he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task of destroying the rulers
of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the secretary, and Charon at Thebes. — Plans of Phyllidas for
admitting the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house — he invites the polemarchs to a
banquet. — The scheme very nearly frustrated — accident which prevented Chlidon from
delivering his message. — Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes, and conceal themselves
in the house of Charon. — Leontiades and Hypates are slain in their houses. — Phyllidas opens the
prison, and sets free the prisoners. Epaminondas and many other citizens appear in arms. —
Universal joy among the citizens on the ensuing morning, when the event was known. General
assembly in the market-place — Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon are named the first Bœotarchs. —
Aid to the conspirators from private sympathizers in Attica. — Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare
to storm the Kadmeia — the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and are dismissed — several of the
oligarchical Thebans are put to death in trying to go away along with them. The harmost who
surrendered the Kadmeia is put to death by the Spartans. — Powerful sensation produced by this
incident throughout the Grecian world. — Indignation in Sparta at the revolution of Thebes — a
Spartan army sent forth at once under king Kleombrotus. He retires from Bœotia without
achieving anything. — Kleombrotus passes by the Athenian frontier — alarm at Athens —
condemnation of the two Athenian generals who had favored the enterprise of Pelopidas. —
Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ to surprise the Peiræus by a night-march. He fails. —
Different constructions put upon this attempt and upon the character of Sphodrias. — The
Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed. — Trial of Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted
through the private favor and sympathies of Agesilaus. — Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
procedure. — The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract alliance with Thebes. —
Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes
enrolls herself as a member. — Athens sends round envoys to the islands in the Ægean. Liberal
principles on which the new confederacy is formed. — Envoys sent round by Athens — Chabrias,
Timotheus, Kallistratus. — Service of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of Antalkidas. He
marries the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys, and acquires possession of a Thracian seaport,
Drys. — Timotheus and Kallistratus. — Synod of the new confederates assembled at Athens —
votes for war on a large scale. — Members of the confederacy were at first willing and harmonious
— a fleet is equipped. — New property-tax imposed at Athens. The Solonian census. — The
Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications, at the restoration under the
archonship of Eukleides in 403 B.C. — Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C. — New census and
schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and upwards, distributed into classes,
and entered for a fraction of their total property; each class for a different fraction. — All metics,
worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in the schedule; all in one class, each man for
one-sixth of his property. Aggregate schedule. — The Symmories — containing the twelve
hundred wealthiest citizens — the three hundred wealthiest leaders of the Symmories. — Citizens
not wealthy enough to be included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule, and liable to
property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories — extension of the principle to the trierarchy. —

Enthusiasm at Thebes in defence of the new government and against Sparta. Military training —
the Sacred Band. — Epaminondas. — His previous character and training — musical and
intellectual, as well as gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as
Pythagorean. — His eloquence — his unambitious disposition — gentleness of his political
resentments. — Conduct of Epaminondas at the Theban revolution of 379 B.C. — he acquires
influence, through Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city. — Agesilaus marches to
attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan confederacy — good system of defence adopted by
Thebes — aid from Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in Bœotia, against the
philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian cities. — Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia —
he gains no decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater strength. Agesilaus retires
— he is disabled by a hurt in the leg. — Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia.
— He retires without reaching Bœotia. — Resolution of Sparta to equip a large fleet, under the
admiral Pollis. The Athenians send out a fleet under Chabrias — Victory of Chabrias at sea near
Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ. — Extension of the Athenian maritime
confederacy, in consequence of the victory at Naxos. — Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by
Timotheus with an Athenian fleet — his victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet — his success in
extending the Athenian confederacy — his just dealing. — Financial difficulties of Athens. — She
becomes jealous of the growing strength of Thebes — steady and victorious progress of Thebes in
Bœotia. — Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra over the Lacedæmonians. — The Thebans expel the
Lacedæmonians out of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus — they reorganize the Bœotian federation.
— They invade Phokis — Kleombrotus is sent thither with an army for defence — Athens makes a
separate peace with the Lacedæmonians. — Jason of Pheræ — his energetic character and
formidable power. — His prudent dealing with Polydamas. — The Lacedæmonians find
themselves unable to spare any aid for Thessaly — they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He
comes to terms with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly. — Peace between Athens and Sparta
— broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians declare war again, and resume their plans
upon Zakynthus and Korkyra. — Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from all
the confederates, invades Korkyra. — Mnasippus besieges the city — high cultivation of the
adjoining lands. — The Korkyræans blocked up in the city — supplies intercepted — want begins
— no hope of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from Athens — large
Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus is defeated and slain — the city supplied
with provisions. — Approach of the Athenian reinforcement — Hypermenês, successor of
Mnasippus, conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property behind. — Tardy
arrival of the Athenian fleet — it is commanded not by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates — causes of
the delay — preliminary voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted. — Discontent at Athens, in
consequence of the absence of Timotheus — distress of the armament assembled at Kalauria —
Iphikrates and Kallistratus accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place. — Return of
Timotheus — an accusation is entered against him, but trial is postponed until the return of
Iphikrates from Korkyra. — Rapid and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra — his
excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia, he learns the flight of the
Lacedæmonians from Korkyra. — He goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten
Syracusan triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta. — Iphikrates in want of money — he
sends home Kallistratus to Athens — he finds work for his seamen at Korkyra — he obtains funds
by service in Akarnania. — Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in consequence of the
success at Korkyra — the trial of Timotheus went off easily — Jason and Alketas come to support
him — his quæstor is condemned to death. — Timotheus had been guilty of delay, not justifiable
under the circumstances — though acquitted, his reputation suffered — he accepts command under
Persia. — Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at Korkyra, and of the
triumphant position of Iphikrates. — Helikê and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake. — The
Spartans again send Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send

down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their differences. — Athens disposed
towards peace. — Athens had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of
Thebes. — Equivocal position of the restored Platæa now that the Lacedæmonians had been
expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the
inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the
Thebans, on account of their dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of Isokrates.
— Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian
confederacy give notice to Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of the
Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus and his policy. — He proposes that
Sparta and Athens shall divide between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at
sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy of each city to be
recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the
oath for herself and her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after her, successively.
— The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the
oath in the name of the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall take it
for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered by Epaminondas in the congress —
protesting against the overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient
institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation. — Indignation of the Spartans,
and especially of Agesilaus — brief questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. —
General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes alone is excluded. — Terms
of peace — compulsory and indefeasible confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone
maintained. — Real point in debate between Agesilaus and Epaminondas.
72-174

CHAPTER LXXVIII.
BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of Sparta. — Violent impulse of the
Spartans against Thebes. — King Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
Leuktra. — New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas. — Confidence of the Spartans and of
Kleombrotus. — Battle of Leuktra. — Defeat of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus. — Faint
adherence of the Spartan allies. — Spartan camp after the defeat — confession of defeat by
sending to solicit the burial-truce. — Great surprise, and immense alteration of feeling, produced
throughout Greece by the Theban victory. — Effect of the news at Sparta — heroic self-command.
— Reinforcements sent from Sparta. — Proceedings in Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The
Theban victory not well received at Athens. — Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra — the Spartan
army retires from Bœotia under capitulation. — Treatment of the defeated citizens on reaching
Sparta — suspension of the law. — Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece — prestige of military
superiority lost. — Extension of the power of Thebes. Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ. —
Power and ambition of Jason. — Plans of Jason — Pythian festival. — Assassination of Jason at
Pheræ. — Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason — satisfaction in Greece. — Proceedings in
Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra. Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies. —
Skytalism at Argos — violent intestine feud. — Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta. —
Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian land-confederacy. — Accusation
preferred in the Amphyctionic assembly, by Thebes against Sparta. — The Spartans are
condemned to a fine — importance of this fact as an indication. — Proceedings in Arcadia. —
Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own citizens. — Humiliating refusal experienced by
Agesilaus from the Mantineans — keenly painful to a Spartan. — Feeling against Agesilaus at
Sparta. — Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian union. Opposition from

Orchomenus and Tegea. — Revolution at Tegea — the philo-Spartan party are put down or
expelled. — Tegea becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian union. — Pan-
Arcadian union is formed. — March of Agesilaus against Mantinea. Evidence of lowered
sentiment in Sparta. — Application by the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused:
they then apply to the Thebans. — Proceedings and views of Epaminondas since the battle of
Leuktra. — Plans of Epaminondas for restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus. — Also, for
consolidating the Arcadians against Sparta. — Epaminondas and the Theban army arrive in
Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The allies entreat him to invade Laconia. —
Reluctance of Epaminondas to invade Laconia — reasonable grounds for it. — He marches into
Laconia — four lines of invasion. — He crosses the Eurotas and approaches close to Sparta. —
Alarm at Sparta — arrival of various allies to her aid by sea. — Discontent in Laconia among the
Periœki and Helots — danger to Sparta from that cause. — Vigilant defence of Sparta by
Agesilaus. — Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by
Epaminondas. — He retires without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to
Gythium. He returns into Arcadia. — Great effect of this invasion upon Grecian opinion —
Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther lowered. — Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis.
— Foundation of Messênê. — Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta. — Periœki and Helots
established as freemen along with the Messenians on the Lacedæmonian border. — The details of
this reorganizing process unhappily unknown. — Megalopolis — the Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand.
— Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus. — The Spartans solicit aid from Athens —
language of their envoys, as well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens. — Reception of the
envoys — the Athenians grant the prayer. — Vote passed to aid Sparta — Iphikrates is named
general. — March of Iphikrates and his army to the Isthmus. — Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes
for retaining his command beyond the legal time — his honorable and easy acquittal.
174-241

CHAPTER LXXIX.
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
PELOPIDAS.

Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra. — Changes out of Peloponnesus. — Amyntas
prince of Macedonia. — Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra. — Her aspirations
to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies. — She wishes to recover Amphipolis
— Amyntas recognizes her right to the place. — Athens and Amphipolis. — Death of Jason and
Amyntas — state of Thessaly and Macedonia. — Alexander of Pheræ — he is opposed by
Pelopidas — influence of Thebes in Thessaly. — State of Macedonia — Alexander son of
Amyntas — Euridikê — Ptolemy. — Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family
of Amyntas. — Iphikrates and Timotheus. — The Spartan allied army defends the line of Mount
Oneium — Epaminondas breaks through it, and marches into Peloponnesus. — Sikyon joins the
Thebans — Phlius remains faithful to Sparta. — Reinforcement from Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in
aid of Sparta. — Forbearance and mildness of Epaminondas. — Energetic action and insolence of
the Arcadians — Lykomedes animates and leads them on. — Great influence of Lykomedes. —
Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the
Arcadian union, to the great offence of Elis. — Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Ariobarzanes. —
Political importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of
discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia. — Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. —
The Tearless Battle — victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians. — Third expedition
of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus — his treatment of the Achæan cities. — The Thebans reverse
the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not reëlect him

Bœotarch. — Disturbed state of Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot — his rapacious and
sanguinary conduct. — Sufferings of the Phliasians — their steady adherence to Sparta. —
Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian Chares — surprise of the fort of Thyamia. —
Euphron is expelled from Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans — he retires to the harbor, which
he surrenders to the Spartans. — Euphron returns to Sikyon — he goes to Thebes, and is there
assassinated. — The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes — their defence. — They are
acquitted by the Theban Senate. — Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable to Euphron
— honors shown to his body and memory. — The Sikyonians recapture their harbor from the
Spartans. — Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship — mission of
Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa. — Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable rescript. —
Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the rescript. — Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It
is read publicly before the Greek states convoked at Thebes. — The states convoked at Thebes
refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes. — The
Thebans send the rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse: failure of the Theban
object. — Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly. He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of
Pheræ. — The Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated and retreating,
is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man. — Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and
discredit of Thebes. Harsh treatment of Pelopidas. — Second Theban army sent into Thessaly,
under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length released by Alexander under a
truce. — Oropus is taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians
recall Chares from Corinth. — Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into
alliance with Lykomedes and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes. — Epaminondas is sent as
envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus. — Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth;
they are disappointed. — They apply to Sparta. — Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the
independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with consenting. — Corinth, Epidaurus,
Phlius, etc., conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta — recognizing the independence of
Messênê. — Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king — altered rescript from him,
pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession. — Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia —
Agesilaus — revolt of Ariobarzanes. — Conquest of Samos by Timotheus. — Partial readmission
to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus. — Athenian kleruchs or settlers sent thither as
proprietors. — Difficulties of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese. — Kotys of
Thrace. — Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates. — Timotheus acts with success on the coast of
Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He fails at Amphipolis. — Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
Chersonese. — Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly — Pelopidas is sent with an army against
Alexander of Pheræ. — Epaminondas exhorts the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens. —
Discussion between him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly. — Menekleidas seemingly
right in dissuading naval preparations. — Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the
Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas attacks Alexander of Pheræ — his success in battle — his
rashness — he is slain. — Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his death. — The
Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.
242-310

CHAPTER LXXX.
FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes — destruction of Orchomenus by the
Thebans. — Repugnance excited against the Thebans — regret and displeasure of Epaminondas.
— Return of Epaminondas from his cruise — renewed complications in Peloponnesus. — State of
Peloponnesus — Eleians and Achæans in alliance with Sparta. — The Eleians aim at recovering

Triphylia — the Spartans, at recovering Messênê. — War between the Eleians and Arcadians; the
latter occupy Olympia. — Second invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.
Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia. — Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at
Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him — armistice. — The Arcadians blockade
Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison. — The Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along
with the Pisatans — excluding the Eleians. — The Eleians invade the festival by arms — conflict
on the plain of Olympia — bravery of the Eleians. — Feelings of the spectators at Olympia. —
The Arcadians take the treasures of Olympia to pay their militia. — Violent dissensions arising
among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence of this appropriation. The
Arcadian assembly pronounces against it. — Farther dissensions in Arcadia — invitation sent to
the Thebans — peace concluded with Elis. — The peace generally popular — celebrated at Tegea
— seizure of many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost. — Conduct of the
Theban harmost. — View taken by Epaminondas. — His view is more consistent with the facts
recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon himself. — Policy of Epaminondas and the
Thebans. — Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at Tegea. —
Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for. — Night-march of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta.
Agesilaus is informed in time to prevent surprise. — Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds it
defended. — He marches back to Tegea — despatches his cavalry from thence to surprise
Mantinea. — The surprise is baffled, by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry — battle of
cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage. — Epaminondas resolves to
attack the enemy near Mantinea. — View of Xenophon — that this resolution was forced upon
him by despair — examined. — Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting
is given. — Mantinico-Tegeatic plain — position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans. —
March of Epaminondas from Tegea. — False impression produced upon the enemy by his
manœuvres. — Theban order of battle — plans of the commander. — Disposition of the cavalry on
both sides. — Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army. — Battle of Mantinea — complete
success of the dispositions of Epaminondas. — Victory of the Thebans — Epaminondas is
mortally wounded. — Extreme discouragement caused by his death among the troops, even when
in full victory and pursuit. — Victory claimed by both sides — nevertheless the Lacedæmonians
are obliged to solicit the burial-truce. — Dying moments of Epaminondas. — The two other best
Theban officers are slain also in the battle. — Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons honored
for it. — Peace concluded — statu quo recognized, including the independence of Messênê —
Sparta alone stands out — the Thebans return home. — Results of the battle of Mantinea, as
appreciated by Xenophon — unfair to the Thebans. — Character of Epaminondas. — Disputes
among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which
maintains the incorporation. — Agesilaus and Archidamus. — State of Persia — revolted satraps
and provinces — Datames. — Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia Minor — it is suppressed
by the Persian court, through treachery. — Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt — Chabrias is
there also. — Death and character of Agesilaus. — State of Egypt and Persia. — Death of
Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family. — Athenian maritime operations — Timotheus
makes war against Amphipolis and against Kotys. — Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the
Chersonese — Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis — war at sea against Alexander of
Pheræ. — Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful — both tried. — Autokles in the
Hellespont and Bosphorus — convoy for the corn-ships out of the Euxine. — Miltokythes revolts
from Kotys in Thrace — ill-success of the Athenians. — Menon — Timomachus — as
commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos. — Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos. — Assassination of Kotys. — Kersobleptes succeeds
Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his rivals — ill-success of Athens — Kephisodotus. — Improved
prospects of Athens in the Chersonese — Athenodorus — Charidemus. — Charidemus is forced to
accept the convention of Athenodorus — his evasions — the Chersonese with Sestos is restored to

Athens. — The transmarine empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her
conquests made against Olynthus. — Maximum of second Athenian empire — accession of Philip
of Macedon.
311-383

CHAPTER LXXXI.
SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE
SYRACUSE.

Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian armament. — Anticipation of the impending ruin of
Athens — revolution at Thurii. — Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to act against
Athens in the Ægean. — Disappointed hopes — defeat at Kynossema — second ruinous defeat at
Kyzikus. — Sufferings of the Syracusan seamen — disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse.
— Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokrates to the
armament. — Internal state of Syracuse — constitution of Diokles. — Difficulty of determining
what that constitution was. — Invasion from Carthage. — State of the Carthaginians. — Extent of
Carthaginian empire — power, and population — Liby-Phœnicians. — Harsh dealing of Carthage
towards her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage. — Military force of Carthage. — Political
constitution of Carthage. — Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage. — Powerful families
at Carthage — Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal. — Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in Sicily. —
Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid — application granted — eagerness of Hannibal. —
Carthaginian envoys sent to Sicily. — Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large armament.
He lays siege to Selinus. — Vigorous assault on Selinus — gallant resistance — the town is at
length stormed. — Selinus is sacked and plundered — merciless slaughter. — Delay of the
Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to their embassy. — Hannibal marches
to Himera and besieges it. Aid from Syracuse under Diokles — sally from Himera. Hannibal
destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an expiation to the memory of his
grandfather. — Alarm throughout the Greeks of Sicily — Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns
to Carthage. — New intestine discord in Syracuse — Hermokrates comes to Sicily. — He levies
troops to effect his return by force. — He is obliged to retire — he establishes himself in the ruins
of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians. — His father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the
bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles. — Hermokrates tries again to
penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force. — He is defeated and slain. — First appearance of
Dionysius at Syracuse. — Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political discord — party of
Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage. — Fresh invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense
host under Hannibal and Imilkon. — Great alarm in Sicily — active preparations for defence at
Agrigentum. — Grandeur, wealth, and population of Agrigentum. — The Carthaginians attack
Agrigentum. They demolish the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
terrors — sacrifice. — Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under Daphnæus. His victory over
the Iberians. He declines to pursue them. — Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the
Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death. — Privations in
both armies — Hamilkar captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans — Agrigentum is
evacuated. — Agrigentum taken and plundered by the Carthagians. — Terror throughout Sicily. —
Bitter complaints against the Syracusan generals. — The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes
forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius. — Harangue of Dionysius in the
Syracusan assembly against the generals, who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius
with others appointed in their room. — Ambitious arts of Dionysius — he intrigues against his
colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean
exiles. — Dionysius is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the execution or

banishment of the Geloan oligarchy. — He returns to Syracuse with an increased force — he
accuses his colleagues of gross treason. — Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with full
powers. — Apparent repentance of the people after the vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a
vote ensuring to him a body of paid guards. — March of Dionysius to Leontini. — Dionysius
establishes himself at Syracuse as despot. — Dionysius as despot — the means whereby he
attained the power.
383-446

CHAPTER LXXXII.
SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of
the Geloans — Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius for a general
attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela
and Kamarina — flight of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the
Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against Dionysius. — Mutiny of the
Syracusan horsemen — they ride off to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their
imprudence. Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from Imilkon. Terms of
peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over
Syracuse. Pestilence in the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace, with the
victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with Dionysius. — Depressed condition
of the towns of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of
Dionysius. — Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia.
— He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans — he distributes the lands of
Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius
marches out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers at Herbesa —
Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and
Messênê, besiege Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body of
Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the assailants with feigned
submission — arrival of the Campanians — victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his
despotism more than before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles the
Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens — strengthens the fortifications of
Ortygia — augments his mercenary force. — Dionysius conquers Naxus, Katana, and Leontini. —
Great power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution of Dionysius to
make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse — danger to which the town had been exposed,
in the Athenian siege. — Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of
the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the work — efforts made by all the
Syracusans as well as by Dionysius himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war
against the Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards the Syracusans.
— His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines
towards him. Their application to Messênê. — He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He
desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed. —
He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian
maiden named Doris. — Immense warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines,
etc. — Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk of ships of war —
quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of the Syracusans in his projects against
Carthage. — He hires soldiers from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on
the same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse towards him. — He
convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage. — He desires to

arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his. — He
grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage
— suffering in Africa from the pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a
prodigious army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against Carthage, among the
Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius
besieges the Carthaginian seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege —
vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies of Carthage — doubtful
result of the siege of Motyê — appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to
return. — Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal attack. — Plunder of
Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius.
— Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he retakes
Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels
from Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of
Syracuse — he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army as well as his
fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival
of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the Campanians of
Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of his army. — Imilkon marches close up to
Syracuse — the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry.
Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders the suburb of Achradina —
blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of
Dionysius. — Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. — Public meeting
convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him — vehement speech by Thedorus. —
Sympathy excited by the speech in the Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds
Dionysius — who finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. — Alliance
of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy at the time. The emancipation of
Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas. — Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence
among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the Carthaginian camp. He
deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both by sea and
by land, against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian camp — exultation
at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the
Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the remaining
Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress at Carthage — miserable end of
Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.
446-512

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXXVI.
FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE
SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.
The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which
we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one to
Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians medising!”—“Nay (replied the
Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) laconising.”[2]
These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between Spartan
and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalkidas, and
propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express ground, that it was exactly
calculated to meet the Persian king’s purposes and wishes,—as we learn
even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were
both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything, as the
convention was originally framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas
saw the necessity of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article
providing that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4]
This addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by
Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final decree
which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name from
Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the adherence of
Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia had become so
overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means of standing out,
even if the supplementary article had been omitted. Nevertheless, this
condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a certain share in the gain,
conjointly with the far larger shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is,
however, not less true, that Athens, as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the
peace only under fear and compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they

were interested merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general
loss and degradation.
That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance. It was a fiat
issued from the court of Susa; as such it was ostentatiously proclaimed and
“sent down” from thence to Greece. Its authority was derived from the
king’s seal, and its sanction from his concluding threat, that he would make
war against all recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus
(along with Antalkidas), read by him aloud, and heard with submission by
the assembled Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to
the regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at the hands of
the Persian king, and which she now not only set the example of
sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as
guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the
point of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or not.
Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and placed as
a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the
common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great foci
and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of
a convention, it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding
from the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all Pan-
hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8] Effacing
altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world, bound together and
regulated by the self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own
members,—even the words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of
intrusive foreign power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial
settler of Grecian differences; a guardian[9] who cared for the peace of
Greece more than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form
alone, it was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth
and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor of
Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand,
which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so
cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—
stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying

with it.[10] Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than
what stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic glories
and ornaments at Olympia.[11]
Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate events,
when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own estimation
even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost all Pan-hellenic
conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious minister,
procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political objects of her own.
How insane would such an anticipation have appeared to Æschylus, or the
audience who heard the Persæ! to Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and
Archidamus! nay, even to Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last
consummation of a series of previous political sins, invoking more and
more the intervention of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.
Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from the
commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology,
little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious of
the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta, when the
Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be blamed for asking
from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for her own preservation.[13]
From the earliest commencement to the seventh year of the war, many
separate and successive envoys were despatched by the Spartans to Susa;
two of whom were seized in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to
death. The rest reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way,
and contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to
understand what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in
the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking for
clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an Athenian squadron
at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens; where he was treated
with great politeness, and sent back (after the letters which he carried had
been examined) to Ephesus. What is more important to note is, that
Athenian envoys were sent along with him, with a view of bringing Athens
into friendly communication with the Great King; which was only
prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes Longimanus just then died. Here we
see the fatal practice, generated by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid;
begun by Sparta as an importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by

Athens, though we do not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had
they been able to reach Susa.
Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of the
great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes arising out of
that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but were quite as eager to
tender interference for their own purposes, as Sparta was to invite them for
hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase their aid by the surrender of the
Asiatic Greeks, and that too without any stipulations in their favor,—has
been recounted in my last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it
stands only as an excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against
aggression from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning
of the war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object was
something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to
accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition,
Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a price
which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly never have
endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then formidable power
of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the example; and
consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though
the bargain was never consummated. It is true that she was then contending
for her existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how
much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of
Ægospotami.[16]
After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would doubtless
have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have passed at once under
the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely new train of circumstances
arisen out of the very peculiar position and designs of Cyrus. That young
prince did all in his power to gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries
for his ambitious speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the
Asiatic Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to protect
the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they were threatened; a
protection easy for her to confer, not merely from the unbounded empire

which she then enjoyed over the Grecian world, but from the presence of
the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand, and the contempt for Persian military
strength which they brought home from their retreat. She thus finds herself
in the exercise of a Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the
ministry of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play against
her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in playing against
Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she had invited for her own
purposes, is now brought in against herself, and with far more effect, since
her empire was more odious as well as more oppressive than the Athenian.
It is now Athens and her allies who call in Persian aid; without any direct
engagement, indeed, to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that
after the battle of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by
his supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid was
still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving the way
for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render themselves
culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we may remark, as
before, that they act under the pressure of stronger necessities than could
ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might employ on their own behalf,
with much greater truth, the excuse of self-preservation preferred by king
Archidamus.
But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than in
regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful,
even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the Isthmus of
Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only by common terror,
could hardly stand on the defensive against her, and would probably have
been disunited by reasonable offers on her part; nor would she have needed
even to recall Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably
dictated in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the
fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before,
was about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since the very
peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian empire were
now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first
object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put

down all partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in order that
there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting herself, the strongest
of all individual states. As a means to this end, which was no less in the
interest of Persia than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great
King, betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen,
but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,
—and volunteered to medise in order that the Persians might repay her by
laconising.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps, who had
more than once manifested dissentient views of their own, Antalkidas
procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed at Susa; and
Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce the same order,
—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her countrymen; thus
converting them into the subjects, and herself into a sort of viceroy or
satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was
far more flagrant and destructive than that alleged confederacy with the
Persian king, for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death,
and that, too, by the Spartans themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a
precedent for the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20]
foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political
independence had to run.
That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C., refusing in
the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation to betray the
sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during
the two following generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and
had also been powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now,
in the former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter
completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that Greece had
to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from
the smaller states nothing more could be required than that they should
adhere to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint), the
proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by Antalkidas,—
that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems of Grecian political

life. The grand idea represented by it,—of collective self-determining
Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the bosoms of individual patriots.
If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that though its
first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was at least popular as a
promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to each city, small or great, was
dear to Grecian political instinct. I have already remarked more than once
that the exaggerated force of this desire was the chief cause of the short
duration of Grecian freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the
separate parts, it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under certain
modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian political
instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great preponderance of
mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the convention was in its promise
acceptable and popular,—and although we shall find it hereafter invoked as
a protection in various individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how
it was carried into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good
or evil, the present of a friend or of an enemy.
The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace, sent
down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and we shall see
that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They did not even
attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the honest, though
undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek mind; much less did they
seek to grant as much as was really good, and to withhold the remainder.
They defined autonomy in such manner, and meted it out in such portions,
as suited their own political interests and purposes. The promise made by
the convention, except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own
power by dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,
when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece,
we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious import;
demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free,
which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of
the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher empire. But in

387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were no large body of
subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it
was by no means intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as
well as what was realized, even by the most specious item of this
disgraceful convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for
their own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian
convenience;” a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text for
Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas
and the battle of Leuktra.
I have already mentioned that the first two applications of the newly-
proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to extort from
the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian auxiliaries, and to
compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency of the Bœotian
federation. The latter especially was an object which they had long had at
heart;[25] and by both, their ascendency in Greece was much increased.
Athens, too, terrified by the new development of Persian force as well as
partially bribed by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of
the peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
proceedings of the Persians.
Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince named
Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have much
incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation which took
place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with Artaxerxes,
intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual aid in
reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who were exposed
to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various Persians and other
subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of whom made submission and
tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except Tamos, who had commanded the fleet
of Cyrus on the coasts both of Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of
Tamos when Tissaphernes came down in full power to the coast, that he fled
with his fleet and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king

Psammetichus, to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor,
however, having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with all his
children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to
the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28] Two years afterwards (392-
390 B.C.), during the years immediately succeeding the victory of Knidus,
and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we
hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in
strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus
repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380
B.C.,[30] sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in
spite of farther efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt,
the native kings in that country maintained their independence for about
sixty years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.
But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention of
the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras, despot of
Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a discourse of the
most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed after his death for the
satisfaction (and probably paid for with the money) of his son and successor
Nikoklês, by the contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for
exaggeration and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are
sufficiently interesting.
Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them, from the
divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer Teukrus, after returning
from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a
harsh order from his father Telamon, and given commencement to the city
of that name on the eastern coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus,
the Greek and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in
very different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns being all
dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two
most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos,
Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture of

Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.[32] Each was
ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek
immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have
been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C.
496), the preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with
considerable intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however,
greatly crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And though
doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450 B.C.) partially
revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with the Persians, had prudently
relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34] so that the Grecian element in the
former, receiving little extraneous encouragement, became more and more
subordinate to the Phœnician.
It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of Salamis,
who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of the Teukrid Gens,[35]
were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician exile who gained their
confidence and made himself despot in their place.[36] To insure his own
sceptre, this usurper did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen
the Phœnician population, as well as to discourage and degrade the
Hellenic. The same policy was not only continued by his successor at
Salamis, but seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns;
insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became
sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed;
new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the body which
were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals; while Grecian arts,
education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.[37]
Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an early age
so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of winning
popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among Greeks and
Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician despot was slain,
through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who
got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper, mistrustful of his position,
and anxious to lay hands upon all conspicuous persons who might be
capable of doing him mischief, tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter

escaped and passed over to Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance
a helpless exile, he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new
usurpation, stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any firm
footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but determined
band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission by a postern gate
of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in his palace. In spite of a
vastly superior number of guards, this enterprise was conducted with such
extraordinary daring and judgment, that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras
became despot in his place.[39]
The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully justified the
expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain from bloodshed, or
spoliation, or violence for the gratification of personal appetite; abstinences
remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his reign with letters of
gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible
temperament of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under
due control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction by
which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government was at
the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the
multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal
supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of
policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was foremost in all effort
and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security, he gradually doubled
the wealth, commerce, industry, and military force, of the city, while his
own popularity and renown went on increasing.
Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and in
Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last fifty years
had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in this scheme, he seems
to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with which city he was connected as
a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only
just ceasing to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we
cannot exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may

conclude it to have been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly
after that period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44]
moreover, he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other
parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under the
auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He took especial pains to
revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching, music, and intellectual
tendencies. Such encouragement was so successfully administered, that in a
few years, without constraint or violence, the face of Salamis was changed.
The gentleness and sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism,
became again predominant; with great influence of example over all the
other towns of the island.
Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens might
perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her ambition eastward,
in preference to that disastrous impulse which led her westward to Sicily.
But coming as he did only at that later moment when she was hard pressed
to keep up even a defensive war, he profited rather by her weakness than by
her strength. During those closing years of the war, when the Athenian
empire was partially broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the
tranquillity which it had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a
scene of contest between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-
settlers from Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the
Chersonesus, or elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure
in every way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the
defeat of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained were
expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that moment the
least attractive place in Greece), or in some other locality. To such persons,
not less than to the Athenian admiral Konon with his small remnant of
Athenian triremes saved out of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations
of Evagoras would present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found.
Accordingly, we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from
different parts of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women,
during the years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as
followed the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the

Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting. The
extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On what
conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the conduct of
Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.
During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his tribute
regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian king. But as his
power increased, his ambition increased also. We find him towards the year
390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with
Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician cities
on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, this war began,
we cannot determine. At the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras
had not only paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the
Persian fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians,
himself serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the
extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion
in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the latter
against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and at the very
moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of Evagoras, the
Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against him, and forced him
into the war in self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of
the disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at first
gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not only
worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the
prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet,
attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take
the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian
towns to declare against the Persians.[50] He received powerful aid from
Akoris, the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias
and the force sent out by the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390
B.C., the war against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing
the Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice did
Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his long
protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the battle of
Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her
enemies.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a war in
Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince
of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort made
by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the peace of
Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as should overawe
Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of the conditions of that
peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus
being acknowledged as belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off
from Athens, and reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as
he could pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But the
peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were
completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board, and were
enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only their whole fleet
from Ionia, but also additional contingents from these very Grecian cities. A
large portion of the Persian force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet
seemingly acting by constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and
therefore not very efficient.
The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos was at
the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the south of the
island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously gained a battle on land,
attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he had got together a fleet of two
hundred triremes, nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought
contest, in which he at first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a
complete naval defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and
enabled the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55]
Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris in
Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued in revolt
against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians were distracted, and
the war was not concluded until ten years after its commencement.[56] It
cost them on the whole (if we may believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand
talents in money, and such severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to
the propositions of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full
possession of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave to

his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be literally
inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily refused his consent,
demanding that the tribute should be recognized as paid by “one king to
another.” Rather than concede this point of honor, he even broke off the
negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself to the uttermost. He was
rescued, after the siege had been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which
broke out between the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes,
accusing Tiribazus of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in
conjunction with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and
thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already
wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant the
capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging the offensive
phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the other side.[58]
It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies, and
continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince of Salamis under
the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war, nor was his general
popularity among the Salaminians diminished by the hardships which they
had gone through along with him.[59] His prudence calmed the rankling
antipathy of the Great King, who would gladly have found a pretext for
breaking the treaty. His children were numerous, and lived in harmony as
well with him as with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact,
standing as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and conflict,
often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice the incident whereby
Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping with that superhuman good
fortune and favor from the gods, of which the Panegyrical Oration boasts as
having been vouchsafed to the hero throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly
not very long after the peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a
conspiracy against his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular
accident, before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in
flight. He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of the
young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis against
the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to the other, to

make a secret assignation for being conducted to her chamber by the
eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his hand.[62]
Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence, remarkably
free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and forming a strong contrast
in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose military energy is
so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras,
reigned at Salamis after him, and showed much regard, accompanied by
munificent presents, to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a
pacific and well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts,
conversant by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all,
copying his father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person
or property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
prosperity of the city.[63]
We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse of
Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece. For the
first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the Persians were now
really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no
time in confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected,
they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some cases, their
mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64]
And thus these cities, having already once changed their position greatly for
the worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale of
Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards
individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap
maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained,
than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required
beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women as inmates
of their harems.[65] What was taken for their convenience admitted neither
of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than
many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and
seductive,—as we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the
companion of Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these

Asiatic Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came
under the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but
also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66] The difference
between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just
noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians was still
more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made over by Sparta and
the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect
worse, they were at the same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to
strengthen the hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against
Evagoras in Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast
of Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that
from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius,
the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized, and so
long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom its extinction
was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security
even of the islanders.
It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by this
surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government of Corinth,
—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of Argeian auxiliaries,
and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian exiles who were the most
devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her for support, and made her
mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence or for defence. She thus gained
the means of free action against Thebes, the enemy upon whom her
attention was first directed. Thebes was now the object of Spartan antipathy,
not less than Athens had formerly been; especially on the part of King
Agesilaus, who had to avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice
near Aulis, as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense miso-Theban
sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all sides, doubly
aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans, like Antalkidas, warned
him[68] that his persevering hostility would ultimately kindle in the Thebans
a fatal energy of military resistance and organization. But the warning was

despised until it was too fully realized in the development of the great
military genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.
I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths to
the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to recognize the
autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which Agesilaus had
manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the treaty, and attack
them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession balked him in this impulse;
but it enabled him to enter upon a series of measures highly humiliating to
the dignity as well as to the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were
now proclaimed autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee,
and interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have,
the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she availed
herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them a local
oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as devoted to
herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost and garrison.[70]
Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally out of the situation; since
the previous leaders, and the predominant sentiment in most of the towns,
seem to have been favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued
presidency of Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves
hampered, intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those
who had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a
bold and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the
surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather
invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as well as
against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them under the
assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of the Bœotian
cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and though Sparta
thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy, from motives of her
own, and not from their solicitation,—yet, Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over
whom the presidency of Thebes appears to have been harshly exercised,
were adverse to her, and favorable to the Spartan alliance.[71] These two
cities were strongly garrisoned by Sparta, and formed her main stations in
Bœotia.[72]

The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols and
proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a deep
wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound still
deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to inflict,—the
restoration of Platæa.
A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as one
of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and faithful
population, victims of an exposed position combined with numerical
feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance the capricious
turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior towards them. One
hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon
Sparta, to entreat her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king
Kleomenes had then declined the obligation as too distant, and had
recommended them to ally themselves with Athens.[73] This
recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish to raise contention
between Athens and Thebes, was complied with; and the alliance, severing
Platæa altogether from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both
advantageous and honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war. At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and
strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it
was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes
was reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which she
had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service of Mardonius.
[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing her best to break up
the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various cities as her allies; in which
project, though doubtless suggested by and conducive to her own ambition,
she was at that time (460-445 B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic
grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted
them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same
again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a time
successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of Korôneia;
and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole Bœotian
federation (except Platæa, was united under Thebes, in bitter hostility
against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any declaration, was

struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the
third year of the war, king Archidamus, at the head of the full
Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic
defence and a long blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme
pressure of famine; yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced
their way out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the
Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before the
siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian
warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa had been
razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had remained ever since
cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving Platæans had been dealt
with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship
was conceded to them at Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420
B.C., that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed
over to the Platæans as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they
were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace of
Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their town and
their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and restore it.[78]
Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either to carry
out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the autonomy of
existing towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since the prior destruction
had been the deliberate act of themselves, and of King Archidamus the
father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step conducive to the present political
views of Sparta. And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It
weakened the Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for
about forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by
establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional station
for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the newly-established
inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced a subject of contention
between Athens and Thebes, calculated to prevent the two from hearty
coöperation afterwards against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans
with Athens was no less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against

Thebes, we may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an
act acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made
of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to Greece
generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at Athens, had
intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably, accompanied
their husbands to the restored little town on the north of Kithæron, near the
southern bank of the river Asôpus.
Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian war, we
should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the sequel will prove
—and their own subsequent statement emphatically sets forth—that they
were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost of Spartan operations
against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the great revolution which the
Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes was degraded from
the president of a federation into an isolated autonomous city, while the
other Bœotian cities, who had been before members of the federation, were
elevated each for itself into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the
real truth[81] in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and
sworn in as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans should
submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of Platæa as an
independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from themselves,—proves
how much they felt their own weakness, and how irresistible at this moment
was the ascendency of their great enemy, in perverting to her own ambition
the popular lure of universal autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas.
Though compelled to acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn
of fortune which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation;
while their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for being
suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent the reunion of
Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time completely successful,
and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to become possessed of Thebes
itself,[83] through a party of traitors within,—as will presently appear.
In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the great
director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more just and
moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a section of the

leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his project of ruling
Greece by means of subservient local despots or oligarchies in the various
cities,[85] and who contended that the autonomy promised by the peace of
Antalkidas ought to be left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive
intervention on the part of Sparta.[86]
Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they had
themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early
moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth, to
strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous limits. Passing in
review[87] the conduct of each during the war, they resolved to make an
example of the city of Mantinea. Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of
equivocal fidelity, were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of
having been slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes
even to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence
of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to the
hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected feeling
towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she obtained,—
satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.[88] The Spartan
ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all such past behavior,
and peremptorily requiring that the walls of the city should be demolished,
as the only security for future penitence and amendment. As compliance
was refused, they despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents
generally for the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the
command to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the
duty, on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to his
father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta
during the early part of his reign.[89]
Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging their
lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging a ditch
around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard, while the rest
worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he prepared to erect a
wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that the preceding harvest had
been so good, as to leave a large stock of provision in the town, and to
render the process of starving it out tedious both for Sparta and for her
allies,—he tried a more rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the
river Ophis, of considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through

the middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus
causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the stability of the
walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of sun-burnt
bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for aid,[91] and unable to
provide extraneous support for their tottering towers, the Mantineans were
compelled to solicit a capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the
request, except on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but
the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants
should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been brought
together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of Mantinea. To this
also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the capitulation was
ratified.
Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the
Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that they
were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and by the
Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put to death. And
such would assuredly have been their fate, had not Pausanias (the late king
of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose good opinion they had always
enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor from his son Agesipolis the lives of
the most obnoxious, sixty in number, on condition that they should depart
into exile. Agesipolis had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of
his father. His Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of
the gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as
a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their spears
unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their reach;
especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most murderous
propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.[92] As at Peiræus
before, so here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king
Pausanias is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the
ferocity of political antipathies.
The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were
distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the
population, each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the
village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to
occupy Mantinea as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical
government, and left unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the

change proved troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found
themselves resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when
they felt themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new
situation became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still
better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian
villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They assigned to
each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the command of each
allied contingent), and the military service of all was henceforward
performed with the utmost regularity.[93]
Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan despotism.
Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the historian, who recounts it
with a confident assurance, that after the trouble of moving was over, the
population felt themselves decidedly bettered by the change. Such an
assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that, being captives under
the Grecian laws of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more
terrible liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting their
civic community. That their feelings towards the change were those of
genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after the battle of
Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together,
with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.
[94] It would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for
attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct of the
Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily
averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of his
community by joining in any larger political combination, however
equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the idea of
breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging the character of
a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing less than great social
degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally, Spartans not excepted.[95]
In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was in
point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest which could be
inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory and superiority of
Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic manifestations,—all that there
was of literature and philosophy, or of refined and rational sociality,—

depended upon the city-life of the people. And the influence of Sparta,
during the period of her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde,
as tending not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into
isolated towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea
into villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively
dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised
no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter find
coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of Megalopolis
and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse than those of
either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving or Pan-hellenic
sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon subservient factions
in each subordinate city. In the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it
is clear that the attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally
invited, by the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the
power into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the
first object they completely succeeded, and their government probably was
more assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire town.
In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except the
accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident, which alone
rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace of a political
massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by
breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt
enmity, and which was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to
receive the favorable criticism of judges rather disinclined towards
democracy generally.[96] Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered
certain neighboring Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with
Sparta to preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than
the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they are satisfied
with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified villages,
though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had Spartan
power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed during this
interval.
The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98]
indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most stringent
among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians through their
whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its members as gave

them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During the ten years after the
surrender of Athens, they had been lords of the Grecian world both by land
and sea, with a power never before possessed by any Grecian state; until the
battle of Knidus, and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and
Corinth, seconded by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much
endangered it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on
their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled
them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general
autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant nothing
more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,[99] and of Corinth
from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation between Sparta
and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied
themselves to raise their ascendency on land to the point where it had stood
before the battle of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their
empire at sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian
harmosts and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most
devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had been
somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic
policy.
Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their fellow-citizens
for subservience to Sparta, now found the season convenient for soliciting
Spartan intervention to procure their return. It was in this manner that a
body of exiled political leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that
the city when under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta,
but had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring that the
exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished without just cause.
[100]

While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of
Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts
were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades and other
smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this latter sphere, however,
Athens became her competitor. Since the peace, and the restoration of
Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined with the refortified Peiræus and its
Long Walls,—Athenian commerce and naval power had been reviving,

though by slow and humble steps. Like the naval force of England
compared with France, the warlike marine of Athens rested upon a
considerable commercial marine, which latter hardly existed at all in
Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except constrained Helots or paid
foreigners;[101] while the commerce of Peiræus had both required and
maintained a numerous population of this character. The harbor of Peiræus
was convenient in respect of accommodation, and well-stocked with
artisans,—while Laconia had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of
harbors.[102] Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but
the shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with
Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to
compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the smaller
islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of their own, and
who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies of imported corn, it
was important to obtain both access to Peiræus and protection from the
Athenian triremes against that swarm of pirates, who showed themselves
after the peace of Antalkidas, when there was no predominant maritime
state; besides which, the market of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign
corn from the Crimea, through the preference shown by the princes of
Bosphorus to Athens, at a time when vessels from other places could obtain
no cargo.[103] A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the
tributary island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least
equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was
farther aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent out the
funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions remaining, that
large sums were borrowed at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely
by individual islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos,
Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who
dispensed these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians
named annually at Athens.[104] Moreover, these islanders rendered religious
homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought
within the range of a central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable
circumstances, of being strengthened and rendered even politically
important.
By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of considerable

moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her former empire; so
that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates published his Panegyrical
Discourse (seven years after the peace of Antalkidas), though her general
power was still slender compared with the overruling might of Sparta,[105]
yet her navy had already made such progress, that he claims for her the
right of taking the command by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously
enforces, of Athens and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all
Greece, against the Asiatic barbarians.[106]
It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to
Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans encouraged the
scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia, in compliance with
propositions from some disaffected subjects of Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some
such project, currently discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably
built his Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic
eloquence (380 B.C.) to stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and
calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home
for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad.
But whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained,
their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a more remote
region of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.
Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the siege
of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of Macedonia, or of
the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of Thrace adjoining
Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained a portion of her
maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were still in possession of
Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she had assigned to them; while
the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded by many hired Thracians, and even
by Perdikkas king of Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer
Amphipolis on the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having
disabled Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to
her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not
know how. At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian
war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may
conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more from the
abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of Perdikkas.

The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to
have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at the death of
several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes of Macedonians, who,
though forming part, really or nominally, of the dominion of the Temenid
princes, nevertheless were immediately subject to separate but subordinate
princes of their own. The reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this
manner. In the first instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the
crown,[109] who appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better
right to it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his
subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one
of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition
undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of the
Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about 413 B.C.), his
eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven years old; but his natural
son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The
dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of
reëstablishing himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son
under pretence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment,
slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the
boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these
crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic and
able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as none of his
predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military equipments, and
fortified places, were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight
roads of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a
novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.[112] Besides such improved
organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in detail),
Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the
Olympian Zeus and the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the
poets and philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets
Euripides and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in
Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished favor
and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in 406 or 405 B.C.
Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears
to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He perished in the same year as
Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and
Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his

assassins during a hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was
strongly attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment
and non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for
having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had
been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might
be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be inflicted; but
it was not till six years after his death that Dekamnichus, who had neither
forgotten nor forgiven the affront, found the opportunity of taking revenge
by instigating and aiding the assassins of Archelaus.[116]
These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and relating as
well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian citizen and poet
Euripides, illustrate the political contrast between Macedonia and Athens.
The government of the former is one wholly personal,—dependent on the
passions, tastes, appetites, and capacities, of the king. The ambition of
Archelaus leads both to his crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his
improved organization of the military force of the state afterwards; his
admiration for the poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize
warmly with Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an
offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by
drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. L’Etat, c’est
moi—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the personality of
the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens, no such element
exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of bringing to bear the
ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the military organization,—as
Athens found to her cost, when she was afterwards assailed by Philip, the
successor after some interval, and in many respects the parallel, of
Archelaus. But on the other hand, neither the personal tastes nor the
appetites, of any individual Athenian, count as active causes in the march of
public affairs, which is determined by the established law and by the
pronounced sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult
might have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to require.
Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might be well or ill-
judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated by regard to a known law

and to the public conceptions entertained of state-interests, state-dignity,
and state-obligations, without the avowed intrusion of any man’s
personality. To Euripides,—who had throughout his whole life been the butt
of Aristophanes and other comic writers, and who had been compelled to
hear, in the crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have the
offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal, by order of
his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that he should have availed
himself of the privilege, by causing the punishment to be really
administered; a punishment which he could never have seen inflicted,
during the fifty years of his past life, upon any free Athenian citizen.
Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after
which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne, under
the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about four years,
made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for two years. He then
died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son Pausanias; who, after a
reign of only one year, was assassinated and succeeded by Amyntas.[117]
This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the father of Philip and the grandfather
of Alexander the Great), though akin to the royal family, had been nothing
more than an attendant of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by
putting to death Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions,
twenty-four years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and
humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The
vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to have
declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations of kings,
beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus, and continued down
to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority and disunited the various
portions of the Macedonian name; which naturally tended to separation, and
could only be held together by a firm hand.
The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north, north-
east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and Illyrian,
whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable. Tempted,
probably, by the unsettled position of the government, the Illyrians poured
in upon Amyntas during the first year of his reign; perhaps they may have
been invited by other princes of the interior,[120] and at all events their
coming would operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves.

Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before by
assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was
not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella,
and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his position, he
made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the neighboring territory,—
Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As
this cession is represented to have been made at the moment of his distress
and expatriation, we may fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal
benefit or valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need,
at a moment of so much exigency.
It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the Chalkidians of
Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually aggregated around
their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to have taken its start from
this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to speak more properly, from his
abdication; for the cession of what he could not keep was of comparatively
little moment, and we shall see that he tried to resume it as soon as he
acquired strength. The effect of his flight was, to break up the government
of Lower or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the interior. To these
cities, the only chance of security, was to throw themselves upon the Greek
cities on the coast, and to organize in conjunction with the latter a
confederacy for mutual support. Among all the Greeks on that coast, the
most strenuous and persevering (so they had proved themselves in their
former contentions against Athens when at the summit of her power) as
well as the nearest, were the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians
now put themselves forward,—took into their alliance and under their
protection the smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near
them,—and soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the
larger towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable
city of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when the
Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to despair and
flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them serious efforts, not
without great danger if they failed. We may also be sure that the cities
themselves must have been willing, not to say eager, coadjutors; just as the
islanders and Asiatic Greeks clung to Athens at the first formation of the
confederacy of Delos. The Olynthians could have had no means of

conquering even the less considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella,
by force and against the will of the inhabitants.
How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the
confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our
information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy
Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383), and
describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood. But there is one
circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming
to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous,
and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their scheme
from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an imperial city
enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt
common laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty of
intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship. That the
Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a proposition as
this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at
all surprise us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian
invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto always
been subjects;[123] their cities had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each
its own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to
them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past
subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to
protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various
cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may
have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion of
domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the
Olynthians would be especially acceptable.
We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the Olynthians,
having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge farther, by making the
like liberal propositions to the Greek cities in their neighborhood. Several
of these latter joined voluntarily; others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that
the confederacy came to include a considerable number of Greeks,—
especially, Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding
the road of communication between the cities within Pallênê and the

continent. The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their
professed principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But in
spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian neighbors
obstructions which they had not experienced from the Macedonian. Each of
the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own town-autonomy and
separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and customs. All of them were
attached to this kind of distinct political life, by one of the most tenacious
and universal instincts of the Greek mind; all of them would renounce it
with reluctance, even on consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy,
with its generous promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest
advantages; and there were even some who, disdaining every prospective
consideration, refused to change their condition at all except at the point of
the sword.
Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities (next
to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore, the least unable to
stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not make application, until they
had already attracted within their confederacy a considerable number of
other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and
Apollonia to come in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-
citizenship. The proposition being declined, they sent a second message
intimating that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would
enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the military
force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia,
incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set
forth the position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit
intervention against Olynthus.
Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans, having
broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the
full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved
the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks
upon any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing
himself to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming
picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus,
invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian
confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great,

Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its
military power, even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The
territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a
numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while the
numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade as well
as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring Thracian tribes
would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would thus augment the
military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of Mount Pangæus would
speedily come within her assured reach. “All that I now tell you (such was
the substance of his speech) is matter of public talk among the Olynthian
people, who are full of hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who
are taking anxious pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125]
permit the aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land
and by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from
Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy
in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will
derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having
declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have received
notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we are anxious to
retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.[126]
But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of
joining them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring to
refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had they not been
afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith,
and with a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if
you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy to work,
their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit together in
attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity
of landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively. All
of them will become convinced that they have a common interest both in
belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as the Arcadians,
when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not only enabled to preserve
their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the
attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come into real operation,
you will presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”

This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all testimonies to
the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the Olynthians were acting.
They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of selfish ambition, nor of
degrading those around them,—but literally, of organizing a new
partnership on principles too generous and too seductive; of gently
superseding, instead of violently breaking down, the barriers between the
various cities, by reciprocal ties of property and family among the citizens
of each; of uniting them all into a new political aggregate, in which not only
all would enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers.
The advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to all,
is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of his argument.
“Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses upon Sparta)
before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may never taste it nor find
out how good it is; for if they do, you will not prevail on them to forego it.”
By implication, he also admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise
a doubt,—that the cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia,
would share along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian
political instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is the objection
stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus should lose its
freedom and become subject to an imperial city like Athens,—but whether
it should become a free and equal member of a larger political aggregate,
cemented by every tie which could make union secure, profitable, and
dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly the orator is conscious that
this repugnance, though at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless
essentially transitory, and would give place to attachment when the union
came to be felt as a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no
time in clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for
any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own
dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were
pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that each
city, or each village, while protected against subjection to any other, should
farther be prevented from equal political union or fusion with any other;
being thus more completely helpless and dependent in reference to Sparta.

It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the
dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to ask
for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having abandoned the
kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had obtained some aid
from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had
failed, being defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person
named Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and
possessing it for two years.[128]
After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared their
own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down Olynthus; next,
they submitted the same point to the vote of the assembled allies.[129]
Among these latter, there was no genuine antipathy against the Olynthians,
such as that which had prevailed against Athens before the Peloponnesian
war, in the synod then held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies
was now far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under
oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their fellow-
citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at Mantinea had
operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of Sparta was
accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as well as most of the
votes, declared for war,[130] and a combined army of ten thousand men was
voted to be raised. To make up such total, a proportional contingent was
assessed upon each confederate; combined with the proviso now added for
the first time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of
three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A
cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as
equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or
pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default were made
liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day, for every soldier not
sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of
pecuniary payment for personal service, is the same as I have already
described to have taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of
Delos under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to be
extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once poorer
and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it was favorable to
the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency becomes here manifest,

to sanction, by the formality of a public resolution, that increased
Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already grown up in practice.
The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with the vote
just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous contingents would
occupy some time, and again insisted on the necessity of instant
intervention, even with a small force; before the Olynthians could find time
to get their plans actually in work or appreciated by the surrounding cities.
A moderate Lacedæmonian force (they said), if despatched forthwith,
would not only keep those who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their
refusal, but also induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt.
Accordingly the ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two
thousand hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and
Skiritæ or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the whole of
this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with such as were
ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind to collect the remainder
and follow him. And it seems that the Akanthians judged correctly. For
Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after a rapid march, though he was unable to
contend against the Olynthians in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt
from them, and was able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and
Apollonia, which resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to
coöperate with him.
The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no
less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus to
Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the Thebans,
whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful enough to
refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with Olynthus,[134] and
though proclamation was made that no Theban citizens should join the
Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having departed at a moment’s notice,
passed through Bœotia without a halt, in his way to Thrace. But it was
known that his brother Phœbidas was presently to follow; and upon this fact
the philo-Laconian party in Thebes organized a conspiracy.
They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings of
Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate with them in
any party movement which they might find opportunity of executing;[135]

and when he halted with his detachment near the gymnasium a little way
without the walls, they concerted matters as well with him as among
themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias, were the chiefs of the party
in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party decidedly in minority, yet still
powerful, and at this moment so strengthened by the unbounded ascendency
of the Spartan name, that Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of
the city. Of the anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which
included most of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came
successively into office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the
leaders were Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the
foremost as well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now
in office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.
While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the day
of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by the women apart
from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to
their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put
himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the
walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in
the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every
one out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate,
hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of
which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch.
There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the
Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine
Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the
Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they became
possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the persons of all
the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages for the quiet
submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the town below.
Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates, and then descended
into the town, giving orders that no man should go up without his order.[138]
The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the
acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among the
senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages and

armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given orders, stood
close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated by the news that the
Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure us that they have no hostile
purpose against any one who does not court war against them. But I, as
polemarch, am empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is
manifestly and capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as
the great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of
him, and carry him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias was accordingly
seized and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators,
thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as were
partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more neutral
members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape with their lives.
Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and
others, sought safety by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the
remainder of the Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-
Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and
appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]
This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a worthy
counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140] twenty-two years
before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty. Terror-striking in itself, it
was probably accompanied by similar deeds of force against others of the
same party. The sudden explosion and complete success of the conspiracy,
plotted by the Executive Chief himself, the most irresistible of all
conspirators,—the presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a
compliant Senate in the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his
leading partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of resistance
on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably was, to extricate
their wives and daughters from the custody of the Lacedæmonians in the
Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer, Leontiades would extort submission
the more easily, and would probably procure a vote of the people ratifying
the new régime, the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the
acropolis. Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
reigned” at Thebes.
The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes
had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a

mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout Greece,
probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of
Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public law of Greece, it was a
flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. It
was even worse than the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans before the
Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial excuse that war was at any
rate impending; whereas in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor
threatened anything to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned
by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the
philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time an
immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with preëminent
skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta
the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her
two really formidable enemies.[142]
Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the object
of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the citizens generally.
Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium of the proceeding, and to
denounce him as having acted without orders. Even the ephors, who had
secretly authorized him beforehand to coöperate generally with the faction
at Thebes, having doubtless never given any specific instructions, now
indignantly disavowed him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence,
contending that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes
had been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service, even
impromptu and without previous orders.
Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man at
Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it still more,
when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation as well as profuse
in promise. In his speech addressed to the assembled ephors and Senate, he
first reminded them how hostile Thebes had hitherto been to them, under
Ismenias and the party just put down,—and how constantly they had been
in jealous alarm, lest Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian
federation. “Now (added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good
care to uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For
the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch, to
get every service which you require.[143]” It was resolved by the

Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison now in
the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the government
of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they at the same time, as a
sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece, passed a vote of censure on
Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command, and even condemned him to a
fine. The fine, however, most probably was never exacted; for we shall see
by the conduct of Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against
Phœbidas, if at first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.
That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the Kadmeia,
the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised itself for Sparta
as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have been irretrievably
sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be, cannot be urged in respect to
their treatment of Ismenias; whom they put upon his trial at Thebes, before
a court consisting of three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from
each allied city. He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other
enemies, of having entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian
king to the detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian
funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the
real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down to
the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was condemned
and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his political
antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory, it would have been
too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special
remark. But there is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of
judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians
here committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a
criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge of
confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves, only five
years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that
monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received
money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in like
manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on Grecian
war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves
upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against them the war

which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice by which that revenge
was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that same
foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified themselves,
lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.
Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in Thebes,
with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them and execute
their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as a member of
Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to prosecute her
Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas and Amyntas,
though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian confederacy, had not
been strong enough to put it down; so that a larger force was necessary, and
the aggregate of ten thousand men, which had been previously decreed, was
put into instant requisition, to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of
Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very popular manners, was soon on
his march at the head of this large army, which comprised many Theban
hoplites as well as horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their
unqualified devotion to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in
Macedonia, urging upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of
recovering the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and
also to Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia,
inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily
extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the
interior, unless she were put down.[145]
Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their
hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful
forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent Macedonian
horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy enterprise.[146] The
Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous and efficient. Unable as they
were to make head against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance,
nevertheless in a desultory engagement which took place near the city
gates, they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the
infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete
victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a
diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the city.
Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian
territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians retaliated

by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in alliance with him.
[147]

In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial defeats,
especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more and more
confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became confident and
began to despise them. Under these dispositions on his part, a body of
Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed the river near
their city, and advanced in calm array towards the Lacedæmonian camp.
Indignant at such an appearance of daring, Teleutias directed Tlemonidas
with the peltasts to disperse them; upon which the Olynthians slowly
retreated, while the peltasts rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when
they recrossed the river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the
peltasts had crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously,
and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a
hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely lost his
temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the fugitives with the
hoplites around him, sending orders to all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and
horsemen, to advance also. But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him
on towards the city, with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his
soldiers ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed
close up to the walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of
missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the
Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once,
and charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites. The
Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the first, were
unable to stand against the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself,
fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the
flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled in
different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia.
So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of
the fugitives was immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for
probably many of the allies who escaped became discouraged and went
home.
At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred the
Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But now,
they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they thought only of

repairing the dishonor by a still more imposing demonstration. Their king
Agesipolis was placed at the head of an expedition on the largest scale; and
his name called forth eager coöperation, both in men and money, from the
allies. He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to
Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the
Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers or
citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced as friends
of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous Lykurgean training.[150]
Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to greater exertions than before,
so that Agesipolis was enabled, after receiving their reinforcements in his
march through Macedonia, to present himself before Olynthus with an
overwhelming force, and to confine the citizens within their walls. He then
completed the ravage of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias;
and even took Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer
weather presently brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s
time; although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His body
was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was buried with
the customary solemnities.[151]
Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the
war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their home
produce as well as from importation, were speedily reduced to such straits
as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged to break up their own
federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn members of the
Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of service to Sparta.[152]
The Olynthian union being dissolved, the component Grecian cities were
enrolled severally as allies of Sparta, while the maritime cities of
Macedonia were deprived of their neighboring Grecian protector, and
passed again under the dominion of Amyntas.
Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the reconstitution
of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to the Grecian world.
Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously or more unwarrantably
employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy should be formed in the
Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region where Hellas joined the non-
Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of signal benefit to the Hellenic world
generally. It would have served as a bulwark to Greece against the

neighboring Macedonians and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if
it made any, would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her
Grecian neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct of town-
autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct would have
become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the benefits conferred
by the confederacy on each and every one,—these are facts certified by the
urgency of the reluctant Akanthians, when they entreat Sparta to leave no
interval for the confederacy to make its workings felt. Nothing but the
intervention of Sparta could have crushed this liberal and beneficent
promise; nothing but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to
379 B.C., she was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite
free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did
not long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of
Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised so
vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled from
meddling with Olynthus,—as we shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter
to be recounted), that she declined interfering in Thessaly to protect the
Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy
been left to its natural working, it might well have united all the Hellenic
cities around it in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in
possession of a confederacy of free and self-determining communities,
confining the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat these
tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from fractional
autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal autonomy with
collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to bring about. She gave
the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the indispensable basis upon which
his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus,
Apollonia, and the major part of the Grecian world, to one common level of
subjection. Many of those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal
partnership and free communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to
discover how impotent were their own separate walls as a bulwark against
Macedonian neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common
servitude which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to

Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the
Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never again did the
opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm, consolidated, and self-
supporting basis, round the coast of the Thermaic Gulf.
While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians were
carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within Peloponnesus,
against the city of Phlius. It has already been mentioned that certain exiles
of this city had recently been recalled, at the express command of Sparta.
The ruling party in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the
confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury,
to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid,—and
reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.[153] The returned exiles
now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that they could obtain no just
restitution of their property; that the tribunals of the city were in the hands
of their opponents, many of them directly interested as purchasers, who
refused them the right of appealing to any extraneous and impartial
authority; and that there were even in the city itself many who thought them
wronged. Such allegations were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At
the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius,
so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against
all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh count for
strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-
Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.
[154] Their cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal
relations of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his
colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party at
Phlius,—had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money, for
his Olynthian expedition,—and had publicly thanked them for their
devotion to Sparta.[155] The Phliasian government, emboldened by the
proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied
that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coërcion would be
enforced against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in
Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that
jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan kings. In spite of
much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against
a city of five thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not

only seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but
also took the command of the army.[156]
The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable, Agesilaus
marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing those Phliasian
envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or entreated him to desist, with
the harsh reply that the government had already deceived Sparta once, and
that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the
acropolis. This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a
wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves with resolute
bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select
troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and even
annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree, every citizen
was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the siege was prolonged to
double the time which Agesilaus, from the information of the exiles as to
the existing stock of provisions, had supposed to be possible. Gradually,
however, famine made itself felt; desertions from within increased, among
those who were favorable, or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions,
which Agesilaus took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by
enrolment as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about
a year’s blockade,[157] the provisions within were exhausted, so that the
besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to despatch
envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their request. But
being at the same time indignant that they submitted to Sparta rather than to
him, he sent to ask the ephors that the terms might be referred to his
dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his watch over the city; in spite of
which, Delphion, with one of his most active subordinates, contrived to
escape at this last hour. Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion
to Agesilaus, who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles,
half from those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and
death over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the
future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a garrison in
the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.[158]
Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained
better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan
feelings of Agesilaus,[159] conducted themselves, we do not know. But the
presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as well as their

power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and the Lysandrian
Dekarchies elsewhere.
The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus,
seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.

CHAPTER LXXVII.
FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE
LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA,
AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.

At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on land had
reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their fleet was but
moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided empire with
Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands (so far as we can
make out) were independent of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both
within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the
more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy
dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and
an oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond all
chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the war against
Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching
power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan
harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much
more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the
Peloponnesian war.
Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same mingled
fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt towards imperial
Athens fifty years before, when she was designated as the “despot city.[160]”
And this sentiment was farther aggravated by the recent peace of
Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had first procured,
and afterwards carried into execution. That peace was disgraceful enough,
as being dictated by the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and
surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more
disgraceful when the universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be
so executed, as to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the
acts yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy

promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of
right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent
seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in
alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia) of
the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to every Greek of
large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as the confederate of the
Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the
Syracusan despot Dionysius on a third,—as betraying the independence of
Greece to the foreigner, and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that
free spirit which stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan
oligarchies.
Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the
head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship, or to
provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and free-spoken Greeks
at this moment is manifested in two eminent residents at Athens,—Lysias
and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the former composed an oration which
he publicly read at Olympia during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad,
B.C. 384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which
unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of
Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the
Persian king, partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls
upon all Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other, and
to unite in making head against these two really formidable enemies, as
their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for putting down
despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in
Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable
him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose naval force
was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster; while the
strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan Dionysius.
Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his
astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire to extend itself from
one city to another. They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities
which had been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as
coming home to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile
powers had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet
remained independent.

Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom
Lysias thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival a
splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his name; together
with several chariots to contend in the race, and some excellent rhapsodes
to recite poems composed by himself. The Syracusan legation, headed by
Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were clothed with rich vestments, and
lodged in a tent of extraordinary magnificence, decorated with gold and
purple; such, probably, as had not been seen since the ostentatious display
made by Alkibiades[162] in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While
instigating the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the
liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted
them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter, by
plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the sacred plain of
Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from Grecian sufferers. It
appears that this exhortation was partially, but only partially, acted upon.
[163] Some persons assailed the tents, but were, probably, restrained by the
Eleian superintendents without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in
conjunction with the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the
apprehensions and sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C.
384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a
festival memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians,
Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented by the
preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C. 392,—but also as it
exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for the first
time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the Persians,—and the
like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius
had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless
be full of complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against
Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth genuine
sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted
reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of
sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a
Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan tents
or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator’s remark, that the
free Grecian world was on fire[164] at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and
Sicilians, had already passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius;

and that, if these two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even
of central Greece would be in great danger.
It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would tend
to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his speech which
we possess, disguises his censure against her under the forms of surprise.
But Isokrates, who composed an analogous discourse four years afterwards
(which may perhaps have been read at the next Olympic festival of B.C.
380), speaks out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors
to the general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign
kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of
autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish
ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world
was every day becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the
presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb
it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus,
Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]
The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be sufficient
to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries took, both of the
state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta, during the eight years
succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379 B.C.). But the philo-Laconian
Xenophon is still more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having
described her triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the
subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could
produce numerous other incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that
the gods take careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events
which I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians,
who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths
by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they
had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over
them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel,
with the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta in
order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down by no
more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had banished.”
What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when

Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his dislike of
Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering in the coming phase
of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a well-merited judgment from the
gods? The sentence which I have just translated marks, in the commonplace
manner of the Xenophontic Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast
and transition,—past glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by
supervening misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of
Thucydides by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the
Melian[167] council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the
warnings of the prophet Teiresias.
The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow
struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical
partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting the
details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can only (as
above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens,
and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin,
position, and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel,
oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree we
have no means of knowing. The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as
those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which,
those rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies
amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded, from
being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better than a captive
dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a
numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan
party; three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first seizure
of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined subsequently by
others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these
exiles, that they hired assassins to take them off by private murder at
Athens; and actually succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the
band and chief successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed
their blows at the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in
Thebes subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read
not only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that
revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce

antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd of Theban
women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the women not only took
no part in political disputes, but rarely even showed themselves in public;
[172] so that this furious demonstration of vindictive sentiment must have
been generated by the loss or maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.
The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but genuine
sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian injustice. The
generous countenance which had been shown by the Thebans, twenty-four
years before, to Thrasybulus and the other Athenian refugees, during the
omnipotence of the Thirty, was now gratefully requited under this reversal
of fortune to both cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of
Sparta, who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in
the earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be
dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all
that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and
seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of
Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control.
Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and
Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs,
though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at the same
time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and
allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as
well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—
Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of
Theban sentiment in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and
though the young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises
being more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at
Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but
compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly
kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the
citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.[175]
For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of some
rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At length, in the
third winter after their flight, they began to despair of encouragement from
either quarter, and resolved to take the initiative upon themselves. Among
them were numbered several men of the richest and highest families at

Thebes, proprietors of chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for
contending at the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas,
Theopompus, Pherenikus, and others.[176]
Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though
almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion, in an
enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated itself to a
handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant private
correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of the sympathy of
the citizens generally, if they could once strike a blow. Yet nothing less
would be sufficient than the destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and
his colleagues,—nor would any one within the city devote himself to so
hopeless a danger. It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five
or ten other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as
seven, by others, twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in
Thebes came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the
design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next to him,
Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having been despatched
to Athens on official business, entered into secret conference with the
conspirators, concerted with them the day for their coming to Thebes, and
even engaged to provide for them access to the persons of the polemarchs.
Charon not only promised them concealment in his house, from their first
coming within the gates until the moment of striking their blow should have
arrived,—but also entered his name to share in the armed attack.
Nevertheless, in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still
appeared desperate to many who wished heartily for its success.
Epaminondas, for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—
resident at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded others
from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He announced distinctly
that he would not become an accomplice in civil bloodshed. It appears that
there were men among the exiles whose violence made him fear that they
would not, like Pelopidas, draw the sword exclusively against Leontiades
and his colleagues, but would avail themselves of success to perpetrate
unmeasured violence against other political enemies.[178]

The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary,
who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in
celebration of the period when they were going out of office as polemarchs,
—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into their company some
women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the best families in Thebes.[179]
In concert with the general body of Theban exiles at Athens, who held
themselves ready on the borders of Attica, together with some Athenian
sympathizers, to march to Thebes the instant that they should receive
intimation,—and in concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens,
who took on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without
any public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180]
crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about
December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with no other
arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates of Thebes one
by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men were coming home
from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the house of Charon, the
appointed rendezvous.
It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back,
and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas,
friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into the secret
against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the moment of
execution approached, that he took upon himself, without the knowledge of
the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go
forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to
desire that he and his comrades would go back to Attica, since
circumstances had happened to render the project for the moment
impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in
its usual place, asked his wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending
to look for it, at last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon
became so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with
his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He at last
beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure was thus
accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of countermand never
reached the conspirators on their way.[181]
In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day, on
the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to take

place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that banquet, at the
moment when the two polemarchs had become full of wine, in female
attire, as being the women whose visit was expected. The hour had nearly
arrived, and they were preparing to play their parts, when an unexpected
messenger knocked at the door, summoning Charon instantly into the
presence of the polemarchs. All within were thunderstruck with the
summons, which seemed to imply that the plot had been divulged, perhaps
by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was agreed among them that Charon must
obey at once. Nevertheless, he himself, even in the perilous uncertainty
which beset him, was most of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had
sheltered should suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their
cause. Before departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of
fifteen, and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in
the hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas and
the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon to put his
son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all were now involved.
Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to comply, and left his son
among them to share the fate of the rest. He went into the presence of
Archias and Philippus; whom he found already half-intoxicated, but
informed, by intelligence from Athens, that some plot, they knew not by
whom, was afloat. They had sent for him to question him, as a known friend
of the exiles; but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas,
in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume
their conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends.
Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable
chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was
delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the
Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme of
the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian party at
Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to Archias with
an intimation, that it related to very serious matters. “Serious matters for to-
morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the despatch, unopened and unread,
under the pillow of the couch on which he was reclining.[183]
Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called
upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon this
the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed in female attire,

into an adjoining chamber; then going back to the polemarchs, he informed
them that the women would not come in unless all the domestics were first
dismissed. An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart,
while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with wine at the
lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only
with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves;
among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his
term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession, and had it at
that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended
women into the banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of
distinction, the four others following as female attendants. Their long veils,
and ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had
the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the
polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using
their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little
resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself, and thus
perished with the others, though the conspirators had not originally intended
to take his life.[184]
Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing himself as
the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was reclining after
supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his side, when they entered
his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man, he started up, seized his
sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus in the throat; a desperate
struggle then ensued between him and Pelopidas in the narrow doorway,
where there was no room for a third to approach. At length, however,
Pelopidas overthrew and killed him, after which they retired, enjoining the
wife with threats to remain silent, and closing the door after them with
peremptory commands that it should not be again opened. They then went
to the house of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over
the roof.[185]
The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been
now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the prison.
Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of the deceased
governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a sudden thrust with his

spear, so as to ensure free admission to all. To liberate the prisoners,
probably, for the most part men of kindred politics with the conspirators,—
to furnish them with arms taken from the battle-spoils hanging up in the
neighboring porticos,—and to range them in battle order near the temple of
Amphion,—were the next proceedings; after which they began to feel some
assurance of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised
of what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes was free,
—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in arms in the
market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many trumpeters who
had come to contend for the prize at the approaching festival of the
Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow their trumpets in
different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to excite the citizens to
arms.[187]
Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling, and no
one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the truth became
known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic enthusiasm among the
majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen and hoplites hastened in arms
to the agora. Here for the first time since the seizure of the Kadmeia by
Phœbidas, a formal assembly of the Theban people was convened, before
which Pelopidas and his fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The
priests of the city crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the
name of the local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations
of delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and
Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which
had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an event of no
mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had waked up again
into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also had been, or would be,
restored.
Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to Attica
to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining exiles, with the
two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body of Athenian volunteers,
or corps francs, all of whom were ready on the borders awaiting the
summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the work. The Spartan generals,
on their side also, sent to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole

night, they had been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city;
lights showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and
shouts for the recent success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the
polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they
knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by
affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up the
Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in their favor from
the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces were not permitted even
to approach the city gate; being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in
sight, by the newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with
loss. The Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without
support, but saw their enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and
by the auxiliary volunteers.[191]
Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves
at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism and
unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed themselves of this
first burst of fervor to prepare for storming the Kadmeia without delay,
knowing the importance of forestalling all aid from Sparta. And the citizens
were already rushing up to the assault,—proclamation being made of large
rewards to those who should first force their way in,—when the
Lacedæmonian commander sent proposals for a capitulation.[192]
Undisturbed egress from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily
guaranteed to him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the
Spartans were marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated
party came forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors
was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they
passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along with
them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not the
Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort to get them
out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not told,—nor is it certain,
—that these Thebans were protected under the capitulation. Even had they
been so, however, the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against
them. Of the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a
blow, two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by
the authorities at Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the
Kadmeia were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder

that these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that hardly
more than four or five days would be required to procure adequate relief
from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the Macedonian
garrison in the same place maintained itself against the Thebans in the city
for more than fourteen days, until the return of Alexander from Illyria.[195]
The first messenger who brought news to Sparta of the conspiracy and
revolution at Thebes, appears to have communicated at the same time that
the garrison had evacuated the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train
of Theban exiles from the defeated party.[196]
This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the Grecian
world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four leaders, in their
houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which
withdraws his attention from the other features of this memorable deed.
Now an ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized
with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the death of
Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary personal daring of
Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden
overthrow, by a force so contemptibly small, of a government which the
day before seemed unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the
richest men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their own
persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than
desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free
Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person
in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being generally superior to
them in strength and bodily efficiency.
As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from the
manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects it altered
forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from
being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece, is from henceforward
only maintained by more or less effort, until at length it is completely
overthrown.[199]
The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors,
and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was then the
depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith against Thebes,

and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the
command of it, on the ground that he was above sixty years of age, and
therefore no longer liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says
Xenophon[201]) was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at
Sparta would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order
that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had
been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches
against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and
Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with foreigners to
put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta herself.
Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the command. He
had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had never commanded
before.
Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through
Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed
chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had been
placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From Platæa he
went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban
territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after which he retreated
to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the
subject of much wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted
whether he was really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles,
with customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could
provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate the bad
weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since in his march
back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a
hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their
shields and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit
Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with
one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of money to
employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against the Thebans.
[202]

The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had
passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the Athenians, that
they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to guard their frontier and the
neighboring road through Eleutheræ into Bœotia. This was the first time

that a Lacedæmonian army had touched Attica (now no longer guarded by
the lines of Corinth, as in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the
retirement of king Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure
of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible
recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during the first
prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with
his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that
three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens
to demand satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and
the Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aiding the enterprise of
Pelopidas and his comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public
mind to avoid giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of
them accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and
executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the
psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately),
escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204] These
two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse of their
official functions. They had brought the state into public hazard, not merely
without consulting the senate or assembly, but even without taking the
sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence
pronounced indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general
body of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of
all political connection with Thebes.[205]
Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however, an
incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the Athenian
temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had
left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that
Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since there was
no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising it by a night-
march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one stroke the commerce, the
wealth, and the naval resources of Athens. Putting his troops under march
one evening after an early supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the
next morning before daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning
overtook him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near
Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back

and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts of
plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.
This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had
Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as
rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have
succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been
changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both could
and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those injustices,
which no one ever commends until it has been successfully consummated,
—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]” As it failed, it has
been considered, by critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a
crime but as a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly
weak and hot-headed.[207] Without admitting the full extent of this censure,
we may see that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation
of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient
displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia. That
Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus
states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion, intimated by
Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon by secret emissaries
and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for the purpose of plunging
Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether improbable;[208] and seems
merely an hypothesis suggested by the consequences of the act,—which
were such, that if his enemies had bribed him, he could not have served
them better.
The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was
communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited no less
terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself under arms for
defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had retired. When thus
reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to indignation. The
Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house of Kallias the
proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest and interrogated. But
all three affirmed that they were not less astonished, and not less
exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than the Athenians themselves;
adding, by way of confirmation, that had they been really privy to any
design of seizing the Peiræus, they would have taken care not to let
themselves be found in the city, and in their ordinary lodging at the house of

the proxenus, where of course their persons would be at once seized. They
concluded by assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be
indignantly disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply
was deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the
offending general.[209]
The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of his case, that
he durst not make his appearance; while the general impression was, both at
Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly be condemned. Nevertheless,
though thus absent and undefended, he was acquitted, purely through
private favor and esteem for his general character. He was of the party of
Kleombrotus, so that all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a
matter of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his
friends dreaded that the latter would declare against him, and bring about
his condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside his
judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner: “To be sure,
Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless,
we cannot put to death a man like him, who, as boy, youth, and man, has
stood unblemished in all Spartan honor. Sparta cannot part with soldiers
like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends of Agesilaus, following this opinion and
coinciding with those of Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is
remarkable, that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had
announced as a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator
and friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]
This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely
philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows how
powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by private
sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings. It especially
illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter respecting the
oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the dekadarchies, for
which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here was a case where not only
the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed, but in which also his acquittal was

sure to be followed by a war with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the
Athenian demand for redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings,
what chance was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city,
or an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan
and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before, the
Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two generals who had
without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles. In so doing, the Athenian
dikastery enforced the law against clear official misconduct,—and that, too,
in a case where their sympathies went along with the act, though their fear
of a war with Sparta was stronger. But the most important circumstance to
note is, that at Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly
influence, capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a
numerous and independent dikastery.
The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of Greece, the
sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But the Athenians, who had so
recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances of Sparta against their
own generals, were stung by it to the quick; and only the more stung, in
consequence of the extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the
acquittal was made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance
with Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by
land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it
beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to the
building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their naval
ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]
From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction of a
new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed a century
before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable Athenian empire,
lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards such construction there
was so far a tendency, that Athens had already a small body of maritime
allies; while rhetors like Isokrates (in his Panegyrical Discourse, published
two years before) had been familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas.
But the enterprise was now pressed with the determination and vehemence
of men smarting under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to
build upon; since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta

was widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen
that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To
Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her
leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new
confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,
—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of
the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which
reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing that the
Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under harmosts and
oligarchies.
The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance on equal
and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the same as those
upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed against the Persians,
almost a century before. It was proposed that a congress of deputies should
meet at Athens, one from each city, small as well as great, each with one
vote; that Athens should be president, yet each individual city autonomous;
that a common fund should be raised, with a common naval force, through
assessment imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same
authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be,
maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each
confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much
as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered the
recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215] And as there
were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times of supremacy, had
been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in various dependencies, but had
been deprived of their properties at the close of the war,—it was thought
necessary to pass a formal decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of
these suspended rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no
Athenian should on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in
the territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as
security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any
Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against
before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of the
property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general purposes of
the confederacy.

Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just, like
the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as well by the
Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies assembled
within their walls. The formal decree and compact of alliance was inscribed
on a stone column and placed by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius
or the Liberator; a symbol, of enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished,
as well as of freedom to be maintained against Persia and other enemies.
[218] Periodical meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be
held (how often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized
as competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with
treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates
generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any Athenian
citizen should either speak, or put any question to the vote, in the Athenian
assembly, contrary to the tenor of that document,—he should be tried before
the synod for treason; and that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by
them to the severest punishment.
Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the first
organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with those numerous
cities whose junction was to be won by amicable inducement,—Chabrias,
Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]
The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and Iphikrates
were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered among her
citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since the peace of
Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their services; hence both of
them had been absent from the city during much of the last nine years, and
Iphikrates seems still to have been absent. At the time when that peace was
concluded, Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias
with Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the
head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops, and
returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less agreeable to the
military tastes of these generals, than conducive to their importance and
their profit, to keep together their bands, and to take foreign service.
Accordingly, Chabrias had continued in service first in Cyprus, next with
the native Egyptian king Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served,
found his hostility so inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the

Athenians to recall him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and
requested at the same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian
satraps in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied on
both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for the
Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command along
with the Persians.
Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts in
the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the shores of the
Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain lost dominions,—next
of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose daughter he presently
married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and
plunder, among the “butter-eating Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as
dowry, a large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their
disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not
far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a
fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223]
Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same thing
before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made
to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became a great man in
Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens, but
making his position in each subservient to his importance in the other.
While he was in a situation to favor the projects of Athenian citizens for
mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the Chersonese and other parts of
Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval and military art, not
merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even beyond those limits,—since
we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted
to him as to adopt him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to
Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates
had fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was opening
before him.[226]
Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in the
mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two other
colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of
Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.[227] The
abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while Timotheus and

Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit. But in acquiring new
allies and attracting deputies to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need
of persuasive appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all her
propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus,
doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle
of Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and
probably Kallistratus,[228] going round with him to the different islands,
contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same result. On their
invitation, many cities entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the
earlier confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained
members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when we
read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny of the
Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the neighboring
islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing force, presented
by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also a wide-spread hatred of
imperial Sparta, aggravated since her perversion of the pretended boon of
autonomy, promised by the peace of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of
these sentiments caused the Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely
successful. All the cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the
island)—as well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three
former of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the
peace of Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian
fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of
the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231]
together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted;
and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of the newly-
constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be not
less than seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent
deputies to it;[232] an aggregate sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to
flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to something like her former
lustre.
The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was passed to
equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and two hundred
triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies promised each a
certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond. We do not, however,

know how much,—nor how far the engagements, large or small, were
realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to enforce execution against
defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act upon such authority, if granted
to her by the congress. It was in this way (as the reader will recollect from
my fifth volume) that Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the
confederacy of Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate
synod against evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what
was at first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by
constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may presume that
the confederates, though ardent and full of promises on first assembling at
Athens, were even at the outset not exact, and became afterwards still less
exact, in performance; yet that Athens was forced to be reserved in
claiming, or in exercising, the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of
contribution by the majority of deputies present, was only the first step in
the process; to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent
round for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
difficult.
It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities came
together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A
few years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and the
confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as well by their position of renovated
headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the Athenians made
important efforts of their own, both financial and military. Equipping a
fleet, which for the time was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile
territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands
of Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct
property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.
It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great change in
the financial arrangements and constitution of the city; a change conferring
note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C. 378-377). The great body of
substantial Athenian citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for
purposes of taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of
Solon[235] the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four classes,—
Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each

other by the amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian
classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former
were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion of
their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or
Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of five
hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum
equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who
possessed between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual
income) at ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an
annual income between two hundred and three hundred medimni) at five
times their income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a
drachma; which permitted the application of this same class-system to
movable property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax
(or eisphora) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so
far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or
progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared with
those of the poorer.
The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have lasted,
though probably not without modifications, down to the close of the
Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved, after the
renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403, during the archonship of
Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the great offices of state had before that
time ceased to be dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still
necessary to possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens,
not merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the
liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a
man’s enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It
seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles of
classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property being
valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according to its
amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable capital to each
man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in the schedule, not for
his whole property, but for the sum of taxable capital corresponding to his
property, according to the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class,
the taxable capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less
rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these

items of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to each
man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census of Attica;
upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal proportion upon
every man.
Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which had been
introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we have no
information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous were the
assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens between that
archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C. But at this latter
epoch the register was again considerably modified, at the moment when
Athens was bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was
made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount of
twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards.
Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a
sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But
this fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many
classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except in
reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the minimum for
any one of them. There could hardly have been less, however, than three
classes, and there may probably have been four. But respecting the first or
richest class, we know that each man was entered in the schedule for a
taxable capital equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that
possessors of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes
died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to
the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was
entered on the schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against
him; being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the second
class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property
(probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of
the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even
smaller than the third. This last class descended down to the minimum of
twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no
account was taken.[237]
Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule
also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each enrolled

(without any difference of greater or smaller property, above twenty-five
minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth of his actual property;[238]
being a proportion less than the richest class of citizens, and probably equal
to the second class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted
to five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239]
forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is, something near
about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways
and means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and
whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every man,
rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable capital as there
entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would thus produce sixty talents;
two per cent., one hundred and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that
the exertions of Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new
schedule was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then
imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]
Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution of
the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories. As far as
we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that these Symmories
were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens,
thus making one thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two
hundred were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps,
the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two
hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate
body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men
in the city, and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The
three hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to
the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which latter
class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices,
were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the
Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially
fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time, discharging
the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals suffered him to be
mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted one of the latter body to
take his place in the Three Hundred. As between man and man, too, the
Attic law always admitted the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of

Property. Any citizen who believed himself to have been overcharged with
costly liturgies, and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had
not borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the
other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender to him
an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would undertake
the new charge, if the property of the other were made over to him.
It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens
who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable number of
less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still liable to the property-
tax; persons who possessed property from the minimum of twenty-five
minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know, at which point the
Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking loosely, to the third
class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census. The two Symmories of each tribe
(comprising its one hundred and twenty richest members) superintended the
property-register of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its
less wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required
immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up
altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable
upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the other
members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The richest
citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with duties, such as
had not belonged to them before the archonship of Nausinikus. By their
intervention (it was supposed) the schedule would be kept nearer to the
truth as respects the assessment on each individual, while the sums actually
imposed would be more immediately forthcoming, than if the state directly
interfered by officers of its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories
was extended to the trierarchy; a change which had not at first been
contemplated. Each Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors,
acting under the general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years
afterwards, we also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age)
recommending a still more comprehensive application of the same
principle, so that men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the
state, might thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to
distinct Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the
component persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal
process, but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will

rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories came to
be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never anticipated.
At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political
classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor with
which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The feeling
among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The government of
Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an
antipathy, that the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the
revolution against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and
his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to repel the
common enemy. The Theban government now became probably
democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from the
unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force was put under
the best training; the most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from
which the chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and
a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the memorable
Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was a brigade of
three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment of the city, as being
consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or acropolis.[243] It was put
under constant arms and training, at the public expense, like the Thousand
at Argos, of whom mention was made in my seventh volume.[244] It
consisted of youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their
strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and
was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were
at the same time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept
together by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under
Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who
fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as front rank
men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a circumstance to
be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by Pelopidas and
Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge was then found
irresistible.[246]
We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both
as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with the more
sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much better. But Thebes
was now blessed with another good fortune, such as had never yet befallen

her. She found among her citizens a leader of the rarest excellence. It is now
for the first time that Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out
in the public life of Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among
the most ancient in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose
heroic progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown
by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was
younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were
those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the
two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had
saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds, and the
greatest possible danger, to himself.[248]
Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and
gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen. But we
are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the maximum of activity
rather than of strength; the nimble movements of a runner and wrestler,—
not the heavy muscularity, purchased in part by excessive nutriment, of the
Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and
dancing; by which, in those days, was meant, not simply the power of
striking the lyre or blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful,
expressive, and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body;
rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and
disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming
consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic and
musical training, the combination of which constituted an accomplished
Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes, the latter at Athens.
Moreover, at Thebes the musical training was based more upon the flute
(for the construction of which, excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs);
at Athens more upon the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by
the player. The Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he
threw away his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to the
countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly less true than
contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas formed a splendid
exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252] as well as the flute from the
best masters, but also, dissenting from his brother Kapheisias and his friend
Pelopidas, he manifested from his earliest years an ardent intellectual

impulse, which would have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He
sought with eagerness the conversation of the philosophers within his reach,
among whom were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both
of them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence of the
Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at second-hand, to
the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between Thebes and Athens,
ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had become more and more
friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war against the Spartans,
—we may reasonably presume that he profited by teachers at the latter city
as well as at the former. But the person to whom he particularly devoted
himself, and whom he not only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son,
during the close of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a
member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we
cannot make out, had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his
death.[253] With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas
discussed all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable positive
instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged intellectual
combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated from that timorous
interpretation of nature, which rendered so many Grecian commanders the
slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a listener, and his indifference to
showy talk on his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the
father of Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed
that he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.
[255]

Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when he
entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely preëminent
among Thebans, but effective even against the best Athenian opponents.[256]
But his disposition was essentially modest and unambitious, combined with
a strong intellectual curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination
amidst a race usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem.
Little moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by
unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of
money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life, not leaving
enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating not merely the

corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the solicitous tenders of
personal friends;[257] though we are told that, when once serving the costly
office of choregus, he permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the
expense.[258] As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities
which most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character; the gentleness
of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to harsh treatment of
conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in intestine bloodshed. If
ever there were men whose conduct seemed to justify unmeasured
retaliation, it was Leontiades and his fellow-traitors. They had opened the
doors of the Kadmeia to the Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the
Theban leader Ismenias. Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of
Pelopidas and the other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part
in it; partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious
scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his
subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and vindictive
passions.[260]
Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however, it
was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary capacities for
action with which they were combined, and that he should achieve
something to earn that exclamation of praise which we shall find his enemy
Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the
invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”[261] In
the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was as yet
undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas with his other
friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was
a subject of complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But
the unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled all
backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having
just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves
exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta and her extensive
confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a
single other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by
the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as
the rest. As the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion,
so the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken

enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas. He was
among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after the contest had
been transferred from the houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open
market-place; and he would probably have been among the first to mount
the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault.
Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally
placed among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary
military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment his
capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment almost an
unknown man, he had acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so
much reputation both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the
expositor of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the
battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may
fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of defence,
together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the
intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.[263]
The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of Sphodrias
was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as well as
encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at the new
enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought it necessary to
make some efforts on their side. They organized on a more systematic scale
the military force of their confederacy, and even took some conciliatory
steps with the view of effacing the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full
force of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan
power, even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against
Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived, by
putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in the service of
the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to
make himself master of the passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and
Athenians could have notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266]
Then crossing Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at
Thespiæ, a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he
commenced his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended
partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main
force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries,
sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the

palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked
Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were frequently
repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he forced his way through
an opening in the breastwork into their inner country, which he laid waste
nearly to the city walls.[267] The Thebans and Athenians, though not
offering him battle on equal terms, nevertheless kept the field against him,
taking care to hold positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his
side did not feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on
one occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to the
charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the
troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach, on a
high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be
given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protended. So
imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus called off his troops without
daring to complete the charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on
the lands of Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems
to have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the
fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a
considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to
Peloponnesus.
Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his own
Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised him
unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals from the
Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas with the
loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying incautiously
forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban cavalry;[269] upon
which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans to the very gates of
Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of this misfortune,
despatched by sea another general and division to replace Phœbidas, the
cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened by their recent victory. They
pushed their success not only against Thespiæ, but against the other
Bœotian cities, still held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At
the same time, these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of
their own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable
numbers as exiles to Thebes.[270]

A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the
ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither more
decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he contrived, by a
well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban palisade, and lay waste the
plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed, more clearly than
before, his reluctance to engage except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It
became evident that the Thebans were not only strengthening their position
in Bœotia, but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the
Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions
remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give
improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him
to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after the
summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In his way he appeased an
intestine conflict which was about to break out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on
passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or hurt, which grievously injured
his sound leg, (it has been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,)
and induced his surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the
inflammation. When this was done, however, the blood could not be
stopped until he swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great
suffering, he was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained
during a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]
The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the confederacy
to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the Athenians and Thebans
had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he was unable even to enter
the country, and was obliged to dismiss his troops without achieving
anything.[274]
His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when they
met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval force, sufficient both
to intercept the supplies of imported corn to Athens, and to forward an
invading army by sea against Thebes, to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the
Krissæan Gulf. The former object was attempted first. Towards midsummer,
a fleet of sixty triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was
cruising in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina,
Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed
confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves

thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade
and even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely
reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented from
doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they fitted out at
Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of
citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near
Naxos, completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the
mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or
captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias might have
destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having
eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living men and the
dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians who were swimming for
their lives. He did this (we are told[277]), from distinct recollection of the
fierce displeasure of the people against the victorious generals after the
battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on
that memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence,
they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent
commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally of
citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson
administered by the people to their generals in 406 B.C., thirty years before.
This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278]) which the
Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus
filled them with joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their
maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was
detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing
himself for the first time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed
victorious round the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single
ships, brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents
in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending
deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and
conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among
the islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the
inhabitants of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service,
by aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their
abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites
and plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left to defend

their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus
extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]
Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new allies in
the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently served under
Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the son of Konon, to
circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of Laconia; partly at the
instance of the Thebans, who were eager to keep the naval force of Sparta
occupied, so as to prevent her from conveying troops across the Krissæan
Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of
Peloponnesus,—the first which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her
humiliation at Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long
remembered by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not only
Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra, voluntarily
accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid all violence or
interference with the political constitution, his popularity all around
augmented every day. Alketas, prince of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with
other Epirotic tribes,—and the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his
alliance.[282] While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by
the Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his
fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other
triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that the
hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only thirteen
talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great difficulty in paying
his fleet; that he procured an advance of money, from each of the sixty
trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective
ships; and that he also sent home requests for large remittances from the
public treasury;[283] measures which go to bear out that honorable
repugnance to the plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the
suspicion of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284]
This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on both
sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased employment of
mercenary bands.
The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably
received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and

commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though no
Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the Ægean,[285]—yet the
cost of the war began to be seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring
island of Ægina annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard;
while the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were not
sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at
home.[286]
In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were
represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards the
cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their instance that the
fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined
compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any condition to furnish
pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much displeasure at Athens,
embittered by jealousy at the strides which they had been making during the
two last years, partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of
Athens. At the end of the year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of
Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that
they were forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which
enterprise their ships and seamen were at first captured by the
Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence,
however, soon led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been
taken prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the
communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the
two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since,
in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights of Kithæron,—
while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had been occupied by the naval
operations of Timotheus in the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the
Thebans had exerted themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities
of Bœotia, in most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the
population, was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands
of the philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.
[289] We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa,
under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the
Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.[290]
But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas near
Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with his two

(moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone away on an
excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from Thebes with the
Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place. It was the season in
which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at the fullest, so that he was
obliged to take a wide circuit to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on
the road between Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near
Orchomenus, he ascertained that there were still some Lacedæmonians in
the town, and that no surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his
steps. But on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian
commanders, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from
the Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they
rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first
dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the
fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass, the
strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved irresistible.
The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain; their troops opened,
to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this
opportunity, persisted in the combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled.
The neighborhood of Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that
Pelopidas could only erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to
Thebes.[291]
This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time beaten
in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a strong sensation in
the minds of both the contending parties. The confidence of the Thebans, as
well as their exertion, was redoubled; so that by the year 374 B.C., they had
cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies
which sustained them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come
into union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus,
Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became
again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency
Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under
Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly to
Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in
some the prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained
by intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these
cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative system of

Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in
431 B.C.[293] While resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head
of the Bœotian federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other
cities,—by convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their
ancient rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the
system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.
The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this reconquest
or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis, the port of
Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes to repel any invasion
from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan Gulf. Feeling thus secure
against invasion, they began to retaliate upon their neighbors and enemies
the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on
Thebes,—yet also, from ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295]
So hard pressed were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in
Thessaly was at the same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted,
they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with
them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it;
while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid open,
in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by
the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea
across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an
auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to
retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus
sustained them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy.
When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to the
offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to contribute to the
cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful,
that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms
were, we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received
notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of
the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence, without even
going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the peace to
Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.
[298]

This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and served

somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the
Spartans a little before from a different quarter.
Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to Sparta
to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality with the
Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in alliance with
them, but was for some time occupied by one of their garrisons.[299] In the
usual state of Thessaly, the great cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and
others, each holding some smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance,
were in disagreement with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare
that they could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a
supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now
in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family factions
who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree, indeed, that he
was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the entire management of
the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements. Being a wealthy man,
“hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian fashion,” he advanced money
from his own purse to the treasury whenever it was low, and repaid himself
when public funds came in.[300]
But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason,
despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence of
Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of Jason
can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed through
Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions against Olynthus,
he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of nearly all the
Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially succeeded in
becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a large area of tributary
circumjacent territory. The great instrument of his dominion was, a standing
and well-appointed force of six thousand mercenary troops, from all parts
of Greece. He possessed all the personal qualities requisite for conducting
soldiers with the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to temptation,
alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the drill and in the
gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military merits with the utmost
munificence, he had not only disciplined them, but inspired them with
extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his person. Several of the
neighboring tribes, together with Alketas, prince of the Molossi in Epirus,

had been reduced to the footing of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had
already defeated the Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns
which had once been connected with them, so that it only remained for him
now to carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects. He
therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting for
himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as Tagus or
president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with its array of
tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first power in Greece,
superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and at sea to Athens. And as to
the Persian king, with his multitudes of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded
him as an enemy yet easier to overthrow; considering what had been
achieved first by the Cyreians, and afterwards by Agesilaus.
Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the
energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied, that he
himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could take no
resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then (rejoined Jason), and
give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and that it is for them to
afford you protection. If they cannot comply with the demand, you will be
unfaithful to the interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It
was on this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce
that unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to
sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against
whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from
personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate force
and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can do.”
The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in the
negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus as
essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were now the
stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no active assistance to
Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be provoked to do, if a
Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly. Accordingly the ephors
told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable to satisfy his demands,
recommending him to make the best terms that he could, both for Pharsalus

and for himself. Returning to Thessaly, he resumed his negotiation with
Jason, and promised substantial compliance with what was required. But he
entreated to be spared the dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the
citadel which had been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the
same time to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this was
actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were gently brought
round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the rest, was unanimously
elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]
The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in the real
decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance of the Akanthian
envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had sent three powerful
armies in succession to crush the liberal and promising confederacy of
Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on the sea-coast to the
Macedonian crown. The region to which her armies had been sent, was the
extreme verge of Hellas. The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely
the shadow of a claim, as friends or allies; while those against whom she
acted, had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the
main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free
and equal confederation of Grecian cities. Now, a claim, and a strong claim,
is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally. It
comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political interest would
naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of an aggressive power
already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of
Sparta altered in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now
compelled to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political
policy alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian
confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly
during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power! So
unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus, but for
Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference restored the
Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian confederacy, had it
been allowed to expand, might probably have confined them to the interior,
and averted the death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next
generation from their hands.

The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens which
liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace thus
concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus, being
ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet. He had
serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as he passed by
that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked these exiles upon it,
aiding them in establishing a fortified post. Against this proceeding the
Zakynthian government laid complaints at Sparta, where it was so deeply
resented, that redress having been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace
was at once broken off, and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron
of twenty-five sail was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while
plans were formed for the acquisition of the more important island of
Korkyra. The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a
malcontent Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the
Lacedæmonians as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian
fleet of twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a
voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot,
refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent envoys to
Athens to entreat assistance.
The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with the
full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts of Sparta, Corinth,
Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê,
and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary payments from other confederates,
who preferred commuting their obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of
sixty triremes and a body of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites
were assembled; besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or
Neodamodes.[304] At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the
Syracusan despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that
the connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove
again, dangerous to his city.
It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against
Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who,
having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed
on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within the walls
of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were

found in the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce;
fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,—with splendid
farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as
well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves
by depredations on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful
stock around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first
quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness,
of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the time
when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable than that
presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus), of the flourishing
agriculture surrounding democratical Athens, at the moment when the hand
of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]
With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped on a
hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies out of the
country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor with his fleet. The
Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they seemed to have no chance
of safety except through aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent
envoys with pressing entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their
hasty consent (in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of
Timotheus from the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed
admiral of a new fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred
peltasts, under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest
route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the
delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by land
across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon which
island they were enabled to land through the intervention of Alketas
solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to get into the town;
where they not only brought the news that a large Athenian fleet might be
speedily expected, but also contributed much to the defence. Without such
encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans would hardly have held out; for the
famine within the walls increased daily; and at length became so severe,
that many of the citizens deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out.
Mnasippus refused to receive them, making public proclamation that every
one who deserted should be sold into slavery; and since deserters
nevertheless continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the

city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor
re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.
[308]

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour of
surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the general
insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through the numerous
pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in commutation of
personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his mercenaries without
pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last two months. His present
temper made him not only more harsh towards his own soldiers,[309] but
also less vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged,
detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose a
favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his
outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward with the
Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of
the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied,
that they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay; upon
which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his stick and
with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still farther the existing
discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and
heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing
out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate energy.
Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at length slain, and all
his troops, being completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which
their stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the
whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But they
were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous camp-
followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.
Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary supplies,
and to afford a certainty of holding out until reinforcement from Athens
should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed, was already on its way, and had
been announced as approaching to Hypermenês (second under the deceased
Mnasippus), who had now succeeded to the command. Terrified at the
news, he hastened to sail round from his station,—which he had occupied
with the fleet to block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first

put the slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers and
marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these latter also
aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the island, making off
for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so great the terror lest the
Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much corn and wine, many slaves, and
even many sick and wounded soldiers, were left behind. To the victorious
Korkyræans, these acquisitions were not needed to enhance the value of a
triumph which rescued them from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]
The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to incur
much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it did come, it was
commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator Kallistratus,[311]—not
by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the people had nominated. It
appears that Timotheus,—who (in April 373 B.C.), when the Athenians first
learned that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack
Korkyra, had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty
triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore
undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory
funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six
hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into relations
with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become the ally of Athens,
and to further the march of Stesiklês with his division by land across
Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at
once the ally of Athens, and the dependent of Jason, conveyed them by
night across the strait from Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened
important connection with the powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained
from him a very seasonable service, together (perhaps) with some seamen
from Pagasæ to man his fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports
of Macedonia, where he also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving
from him signal marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the
neighboring islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in
money and supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to
the Athenian confederacy.
This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general
purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began in the
month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On departing, it

appears, he had given orders to such of the allies as were intended to form
part of the expedition, to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen,
consecrated to Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to
proceed onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at
this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though
in the preceding year it had been alleged against them that they contributed
nothing to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a
long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he
was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes
accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his
return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was
much pressed; so that great indignation was felt against the absent admiral,
for employing in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable
him to reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back
from serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer
Egypt for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud
in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra
required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of
Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus, and
Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without delay.[314]
Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new
adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general success.
[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies of funds, and
make up for the embarrassments which his absence had occasioned. But he
could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without borrowing money for the
purpose on his own credit; for though the sum brought home from his
voyage was considerable, it would appear that the demands upon him had
been greater still. At first an accusation, called for in consequence of the
pronounced displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates
and Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for the
expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was
postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused,
and doubtless seconded by his friends.[316]
Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the public,
and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though perhaps

Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed) not only to
impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the trierarchs with severity,
[317] and to employ all the triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as
well as the two sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus
completed a fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of
it directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on
the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he arranged
his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with training to his
seamen, and with preparation for naval combat. The larger sails of an
ancient trireme were habitually taken out of the ship previous to a battle, as
being inconvenient aboard: Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed
even the smaller sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar;
which greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men
in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on an
enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme dexterity
as well as precision, that the least possible time was consumed, not enough
for any local hostile force to get together. On reaching Sphakteria,
Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet
not fully trusting the correctness of his information, he still persevered both
in his celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he
first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The
excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of
in terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]
Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which he
had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from the defence of
the coast.[319] After making himself master of some of the Kephallenian
cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra; where the squadron of ten
triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent by Dionysius
to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates,
posting scouts on the hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty
triremes to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his
discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made, the
ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did
not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The ten Syracusan
triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest

their men on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found
by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral Anippus;
one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her captain, the
Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes
into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to
him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation
of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from mortification.
[321]

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay his
men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment to him,
and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced him to
consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an orator by
profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had come out
against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus
and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their
advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw
in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus, and
the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached to the son
of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could succeed in relieving
Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion which he applied to man his fleet.
Had the island been taken and had Iphikrates failed, he would have found
himself exposed to severe crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens.
Perhaps Kallistratus and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have
been among his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both
of them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability of
the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.[322] As the result
of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all such anxieties
were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part with both his colleagues;
and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted to go home, he would employ all
his efforts to keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this
were impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible are
the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring
money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are acting,)
for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same embarrassment
which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and which will be

found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in the history. For the
present, he subsisted his seamen by finding work for them on the farms of
the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample necessity for
repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to
Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the
townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to Sparta;
especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.
[324]

The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than to
Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as well as his
quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each his trial.
Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps
against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325] though probably in a
spirit of greater gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent
joint success and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And
while the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the
defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking
in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon
of two powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both
Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little before the
trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were received and lodged by
him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the
Peiræus. And as he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he
found it necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them
honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a
wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose
to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had
inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing them
into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed at once by
conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra.
The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully affected by seeing before
them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful
individual in Greece; and we are not surprised to learn that Timotheus was
acquitted. His treasurer Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and
doubtless not so powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was

condemned to death, and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless
believing (on what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of
fraud in dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was held
responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the money-levying
command confided to Timotheus by the people.
As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested with
the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged Korkyra, he
appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time to his own self-
originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was in itself beneficial to
Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really been taken, the people would
have had good reason for imputing the misfortune to his delay.[326] And
although he was now acquitted, his reputation suffered so much by the
whole affair, that in the ensuing spring he was glad to accept an invitation
of the Persian satraps, who offered him the command of the Grecian
mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian war; the same command from
which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.[327]
That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large number
of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition incursions
against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus; insomuch that
the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began
to conceive hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they
had occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And
while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and west of
Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous
failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to
have remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were
powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful
earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited during
this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of the god
Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this year in
Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one, the worst
of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed,
together with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian

triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the
calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.[330]
Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had
recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose
fifteen years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy to
Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,[331] and a fresh Persian intervention
enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which peace had now been
infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction) by the reconstitution
of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as president. And it appears that
in the course of the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to
Greece, requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind
up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The
Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt, were
anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means of enlarging
their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops Timotheus had left
Athens a few months before to take the command.
Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more and
more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378
B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head of a
considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly hope to
increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval power had
already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of warlike
operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the contributions of
her allies or by the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had
promised either to procure remittances from Athens to Iphikrates, or to
recommend the conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the
latter alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions
of his countrymen.[333]
Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a time
been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes had
reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens again began
to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a peace with the Spartans, without

the concurrence of Thebes; which peace was broken almost as soon as
made, by the Spartans themselves, in consequence of the proceedings of
Timotheus at Zakynthus. The Phokians,—against whom, as having been
active allies of Sparta in her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making
war,—had also been ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their
sufferings.[334] Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the
unpaid and destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by
Timotheus at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the
preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped both the
glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of the
confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the unfriendly
spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was farther exasperated
by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the first half of 372 B.C.
During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of
Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against Thebes,
and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the Spartans had
been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other Bœotian cities were
glad to find themselves emancipated from their philo-Laconian oligarchies
and rejoined to the federation under Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,
—submitted to the union only by constraint; awaiting any favorable
opportunity for breaking off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware
probably of the growing coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the
Platæans were secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their
town, annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes
and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while
neither was yet at peace with Sparta.
This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one of the
minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to the roughness
of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they not only bore an
ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished town as little better than a
Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting from themselves a portion of
territory which had become Theban, by prescriptive enjoyment lasting for
forty years from the surrender of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been

to them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close
with the tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the
town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the
Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient constitution
of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes, acknowledging her rights
as president of the federation, and having their own rights as members
guaranteed in return by her, probably under positive engagement,—that is,
their security, their territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the
federal restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,
[337] the Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them, and
their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that
they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off
from the federation,—the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still
farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being
apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves
habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat relaxed and
most of them went out of the city to their farms in the country, on the days,
well known beforehand, when the public assemblies in Thebes were held.
Of this relaxation the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted
a Theban armed force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route
through Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the
fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in possession
of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the terms proposed to
them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to carry away all their
movable property; but their town was destroyed, and its territory again
annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives were constrained for the second
time to seek refuge at Athens, where they were again kindly received, and
restored to the same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior
to the peace of Antalkidas.[339]
It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes was
now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340] as she had
caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the victory of Delium,[341] on
suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.

Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited strong
emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as suppliants,
with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their case
pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain their town, of
which they had been just bereft. On a question at once so touching and so
full of political consequences, many speeches were doubtless composed and
delivered, one of which has fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates,
and perhaps actually delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public
assembly. The hard fate of this interesting little community is here
impressively set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a
little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done by
Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his invective is
more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator repeatedly claims for
Platæa her title to autonomous existence, under the guarantee of universal
autonomy sworn at the peace of Antalkidas,[342]—the Thebans would
doubtless reply, that at the time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in
existence; but had been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated
afterwards by the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the
orator intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers espoused the
same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with Sparta in her recent
operations in Bœotia against both Athens and Thebes, was an undeniable
fact; which the orator himself can only extenuate by saying that they acted
under constraint from a present Spartan force,—but which was cited on the
opposite side as a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their
readiness again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.
[344] The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the
confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered
a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which they were
members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of Platæa and dismantling
Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta, but also adjoining
Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan army would invade Bœotia.
Both in the public assembly of Athens, and in the general congress of the
confederates at that city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole
subject;[346] discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator
and representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against

Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the
Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing
reputation.[347]
But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the
prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step was
taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made against those
to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general result of the debates,
animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan sufferers, tended decidedly to
poison the good feeling, and loosen the ties, between Athens and Thebes.
This change showed itself by an increased gravitation towards peace with
Sparta; strongly advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not
merely by the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war,
and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution
was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority of
the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make propositions of peace to
Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions prevailed towards
peace. Notice of this intention was given to the Thebans, who were invited
to send envoys thither also, if they chose to become parties. In the spring of
371 B.C., at the time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy
were assembled at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those
from the various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there.
Among the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch
or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of
great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the
orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas, then
one of the Bœotarchs.
Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we have
very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no knowledge at
all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three Athenians, and from
no one else. That of Kallias, who announces himself as hereditary proxenus
of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in
spirit;[349] that of Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on
the past conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two,
—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both
parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklês,[350]—is

framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides, but
deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and showing how
much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.[351]
This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time, recognizes
distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which Athens was
prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well as great; and in this
way, coinciding with the views of the Persian king, he dismisses with
indifference the menace that Antalkidas was on his way back from Persia
with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in the war. It was not from fear of
the Persian treasures (he urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that
Athens sought peace.[352] Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea
and land, as to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general
evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence
which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a gamester
playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta and Athens now
to desist from hostilities. The former had the strength on land, the latter was
predominant at sea; so that each could guard the other; while the
reconciliation of the two would produce peace throughout the Hellenic
world, since in each separate city, one of the two opposing local parties
rested on Athens, the other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably
necessary that Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already
pointedly denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted
since the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by throwing
into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose separate
autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]
Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a judicious
measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy to every city; and
autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and enforced by the separate
interests of Sparta, as it had been at the peace of Antalkidas; next, the
distribution of such preëminence or headship, as was consistent with this
universal autonomy, between Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the
latter at sea,—as the means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That
“autonomy perverted to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had
denounced before the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus,
and which had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of

Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship of
Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and her claim
to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by mutual consent.
It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments on
both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons everywhere
withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full autonomy. If any city
should fail in observance of these conditions, and continue in a career of
force against any other, all were at liberty to take arms for the support of the
injured party; but no one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take
arms. This last stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of
their most vexatious chains.
To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the ensuing
day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for herself and her
allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her allies afterwards took it
severally, each city for itself. Why such difference was made, we are not
told; for it would seem that the principle of severance applied to both
confederacies alike.
Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch was
disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the oath, not
for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the Bœotian
federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan authorities on the
other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him.
They required that he should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian
cities to take the oath each for itself.
Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas had
spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While most of the
deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the energetic
Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês, and with strong
sympathy from many of the deputies present, had proclaimed that nothing
kept alive the war except her unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be
durable unless such pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the
conditions of peace as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to

them in the name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that
each of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to those
same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just invoked,
and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as good a title to
autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied by asking, why
Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for her allies as well as for
herself. But he took a higher ground. He contended that the presidency of
Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia
by Sparta.[357] He would remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first
conquered and settled by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all
been planted out from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal
union of all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with
Thebes as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country; that
the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established institution,
devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at Thebes the management
of the foreign relations of all jointly. All this had been already pleaded by
the Theban orator fifty-six years earlier, before the five Spartan
commissioners, assembled to determine the fate of the captives after the
surrender of Platæa; when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as
guilty of treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan
commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a
sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time
when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been greatly
impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with the invading Persians, the
Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their power to reëstablish it, as
a countervailing force against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that
the presidency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the
federation; a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly
recognized and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He
could show farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to
govern the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one
of the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by
nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.
An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it

were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question such
as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty startling to all,—
extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus and the Athenians,—but to
the Spartans themselves, intolerably poignant and insulting.[361] They had
already a long account of antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own
wrong-doing in seizing the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in
losing it and being unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and
failures, in the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To
aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now
wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus, full to
overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of a Spartan
passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick. Had he been an
Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would have found vent in an
animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was anxious only to close these
offensive discussions with scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the
presumptuous Theban no middle ground between humble retraction and
acknowledged hostility. Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to
Epaminondas,—“Speak plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of
the Bœotian cities its separate autonomy?” To which the other replied
—“Will you leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without
saying another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the
Thebans to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the
treaty.[362]
Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June, 371
B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective allies, peace
was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned
home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged and mournful. Yet
such a man as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his
claims nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was
disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted upon, but
did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.
The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined, from
their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential claims of
Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest of Athens that the
Bœotian federation should be maintained, as a bulwark to herself against

Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the congress as before
it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only
with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally
attached to her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed
the interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success.
They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been
dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but
which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of
continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been
accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven
years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval power,
and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the Spartans had
lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens was now the ascendent
leader of maritime and insular Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be
the leading power on land, but only on land; and a tacit partnership was
now established between the two, each recognizing the other in their
respective halves of the Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the
prudence to draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her
acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.
On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable confederacies
was renounced; a renunciation which had already been once sworn to,
sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but treacherously perverted
by Sparta in the execution. Under this new engagement, the allies of Sparta
or Athens ceased to constitute an organized permanent body, voting by its
majority, passing resolutions permanently binding upon dissentients, arming
the chief state with more or less power of enforcement against all, and
forbidding voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a
mere uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as all were in
harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the others, nor
recognizing any right in the others to compel him even to performance of
what he had specially promised, if it became irksome. By such change,
therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power; yet the latter to a
much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as her reach of power over
her allies had been more comprehensive and stringent.

We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed by
Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and Agesilaus,
really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation between Thebes and the
other Bœotian cities was the same as what subsisted between Sparta and her
allies; that accordingly, when Sparta renounced the indefeasible and
compulsory character of her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its
members as a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel. He
maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was the
relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to the Laconian
townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns under Thebes was
coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the most ancient
phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states, Bœotia, like Laconia
or Attica, was the compound and organized whole, of which each separate
city was only a fraction; that other Greeks had no more right to meddle with
the internal constitution of these fractions, and convert each of them into an
integer,—than to insist on separate independence for each of the townships
of Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as that of
Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her presidential power,
and the federal system of which it formed a part, were established,
indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any Hellenic convention,—
quite as much as the internal government of Sparta in Laconia.
Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the superior
power of the former, extorting submission from the latter. The last sixteen
years had reversed the previous decision, and enabled the Thebans to
reconquer those presidential rights of which the former peace had deprived
them. Again, therefore, the question stood for decision, with keener
antipathy on both sides,—with diminished power in Sparta,—but with
increased force, increased confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable
worth was even yet but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly
with both, yet allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out
without interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.
BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the Athenians and
Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants sworn
respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally. The Athenians
despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian
Sea, engaged in incursions against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian
coasts,—that he should forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had
made any captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they
should all be restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had
occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula of
Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their harmosts
and their garrisons from every city still under occupation. Since they had
already made such promise once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had
never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not Spartans, were now named
from the general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.
No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part of
the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans were
absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse now
drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts; and which,
though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at the time as legitimate
patriotic resentment for the recent insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian
Xenophon, when he looked back upon it from the subsequent season of
Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—
like that of the Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens
and all other allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being
able to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of
Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other
Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was
anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages
(as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which

she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her
property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that had
been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the assistance lent
by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of Bœotia doubted of the
success of Sparta.
To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the
peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency over
her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold assistance as they
chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for the allies, generally
speaking, being not at all inflamed with the Spartan antipathy against
Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it
so happened, that at the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king
Kleombrotus was actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and
allies, in Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on
hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to
his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities
and assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was
directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch at the last
moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas), and relinquish their
presidency over the other Bœotian cities. One citizen alone, named
Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He protested against the order, first, as
a violation of their oaths, which required them to disband the army and
reconstitute it on the voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to
the allies, who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never
serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was
treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory order was
despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a reinforcement of
Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in the ensuing battle,
seems to have been greater than can reasonably be imagined to have been
before serving in Phokis.
Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372]
Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the resolute
tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian federation and
against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude of the danger, it was
still hoped that the enemy might be prevented from penetrating out of
Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly occupied with a strong force

the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying between a spur of Mount Helikon on
one side and the Lake Kopaïs on the other; the same position as had been
taken by the Bœotians, and forced by the army returning from Asia under
Agesilaus, twenty-three years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is,
on the Phokian side) of this position; and its citizens, as well as its
Lacedæmonian garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in the Spartan
commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead of marching by
the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by a
mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban division
under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of Helikon to the
Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming upon this place by
surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban triremes which lay in the
harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy the port, and marched without
delay over the mountainous ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the
eastern declivity of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a
place of ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]
Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and thus
eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king and the
Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence; while the
Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as surprise. It
required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the daring of Pelopidas, to
uphold the resolution of their countrymen, and to explain away or neutralize
the terrific signs and portents, which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in
every accident of the road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and
the Thebans with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to
Leuktra, where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan
camp. They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom
Epaminondas was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining
battle with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for fighting,
and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege, sending their
wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was vainly combatting
their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch, Branchylides, arrived from

the passes of Kithæron, where he had been on guard, and was prevailed
upon to vote in favor of the bolder course. Though a majority was thus
secured for fighting, yet the feeling throughout the Theban camp was more
that of brave despair than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to
perish in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters of
the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to the
camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of Trophonius at
Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias, serving in the Theban
ranks, ventured to assure them that they were now on the very spot
foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire. Here stood the
tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian named Skedasus) who had
been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had afterwards slain themselves.
Skedasus, after having in vain attempted to obtain justice from the Spartans
for this outrage, came back, imprecating curses on them, and slew himself
also. The vengeance of these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour
itself out on Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their
own tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]
While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid,
Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been confided,
took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His task was
arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while those of the enemy
were confident,—but their numbers were inferior, and some of the
Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy. What the exact numbers
were on either side, we are not permitted to know. Diodorus assigns about
six thousand men to the Thebans; Plutarch states the numbers of
Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376] Without placing faith in these figures,
we see good reason for believing that the Theban total was decidedly
inferior. For such inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful
tactics, and by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all
former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line, and
had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the intention of
the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was to be sought in
accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder on the part of some
division of the soldiers. Departing from this habit, Epaminondas now

arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left to bear with irresistible force
upon the Spartan right, and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively
out of action. Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the
official persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that,
if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find little
resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing
chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields, with
Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance was disposed
obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on the left should join
battle first, while the centre and right kept comparatively back and held
themselves more in a defensive attitude.
In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened high
military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus that he was not
prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary Grecian tactics of
joining battle at once along the whole line. But so unbounded was the
confidence reigning among the Spartans, that there never was any occasion
on which peculiar precautions were less thought of. When, from their
entrenched camp on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans
encamped on an opposite eminence, separated from them by a small
breadth of low ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was
to hurry on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping.
Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking
the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him,
since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a blow,
and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor instituted
between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be understood, that if
Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions would be confirmed that
he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was
himself sufficiently eager to fight, and so would any other Spartan general
have been, under the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But
even had he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the
Lacedæmonian portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the
decided resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the
final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious
libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper of every
man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on the lower

portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and most of the
Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve deep. Some
Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the order of the other
parts of the line, we have no information. The cavalry was chiefly posted
along the front.
Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his own
chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and strengthened
into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry too were posted in
front of his line. But before he commenced his march, he sent away his
baggage and attendants home to Thebes; while at the same time he made
proclamation that any of his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the
cause, might also retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians
immediately availed themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban
camp, who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian
victory. But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen
retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either
with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced them to
return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous among the
allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and the Herakleots,
together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this movement; which
seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main battle, without
doing any mischief to the Thebans.
The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the superiority
of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian cavalry,—at no
time very good, but at this moment unusually bad, composed of raw and
feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by the rich,—was soon broken
and driven back upon the infantry, whose ranks were disturbed by the
fugitives. To reëstablish the battle, Kleombrotus gave the word for the
infantry to advance, himself personally leading the right. The victorious
Theban cavalry probably hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the
centre and left, and prevented them from making much forward movement;
while Epaminondas and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to
their intention to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock
here was terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields and
opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the Theban

charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front, composed of
men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep column of fifty shields
propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with all their courage,
obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand up against it. Kleombrotus,
himself either in or near the front, was mortally wounded, apparently early
in the battle; and it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part
of his comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve
him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most
eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch,
Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an obstinate
resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the Spartans was
completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the higher ground.
It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as Epaminondas had
intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there appear to have
been any serious fighting; partly through his deliberate scheme of not
pushing forward either his centre or his right,—partly through the
preliminary victory of the Theban cavalry, which probably checked a part of
the forward march of the enemy’s line,—and partly also through the
lukewarm adherence, or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled
under the command of Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—
zealous in the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a
blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after
mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp as soon as
they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to it. Moreover, even
some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably astounded by the
lukewarmness of those around them, and by the unexpected calamity on
their own right, fell back in the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian
force, with the dying king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the
entrenchment on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not
attempt to molest them.[381]
But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed in the
camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had quitted it an
hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when it came to be verified. Of
seven hundred Spartans who had marched forth from the camp, only three
hundred returned to it.[382] One thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had

been left on the field, even by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real
number was even larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of
itself an event impressive to every one, the like of which had never
occurred since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies
who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick
of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a
positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now
commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps proper
in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans who pressed for
renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force their slain brethren in the
field, or perishing in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that
the polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to
solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted,
after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas, aware that the
Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their
losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should bury their
dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and
that nearly every slain warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And
thus the Theban general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of
concealment, proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan
courage, as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the
score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell us.
Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three hundred. The
former number is preposterously small, and even the latter is doubtless
under the truth; for a victory in close fight, over soldiers like the Spartans,
must have been dearly purchased. Though the bodies of the Spartans were
given up to burial, their arms were retained; and the shields of the principal
officers were seen by the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years
afterwards.[386]
Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas
quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to
the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387] The event
came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon victors as well as
vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and distant, alike. The general
expectation had been that Thebes would be speedily overthrown and
dismantled; instead of which, not only she had escaped, but had inflicted a

crushing blow on the military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,
—whose account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that
chagrin which the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to
untoward accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of
Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta did
not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others faintly exculpated
him by saying that he had fought contrary to his better judgment, under fear
of unpopularity. Such criticisms, coming from men wise after the fact, and
consoling themselves for the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate
commander, will not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this
occasion the feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to
march against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him. To fight
the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every other Spartan
desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of Bœotia, and his
capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he seems to have arranged
his order of battle in the manner usual with Grecian generals at the time.
There appears no reason to censure his generalship, except in so far as he
was unable to divine,—what no one else divined,—the superior
combinations of his adversary, then for the first time applied to practice. To
the discredit of Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of
the battle, though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of the enemy’s
phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391] expressly refer to the
genius of the general. All the calculations of Epaminondas turned out
successful. The bravery of the Thebans, cavalry as well as infantry,
seconded by the training which they had received during the last few years,
was found sufficient to carry his plans into full execution. To this
circumstance, principally, was owing the great revolution of opinion
throughout Greece which followed the battle. Every one felt that a new
military power had arisen, and that the Theban training, under the
generalship of Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair
field, with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood without a
parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war, against mere citizens in
the opposite ranks, armed but without the like training.[392] Essentially
stationary and old-fashioned, the Lykurgean discipline was now overborne

by the progressive military improvement of other states, handled by a
preëminent tactician; a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at
Sparta sixty years before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece,
on the field of Leuktra.
But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching wherein
it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of enduring pain
and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the manner in which the
news of this fatal catastrophe was received at Sparta. To prepare the reader
by an appropriate contrast, we may turn to the manifestation at Athens
twenty-seven years before, when the trireme called Paralus arrived from
Ægospotami, bearing tidings of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet.
“The moan of distress (says the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls
from Peiræus to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his
neighbor: on that night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-
citizens and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there was
everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only was the
defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel, but it came at
a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon as Kleombrotus,
having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted Thebans on plain
ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt of the result. Under
this state of feeling, a messenger arrived with the astounding revelation, that
the army was totally defeated, with the loss of the king, of four hundred
Spartans, and more than a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood
confessed by having solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the
moment when he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually
being celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going
through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of
the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be either
interrupted or abridged. “Of necessity, I suppose, they were grieved,—but
they went through the whole as if nothing had happened, only
communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and issuing a
general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing, but to bear the
misfortune in silence.” That such an order should be issued, is sufficiently
remarkable; that it should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be

expected; that it should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is
what no man could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the
contemporary historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those
whose relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and
cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one
showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and
humbled.”[395]
In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to orders,
at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the sensitive and
demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of feeling at Athens, so
much more nearly approaching to the Homeric type of Greeks,—we must at
the same time remark, that in reference to active and heroic efforts for the
purpose of repairing past calamities and making head against preponderant
odds, the Athenians were decidedly the better of the two. I have already
recounted the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after
the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one
expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now about to
recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a
calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what
had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that, looking to
the intensity of active effort in both cases, the comparison is all to the
advantage of Athens; excusing at least, if not justifying, the boast of
Perikles[396] in his memorable funeral harangue,—that his countrymen,
without the rigorous drill of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to
Spartans in daring exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.
It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety of their
defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march nearly the
whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian moræ, or military
divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two or three had been sent with
Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now despatched, even including
elderly citizens up to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left
behind in consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the
command (Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself
in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages
representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius,
and Achaia; all these places being still under the same oligarchies which

had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta.
Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new
army across to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the
port of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found
inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]
Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp at
Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb it. Besides
that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the recent victory,—we
must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans themselves, upon whom
their own victory had come by surprise, at a moment when they were
animated more by despair than by hope. They were doubtless absorbed in
the intoxicating triumph and exultation of the moment, with the embraces
and felicitations of their families in Thebes, rescued from impending
destruction by their valor. Like the Syracusans after their last great
victory[398] over the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably
required an interval to give loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they
would resume action. Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much
the value of Theban alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain
reinforcement from without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow.
To Athens they sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming
their recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands with
those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now rather
hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn peace with
Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled in the
acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident chagrin, and
dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while the unfortunate
Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in expectation of the
victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy reëstablishment, found
themselves again struck down and doomed to indefinite exile.
To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the
same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back word that
he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be equipped for
the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the same time, he
collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near to him, and began
his march by land. So rapid were his movements, that he forestalled all

opposition,—though he had to traverse the territory of the Herakleots and
Phokians, who were his bitter enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in
Bœotia.[399] But when the Theban leaders proposed that he should attack
the Lacedæmonian camp in flank, from the high ground, while they would
march straight up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded
the enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the
enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the great
victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by
attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven
to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, you yourselves were
in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very feeling.
Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these sudden
changes of fortune.”[400] Having by such representations convinced the
Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians,
reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little trust to
be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for
their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance,
a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians the
liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however, the
Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans or in
Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him to quit the
camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly, he issued public
orders in the camp for every man to be ready for departure after the evening
meal, and to march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that
mountain on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he
directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to
Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans
offered no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any fraud,
considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had at least no
motive to break his word.
It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met
Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and
was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his
march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was
disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]

In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers, liberated
under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a scene of mourning.
But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So
terrible was the scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who
survived a defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact
sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or
extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be
seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would
intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of
cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until he assumed
that visible humility which was supposed to become his degraded position.
Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from the panegyrist Xenophon)
[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of the Spartan father and mother, when
they learned that their son was among the slain and not among the
survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of
the prisoners at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back
to a degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some
precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous
malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The
vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe loss
sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of
enforcing against them the established custom, the ephors referred the case
to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that time and case the customary
penalties should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and
come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that
the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the
remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed
doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified
citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature of the
Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of Spartan
training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution as that of the
four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up
against a single defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her
citizens.”[407]
The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter loss of
ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power and of

inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick upon Sparta,
was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still more important was, the
alteration of opinion produced everywhere in Greece with regard to Sparta,
by the sudden shock of the battle of Leuktra. All the prestige and old
associations connected with her long-established power vanished; while the
hostility and fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but
hitherto reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
manifestation.
The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the
Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her, and
became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of Pheræ. The
Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in cordial sympathy
with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent success, were eager for
fresh glories, and readily submitted to the full exigencies of military
training; while under a leader like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to
such good account, that they became better soldiers every month.[408] The
Phokians, unable to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come
under the protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than the
Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual defence
and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the Lokrians (both
Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the town of Heraklea,
followed the example. The latter town was now defenceless; for Jason, in
returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had assaulted it and destroyed its
fortifications; since by its important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it
might easily be held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.
[410] The Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the
Lacedæmonians even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and
the Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to
destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this
proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war,
nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been
victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas
prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished for mild
temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his countrymen that in their
present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to
establish a character for moderation of dealing[411] not inferior to their

military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly, the
Orchomenians were pardoned upon submission, and re-admitted as
members of the Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same
lenity was not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their
territory annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before
the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made
that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban cause might
march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and
departed.[412] The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at
Athens.[413]
While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection of
a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings at Delphi,—
while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such marked
improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached to Thebes was
thus becoming larger, under the able management of Epaminondas,—Jason
in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every day. He was tagus of all
Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under complete obedience,—with
Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with a mercenary force, well
paid and trained, greater than had ever been assembled in Greece. By
dismantling Heraklea, in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the
strait of Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece
whenever he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his
great power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would
direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond of
boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or southward
against Greece.
The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning of
370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed
distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian festival (the season
for which was about August 1, 370 B.C., near Delphi), not only with
splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also at the head of a
numerous army. Orders had been given that his troops should hold
themselves ready for military service,[416]—about the time when the festival
was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from
all his tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not less than
one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a

prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was
to be given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those
who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more beasts
bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however,
that this Pythian festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances;
for the two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been
comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta and
her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and also of the
occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival of 370 B.C.,
following immediately after the peace, appeared to justify an extraordinary
burst of pious magnificence, to make up for the niggardly tributes to the
god during the two former; while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians
would be alleged as an excuse for the military force intended to accompany
Jason.
But there were other intentions, generally believed though not formally
announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness. It was
affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the presidency and
celebration of the festival, which belonged of right to the Amphiktyonic
assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay hands on the rich
treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said to have been conceived by
the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen years before, in conjunction with the
epirot Alketas, who was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no
visible means of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to
know what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which
the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept his
word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at the summit of
his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day of the festival
arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near Pheræ, and was sitting
to receive and answer petitioners, when seven young men approached,
apparently in hot dispute with each other, and appealing to him for a
settlement. As soon as they got near, they set upon him and slew him.[420]
One was killed on the spot by the guards, and another also as he was
mounting on horseback; but the remaining five contrived to reach horses
ready prepared for them and to gallop away out of the reach of pursuit. In
most of the Grecian cities which these fugitives visited, they were received
with distinguished honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one

who inspired universal alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him,
while no other power had as yet taken her place.
Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor ability,
by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived longer, he would
have influenced most seriously the subsequent destinies of Greece. What
else he would have done, we cannot say; but he would have interfered
materially with the development of Theban power. Thebes was a great
gainer by his death, though perfectly innocent of it, and though in alliance
with him to the last; insomuch that his widow went to reside there for
security.[422] Epaminondas was relieved from a most formidable rival, while
the body of Theban allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent
than they would have remained, if there had been a competing power like
that of Jason in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few
years longer, to be rifled by another hand.
While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during the
months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events not less
serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The treaty sworn at
Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the Lacedæmonians to disband
their forces, remove all their harmosts and garrisons, and leave every
subordinate city to its own liberty of action. As they did not scruple to
violate the treaty by the orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were
not zealous in executing the remaining conditions; though officers were
named, for the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of
the cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not
accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more
than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in
Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the
fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta was broken;
she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of foreign ascendency. Her
harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had disappeared from the Asiatic and
insular cities twenty-three years before, immediately after the battle of
Knidus,[424]) and returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian
ascendency had been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or
dekarchies, which had been for the most part violent and oppressive.
Against these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the long-
accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible force,

stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past misgovernment was
avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to the length of great
reactionary injustice; and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan
revolution became so numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-
established governments. Such were the commotions which, during the
latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed many of the Peloponnesian towns,—
Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though with great local
difference, both of detail and of result.[425]
But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent
form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with the
general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had not been in any
way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor (so far
as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace of Antalkidas in
387 B.C. The Argeian government was a democracy, and the popular leaders
were vehement in their denunciations against the oligarchical opposition
party—who were men of wealth and great family position. These last, thus
denounced, formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the
government. But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and
some of the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of them
deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after a hasty trial,
put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their property, while others
slew themselves to escape the same fate. So furious did the fear and wrath
of the people become, exasperated by the popular leaders, that they
continued their executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as
some say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the popular
leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon
which the people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death
also.[426]
This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling,
from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied executions
were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate an impetuous
popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know the facts too
imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than the brutal working of
angry political passion amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra,
where there was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit of

being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every question fully
discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The
acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual
eloquence of vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards
decided between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people,
when they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it,
that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round the
assembly.[427]
Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled, or
maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and though as
yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus, either actual or
prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged, and incapable of any
effort either to afford protection or to uphold ascendency. One single defeat
had driven her to the necessity of contending for home and family;[428]
probably too the dispositions of her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia,
were such as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any
rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of
Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when
we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek mind, and
that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as Olynthus. How
completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step
taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of 371 B.C., about four
months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian cities, though
they had lost both their fear and their reverence for Sparta, were still
anxious to continue members of a voluntary alliance under the presidency
of some considerable city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to
send envoys and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on
the basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at
Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an
engagement to the following effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent down
by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies
generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked, I
will assist her with all my might.” What cities, or how many, swore to this
engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly that Corinth was one;
[430] but the Eleians refused it, on the ground that their right of sovereignty
over the Marganeis, the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not

recognized. The formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as
president, is a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of
Sparta, and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her
own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped
into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and
guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into this new
compact were not for that reason understood to break with their ancient
president.[431]
Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time,
though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered position
of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of Amphiktyons an
accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of their citadel the Kadmeia
by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and for the sanction conferred by
the Spartan authorities on this act, in detaining and occupying the place.
The Amphiktyonic assembly found the Spartans guilty, and condemned
them to a fine of five hundred talents. As the fine was not paid, the
assembly, after a certain interval, doubled it; but the second sentence
remained unexecuted as well as the first, since there were no means of
enforcement.[432] Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor
those who passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really
submit to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of
punishment for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the
Pythian games, which were celebrated under the presidency of the
Amphiktyons; and we may perhaps presume that they really were thus
excluded.
The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one point
of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta. Since the victory
of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had become preponderant,
especially in Northern Greece, where the majority of the nations or races
voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly were situated. It is plainly through the
ascendency of Thebes, that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as
indicating the incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still
farther developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it the
instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of the predominant
state. In the previous course of this history, an entire century has passed

without giving occasion to mention the Amphiktyonic assembly as taking
part in political affairs. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their
united histories cover seventy years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak
of that assembly. The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed
upon the Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history.
We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely
as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details. During the
sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra, Sparta had always
had her regular political confederacy and synod of allies convened by
herself: her political ascendency was exercised over them, eo nomine, by a
method more direct and easy than that of perverting the religious authority
of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.
[433] But when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more
powerful state individually, she had no such established confederacy and
synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her
antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and
at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable in
power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her purposes. There
was a certain show of reason for considering the seizure of the Kadmeia by
Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it was not only executed during the
Pythian festival, but was in itself a glaring violation of the public law and
interpolitical obligations recognized between Grecian cities; which, like
other obligations, were believed to be under the sanction of the gods;
though probably, if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar
complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt
to surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both Spartans
and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case, however, the
Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined
with their overruling ascendency, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic
assembly, and to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the
sentence produced no direct effect,—which will explain the silence of
Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected with the
Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results
for Grecian stability and independence.

Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully
affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the Arcadians.
Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border of Laconia, was
governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was
of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been broken up into separate villages
(about fifteen years before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of
high-handed injustice committed at the zenith of their power after the peace
of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion
villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the
Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference, as
from the love of plunder.[434]
The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians not
only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of Sparta, but
began to fancy that their own military prowess was not inferior to that of
the Spartans; while the disappearance of the harmosts left them free to
follow their own inclinations. It was by the Mantineans that the movement
was first commenced. Divested of Grecian city-life, and condemned to live
in separate villages, each under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had
nourished a profound animosity, which manifested itself on the first
opportunity of deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The
resolution was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its
walls, and resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished
by the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had been
one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there was now a
strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many Arcadians from
other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the Eleians sent three
talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply mortified by this
proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus
with a friendly remonstrance. Having been connected with the city by
paternal ties of hospitality, he had declined the command of the army of
coërcion previously employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the
Mantinean leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his
communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them.
Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the
re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would defer it

until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which (he promised)
should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome subscription to
lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered, that compliance was
impossible, since a public resolution had already been taken to prosecute
the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it,
Agesilaus was compelled to return home.[436] The Mantineans persevered
and completed the rebuilding of their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical
form, surrounded with elaborate walls and towers.
The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean
leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with the
exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently to be
recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was doubtless felt to the
quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that
prostration into which they had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such
painful sentiment, we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of
dignity, individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence
and earned by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result
imbibed by every pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by
the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense for the
severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow, monotonous, and
unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As an individual, the
Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of admiration at the Olympic
and other festivals;[437] while he saw his city supplicated from the most
distant regions of Greece, and obeyed almost everywhere near her own
border, as Pan-hellenic president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory
series of events, he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only
robbed of its former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner.
Agesilaus, especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was
not only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of having
exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of having
succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the maximum of
her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied her, in part
brought her by his misjudgments, into her present degradation.
Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from

childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by his
opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398 B.C. for
the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the regal dignity, and as being
the precise calamity against which an ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame
reign”—had given warning. Ingenious interpretation by Lysander,
combined with superior personal merit in Agesilaus, and suspicions about
the legitimacy of Leotychides, had caused the objection to be then
overruled. But there had always been a party, even during the palmy days of
Agesilaus, who thought that he had obtained the crown under no good
auspices. And when the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion
suggested to him readily the cause of it,[438]—“See what comes of having
set at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a
lame reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real energy
and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even an infirm body and
an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his country.
He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity
of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it,
without the least power of hindrance.
The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages into a
town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to Sparta, appears
to have suggested the idea of a larger political union among all who bore
the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union had ever existed; the fractions of
the Arcadian name had nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except
many legendary and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic
lineage and indigenous antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration,
espoused with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes,
spread itself rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or
central Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the
sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of
determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however, was
not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but only to be
exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining unanimity at home,
together with concurrent, independent action, as to foreign states.[440] This
plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans,
who looked to it as a protection to themselves in case the Spartan power

should revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was
expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia,
especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in
need of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians,
Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among the more
considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme emanating
from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the
west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442] conterminous with
Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of
the Spartans on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through
Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited
their hostages taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by
Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.[443]
Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous of
breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of this party were
Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his friends, supported by a
senate composed chiefly of their partisans, vehemently opposed any
alteration of the existing system. Proxenus and his partisans resolved to
appeal to the assembled people, whom accordingly they convoked in arms;
pacific popular assemblies, with free discussion, forming seemingly no part
of the constitution of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed
numbers also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other
with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first Stasippus had the
advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite party were slain, while
Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall, and in
possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that city he had
before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with
the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted
within the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer
maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took
sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he
was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast
the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender.
Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and put on
their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them

and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as
exiles to Sparta.[445]
Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a
struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in the nature
of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any serious change of
policy in the state could be brought about without violence. It decided the
success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which now proceeded with
redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were cordially united in its
favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in opposing it, hired for that
purpose, as well as for her own defence, a body of mercenaries from
Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly of the Arcadian name was
convoked at a small town called Asea, in the mountainous district west of
Tegea. It appears to have been numerously attended; for we hear of one
place, Eutæa (in the district of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of
Laconia), from whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was
here that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally
determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.[447]
There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss to
herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful of her
remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and avenge Stasippus, as well as to
arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march into the country, in
spite of her present dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no
other places, sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other
hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the
Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea,
Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town
which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found that all the male adults
had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feebler population,
remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took scrupulous care to
respect both person and property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed
portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to
wait for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under
Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the
Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth
from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.[450]
Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own unassisted

forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the neighborhood of Mantinea.
His onward march left the way from Asea to Tegea free, upon which the
Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up, and marched by night to Tegea;
from whence, on the next day, they proceeded to Mantinea, along the
mountain range eastward of the Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian
force thus became united. Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields
and encamped within little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea,
was agreeably surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who
had eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side
and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself
on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of the
mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the high
ground around, in order to attack him from above, the next morning. By a
well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this inconvenient position,
and regained the plain; where he remained three days, prepared to give
battle if the enemy came forth, in order that he might “not seem (says
Xenophon) to hasten his departure through fear.”[451] As the enemy kept
within their walls, he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former
camp in the Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed
on his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing (says
Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires could be
seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He thought
that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous discouragement,
by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without any enemy coming
forth to fight him.”[452] The army was then brought back to Sparta and
disbanded.
It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his
own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days, without
showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan pride broken
down, since the day (less than eighteen months before) when the
peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out of Phokis
straight against Thebes!
Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the walls of
Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their
aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the Eleians

to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by them and by others of the
smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of some external
protector against Sparta,—and who even before they applied to Thebes for
aid, had solicited the like interference from Athens (probably under the
general presidency accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her
with various inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced
a refusal.[454]
Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the
battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to establish or
confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant Bœotian cities and
over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc. After this had been
accomplished, he must have been occupied (during the early part of 370
B.C.) in anxiously watching the movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had
already announced his design of marching with an imposing force to Delphi
for the celebration of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this
despot was the ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations
towards the headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general,
even of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of such
liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus, leaving
Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes from such
apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his successors were
far less formidable in power as well as in ability. Accordingly, in the
autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention free to turn to
Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining the anti-Spartan
revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and of seconding the
pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards federative coalition.
But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still; embracing
long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should forever disable
Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the Grecian world. While
with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he took measures for
replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient territory. To achieve this, it
was necessary to dispossess the Spartans of the region once known as
independent Messenia, under its own line of kings, but now, for near three
centuries, the best portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of
proprietors at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians,
as their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back all

the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various portions of
Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of territory, and to plant
upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile. It has been already mentioned,
that during the Peloponnesian war, the exiled Messenians had been among
the most active allies of Athens and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at
Pylus, in Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by
the triumphant Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from
Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among
various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at
Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373 B.C., they
had remained thus without a home. At length, about the latter year (when
the Athenian confederate navy again became equal or superior to the
Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge
the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457] Probably their request may
have been preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where
the Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by
the Athenians,—who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length
made peace with Sparta,—when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered,
both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A chance of
protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes, far more
promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of
the loss as well as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by
restoring them to their ancient territory, entered into communication with
them, and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant
places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in the late
autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him, burning with all
their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same
sentiment among Thebans and allies.
With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the mind
of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of the Arcadians;
both being intended as parts of one strong and self-supporting organization
against Sparta on her own border. Of course he could have accomplished
nothing of the kind, if there had not been a powerful spontaneous
movement towards consolidation among the Arcadians themselves. But
without his guidance and protection, the movement would have proved
abortive, through the force of local jealousies within the country, fomented

and seconded by Spartan aid from without. Though the general vote for
federative coalition had been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such
a vote to the satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail,
would have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians. It was
necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy between
Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one common cause,
would never have permitted that either should be preferred as the centre of
the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing upon the new site required, it was
indispensable also to choose between conflicting exigencies, and to break
up ancient habits, in a way such as could hardly have been enforced by any
majority purely Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely
supplied by Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a
splendid personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics
of Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.
It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to expel
Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army into Arcadia;
the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by Pelopidas and the other
Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after the retirement of Agesilaus,
while the Arcadians and Eleians were ravaging the lands of the recusant
town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet his arrival, the
aggregate confederate body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with
the Thebans and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to
forty thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460]
Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of
auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots,
Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands
themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal
admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an
enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas,
and made to produce a finished discipline which even the unwilling
Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of the might of
their assembled force, within a day’s march of Laconia, the Arcadians,
Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now
that no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was unwilling
to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise; being well aware,

from his own journey to Sparta (when the peace-congress was held there
prior to the battle of Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening
country, so easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by
troops like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all
the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his allies
were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier, that the
passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from some of the
discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These Periœki engaged to revolt openly,
if he would only show himself in the country. They told him that there was
a general slackness throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions
from Sparta; and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found
to speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general
impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career of
pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to give
the order of invasion.[462]
That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will not
surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real difficulties of the
country, invasion of Laconia by land was an unparalleled phenomenon,—
that the force of Sparta was most imperfectly known,—that no such thought
had been entertained when he left Thebes,—that the legal duration of
command, for himself and his colleagues, would not permit it,—and that
though his Peloponnesian allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his
troops and his countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of
resistance turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led
them to apprehend.
The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating by
different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest road, the
Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves and the
Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter alone experienced
any serious resistance. More daring even than the Thebans, they
encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum in the district called
Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and overpowered him by vehemence of
assault, by superior numbers, and seemingly also by some favor or
collusion[464] on the part of the inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this
brave Spartan with nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans
also found and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the

Arcadians over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the
four divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety.
Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now
burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the
plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of
Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the bridge
which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.
Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it; a
strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other side, in
the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down the left bank
of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his way, as far as
Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here he found a ford,
though the river was full, from the winter season; and accomplished the
passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to
oppose it. He was now on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city
he slowly and cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban
troops always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped,
by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies
dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]
Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute of
fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable even in idea.
Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no auxiliaries except those
mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come back with Agesilaus; nor was
it certain beforehand that even these troops would remain with them, if the
invasion became formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible
army on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of
foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such
Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also envoys to
Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and
rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus,
Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But the ordinary line of march into
Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being barred by
Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to
the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably
at Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the
eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the

Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels, they
were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots for priority.
[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not come over until the
last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and
conducted the rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies
debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found
neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to
Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the
vigilance of the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.
These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than creditable
to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which habitually reigned in
Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one side, and the Periœki and
Helots on the other, produced in this hour of danger its natural fruits of
desertion, alarm, and weakness. Not only were the Periœki and Helots in
standing discontent, but even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a
privileged fraction called Peers had come to monopolize political honors;
while the remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known
under the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a previous
chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed the fearful
insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many disaffected
companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior citizens at Sparta. On
the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain feeling of common
interest arose, since even the disaffected might reasonably imagine that a
plundering soldiery, if not repelled at the point of the sword, would make
their condition worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors
made public proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and
serve in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six
thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous,
when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so
that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ was welcomed as a security,
not less against the armed Helots within the city, than against the Thebans
without.[470] Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A considerable
number both of Periœki and Helots actually took arms on behalf of the
Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from
the ephors, which could not now be enforced.[471]

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of
Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all the energy
of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the Thebans from crossing
the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ and to throw himself back
upon the city of Sparta, towards which they immediately advanced. More
than one conspiracy was on the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance
forestalled the projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity
were marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis)
called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but
Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them
in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had
mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium, but in
another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to the spot
indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium with troops
whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized and put to death fifteen
of the leaders of the two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on
the point of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the
house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried; the
first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to
death untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing
from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan kings
and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure as to Periœki
and Helots.
By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the
strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider approaches
barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though destitute of walls,
Sparta was extremely defensible by position. Epaminondas marched slowly
up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and others in his army spreading
themselves to burn and plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth
day his cavalry occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground
near the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry,
though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage over
them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom Agesilaus
had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the Dioskuri. Though
this action was probably of little consequence, yet Epaminondas did not
dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with having defied the Spartans

and manifested his mastery of the field even to their own doors, he marched
away southward down to Eurotas. To them, in their present depression, it
was matter of consolation and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to
assail them in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same firmness
as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians first invaded
Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Especially the Spartan
women, who had never before beheld an enemy, are said to have manifested
emotions so furious and distressing, as to increase much the difficulty of
defence.[475] We are even told that Antalkidas, at that time one of the
ephors, sent his children for safety away from Sparta to the island of
Kythêra. Epaminondas knew well how desperate the resistance of the
Spartans would be if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst
of a hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]
On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos and
Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country, and trying
for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the Lacedæmonian
arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined and took service in
his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium did not succeed; upon which
he turned back and retraced his steps to the Arcadian frontier. It was the
more necessary for him to think of quitting Laconia, since his
Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and others, were daily stealing home
with the rich plunder which they had acquired, while his supplies were also
becoming deficient.[477]
Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian opinion
was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his own, was
prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon, unfriendly as
well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to the excellence of his
generalship and to the good discipline of his troops. He made his Thebans
keep in rank and hold front against the enemy, even while their Arcadian
allies were dispersing around for plunder. Moreover, the insult and
humiliation to Sparta were still greater than that inflicted by the battle of
Leuktra; which had indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the

field, but had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
territory and an unapproachable city.
The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards their
city) had been far less than either friends or enemies expected; the belief in
their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now remained for
Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing those two
enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his expedition: the
reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of the Arcadians.
The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative, had
inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy against
Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas. When that
eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a strong frontier
against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when he announced his intention
of farther weakening Sparta by the restoration of the exiled Messenians,—
the general feeling of the small Arcadian communities, already tending in
the direction of coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such
impediments of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit
involves. Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478]
that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition to his
great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those numerous
independent governments which once divided Attica, and had consolidated
them all into one common government at Athens. Just such was the
revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the like combination of
intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or Founders was named to carry
out the resolution taken by the Arcadian assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for
the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian city and centre. Of this Board, two
were from Tegea, two from Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the
district of Menalus, two from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site
being chosen upon the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided
the town in two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up
the marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of the
new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides of this
centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from the
Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii, three great sections
of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little townships,

occupying a portion of the area intended for the new territory, yet being
averse to the scheme, were constrained to join; but in one of them,
Trapezus, the aversion was so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred
to emigrate, and went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea
(Trebizond), who received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines
were even slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of
the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than
five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also gathered
around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles from the city,
and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, and
Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and Heræa.
The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês being
especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481] The Messenian
exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of regaining their name and
nationality, were averse to fix their new city either at Œchalia or Andania,
which had been the scenes of their calamities in the early wars with Sparta.
Moreover the site of Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the
hero Kaukon, in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local
circumstances of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the
revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the
Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams,
prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate choice of a
judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê (then bearing the
town and citadel of Messênê), together with the Akrocorinthus, were
marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two horns of Peloponnesus:
whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.[482] Ithômê was near
two thousand five hundred feet above the level of the sea, having upon its
summit an abundant spring of water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit
the citadel or acropolis of the new town of Messênê was built; while the
town itself was situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a
continuous wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by
Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to Dionysius
and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus
Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri. Next,
prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the Messenian

nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes, that they would
now come back and again take up their residence as inmates in enfranchised
Messênê. After this, the ground was marked out and the building was
begun, under the sound of Argeian and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of
Pronomus and Sakadas. The best masons and architects were invited from
all Greece, to lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a
proper distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect of
the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such was
their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for admiration even
in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]
From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the Messenians
enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward down to the
Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the richest and most
fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward, their territory was
conterminous with that of Arcadia and the contemporary establishment of
Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated space was land cut off from the
Spartan dominion. How much was cut off in the direction south-east of
Ithômê (along the north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot
exactly say. But it would appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that
neighborhood, were converted into an independent community and
protected by the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to
notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward and south-
westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of Peloponnesus, from
the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now also subtracted from
Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan Brasidas had
been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—
where the Athenian Demosthenes erected his hostile fort, near which the
important capture at Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point
belonging to Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather
farther north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of
Kinadon a township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now
all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf
westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from Sparta to
become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into freemen; not
only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before, but bitterly hostile to her
from the very nature of their tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the

Arcadian army cut to pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490]
killing the Spartan polemarch Geranor; and probably about the same time
the other Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must
have been expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the
new Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides
confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some
other towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been
kept unfortified and had dwindled away.
In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus,
Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and a serious
injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of Messenians in that
insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan territory and instigators of
Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as their dialect could not be
distinguished from that of the Spartans themselves. How prodigious must
have been the impression throughout Greece, when Epaminondas, by
planting the Messenian exiles and others on the strong frontier city and
position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta in a short time of all the wide space
between that mountain and the western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and
Helots contained in it! We must recollect that the name Messênê had been
from old times applied generally to this region, and that it was never
bestowed upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore
the Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all comprised in the
domain of the new city.
They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.[493]
Herein were included, not only such of these two classes as, having before
dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now
remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of others
who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such
desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better
shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure
that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of
Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a

chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a new
home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined the
invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from simple
insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be supplied with
fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would
pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of
free and equal Hellens,[494] sending again a solemn Messenian legation or
Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of more than three
centuries,[495]—outdoing their former masters in the magnitude of their
offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by
words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal deference and
admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as
his due.
The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the
renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new cities
(Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and sympathy,—
while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted in all respects
the most interesting political phenomena that Greece had witnessed for
many years. To the profound mortification of the historian,—he is able to
recount nothing more than the bare facts, with such inferences as these facts
themselves warrant. Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed,
designedly omits to notice them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for
most of what we know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate
many divine signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence.
Details are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time
was occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the cost;
though both the one and the other must have been considerable. Of the
thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many small
townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are unable to
render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein social phenomena
are either so interesting or so instructive. In describing societies already
established and ancient, we find the force of traditional routine almost
omnipotent in its influence both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad
as well as good is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the
past stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even for
improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which coalesced

into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers who came for the
first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in a state in which new
exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate satisfaction. There was no
file to afford a precedent, nor any resource left except to submit all the
problems to discussion by those whose character and judgment was most
esteemed. Whether the problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have
been now a genuine and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as
the lights of the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for
conflicting views. Arrangements must have been made for the
apportionment of houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or
grant, or both together; for the political and judicial constitution; for
religious and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many other
social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided for, and
it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily the means
are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare fact that these two
youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of cities were born at the
same time, and under the auspices of the same presiding genius,
Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly sympathy and in
repelling all common danger from the attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which,
even two centuries afterwards, remained engraven on the mind of a
Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.[497]
Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as the
centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised all
Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod or
assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name, and in
which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent communities
had the right of attending, should be periodically convoked there. This
assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the Great Number. A body of
Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined to uphold the federation, and
receiving pay when on service, was also provided. Assessments were levied
upon each city for their support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also
other officers) was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia,
received foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried
all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of public
misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus, Demosthenes,

Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499] What were its times
of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed seriously, for a certain time,
to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion of action and sentiment which had
never before existed;[500] and to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which
had always a tendency to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The
patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence or
power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be
laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it.[501]
Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now
rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which lies
north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ (hardy
mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon Sparta, and
constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502] with their territory
forming the northern frontier of Laconia towards Arcadia, became from this
time independent of and hostile to Sparta.[503] The same is the case even
with a place much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was
retaken by the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.[504]
Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of
his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe mid-
winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians, who, full of
devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of hospitality which he
could not permit consistently with his military duties.[506] He stayed long
enough to settle all the preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in
train of serious execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis.
For the completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face
and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary.
Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all
obstruction from Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for
some years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]
Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these
proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force
against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed
sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in the
contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509] involving the

aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with their security. It was
in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens
from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one
not merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously
sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in
reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility,
little either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the
Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys
dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the
Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion of Xerxes
from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by
Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the Spartans against the revolted
Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian
assembly) Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and
had been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime
forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of
Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta; while the
headship of the latter by land had in like manner been accepted by the
Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of these former glories,
to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had
since intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old
common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to
the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of
their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought
heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished
to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to
concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.[510]
This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys from
Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that Epaminondas
and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth and inflicting damage
upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus, had committed a glaring
violation of the general peace, sworn in 371 B.C., first at Sparta and
afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian
city. The envoy from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud
position which she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt
on the meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now

generously interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and
remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she would act
in accordance with her own true interests; since, should Sparta be crushed,
the Thebans would become undisputed heads of Greece, and more
formidable still to Athens.[511]
It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that she
should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to entreat an
amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past. The contrast is
indeed striking, when we set her present language against that which she
had held respecting Athens, before and through the Peloponnesian war.
At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment of the
assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such language
from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is intelligible enough
during their present distress; but so long as they were in good
circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage from them.”[512] Nor was
the complaint of the Spartans, that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to
the sworn peace guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without
opposition. Some said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion
upon themselves, by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia;
and that the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable,
since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the first
to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made by the envoys
to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404 B.C., after the surrender
of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be
totally destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against so
cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly, and
contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor of the
proposition.[513] “As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of
ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta,
and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and
simple issue which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians,
disposing them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from
Corinth and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.
To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A
counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive

aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused serious
alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the first ebullition of
resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested by the history of the past, the
philo-Spartan view of the situation gradually became more and more
predominant in the assembly. Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in
support of the Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly
listened to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to
aggrandize farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for
assisting the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since the peace
of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from Korkyra.
As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this enterprise
were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made proclamation that the
citizens destined for service should equip themselves and muster in arms in
the grove of Akadêmus (outside the gates), there to take their evening meal,
and to march the next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that
many citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates
himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve
thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but
volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some days;
much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to accomplish
their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates was well aware that
all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that he had formidable enemies
to deal with. After having established his position at Corinth, and obtained
information regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made
war without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted
Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the
plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled
in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general
himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which it was
necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between Corinth and
Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground, and afforded good
means of resistance to the passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates,
though he occupied its two extremities, did not attempt directly to bar the
passage of the Thebans. He contented himself with sending out from
Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in

their march. But Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued
them to the gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main
body within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle.
Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth,
suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]
On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other
Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for four
months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, by the
constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his functions longer
than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy of death, yet
Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects for humiliating Sparta
and founding the two hostile cities on her border, had taken upon himself to
brave this illegality, persuading all his colleagues to concur with him. On
resigning the command, all of them had to undergo that trial of
accountability which awaited every retiring magistrate, as a matter of
course,—but which, in the present case, was required on special ground,
since all had committed an act notoriously punishable as well as of
dangerous precedent. Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his
colleagues as well as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political
enemies, likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present occasion
any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that the penalty
legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because this proposition, in
the face of a victorious army, returning elate with their achievements and
proud of their commanders, was full of danger to the mover himself,—but
also for another reason,—because Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent
enough to wait for the case to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the
illegality committed was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also
the reputation of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would
forestall accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just finished;
the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any enemy,—
the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the liberation of all
Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê as a city,—the
constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, with Tegea on one
flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence on the Spartan frontier, so

as to ensure the permanent depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the
emancipation of Greece generally, from Spartan ascendency, now
consummated.
Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive accuser,
or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by Epaminondas
himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. He and the other
generals were acquitted by acclamation; without even going through the
formality of collecting the votes.[519] And it appears that both Epaminondas
and Pelopidas were immediately re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the
year.[520]

CHAPTER LXXIX.
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND
MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during
the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general peace,
including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the
battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when the Thebans, after a
victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by
Epaminondas.
How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter.
Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta,
the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were
overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been
invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content
themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from
assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them;
Messênê had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large
proportion of their Periœki and Helots had been converted into independent
Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been
emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous
neighbors in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea.
The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of
Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and
Thebans against her.
Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable;
partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the
position and policy of Athens.

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was tagus
of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on,
if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue,
combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him
decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known
to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere,
especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a
reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had
cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the
former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over
the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an
overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that
promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power
(382-379 B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject
allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens
(from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land;
while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the
Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of
Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the
Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia, and
even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the
Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522] To Amyntas, accordingly, the
friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece,
had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to
conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He
adopted the former as his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be
discovered; but I have already stated that Iphikrates had married the
daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement
called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find
Timotheus also in great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present
sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524]
Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his
deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was
treated with considerable favor.[525]
The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely the
connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the

auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of Jason. It
produced at the same time the more important effect of stimulating the
ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only her ancient rival, Sparta,
beaten in the field and driven from one humiliation to another, was disabled
from opposing her, and even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals,
the Thebans, were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with
mingled jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as had
never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such enlargement
of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step taken two or three
months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter),—
of causing the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the
preceding month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee
of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as defensive
allies of Athens;[526] thus silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.
On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to
hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against Theban
aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place, at the head of
an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther maritime aggrandizement
that her present chances, as well as her past traditions, pointed. Such is the
new path upon which we now find her entering. At the first formation of her
new confederacy, in 378 B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of
resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private, which had
been snatched from her along with her empire at the close of the
Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen
should for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee
against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions. This
prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during the last seven
years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown
aside, under the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the
Athenian maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost
possessions as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The
prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten.
Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so
that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found
twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who

starts up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son of
Amyntas.
Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in
371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of need
against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens about
September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was resworn under
Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have first put
forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing to every Grecian
city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she made exception of
some cities which she claimed as belonging to herself. Among these was
certainly Amphipolis; probably also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus
and Potidæa; all which we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by
Athenians.[527] How much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it
prudent now to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that
their aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment
was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides.
Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys,
recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.[529]
Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to Amyntas, or
any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering on his kingdom, had
never belonged to him, nor had he any power of transferring it. Originally
an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from Athens in 424-423 B.C. by
Brasidas, through the improvidence of the Athenian officers Euklês and
Thucydides, then recolonized under Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever
since remained an independent city; though Sparta had covenanted to
restore it by the peace of Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her
covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of
the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the mining
district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and the right of Athens
to it was indisputable; so far as original colonization before the capture by
Brasidas, and formal treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could
confer a right. But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years
old. The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of a long
prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their second founder,
consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable admonition to repel all

pretensions on the part of Athens. Such pretensions, whatever might be the
right, were deplorably impolitic unless Athens was prepared to back them
by strenuous efforts of men and money; from which we shall find her
shrinking now as she had done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421
B.C., and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated
pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the
Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness
in military action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest
mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the
most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of
Macedon.
Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost
transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the congress
of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to take any
immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of
northern Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the
same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.[531] The
former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) by
assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his great power could
not be held together by an inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and
Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron,
having put to death his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after
which he too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not
before he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of
the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the
estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the
great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas
(having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne by his youthful
son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade Thessaly for the
purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting possession of Larissa and
Krannon; both which cities he kept under his own garrisons, in spite of
unavailing resistance from Polyphron and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]
This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and to a
considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless unable to keep
together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and its circumjacent
tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian cities hostile to him

invited assistance, not merely from Alexander of Macedon, but also from
the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas into the country, seemingly in 369
B.C., soon after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its
victorious progress in Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at
the head of an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban
protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon,
with whom he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus
came under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ,
and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.
Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian towns
in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and after a reign of
scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by some conspirators of
Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the
western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is
mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of
the agents.[535] But besides these conspirators, there was also another
enemy, Pausanias,—a man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the
throne;[536] who, having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at
the head of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous
partisans in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê,
Strepsa, and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war
both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas.
Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger
children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in the
same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against her son
Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her as his
accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and
those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]
Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy
would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they not
found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian admiral
Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on the coast of
Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen (369 B.C.) (soon
after his partial conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of
Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of

generally surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening
negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for future
military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, and when
Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the
Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons
Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years
of age, the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the
family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had not
only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted
him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two
young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to
embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked
his aid as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the
family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in her
favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from
Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under
Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.
This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in an
oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who then
clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow the
independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The Athenian
general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of succession to the
Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the circumstances of the time,
his interference may really have promised beneficial consequences to
Athens; so that we have no right to blame him for the unforeseen ruin
which it was afterwards found to occasion.
Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not procure to
Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the power of the
Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time a free Greek city,
inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in
confederacy with Olynthus.[539] Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations
on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365
B.C.). We make out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his
service a general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of
those Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century),

who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the
best bidder and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served
under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he was dismissed by the
Athenians from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What
successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is
certain that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have
directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, which
proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan prisoners or
hostages,[541] which opened a prospect of accomplishing the surrender of
the town.
It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of information,
that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365 B.C. did not satisfy the
expectations of his countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large,
as testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but
also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with the Persians in
372-371 B.C.) to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes
the satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as
of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which
Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn, towards more
special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the
battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus
(366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must notice the main course of political
conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.
Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369 B.C.)
to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent
alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her
allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.[543] All pretensions
to exclusive headship on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst
abundant discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian
and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship
must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point
in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried out.
It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter
at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, found favor both as equitable
and convenient, until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his
countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians had few ships of war, and those

manned chiefly by Helots; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her
horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the
distribution now pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best
quality, would be placed under Spartan command; while few
Lacedæmonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian
command; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus
proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate
between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was
adopted.[544]
Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the
two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for
success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies
determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard the line of
Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as to prevent the
Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the
depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for
the purpose of keeping a Theban invader away from her frontier, had been
held, during the war from 394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans
against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into
Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any
necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-
Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to
Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the
Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the
Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land
across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and a
large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according to
Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries under
Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.
It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans
and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in front of this
position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers were inferior to
those of his assembled enemies, whose position prevented him from joining

his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies, already assembled in
Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged the enemy to come down and
fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position.
Moving from his camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy
just when the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had
yet risen and got under arms,[546]—he directed an assault along the whole
line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was
made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in the
most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his movement
conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them. The
Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position,
and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently sent to
solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon the line of Oneium,
which had now become indefensible. The other parts of the Theban army
made no impression by their attack, nor were they probably intended to do
more than occupy attention, while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed
the weak point of the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian
polemarch as faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as
his own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might have
summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans, in spite
of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend on the
Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to retreat. The
criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable judgment
pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which we are not in
a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian commander was
to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and victorious attack upon this
strong position, enhanced his already high military renown.[548]
Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian force,
which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, and
Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Phlius; and
obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.[549] At Sikyon, a vote
of the people being taken, it was resolved to desert Sparta, to form alliance
with Thebes, and to admit a Theban harmost and garrison into the acropolis;
Euphron, a citizen hitherto preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and

devoted to her interest, now altered his politics and went along with the
stronger tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into
Arcadia to encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,
—the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of
Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns
having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet
finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious
army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west of
Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, was also in
great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. When the Arcadians
and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join Epaminondas at Oneium,
these exiles entreated them only to show themselves near Phlius; with the
assurance that such demonstration would suffice to bring about the capture
of the town. The exiles then stole by night to the foot of the town walls with
scaling-ladders, and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts
from the neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies
were in sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged on
the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, overpowered the
few unprepared guards, and got possession of the acropolis. Instead of
contenting themselves with this position until the allied force came up, they
strove also to capture the town; but in this they were defeated by the
citizens, who, by desperate efforts of bravery, repulsed both the intruders
within and the enemy without; thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity
of the Phliasians to Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the
superiority of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of
their territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it was only
on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to afford
them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]
Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. Their
march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the boldness to
rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town. But the Athenian
Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his troops so skilfully, and
made so good a resistance, that he defeated them with loss and reduced
them to the necessity of asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead,
which were lying very near to the walls.[553] This advantage over the

victorious Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who
were still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from
Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians,
with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such foreigners
had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery, and singular
nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in several partial
skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians
were not bold enough to hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan
detachment returned home after no very long stay,[554] while the Thebans
also went back to Bœotia.
One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial
notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death all the
Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while they released
under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture of a village named
Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas took captive a
considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least possible delay, he let
them depart under ransom, professing to regard them as belonging to other
cities.[555] We find him always trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then
customary towards political opponents.
Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies had
acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in
the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the
formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of
Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous depression of Sparta,—that
they fancied themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence
by themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens
divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and
able, stood forward as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the
champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-
Arcadian synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were
originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of the
peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as the bravest
and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which proof was
afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all
others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the
Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. “Let us follow no

man’s lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we
built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if we submit
quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for
ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans under another
name.”[556]
Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of collective
dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for Lykomedes, they
chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon him to
lead them into active service, so as to justify their new pretensions. He
conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the
Argeians; who were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having
their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under Chabrias,—
Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians, fighting his way
through enemies as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division
of Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the
territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf,
part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as
Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison to
resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the suburbs of
Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery of the south-
western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by this expedition. The
indefatigable activity which these Arcadians now displayed under their new
commander, overpowering all enemies, and defying all hardships and
difficulties of marching over the most rugged mountains, by night as well as
by day, throughout the winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment
and alarm; not without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies
the Thebans.[558]
While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians
and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them from
Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and the other
towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled by the Spartan
arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since that period, these towns
had ranked as separate communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of
Sparta. Now that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at
resumption of their lost supremacy. But the formation of the new

“commune Arcadum” at Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before
thought of. The Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian
origin, and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,
[560] solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently shown by
the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as political brethren, and
guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561] The Eleians, thus finding
themselves disappointed of the benefits which they had anticipated from the
humiliation of Sparta, became greatly alienated from the Arcadians.
Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had just
established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their instance) to
mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen of Abydus named
Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a
centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies
from all the belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to
meet him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of
attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among
themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards peace;
since the Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be
restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting the
proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were willing to concede
the point, and even tried, though in vain, to overcome her reluctance. The
congress accordingly broke up; while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor
of Sparta and Athens, employed his money in levying mercenaries for the
professed purpose of aiding them in the war.[563] We do not find, however,
that he really lent them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were
intended for the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his
revolt from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close the
war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate result,
however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to send an
embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that the
Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court, to
solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in
reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other
evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed
the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too, on which
Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom Xenophon[565]
specifies as if there were no others of the same sentiment), but all the allies
of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-
enfranchised residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the
allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them, if not
positively inclined in their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented
itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-
revived, Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one
hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which
occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-
stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as
victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the
nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no Messenian victor had ever been
enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of recorded
Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the register. No
competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a
free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either
enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the
prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression
produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three centuries,
Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public
legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she
was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual
Lacedæmonians were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of
Greeks unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name
as being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the
long and severe oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—
the first after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was
doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.
During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into
Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their
attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid. But

Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly, in order to
protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to
counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot, who was soliciting
reinforcement from Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was
compelled to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however,
alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his cruelty,—
and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—
soon ceased to think himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas
established a defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities,
and then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not
strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering
to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia,
as a guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the
youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character at Thebes
for some years, under the care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy
and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia
by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months
before, nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the
Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces
them for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left
them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus
enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.[570]
And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendency of
Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the
acquisition of the thirty hostages.
Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted
the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time
that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of
Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second
squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under
Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies
assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing
them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in
Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have
them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might
coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these

Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces
against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man
whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian
territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian
and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an
eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave
notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders reached had
expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march,
in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so
hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter
soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed
also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea.
Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of
Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the
Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarce any
resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries,
and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand men (if we are to believe
Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this
easy and important victory,—or, as it came to be called, “the tearless
battle,”—news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demotelês to
Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the
Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the
ephors, setting the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and
disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a
striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control
which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how
much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working
on these minds of iron temper!
So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of
their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and
Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid,
and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with
the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line
of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and
Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained

unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that
Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of
Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ,
with a force of two thousand men and seven days’ provision. The Theban
commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near
Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he
proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.
[574] Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent
allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that
event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical
governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained
neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or
Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading
force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be
enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever
summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered
securities which Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their
promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed
to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the
existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the
oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation
of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also calculated to strengthen
the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and
unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar
grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-
alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and
Kalydon,[577] which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled
as separate allies of Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other
achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.
But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor
with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party in the
Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had
discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in
the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The
accusation was farther pressed by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability,
strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced

was the displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to
offend the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of
Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch
during the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of the
Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief
oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
combining their united forces against each city successively, were strong
enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the
Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and
active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side,
while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle,
exerted themselves actively on the other.
The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in
alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis.
But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained
unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed
closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians,
lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading
Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if
the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the
garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such
defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be
democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the
revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against
the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on
the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and
interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron,
sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he
summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the
oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future.
His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose
generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected,
himself with five partisans. The prior oligarchy had not been without a

previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of
Lysimenês; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force
introduced. Euphron now proceeded to reorganize them, to place them
under the command of his son Adeas instead of Lysimenês, and to increase
their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his
own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible
color of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most
rapacious and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues
to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the
wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the
public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of
consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured for himself
adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship,
and probably enrolling them among his paid force.[581] The power which he
thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to
keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading
Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he
was farther ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The
Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron
was master of the town and harbor.
During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city of
Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached
to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant
hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which destroyed their
crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I have already recounted,
that in the year 369 B.C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by
Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles
with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate
bravery and resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C., the
Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great
damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from
the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen
from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367 B.C., a second invasion of the
Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron, with his own mercenaries to
the number of two thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and

the Theban harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving
near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the
city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within;
while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of
ground called the Trikaranum (which had been fortified by the Argeians and
was held by their garrison), to approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But
the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent
them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day
they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last,
however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to
take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close
under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and
Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron
with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent
the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.[584]
An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made
prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without
ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss sustained by the
Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical
counter-revolutions which had disjoined the other Achæan cities from
Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that
city and Phlius.[585] Such an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might
almost be said, salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel
impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was
obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by
purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more
difficult to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to
Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military
Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Phlius, broke through
and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterwards, in
conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort of Thyamia, which the
Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort
became not only a defence for Phlius, but a means of aggression against the

enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from
Corinth.[586]
Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the
Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So
intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had
helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of
the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon,
joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis, and there summoned the
Sikyonian notables to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense
sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to
recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or
public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies,
Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor;
where he invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of
the garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open partisan
of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little
distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by
and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians.
In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained
violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary
measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired
political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting
that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.
Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured
from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return
to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in
conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men
in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis,
which he vainly tried to take by assault,[587]—his possession even of the
town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be
removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining
from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over
Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a
defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know;
except that he took with him a large sum of money for the purpose of
bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry

his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther
increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under
the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad
daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban
Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.
For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith,
and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon
their heads the extreme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and
even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the
authorities,—as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the
majesty, but even the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon
offenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the
persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-
participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it
before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking
up the language of the accusing magistrates:—
“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person
and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I
had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous
judgment. I knew that you did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias
and Hypatês,[589] whom you caught after a career similar to that of
Euphron,—but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under
the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were
already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty
of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and silver
offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor
more palpable than the man, who, favored and upheld by Sparta, first
betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of
confidence from you, betrayed you to her,—handing over the harbor of
Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who
exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who
despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and
most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in
conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by
force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither
to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you

would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for
giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to
purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as
well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should
undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor,
playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that
he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well!
you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why
not in Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing
you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity
ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have
passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized
as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has
ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of
allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell
you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you will have
made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if you adjudge
me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves publicly as just
avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of
allies.”[590]
This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that
Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal
citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the
victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that
portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes
procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no
legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not
being entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever
be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with
confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found
responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the
like assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or
assemblies elsewhere.
Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of
Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished preëminence of
being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along with his tomb, a chapel

was erected, in which he was worshipped as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and
Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honors as had been paid
to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom
he had conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of a
political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as their
benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon
their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always
menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the
citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created,
enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favors and earn
popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether
employed or not for the benefit of the many, goes along with their
antipathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing few.
We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon
became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not
inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in
the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy
in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed,—nor what
became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long
afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction
with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by
the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the
forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.[592]
It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism
to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbor) took place
throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half of 366 B.C. No such enemy,
probably, would have arisen to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy
recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he
himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence
too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse,
by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his
mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the
transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of
the year 367 B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in
the beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus,—
who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap
Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of
Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have
been realized, as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês
(after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the Persian court, soliciting aid.
Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as
good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta
at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by
Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of
recognized fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as
enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed
elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a
peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her
leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two
new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The vitality and chance for duration,
of both,—especially that of the latter, which had the inextinguishable
hostility of Sparta to contend with,—would be materially improved, in the
existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous
under a Persian rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias
now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the
Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed
of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and
we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in
the same company.[595]
Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of
prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court. Xenophon,—
who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious towards
the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the example of
Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that his application was greatly
furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes,
against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the
fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually
discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps

doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence
of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach
Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to
know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had
subsequently trodden down still farther the glory of Sparta, by carrying
their arms over Laconia, and emancipating the conquered half of the
country; that when they were no longer in Peloponnesus, their allies the
Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the
Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of
Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras,
—would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise
ascendency over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta.
Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript
he wished, obtained his own terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and
independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and
autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up
their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention
against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the
head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was
menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the
points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty
over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into
the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favor of the Eleians;
[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much
coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.
Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing
aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for
you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.” This remark,
made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following
addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians have anything juster to propose,
let them come to the King and inform him.” So vague a modification,
however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return
of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of
having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also
of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in
treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian King.

On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600] The
Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript; refusing
even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and
accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything
beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong
contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.[601]
Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia, made report of his mission to the Pan-
Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the
most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There
were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for
men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with
care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not
large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]
On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their
allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was
produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa,—the first
Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding
the battle of Platæa,—who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the
document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the
peace of Antalkidas.[603]
But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta
both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready
acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present to take an oath to
the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied that they had
come with instructions, authorizing them to hear and report, but no more;
and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities.
Nor was this the worst. Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia,
already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry
report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general
protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to
be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might
be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedes of violating
the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian
comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no
longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his

example. Indeed, as they had refused to take the oath submitted to them, the
special purpose of the synod was defeated.
Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the
Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They
accordingly despatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit
the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of
adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse,
under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that they
addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even
to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition
at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a
centre of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the
line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into
Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether,
declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the
Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed
on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so large a
proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the
rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure, was found
practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship;[604] though
doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognized Messênê,
contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born
city.
In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards the
recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would
naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It
appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and
that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by
Alexander of Pheræ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under
pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him
as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by
the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on
enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the
application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even
between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether

Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of
Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any
military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Pheræ as
prisoners.
Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to
Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his
imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and
induced several of them to submit to the despot of Pheræ; who moreover
sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against
the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the
Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the
menacing ascendency of their neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately
despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under
Autoklês; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa
were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island.
He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure
at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight thousand
hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately
for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander since his last
year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the
ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the command. On
entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the
army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command
of Autoklês, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The
Thessalian allies of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in
the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was
rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to
make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat
homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s cavalry
so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or
destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a
common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole
army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to
extricate them from their perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—
marshalled the retreat in consummate order,—took for himself the

command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and
conducted the army safely back to Thebes.[606]
This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Bœotarchs,
who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher
than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the
failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of
Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and
irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and
oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an
excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we
read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the
unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in
mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself,
with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was
manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of Alexander,
for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful of incurring the
implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though
retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted
some time before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were
prepared to undertake a second expedition.
At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this
occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name
rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his
military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating
Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to
the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy
excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to
be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would
grant nothing more than a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the
engagement of evacuating Thessaly; while he required in exchange the
release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he
had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes.
Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he
did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with its

consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander;
who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the
Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on
Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.
[609]

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
important point was gained in their favor on the other side of Bœotia.
Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was
captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over
from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-
mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between
Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never
incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian
commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency of Athens; though, as
it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of
Athens, demots of the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as
the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry
remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting
a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were
forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611] It was
these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now
effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless
to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens.[612] So great was the
sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched with
all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general, Chares,
with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth
and Phlius. They farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other
allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the
Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the
Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was
obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to
impartial arbitration.[613]
This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence.
Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon could no
longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid

of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both town and harbor again came
into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became
discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her
summons on the emergency at Oropus, although Athenian troops had been
constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the
Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the
Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia,
who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had
come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of
the Persian rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as
well as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of
Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the
Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was
difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the
alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that
to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of
Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was then given to
Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his return, but never reached
Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of
the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once.
[615] In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens
was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.
Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in
Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled
her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had
been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and her only
conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction
with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian
alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator
at Athens, who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst
the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced
the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and
Argos. “Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers
(asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father
and married his mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in
his reply) they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these

persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As
soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and
then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt.”[616]
This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of
Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The Arcadians
concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship
with Thebes.
As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to
Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the
same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons
to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was
resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named
Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered
Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be
concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force
under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the
Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from
admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the
Athenians had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon
their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian
outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any
complaints for which they might have ground, as their services were no
longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that Corinth was in danger.
But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with
every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]
The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and
uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their
masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an
enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in
their own pay;[618] but while thus providing for military security, they sent
envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to
them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in
conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views.
Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the
full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point of ruin

(said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make
it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to
persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you.” The
Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to the like distress, held the same
language of weariness and impatience for peace.[619]
It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could
be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the
independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta
had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored to prevail upon
Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely
refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and
held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the
idea of recognizing as free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so
long been their slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of
continuing the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain
what they had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the
Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become
intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet they
gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even
reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their
benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending her to
submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan prince conjured
his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the
mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the
reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece;
and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending
away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.
Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission
between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phliasians, Epidaurians, and
others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognizing the independence
of Messênê, and affirming the independence of each separate city within its
own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of
any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they
declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly

sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded
the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messênê;
but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.[622]
This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of
neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those near the
Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and Hermionê,
since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties.
But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and Argos,—Sparta and Athens,
[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations
between these states, however, were now somewhat complicated; for
Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty
alliance, with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in
alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance
with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on
unfriendly terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves
were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one with another, which
had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under
the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a
Theban harmost and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and
Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united
frontier against Sparta.
As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the
recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were no less
indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally,
had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.[624]
The Athenians also were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has
been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys
who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now
availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the
rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more
favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras
had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great
King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession
instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article also in the former

rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now
revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.
At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they also
despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet
with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king.
Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any
public force; availing himself only of his long-established military
reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both
Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially,
towards Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already
related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus,
with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms
favorable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes
was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his
revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach
with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet with a formal
proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also
conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus,
the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627] That satrap seems now to have had a
large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the
Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his
chief officer, exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny
and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.
Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos;
which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force
in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite mainland. How or
when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but the Persians, when once
left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the continental Asiatic
Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighboring
islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with eight
thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus
became master of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found
means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of
enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting

contributions from allies.[628] An important possession was thus acquired
for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party
went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was
not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest
was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it
appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various
neighboring satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed
his revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and
Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked
Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and
laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been
induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter
had no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money
derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers
were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a
few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the
Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for
Sparta.[631]
The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus,
materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have
weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor,—to have disposed the
residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt,—and thus to have
helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded both Agesilaus and Timotheus.
Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed
countrymen; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens
the more valuable boon of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese.
Ariobarzanes made over to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula;
possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial
mastery of the passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory
for occupation.[632]
Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates
aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new
territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as
out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by
Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiades and afterwards
down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B.C. Though all these