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Title: The Art of War

Author: baron de Antoine Henri Jomini

Translator: Wm. P. Craighill
George H. Mendell

Release date: September 28, 2004 [eBook #13549]
Most recently updated: December 18, 2020

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF
WAR ***

THE

ART OF WAR
BY

BARON DE JOMINI,
GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

Capt. G.H. MENDELL,
CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY,

AND

Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL,
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY.

Originally published in 1862

PREFACE

In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand which
are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in making a
translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too rigid adherence,
word for word and line for line, to the original, and on the other is the
danger of using too free a pen. In either case the sense of the author may not
be truly given. It is not always easy to preserve a proper mean between
these extremes. The translators of Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the
Art of War have endeavored to render their author into plain English,
without mutilating or adding to his ideas, attempting no display and making
no criticisms.

To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is not
necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To those not
thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more interested in such
subjects, (and this class must include the great mass of the American
public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said with entire truth, that
General Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest
military critics and historians of this or any other day.

The translation now presented to the people has been made with the earnest
hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As the existence of a
large, well-instructed standing army is deemed incompatible with our
institutions, it becomes the more important that military information be as
extensively diffused as possible among the people. If by the present work
the translators shall find they have contributed, even in an inconsiderable
degree, to this important object, they will be amply repaid for the care and
labor expended upon it.

To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is
recommended to begin at the article "Strategy," Chapter III., from that point
to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return to Chapters I.

and II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be appreciated, must
be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially true of strategy. An
acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is quite important, as they
are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all other recent writers on the
military art.

U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, N.Y.
January, 1862.

CONTENTS.
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.
CONTENTS.
DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.

CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.
ART. I.—Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.
ART. II.—Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a
Military View.
ART. III.—Wars of Expediency.
ART. IV.—Wars with or without Allies.
ART. V.—Wars of Intervention.
ART. VI.—Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other
Causes.
ART. VII.—Wars of Opinion.
ART. VIII.—National Wars.
ART. IX.—Civil and Religious Wars.
ART. X.—Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the
Same Time.

CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY.
ART. XI.—Military Statistics and Geography.
ART. XII.—Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success
of a War.
ART. XIII.—The Military Institutions of States.ART. XIII.—The
Military Institutions of States.
ART. XIV.—The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of
Operations.
ART. XV.—The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.

CHAPTER III.—STRATEGY.
Definition of Strategy and Tactics.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

ART. XVI.—The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.
ART. XVII.—The Theater of Operations.
ART. XVIII.—Bases of Operations.
ART. XIX.—Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater
of War, and Objective Points of Operation.
ART. XX.—Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense,
and Strategic Positions.
ART. XXI.—Zones and Lines of Operations.
ART. XXII.—Strategic Lines of Maneuver.
ART. XXIII.—Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary
Bases or Strategic Reserves.
ART. XXIV.—The Old and New Systems of War.
ART. XXV.—Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.
ART. XXVI.—Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched
Lines.—Wars of Sieges.
ART. XXVII.—Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts in their Relation
to Strategy.
ART. XXVIII.—Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.
ART. XXIX.—Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
Epitome of Strategy.

CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
ART. XXX.—Positions and Defensive Battles.
ART. XXXI.—Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.
ART. XXXII.—Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in
Battle.
ART. XXXIII.—Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
ART. XXXIV.—Surprises of Armies.
ART. XXXV.—Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups
de Main generally.

CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED
CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN THE DOMAIN OF
STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.
ART. XXXVI.—Diversions and Great Detachments.
ART. XXXVII.—Passage of Rivers and other Streams.
ART. XXXVIII.—Retreats and Pursuits.

ART. XXXIX.—Cantonments and Winter Quarters.
ART. XL.—Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.

CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF
MOVING ARMIES.
ART. XLI.—A few Remarks on Logistics in general.
ART. XLII.—Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate
Information of the Enemy's Movements.

CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS
FOR BATTLE.
ART. XLIII—Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
ART. XLIV.—Formation and Employment of Infantry.
ART. XLV.—-Formation and Employment of Cavalry.
ART. XLVI.—-Formation and Employment of Artillery.
ART. XLVII.—Employment of the Three Arms together.
CONCLUSION.
SUPPLEMENT.
APPENDIX.
SECOND APPENDIX.
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
INDEX

SUMMARY
OF

THE ART OF WAR.

DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.

The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military
branches,—viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and
Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be
termed Diplomacy in its relation to War. Although this branch is more
naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than
with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a
subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an
army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a
connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in
this view, it should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:—

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.

2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war,
either for defense or for invasion.

3. Grand Tactics.

4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.

5. Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications.

6. Minor Tactics.

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry,
cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this
knowledge is indispensable.

CHAPTER I.
STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.

Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war.

A government goes to war,—

To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;

To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
manufactures, or agriculture;

To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
safety of the government or the balance of power;

To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend
them;

To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;

To defend the threatened independence of the state;

To avenge insulted honor; or,

From a mania for conquest.

It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the
proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the

defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may
be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war,
as,—

1. A state may simply make war against another state.

2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each other.

3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.

4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.

5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it
has commenced.

6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
ally, or upon its own.

7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory:
it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous.

8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy.

9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art;
but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be
undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.

For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in nearly
the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances
and events.

To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong
exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest
importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.

ARTICLE I.
Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.

When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to enforce
them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before action.

The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with the
sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our times
there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though
apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but
wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the Spanish crown
under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by a solemn
will, and was supported by family ties and by the general consent of the
Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by all Europe, and produced a
general coalition against the legitimate legatee.

Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an old
claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus doubling the
power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if he had failed, he
could not have been much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the
enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be
justified.

In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit by
every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements should
be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step would be to
occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may be carried on
according to circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the
object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy, and the
means being to threaten him in the heart of his own country. Every thing
depends upon the alliances the parties may be able to secure with other

states, and upon their military resources. In an offensive movement,
scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other
state which might come to the aid of the enemy. It is a part of the duty of a
statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper
explanations and giving proper guarantees to other states.

ARTICLE II.
Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point
of View.

A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more honorable.
But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of awaiting the
attack on the frontiers.

There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also advantages
in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no internal
dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third party, will
always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile soil. This course
will spare its territory from devastation, carry on the war at the expense of
the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the spirits of the
adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely military sense, it is certain that an army
operating in its own territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and
artificial features are well known, where all movements are aided by a
knowledge of the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.

These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war; but, if
the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the
political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by
localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies. The
fact of these modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules.
Military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in
the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political
part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as
circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of
war must be observed.

For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of Turks,
which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and possess
no steadiness under misfortunes.

ARTICLE III.
Wars of Expediency.

The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
Succession, were wars of expediency.

There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to prevent his
aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a state will rarely
singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to form a coalition for that
purpose.

These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.

ARTICLE IV.
Of Wars with or without Allies.

Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being equal.
Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker states in
alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than either separately. The
ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the
enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of his frontier which
otherwise would have been secure. All history teaches that no enemy is so
insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any power, however
formidable.

ARTICLE V.
Wars of Intervention.

To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a state
than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. The power
which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole weight and
influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when it can make
decisive use of its resources.

There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal affairs of
neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.

Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the first
class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured in
a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful. While
Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland, Austria, on the
contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere in the internal affairs
of France during the Revolution.

Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it certainly has
a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may reach the
adjoining states.

There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign wars,—viz.: 1,
by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain the political
equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the war already
commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not to be obtained
otherwise.

History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect of
these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the immoderate
aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become the arbiter
of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the proper time."

In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new and
large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be decisive. Much
will depend upon its geographical position in reference to the armies
already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807 Napoleon crossed
the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg, leaving Austria on his
rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had launched an army of one
hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder, it is probable that the
power of Napoleon would have been ended; there is every reason to think
that his army could not have regained the Rhine. Austria preferred to wait
till she could raise four hundred thousand men. Two years afterward, with
this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand
men well employed at the proper time would have decided the fate of
Europe.

There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
interventions:—

1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force specified by
former treaties.

2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending his
territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.

3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of war,—
which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against one.

4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or interferes
before the declaration of war.

When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the
main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an
imposing force, the case is quite different.

The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France: still, it
was a principal party in the North until its occupation of Prussia. But when
Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as far as Brandenburg it
acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate of these troops, far from their
base, depended upon the good or bad maneuvering of their allies.

Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate operations.
The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of this, to which
we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the military character of
these expeditions.

It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so
distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a
measure, an advantage to the state.

In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is both a
statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the
part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an
objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interests. By
the neglect of these precautions, the greater number of coalitions have
failed, or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power more united but
weaker than the allies.

The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the whole
force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising than the others.
Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807, but failed to profit by
it: she again had the opportunity in 1813. Napoleon had just collected his
forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking his front of operations in reverse,
threw herself into the struggle with two hundred thousand men, with almost
perfect certainty of success. She regained in two months the Italian empire
and her influence in Germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of
disaster. In this intervention Austria had not only the political but also the
military chances in her favor,—a double result, combining the highest
advantages.

Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater was
sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible display of
force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already in progress, upon
which she entered with the whole of her resources and at the time most
opportune for her.

This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence when
they know how to profit by it.

Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy, and
the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held France
in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and arrested the
great conqueror in his career.

In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the recall of
the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of Turin, where it
encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized Prince Eugene.

Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they could
not add to the conviction of the reader.

ARTICLE VI.
Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.

There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of great
extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.

Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,—as Alexander, Cæsar,
and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus and
the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia, furnish
bloody proofs of these truths.—The love of conquest, however, was not the
only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his contest with
England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to make him
supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he was also a
victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of yielding to
England. It might be said that he was sent into this world to teach generals
and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories teach what may be
accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his disasters, what might have
been avoided by prudence.

A war of invasion without good reason—like that of Genghis Khan—is a
crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.

The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object and
in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which threatened the
existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its author; the second,
while combating dangerous principles, fostered the general interests of the
country, and was the more readily brought to a successful termination

because its object met with the approval of the majority of the people whose
territory was invaded.

These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the same
character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon; the second
restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought never to have
been changed.

Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack than to be
invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the spirit of
conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the proper time.

An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.

An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as was
well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the Revolution
in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was better prepared
than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was attacked by all Europe
upon both land and sea.

Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of Turkey
developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national resistance. The
religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him to arms; but the
same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were twice as
numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and Turks been
harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united people would
have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element of religious
fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was formidable only upon
the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, while in the interior all
was weakness.

When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the
inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular feeling
rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt. (These
military points are treated of in Article XXIX.) But when the invasion is
distant and extensive territories intervene, its success will depend more

upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to insure success will be
to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a state adjoining the enemy,
which will afford reinforcements of troops, and, what is still more
important, give a secure base of operations, depots of supplies, and a safe
refuge in case of disaster. The ally must have the same interest in success as
the invaders, to render all this possible.

Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not powerless in
adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may arrest the most
brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805 and 1809 might have
ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The invasion of the North of
Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by Austria. That of Rumelia in
1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a wise statesmanship by
negotiation obviated all chance of intervention.

ARTICLE VII.
Wars of Opinion.

Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes
confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.

Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, lastly,
(which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior without being
intestine or civil.

Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of
intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party desires to
propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it desires to crush,—
in both cases leading to intervention. Although originating in religious or
political dogmas, these wars are most deplorable; for, like national wars,
they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.

The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of the
League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is the pretext
to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of dogmas. The
successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach
the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not sustain the League in
France for the purpose of advancing the Roman Church. We agree with M.
Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a crusade in Egypt, thought more
of the commerce of the Indies than of gaining possession of the Holy
Sepulcher.

The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for it
excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For instance, the
Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France, had allies in the
country more powerful than their armies. It may, however, happen, as in the
Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the dogma for which the war is

waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the country invaded;
and then the contest becomes fearful.

The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous declaration
of the rights of man, and how governments became justly alarmed, and
rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing the lava of this
volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing it. The means were not
fortunate; for war and aggression are inappropriate measures for arresting
an evil which lies wholly in the human passions, excited in a temporary
paroxysm, of less duration as it is the more violent. Time is the true remedy
for all bad passions and for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may
bear the yoke of a factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval;
but these storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt
to restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to
prevent it and to perish in the attempt.

After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of Dumouriez
and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to clash and
quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of
giving place to the terrible Convention, the Assembly would slowly have
returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical doctrines, in
accordance with the necessities and the immemorial traditions of the
French.

In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not only is
met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of an
exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party will
necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of another and
opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all the public

resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is supported by a large
majority of the people, of what avail will be the support of the faction
which possesses no such means? What service did one hundred thousand
Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do for the Coalition in
1793?

History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the
Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of attacking an
intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the military
operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before deducing any
certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what would have been
the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of destroying and
capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the commanders of those
fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to France, to her forts or her
brave armies, and had marched on Paris with two hundred thousand men.
They might have restored the monarchy; and, again, they might never have
returned, at least without the protection of an equal force on their retreat to
the Rhine. It is difficult to decide this, since the experiment was never
made, and as all would have depended upon the course of the French nation
and the army. The problem thus presents two equally grave solutions. The
campaign of 1793 gave one; whether the other might have been obtained, it
is difficult to say. Experiment alone could have determined it.

The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less
importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to
gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly
taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its independence
or the integrity of its territory.

The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of this
course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the conditions
were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was made up of more
solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de Leon. The war of the
Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national war, and a civil war,—

while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was thoroughly a national war, that
of 1823 was a partial struggle of opinions without the element of
nationality; and hence the enormous difference in the results.

Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulême was well carried out.
Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the above-
mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there divided his
forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of strength of their
enemies,—which they could safely do, since they were sustained by a
majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the instructions of the
Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of the country and the
reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to
provide a base of operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission,
or at least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the national
spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that of 1807.

Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it behooved
him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from that of the
allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged with similar
missions. In three months the army was under the walls of Cadiz.

If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship was
not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid order of
things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its commanders, but in the
Spanish government, which, yielding to the counsel of violent reactionaries,
was unable to rise to the height of its mission. The arbiter between two
great hostile interests, Ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of the
party which professed a deep veneration for the throne, but which intended
to use the royal authority for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of
consequences. The nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it
would not have been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps
came anew into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,—a striking
lesson, by which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy
land, although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful conflict

may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated from all
factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the general
interests of the country,—a monarchy capable of rallying to its support this
incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not less extraordinary
than its faults, was always a problem for those who were in the best position
to know it.

ARTICLE VIII.
National Wars.

National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of invasion,
are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied to such as are
waged against a united people, or a great majority of them, filled with a
noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence: then every step is
disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be
obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are everywhere
threatened or captured.

The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity,
we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be confounded with
a national defense in accordance with the institutions of the state and
directed by the government.

This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, affected by a
noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them the example and
take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical people may arm under
the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic in its political opinions, or
animated by a sacred love of its institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in
defense of all it holds most dear.

The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a national
invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and are masters of the
sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is
quintupled, not only on account of the facility of feeding the insurrection
and of alarming the enemy on all the points he may occupy, but still more

by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies
by the sea.

The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a
national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always most
formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive forests.

The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that of
the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, the
reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the inhabitants of
mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer time than those of
the plains,—which is due as much to the difference in character and
customs as to the difference in the natural features of the countries.

Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that any
country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals,
admits of a formidable defense.

The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as in
national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general
conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest of
the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the English,
furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary struggle of
La Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain, Portugal, and the
Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the Morea against the Turks,
and of Navarre against the armies of Queen Christina, are still more striking
illustrations.

The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a
considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an army:
his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly in
arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of
whom conspires against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have
an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their power. He
holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps; outside the

limits of his camp every thing is hostile and multiplies a thousandfold the
difficulties he meets at every step.

These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is
difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their
connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the
commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the slightest
movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat
his projects; while the latter, without information of their movements, and
not in a condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource but
in his bayonets, and certain safety only in the concentration of his columns,
is like a blind man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most
carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches,
he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he
finds no signs of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don
Quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of
communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his
convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that
he must inevitably yield after a time.

In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When Ney's
corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of the
artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four brigades
distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish forces had
been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago de Compostela,
the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo, Marchand's at
Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the companies of the
train—men and horses—disappeared, and we were never able to discover
what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that
the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with
them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single division marched to
conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the Navia, while Kellermann
debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part of the corps of La
Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind the very heights
which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a league from our
columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when he was entering
Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the regiments of the

division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard Galicia, barely escaped,
and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to Lugo. This war
presented a thousand incidents as striking as this. All the gold of Mexico
could not have procured reliable information for the French; what was
given was but a lure to make them fall more readily into snares.

No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a
system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the
essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same
time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may
present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a
nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient to be
superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long lines of
communication against numerous bodies?

The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles
which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or
conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What efforts of
patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of Napoleon,
Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for six years against
three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese supported
by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta,
Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!

If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will be
most likely to insure it,—viz.: make a display of a mass of troops
proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm
the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and
patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly,
deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the League, of
Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and Valencia, of Hoche
in La Vendée, are models of their kind, which may be employed according
to circumstances with equal success. The admirable order and discipline of
the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the late war were also models,
and were not a little conducive to the success of their enterprises.

The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars
have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any

other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being
also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. This
reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its consequences, it
would be necessary always to be able to induce the people to take up arms,
and it would also be necessary for us to be convinced that there would be in
the future no wars but those of conquest, and that all legitimate though
secondary wars, which are only to maintain the political equilibrium or
defend the public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could
it be known when and how to excite the people to a national war? For
example, if one hundred thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered
France, originally with the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium
by France, and without any other ambitious project, would it be a case
where the whole population—men, women, and children—of Alsace,
Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a
Saragossa of every walled town, to bring about, by way of reprisals,
murder, pillage, and incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not
done, and the Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy
these provinces, who can say that they might not afterward seek to
appropriate a part of them, even though at first they had never contemplated
it? The difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in
favor of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion
without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of
extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the people
and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will it not be
sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or
landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments into service,
would regulate the part the people should take in the war, and place just
limits to its barbarities?

I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the cases
stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French troops,
supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the better of this
German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand
men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or arriving in Argonne
it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. To attain this mean,
we have laid it down as a necessity that good national reserves be prepared
for the army; which will be less expensive in peace and will insure the

defense of the country in war. This system was used by France in 1792,
imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the whole of Germany in 1813.

I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian
philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of
extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the
defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good political
alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized
assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my
prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English
Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,—as at Fontenoy,—
preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children
throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.

ARTICLE IX.
Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.

Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally the
result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious sectarianism. In the
Middle Ages they were more frequently the collisions of feudal parties.
Religious wars are above all the most deplorable.

We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force
against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would weaken
the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that it should
murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in French or Latin,
or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is difficult of conception.
Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis XIV., who persecuted a
million of industrious Protestants, who had put upon the throne his own
Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with
exterior wars, and they are also frightful when they are family quarrels. The
history of France in the times of the League should be an eternal lesson for
nations and kings. It is difficult to believe that a people so noble and
chivalrous in the time of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into
so deplorable a state of brutality.

To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon
which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two parties or
sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to reconcile by
treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the intervention of a third
power in a religious dispute can only be with ambitious views.

Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a
political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although these
fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible
that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in religious

disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had no other object
in interfering in the affairs of the League than to subject France to his
influence, or to dismember it.

ARTICLE X.
Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at
Once.

The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at
the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the
necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.

A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring
states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally to come
to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of the political
equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations allied against it will
have the same interest in the war and will enter into it with all their
resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an ordinary war.

Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon,
sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests
arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on the
part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from imperious and
inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking alliances, or by
opposing such means of resistance as shall establish something like equality
between the strength of the parties.

The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his designs
on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had alarmed his
neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only oppose the
faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of
the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding to the number of
his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the subsidies of England, and
fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different states, sustained a war against
the three most powerful monarchies of Europe: the division and folly of his
opponents were his best friends.

Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was
almost impossible to avoid.

France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of the
extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of the
Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets they
would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd
calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France
miraculously escaped.

Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has
voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable
wars,—with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case he
expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of Turkey and
Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so that the
enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been generally
supposed.

It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made
against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary, and
two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in
opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For instance,
the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and Spain aided by
England was a very different affair from a contest with Austria assisted by
an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter contests belong to
ordinary wars.

It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if possible,
and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more prudent to dissimulate
or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until a proper opportunity
for redressing them shall arrive. The rule, however, is not without
exception: the respective forces, the localities, the possibility of finding
allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength between the parties, are
circumstances which will influence a government so threatened. We now
have fulfilled our task, in noting both the danger and the means of
remedying it.

CHAPTER II.
MILITARY POLICY.

We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces the
moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the political
considerations which we have just discussed be also moral, there are others
which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a war, which belong
neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We include these under the head
of Military Policy.

Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy; and,
as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be assigned to
each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and without
deviating from my intention,—which is, not to give a treatise on theses
subjects, but to point out their relations to military operations.

Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be fought,
their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, their
financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government or their
institutions, the character of the executive, the characters and military
abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet
councils or councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the system
of war in favor with their staff, the established force of the state and its
armament, the military geography and statistics of the state which is to be
invaded, and, finally, the resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be
met with, all of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.

There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and that it
is indispensable to take them into consideration in the arrangement of all

plans. We propose to sketch the principal points which ought to guide in
this sort of combinations.

ARTICLE XI.
Military Statistics and Geography.

By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy with
whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all the
obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of the
permanent decisive points which may be presented in the whole extent of
the frontier or throughout the extent of the country. Besides the minister of
war, the commanding general and his chief of staff should be afforded this
information, under the penalty of cruel miscalculations in their plans, as
happens frequently in our day, despite the great strides civilized nations
have taken in statistical, diplomatic, geographical, and topographical
sciences. I will cite two examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796,
Moreau's army, entering the Black Forest, expected to find terrible
mountains, frightful defiles and forests, and was greatly surprised to
discover, after climbing the declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine,
that these, with their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country,
from the sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.

The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed
the interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,—whereas there is no
district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding it
has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.

All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to the
Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was given out
at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable barrier and
the palladium of the empire,—an error which I, having lived in the Alps,
did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply rooted, have led to the
belief that a people all the individuals of which are constantly armed would

constitute a formidable militia and would defend themselves to the last
extremity. Experience has proved that the old regulations which placed the
elite of the Janissaries in the frontier-cities of the Danube made the
population of those cities more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior.
In fact, the projects of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the
overthrow of the old system, and there was no time to replace it by the new:
so that the empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a
mere multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army
nor a national defense.

Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography and
statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in treatises, and are
yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon them, in describing
the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not fortunate in his maxims
and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he represents as
impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau,
where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed with armies of
one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and 1809.

But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the European
staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for instruction in
them,—at least for the special staff school. Awaiting the time when some
studious officer, profiting by those published and unpublished documents,
shall present Europe with a good military and strategic geography, we may,
thanks to the immense progress of topography of late years, partially supply
the want of it by the excellent charts published in all European countries
within the last twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution
topography was in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of
Cassini, the works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and
Prussian staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and Paris,
as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise to future
generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.

Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by a

state,—which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan operations.
Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important subjects, but to
indicate them, as facilitating success in military enterprises.

ARTICLE XII.
Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a
War.

As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to
allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this point
under the head of national wars.

On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his own
soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to
repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike susceptible of this spirit: the
springs of action and means, only, vary with the national character. Military
eloquence is one means, and has been the subject of many a treatise. The
proclamations of Napoleon and of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients
to their soldiers, and those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are
models of their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and
the miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires
confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army
and conducing to victory. Some dispute the advantages of this enthusiasm,
and prefer imperturbable coolness in battle. Both have unmistakable
advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm impels to the performance of
great actions: the difficulty is in maintaining it constantly; and, when
discouragement succeeds it, disorder easily results.

The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the armies
are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to rules. A
cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value of their
troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared with that of
the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly organized

troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against undisciplined
and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave may be its
individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order produces this
concert, and discipline insures order; and without discipline and order no
success is possible. The Russian general would not be so bold before
European troops having the same instruction and nearly the same discipline
as his own. Finally, a general may attempt with a Mack as his antagonist
what it would be madness to do with a Napoleon.

The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences the
boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are tied by
an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match for one who
has liberty of action, other things being equal.

As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of victory, all
other things being equal. It is true that great generals have often been beaten
by inferior ones; but an exception does not make a rule. An order
misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy
all the chances of success which a skillful general had prepared for himself
by his maneuvers. But these are risks which cannot be foreseen nor
avoided. Would it be fair on that account to deny the influence of science
and principles in ordinary affairs? This risk even proves the triumph of the
principles, for it happens that they are applied accidentally by the army
against which it was intended to apply them, and are the cause of its
success. But, in admitting this truth, it may be said that it is an argument
against science; this objection is not well founded, for a general's science
consists in providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and
of course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.

If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it will
readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of the most
delicate points in the science of government and one of the most essential
parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately, this choice is
influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party
spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest and

justice. This subject is so important that we will devote to it a separate
article.

FOOTNOTES:

[1]

Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of the
greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting
communication, &c., and may—as in the case of the French in
1812—make a retreat very disastrous.

ARTICLE XIII.
Military Institutions.

One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is the
nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a general of
ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with a good
general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal
more if its own superiority and that of the general be combined.

Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:—

1. To have a good recruiting-system;

2. A good organization;

8. A well-organized system of national reserves;

4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as
those of a campaign;

5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and
punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the
service;

6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;

7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;

8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
defensive and offensive arms;

9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of

its officers;

10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
administration;

11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the principal
operations of war;

12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.

To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of battle, it
nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the troops; and it is
always a great object to economize the lives and health of veterans.

None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in fifteen days
under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has often been seen of
how much advantage it is for a state to have a good army. It was the care
and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and instructing their phalanxes
and rendering them easy to move, and capable of the most rapid maneuvers,
which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate India and Persia with a
handful of choice troops. It was the excessive love of his father for soldiers
which procured for Frederick the Great an army capable of executing his
great enterprises.

A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing for it
success. We are far from saying that a government should sacrifice every
thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it ought to make the army
the object of its constant care; and if the prince has not a military education
it will be very difficult for him to fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case
—which is, unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence—the defect must be
supplied by wise institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good
system of the general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system
of national reserves.

There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle, it
cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form of
government exercises a great influence in the development of the military
strength of a nation and the value of its troops.

When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected by
local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and penurious
as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, whom very
many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a chief
devoted to all the national interests.

The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to this
deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most far-sighted
administration to prepare in advance for a great war, whether it be
demanded by the most important interests of the country at some future
time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist sudden aggressions.

In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members of
an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus, Pitts, or
Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the institutions
necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army to fall into
decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an exaggerated philanthropy,
may they not end in convincing themselves and their constituents that the
pleasures of peace are always preferable to the more statesmanlike
preparations for war?

I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean that
civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in a short
time,—that they should never be found unprepared. And the wisdom of
their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation as foresight in
their administration and the perfection of their system of military policy.

If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, governments
subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are less suitable than
others for the creation or preparation of a formidable military power,
nevertheless, in great crises these deliberative bodies have sometimes
attained very different results, and have concurred in developing to the full
extent the national strength. Still, the small number of such instances in
history makes rather a list of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and
violent assembly, placed under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has
profited by the extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country
and themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which overthrew
both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here it is the
dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of power, rather than
the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the true cause of the display
of energy. What happened in the Convention after the fall of Robespierre
and the terrible Committee of Public Safety proves this, as well as the
Chambers of 1815. Now, if the dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a
few, has always been a plank of safety in great crises, it seems natural to
draw the conclusion that countries controlled by elective assemblies must
be politically and militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other
respects they present decided advantages.

It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in the
interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to degenerate. It is
important to foster the military spirit in the armies, and to exercise them in
great maneuvers, which, though but faintly resembling those of actual war,
still are of decided advantage in preparing them for war. It is not less
important to prevent them from becoming effeminate, which may be done
by employing them in labors useful for the defense of the country.

The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
permanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. In general terms, the
Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and if in
many points its customs would be useless and impracticable elsewhere, it
must be admitted that many good institutions might well be copied from it.

As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service, and at
the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the promotions in
each grade should be made according to the roster, and the remaining fourth
reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On the contrary, in time
of war the regular order of promotion should be suspended, or at least
reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the other two-thirds for
brilliant conduct and marked services.

The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it
does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of success. Every
one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau and Marengo was
their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer to the great gain of the
heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the cuirass, which they had for
so long thrown aside. Every one knows the great advantage of the lance.
Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would not be more effectual than hussars,
but when charging in line it is a very different affair. How many brave
cavalry soldiers have been the victims of the prejudice they bore against the
lance because it was a little more trouble to carry than a saber!

The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the state
which shall take the lead in making them will secure great advantages.
There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the offensive and defensive
arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the attention of a provident
government.

The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone will
remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios and
Cæsars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature
of the arms and the organization of the troops.

The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.
[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it is said the

Austrians can now regulate,—the shrapnel howitzers, which throw a stream
of canister as far as the range of a bullet,—the Perkins steam-guns, which
vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,—will multiply the chances of

destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino, Leipsic, and
Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the European races.

If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these inventions
of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the half of an army
consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture with great rapidity
these machines; and the infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its armor
of the Middle Ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed before
engaging the enemy.

We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor, and
horses also will require the same protection.

While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is, however,
certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which should lead
us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused by Napoleon.
We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.

We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the military
policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.

1. The prince should receive an education both political and military. He
will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils than
good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the latter
himself.

2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his first duty
and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He must confide the
glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the general most capable of
directing his armies.

3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves,
which should always be prepared. Its instruction and discipline should be of
a high character, as well as its organization; its armament should at least be
as good as that of its neighbors, and superior if possible.

4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and abundant.
The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals. National jealousy
should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all improvements in this
matériel made in other countries.

5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
securing for the army men of merit and genius.

6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should be
furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all
statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for
the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief of this corps, with
a number of its officers, should be permanently stationed at the capital in
time of peace, and the war-office should be simply that of the general staff,
except that there should be a secret department for those documents to be
concealed from the subalterns of the corps.

7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their material and
moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the strategic advantages of
the two parties. Distinguished officers should be employed in these
scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they acquit themselves with
marked ability.

8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
entire plan of operations,—which is always impossible,—but a system of
operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well as all
the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the enterprise.

9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the war,
the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, the
characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of the army or of the
state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and material means of
attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action; and it

ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may obtain in
favor of or against either of the parties during the war.

10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the chances
of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute to this condition
the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great in the history of his
times. He was probably right at his epoch, when armies were chiefly
recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last crown brought the last
soldier; but when national levies are well organised money will no longer
exercise the same influence,—at least for one or two campaigns. If England
has proved that money will procure soldiers and auxiliaries, France has
proved that love of country and honor are equally productive, and that,
when necessary, war may be made to support war. France, indeed, in the
fertility of her soil and the enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of
temporary power which cannot be adopted as a general base of a system;
but the results of its efforts were none the less striking. Every year the
numerous reports of the cabinet of London, and particularly of M.
d'Yvernois, announced that France was about to break down for want of
money, while Napoleon had 200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the
Tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses of the government, including
the pay of his armies.

A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very badly.
History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the strongest nor the
happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military
strength. Still, we must admit that a happy combination of wise military
institutions, of patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and
public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best
capable of sustaining a long war.

A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, and to
determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This result
can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of the enemy;
and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing resources to an
assailant.

We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are not
directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our purpose to
indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be for the statesman to
develop the modifications which circumstances and localities may make in
these relations.

FOOTNOTES:

[2]

It will be recollected that the author wrote this many years ago,
since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery,
which he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone
important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small
arms is no less marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's
steam-guns; and as yet no civilized army has been organized upon
the plan the author suggests for depriving these destructive
machines of their efficiency.—TRANSLATORS.

[3]

There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall of
Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.

ARTICLE XIV.
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over
Operations.

Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by the
monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain that if
the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or Napoleon, he
will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of performing great
actions which he might do himself; for in this he would be untrue to his
own glory and to the well-being of the country.

As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate
for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a
philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will only state upon this
point that, with equal merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will
always have an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a
state. Leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to himself for
his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty he has of being able
to dispose of all the public resources for the attainment of his end. He also
possesses the powerful accessory of his favor, of recompenses and
punishments; all will be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to
insure for his enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with
the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and in
secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to induce a
prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and the contest be
of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no military ability, if his
character be feeble, and he be easily influenced, his presence with the army,
instead of producing good results, will open the way for all manner of
intrigues. Each one will present his projects to him; and, as he will not have
the experience necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will
submit his judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with

and opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if
he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the contrary,
aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his presence might
be productive of good results, but it also might lead to great embarrassment.
If the army were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged to
extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not follow from the
presence of the sovereign at head-quarters!

When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the Prussian
government with Blücher,—viz.; he should be accompanied by two
generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, the
other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be harmonious, it may
yield excellent results, as in the case of the army of Silesia in 1813.

The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently
happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred that the prince
possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality
commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with the Duke of
Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward with the Duke
of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I think, also at
Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is deplorable,
since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known that at the battle of
Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity than Marsin, and it
became necessary for the latter to show full secret authority from the king
before the prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost.
So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than Mack, who
was to be his mentor.

If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles, he
should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same titles to
command, he may then be provided with an educated general of the staff,
and another general distinguished for his talent in execution; but in no case

will it be wise to invest either of these counselors with more authority than
a voice in consultation.

We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in person,
his most important duty will be to have the position of commander well
filled,—which, unfortunately, is not always done. Without going back to
ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the more modern examples under
Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince Eugene was estimated by his
deformed figure, and this drove him (the ablest commander of his time) into
the ranks of the enemy. After Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi
filled the places of Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently
Soubise and Clermont succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable
selections made in the Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and
Napoleon's preference for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the
margin is wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means of
making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will
exercise an influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off
the prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be profitable to
inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even
when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a judicious one. In the
first place, to make choice of a skillful general requires either that the
person who makes the selection shall be a military man, able to form an
intelligent opinion, or that he should be guided by the opinions of others,
which opens the way to the improper influence of cliques. The
embarrassment is certainly less when there is at hand a general already
illustrious by many victories; but, outside of the fact that every general is
not a great leader because he has gained a battle, (for instance, Jourdan,
Scherer, and many others,) it is not always the case that a victorious general
is at the disposition of the government. It may well happen that after a long
period of peace, there may not be a single general in Europe who has
commanded in chief. In this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one
general is better than another. Those who have served long in peace will be
at the head of their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it? Moreover,
the intercourse of the heads of a government with their subordinates is
generally so rare and transient, that it is not astonishing they should

experience difficulty in assigning men to their appropriate positions. The
judgment of the prince, misled by appearances, may err, and, with the
purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his selections.

One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding a
faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the prince
and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his more
direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in reference to
selections of individuals best recommended by their character and abilities.
But will this faithful friend never yield to personal affections? Will he be
always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was rejected by Potemkin on account
of his appearance, and it required all the art of Catherine to secure a
regiment for the man who afterward shed so much luster upon the Russian
arms.

It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing could
be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cæsar, when he was
ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte at
the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two directors?
Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be
despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the experience of events.

The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:—First,
A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions; Secondly, A physical
courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military
acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though
if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It is not necessary that he should
be a man of vast erudition. His knowledge may be limited, but it should be
thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base
of the art of war. Next in importance come the qualities of his personal
character. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming
merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this
merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may
even pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always
jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of little ability,

fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing that the nominal
commander of an army always receives almost all the glory of its success,
even when least entitled to it.

The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to assign to
the command a general of long experience in service with troops, or an
officer of the staff, having generally but little experience in the management
of troops. It is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and
that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations skillfully without
ever having led a regiment against an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé,
Frederick, and Napoleon are instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that
an officer from the staff may as well as any other prove to be a great
general, but it will not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a
quartermaster that he will be capable of the supreme command, but because
he has a natural genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics.
So, also, a general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as
capable of conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this
question does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of the
individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to a rational
conclusion:—

1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has
commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal chances, be
superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special
corps.

2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will
be equally fitted for the command.

3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
commander-in-chief.

Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the requisite
personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the principles of the
art of war.

The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of
a good general staff, which being near the general may advise him, and thus
exercise a beneficial influence over the operations. A well-instructed
general staff is one of the most useful of organizations; but care must be
observed to prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this
case it might prove fatal.

Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General Ruchel,[4]
and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for gaining all
battles. How true it is that there is but a step from the sublime to the
ridiculous!

Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and his
chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man of recognized
ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice of the men who are to
be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to create
anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select a cipher for
that position would be still more dangerous; for if he be himself a man of
little ability, indebted to favor or fortune for his station, the selection will be
of vital importance. The best means to avoid these dangers is to give the
general the option of several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.

It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent
councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if the
commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find in a
council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of the
opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his own
conception?

I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and no
one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and
it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. The greater

the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the
council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and
reason, however small be the amount of dissent.

What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting them;
and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been executed by
any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures?

In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful
only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they
may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may
assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use every means to
insure the success of the movement. This is the only advantage of a council
of war, which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no further
authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should be difference of
opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results.

Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of organizing
the command of an army, in default of a general approved by experience, is
—

1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of
unshaken firmness in danger.

2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to the
friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher, aided by
Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have
been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command is more
objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon, a
Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great general to lead
the armies it is certainly the preferable system.

Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
influencing military operations—viz.: that of a council of war at the seat of
government—deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed from Paris
the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also, from Paris
directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and saved France;
in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired his faults
afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at fault. It is to be
observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot individually controlled
the armies, and that there was no council of war. The Aulic council, sitting
in Vienna, was often intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of
the armies; and there has never been but one opinion in Europe as to its
fatal influence. Whether this opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian
generals alone are able to decide. My own opinion is that the functions of
such a body in this connection should be limited to the adoption of a
general plan of operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace
out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to
give battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether
offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these first
enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may
be necessary if the country be invaded. These points, it is true, should be
discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to these points
should the control of the council be limited; for if it should not only order
the general in command to march to Vienna or to Paris, but should also
have the presumption to indicate the manner in which he should maneuver
to attain this object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and
the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of
those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
directing the army,—a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the scene of
operations.

FOOTNOTES:

[4]

General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could save the
army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in

order to form an oblique line.

ARTICLE XV.
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.

The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army would
be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a military
spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London, situated on an island
and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich
banker should be preferred to a military decoration; but a continental nation
imbued with the sentiments and habits of the tradesmen of London or the
bankers of Paris would sooner or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to
the union of the civic virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions
that the Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor as
well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls, the fall of
the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that whatever increases
the prosperity of the country should be neither neglected nor despised; it is
also necessary to honor the branches of industry which are the first
instruments of this prosperity; but they should always be secondary to the
great institutions which make up the strength of states in encouraging the
cultivation of the manly and heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on
this point; for, whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to
confront death in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the public
miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. Misfortune
will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the
greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public estimation, above the uniform of
the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the defense of his
country.

The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with
all possible social and public consideration. The second means is to give the
preference to those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any

vacancies in the administrative departments of the government, or even to
require a certain length of military service as a qualification for certain
offices. A comparison of the ancient military institutions of Rome with
those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it
would also be interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern
theorists, who declare against the employment of officers of the army in
other public functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the
important offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public
employments demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in
the abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession of
arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers retired
from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would it not be a
stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them, when
in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than in the theaters and
public clubs?

It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to the civil
service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high military spirit,
and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient to place the
profession of the soldier above all others. This was the early practice of the
Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were bought at the age of about
seven years, and were educated in the idea that they were to die by their
standards. Even the English—so jealous of their rights—contract, in
enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for the whole length of their lives, and
the Russian, in enlisting for twenty-five years, does what is almost
equivalent. In such armies, and in those recruited by voluntary enlistments,
perhaps it would not be advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil
offices; but where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the
people, the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a
previous military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military spirit,—
particularly in this age, when the attainment of material comfort and
prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.

However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of government, it
will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in order to encourage

the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under the penalty of receiving
the reproaches of posterity and suffering insult and dependency.

It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people, but, more
than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of what avail would it
be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be regarded as a duty to
serve in the army, while the military virtues are wanting? The forces would
be numerous but without valor.

The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite different
things, and should not be confounded, although they produce the same
effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a temporary
character,—of a political or religious nature, for instance, or of a great love
of country; while the latter, depending upon the skill of the commander and
resulting from military institutions, is more permanent and depends less
upon circumstances, and should be the object of the attention of every far-
seeing government.[6] Courage should be recompensed and honored, the
different grades in rank respected, and discipline should exist in the
sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only.

The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and faithful
attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is possible, no army is
respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is more honorable than
enthusiasm in success,—since courage alone is necessary to storm a
position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat before a
victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposing to him a firm and
unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet with a reward equal to that given
for a great victory.

By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation in
garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over their
enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a love for
great exploits,—in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by every means in
harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage, punishing
weakness, and disgracing cowardice,—we may expect to maintain a high
military spirit.

Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in the
times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too heavy
in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was lost.

I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for the
enemy, lest the morale of the soldier should be shaken if he encounter an
obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes' troops, praised
the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would contend in vain against
the bayonets of his Egyptians.

The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics which
often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled by
discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the surest
hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred thousand
Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at Kagoul by
Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly charges, every
one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they fought individually,
but not in masses and in order. An army seized with panic is similarly in a
state of demoralization; because when disorder is once introduced all
concerted action on the part of individuals becomes impossible, the voice of
the officers can no longer be heard, no maneuver for resuming the battle can
be executed, and there is no resource but in ignominious flight.

Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics; and
nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy it. Even
the French, whose military virtues when well led have never been
questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle of
Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after the
victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still more
extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen hundred
strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two days
afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most vigorous
assaults mentioned in modern history.

Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.

In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others. The
firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal degrees to the
national character, the natural instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent
disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity of imagination is not always the
cause of the introduction of disorder: the want of the habit of order often
causes it, and the lack of precautions on the part of the generals to maintain
this order contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference
of most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments or
scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the rallying in each
division of the fractions which may be scattered in a momentary panic or in
an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were offended that any one
should think of proposing such precautions. Still, the most undoubted
courage and the most severe discipline will often be powerless to remedy a
great disorder, which might be in a great degree obviated by the use of
rallying-signals for the different divisions. There are, it is true, cases where
all human resources are insufficient for the maintenance of order, as when
the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been so great as to render them
deaf to all appeals, and when their officers find it impossible to do any thing
to organize them,—which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out
these exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not in
preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.

It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to trace an
outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which are purely
military.

FOOTNOTES:

[5]

For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers from the
privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature.
The most venal deputies will not be those from military life.

[6]

It is particularly important that this spirit should pervade the
officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable, and
the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.

CHAPTER III.
STRATEGY.

DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of
five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the
different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three
branches, and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the
order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences
with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and
afterward descends to the necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins
with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for
the formation and handling of a great army.

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander
should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war:
then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable
base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and
those of its allies.

The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone of
operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will select the
line of operations leading to this point, either as a temporary or permanent
line, giving it the most advantageous direction; namely, that which promises
the greatest number of favorable opportunities with the least danger. An
army marching on this line of operations will have a front of operations and
a strategic front. The temporary positions which the corps d'armée will
occupy upon this front of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be
strategic positions.

When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet resistance,
the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel him to retreat;
and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which,
being temporary, may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of
operations, with which they must not be confounded.

To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, lines of
supply, depots, &c. will be established.

If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in annoying
proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and dispersed or be
merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may be carried on
without reference to them. If the second of these courses be pursued, a
double strategic front and large detachments will be the result.

The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will be
resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective point or
will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective point be the
possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. If the army
be not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching a sufficient
force to maintain the siege, it will take a strategic position to cover it, as did
the army of Italy in 1796, which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not
pass Mantua to enter Austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within
its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the double line of the
Tyrol and Frioul.

If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it have
no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more important
objective point.

If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point
of support. One or more secure cities already occupied will form an
eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve may be
established, which will protect the rear and also the depots by temporary
fortifications. When the army crosses large streams, it will construct têtes
de pont; and, if the bridges are within walled cities, earth-works will be

thrown up to increase the means of defense and to secure the safety of the
eventual base or the strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.

Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in order to be
reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is equivalent, to
strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus
compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.

When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the field
will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and is
desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not differ
from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and
energy to attain prompt success.

Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while
discussing combinations which result from these operations.

Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:—

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different
combinations of which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the
most favorable direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
operations.

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers
necessary to embrace all possible cases.

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
army.

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an
obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.

12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont, &c.

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

These points are principally of importance in the determination of the first
steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed nature, such
as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter
quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and
arrangement to strategy.

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art
of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps,
and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of
strategical and tactical enterprises.

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the
means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.
Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand
tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.

It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, and
have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in the

exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of pitched battles
the above definition holds good.

Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the following
objects:—

1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.

2. The offensive in a defensive battle.

3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
attack of the enemy's line.

4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.

5. Surprises of armies in the open field.

6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.

7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.

8. Coups de main.

All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, skirmishes
of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and any thing
accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be regarded as
details of war, and not included in the great operations.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the
operations of war,—a principle which must be followed in all good
combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:—

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon
the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of
the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
one's forces.

3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive
point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first
importance to overthrow.

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
energy.

This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one objection is
that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the forces upon the
decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in recognizing those points.

This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article XIX.
these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from XVIII. to XXII.
will be discussed their relations to the different combinations. Those
students who, having attentively considered what is there stated, still regard
the determination of these points as a problem without a solution, may well
despair of ever comprehending strategy.

The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three zones,—
the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of operations,
strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each line of battle, has the
same subdivisions,—two extremities and the center. A direction upon one of
these three will always be suitable for the attainment of the desired end. A
direction upon one of the two remaining will be less advantageous; while
the third direction will be wholly inapplicable. In considering the object
proposed in connection with the positions of the enemy and the geography
of the country, it will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical
maneuver the question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to
the right, to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of strategy,
although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive talent, skill, energy,

and a quick apprehension of events are necessary to carry out any
combinations previously arranged.

We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy and
tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that,
with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses
resulted from an adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a
neglect of it in the other.

OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.

ARTICLE XVI.
Of the System of Operations.

War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it shall
be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant by these
terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a great state, the
whole or a large portion of whose territory is attacked, it is an invasion; if a
province only, or a line of defense of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the
ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's
position, and is confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
initiative. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly always
advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the assailant's
country from devastation, increases his resources and diminishes those of
his enemy, elevates the morale of his army, and generally depresses the
adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion excites the ardor and energy
of the adversary,—particularly when he feels that the independence of his
country is threatened.

In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad side.
Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are
always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in the enemy's
country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense,
while the inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being the
instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile. However, if success
be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital point: he is deprived of his
resources and compelled to seek a speedy termination of the contest.

For a single operation, which we have called the taking the initiative, the
offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly in strategy. Indeed, if
the art of war consists in throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to
do this it will be necessary to take the initiative. The attacking party knows
what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his masses to the point

where he desires to strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere
anticipated: the enemy fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he
neither knows where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what
manner to repel him.

Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party taking
the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect his
designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.

The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which account
the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are about equally
balanced.

Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
defensive before it ends.

A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive defense
is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. The object
of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the country
threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to retard his
progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and
difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own army. He who
invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then seek to make
the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the contrary, desires delay
till his adversary is weakened by sending off detachments, by marches, and
by the privations and fatigues incident to his progress.

An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or artificial
barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying obstacles in the way
of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an extreme, promises many
chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to
make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive

whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on the contrary,
redouble his activity, and be constantly upon the alert to improve all
opportunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy. This plan of war
may be called the defensive-offensive, and may have strategical as well as
tactical advantages.. It combines the advantages of both systems; for one
who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field, with all his own resources
in hand, surrounded by all the advantages of being on his own ground, can
with hope of success take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and
where to strike.

During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was the
assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of the
defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by his
adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course was
mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest talents
of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these two
systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during the progress
of a defensive war.

ARTICLE XVII.
Of the Theater of Operations.

The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties may
assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker
states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. When the
war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres,—as has
happened in contests between France and England since the time of Louis
XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must, not be
confounded with the theater of operations of one or the other army. The
theater of a continental war between France and Austria may be confined to
Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the German States take part
therein.

Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole theater
of operations may be considered as a single field upon which strategy
directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the second case
each army will have its own independent theater of operations. The theater
of operations of an army embraces all the territory it may desire to invade
and all that it may be necessary to defend. If the army operates
independently, it should not attempt any maneuver beyond its own theater,
(though it should leave it if it be in danger of being surrounded,) since the
supposition is that no concert of action has been arranged with the armies
operating on the other fields. If, on the contrary, there be concert of action,
the theater of operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of
operations of the general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of
a common object.

Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one or
more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:—

1. Of a fixed base of operations.

2. Of a principal objective point.

3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.

4. Of zones and lines of operations.

5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.

6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
enemy.

7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, either
for the offensive or defensive.

8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
point and the primary base.

9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.

For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria with two
or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and starting from
Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime Alps,
respectively. The section of country which each of these armies traverses
may be considered as a zone of the general field of operations. But if the
army of Italy goes but to the Adige without concerted action with the army
of the Rhine, then what was before but a zone becomes for that army a
theater of operations.

In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point,
its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the
base, either in the offensive or the defensive.

It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations par
excellence. Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to move the
army within the range of its operations, and at least one line of retreat,
rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of maneuver. It would
be much more accurate to say that rivers are excellent lines of supply, and

powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of a good line of operations, but
never the line itself.

It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly to be
a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because they
facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities for
manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these points must
be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a desert, to be
molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an individual, commercial
cities and centers of trade would spring up, and the roads would again
necessarily converge to these points. Moreover, was not the Archduke
Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use of converging routes?
Besides, these routes are more favorable for defense than attack, since two
divisions retreating upon these radial lines can effect a junction more
quickly than two armies which are pursuing, and they may thus united
defeat each of the pursuing masses separately.

Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in strategic
positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, these points are
more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also that if more rare they
are more important and more decisive.

Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the Rhetian
Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his foot."

Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have united
with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of carrying on a
defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of partisan and
regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the heights and to harass
the enemy, the second to give battle at the decisive points,—the junctions of
the large valleys.

These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many points
that admit of discussion.

The most important topographical or artificial features which make up the
theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be examined as
to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to remark that this value
will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the general. The great leader
who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the passage of the Splugen was
far from believing in the impregnability of these chains; but he was also far
from thinking that a muddy rivulet and a walled inclosure could change his
destiny at Waterloo.

ARTICLE XVIII.
Bases of Operations.

A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army obtains
its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the
offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported
when it takes position to cover the country defensively.

The base of operations is most generally that of supply,—though not
necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, a French
army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or Franconia, but
its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.

When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line of
defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always be
prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its own
country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a vast
difference between those parts of the country without military positions and
means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those other portions
where these military resources are found; and these latter alone can be
considered as safe bases of operations. An army may have in succession a
number of bases: for instance, a French army in Germany will have the
Rhine for its first base; it may have others beyond this, wherever it has
allies or permanent lines of defense; but if it is driven back across the Rhine
it will have for a base either the Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third
upon the Seine, and a fourth upon the Loire.

These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the first. On
the contrary, a total change of direction may become necessary. A French
army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good base on Béfort or
Besançon, on Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian army after the evacuation

of Moscow left the base on the north and east and established itself upon
the line of the Oka and the southern provinces. These lateral bases
perpendicular to the front of defense are often decisive in preventing the
enemy from penetrating to the heart of the country, or at least in rendering it
impossible for him to maintain himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid
river, both banks being held by strong works, would be as favorable as
could be desired.

The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in covering it;
but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from it. A state whose
capital is too near the frontier cannot have so favorable a base in a
defensive war as one whose capital is more retired.

A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of sufficient
capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There should be a tête de
pont upon each of its unfordable streams.

All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to that of
the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are
more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides almost
perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a
double base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides of the
strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any
change of the line of operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may
necessitate.

The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
Operations:—

"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
consequently, upon the direction of the bases.

Fig. 1.

"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
may hold one of these faces,—perhaps two,—while the enemy
occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762,
and that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in
Fig. 1, p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D
the line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the
line of the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of
the Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two
faces, the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only
necessary for them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be
masters of the four faces, including the base and the
communications of the enemy. The French army, starting from its
base C D and gaining the front of operations F G H, could cut off
the allied army I from its base B D; the latter would be thrown
upon the angle A, formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Ems, and
the sea, while the army E could communicate with its bases on
the Main and Rhine.

"The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by
Halle and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea,
represented by the side A B. The result is well known.

"The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them such
directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and
the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the
communications with the base C D; and this is exactly the
maneuvers of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena.

Fig. 2.

"When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is
always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its
frontiers and closes one side of the square. This may not be an
obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be
considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to
retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the
enemy upon it. The soil of a power which can bring into the field
one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be
violated with impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt,

it would be none the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of
the theater of war should be the territory of a weak state, it would
be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it
reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of
the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to
make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,—as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of
the Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier
of Franconia."

The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the French
army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense advantages which
the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded Napoleon, and turned
the advantages of the campaign in their favor. Likewise, in 1812, by
establishing their base perpendicularly upon the Oka and Kalouga, the
Russians were able to execute their flank march upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.

If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only be
necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of the enemy,
the front of operations will be parallel to his line of operations, and that
hence it will be easy to attack his communications and line of retreat.

It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable in the
case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may object to this that
it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are
salient toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with
equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The objection is not well founded; for the
greatest advantage of a perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms
such a salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations.
On the other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both
should be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be

sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, while
the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,—as was done in the
campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety degrees formed by
the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and thence to Kehl, gave
General Moreau one base parallel and another perpendicular to that of his
antagonist. He threw two divisions by his left toward Kehl on the first base,
to attract the attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine
divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen,
which carried him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached
divisions having already rejoined him.

In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main, forming
almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first and parallel
one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the extremity of the
perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians at Gera and
Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.

If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is well to
recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be partially
supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in Article XX.

Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of bases
relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be favorable
in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be
readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always exist of an
army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of the establishment
of the base upon it, (which bases can only be favorable to naval powers,)
that it is astonishing to hear in our day praises of such a base. Wellington,
coming with a fleet to the relief of Spain and Portugal, could not have
secured a better base than that of Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of
Torres-Vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on the land side.
The sea and the Tagus not only protected both flanks, but secured the safety
of his only possible line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.

Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many
generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good except such

as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of supply and refuge
with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar notions, Colonel Carion-
Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to have posted half of his army
in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on the mouths
of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that the first precept for a
continental army is to establish its base upon the front farthest from the sea,
so as to secure the benefit of all its elements of strength, from which it
might find itself cut off if the base were established upon the coast.

An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, viz.: to
establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the
resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat.

A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty or
fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its supplies
could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of one hundred
and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined
and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.

However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it may
be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when your
adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master of the
sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. We rarely
see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the Turkish war of
1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was given to Varna and
Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan which they could not
have pursued in the presence of a European army (even with the control of
the sea) without great danger of ruin.

Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon the fate
of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army covered
itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and Silistria, and
afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as its base was well
established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously would have been
madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army

not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have terminated with
the first campaign.

Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or temporary
bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's country; but, as these
are rather temporary points of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be
discussed in Article XXIII.

ARTICLE XIX.
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of
War, and Objective Points of Operations.

Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this title
simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: these are
permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value from the
relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to
the enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic points
of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there are points which have only a
secondary importance, and others whose importance is constant and
immense: the latter are called DECISIVE strategic points.

Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether
from its position as a center of communication, or from the presence of
military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical strategic point.

A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily be a
strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated operation. I
think differently; for a strategic point is such essentially and by nature, and,
no matter how far distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it
may be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus
acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more accurate to state that all
strategic points are not necessarily decisive points.

Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from their
relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided as
follows,—viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which have
value merely because they connect two strategic points.

To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in their
relations to maneuvers,—confining ourselves here to what relates to the
decisive and objective points of the zone of operations upon which
enterprises occur.

Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective point
ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater of war, there
is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all decisive points cannot be
at the same time the objective of operations. We will, then, define the first,
in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the second.

I think the name of decisive strategic point should be given to all those
which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of
the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose geographical
position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or
defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this
number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first
rank among them.

The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first are the
geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the case
of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the Meuse will
have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the country; for his
adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the Meuse and the North
Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel to
that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the Danube presents a series of important
points which have caused it to be looked upon as the key of Southern
Germany.

Those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction
of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a
country are also decisive geographic points. For instance, Lyons is an
important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the Rhone and
Saône, and is at the center of communications between France and Italy and
between the South and East; but it would not be a decisive point unless well
fortified or possessing an extended camp with têtes de pont. Leipsic is most

certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,—if a
country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive point.

All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only
centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government.

In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit
practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any
enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the importance of
the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in 1800.

The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.

When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian
army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was
Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him
he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same position,
expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army
of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not
Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this would
take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off
from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the
Main. In the same campaign the first objective point of Napoleon was to
fall upon the right of Mélas by the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of
communications: hence Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive
points only by reason of the march of Mélas upon Nice.

It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces
without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to the sea is
always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy
upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and

inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut
it off from the fleet.

If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more
divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
separately.

The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,—

1. The features of the ground.

2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.

3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.

These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.

OBJECTIVE POINTS.

There are two classes of objective points,—objective points of maneuver,
and geographical objective points. A geographical objective point may be
an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords
good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises.
Objective points of maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical
objectives, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon,
the situation of the hostile masses.

In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this
aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or
that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a
war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. However, the
geographical position of the capital, the political relations of the belligerents
with their neighbors, and their respective resources, are considerations
foreign in themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately connected
with plans of operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt

or not to occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the
capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For instance,
if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the first objective
point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the second, Mantua and the
line of the Adige. In the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that
which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to be defended.
The capital, being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal
objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense
of a first line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be to
prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in
Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in
besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first base of
operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,—which might be attained by a
lateral defense as well as one in front.

As to the objective points of maneuvers,—that is, those which relate
particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces,—their
importance may be seen by what has already been said. The greatest talent
of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good
choice of these points. This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon.
Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two
points or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced
that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and
destroy the hostile army,—since states and provinces fall of themselves
when there is no organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the
relative advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if
his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could
more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to
pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces,—such was the
system followed by Napoleon in his first campaigns. These campaigns
proved this system to be one of the very best.

When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as in
Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is not
suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances of success
are still very great, and it is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the
system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is
assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the respective
conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states.

The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are almost
entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and in what
will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines of operations.

As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend upon
the aim of the war and the character which political or other circumstances
may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of the two parties.

In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be
prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,—such as the
capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. In other
cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring
great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did
Napoleon.

The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they could
not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five hundred
leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to be lost by
failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by success.

There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans
of cabinets. They may be called political objective points.

Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often

very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great errors in
strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the Duke of York to
Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the
allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence this objective
point was bad in a military view. The expedition of the same prince to
Holland in 1799—likewise due to the views of the English cabinet,
sustained by the intentions of Austria on Belgium—was not less fatal; for it
led to the march of the Archduke Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,—a
step quite contrary to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was
undertaken. These illustrations prove that political objective points should
be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
attained.

This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to
attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given has just
been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be
selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should
be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign. Applying this
rule to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at Cambray or in
the heart of France that Dunkirk should have been conquered in 1793 and
Holland delivered in 1799; in other words, by uniting all the strength of the
allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions
of this kind are generally included in grand diversions,—to be treated of in
a separate article.

FOOTNOTES:

[7]

I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,—since a line
cannot be a point, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive or
objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that objective
points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
attain.

[8]

This only applies to continental armies, and not to the English,
who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have
nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.

ARTICLE XX.
Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and
Strategic Positions.

There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble each
other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently confounded,
although they are decidedly distinct. Such are fronts of operations, strategic
fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions. It is proposed in this article
to show the distinction between them and to expose their relations to each
other.

FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.

When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
toward the enemy is called the strategic front. The portion of the theater of
war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two or three
marches is called the front of operations.

The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.

Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed by
the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the other
embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or two
marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes the
ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.

When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will undertake to

prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the strategic front or
more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line of defense may coincide,
as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the Rhine, which was then a line of
defense for both Austrians and French, and at the same time their strategic
front and front of operations. This occasional coincidence of these lines
doubtless leads persons to confound them, while they are really very
different. An army has not necessarily a line of defense, as, for example,
when it invades: when its masses are concentrated in a single position, it
has no strategic front, but it is never without a front of operations.

The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
different terms.

At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations
extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the line
of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at Löwenberg,) and
followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His forces were
stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose strategic positions were
interior and central and presented three different faces. Subsequently, he
retired behind the Elbe. His real line of defense then extended only from
Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to the rear toward Marienberg, for
Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the strategic field, and it would have
been fatal for him to have extended his operations to these points.

The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
positions.

The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies, and
upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of operations.
The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought to be
perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend far enough
on either flank to cover this line well. However, this direction may vary,
either on account of projects that are formed, or on account of the attacks of
the enemy; and it quite frequently happens that it is necessary to have a

front perpendicular to the base and parallel to the original line of operations.
Such a change of strategic front is one of the most important of all grand
maneuvers, for by this means the control of two faces of the strategic field
may be obtained, thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it
possessed a base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)

The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made the
Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew, from
whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka, to
maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the Baltic. In
such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be obtained, the
strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It ought to be borne
in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always be sure of regaining
its temporary base if necessary; in other words, that this base should be
prolonged behind the strategic front, and should be covered by it. Napoleon,
marching from the Narew by Allenstein upon Eylau, had behind his left
Thorn, and farther from the front of the army the tête de pont of Praga and
Warsaw; so that his communications were safe, while Benningsen, forced to
face him and to make his line parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from
his base, and be thrown back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon
executed another very remarkable change of strategic front in his march
from Gera upon Jena and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in
moving by his right upon Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and
France, and thereby forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.

The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the base may
be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' duration, or it
may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by important advantages
afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the
army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which would be
almost equivalent to a real base.

It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic front,
either by the features of the theater of war, or because every line of
offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an example of the
first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In order to cross the

Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to present a double front,—
in the first case, to face the valley of the Danube; in the second, to confront
forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.

All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the same
precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require a double
front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops into the Tyrol or
Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries which present a
narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on
the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be cut off
and captured. This necessity of double strategic fronts is one of the most
serious inconveniences of an offensive war, since it requires large
detachments, which are always dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)

Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national or
intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. Nevertheless,
each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would have its own
strategic front determined by the features of the country and the positions
occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in Catalonia and
Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some
other corps of the army was not clearly defined.

LINES OF DEFENSE.

Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical lines of
defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of defense,
which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a
fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the
temporary position of an army.

The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a well-
connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as ranges of
mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of the Alps between
France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the practicable passes are
guarded by forts which would prove great obstacles in the way of an army,

and since the outlets of the gorges in the valleys of Piedmont are protected
by large fortresses. The Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe may also be
considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the important forts
found upon them.

Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and every
defile, having their weak points covered by temporary fortifications, may be
regarded as eventual lines of defense, both strategic and tactical, since they
may arrest for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to
deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker point,—in which case the
advantage is evidently strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines
present an evident tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to
drive an army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other hand, this
advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should fall into the
system of positions which has been the ruin of so many armies; for,
whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain
that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his
adversary will finally yield.[9] In addition to this, since a position naturally
very strong[10] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the
enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding
all the outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
Wurmser in Mantua.

STRATEGIC POSITIONS.

There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may
be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle.

Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to
cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line of
defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and
Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in Saxony and Silesia

in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The positions of the Anglo-
Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligny,
(1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar in 1799, were also
strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and
not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions,—for instance,
Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily positions taken up by an army
beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to
deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class.

This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position of a
detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on
another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large detachments or fractions of
an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions.

The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines
of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a multitude of
circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.

In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with the
different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.

In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense
should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial
obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of support on the
strategic front are called pivots of operations, and are practical temporary
bases, but quite different from pivots of maneuver. For example, in 1796
Verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all Napoleon's enterprises
about Mantua for eight months. In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.

Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which it
is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the fulfillment of
some important end; and when this is accomplished the pivot of maneuver
ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of Napoleon's maneuver by
Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line of retreat. A pivot of
operations, on the contrary, is a material point of both strategical and

tactical importance, serves as a point of support and endures throughout a
campaign.

The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as short
as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if it is
compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the extent of the
strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the prompt concentration
of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous point.

The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it be too
contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to make
strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a short front
could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither should the front of
operations be too extended. Such a front is unsuitable for offensive
operations, as it would give the enemy, if not a good line of defense, at least
ample space to escape from the results of a strategic maneuver even if well
planned. Thus, the beautiful operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could
not have produced the same results upon a theater of the magnitude of that
of the Russian War in 1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of
retreat, could have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.

The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should be
more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army should
have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the intervention of the
enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or interior positions would
be preferable to exterior ones, since the front in the latter case would
necessarily be more extended and would lead to a dangerous division of
force. Great mobility and activity on the part of the troops occupying these
positions will be a strong element of security or of superiority over the
enemy, since it renders possible rapid concentration at different and
successive points of the front.

An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy when
he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon prepared the
fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of Waterloo, and the
Archduke Charles that of Wagram.

When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal faces,
so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for all the
divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an attack.

Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon
which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. For
instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able to occupy in
force the whole line, ought always to have a position in rear of the center
selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so as to oppose them united
to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting a passage.

For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation or of
temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however brilliant may
have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of defense as a refuge in
case of reverse. This remark is made to complete the subject: the lines
themselves are intimately connected with temporary bases, and will be
discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)

FOOTNOTES:

[9]

This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.

[10]

It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of positions for
battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter devoted to Grand
Tactics, (Article XXX.)

ARTICLE XXI.
Zones and Lines of Operations.

A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which
may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act
singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For example, in the
plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the right, Bavaria that of
the center, Franconia that of the left army.

A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single line of operations,
either on account of the configuration of the country, or of the small number
of practicable routes for an army found therein. Generally, however, a zone
presents several lines of operations, depending partly upon the plans of the
campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of communication
existing in the theater of operations.

It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a line of
operations,—though doubtless it may happen that any good road in a
certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; but as
long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of
the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of operations.
Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to the same front of
operations, and separated by one or two marches, would not constitute so
many lines of operations, but, being the communications of the different
divisions of the same army, the whole space bounded by them would
constitute but a single line.

The term zone of operations is applied to a large fraction of the general
theater of war; the term lines of operations will designate the part of this
fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single
or several routes, the term strategic lines will apply to those important lines
which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with

each other or with the front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give
this name to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these
decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. Lines of
communications designate the practicable routes between the different
portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of
operations.

For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand Coalition,
three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and another Italy:
so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden, Magdeburg, and
Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the forces. This zone
had three lines of operations leading to Leipsic as an objective: the first was
the line of the army of Bohemia, leading from the mountains of Erzgebirge
by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic; the second was the line of the army
of Silesia, going from Breslau by Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic;
the third was that of Bernadotte from Berlin by Dessau to the same
objective point. Each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent
parallel routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of
operations as roads. The principal line of operations is that followed by the
bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and
other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.

If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive combinations,
since there can never be more than two or three zones on each theater, and
the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different
with lines of operations, as they are divided into different classes, according
to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the
communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by
the commander.

Simple lines of operations are those of an army acting from a frontier when
it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.

Double lines of operations are those of two independent armies proceeding
from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are

commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and
for long intervals of time.[11]

Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two armies to
oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general
can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter
period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a
greater force.[12] Exterior lines lead to the opposite result, and are those
formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the
enemy, or against several of his masses.

Concentric lines of operations are those which depart from widely-
separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind
the base.

Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave a given point to
move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a
subdivision of the army.

There are also deep lines, which are simply long lines.

The term maneuver-lines I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
confounded with the real lines of operations.

Secondary lines are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other
mutual support,—as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
was secondary to that of Barclay.

Accidental lines are those brought about by events which change the
original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully recognized
only by a great and active mind.

There may be, in addition, provisional and definitive lines of operations.
The first designate the line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive
enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or direct

line. They seem to belong as much to the class of temporary or eventual
strategic lines as to the class of lines of operations.

These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than that
arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter has even
asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of
operations.

The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of Dusseldorf or
any other point of this frontier, and that their large depots are immediately
behind the river,—certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous
position for them which could possibly be adopted. These armies will have
an offensive or defensive object: hence they will certainly have lines of
operations, arising from the different proposed enterprises.

1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will extend
to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both be cut off
from this second line should the enemy establish himself in the interval
which separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] had possessed a year's
supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off from his
base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy occupied the line of the
Po.

2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated his
forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double exterior
line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided his forces into
two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all
his forces before the two armies first referred to could unite.

Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than when
on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of support and some
of the advantages which are sought for in the establishment of lines of
operations; it may even lose its line of operations without incurring great
danger; but that is no reason why it has no line of operations.

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN
THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included in
the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it being too
remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. The real theater
extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three zones of
operations,—the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue to Landau,
and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the interval between the
Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the frontier from Givet to
Dunkirk.

When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in Belgium.
It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not conquer this
country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. Four months
intervened between the declaration of war and the concentration of the
allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion of Belgium would have
prevented that of Champagne, and have given the King of Prussia a
conception of the strength of France, and induced him not to sacrifice his
armies for the secondary object of imposing upon France another form of
government?

When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the French
were no longer able to invade. This rôle was reserved for the allies; and it is
well known how they acquitted themselves.

The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
leagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a good
defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was only
necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in favor of this
plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could only be attained by

rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the Moselle and Meuse,
which was the center, was less fortified than the rest of the frontier, and,
besides, gave the allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of
Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the
execution was not equal to the conception.

The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family reasons,
as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might subject her
provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand, Austria co-operated
only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five thousand men remained as
an army of observation in Brisgau, on the Rhine, and in Flanders. Where
were the imposing armies she afterward displayed? and what more useful
disposition could have been made of them than to protect the flanks of the
invading army? This remarkable conduct on the part of Austria, which cost
her so much, may account for the resolution of Prussia to retire at a later
period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very moment when she should
have entered it. During the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the
activity necessary for success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at
Kons. If they had anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even
made a more serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have
had all the advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered
divisions, and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them
separately. Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of
Dumouriez at Grandpré,—that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons.

The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with the
false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to guard
every point.

The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and how
their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin of
armies.

Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the strongest
force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of a frontier to

prevent invasion,—which was exactly the means of rendering invasion
upon every point feasible.

I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater from the
center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he was unable to
perceive the great results rendered possible by this movement, but attacked
the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front, while by descending the
Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon the North Sea toward
Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely in a more successful
battle than that of Jemmapes.

The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves praise:
the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this enterprise,
which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the
long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had been driven back under
the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable to resist, why
did the allies remain six months in front of a few towns and permit the
Committee of Public Safety to organize new armies? When the deplorable
condition of France and the destitution of the wreck of the army of
Dampierre are considered, can the parades of the allies in front of the
fortresses in Flanders be understood?

Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince, and
in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of the army;
but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the
capital is generally the center of national power.[14] If this is ever doubtful,
it was not so on this occasion. Paris was France, and this to such an extent
that two-thirds of the nation had risen against the government which
oppressed them. If, after having beaten the French army at Famars, the
allies had left the Dutch and Hanoverians to observe what remained of it,
while the English and the Austrians directed their operations upon the
Meuse, the Sarre, and the Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part

of the useless army of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty
thousand men, with its flanks protected by other troops, could have been
pushed forward. It is even probable that, without changing the direction of
the war or running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have
performed the duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the
bulk of the army pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining
several victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in
carrying on a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of
troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes and
Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon the camp
at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one side and Landau
on the other.

It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in the
beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they should
have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while the allies were
operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or aided by the
imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this army took up the
offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the Sambre. Do not these false
combinations resemble those of Soubise and Broglie in 1761, and all the
operations of the Seven Years' War?

In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a painful
defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of this campaign
were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to represent them as
forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary
to observe that the respective positions of the armies in this campaign and
in that of 1757 were almost identical, and the direction of the operations is
quite the same. The French had four corps, which constituted two armies, as
the King of Prussia had four divisions, which composed two armies.

These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels, as
Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position of the

North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank the Austrian
right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of the enemy,—a
direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to great operations. This
movement was the same as that of Benningsen on the Lower Vistula which
almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate of the Prussian army, cut off
from its communications and forced upon the Baltic, is another proof of this
truth.

If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have made
Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a month
before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.

The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
Flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon the left
Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of a battle
before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis was found a
plan of the diversion in Flanders: only twelve battalions were sent to
Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were known to have
been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to Clairfayt's relief;
but what was the use of the remainder of the army before Landrecies, after
it was obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? The Prince of Coburg
threw away all the advantages of his central position, by allowing the
French to concentrate in Belgium and to beat all his large detachments in
detail.

Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing this
grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have been
concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and forty
squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up between
the sea and two fortresses?

The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical error of
exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on Courtray took
place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi till the 3d of June,

—more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid opportunity for the
Austrians to profit by their central position. If the Prussian army had
maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by its left,—that is, both
upon the Meuse,—the state of affairs would have been different. By
establishing themselves in the center of a line of scattered forces they could
have prevented the junction of the different fractions. It may be dangerous
in a battle to attack the center of a close line of troops when it can be
simultaneously sustained by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite
different on a line of three hundred miles in extent.

In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,—which opened a new
field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this campaign
were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Clairfayt,
wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces alternately upon these
points, and gained victories at Manheim and in the lines of Mayence so
decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre and Meuse to recross the
Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought Pichegru back to Landau.

In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The armies of
the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the extremities of the
base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794, they were exterior
lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the Prince of Coburg,
profited by his interior lines by concentrating his forces at a point nearer
than that expected by the French. He then seized the instant when the
Danube covered the corps of Latour, to steal several marches upon Moreau
and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the battle of Wurzburg decided the fate
of Germany and compelled the army of Moreau to retreat.

Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is to
separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the battle of
Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic lines, and beats
them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable army is collected in
the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits the error of marching
there in two bodies separated by a lake. The lightning is not quicker than
Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons every thing before Mantua, throws

the greater part of his force upon the first column, which debouches by
Brescia, beats it and forces it back upon the mountains: the second column
arrives upon the same ground, and is there beaten in its turn, and compelled
to retire into the Tyrol to keep up its communications with the right.
Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines
of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown
the first back upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by
the gorges of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine
army to take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.

In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and the
Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the center
marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia, being
occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. The three armies
could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn, eighty leagues from
their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he unites them
against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the army of
Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern Switzerland.
The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of following up their
success on this central line, which cost them so dearly afterward, they
formed a double line in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine. The army of
Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the other trifles at Manheim.

In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves thirty-two
thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the Adige, where
the vital blows were to be given or received, their force is too weak and
meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples returns to the North,
it commits the error of adopting a strategic direction opposed to Moreau's,
and Suwaroff, by means of his central position, from which he derives full
profit, marches against this army and beats it, while some leagues from the
other.

In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the

Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines, affording
reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt an exterior
line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. By a skillful
arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts off the enemy from
his line of operations, at the same time preserving its own relations with its
base and with the army of the Rhine, which forms its secondary line.

Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of the
two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the armies of the
Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and Mélas; C C C C, the
passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the Saint-Gothard, and of
the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of operations of the army of the
reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of Mélas; H J K, the French divisions
preserving their line of retreat. It may thus be seen that Mélas is cut off
from his base, and that, on the contrary, the French general runs no risk,
since he preserves all his communications with the frontiers and with his
secondary lines.

Fig. 3.

THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.

To illustrate Maxim 3 on the direction of Lines of Operations.

The French army moves from its
base on the Main, concentrates in g
g, behind the mountains of
Franconia; then it executes a change
of stratigic front (h i) in order to cut
off the Prussians (k k from their
base on the Elbe, still preserving its
own communications (h g e).

If the Prussians throw themselves
between k and e, they open to the
French their direct communications
with the Rhine (m m m).

The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his invasion
futile, or assure the conquest of a province.

By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led to
success have been established in conformity to the fundamental principle
already alluded to,—viz.: that simple and interior lines enable a general to
bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a
stronger force than the enemy. The student may also satisfy himself that
those which have failed contained faults opposed to this principle. An
undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits fractions to be
overwhelmed by the enemy.

MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.

From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from that of
many others, the following maxims result:—

1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of
the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of
operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded
as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign. Napoleon proved this
by the direction he gave his armies in 1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on
Gera,—maneuvers that cannot be too much studied by military men.

Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to be
followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for this end:
what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first operation and the
new phases it may develop.

2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position of the

hostile masses upon this strategic field. In every case, however, it must be
directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. Only when the
assailing forces are vastly preponderating would it be otherwise than a fatal
error to act upon the center and the two extremities at the same time.[15]

It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide his
forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line will be
upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best
direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the rear of his line of
defense or front of operations.

The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it affords
of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that by using it the
assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's force. Thus, the army
of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of the line of defense of the
Black Forest, caused it to yield almost without an effort. This army fought
two battles on the right bank of the Danube, which, although not decisive,
yet, from the judicious direction of the line of operations, brought about the
invasion of Swabia and Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the
reserve by the Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Mélas
were still more brilliant.

3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, it
is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the assailant in
many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this danger, the
line of operations should have a geographic and strategic direction, such
that the army will always find either to its rear or to the right or left a safe
line of retreat. In this case, to take advantage of either of these flank lines of
retreat would require a change of direction of the line of operations,
(Maxim 12.)

The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important
qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by these
examples.

If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the Po, he

would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat than Mélas
from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points of Casale and
Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and Tenda toward the
Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of regaining the Var or
the Valais.

In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had there
awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have been cut
off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the Elbe, while
by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he placed his front
before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof, which thus became
well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians had endeavored to
cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera and Baireuth, they
would have opened to him his most natural line,—the excellent road from
Leipsic to Frankfort,—as well as the two roads which lead from Saxony by
Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.

4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large coalitions, or
where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon the same zone of
operations; and even in this case it would be better to have all the forces
under the same commander, who accompanies the principal army.

5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces on
the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more advantageous than
a double one.

6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either from
the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has been adopted
by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of the army to each
of his masses.

7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines,
since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated
before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign.[16]
Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic plan, unite upon and
overwhelm successively the fractions of the adversary's forces. To be
assured of success in these maneuvers, a body of observation is left in front

of the army to be held in check, with instructions to avoid a serious
engagement, but to delay the enemy as much as possible by taking
advantage of the ground, continually falling back upon the principal army.

8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of force,
when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring against
it. In this case this course will be advantageous,—since a single line would
crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to advantage.
However, it will always be prudent to support well the army which, by
reason of the nature of its theater and the respective positions of the parties,
has the most important duty to perform.

9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not be
abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the opportunity of
overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however, may be incurred if
the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as to conclude the war,—
when the fate of these secondary bodies would be viewed with comparative
indifference.

10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy, and
possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and supply;
but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the armies which
pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the combined masses of
the enemy, before being able to effect their junction.

11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by a
strategic movement,—in which case divergent operations would add to the
dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior, since the
pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the pursued.

12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an army
from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to meet
unforeseen events.

At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a line of
operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would have
opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by Vienna,
which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the Archduke
Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one of these
changes of the line of operations after the raising of the siege of Olmutz.

In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to the
allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he possessed
fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the most decisive
results and have put the seal on his military career.

13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on the
direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages to be
obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like Bohemia and
Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they naturally lead to the
adoption of interior lines and facilitate the project of taking the enemy in
reverse. The sides of this salient angle become so important that every
means should be taken to render them impregnable. In default of such
central positions, their advantages may be gained by the relative directions
of maneuver-lines, as the following figure will explain. C D maneuvering
upon the right of the front of the army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G
F, will form two interior lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior
lines A B, F G, which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon
them. Such was the result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.

Fig. 4.

14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the
direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being naturally
dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the greatest
advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the frontieres allow
it to be assumed parallel to the linee of operations of the enemy, thus
affording the opportunity of seizing this line and cutting him from his base.

But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the line of
operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the perpendicular base
may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the figure on page 79. The army
E, having the double base A C and C D, if it marched toward F, instead of to
the right toward G H, woud lose all the strategic advantages of its base C D.

The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army as to
seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's own, and
is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.

15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the principal
enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the presence of a
numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the choice of this line
depends neither upon the will of the general nor the advantages to be gained
by an attack on one or another point; for the first consideration will be to
ascertain where the passage can be most certainly effected, and where are to
be found the means for this purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by

Jourdan, was near Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831
was crossed by Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,—viz., that in neither case
was there the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged
to procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy was
not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led the French
into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed because the
double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies separately.
Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only a small
detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at Lowicz.

When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances of
failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to select the
point which may, either on account of its topography or the position of the
enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between Napoleon and
Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the most curious
examples of the different combinations presented by this question, which is
both strategic and tactical.

Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory is gained,
the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the directions of a few
marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The point selected in every
case for the principal passage will be upon the center or one of the flanks of
the enemy.

A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the dispersion of
the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not think of disturbing
the bridges.

If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more concentrated,
and the general has the means of taking up after the passage a front
perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass it upon one of the
extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the bridges. This will be
referred to in the article upon the passage of rivers.

16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be noticed. It
is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home and one in a
hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will also influence these
chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or the Rhine to carry on
war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of the second rank; and, even
if they are in alliance, there are always rivalries or collisions of interest
which will deprive them of that unity and strength possessed by a single
powerful state. On the other hand, a German army invading France would
operate upon a line much more dangerous than that of the French in Italy,
because upon the first could be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco,
united in feeling and interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of
operations on its own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the
inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and
even private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.

Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert regions,
particularly when the people are not united against the invader. In provinces
like those first named the army would find a thousand necessary supplies,
while in the other huts and straw are about the only resources. Horses
probably may obtain pasturage; but every thing else must be carried by the
army,—thus infinitely increasing the embarrassments and rendering bold
operations much more rare and dangerous. The French armies, so long
accustomed to the comforts of Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in
1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy
forests of Lithuania.

17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much insisted
upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is that on each
side of the line of operations the country should be cleared of all enemies
for a distance equal to the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might
threaten the line of retreat. This rule is everywhere belied by the events of
war. The nature of the country, the rivers and mountains, the morale of the
armies, the spirit of the people, the ability and energy of the commanders,
cannot be estimated by diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable
bodies of the enemy could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat;
but a compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means

of taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in recent
wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not contradict
this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna when Fussen,
Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the Austrians? Was not
Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the Col-di-Tenda were
occupied by the army of Mélas? Did not Eugene march by way of Stradella
and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon the Mincio but a few
leagues from his base?

OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES—WHAT HAS
BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.

Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a
rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural principles.

In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe in
principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional cases from
which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed
instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the
maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish their
soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case of a considerable
numerical superiority I recommended double lines of operations as most
advantageous, particularly when concentric and arranged to combine an
effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. Now, in the allied armies
of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, Bernadotte, and Benningsen, this case of
decided superiority is found. The inferior army, to conform to the principles
of this chapter, should have directed its efforts against one of the extremities

of his adversary, and not upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted
against me are doubly in my favor.

Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
Katzbach, and Dennewitz,—in a word, to faults of execution, entirely
foreign to the principles in question.

What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with the
greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain on the
defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the decisive blow is
struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the
army. Then the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon
other points. Whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive
shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is not
understood; and this was what happened in 1813.

If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the allies
into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have threatened
Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this error may be
added a fault quite as great,—that of fighting decisive battles when he was
not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach his instructions were
not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for Blücher, and to fall upon him
when he should expose himself by hold movements. Macdonald, on the
contrary, crossed his detachments over torrents which were hourly
becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet Blücher. If he had fulfilled
his instructions and Napoleon had followed up his victory, there is no doubt
that his plan of operations, based upon interior strategic lines and positions
and upon a concentric line of operations, would have met with the most
brilliant success. The study of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France
in 1814 shows that he knew how to apply this system.

There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in Saxony,—viz.:
that his front of operations was outflanked on the right, and even taken in
reverse, by the geographical position of the frontiers of Bohemia. Such a
case is of rare occurrence. A central position with such faults is not to be
compared to one without them. When Napoleon made the application of

these principles in Italy, Poland, Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to
the attack of a hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have
threatened him in 1807; but she was then at peace with him and unarmed.
To judge of a system of operations, it must be supposed that accidents and
chances are to be as much in favor of as against it,—which was by no
means the case in 1813, either in the geographic positions or in the state of
the respective forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the
reverses at Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof
capable of destroying a principle the simplest application of which required
these officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious
engagement. Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what
advantage can be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of
the army which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows
elsewhere, shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being
contented with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy
who applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these
maxims.

The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic question
which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions founded upon
theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses its advantages when
the masses are very large. Agreeing with Montesquieu, that the greatest
enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements necessary to
consummate them, I am disposed to answer in the affirmative. It is very
clear to me that an army of one hundred thousand men, occupying a central
zone against three isolated armies of thirty or thirty-five thousand men,
would be more sure of defeating them successively than if the central mass
were four hundred thousand strong against three armies of one hundred and
thirty-five thousand each; and for several good reasons:—

1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring
a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of one hundred
and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily resist a much
larger force.

2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand men
to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the
other armies.

3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a quantity
of provisions, munitions, horses, and matériel of every kind, that it will
possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the
zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions
from a region too restricted to support such numbers.

4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will probably
suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the advantages gained
by the principal army.

I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric system.
All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and to
demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
principles.

Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad: all
depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric lines, for
instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a given point, and
acting in divergent directions to divide and separately destroy two hostile
forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the maneuver of Frederick
which brought about, at the end of the campaign of 1767, the fine battles of
Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the operations of Napoleon,
whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by closely-calculated marches,
imposing masses on the center, and, having pierced the enemy's center or
turned his front, to give them eccentric directions to disperse the defeated
army.[19]

On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be sure
to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the efforts

of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately by a
stronger enemy.

Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
most pernicious,—which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base to
march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines and
more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union before the
former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case with Moreau and
Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.

In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
city,—one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington,
taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and the
terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.

Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not in
accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim to the
creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and were applied
by Cæsar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by Marlborough and
Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them out, and to lay down
the principal chances in their various applications.

FOOTNOTES:

[11]

This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise to
misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
maneuver-lines, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of
great routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon
two or three routes, near enough to each other to admit of the
concentration of the different masses within forty-eight hours,
would not have two or three lines of operations. When Moreau
and Jourdan entered Germany with two armies of 70,000 men
each, being independent of each other, there was a double line of
operations; but a French army of which only a detachment starts
from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would
not have a double line of operations in the sense in which I use
the term to designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he
concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by Bamberg to
march on Gera, while Mortier with a single corps marched on
Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal enterprise, had but
a single general line of operations, with an accessory detachment.
The territorial line was composed of two arms or radii, but the
operation was not double.

[12]

Some German writers have said that I confound central positions
with the line of operations,—in which assertion they are
mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence
of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of
operations: these are two very different things. Others have
thought that I would have done better to use the term radii of
operations to express the idea of double lines. The reasoning in
this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of operations to be
a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a
dispute about words.

[13]

This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct; for Mélas,
confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a
communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would
have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he
had not been reinforced.

[14]

The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of Napoleon;
but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If
he had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have
shown that the capital was at his head-quarters.

[15]

The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon the
number of soldiers: their military qualities, their morale, and the
ability of their commander are also very important elements.

[16]

When the fractions of an army are separated from the main body
by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not
intended to act separately throughout the campaign, these are
central strategic positions, and not lines of operations.

[17]

In the movements immediately preceding the battle of Leipsic,
Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of operations,
and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; but the
principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
lines of operations.

[18]

I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a combat
without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
Macdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage if he had
better understood Napoleon's instructions.

[19]

It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we
reflect that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are
some in which he employed these two systems alternately within
twenty-four hours; for example, in the movements about Ratisbon
in 1809.

ARTICLE XXII.
Strategic Lines.

Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to define them,
for many confound them. We will not consider those strategic lines which
have a great and permanent importance by reason of their position and their
relation to the features of the country, like the lines of the Danube and the
Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the Balkan. Such lines can best be
studied by a detailed and minute examination of the topography of Europe;
and an excellent model for this kind of study is found in the Archduke
Charles's description of Southern Germany.

The term strategic is also applied to all communications which lead by the
most direct or advantageous route from one important point to another, as
well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its objective points. It
will be seen, then, that a theater of war is crossed by a multitude of such
lines, but that at any given time those only which are concerned in the
projected enterprise have any real importance. This renders plain the
distinction between the general line of operations of a whole campaign, and
these strategic lines, which are temporary and change with the operations of
the army.

Besides territorial strategic lines, there are strategic lines of maneuvers.

An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between the
Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and the
sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at most, a
double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions,—while
it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic lines as its enterprises
were developed: it would have at first one for each wing which would join

the general line of operations. If it operated in the zone between the Danube
and the Alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading
from Ulm on Donauwerth and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or
that which connects Ulm with Nuremberg or Mayence.

It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of operations,
as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily applicable to
strategic lines. These may be concentric, to inflict a decisive blow, or
eccentric, after victory. They are rarely simple, since an army does not
confine its march to a single road; but when they are double or triple, or
even quadruple, they should be interior if the forces be equal, or exterior in
the case of great numerical superiority. The rigorous application of this rule
may perhaps sometimes be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line,
even when the forces are equal, to attain an important result without
running much risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to
the important masses.

Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against one
of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.

The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply them to
particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves mention,—
viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of these temporary
strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations exposed to the assaults of
the enemy. Even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army from
great danger, or to attain a great success; but the operation must be of short
duration, and care must have been taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by
a sudden change of the line of operations, if necessary, as has already been
referred to.

We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army was
based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne and
Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp, and
his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack by
Napoleon on Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel to the
English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good

chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and seeking
refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Blücher had but three strategic lines
to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht, that farther north on
Venloo, or the one leading to the English army near Mont St. Jean. He
audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the application of interior
strategic lines,—which Napoleon here, perhaps for the first time in his life,
neglected. It will readily be seen that the line followed from Gembloux by
Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a line of operations of the Prussian
army nor a line of battle, but a strategic line of maneuver, and was interior.
It was bold, because he exposed fully his own natural line of operations.
The fact that he sought a junction with the English made his movement
accord with the principles of war.

A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right to
gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his primitive line
of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in force. His object
was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose intention was to join him
by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the beginning have taken all
logistic and tactical means of accomplishing this change of strategic line
and of informing his army of it. He did nothing of this kind,—either from
forgetfulness, or on account of the feeling of aversion he had to any thing
like a retreat,—and the severe losses at Dennewitz were the result.

Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon
Roveredo and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the
valley of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser
had moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
There were but three courses open to him,—to remain in the narrow valley
of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, or the last,
—which was sublime, but rash,—to follow him into the valley of the
Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two passages
might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to hesitate

between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis to cover Trent,
and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano. The brilliant
results of this bold step are well known. The route from Trent to Bassano
was not the line of operations of the army, but a strategic line of maneuver
still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre. However, it was an operation of
only three or four days' duration, at the end of which time Napoleon would
either beat or be beaten at Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct
communication with Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he
could regain in great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could
fall back either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country,
which made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another;
for even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him to
anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois from
Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian general,
previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French army was
doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would scarcely
have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten at Bassano
would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had advanced as far
as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there have been
surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon him the
fate of Vandamme at Culm.

I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time and
distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
adopted under an urgent necessity.

ARTICLE XXIII.
Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases
or Strategic Reserves.

When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
temporary bases,—which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as his
own frontiers. A river with têtes de ponts, and one or two large towns secure
from a coup de main to cover the depots of the army and to serve as points
of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an excellent base of this
kind. Of course, such a line could not be a temporary base if a hostile force
were near the line of operations leading to the real base on the frontiers.
Napoleon would have had a good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria
had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was
taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for
the execution of a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged
occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is
beaten in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from
its own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and
are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot expect to
find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a temporary
base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic reserve,—which is
purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits deserve notice.

STRATEGIC RESERVES.

Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army

has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to provide
one.

The reserves of an army are of two kinds,—those on the battle-field, and
those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the latter, while
organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of war, and serve
even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend not only on their
magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and the distance from the
base to the front of operations. Whenever an army takes the offensive, it
should always contemplate the possibility of being compelled to act on the
defensive, and by the posting of a reserve between the base and front of
operations the advantage of an active reserve on the field of battle is gained:
it can fly to the support of menaced points without weakening the active
army. It is true that to form a reserve a number of regiments must be
withdrawn from active service; but there are always reinforcements to
arrive, recruits to be instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by
organizing central depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and
by making them the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming
from the army, and adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a
reserve may be formed capable of important service.

Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even in
1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on the
Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near Vienna.

In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used
them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When
Napoleon decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed,
with much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her interests.

The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or

Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
Prince Hohenlohe and Blücher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.

These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the country
leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the double object of
observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, of aiding the
operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its flanks or a
reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.

Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the scene
of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the frontier, they are
quite superfluous. At home they may generally be dispensed with: it is only
in the case of a serious invasion, when new levies are organizing, that such
a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under the protection of a fortress which
serves as a great depot, will be indispensable.

The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line of
operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of a hostile
state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to use for this
purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much as the
withdrawal of his good troops.

These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if there
be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up intrenched camps
or têtes de ponts to protect the depots and to increase the strength of their
positions.

All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to temporary
bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable if they
possess such well-located pivots.

ARTICLE XXIV.
The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of
Marches.

By the system of positions is understood the old manner of conducting a
methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies at hand, engaged in
watching each other; one besieging a city, the other covering it; one,
perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the other counteracting
its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war from the Middle Ages
to the era of the French Revolution. During this revolution great changes
transpired, and many systems of more or less value sprang up. War was
commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the French encamped near their
strong places, and the allies besieged them. It was not till 1793, when
assailed from without and within, that this system was changed. Thoroughly
aroused, France threw one million men in fourteen armies upon her
enemies. These armies had neither tents, provisions, nor money. On their
marches they bivouacked or were quartered in towns; their mobility was
increased and became a means of success. Their tactics changed also: the
troops were put in columns, which were more easily handled than deployed
lines, and, on account of the broken character of the country of Flanders and
the Vosges, they threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and
cover the columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances,
at first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack, to
whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased his
reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose an open
order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the poor man that
while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried the positions.

The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the

Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the war.
In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of Dunkirk,
Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly from point
to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these different points,
compelled the enemy to evacuate France.

The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances, and
not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement of the
army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to the success
of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.

In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed to
treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the Prince
of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of interior lines,
triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single march.

Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,—either to
procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it better to
put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders to arrange them
for battle. The reserves were small detachments, incapable of redeeming the
day even if the enemy succeeded in overwhelming but a single division.
Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon made his début in Italy. His
activity from the beginning worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free
from useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern
armies. He conquered the Italian peninsula by a series of marches and
strategic combats. His march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by
the necessity of overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive
reinforcements from the Rhine.

The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the capture
or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less extended, and
the more rational organization of armies in large bodies of two or three
divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was here fully
developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely corollaries to

the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system of columns and
skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy not to meet with
his approval.

It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to all
capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there can be any
return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the old system of wars
of position. After a comparison of the marches and camps of the Seven
Years' War with those of the seven weeks' war,—as Napoleon called the
campaign of 1806,—or with those of the three months which elapsed from
the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till its arrival in the plains
of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to the relative merits of the two
systems.

The system of Napoleon was to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and
then to camp in quiet. He told me that he knew no other method of
conducting a war than this.

It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his personal
situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in urging him to
undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne, or a
general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. This
is probably true; but between the extremes of very distant invasions, and
wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his
impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. It is
probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a long time be
proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved.

If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, are
not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes
between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not likely that the
system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has been demonstrated
by Napoleon's wars,—viz.: that remoteness is not a certain safeguard
against invasion,—that a state to be secure must have a good system of
fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and military institutions, and,
finally, a good system of government. Then the people may everywhere be

organized as militia, and may serve as reserves to the active armies, which
will render the latter more formidable; and the greater the strength of the
armies the more necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt
results.

If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,—if nations, instead of
fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to acquire a natural
frontier or to maintain the political equilibrium,—then a new right of
nations may be agreed upon, and perhaps it will be possible to have armies
on a less extensive scale. Then also we may see armies of from eighty to
one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system of war,—a mean
between the rapid incursions of Napoleon and the slow system of positions
of the last century. Until then we must expect to retain this system of
marches, which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in
the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to
his indiscretion.

The science of marches now includes more than details, like the following,
viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of departure and
arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and the means of
communication between the columns, all of which is a part of the duties of
the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very important details, there
is a science of marches in the great operations of strategy. For instance, the
march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard to fall upon the communications
of Mélas, those made in 1805 by Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806
by Gera to turn the Prussians, the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the
Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that of the Russian army on Taroutin, then
upon Krasnoi, were decisive operations, not because of their relation to
Logistics, but on account of their strategic relations.

Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great principle of
throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point; and this point is to
be determined from the considerations given in Article XIX. What was the
passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of operations directed against an
extremity of the strategic front of the enemy, and thence upon his line of
retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena were the same maneuvers; and what

was Blücher's march at Waterloo but an application of interior strategic
lines?

From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to
throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the
front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the principle
of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The operations of the
French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of Napoleon in 1796,
1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.

One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to so
combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest strategic
front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple object of deceiving
him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease and rapidity, and of
procuring supplies with more facility. However, it is necessary in this case
to have previously arranged the means of concentration of the columns in
order to inflict a decisive blow.

This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the true
test of a great general.

There is another kind of marches, designated as flank marches, which
deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but
nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term flank
marches are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of battle in
view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate operations,
though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to ordinary strategic
marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in them, unless the most
common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a strategic movement, the
two hostile armies ought to be separated by about two marches, (counting
the distance which separates the advanced guards from the enemy and from
their own columns.) In such a case there could be no danger in a strategic
march from one point to another.

There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether
inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations, of the
strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as to present the
flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the famous project

of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on the flank,
which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. It was modified
by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the author.

The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was the
case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line affords but a
single suitable route for retreat: then every flank movement exposing this
line would be a great fault.

In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are
still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a change of
the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of the troops and
the more or less energetic characters of the commanders will, of course, be
elements in the determination of such movements.

The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so
was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of Marshal
Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful issue is well
known.

A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a
different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz, and
so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.

Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a true
flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed by the
heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its camp; and
it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock Daun was
taken in flank, and not Frederick.

In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line of
battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a right or
left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were not flank
marches, because the flank of the column was the real front of the line of
battle.

The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the
lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and no less

successful.

In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not strategic. The
march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the greatest strategic
operations of the age; but the case above referred to was a movement made
to turn the French camp the evening before the battle.

ARTICLE XXV.
Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.

The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the
commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be
supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's
country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation between
the commissariat and strategy.

It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted their
immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to supply
thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks, barbarians, and
more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable bodies of men in that
country. Cæsar said that war should support war, and he is generally
believed to have lived at the expense of the countries he overran.

The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds, and
it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals, Goths,
and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived during
their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders would also
be an interesting subject of research.

In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies of
Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them large
stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or fifty thousand
men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of the Ticino and Po.

Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought on
their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were
established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,
restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon the

means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the number of
days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to camp.

During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.
The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in
the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the country,
and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the granaries of
Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and Danube, is
easy,—particularly if it marches in a number of columns and does not
exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but this
would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite impossible in
Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be conceived how great
may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where every thing depends
only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This system gave Napoleon great
advantages; but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale and to
countries where it was impracticable.

A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded
country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the local
authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to make them
uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their fulfillment. If the
authorities do not remain, he should create provisional ones of the leading
men, and endow them with extraordinary powers. The provisions thus
acquired should be collected at the points most convenient for the
operations of the army. In order to husband them, the troops may be
quartered in the towns and villages, taking care to reimburse the inhabitants
for the extra charge thus laid upon them. The inhabitants should also be
required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the points occupied by
the troops.

It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to undertake
without having previously established these depots, as much depends upon
the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of the people; but the
following may be considered as general maxims:—

1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one hundred
to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from the
enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of country, may

draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any single
operation.

As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which time
the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be sufficient to
provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants of the army, and
particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain at a particular point.
Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was besieging Ulm, would
need bread until the surrender of the city; and if there had been a scarcity
the operation might have failed.

2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies
obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the wants
of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a position to
recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.

3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be
echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of communication,
in order to supply with more facility the wings of the army, and to extend as
much as possible the area from which successive supplies are to be drawn,
and, lastly, in order that the depots should be as well covered as possible. To
this end, it would be well to have the depots on lines converging toward the
principal line of operations, which will be generally found in the center.
This arrangement has two real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed
to the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased;
secondly, it facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a
single point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the
initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the offensive
and gained some advantage.

4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its most
necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to advance too far
from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient provisions to enable it, if
compelled to do so, to fall back upon its lines of depots.

5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in their
path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible
to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure

base of supply near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a
war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.

6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is
indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army;
and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To
facilitate their transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable
articles,—as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be both light and strong,
so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the
vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or
drivers; and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points,
so as not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to
husband the successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to
carry with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.

7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of supplies; and
the party which is master on this element can supply himself at will. This
advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of a large continental army;
for, in the desire to maintain communications with its depots, it may be
drawn into operations on the coast, thus exposing itself to the greatest risks
if the enemy maneuver with the mass of his forces upon the extremity
opposite the sea. If the army advance too far from the coast, there will be
danger of its communications being intercepted; and this danger increases
with the progress of the army.

8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base itself on
the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its ships, and a
line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic front opposed to the
sea.

9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations of
the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also free the
roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise necessary.
For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the most favorable. The
water-communications themselves are not in this case the lines of
operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is essential that the
troops should be able to move at some distance from the river, in order to

prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior flank upon the river,—
which might be as dangerous as if it were the sea.

In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for
transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a small
body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it sure, it is
necessary to occupy both banks,—which is hazardous, as Mortier
experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages of rivers are
more substantial.

10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be fed
by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous
countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of supply will,
however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan leads to plunder.
The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated; and the best plan of all
is to supply the army with cattle purchased elsewhere.

I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may appear
whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in his first
campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops were in
want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy to procure
every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it would be absurd
to found a system, but which perhaps explains the success of many a rash
enterprise, and proves how much actual war differs from narrow theory.

ARTICLE XXVI.
The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.—
Wars of Sieges.

Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers; secondly, to
aid the operations of the campaign.

The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate. It
is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great natural
obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and these admitting
of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here is simple; but in
open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the Pyrenees, and the lesser
ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of Erzgebirge, of the
Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and of the Jura, are not so
formidable that they cannot be made more so by a good system of
fortresses.

Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best
covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of
Mont-Genèvre, and of Mont-Cenis,—the only ones considered practicable,
—were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of considerable
magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains of Piedmont. It
was certainly no easy matter to surmount these difficulties.

These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage of an
army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be
carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other
route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis I.,
—which is so well described by Gaillard,—Napoleon's passage of the
Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in the
remark of Napoleon, that an army can pass wherever a titan can set his

foot,—a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man, and applied
by him with great success.

Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or as a
second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so well
calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and
communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be said
that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long as the
Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real frontier of
France and Germany; for the French for long periods held points upon the
right bank, while the Germans were in possession of Mayence,
Luxembourg, and the têtes de ponts of Manheim and Wesel on the left bank.

If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and
Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they
should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they permit
the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.

An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from Austria:
flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by Bohemia and the
Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three fortified places of Passau,
Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some poetic license, compares this
frontier to two impregnable bastions whose curtain is formed of three fine
forts and whose ditch is one of the most rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated
these advantages; for his epithet of "impregnable" was decidedly disproved
by the bloody events of 1800, 1805, and 1809.

The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so
formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or
consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number of
points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally applicable to all
cases.

When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to
make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses, requiring
armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not prevent an enemy
from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build fewer works, and to
have them properly located, not with the expectation of absolutely

preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the impediments to his
progress, and, at the same time, to support the movements of the army
which is to repel him.

If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the progress of
an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels the army to
detach a part of its force or to make détours in its march; while, on the other
hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to the army which holds it,
covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, finally, is a place of refuge
in case of need.

Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations; and
we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.

The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in the
distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the forts
without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege; the third
point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege which it proposes
to cover.

As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same degree
those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They are an
incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the state
whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe in
this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses very close
together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban, who, on the
contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great number of points
the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point are as follow:—

1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and should
extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be three in the
first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the third, near the
center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would require, for a complete
system, from twenty-four to thirty places.

It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has not so
many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon only a
third of its frontiers, (from Besançon to Dunkirk,) and still has not enough

on the third line in the center of the country. A Board convened for the
purpose of considering the system of fortresses has decided quite recently
that more were required. This does not prove that there were not already too
many, but that certain points in addition should be fortified, while those on
the first line, although too much crowded, may be maintained since they are
already in existence. Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to
Basel, one from Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the
totally distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,
requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this is
enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the northeast.
The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important element of
their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is bordered by the
small German states, which, instead of being hostile, place their own forts
at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given is what was considered
necessary for a state having four fronts of nearly equal development.
Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending from Königsberg almost to
the gates of Metz, should not be fortified upon the same system as France,
Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical position and extent of states may
either diminish or increase the number of fortresses, particularly when
maritime forts are to be included.

2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points already
designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their sites should
not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in order to
increase the difficulty of blockading them.

3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own
defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those
situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,
and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of this
kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command three
different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for instance,
Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the fort of
Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable place in
Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men: so that
works of this extent must be few in number.

4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are
preferable to small ones,—particularly when the assistance of the citizens
can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole power of Charles
V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and Marlborough. Strasbourg
has many times proved the security of French armies. During the last wars
these places were passed without being besieged by the invading forces,
because all Europe was in arms against France; but one hundred and fifty
thousand Germans having in their front one hundred thousand French could
not penetrate to the Seine with impunity, leaving behind them these well-
fortified points.

5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, and
positions; recently they have been directed only against organized armies,
leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial obstacles. The exclusive
use of either of these systems is faulty: the true course is a mean between
these extremes. Doubtless, it will always be of the first importance to
destroy and disorganize all the armies of the enemy in the field, and to
attain this end it may be allowable to pass the fortresses; but if the success
be only partial it will be unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also,
very much depends upon the situation and respective strength of the armies
and the spirit of the nations.

If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in the
footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty thousand
French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in the very
heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only occur under
exceptional circumstances.

6. It may be concluded from what precedes,—1st, that, while fortified
places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by dividing an
army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d, that an army may,
with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line of these forts,—always,
however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d, that an army cannot pass a
large river, like the Danube or the Rhine, without reducing at least one of
the fortresses on the river, in order to secure a good line of retreat. Once
master of this place, the army may advance on the offensive, leaving
detachments to besiege other places; and the chances of the reduction of

those places increase as the army advances, since the enemy's opportunities
of hindering the siege are correspondingly diminished.

7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly
people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an enemy,
who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the operations of an
army in the field. The fort of Königstein in 1813 was as useful to the French
as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured a tête de pont on the Elbe.

In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value to
fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and not to
afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley of Aosta, almost
arrested Napoleon's army in 1800.

8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses as
places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to facilitate
military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may be very useful in
the interior of a country, to contain depots, hospitals, &c, when they are
strong enough to resist the attacks of any small bodies that may traverse the
vicinity. They will be particularly serviceable if they can be defended by the
militia, so as not to weaken the active army.

9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions are a
positive misfortune for both the army and state.

10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war, except
for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental army, by
holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen almost lost the
Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on Königsberg,—which he did
because it was convenient for supply. If the Russian army in 1812, instead
of concentrating on Smolensk, had supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga,
it would have been in danger of being forced into the sea and of being cut
off from all its bases.

The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of two
kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without attacking
them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to watch them; and
when there are a number of them adjacent to each other it will be necessary

to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single commander, to invest or
watch them as circumstances may require. When the invading army decides
to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry on the siege will be assigned to
this duty; the remainder may either continue its march or take a position to
cover the siege.

Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole army,
which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and contravallation. These
lines cost as much in labor and expense as the siege itself. The famous case
of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen miles in length, and, though
guarded by seventy-eight thousand French, were forced by Prince Eugene
with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough to condemn this ridiculous
system.

Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cæsar in the investment of
Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in our
times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary for the
investing force to strengthen its position by detached works commanding
the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the siege might be
disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at Mantua, and by the
Russians at Varna.

Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and
pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If the
besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a strategic position
covering all the avenues by which succor might arrive; and when it
approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be spared should unite
with the covering force to fall upon the approaching army and decide
whether the siege shall continue or not.

Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the
operations of an army of observation.

INTRENCHED LINES.

Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to above,
there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and is in a
measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is intended to protect
a part of the frontiers.

As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an army,
be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of intrenched
lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent closing a narrow
gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be regarded as forts; but I
speak of extended lines many leagues in length and intended to wholly
close a part of the frontiers. For instance, those of Wissembourg, which,
covered by the Lauter flowing in front, supported by the Rhine on the right
and the Vosges on the left, seemed to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and
yet they were forced on every occasion when they were assailed.

The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same
part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and
those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.

The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although intended
as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in question in their
extent and in the fate which befell them. However well they may be
supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes their defenders,
and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. To bury an army in
intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or forced in
front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is to be
hoped that we shall never see another instance of it. Nevertheless, in our
chapter on Tactics we will treat of their attack and defense.

It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended lines,
it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be derived from
detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging force, the safety of
a position, or the defense of a defile.

FOOTNOTES:

[20]

The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the
defiles of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the
Russians would not have reached Adrianople, and the affair
would not have been so simple.

[21]

Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the Frioul,
since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the
Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly
important to beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined
him. In view of the circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct
was in accordance with the principles of war.

ARTICLE XXVII.
The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts with
Strategy.

It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of ordinary
camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards, or upon
the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts. Only fortified
camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and even of strategy;
and this they do by the temporary support they afford an army.

It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that such a
refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in 1800,
enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on the
Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of Torres-
Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country between
the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.

The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be established on
strategic points which should also possess tactical advantages. If the camp
of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812, it was because it was not in a
proper position in reference to their defensive system, which should have
rested upon Smolensk and Moscow. Hence the Russians were compelled to
abandon it after a few days.

The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because they
ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these camps is
variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure for an
offensive operation, as têtes de ponts to assure the crossing of a large river,
as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for a defeated army.

However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult to
locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of Torres-Vedras,
it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can be passed either
by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to abandon it or run the
risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden was an important support
to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it was outflanked by the allies it
had not the advantages even of an ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the
sacrifice of two corps within a few days for want of provisions.

Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even when the
enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in reverse,—that is,
provided all their faces are equally safe from a coup de main. It is also
important that they be established close to a fortress, where the depots may
be safe, or which may cover the front of the camp nearest to the line of
retreat.

In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large tête de pont on the
other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city like
Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never be
more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of collecting
reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy, it will be
necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the open country.

The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a French
army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost when the
space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if it were
invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a little
assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the enemy in the
interior of France and between the relieving force and the intrenched army
would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.

We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but several
German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover places or
to prevent sieges,—which appears to me to be a little sophistical. Doubtless,
it will be more difficult to besiege a place when an army is encamped on its
glacis; and it maybe said that the forts and camps are a mutual support; but,

according to my view, the real and principal use of intrenched camps is
always to afford, if necessary, a temporary refuge for an army, or the means
of debouching offensively upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To
bury an army in such a camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked
and cut off, simply to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of
Wurmser, who prolonged the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition
to this; but did not his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I
do not think so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed,
and the siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege
was necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken
by reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought
rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.

The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,
indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had possessed
the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not been crossed;
but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in the Black
Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the place to its
own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a fortress occupying
a point such that it would be impossible for an army to pass it without
taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object of preventing an attack
upon it, would be established; and what place in Europe is upon such a site?

So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it seems
to me that a very important question in the establishment of these camps
near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the same bank
as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make a choice, by
reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to cover both banks, I
should decidedly prefer the latter.

To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the bank
of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal danger to be
feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by passing the river
at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the same bank us the
camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the other bank, opposite to
the camp, it would be almost impossible to take the latter in reverse. For
instance, the Russians, who could not hold for twenty-four hours their camp

of Drissa, would have defied the enemy for a long time if there had been a
fortification on the right bank of the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp.
So Moreau for three months, at Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the
Archduke Charles; while if Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite
bank his camp would easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.

Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified place
upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would fulfill this
condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently constructed, seems to
introduce a new epoch. This system of the Prussians, combining the
advantages of intrenched camps and permanent works, deserves attentive
consideration; but, whatever may be its defects, it is nevertheless certain
that it would afford immense advantages to an army intended to operate on
the Rhine. Indeed, the inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is
that they are only very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they
are exposed to the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened
to Napoleon at Essling,)—to say nothing of the danger of losing their
provisions and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works
might not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has
the advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the
same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were upon the
right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp of field-
works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security either for the
depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary fortress without
detached forts, a large army could not so readily make it a place of refuge,
nor would there be such facilities for debouching from it in the presence of
an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which is intended to protect
Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult of access that it would be quite
easy to blockade it, and the egress of a force of any magnitude might be
vigorously disputed.

Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke
Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,—by masonry towers. As
I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in the
Spectateur Militaire, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know that the
system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis appeared to

me to be useful, but still susceptible of improvements,—which the archduke
seems to have added. We are told that the towers of Linz, situated in ditches
and covered by the glacis, have the advantage of giving a concentrated
horizontal fire and of being sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy.
Such towers, if well flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very
advantageous camp,—always, however, with some of the inconveniences of
closed lines. If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered
by field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp
preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous as
afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank, some
seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line is about
twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six hundred yards
apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a palisaded covered way.
They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with a barbette battery which is
the principal defense, mounting eleven twenty-four pounders. Two
howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those towers are placed in a wide
and deep ditch, the déblais of which forms a high glacis which protects the
tower from direct shot; but I should think it would be difficult to protect the
artillery from direct fire.

Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete
bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,
would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a quarter as
much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an entirely
different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege, they are
certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp to give refuge
and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large army, they are
appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war like that of 1809,
and, if existing then, would probably have saved the capital.

To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to encircle
Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built seven or eight
towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the Traun, within a
direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to have included for the
camp only the curved space between Linz, the Traun, and the Danube. Then

the double advantage of a fortress of the first rank and a camp under its
guns would have been united, and, even if not quite so large, would have
answered for a large army, particularly if the eight towers on the left bank
and the fort of Perlingsberg had been preserved.

TÊTES DE PONTS.

Têtes de ponts are the most important of all field-works. The difficulties of
crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face of the enemy,
demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works, which can be
less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if the bridges are
safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which may attend a rapid
retreat across a large river.

Têtes de ponts are doubly advantageous when they are as it were keeps for a
large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also cover the bank
opposite to the location of the camp, since then they will mutually support
each other. It is needless to state that these works are particularly important
in an enemy's country and upon all fronts where there are no permanent
works. It may be observed that the principal difference between the system
of intrenched camps and that of têtes de ponts is that the best intrenched
camps are composed of detached and closed works, while têtes de ponts
usually consist of contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit
of defense must be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which
would generally require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments
are detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.

The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent
part of this volume.

ARTICLE XXVIII.
Strategic Operations in Mountains.

A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under
four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it may be
but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or there
may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may
debouch into large and rich plains.

If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and
Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries
the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a difficult
defile to cross,—a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome, is an
advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once crossed and the
war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may be regarded as an
eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and find a temporary
refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed is, not to allow the
enemy to anticipate the army on this line of retreat. The part of the Alps
between France and Italy, and the Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though
equally broad,) are of this nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the
Black Forest, and the Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the
mountains cover the whole country as far as the Ebro: if the war were
limited to this province, the combinations would not be the same as if there
were but a line of mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from
Lombardy and Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part
are as marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary
obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of
the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of Mongatsch,
would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss for a field of
operations. The only difference would be in the roads, which in the Alps,
though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary there are none of

much value. In its northern part, this chain, though not so high, becomes
broader, and would seem to belong to that class of fields of operations
which are wholly mountainous; but, as its evacuation may be compelled by
decisive operations in the valleys of the Waag or the Theiss, it must be
regarded as a temporary barrier. The attack and defense of this country,
however, would be a strategic study of the most interesting character.

When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,
is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is secondary,
and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies deciding the great
contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be otherwise if this be the whole
field.

It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave
control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave control of
the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and competent
judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that the valley of the
Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in this kind of questions
much depends upon the relative forces and their arrangement in the country.
If sixty thousand French were advancing on Bavaria in presence of an equal
force of Austrians, and the latter should throw thirty thousand men into the
Tyrol, intending to replace them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn,
it would be difficult for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so
large a force on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen,
Kufstein, and Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty
thousand men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority
over the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to
mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,—as
Moreau did in 1800.

Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only accessory
zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of operations, the strategic
problem seems to be more complicated. The campaigns of 1799 and 1800
are equally rich in instruction on this branch of the art. In my account of
them I have endeavored to bring out their teachings by a historical
exposition of the events; and I cannot do better than refer my readers to it.

When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by
the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of the
theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples, we
cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the
transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of
Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying the
interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and Massena in
1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is a model for
operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is a model for
wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided on the plains.

I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this
study.

When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal theater
of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely based upon
maxims applicable in an open country.

Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations of
the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In such
a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small number
of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced guards of
sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide means for
defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate these valleys will
be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for the passage of an army,
transversal marches can only be made by small bodies of light troops.

The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the larger
valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in number; and, if
the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its forces, the invader will
generally be compelled to resort to direct attacks to dislodge it.

However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and
difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the
contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these
centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of retreat
of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it would be in an

open country; since the occupation of one or two difficult defiles will often
be sufficient to cause the ruin of the whole army.

If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be admitted that
the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity of covering all
the outlets by which an attack in force may be made upon the decisive
points, and of the difficulties of the transversal marches which it would be
compelled to make to cover the menaced points. In order to complete what I
have said upon this kind of marches and the difficulties of directing them, I
will refer to what Napoleon did in 1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this
operation was facilitated by the hundred roads which cross Swabia in all
directions, and if it would have been impracticable in a mountainous
country, for want of transversal routes, to make the long circuit from
Donauwerth by Augsburg to Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by
these same hundred roads have effected his retreat with much greater
facility than if he had been entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or
of the Tyrol, from which there was but a single outlet.

On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country
concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to occupy all
the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be easy for the
latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very mountainous country,
where there are ordinarily but one or two principal routes into which other
valleys open, even from the direction of the enemy, the concentration of
forces becomes more difficult, since serious inconveniences may result if
even one of these important valleys be not observed.

Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in
mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we
attempt simply to give advice in such cases,—to say nothing of laying down
maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a single definite
front of small extent, consisting of four or five converging valleys, the
common junction of which is at a distance of two or three short marches
from the summits of the ranges, it would be easier of solution. It would then
be sufficient to recommend the construction of a good fort at the narrowest
and least-easily turned point of each of these valleys. Protected by these
forts, a few brigades of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage,

while half the army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would
be in position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously
threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he
debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of the
advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for rendezvous
when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to continue to act in
the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the general on the defensive
may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the many difficulties which the
country offers to the assailant. But, if there be other fronts like this upon the
right and left, all of which are to be defended, the problem is changed: the
difficulties of the defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this
system of a cordon of forts becomes dangerous,—while it is not easy to
adopt a better one.

We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration of
the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's defeat at
Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and Rheineck to
Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had enemies in
front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch, and at Chur;
Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian army menaced the
Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend such a
circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great valleys,
thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward Soleure, it
was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the trap in which the
French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of the defense. But how
could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how abandon Rheineck and the
Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the approach by Berne, without
surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the Coalition? And if he covered
each point even by a brigade, where would be his army when he would
need it to give battle to an approaching force? It is a natural system on a
level theater to concentrate the masses of an army; but in the mountains
such a course would surrender the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not
easy to say where an inferior army could be concentrated without
compromising it.

After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it seemed
that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line of the Jura.

He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,—a line shorter than that of the
Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance to the attacks of the
Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into Lombardy by the Valtellina,
had marched to Berne or made a junction with the archduke, Massena
would have been ruined. These events seem to prove that if a country
covered with high mountains be favorable for defense in a tactical point of
view, it is different in a strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of
the troops. This can only be remedied by giving them greater mobility and
by passing often to the offensive.

General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on the
contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind of war,
the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he might lose
the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by demonstrating
that a passive defense must yield under an active attack,—which goes to
show that the initiative is no less favorable in mountains than in plains. If
there could be any doubt on this point, it ought to be dispelled by Massena's
campaign in Switzerland, where he sustained himself only by attacking the
enemy at every opportunity, even when he was obliged to seek him on the
Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard. Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in
the Tyrol, when he was opposed to Wurmser and Alvinzi.

As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading
the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the
Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to
capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the
presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the Muttenthal,
Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had been, and
extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary was the ten
days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand men was
surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, and
yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after four admirable
fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory in details, and also that
in such a country a strong and heroic will is worth more than all the
precepts in the world. After such lessons, need I say that one of the
principal rules of this kind of war is, not to risk one's self in the valleys

without securing the heights? Shall I say also that in this kind of war, more
than in any other, operations should be directed upon the communications
of the enemy? And, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of defense at
the confluence of the great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined
with great mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best
means of defending the country?

I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous countries
are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a national one, in
which the whole people rise up to defend their homes with the obstinacy
which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every advance is then dearly
bought. But to be successful it is always necessary that the people be
sustained by a disciplined force, more or less numerous: without this they
must finally yield, like the heroes of Stanz and of the Tyrol.

The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case: it
may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are extensive
plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.

In the first case there is little more to be done than this,—viz.: make
demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the
enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which
promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break through
a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders
than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole line is forced.
The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz in
1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men on Innspruck in the midst
of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled
them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry and bold
commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be forced.

The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army
which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between
Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those
insurmountable obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him
it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have
already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and
Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it

inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral issues.
Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to
defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward Turin or
Carignano.

When we consider the tactical difficulties of this kind of war, and the
immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to regard
the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as
an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought to be divided into as
many columns as there are practicable passes. In my opinion, this is one of
the most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what I say it is only
necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of Championnet at the battle of
Fossano. If there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all,
of course, be threatened; but the army should cross the chain in not more
than two masses, and the routes which these follow should not be divergent;
for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately.
Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed
the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on each flank by Mont-
Cenis and the Simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his
march.

The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much
greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be
accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of battle
for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous region, and
the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it would be
imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow and deep
valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the invading
army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or three lateral
lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, the marches being
so arranged that the masses may debouch at the junction of the valleys at
nearly the same instant. The enemy should be driven from all the ridges
which separate these valleys.

Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would be
the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with their
assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple number.

To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, would
be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best school for this
kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by the Archduke
Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my History of the
Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of the Grisons by
Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr and Suchet, the
campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the passage of the Alps
by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this study.

ARTICLE XXIX.
Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.

There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those which are
merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The second are great
continental invasions, through extensive tracts of country, which may be
either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. The third are of the same
nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous fleets.
The fourth class comprises those beyond the seas, to found, defend, or
attack distant colonies. The fifth includes the great descents, where the
distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is
attacked.

As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the Rhine or
in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly be stronger and
more favorably situated than if it had reached either of these points by
passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its base, lines of
operations, and eventual points of support will be the same as those of its
allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense, provisions in their
depots, and munitions in their arsenals;—while in the other case its
resources would be upon the Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford
another example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions.

In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is merely
an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own interest and with
its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in the way of these
auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of all the armies,—
particularly if he belong to the state which is not a principal party; as may
be learned from the campaign of 1805. General Koutousoff advanced on the
Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty thousand Russians, to effect a
junction with Mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with
the exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from Donauwerth by

Kienmayer. The Russian general thus found himself with fifty thousand
men exposed to the impetuous activity of Napoleon with one hundred and
fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune, he was separated from his
own frontiers by a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles. His
position would have been hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to
reinforce him. The battle of Austerlitz—due to a fault of Weyrother—
endangered the Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It
almost became the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that
gave it the opportunity of regaining its own country.

The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the expedition
to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in Holland, are
examples which should be well studied by every commander under such
circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less
disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in no
respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of the
French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political ties are
never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension which may
compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have been cited in
Article XIX., on political objective points.

History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with forests,
pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were necessary to
transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to the other, the
Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran empires in
succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery and the
organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly since
civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer together and
have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, no
such events have taken place.

Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of

Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of Charles
XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the
campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in Germany were
of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the Swedes were only
auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, besides, the forces
concerned in both were not large. In modern times no one but Napoleon has
dared to transport the armies of half of Europe from the Rhine to the Volga;
and there is little danger that he will be imitated.

Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the same
operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from these great
distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of operations,
strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and here
it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert
all danger. The campaign of 1812, although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a
model for a distant invasion. His care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and
Reynier on the Bug, while Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the
Dwina, Victor covered Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and
Vistula, proves that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in
order to base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises
may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their
success.

If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at Wilna;
in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was unequal to it;
and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which that general could
not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do not speak now of his
error in remaining in Moscow after the conflagration, since then there was
no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been so great if
the retreat had taken place immediately. He has also been accused of having
too much despised distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as
the Kremlin. Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we
ought to know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk,

instead of wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have
been possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without
having previously defeated the Russian army.

It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a dénouement
between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery of
the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the people.
Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and sincere concurrence
of a military state, whose territories would have given him a sure base for
his attack upon the colossal power of Russia, he founded his enterprise
upon the co-operation of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and
besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral
enthusiasm.

The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point for
their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never to attempt
them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a
respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper
base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which may
also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming
the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these operations, the
reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the safety of deep lines of
operations and the establishment of eventual bases, as giving all the military
means of lessening the danger; to these should be added a just appreciation
of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,—in short, accuracy in
calculation and moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not
be carried too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims
can insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
ruined nations and armies.

Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been rare
since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in date of
occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the sea, after
having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed

into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the
land-forces necessary for such expeditions.

It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now is
very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest of
Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
fleet coasted the shore.

Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that the
assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. Still,
sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress depends upon the
winds,—which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is
exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence.

The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the
only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations of
war.

Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still
not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking Cadiz might
find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon the Pyrenees
and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the Tagus. Likewise,
the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of Hungary might
have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going as far as the
Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes
already gained, the state of the country, will all be elements in determining
the extent of the enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion
them well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is a great
talent in a general. Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in
these invasions as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as
stated in Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it
would not be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change
of policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and of
Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the strict

neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their co-operation
cannot be obtained.

EPITOME OF STRATEGY

The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled by
what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which enter
ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the definition at the
beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important operations in war,
strategy fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon tactics
for their execution. Therefore, before treating of these mixed operations, it
will be well to give here the combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as
well as the maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental
principle of war may be made.

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will be
better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give a
synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters of
operations is found in what follows:—

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
accordance with Article XVIII.

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic field,
that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy with the
least risk to one's self.

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
retreats parallel to the frontiers.

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success of
Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations upon
the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the
respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims presented
in Article XXI.

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them such
directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the forces,
and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from affording
each other mutual support.

5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic positions,
and all large detachments made to cover the most important strategic points
of the theater of war.

6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so
as, by their successive employment upon points where it may be important
to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army.

The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the enemy's,
and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will be quintupled if
the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive strategic points of the
zone of operations, where the severest blows to the enemy can be given.

However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and successive
employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, thus insuring
their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and continually, and
gives them proper directions, may be confident both of gaining victories
and of securing great results therefrom.

The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already
mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in

Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty battalions,
carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and Landau, by
reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four victories and
saved France. The whole science of marches would have been found in this
wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive strategic point. The
Austrian was then the principal army of the Coalition, and its line of retreat
was upon Cologne: hence it was upon the Meuse that a general effort of the
French would have inflicted the most severe blow. The Committee of Public
Safety provided for the most pressing danger, and the maneuver contains
half of the strategic principle; the other half consists in giving to such
efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at
Ratisbon. The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.

It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be able to
assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of war most
favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own country, by the
location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and of têtes de ponts, and
by the opening of communications in the great decisive directions: these
constitute not the least interesting part of the science. We have already seen
how we are to recognize these lines and these decisive points, whether
permanent or temporary. Napoleon has afforded instruction on this point by
the roads of the Simplon and Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has
profited by it in the roads from the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard,
and the Splugen, as well as by different fortified places projected or
completed.

CHAPTER IV.
GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.

Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great questions
of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to the decisive
points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of
battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories.

Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles,
as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical
combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in
hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession
of which promises the most important results.

Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been
destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles,
by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that a complete and
decided victory may give rise to results of the same character when there
may have been no grand strategic combinations.

The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which are
not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the order of
battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the plan of the battle,
as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and
enlightened co-operation of the officers subordinate to the commander-in-
chief, the cause of the contest, the proportions and quality of the troops,
their greater or less enthusiasm, superiority on the one side or the other in
artillery or cavalry, and the manner of handling these arms; but it is the
morale of armies, as well as of nations, more than any thing else, which
makes victories and their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error
in asserting that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy

cannot result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a
few brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his position.
At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver
more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As is evident
from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage the use of that
maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of it; but it is very
important to know how to use it skillfully and opportunely, and I am,
moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's design to make himself master
of his enemy's communications while at the same time holding his own, he
would do better to employ strategic than tactical combinations to
accomplish it.

There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those fought by
armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's attack; 2d,
offensive battles, where one army attacks another in position; 3d, battles
fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the collision of two armies meeting
on the march. We will examine in succession the different combinations
they present.

ARTICLE XXX.
Positions and Defensive Battles.

When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line of
battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this work, it
will appear that I make a distinction between lines of battle and orders of
battle,—things which have been constantly confounded. I will designate as
a line of battle the position occupied by battalions, either deployed or in
columns of attack, which an army will take up to hold a camp and a certain
portion of ground where it will await attack, having no particular project in
view for the future: it is the right name to give to a body of troops formed
with proper tactical intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will
be more fully explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate
as an order of battle an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the oblique
order, the perpendicular order.

This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
distinction between two things which should by no means be confounded.
[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that the line of battle

belongs especially to defensive arrangements; because an army awaiting an
attack without knowing what or where it will be must necessarily form a
rather indefinite and objectless line of battle. Order of battle, on the
contrary, indicating an arrangement of troops formed with an intention of
fighting while executing some maneuver previously determined upon,
belongs more particularly to offensive dispositions. However, it is by no
means pretended that the line of battle is exclusively a defensive
arrangement; for a body of troops may in this formation very well proceed
to the attack of a position, while an army on the defensive may use the
oblique order or any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.

Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of positions,
an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a favorable point,
strong by nature and selected beforehand for the purpose of there fighting a
defensive battle. Such a position may be taken up when the object is to
cover an important objective point, such as a capital, large depots, or a
decisive strategic point which controls the surrounding country, or, finally,
to cover a siege.

There are two kinds of positions,—the strategic, which has been discussed
in Article XX., and the tactical. The latter, again, are subdivided. In the first
place, there are intrenched positions occupied to await the enemy under
cover of works more or less connected,—in a word, intrenched camps.
Their relations to strategic operations have been treated in Article XXVII.,
and their attack and defense are discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we
have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp for the purpose of
gaining a few days' time. Third and last are open positions, chosen in
advance to fight on the defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these
positions vary according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of
importance not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep and
difficult of access,—quite suitable places, probably, for temporary camps,
but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this kind, to be
really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of access, but should be
adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as many
advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the principal strength
of the army, and, finally, the obstacles presented by its features should be
more disadvantageous for the enemy than for the assailed. For example, it is
certain that Massena, in taking the strong position of the Albis, would have
made a great error if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery;
whilst it was exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the
same reason, Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his
troops, made a good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues
of approach were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was,
moreover, rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a battle-
ground.

The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are the
following:—

1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him
to approach the line of battle.

2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.

3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of
troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any
point deemed the proper one.

4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements.

5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.

6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or artificial
obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon their
extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or at
least some point of the front.

This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on a
river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest
reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the
broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which
seemed to afford perfect protection. This danger—about which
there can be no doubt—gives rise to the thought that points
admitting an easy defense are better on a battle-field than
insurmountable obstacles.[23]

7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied
by throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy
may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground

must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)

8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points
of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the
center. Such a position will always be one of the most
advantageous for defense,—as was shown at Malplaquet and
Waterloo. Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the
smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington's
center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.

When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
idle spectators of it.

The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is to
know how to take the offensive at a proper time, and to take it. Among the
conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of
enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an examination of a
question presented by the battle of Waterloo. Would an army with its rear
resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the center and each
wing, have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose
the battle? My own opinion is that such a position would be more favorable
for a retreat than an entirely open field; for a beaten army could not cross a
plain without exposure to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat
becomes a rout, a portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest
would, in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. There is,
indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest,—this statement
being made upon the supposition that there are at least two good roads
behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the

enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the
enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating
army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat
would be the more secure if, as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave
line behind the center; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to
receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main
roads.

When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying
chances which the two systems, the defensive and the offensive, give rise to;
and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the initiative has
the great advantage of bringing up its troops and striking a blow where it
may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon the defensive and awaits
an attack is anticipated in every direction, is often taken unawares, and is
always obliged to regulate its movements by those of the enemy. We have
also seen that in tactics these advantages are not so marked, because in this
case the operations occupy a smaller extent of ground, and the party taking
the initiative cannot conceal his movements from the enemy, who, instantly
observing, may at once counteract them by the aid of a good reserve.
Moreover, the party advancing upon the enemy has against him all the
disadvantages arising from accidents of ground that he must pass before
reaching the hostile line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are
always inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,
farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or be
passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's
batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a greater
or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire either of
musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all must
agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting from taking the
initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.

However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more
manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.
Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if attacked,
be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by all the advantages
of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to take the offensive when
occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest success. A general who stands

motionless to receive his enemy, keeping strictly on the defensive, may
fight ever so bravely, but he must give way when properly attacked. It is not
so, however, with a general who indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with
the determination to fall upon him offensively at the proper moment, to
wrest from him and transfer to his own troops the moral effect always
produced by an onward movement when coupled with the certainty of
throwing the main strength into the action at the most important point,—a
thing altogether impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact,
a general who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are
free, has the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces,
previously arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by
batteries placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy
pay very dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies;
and when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral effect of
such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is
certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.

A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success either the
offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,—1st, that, so far from
limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know how to take the
offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his coup-d'oeil be certain and his
coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able to rely surely upon his troops; 4th,
that, in retaking the offensive, he should by no means neglect to apply the
general principle which would have regulated his order of battle had he
done so in the beginning; 5th, that he strike his blows upon decisive points.
These truths are demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and
Austerlitz, as well as by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at
Waterloo.

FOOTNOTES:

[22]

It is from no desire to make innovations that I have modified old
terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is wrong
for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if

we continue to apply the term order of battle to the disposition of
troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important
maneuvers by the terms oblique order of battle, concave order of
battle, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms oblique
system of battle, &c.

I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The order of
battle on paper may take the name plan of organization, and the
ordinary formation of troops upon the ground will then be called
line of battle.

[23]

The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and the
rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the
Danube, in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps
be said that the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not
the same; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it must
be granted that the difficulties of a position, when properly taken
advantage of, need not be insurmountable in order to render the
attack abortive. At Elchingen the great height and steepness of the
banks, rendering the fire almost ineffectual, were more
disadvantageous than useful in the defense.

ARTICLE XXXI.
Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.

We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when
assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic
defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army
receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the offensive
and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes numerous
examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive battles have been
discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages of the defensive been
pointed out, we will now proceed to the consideration of offensive
movements.

It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage over
the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the latter,
who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.

As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack must
be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called order of
battle.

It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without a
detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely known. In
either case it should be well understood that there is in every battle-field a
decisive point, the possession of which, more than of any other, helps to
secure the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application of the
principles of war: arrangements should therefore be made for striking the
decisive blow upon this point.

The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already
stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different localities
upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the arrangement of the

contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's flank to rest upon high
ground from which his whole line might be attained, the occupation of this
height seems most important, tactically considered; but it may happen that
the height in question is very difficult of access, and situated exactly so as
to be of the least importance, strategically considered. At the battle of
Bautzen the left of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia,
which province was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that,
tactically considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to
be held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line of
retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the right,
which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and throw the
allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all their matériel and a
great part of the personnel of their army. This course was also easier for
them on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led to more
important results, and would have diminished the obstacles in the future.

The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated: 1.
The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical key; 2. The
decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which combines strategic
with topographical advantages; 3. When the difficulties of the ground are
not too formidable upon the strategic point of the battle-field, this is
generally the most important point; 4. It is nevertheless true that the
determination of this point depends very much upon the arrangement of the
contending forces. Thus, in lines of battle too much extended and divided
the center will always be the proper point of attack; in lines well closed and
connected the center is the strongest point, since, independently of the
reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive
point in this case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the
numerical superiority is considerable, an attack may be made
simultaneously upon both extremities, but not when the attacking force is
equal or inferior numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all
the combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to
obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points mentioned
which offers the greatest number of chances of success,—a point very
easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.

The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut
his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin his army
completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at some
point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank and rear,
or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him in front while
at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line turned.

To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make choice
of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.

At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple
parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive crotchet;
3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order reinforced in
the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique reinforced on the
attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on one or both wings; 8.
The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The order by echelon on one
or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the center; 12. The order
resulting from a strong combined attack upon the center and one extremity
simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)

Fig. 5.[25]

Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been stated, in
connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to turn the
enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits of each, it
becomes necessary to test each by the application of the general principles
which have been laid down. For example, it is manifest that the parallel
order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it requires no skill to fight one line against
another, battalion against battalion, with equal chances of success on either
side: no tactical skill is needed in such a battle.

There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order, which
occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great strategic
operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's
communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its own;
when the battle takes place between them, that army which has reached the
rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having effected the decisive
maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts should now be directed
toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to open a way through for
himself. Except for this single case, the parallel order is the worst of all. I
do not mean to say that a battle cannot be gained while using this order, for
one side or the other must gain the victory if the contest is continued; and
the advantage will then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best
knows when to engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most
favored by fortune.

Fig. 6.

The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most usually
adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an offensive
combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in the case of
defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very remarkable example
of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if properly attacked.

Fig. 7.

The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the center,
(Fig. 8,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favorable than the two
preceding ones, and is also much more in accordance with the general
principles which have been laid down; although, when the contending
forces are about equal, the part of the line which has been weakened to
reinforce the other may have its own safety compromised if placed in line
parallel to the enemy.

Fig. 8.

Fig. 9.

The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a
superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main strength of
the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it has two others
equally important, since the weakened wing is not only kept back from the
attack of the enemy, but performs also the double duty of holding in
position the part of his line not attacked, and of being at hand as a reserve
for the support, if necessary, of the engaged wing. This order was used by
the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. The
most brilliant example of its use in modern times was given by Frederick
the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand
Operations.)

The perpendicular order on one or
Fig. 10. both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and
11, can only be considered an
arrangement to indicate the
direction along which the primary
tactical movements might be made
in a battle. Two armies will never
long occupy the relative
perpendicular positions indicated in
these figures; for if the army B were
to take its first position on a line

perpendicular to one or both
extremities of the army A, the latter
would at once change the front of a
portion of its line; and even the
army B, as soon as it extended itself
to or beyond the extremity of A,
must of necessity turn its columns
either to the right or the left, in
order to bring them near the
enemy's line, and so take him in
reverse, as at C, the result being two
oblique lines, as shown in Fig. 10.

The inference is that one division of
the assailing army would take a Fig. 11.
position perpendicular to the
enemy's wing, whilst the remainder
of the army would approach in front
for the purpose of annoying him;
and this would always bring us
back to one of the oblique orders
shown in Figures 9 and 16.

The attack on both wings, whatever
be the form of attack adopted, may
be very advantageous, but it is only
admissible when the assailant is
very decidedly superior in numbers;
for, if the fundamental principle is
to bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker
army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior force.
This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.

Fig. 12.

The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the day
when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannæ. This order may
indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to it;
that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him, and he
suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order is adopted
before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on the center, has only
to attack the wings, which present their extremities and are in precisely the
same relative situation as if they had been assailed in flank. This order
would, therefore, be scarcely ever used except against an enemy who had
taken the convex order to fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.

Fig. 12 bis.

An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line with
the center retired, (Fig. 12, bis.) If several writers may be believed, such an
arrangement gave the victory to the English on the famous days of Crécy
and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than a semicircle, since it does
not so much present the flank to attack, whilst allowing forward movement
by echelon and preserving all the advantages of concentration of fire. These
advantages vanish if the enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon
the retired center, is content to watch it from a distance and makes his
greatest effort upon one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the

advantageous use of a concave line; but it must not be inferred that
Napoleon committed an error in attacking the center; for an army fighting
with the Danube behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering
its bridges of communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to
maneuver at pleasure.

Fig. 13.

The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an
engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must
be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a defensive
battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be passed and the
defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may become a natural formation
to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If an enemy directs his efforts
against the center or against a single wing, this order might cause the ruin of
the whole army.[26]

The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because the
Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center or
upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six diverging lines,
and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the same convex order
was adopted at Essling, and during the second and third days of the famous
battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had just the result that might have
been expected.

Fig. 14.

The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as
the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that, because,
the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where the reserve
would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as regards room and
time, to throw himself into the interval of the center and make at that point
a threatening counter-attack.

Fig. 15.

The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special
success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too
extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the wings
and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be probably
destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental principle, this
order of attack would appear to be less certain of success against an army
having a connected and closed line; for the reserve being generally near the
center, and the wings being able to act either by concentrating their fire or
by moving against the foremost echelons, might readily repulse them.

If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge or
boar's head of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also differs
from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid mass,—an
impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of artillery,—it would
have a large open space in the middle, which would render movements
more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been said, for penetrating the
center of a line too much extended, and might be equally successful against
a line unavoidably immovable; but if the wings of the attacked line are
brought at a proper time against the flanks of the foremost echelons,
disagreeable consequences might result. A parallel order considerably
reinforced on the center might perhaps be a much better arrangement, (Figs.
8 and 16;) for the parallel line in this case would have at least the advantage
of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack, and would hinder the
wings from taking the echelons of the center by the flank.

This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the
intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter
xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain that the
defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, there is no
danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this formation having the
inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point of his line which it is
desired to attack, false attacks should be made upon the wings, to mislead
him as to the true point of attack.

Fig. 16.

The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the
same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an attack upon
an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may even be called
the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The attack upon the center,
aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents the assailed party falling
upon the assailant and taking him in flank, as was done by Hannibal and

Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is hemmed in between the attacks
on the center and at the extremity, having to contend with nearly the entire
opposing force, will be defeated and probably destroyed. It was this
maneuver which gave Napoleon his victories of Wagram and Ligny. This
was what he wished to attempt at Borodino,—where he obtained only a
partial success, on account of the heroic conduct of the Russian left and the
division of Paskevitch in the famous central redoubt, and on account of the
arrival of Baggavout's corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it
also at Bautzen,—where an unprecedented success would have been the
result, but for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left
wing intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
arrangement having been made with that view.

It should be observed that these different orders are not to be understood
precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general who would
expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-
ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat.
This is particularly true as battles are now fought. In the time of Louis XIV.
or of Frederick, it was possible to form lines of battle almost as regular as
the geometrical figures, because armies camped under tents, almost always
closely collected together, and were in presence of each other several days,
thus giving ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the
columns to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,—when
armies bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater
mobility, when they take position near each other in obedience to orders
given them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has
been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,—finally,
when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of battle,
—under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be laid out
with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures have never
been of any other use than to indicate approximate arrangements.

If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of winning
battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of battle, and
a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of maneuvers
arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different; for the great

difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to render certain the
simultaneous entering into action of the numerous fractions whose efforts
must combine to make such an attack as will give good ground to hope for
victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is to cause these fractions to
unite in the execution of the decisive maneuver which, in accordance with
the original plan of the battle, is to result in victory.

Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess
of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective coup-d'oeil militaire,—
every thing of this kind may interfere with the simultaneous entering into
action of the different parts, without speaking of the accidental
circumstances which may delay or prevent the arrival of a corps at the
appointed place.

Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive maneuver
is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers seasonably
executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than those
determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to previous strategic
movements, will bring up the columns which are to decide the day upon
those points where their presence will secure the expected result. Waterloo
and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the moment when Blücher and
Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont, nothing could have
prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and they could then only fight
to make the defeat less complete. In like manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney
had reached Klix, the retreat of the allies during the night of the 20th of
May could alone have saved them, for on the 21st it was too late; and, if
Ney had executed better what he was advised to do, the victory would have
been a very great one.

As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the co-
operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, with
the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, it may be
stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends upon such an
accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely seen. This subject
will be considered in Art. XXXII.

Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an order of
battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin without even
the assailant having a well-defined object, although the collision may have
been expected. This uncertainty results either from circumstances prior to
the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans, or from the
fact that a portion of the army may be still expected to arrive on the field.

From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that the
adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an engagement,
—an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases cited above.
Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it is probable that
at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy lines nearly
parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the party acting
upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm will burst upon
him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to be used as occasion
may require; the assailant must make similar efforts to have his forces well
in hand; but as soon as the point of attack shall have been determined, the
mass of his troops will be directed against the center or upon one wing of
the enemy, or upon both at once. Whatever may be the resulting formation,
it will always bear a resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited.
Even in unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,—which
will, it is hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of
the different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.

There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my assertion,
although they are less susceptible than any others of being represented by
lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at Rivoli, at Austerlitz,
and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward the center to be ready at
the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. At the Pyramids he formed an
oblique line of squares in echelon. At Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used
a kind of convex order very like Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was
altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up two masses upon the center and right,
while keeping back the left wing; and this he wished to repeat at Borodino
and at Waterloo before the Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the
collision was almost entirely unforeseen on account of the very unexpected
return and offensive movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left

almost perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to
break through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on
the center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack
vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the
two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center was
covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition, the
attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the enemy's
line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself, the oblique
order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved him from almost
inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by strategy before they
were fought, tactics having but little to do with them. At Ulm there was not
even a regular battle.

I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark out
upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be used in
tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless bear in mind
the orders which have been indicated above, and may so combine his troops
on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be similar to one of them. He
should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or
adopted on the spur of the moment, to form a sound conclusion as to the
important point of the battle-field; and this he can only do by observing
well the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting the
direction in which strategy requires him to operate. He will then give his
attention and efforts to this point, using a third of his force to keep the
enemy in check or watch his movements, while throwing the other two-
thirds upon the point the possession of which will insure him the victory.
Acting thus, he will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand
tactics can impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art
in the most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of
a battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)

Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me that
this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in the
Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.

The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern invention, a
theorist's fancy,—an opinion I can by no means share; for the oblique order

is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it used with my own eyes.
This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more remarkable because Napoleon
himself boasted of having used, at Marengo, the very order of which he thus
denies the existence.

If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid and
precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.
Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I repeat
that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and when such
figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it can only be for
the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by the use of a known
symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of battle which is neither
parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must be oblique of necessity. If
one army attacks the extremity of another army, the attacking wing being
reinforced by massing troops upon it while the weakened wing is kept
retired from attack, the direction of the line must of necessity be a little
oblique, since one end of it will be nearer the enemy than the other. The
oblique order is so far from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the
order is that by echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.)

As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied that at
Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was a concave
line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders parallel lines may be
used as in the case of straight lines, and they would be classified as
belonging to the parallel system when no part of the line was more strongly
occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than another.

Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical
figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles in a truly
scientific manner, the following points must be attended to:—

1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force
the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.

2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to
overwhelm one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same
time. An enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for
outflanking and turning his position.

3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if
concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.

4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without
having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the
rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very
strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.

5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least half
the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,
while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack,
being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line.

6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.

7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the
attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be
such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,
and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to
fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least
expect to meet it.

8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method to
use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order of
battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the
fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. A
skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately
as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. In
the practical use of this system many variations must arise from
differences in the coup-d'oeil of commanders, the morale of
officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers and firings
of all sorts, from varying localities, &c.

9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from
his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means
of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be

accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the
direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better
results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing
which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus
threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if
attacked by main force.

History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain
them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine
these turning movements with attacks by main force.

10. The combination of these two methods—that is to say, the
attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver—will
render the victory more certain than the use of either separately;
but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even
in presence of a contemptible enemy.

11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main
force is the following:—Throw his troops into confusion by a
heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion
by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus
gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in
front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.

But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon
the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, the
reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking party
would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral effect
of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat of the
second and cause the general in command to lose his presence of
mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat
disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to
replace them by those of the second line, because they generally

follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within
musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to
substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the
moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in
repelling the attack.

These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the
troops of the defensive army are equally active in the
performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if
their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage
will usually be on their side at the second collision of the battle;
but to insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.

12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
"that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means
the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in strongly
supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and
these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of
cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at
the second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of
all the problems of the tactics of battles."

In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
substitute for that intuitive coup-d'oeil imparted by experience in
battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.

The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of
all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should
be always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment
of the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties is

broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put forth,—on
the one side to complete the victory, on the other to wrest it from
the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to make this
decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack
upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous.

13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops
as skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses.
The object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion
the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and
musketry will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and
when the enemy presses too closely the columns of the second
line and part of the cavalry must be launched against him. There
will then be a strong probability of his repulse.

FOOTNOTES:

[24]

In every battle one party must be the assailant and the other
assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
defensive for the other.

[25]

The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve orders indicates
the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of
battle ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in
columns of attack, in squares, or checkerwise.

[26]

An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in some
cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a
rule, a false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack
against one extremity, would be the best method to use against
such a line.

[27]

The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when it is
necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and
what Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to
every reader of history.

ARTICLE XXXII.
Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.

We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn an
enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may be
expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide détours
which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many
plans seemingly well arranged.

It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is
so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of
beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger
depends very much upon the rapid and certain coup-d'oeil of the opposing
general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is
not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind have failed
against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a
movement which would have been hazardous in presence of Frederick,
Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire success against a general of
limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the
proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in
this manner.

It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. The
following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the force
well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however,
to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. A
commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and seems
inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more
daring.

A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the
truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended
movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies
concerned in them.

In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because the
Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between
their right and the remainder of their army,—the latter part remaining
motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was the more
extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter distance to pass
over in order to support their right than Frederick had to attack it; for the
right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick was obliged to move on
the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.

On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, because
he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected
(nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of Marshal Daun.[28]
Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of
Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed.

The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar with
that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother wished to
surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of
Rivoli. Their center was beaten,—while their left was piled up in the ravine
of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making a wide détour to get
upon the rear of the French army, where he was speedily surrounded and
captured.

No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst Saint-Cyr,
with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to pass twelve
miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of sixty thousand
men, which could not help being victorious over these divided fractions,
and should certainly have captured the part in their rear. Saint-Cyr's escape
was indeed little less than a miracle.

We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz, in
spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of the
allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off from
Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of
nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their line.
Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes Tellnitz
and Melnitz.

Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to Portugal,
left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,—seeing which, the English
general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no support.

If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case a
total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
merit was a rapid and practiced tactical coup-d'oeil. With the Duke of York
or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been successful.

Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was almost
altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare concurrence of
fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will search in vain in
military history for another example of a single brigade venturing into a
forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such
astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in the defile of Matenpoet, where
he might have expected, in all probability, to lay down his arms.

At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center under
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune

assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have been the
result.

So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for it
seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an order of
battle well closed and well connected, a general will find himself prepared
for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially
important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's character and
his usual style of warfare, to enable him to regulate his own actions
accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may
be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the
commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to outflank and turn a wing
should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an
attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the
wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic operations to cut an
enemy's line of communications before giving battle, and attack him in rear,
the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely
to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
maneuver during the battle.

FOOTNOTES:

[28]

For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and XXV. of
the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.

ARTICLE XXXIII.
Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.

The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.

In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a position
chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as close and
accurate as possible. It often happens, however,—especially as war is now
carried on,—that two armies approach each other, each intending to make
an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision ensues unexpected by both
armies, since each finds the other where it does not anticipate a meeting.
One army may also be attacked by another which has prepared a surprise
for it,—as happened to the French at Rossbach.

A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a skillful
general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always possible to
gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander may not have
great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen, Luzzara, Eylau,
Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius endowed with great
coolness and using the wisest combinations.

There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no means
easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the very cases
in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the fundamental
principles of the art and the different methods of applying them, in order to
a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided upon at the instant
and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.

Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause their
advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they are traversing.

In each army the forces should at the same time be concentrated so that they
may be thrown in a proper direction considering the object of the march. A
grave error would be committed in deploying the whole army behind the
advanced guard; because, even if the deployment were accomplished, the
result would be nothing more than a badly-arranged parallel order, and if
the enemy pressed the advanced guard with considerable vigor the
consequence might be the rout of the troops which were forming. (See the
account of the battle of Rossbach, Treatise on Grand Operations.)

In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, these
routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are unchanged. The
advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then the mass of the
troops concentrated in that direction which is best suited for carrying out
the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the enemy may then attempt,
every thing will be in readiness to meet him.

ARTICLE XXXIV.
Of Surprises of Armies.

I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,—the chief features
in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light Russian and
Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself to an
examination of the surprise of whole armies.

Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected than
at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are heard to so
great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility,
unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten and the enemy is in the
midst of the army before his presence is known because there are no
outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War presents a memorable
example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that a surprise does not
consist simply in falling upon troops that are sleeping or keeping a poor
look-out, but that it may result from the combination of a sudden attack
upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity of the army. In fact, to surprise
an army it is not necessary to take it so entirely unawares that the troops
will not even have emerged from their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in
force at the point intended, before preparations can be made to meet the
attack.

As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan one it
becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's camp. At
Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a surprise; but
this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected attack. The only
great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in 1812, where Murat was
attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his imprudence, Murat
pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but there was really nothing
of the kind, and he was surprised through his own negligence.

It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to fall
upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of the sort
is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place; and, if the
assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can give a suitable
tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his forces, he may expect a
complete success, unless unforeseen events occur. This is an operation by
no means to be despised in war, although it is rare, and less brilliant than a
great strategic combination which renders the victory certain even before
the battle is fought.

For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities for
surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to prevent
such attacks. The regulations for the government of any well-organized
army should point out the means for doing the last.

ARTICLE XXXV.
Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched
Camps or Lines.—Of Coups de Main in General.

There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, are
regarded as secure against coups de main, but may nevertheless be carried
by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether practicable, but so
steep as to require the use of ladders or some other means of getting to the
parapet.

The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations as
that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of coups de main.

This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength of
the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are built; 3d,
with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with the morale of the
respective parties. History gives us examples of all of these varieties.

For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw, the
lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch, Scharnitz, and
Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with varying
circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were better
connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in fact, a tête
de pont nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for the archduke thought
himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would have been extremely
hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At Warsaw the works
were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had as a keep a large city
surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended by a number of
desperate men.

Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of which,
however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was suited

to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple redoubts, at
considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep giving it its sole
strength.[29]

At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at Turin,
where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant parapet
with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. In the latter
case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were attacked in rear by
a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene assailed them from
without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front, only a small
detachment having succeeded in passing around the right flank.

The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few in
number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked a little
before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if this operation
may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by no means to be
expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp will permit itself
to be surprised,—especially as the regulations of all services require armies
to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack by main force seems likely to be
the method followed in this case, the following simple and reasonable
directions are laid down:—

1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire, which
at the same time has the effect of discouraging the defenders.

2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
mount the parapet.

3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
support.

4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.

5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner
of attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies
of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the
ground permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is
nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
daring rashness.

Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.

Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read, none
are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched camp of
Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions for attacking
the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is an excellent
example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited as one of the
finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal Paskevitch and the
troops who executed it. As an example not to be followed, no better can be
given than the arrangements made for attacking Dresden in 1813.

Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,—both
preceded by sieges, but still brilliant coups de main, since in neither case
was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.

Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost impossible
to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. The
capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described in
the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,) and
that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent lessons
for study.

This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of it; but I
cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was bought and
how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan was certainly
admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza to Asti by the
right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio, was beautifully
arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When we examine the
operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors owed more to their
good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no great effort of genius upon
the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the order he issued to his army; and he
must have felt a profound contempt for his opponents to execute a march
with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten different nations between
eighty thousand Frenchmen on the one side and the Alps on the other, and
to pass around their camp for forty-eight hours by the most remarkable
flank march that was ever attempted. The order for the attack was so brief
and so devoid of instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to
write a better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by
brigade in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to
make openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp,
make up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of the
intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the bodies of
its defenders.

But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation of
the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If they have a
sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by assault, and if on the
other hand they may be outflanked or turned by strategic maneuvers, it is
far better to pursue the course last indicated than to attempt a hazardous
assault. If, however, there is any reason for preferring the attack by assault,
it should be made upon one of the wings, because the center is the point
most easily succored. There have been cases where an attack on the wing
was expected by the defenders, and they have been deceived by a false
attack made at that point, while the real attack took place at the center, and
succeeded simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and
the character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
be pursued.

The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief and
proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be quite
difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away from
the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of moderate
activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this character; so also
was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so gloriously defended
against Ney, because he preferred making his stand at the ravines in front,
rather than take shelter behind a parapet with an inclination of scarcely
thirty degrees.

If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think of
penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces, the
mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the enemy
driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive return upon the
assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A general and soldiers
who seek refuge behind lines are already half conquered, and the idea of
taking the offensive does not occur to them when their intrenchments are
attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I cannot advise such a course; and
the general who would run such a risk and meet the fate of Tallard at
Blenheim could have no just cause of complaint.

Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between the
center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of the left
wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement succor can be
easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which could not be done
were there but one central reserve. It has been suggested that three reserves
would not be too many if the intrenchment is very extensive; but I
decidedly incline to the opinion that two are quite enough. Another
recommendation may be given, and it is of great importance,—that the
troops be made to understand they must by no means despair of finally
defending a line which may be forced at one point; because, if a good
reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack the assailant, and
succeed in driving him out of the work he may have supposed in his power.

COUPS DE MAIN.

These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake of the
nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these methods
may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a successful issue.
Although coups de main seem to be entirely tactical operations, their
importance certainly depends on the relations of the captured posts to the
strategic combinations in hand. It will become necessary, therefore, to say a
few words with reference to coups de main in Article XXXVI., when
speaking of detachments. However tiresome these repetitions may seem, I
am obliged to state here the manner of executing such operations, as it is
evidently a part of the subject of the attack of intrenchments.

I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these operations; for
their name, coups de main, implies that ordinary rules are not applicable to
them. I desire only to call attention to them, and refer my readers to the
different works, either historical or didactic, where they are mentioned.

I have previously stated that important results may often follow from these
enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful attack of
General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises of Cremona
in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814, as well as the
escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the different kinds of
coup de main. Some are effected by surprise, others by open force. Skill,
stratagems, boldness, on the part of the assailant, and fear excited among
the assailed, are some of the things which have an influence upon the
successful issue of coups de main.

As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer of
the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon the
results of a great strategic operation.

The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that of a
large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the two attacks
which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the
capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, the capture of a

post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of provisions and
munitions much needed by the enemy;—such are the enterprises which will
justify the risks to which a detachment engaging in them may be exposed.

Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with fascines,
sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the same
purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be prepared.
Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of soldiers, to
help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the intrenchment.
An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by Prince Eugene.

In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for what
has been done once may be done again.

FOOTNOTES:

[29]

The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August 25) was
twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
third day, more than one hundred thousand.

[30]

The distinction between the importance and the strength of a post
must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
importance, and vice aversá.

CHAPTER V.
OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN
CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL AND PARTLY
TACTICAL.

ARTICLE XXXVI.
Of Diversions and Great Detachments.

The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important
a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining their
strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest and most
delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing is more
useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and having a
good ensemble of operations with the main body, it is equally certain that
no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately adopted. Frederick
the Great regarded it as one of the essential qualities of a general to know
how to make his adversary send out many detachments, either with the view
of destroying them in detail or of attacking the main body during their
absence.

The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been
carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many persons
now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly much safer and
more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass; but it is a thing at
times impossible or incompatible with gaining a complete or even
considerable success. The essential point in this matter is to send out as few
detachments as possible.

There are several kinds of detachments.

1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of
operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of
greater or less importance.

2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to
cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard a
secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if threatened.

3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations,
in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some
combined operation.

4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect
of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an
important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign.

I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a
distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a theater
of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly supposed the
whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but two cases, the
first of which arises when the troops thus employed cannot conveniently act
elsewhere on account of their distance from the real theater of operations,
and the second is that where such a detachment would receive strong
support from the population among which it was sent,—the latter case
belonging rather to political than military combinations. A few illustrative
examples may not be out of place here.

The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian
expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the end
of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX.,) are well
known.

In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended
an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined forces
of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover, nearly
sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated points.
But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities of Europe,
Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover, Saint-Cyr
hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, and Bernadotte,
leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of Ulm and
Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no difficulty in
retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the failure of
diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation would have been
proper.

In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to La
Vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the
numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the Rhine,
and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been not only
very useful, but decisive.

It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of small
bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations of the main
army.

If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary objects
is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is no less true
that they are often highly proper and, it may be, indispensable.

These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are permanent
corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction opposite to the
main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a campaign. The
second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of assisting in
carrying out some special enterprise.

Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an army
that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which mention has
been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when the configuration
of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For example, a Russian
army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to leave a portion of its
forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the valley of the Danube, whose
direction is perpendicular to its line of operations. However successful it
may be, a respectable force must always be left toward Giurgevo or
Krajova, and even on the right bank of the river toward Routchouk.

This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a double
strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps must be
made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the main army.
Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned where this
measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the double
strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army passing the

Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main column, a
detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong to hold in
check the enemy threatening to cut the line of communications. The third
example is the frontier of Spain, which enables the Spaniards to establish a
double front,—one covering the road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa
or Galicia as a base. To whichever side the invading army turns, a
detachment must be left on the other proportioned in magnitude to the
enemy's force in that direction.

All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge as
much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to give
them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them by
opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable
illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of 1797.
Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the valley of
the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward the Noric
Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk of losing
temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts of his army
disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that he could be
victorious with his army united, he apprehended no particular danger from
the presence of a few hostile detachments upon his communications.

Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following
reasons:—

1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations,
or else to cover your own.

2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main
body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
reinforcements.

3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing
army, while a blow is struck at the remainder.

4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions,
on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the

success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a
convoy of your own.

5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction
where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of
an enterprise in another direction.

6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a
certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison
shut up within the ramparts.

7. To take possession of an important point upon the
communications of an enemy already retreating.

However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as those
enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are always
secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be successful at
the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be
avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason than that they
were not kept together.

We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their success
depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill of their
designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution.

Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles XII. by
causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous convoy
Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain the large
detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.

The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during the
siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of the
two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen in
1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching that
a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must admit that
in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault was not so much