The Philippines_ Past and Present (Volume 1 of 2) Dean C. Worcester 2298 downloads.pdf

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Philippines: Past and
Present (Volume 1 of 2)

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other
parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may
copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in
the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are
located before using this eBook.

Title: The Philippines: Past and Present (Volume 1 of 2)

Author: Dean C. Worcester

Release date: April 1, 2004 [eBook #12077]
Most recently updated: October 28, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12077

Credits: Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net/ for Project
Gutenberg.

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILIPPINES: PAST
AND PRESENT (VOLUME 1 OF 2) ***

The Philippines Past and Present

Peace and Prosperity.

This chance photograph showing General Emilio Aguinaldo as he is to-day, standing with Director of Education Frank
L. Crone, beside a field of corn raised by Emilio Aguinaldo, Jr., in a school contest, typifies the peace, prosperity, and
enlightenment which have been brought about in the Philippine Islands under American rule.

The Philippines Past and
Present

By
Dean C. Worcester
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands 1901–
1913;
Member of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1913
Author of “The Philippine Islands and Their People”

In Two Volumes — With 128 Plates
Volume I
New York
The Macmillan Company
1914
All rights reserved

Contents

Vol. I
Chapter Page
I. View Point and Subject-Matter 1
II. Was Independence Promised? 18
III. Insurgent “Coöperation” 67
IV. The Premeditated Insurgent Attack 127
V. Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report 152
VI. Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley 170
VII. Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere 206
VIII. Did We Destroy a Republic? 242
IX. The Conduct of the War 270
X. Mr. Bryan and Independence 295
XI. The First Philippine Commission 301
XII. The Establishment of Civil Government 325
XIII. The Philippine Civil Service 360
XIV. The Constabulary and Public Order 378
XV. The Administration of Justice 400
XVI. Health Conditions 408
XVII. Baguio and the Benguet Road 449
XVIII. The Coördination of Scientific Work 488

List of Illustrations

Vol. I
Peace and Prosperity Frontispiece
Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey’s Fleet 6
Felipe Buencamino 14
The San Juan Bridge 20
Insurgent Prisoners 28
Typical Insurgent Trenches 36
Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River 42
General Henry W. Lawton 50
Feeding Filipino Refugees 58
The First Philippine Commission 64
The Second Philippine Commission 72
The Return of Mr. Taft 80
Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort 88
Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man’s Country 96
The Philippine Supreme Court 104
An Unsanitary Well 112
A Flowing Artesian Well 112
An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila 120
An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila 128
Disinfecting by the Acre 136
An Old-style Provincial Jail 144
Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila 154
Bilibid Prison Hospital 160
Modern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro Hospital 168
Filipina Trained Nurses 176
Staff of the Bontoc Hospital 184
A Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with Salvarsan 192
The Culion Leper Colony 200
Building the Benguet Road 208
Freight Autos on the Benguet Road 216
The Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet Road 224
A Typical Baguio Road 232
One of the First Benguet Government Cottages 240
Typical Cottages at Baguio 248
A Baguio Home 256
The Baguio Hospital 264
Government Centre at Baguio 272

A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ Camp 280
The Baguio Country Club 286
The Bureau of Science Building, Manila 306
The Philippine General Hospital 314
The College of Medicine and Surgery, Manila 322
An Old-style Schoolhouse, with Teachers and Pupils 330
A Modern Primary School Building 338
Old-style Central School Building 346
Modern Central School Building 346
Typical Scene in a Trade School 354
An Embroidery Class 362
Philippine Embroidery 370
Filipino Trained Nurses 380
A School Athletic Team 386
Filipina Girls playing Basket-ball 394
University Hall, Manila 402
Bakídan 410
In Hostile Country 418
Travel under Difficulties 426
Dangerous Navigation 434
A Negrito Family and their “House” 442
A Typical Negrito 446
Typical Kalingas 452
Settling a Head-hunting Feud 458
Entertaining the Kalingas 464
An Ifugao Family 470
Ifugao Dancers 478
An Ifugao Dancer 484
Ifugao Rice Terraces 492

The Philippines Past and Present

Chapter I

View Point and Subject-Matter
It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be author or orator to endeavour, at the
beginning of his book or his speech, to establish his status. Possibly I have become
partially Latinized as the result of some eighteen years of residence in the Philippines. At
all events it is my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to make clear my
view point and at the same time briefly to outline the subject-matter which I hereinafter
discuss.

As a boy I went through several of the successive stages of collector’s fever from which
the young commonly suffer. First it was postage stamps; then birds’ nests, obtained
during the winter season when no longer of use to their builders. Later I was allowed to
collect eggs, and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great ambition was to
become a taxidermist. My family did not actively oppose this desire but suggested that a
few preliminary years in school and college might prove useful.

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but did not lose my interest in zoölogy
and botany. While a student at the University of Michigan I specialized in these subjects.
I was fortunate in having as one of my instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the
head of the Department of Zoölogy. Professor Steere, who had been a great traveller, at
times entertained his classes with wonderfully interesting tales of adventure on the
Amazon and in the Andes, Peru, Formosa, the Philippines and the Dutch Moluccas. My
ambition was fired by his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced his
intention of returning to the Philippines the following year to take up and prosecute
anew zoölogical work which he had begun there in 1874, offering to take with him a
limited number of his students who were to have the benefit of his knowledge of Spanish
and of his wide experience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to allow him to
work up their collections after their return to the United States, I made up my mind to
go.

I was then endeavouring to get through the University on an allowance of $375 per year
and was in consequence not overburdened with surplus funds. I however managed to get
my life insured for $1500 and to borrow $1200 on the policy, and with this rather limited
sum upon which to draw purchased an outfit for a year’s collecting and sailed with
Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young Americans accompanied him. One of these,
Doctor Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwards destined to play a part in Philippine
affairs which was not then dreamed of by either of us.

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfortunately we had neglected to provide
ourselves with proper official credentials and as a result we had some embarrassing
experiences. We were arrested by suspicious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival
and were tried on trumped-up charges. On several subsequent occasions we narrowly
escaped arrest and imprisonment.

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish acquaintances was hardly to be
wondered at. They could not believe that sensible, civilized human beings would shoot
tiny birds, pay for eggs the size of the tip of one’s little finger more than hens’ eggs were
worth, undergo not a few hardships and run many risks while living in the simplest of
native houses on very inadequate food, unless actuated by some hidden purpose. At
different times they suspected us of looking for gold deposits, of designing to stir up
trouble among the natives, or of being political spies.

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American troops in 1908 and I returned as a
member of the first Philippine Commission in 1909, this last supposition became a fixed
belief with many of our former Spanish acquaintances who still remained in the islands,
and they frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us while they had the
chance.

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those who could not understand us or
our work I must set much kind and invaluable assistance rendered by others who could,
and did.

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting eighteen of the more important
islands.1

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact with the Filipinos, either occupying
the tribunales, the municipal buildings of their towns, where they felt at liberty to call
and observe us at all hours of the day and night, or actually living in their houses, which
in some instances were not vacated by the owners during our occupancy.

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild tribes, including the Tagbanuas of
Palawan, the Moros of Joló, Basilan and Mindanao, and the Mangyans of Mindoro.

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a few serious risks and ended our
sojourn with six weeks of fever and starvation in the interior of Mindoro. While we
would not have cut short our appointed stay by a day, we were nevertheless delighted
when we could turn our faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed that we had
had quite enough of life in the Philippines.

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent physician told my family that I
might not live a week. I however recuperated so rapidly that I was able to return to the

University of Michigan that fall and to complete the work of my senior year. I became a
member of the teaching staff of the institution before my graduation.

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed their strangely firm grip on me
during that fateful first trip to the Far East which was destined to modify my whole
subsequent life. I had firmly believed that if fortunate enough to get home I should have
sense enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed I was finding life at Ann
Arbor, Michigan, decidedly prosaic, and longing to return to the Philippines and finish a
piece of zoölogical work which I knew was as yet only begun.

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and we set out to raise $10,000 to pay
the expenses of a two-years collecting tour, in the course of which we hoped to visit
regions not hitherto penetrated by any zoölogist.

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, the president of the university,
thought it a great joke that two young fellows like ourselves should attempt to raise so
considerable a sum to be spent largely for our own benefit. Whenever he met me on the
street he used to ask whether we had obtained that $10,000 yet, and then shake with
laughter. One of the great satisfactions of my life came when, on a beautiful May
morning in 1890, I was able to answer his inquiry in the affirmative.

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly recovering himself warmly
congratulated me, and with that kindly interest which he has always shown in the affairs
of young men, asked how he could help us. Through his kindly offices and the
intervention of the State Department we were able to obtain a royal order from the
Spanish government which assured us a very different reception on our return to the
Philippines in August from that which had been accorded us on the occasion of our first
visit to the islands.

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish character which we had largely
missed during our first visit. Satisfied as to our identity and as to the motives which
actuated us, the Spanish officials, practically without exception, did everything in their
power to assist us and to render our sojourn pleasant and profitable. Our mail was
delivered to us at points fifty miles distant from provincial capitals. When our
remittances failed to reach us on time, as they not infrequently did, money was loaned to
us freely without security. Troops were urged upon us for our protection when we
desired to penetrate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish friends constantly
offered us the hospitality of their homes and with many of them the offer was more than
pro forma. Indeed, in several instances it was insisted upon so strongly that we accepted
it, to our great pleasure and profit.

Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the affairs of their several provinces,
and we gained a very clear insight into existing political methods and conditions.

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with the Filipino2 population than on the
occasion of our first visit. Our rapidly growing knowledge of Spanish, and of Visayan,
one of the more important native dialects, rendered it increasingly easy for us to
communicate with them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things from their
view point. They talked with us most frankly and fully about their political troubles.

Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey’s Fleet

This fort, which marked the southern and western end of the Spaninsh line of defences around the city of Manila, was
bombarded by the United States Fleet as a preliminary to the successful assault of August 13, 1898, on the city. The
photograph, although not taken until March, 1899, gives some idea of the havoc wrought by the shells which struck the
outer wall. The chief damage was done when they exploded within the fort.

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, which lengthened to two years and six
months, we revisited the islands with which we had become more or less familiar on our
first trip and added six others to the list.3 We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons
and Negritos of the Negros mountains.

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the misfortune to contract typhoid fever
when alone in Busuanga, and being ignorant of the nature of the malady from which I
was suffering, kept on my feet until I could no longer stand, with the natural result that I

came uncommonly near paying for my foolishness with my life, and have ever since
suffered from resulting physical disabilities. When able to travel, I left the islands upon
the urgent recommendation of my physician, feeling that the task which had led me to
return there was almost accomplished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East were
over.

Shortly after my return to the United States I was offered a position as a member of the
zoölogical staff of the University of Michigan, accepted it, received speedy promotion,
and hoped and expected to end my days as a college professor.

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old memories. I fancy that the
knowledge then possessed by the average American citizen relative to the Philippines
was fairly well typified by that of a good old lady at my Vermont birthplace who had
spanked me when I was a small boy, and who, after my first return from the Philippine
Islands, said to me, “Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin’ the people
that Paul wrote the Epistle to?”

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this ignorance. My knowledge of
Philippine affairs led me strongly to favour armed intervention in Cuba, where similar
political conditions seemed to prevail to a considerable extent, and I fear that I was
considered by many of my university colleagues something of a “jingo.” Indeed, a
member of the University Board of Regents said that I ought to be compelled to enlist.
As a matter of fact, compulsion would have been quite unnecessary had it not been for
physical disability.

My life-long friend and former travelling companion, Doctor Bourns, was not similarly
hampered. He promptly joined the army as a medical officer with the rank of major, and
sailed for the islands on the second steamer which carried United States troops there. As
a natural result of his familiarity with Spanish and his wide acquaintanceship among the
Filipinos, he was ordered from the outset to devote his time more largely to political
matters than to the practice of his profession. He did all that he could to prevent
misunderstandings between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an interpreter at the
negotiations for the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898, after taking part in the
attack on the city. Later he was given the rather difficult task of suppressing a bad
outbreak of smallpox among the Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with
great success. He was finally made chief health officer of Manila, although he continued
to devote himself largely to political matters, got numberless deserving Filipinos out of
trouble, and rapidly increased his already wide circle of Filipino friends. Through his
letters I was kept quite closely in touch with the situation.

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for me, asked for and obtained leave
for study in Europe, and in December 1898 set out for New York to engage passage for

myself and my family. I went by way of Washington in order to communicate to
President McKinley certain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemed to
me ought to be brought to his attention.

I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak of hostilities between Filipinos
and Americans, and that such a catastrophe, resulting from mutual misunderstanding,
might be avoided if seasonable action were taken. I have since learned how wrong was
this latter belief. My previous experience had been almost exclusively with the Visayans
and the wild tribes, and the revolution against the United States was at the outset a
strictly Tagálog affair, and hence beyond my ken.

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time I wanted, displayed a most earnest
desire to learn the truth, and showed the deepest and most friendly interest in the
Filipinos. Let no man believe that then or later he had the slightest idea of bringing about
the exploitation of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a most earnest desire to
learn what was best for them and then to do it if it lay within his power.

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked me whether I would be willing
to go to the islands as his personal representative.

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical change in my plans as this would
involve, and asked for a week’s time to think the matter over, which was granted. I
decided to go.

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of sending out a commission and asked
me if I would serve on it. I told him that I would and left for my home to make
preparations for an early departure. A few days later he announced the names of the
commissioners. They were Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University;
Major-General Elwell S. Otis, then the ranking army officer in the Philippines; Rear-
Admiral George Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet in Philippine
waters; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for fourteen years served as United States
Minister to China, and myself.

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by public business. Mr. Schurman and I
reached Yokohama on the morning of February 13, and on arrival there learned, to our
deep regret, that hostilities had broken out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on
the evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to join us until April 2.
Meanwhile, as we could not begin our work in his absence, I had an exceptional
opportunity to observe conditions in the field, of which I availed myself.

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it had completed its work, and was
then appointed to the second Philippine Commission without a day’s break in my period
of service.

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft of Ohio; Luke E. Wright of
Tennessee; Henry C. Ide of Vermont; Bernard Moses of California, and myself. Briefly
stated, the task before us was to establish civil government in the Philippine Islands.
After a period of ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission was to become
the legislative body, while executive power continued to be vested for a time in the
military.

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on which day Mr. Taft was appointed
civil governor. On September 1, 1901, each of the remaining original members of the
commission became an executive officer as well. Mr. Wright was appointed secretary of
commerce and police; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice; Mr. Moses, secretary of
public instruction, and I myself, Secretary of the Interior. On the same day three Filipino
members were added to the commission: Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda
and Sr. José R. de Luzuriaga.

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission continued to serve as the sole
legislative body. It is at the present time the upper house of the Philippine Legislature,
the Philippine Assembly, composed of eighty-one elective members, constituting the
lower house.

I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all legislation put in force in the
Philippine Islands since the American occupation, with the exception of certain laws
passed during my few and brief absences.

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize and direct the operations of a
Bureau of Health, a Bureau of Govermnent Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a Bureau
of Public Lands, a Bureau of Agriculture, a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining
Bureau and a Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and the
Mining Bureau were incorporated with the Bureau of Government Laboratories to form
the Bureau of Science, which continued under my executive control. The Bureau of
Agriculture was transferred to the Department of Public Instruction in 1909.

I was at the outset given administrative control of all matters pertaining to the non-
Christian tribes, which constitute, roughly speaking, an eighth of the population of the
Philippines, and until my resignation retained such control throughout the islands, except
in the Moro Province, which at an early day was put directly under the governor-general.

I participated in the organization of civil government in the several provinces of the
archipelago, and myself drafted the Municipal Code for the government of the towns
inhabited by Filipinos, as well as the Special Provincial Government Act and the
Township Government Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited chiefly by
the non-Christian tribes.

At the outset we did not so much as know with certainty the names of the several wild
and savage tribes inhabiting the more remote and inaccessible portions of the
archipelago. As I was unable to obtain reliable information concerning them on which to
base legislation for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such information for
myself by visiting their territory, much of which was then quite unexplored.

After this territory was organized into five so-called “Special Government Provinces,”
some of my Filipino friends, I fear not moved solely by anxiety for the public good,
favoured and secured a legislative enactment which made it my official duty to visit and
inspect these provinces at least once during each fiscal year. I shall always feel indebted
to them for giving me this opportunity to become intimately acquainted with some of the
most interesting, most progressive, and potentially most important peoples of the
Philippines.

When in 1901 I received the news that a central government was soon to be established,
I was in the Sub-province of Lepanto on my first trip through the wilder and less-known
portions of northern Luzon. During each succeeding year I have spent from two to four
months in travel through the archipelago, familiarizing myself at first hand with local
conditions.

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection trips representatives of the Bureaus
of Forestry, Agriculture, Science and Health to carry on practical investigations, and
have made it my business to visit and explore little known and unknown regions. There
are very few islands worthy of the name which it has not been my privilege to visit.

The organization of an effective campaign against diseases like bubonic plague,
smallpox, Asiatic cholera and leprosy in a country where no similar work had ever
previously been undertaken, inhabited by people profoundly ignorant of the benefits to
be derived from modern methods of sanitation, and superstitious to a degree, promptly
brought me into violent conflict with the beliefs and prejudices of a large portion of the
Filipino population.

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active campaign for the suppression of
surra, foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest, which were rapidly destroying the horses
and cattle.

From the outset I was held responsible for the enforcement of marine and land
quarantine regulations, which were at first very obnoxious to the general public.

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Congress for the United States was made
applicable to the Philippines without any provision for its enforcement, this not
altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me.

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service in the first instance. The political
influence at my command has never extended beyond my own vote. During a period of
twelve years my removal was loudly and frequently demanded, yet I saw President
Schurman, Colonel Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner Moses,
Governor Taft, Governor Wright, Governor Ide, Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster,
Commissioner Tavera, Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my colleagues
on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, leave the service, before my own
voluntary retirement on September 15, 1913.

I had long expected a request for my resignation at any time, and had often wished that it
might come. Indeed I once before tendered it voluntarily, only to have President Taft say
that he thought I should withdraw it, which I did. I am absolutely without political
ambition save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph, “He did what he could.”

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United States I have discovered there
widespread and radical misapprehension as to conditions in the Philippines, but have
failed to find that lack of interest in them which is commonly said to exist. On the
contrary, I have found the American public keenly desirous of getting at the real facts
whenever there was an opportunity to do so.

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements have been accepted at their face
value has surprised and deeply disturbed me. I have conversed with three college
presidents, each of whom believed that the current expenses of the Philippine
government were paid from the United States Treasury.

The preponderance of false and misleading statements about the Philippines is due, it
seems to me, primarily to the fact that it is those persons with whom the climate
disagrees and who in consequence are invalided home, and those who are separated from
the service in the interest of the public good, who return to the United States and get an
audience there; while those who successfully adapt themselves to local conditions,
display interest in their work and become proficient in it, remain in the islands for long
periods during which they are too busy, and too far from home, to make themselves
heard.

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such persons do attempt to set forth facts
which years of practical experience have taught them, they are promptly accused of
endeavouring to save their own bread and butter by seeking to perpetuate conditions
which insure them fat jobs.

When I think of the splendid men who have uncomplainingly laid down their lives in the
military and in the civil service of their country in these islands, and of the larger number

who have given freely of their best years to unselfish, efficient work for others, this
charge fills me with indignation.

The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service for so long a time was my interest
in the work for the non-Christian tribes and my fear that while my successor was gaining
knowledge concerning it which can be had only through experience, matters might
temporarily go to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work to such a point that
it would move on, for a time at least, by its own momentum.

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past and present situation in the islands
because I believe that their inhabitants are confronted by a danger graver than any which
they have before faced since the time when their fate wavered in the balance, while the
question whether the United States should acquire sovereignty over them or should
allow Spain to continue to rule them was under consideration.

Felipe Buencamino

Perhaps the most prolific writer on political subjects whom the Philippines
have produced. He was at one time a member of Aguinaldo’s cabinet and
accompanied Aguinaldo’s mother and son when they surrendered in order
to obtain American protection.

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regardless of the effect of such conduct upon
my future career. It has been alleged that my views on Philippine problems were
coloured by a desire to retain my official position. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Indeed, no man who has not served for long and sometimes very weary years as a
public official, and has not been a target for numerous more or less irresponsible

individuals whose hands were filled with mud and who were actuated by a fixed desire
to throw it at something, can appreciate as keenly as I do the manifold blessings which
attend the life of a private citizen.

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view point, and now a word as to
subject-matter. It is my intention to correct some of the very numerous misstatements
which have been made concerning past and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall
quote, from time to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and more especially
some of those which have recently appeared in a book entitled “The American
Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1912,” by James H. Blount, who signs himself
“Officer of the United States Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899–1901; United States
District Judge in the Philippines, 1901–1905.”

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has made so very evident
the bitter personal animosities which inspire many of his statements, that it has been a
genuine surprise to his former associates and acquaintances that his book has been taken
seriously.

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced reader that in writing it he has
played the part of the special pleader rather than that of the historian. He has used
government records freely, and as is usually the case when a special pleader quotes from
such records, the nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of more than
passing attention. I shall hope to be able to fill some of the gaps that he has left in the
documentary history of the events which he discusses and by so doing, very materially
to change its purport.

As public documents have been so misused, and as a new administration is bestowing on
Filipinos political offices, and giving them opportunities, for which they are as yet
utterly unprepared, thus endangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing
work performed by experienced and competent men, it becomes necessary to strike
home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of record but have not heretofore been
disclosed because of the injury to reputations and the wounding of feelings which would
result from their publication. In doing this I feel that I am only discharging a duty to the
people of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth if the present possibility
of Philippine independence is to be seriously considered, and to the several Filipino
peoples who are to-day in danger of rushing headlong to their own utter and final
destruction.

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that the Filipino leaders were deceived
and betrayed by American officials whom they assisted, and that this unpardonable
conduct led to the outbreak of active hostilities which occurred just prior to the arrival at
Manila of the first Philippine Commission.

I shall then show that these leaders never established a government which adequately
protected life and property, or gave to their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the
contrary inaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a
governmental institution, while rape, inhuman torture, burying alive and other ghastly
crimes were of common occurrence, and usually went unpunished. The data which I use
in establishing these contentions are for the most part taken directly from the Insurgent
records, in referring to which I employ the war department abbreviation “P.I.R.”
followed by a number.

I next take up some of the more important subsequent historical events, describing the
work of the first Philippine Commission, and showing in what manner the government
established by the second Philippine Commission has discharged its stewardship,
subsequently discussing certain as yet unsolved problems which confront the present
government, such as that presented by the existence of slavery and peonage, and that of
the non-Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like Judge Blount, consider the
Philippines “a vast straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the south seas
which have been a nuisance to every government that ever owned them,” I give some
facts as to the islands, their climate, their natural resources and their commercial
possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to the present ability of the civilized
Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pampangans, Zambals, Pangasináns, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans,
commonly and correctly called Filipinos, to establish, or to maintain when established, a
stable government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing of bringing under just and
effective control, and of protecting and civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven non-
Christian tribes which constitute an eighth of the population, and occupy approximately
half of the territory, of the Philippine Islands.

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to Major J. R. M. Taylor, who
has translated and compiled the Insurgent4 records, thereby making available a very
large mass of reliable and most valuable information without which a number of
chapters of this book would have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his
statements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth in these records can be accused
of deriving his information from hostile or prejudiced sources.

Of them, Major Taylor says:—

“No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be impressed with the difference between the Spanish
and the Tagálog documents. Many of the former are doubtless written with a view to their coming into the
hands of the Americans, or with deliberate purpose to have them do so, and are framed accordingly. All
Tagálog documents, intended only for Filipinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish documents. The
orders of the Dictator5 to his subjects were conveyed in the latter series of documents.”

1 Cuyo, Palawan, Balabac, Cagayan de Joló, Joló proper, Basilan, Mindanao, Panay, Guimaras, Negros, Siquijor,
Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro.

2 I employ the noun Filipinos to designate collectively the eight civilized, Christianized peoples, called
respectively the Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pangasináns, Zambalans, Pampangans, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans, or any of
them; the adjective Filipino to designate anything pertaining to these peoples, or any of them; the noun Philippines to
designate the country, and the adjective Philippine to designate anything pertaining to the country as distinguished
from its people.
3 Busuanga, Culion, Tawi Tawi, Tablas, Romblon and Sibuyan.
4 I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper noun, to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United
States, hence capitalize it, and the adjective derived from it.
5 General Aguinaldo.

Chapter II

Was Independence Promised?
It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to insinuate, that American
consuls and naval officers promised the Insurgent leaders that the independence of the
Philippines would be recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that the
coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against Manila was sought for and
secured. Others say that they were at least de facto allies of the United States, and that they
were in the end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent records, that each of
them is false. I ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to
these matters, I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents or extracts
from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I sometimes insert them bodily in the
text. In other cases I give my own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full
text in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources of documentary
information. I greatly regret that Taylor’s narrative, with its very numerous supporting
documents, is not readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to have been
published, but never got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore
obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures designating the page of
this galley proof on which the passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I give the
War Department numbers1 of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the
exhibit numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of them. Copies of his work
may be found in the War Department and in the office of the Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had deceit been practised as
claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for complaint, for he himself not only
frankly advocated its use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans, as
clearly appears in records hereinafter cited.2 However, most Americans hold to a standard
very different from his. Was it departed from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey promised him the
recognition of the independence of the Philippines by the United States.3

Judge Blount has referred to the “de facto alliance between the Americans and Aguinaldo,”
and has dwelt at length on “promises, both expressed and implied,” which were
subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and
Merritt, constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge, bad faith on the
part of these officers of the United States.4

The San Juan Bridge

This bridge is the one near which the first shot was fired when hostilities began between Americans and Filipinos.

On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal as to exactly what
were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might be desired what
legitimate inferences were deducible from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes
an alleged statement of General Anderson to the effect that:—

“Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman,5 and Williams6 did or did not give Aguinaldo
assurances that a Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos certainly thought so, judging
from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did
subsequently at his request.”7

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain historical facts, knowledge of
which will be useful in considering them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the Philippines under the
leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher,
and was, at that time, gobernadorcillo8 of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called “Treaty of Biacnabató,” signed in Manila on
December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of “Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the
Insurgents in arms,” and Don Marciano Llanera and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his
subordinates, together with their soldiers and arms.

“The Excellent Señor General in Chief” of the Spanish forces was to “provide the necessary
means for supporting the lives” of those who surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,0009 in three instalments,
the first of $400,000, the second and third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence outside the islands. Their
deportation was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were
taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish steamer Uranus; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank, to the credit of
Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the presidency of
Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano10 who was the ranking officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and
requested that the second instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-
general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money, although
Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de Rivera says that he
turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving
as his reason for refusing to pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no
prospect of its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive it under the
agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised by the Spanish
government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató was negotiated, and as these measures were
not put into effect, they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It
included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles, then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and it became necessary to
come to a definite understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the
junta, as a whole, was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago; with
all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and with the preparation and shipment
of such articles as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be
allowed voice by Aguinaldo’s government in any serious question which might arise abroad,
and would aid that government in bringing the civil administration of the Philippines to the
level of that of the most advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division of the funds
deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this period, and as it is of
historic interest, and makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt,

and enter into negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it.11

“From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he
had deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. These expenses
were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with him needed a new
pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute accounts
were kept, which are on file among his papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding his
income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant
demands being made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was not easy under these
conditions. Aguinaldo’s companions were entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had to be
approved by him, and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a
people whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting
for a chance to return to their own country, which they watched with weary eyes while they guarded the embers
by which they hoped to light the fires of a new insurrection.

“The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a
number of men had taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872, and some of them at least had
prospered. Some of them, like the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost no relations with the
followers of Aguinaldo; some, like J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of the
governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate
following wanted and were working for independence and independence alone, while the Filipinos who had
long lived in Hongkong wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no confidence in the ability of the
country to stand alone or in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the councils of a state. The
character of the new refugees did not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate by or
annexation to the United States.

“On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there informed the State Department that D. Cortés,
M. Cortés, A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and
lawyers of Manila, desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to
the United States, and that they had instructed all their connections to render every aid to the United States
forces in Manila. On May 14 he forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong, not members
of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the Philippine
Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo’s followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness of the
rich old men who went about calling their companions ‘beggarly rebels,’ but these men were rich, and their
names and their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in him
among men of property in the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly alienated; therefore, at
first, at least, no open break took place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of the insurrection is
shown by the fact that after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the insurgent
movement, although they were living in Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for
the insurgent government of the Philippines.

“But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions and of the opportunities which were about to
open before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and the United States was imminent and a
United States squadron was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how
to avoid losing the money which had been received from the Spanish government as the price of his surrender.
The importance of his presence near the Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to
him anything which he could obtain there from the aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of
little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to live on in
Paris.

“Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April
5 demanded 200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the agreement that he should establish a
company in Hongkong for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of those who had accompanied
Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He then entered
suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds
deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo

or any member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of
the Biacnabató agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December 19. This suit was brought
not merely in the name of Artacho, but in that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile in
Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had
adherents among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hongkong and of living
upon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than indefinite exile spent in
dependence upon the inner group for even the means of existence.

“The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the trust funds which the complainant recognized were
legally in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty without his presence and
without his account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail,
but he refused to yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the Hongkong junta before a
British court, prepared for flight. A summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court of
Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction.

“He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become due according to the terms of the
deposit, and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by way of
Singapore for G. H. del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to
succeed to his functions, and gave him checks signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to
provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason for departure that he was going to remain under
cover until Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this purpose, as he gave his
destination as Europe and the United States.

“Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on
April 21, after stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain had been rendered inevitable by
the resolution of Congress demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba, and was declared on
April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on the other
side of the world might have upon the future of the Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there
was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of the civil service in India, and had lived for
some years in the Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged in writing letters to the
Singapore Free Press upon the Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his possession
concerning them to the United States consul-general in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to
Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and realized what could be done with him, and that
if the matter were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to see Aguinaldo and
informed him that the United States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general and
informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded to
agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it, and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the
night of April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The statement made by Aguinaldo is
probably correct. According to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegram to the
Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations ‘with America.’

“Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An
interpreter who is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say
what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was said during these conversations it is
within the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more than he intended,
and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression
of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and as promises.
Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on
this occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents
and Pratt on behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural desire to add to
his own importance, did his best to circulate.

“Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an
adviser, so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which
may have had some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and later was employed in furnishing
from Hongkong news to various newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His cablegrams
shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque
than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective, as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given

$5000. He wanted more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased to be in their
employment.”12

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore, and we shall be able to
determine with some accuracy what actually transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo recognition of tile
independence of the Philippines if he and his people would cooperate with the United States
forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his “Reseña Verídica”13 in the following words:—

“In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of
Biac-na-bató, the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution and advised me to take up arms
anew against Spain, assuring me that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages (mayores
ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines,
suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an agreement in writing, to which the
Consul answered that he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, who was the chief of the
expedition against the Philippines, and who had ample powers from President McKinley.

“On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying
that the admiral had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize the
independence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no necessity to put it
in writing, as the words of the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not being
like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the Government of North America was a very honourable
Government, a very just and very powerful one.”14

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as follows: —

“General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.

“Pratt.”

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and
stating just what he had done. He said:—

“At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of an object sought to be obtained by the
present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it
upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of
continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with
our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with
Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as
follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:—

Insurgent Prisoners

On the day of the Polo fight in provinces of Bulacan these Insurgent soldiers lay in a trench and fired into a charging
company of American troops until the latter came in on top of them. They were taken prisoners, sent to Manila and
humanely treated there. This photograph was taken as they were being marched down the railroad track to the Manila
train.

“‘Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation
insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.

“‘Pratt.’”

The Commodore’s reply read thus:—

“‘Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

“‘Dewey.’”

Pratt adds:—

“I received it late at night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and
private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British Steamer Malacca, which
left here on Tuesday the 26th.

“Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of
which I shall give you by next mail.

“The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that had
been placed in him.

“I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the commander of our forces, I have prevented
possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

“If this course of mine meets with the Government’s approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr.
Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

“How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide.

“I have, etc.”15

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no authority to speak for the
government; that there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of
independence or indeed of any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these
details being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought that he had
prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering
the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo and Pratt were
embodied in the following letter:—

“No. 213. Consulate-General of the United States.

“Singapore, April 30, 1898.

“Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and
last interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him
the necessity, under Commodore Dewey’s direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the
Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having
declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of
civilized warfare.

“To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the
field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct.

“The general stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long
enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would
desire American advice and assistance.

“These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

“I have, etc.,

“E. Spencer Pratt,

“United States Consul-General.”

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made the following
statement:—

“I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with
regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no way
whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would
cooperate with him—General Aguinaldo—for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting
his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put
forward.”16

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount’s statement as to what occurred at a meeting held at Singapore, to
celebrate the early successes of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach
to a direct claim, that any one at any time promised independence:—

“First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading and presentation of the address by a Dr.
Santos, representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the ‘eternal gratitude’ of the
Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories of independence, and to
how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul
Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms ‘in defence of those principles of justice and liberty
of which your country is the foremost champion’ and trusted ‘that the United States... will efficaciously second
the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us
our independence under the protection of the United States.’

“Mr. Pratt arose and ‘proceeded, speaking in French,’ says the newspaper—it does not say Alabama French,
but that is doubtless what it was—‘to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were now proving
themselves fit for self-government.’ The gentleman from Alabama then went on to review the mighty events
and developments of the preceding six weeks, Dewey’s victory of May 1st, ‘the brilliant achievements of your
own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea,’ etc. ‘You
have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your
fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived
incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour’s interview convinced me that he was the man
for the occasion; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the
latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.’”17

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and his version of Pratt’s
reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as
interpreter, he, if any one, should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone
of the Singapore Free Press, with which strained relations had formerly existed, and the
subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper and that of the Straits Times, he says that
on the previous afternoon he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:—

“This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having been victorious and immediately after the
cry of our worthy chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30 or more Filipinos—9 of the
higher class, 15 musicians and the remainder of the middle class—went to greet Consul A., here, and on the
invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the
only decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame
holding the portrait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced them all. We found
there also, and were introduced to, the Editor of the Straits Times and the Free Press of here, and after being
thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read the following speech in French:—

“‘His Excellency, The Consul General of the United States of America in Singapore:

“‘Your Excellency: The Filipinos of all social classes residing in this port, have come to greet
Your Excellency as the genuine representative of the great and powerful American Republic in
order to express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral and material support given by Admiral
Dewey to our General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of eight million Filipinos. The
latter and we ourselves hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian
policy, will without cessation and (with) decided energy continue to support the programme agreed
upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the
Independence of the Philippine Islands, under an American protectorate. Accept our cordial
acknowledgments and congratulations on being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea
which time and events have well developed to the great satisfaction of our nation. Finally, we
request you, Most Excellent Sir, to express to your worthy President and the American Republic,
our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.’

“The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the following terms:—

“‘You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only faithfully followed the instructions received from my
Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General will permit you to infer that I have done so. I
shall in any case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you in its name. You know that your
wishes are mine also, and for this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo, I repeated to him that
he should observe the greatest humanity possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our nation and
all the other nations may see that you are humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.’

“After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul; he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry,
and lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered with the sherry by your humble
servant, Sres. Cannon, Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the Free Press, Straits Times and Mr.
Bray. We drank to America and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines with America; we
gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an important defender; we drank to the Free Press for taking such an
interest in our affairs, and to the Straits Times (sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast to
our general, which was done at the proper time by ‘Flaco’18 when we gave three cheers; for the sake of
courtesy we cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had become quiet,
the Editor of the Straits Times took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice, ‘The Philippine Republic,’ to
which we all responded. ‘Flaco’ disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with him the
American flag, and formally presented it to us in French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:
‘Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most
expressive remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for the generous blood of her sons, shed to
obtain her liberty; the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our country; the blue background
indicates the sky and each star represents a free and independent State; this is America, and the Consul is
desirous that we also should have so glorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could be
wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it
our most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.’ Hereupon, to the surprise of everybody as no one expected it,
the Consul requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to please him very much. Finally, about
6.15, we left, very well satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked
me for the text of my speech, which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text, which I
enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion
as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the future, I am,

“Yours, etc.

(Signed) “Isidoro de los Santos.”

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:—

“(Note by Compiler.—In a letter written in Tagalog to Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the
American consul general as having cried out ‘Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the Republic of the
Philippines’ and then, having apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the room waving the
American flag before giving it to the assembled Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)”19

This final statement does not present the representative of the United States government at
Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take the facts as I find them. If now we compare
the speech actually made by Dr. Santos with Blount’s version of it, we shall find that with
the exception of the words “eternal gratitude” the passages which he encloses in quotation
marks are not in the original at all. The glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is
there so much as a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions of
Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure so very commonly
employed that those of us who have dealt much with his people have learned to meet it

almost automatically. It consists in referring to one’s having said just exactly what one did
not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that because one did
not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his dealings with Dewey and
others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he expressed the hope that
the United States would “continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore,
between your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the
Philippine Islands under an American protectorate.”

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his part of the agreement, for
we shall see that he stated over and over again, in correspondence with members of the junta
and others, that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence finally
proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly
I do not know, that Pratt’s knowledge of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply
made not the slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United States
would continue to support the programme which Santos said had been agreed upon between
Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches must
obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with the
ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on this and other
occasions, but to do this was one thing and to have attempted to compromise his government
would have been another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he was
dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that his sympathy was not
purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed “representative of
the Philippines in the United States to promptly secure the official recognition of our
independence” and that he promised him “a high post in the customs service.”20

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount’s statement are enclosed in
quotation marks. From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:—

“Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt’s speech,
refreshments were served, and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in
arranging as to refreshments.”21

The use of this clipping from the Singapore Free Press illustrates admirably Blount’s
methods. The Free Press had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the insurgent
cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely “seen” by Bray, who reported that as a
result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be friendly, and they were.

In other words, the Free Press became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor,
according to Bray, “a true and loyal friend” of Aguinaldo.

Typical Insurgent Trenches

The Insurgents built long lines of well-constructed trenches from which they could escape without exposing themselves
to the fire of the American troops.

Blount claims to have made “an exhaustive examination of the records of that period.”22
Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of
Santos’s letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded to the State
Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at
Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of Aguinaldo’s coming. He says that it was
headed “America’s Allies” and quotes from it as follows:—

“Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach.... The Americans, not from
mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have
considered it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an American squadron
is preparing to sail for the Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reënforcements
coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms,
because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. There where you see the American flag
flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!”23

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too
accurate. He allows it to be inferred that this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its
history is as follows:—

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong since 1872, on account
of his connection with the troubles of that year, wrote letters24 to a number of friends
recommending the widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an
aid to the American policy in the Philippines “in the war against the tyrannical friars and the
Spaniards.”

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations, each beginning with the
words “Fellow Countrymen.” The first, which is the one referred to by Blount, continues:—

“Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our independence, and this under the freest form to which
all individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.

“The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted
Filipinos, find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective mantle, now that they find themselves
obliged to break their friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny they have exercised in Cuba,
causing all Americans, with whom they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.

“At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the Philippines.

“We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of your arms to fire upon the Americans. No,
brothers; do not make such a mistake; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat our liberators as enemies.

“Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera, calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost
you your lives: rather die than act as ingrates toward our redeemers, the Americans.

“Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the same time avoiding reinforcements which may
come from Spain; therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you will have more than sufficient
arms, as the Americans have arms, and will find the means to aid you.

“Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they are our redeemers.”25

On the margin is written: “Viva, for America with the Philippines!”

Apparently what Basa here means by independence is independence from Spain, for it is
known that he was in favour of annexation to the United States, and in the second
proclamation we find the following:—

“This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for contriving that our country (all the Philippine
Archipelago) may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of the United States, great because of its
wisdom, its wealth, and its constitutional laws.

“Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With America we shall have development in the
broadest sense (of advancement) in civilization.

“With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.

“Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have already been given. Explain to all our fellow
countrymen the benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven, by men and by our children.

“Viva America with the Philippines!!!”26

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his arrival. They were
never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose, especially as Basa, who was a man of
importance and means, was a member of the group who desired annexation to the United
States, that Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him and then
quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave a copy of the first one to Pratt,
presumably without the written words: “Viva, for America with the Philippines!”

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore which I consider
incontrovertible.

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting of the junta was
held. The minutes of this meeting,27 signed by each of the several Filipinos present, form a
part of the Insurgent records which have come into the possession of the United States
Government. They state among other things that:—

“The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding meeting, which were approved. The temporary
President reported that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and it became necessary for him
to take possession of the office to which he has been elected.”

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned, appeared at the
meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:—

“The President described the negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American
Consul of that English colony. Both agreed that the President should confer with the Admiral commanding the
American squadron in Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions, advantageous, in his judgment,
to the Philippines, he would go to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet for the purpose of
taking part in the present events. And as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have an interview
with the American Consul of this colony on the day of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.

“Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at present, he begged the committee to discuss the
advisability of his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence in the last rebellion residing in this
colony, in case the Admiral gave them an opportunity to do so.”

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise of independence made to
Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing “the
negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of
the English Colony” would, by any chance, have failed to inform his associates in Hongkong
of such an extraordinary and fortunate occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral
Dewey that the United States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico28 thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for—

“From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the American fleet and with the American Consul in this
colony, he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely necessary for the President to go to the
Philippines, since, according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by said fleet, and a provisional
government was now being formed in that capital. The intervention of the President in the formation of that
government is undoubtedly essential, since his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently prevent
dissensions among the sons of the country, and it would be possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization
both for the military and civil evolution of that country.

“Srs. Garchitorena29 and Apacible30 expressed themselves in similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous
remarks, the President insisted that he considered it reckless for him to go to the Philippines without first
making a written agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed himself at his orders, that he
might make him subscribe to or sign a document containing proposals highly prejudicial to the interests of the
country, from which might arise the following two very grave contingencies:

“1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be
eternally cursed by the Filipinos.

“2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two would be evident.

“And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now
here, under charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him, should go to the Philippines to
intervene, after a conference with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means, in his opinion, should
be first employed to ascertain in an authentic manner what the intentions of the United States in regard to that
country are; and if his intervention is absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to the Philippines,
endeavouring by all the means in his power to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he had
offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice his life.”

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the United States were in
regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt had already promised recognition of
independence?

“Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga31 and Apacible replied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of
the American squadron would furnish the President all the arms which he might desire, since the former was
convinced that the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were used in conjunction with the
insurgents in the development of their plans of war against the Spanish government.... The authority to treat
which the President desired to give to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal
qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious as his personal intervention which is necessary in
grave affairs, such as those the subject of discussion; there would be no better occasion than that afforded them
to insure the landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans and to assure the situation of the Philippines in regard to our legitimate aspirations against those
very people. The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands and exactions of
the United States; but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for
independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finished by saying that it made
no difference if the Spanish government did demand the return of the ₱400,000, and if the demand were
allowed in an action, since the object of the sum would be obtained by the Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the
arms which they required for the struggle for their legitimate aspirations.”

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to be used if necessary
“against those very people” later.

“The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be able to arouse those masses to combat the
demands of the United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered
it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke
of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution, there
was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable then
that it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such case the presence of the President was
necessary, as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought office, who might cause
the intervention of European powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that
the Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the
country, after he had taken all means to provide for her defence? None. Such an act of the President could not
be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be one proof more of his
undoubted patriotism.”

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this remarkable document. On
the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had been made and that the
future relations between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter the editor of the
Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on the occasion when independence was said to
have been promised by Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it
was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task for this claim, in the
following very interesting terms:—

“I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold that you and Santos have evidence that will
controvert his, (and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) quite aware of what took place
in Spanish, and as to turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement he knows nothing. He says very
truly: ‘My own party, the Democrats, will say if they read this book—If this man takes it upon himself to be a
Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not employ him any more—I frankly cannot understand your
action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.’

“Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows
exactly what did take place and what did not, and I should know if he had any ground to think that the slightest
promise was made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized and decline to sanction it. I am
certain Pratt reported what he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you might have said,
naturally.

“And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the
paper you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. It is only more
recently that the fiction took shape. ‘The wish father to the thought,’ or the statement repeated till it has become
believed by the—,32 this is common.

“Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing,
and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the
thing, all else is empty wind.

“Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of paper with ‘Clauses’ and put on a ton of sealing wax
as consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!!
And yet, where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there any signatures? And if you had them—
waste paper—believe me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy misdirected. The sole thing to
have impressed upon the public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together as
participants in common action; you surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it means success as
far as it is possible. The other work is not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially this criticism
of the conduct of American troops; things may be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into
Dewey-Aguinaldo coöperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not imply any actual arrangement,
which, of course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the facts,—undenied—
incontrovertible.”33

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899, seems to me to throw
much light on the question of how these claims relative to the promised recognition of
Filipino independence sometimes originated and were bolstered up:—

“With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any
negotiation in Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an American protectorate? This is what
Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up the ‘price’ of the
telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to swear to it when the proper time
comes. There are five of us against one in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it.
Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has
the rough draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble
servant.”34

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair would confirm his
false statements, made as it was after receiving St. Clair’s letter above quoted.

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried to play it himself by
cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as the man who introduced General Aguinaldo
to the American government through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that
the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were
independence under a protectorate.35

Let us now trace Aguinaldo’s subsequent movements, and see what promises, if any, were
made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had returned to Hongkong with two companions,
all travelling under assumed names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the
junta were at first allowed to know where he was living.

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come to some sort of a
temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to avoid legal difficulties, and to reëstablish
himself with some of his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention
of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When harmony had been
temporarily restored through the good offices of Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with
Consul General Wildman. He has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him

independence, but the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become an
American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to the Philippines and place
himself under Dewey’s orders. He wanted to help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done,
would abide by the decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines.36

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the
latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos desired it, seems to me to be negatived,
not only by Wildman’s own statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written
on August 5, 1908, in which he says:—

“The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o’clock, as I had requested an interview with him before his
departure, and I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling of my feet. From our
conversation I infer that independence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him our true
desires.... Said consul approved my telegram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy of
which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly
understanding, and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in case they refuse to listen to our request. On the
other hand, if at the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative, we will at once be in a position to
know what should be done, i.e. to prepare for war.”37

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go to the Philippines,
and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May
11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the east coast of Luzon;
directing the capture of the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales,
and ending with the words: “We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned,
so you must be prepared.”

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on the McCulloch.

In his “Reseña Verídica” written later for political purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely
claimed that Dewey promised him that the United States would recognize the independence
of the Filipino people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements with those
of the admiral.

“May 19, 1898.

“The McCulloch started at eleven o’clock on the morning of the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored,
between twelve and one o’clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the waters of Cavite, and immediately the
launch of the Admiral—with his aid and private secretary—came to convey me to the Olympia, where I was
received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section of marine guards.”38

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified:39

“The Chairman. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

Admiral Dewey. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don’t
think I ever called him ‘General.’

The Chairman. And when he came on board ship was he received with any special honors at the side?

Admiral Dewey. Never.”

The “Reseña Verídica” continues:—

“The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of courtesy I asked him ‘if all the telegrams relative to
myself which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true.’ He replied in the affirmative,
and added, ‘that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them from the
yoke of Spain.’

He said, moreover, that ‘America was rich in territory and money, and needed no colonies,’ concluding by
assuring me, ‘to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine independence by the United
States.’ Thereupon he asked me if I could get the people to arise against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid
campaign.”40

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about Aguinaldo. It merely directed
that the latter be sent.

“I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgment for the generous help which the United States was
giving the Filipino people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and goodness of the American
people. I also stated to him that ‘before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a meeting, at which
was discussed and considered the possibility that—after defeating the Spaniards—the Filipinos might have a
war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize our independence, who were sure to defeat us
because they should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in the war against the Spaniards,’
requesting that he pardon my frankness.

“The Admiral replied that he ‘was delighted at my sincerity, and believed that both Filipinos and Americans
should treat each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts for the better understanding between
both parties,’ and added that, ‘so he had been informed, the United States would recognize the independence of
the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of honor of the Americans,—more binding than documents which
may remain unfulfilled when it is desired to fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the
Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and
protect it before the other nations, which were represented by the various squadrons then in the Bay; although
he said we should conquer the power from the Spaniards before floating said flag, so that the act should be
more honourable in the sight of the whole world, and, above all, before the United States, in order that when
the Filipino ships with their national flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they should inspire respect
and esteem.’

“Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my
life was necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States, I was then ready to sacrifice it.

“I added that under such conditions I could assure him that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution
to shake off the yoke of Spain; that it was not strange that some few were not yet on his side on account of lack
of arms or because of personal expediency.

“Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom I announced that I would take up my
residence at the Naval Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal.”41

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that on the occasion of the
visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey the latter again promised him independence.

He says:—

“In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General Anderson, presented himself, and after
greetings of courtesy said to me: ‘You have seen confirmed all of what I promised and said to you. How pretty

your flag is. It has a triangle, and it looks like Cuba’s. Will you give me one as a reminder when I return to
America?’

“I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour and that there was no necessity whatever to draw
up in documentary form his agreements, and as for the flag, that he could count on it, even at that very
moment.

“Dewey continued: ‘Documents are not complied with when there is no honour, as has happened with your
agreement with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in my word for I hold
myself responsible that the United States will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend to
you [plural.—TR.] to keep everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with a great deal of
secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat you [plural.—TR.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult
some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking in discipline.’”42

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition of Philippine
independence by him:—

“The Chairman. You remember the question of your recognizing his republic was a good deal discussed and
you wrote me a letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I am only asking now about what you said in the
letter. There was no recognition of the republic?

“Admiral Dewey. Never. I did not think I had any authority to do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There
was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for the first time in their
lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice
were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would.”

General Henry W. Lawton

This photograph was taken by the author at General Lawton’s Manila residence, two months before his death.

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence until the appearance
of Aguinaldo’s proclamation of June 15, 1898:—

“Admiral Dewey.... Then when I heard that our troops were coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from
Cavite and make room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew and established headquarters
across the bay at a place called Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he sent me a proclamation
declaring the independence of the Philippines.

“The Chairman. Was that the first?

“Admiral Dewey. That was the first intimation; the first I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.

“The Chairman. He had said something to you—

“Admiral Dewey. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do
he did. I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contents to Washington,
but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence.”

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the statements of the
“Reseña Veridica,” it will be seen that he has, nevertheless, covered them fully.

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with Admiral Dewey while
serving on the first Philippine commission. He always grew indignant when the subject of
any promises relative to independence said to have been made by him was so much as
mentioned, and gave to the commission in writing the following:—

“The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, published in the Springfield Republican, so far as
it relates to reported conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue of falsehood. I never, directly or
indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors, or
recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although I did make use of
him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards.”43

As Dewey’s allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we must choose between the
two. While I have no doubt as to where the choice will fall, I will now submit some
additional matter of interest. Let us first consider the history of the “Reseña Verídica” in
which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12, 1899, Buencamino
wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:—

“This work is entitled ‘Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina’ in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts
with Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and you are ordered to reprint it there translated
into English and send some copies to the United States, even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable.
Send copies also to Europe, Señor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If the Agent you may have
selected for the United States should still be there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pamphlet
with him for its publication.

“This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in transmitting to you for due execution.”44

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the consuls, for under date of
September 30 Buencamino wrote:—

“We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may not counteract the effects that we desire to produce
with this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe it advisable to make this pamphlet
public in those colonies before your arrival in the United States.”45

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo Ocampo, in charge of
Aguinaldo’s correspondence in Manila:—

“At last moment—Nota bene:

“Don’t deliver any copy of the ‘Reseña Verídica’ to the Consuls, even though it was so directed in the
beginning of the letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de la Viña being
bearer of the same, as also of the other documents. The copy intended for you is neither to be divulged nor
published, for strict reserve is required until those which are being sent arrive at their destination.”46

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document until it could reach its
destination and work its harm is of course obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false
that they would have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been issued
seasonably at Manila.

The truth is that Aguinaldo’s claim that he had been promised independence was a gradual
growth. Let us trace it.

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to “My dear brother,” inviting the recipients and their
companions to meet him at once, and arrange the best way to entrap all the enemy in their
homes.

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they will “carry on modern
war” and adds: “Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well, and
then you will see that our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare for
our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the Americans will decide to sell
us or else divide up our territory. As they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we
shall not secure our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over to other
hands.”47

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he subsequently claimed that
Admiral Dewey had promised independence, does he make any claim that this had
occurred? No, he very distinctly implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly
have said “The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt, has promised to
recognize our independence” he would have failed to do so when this would instantly have
secured him the vigorous support which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed and that Spanish officers
be treacherously attacked. The practising of deceit was a carefully considered part of the
insurgent policy. In a letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows
to Mabini:48—

“the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we will see who is deceiving whom. The statements
made by some of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself were to the effect that the
exclusive purpose of the Government at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to grant this country
independence, without any conditions, although I said to myself that such a purpose was too philanthropical.
Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and I still think the same; that is to say that we are the ones who must
secure the independence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness.”49

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised what he preached.
Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his subsequent flight through Northern Luzon,
before he finally took refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record of
this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of other days, of which none is
more interesting than his account of the beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in
August, 1896. From it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to be
both a mason and a chief of the Katipúnan, was in danger during August, and on the night of
the 29th of that month called a meeting of all the compromised persons of the place, who
agreed that on the following day he should “make representations to the governor of the
province.” Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife. Early on the
following morning, he “presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of
Cavite Viejo, offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain,” at the same time asking a
garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised to send at once if the
captain-general approved.

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his fellow-conspirators, “and told
them that then was the opportune moment for rising against the Spaniards.” He initiated the
uprising himself the next morning.50

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly employed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could hardly have complained had
the methods which he used against others been employed against him. He was never
deceived by the Americans, but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was
soon deceiving his own people.

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of these, doubtless intended to
be seen by Americans, made no mention of Independence, but said:51—

“The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested protection to secure
the liberty of this country.”

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use, he made the statement that
the great North American nation had come to give decisive and disinterested protection,
“considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves.”52

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he felt strong enough to
announce that independence would be proclaimed on June 12, and on that date he did
proclaim it in a decree.

Feeding Filipino Refugees

Before the Insurgent troops retired from Paranñaque near Manila, they plundered their own people and left them
without food. Our army fed them. This photograph shows a typical scene when food distribution was about to begin.

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers of his command,
was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to
have some one there to pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this
purpose a certain “Colonel” Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was running a
cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo’s chief of artillery and the representative of
the North American nation.53

Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to President
McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised, but said:—

“As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American representatives and officials in Singapore,
Hongkong and Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the American arms, which they did gladly
and loyally, as allies, with the conviction that their personality would be recognized, as well as their political,
autonomous and sovereign rights.”54

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government independent of America
and Spain was accomplished with the tacit consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and
with that of the general and military and political commanders of the United States of North
America in the Philippines.

“Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted them as a consummated legal act, and
maintained official relations with the new organization, making use thereof in its subsequent actions and for the
subsequent development of the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a happy end.”55

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure of announcing a policy
and then claiming that failure to attack it meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that
he did not even read this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so, as
it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He had no instructions relative
to the recognition of new governments, and he sent this document to Washington without
comment, as he should have done.56

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized the Insurgent government,
certain passages from an unsigned document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about
July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the Americans, says,
“Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, they have always
refused to recognize that government.” Also, “If they persist in refusing to recognize our
government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement with any other
government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms.”57

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether Americans had recognized the
Insurgent government on or before the date when it was written.

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General Anderson.

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in which, after describing
the Filipinos, he adds, “The people expect independence.” Blount says:—

“That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the commanding general of our forces in the Philippines
advises the Washington Government, ‘The people expect independence’ is the hardest thing in the public
archives of our government covering that momentous period for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley
to get around. After the war with the Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, ‘I never
dreamed they would turn against us.’”58

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of President McKinley will not
suffer, as the important thing is not what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what
the American officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to believe
that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did then expect independence. Blount
has seen fit to leave unmentioned certain other facts which are very pertinent in this
connection.

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following statement in a
letter to Aguinaldo:—

“I also have to inform you that Señores Basa, Cortés and Co. have congratulated the Government of the United
States upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now that Filipino soil had been soaked with

American blood, the Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram should be sent immediately, to
counteract that sent by them.”59

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo had transmitted another
telegram to President McKinley through Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:—

“Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary, representing the provisional government of the
Philippine Islands, in its name and the name of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the
successful termination of the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I assure the United States of the
allegiance and unquestioning support of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more representatives
on the commission that is to decide the future of our Islands.”60

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information on this subject than was
transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo’s pretensions, but on
July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:—

“I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here
simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I have no orders from my
government on the subject.”61

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs was kept up until
further deception was useless. Consul Williams, for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:—

“For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated
submissiveness to our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to form
provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted,
but General Aguinaldo told me today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony
of the United States of America.”62

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the independence of the
Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so
that it was comparatively easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what
Aguinaldo considered it expedient to have him believe.

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have been sent at this
time, is of especial interest in this connection:—

“My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the addressee is] until after the visit of the American
Consul, because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum, and in order that you may tell him all
that is favourable for the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving him a reply, and if he should
ask about me tell him that since the time of his last visit there I have not recovered from my illness. If anything
important should happen we can communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in matters that
require secrecy.”63

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo’s
signature and addressed to Señor McKinley, President of the Republic of the United States

of North America, but apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge64 previously
made in his “Reseñia Verídica,” that Pratt and Dewey promised independence. It need not be
further discussed.

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the Paris Treaty written by
Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the following:—

“The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators
as to the future of the Philippines.

“On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on them the explicit recognition of the political
status of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in the moments of
danger and strife. The noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs were solicited to place
themselves at the head of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to second the
action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.

“At the time of employing their armed coöperation, both the Commander of the Petrel and Captain Wood in
Hongkong, before the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman,
in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American nation, at a
moment of great anxiety offered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as triumph was
obtained.

“Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the McCulloch was placed at the disposal of the
said leaders and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-
war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises, when they were
presented to him on board his flag-ship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo before
and after his victories and notable deeds of arms, with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied
army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the efficacious coöperation of that Army and of those
Generals; by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their
ships should sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemn notification
of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its
existence; by entering into relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino authorities recently
established, recognized without question the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who
had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the impulse of their own force.”65

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of the Petrel Captain
Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are now included among those alleged to have
promised independence, and it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due
the chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas his own original
claim was that he was received with the honours due a general, which is quite a different
matter.

The First Philippine Commission

This photograph taken in the room where the commission held its hearings is the only one ever obtained which shows
all the members. From left to right: the author, Colonel Charles Denby, President Jacob Gould Schurman, Mr. John R.
MacArthur, Secretary to the Commission, Admiral George Dewey and General E.S. Otis.

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated Aguinaldo as a general.
The extent to which they were able to use his organization to further the ends of their
government will be set forth later.

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that there is no agreement,
but says that he cannot tell the peoples that it does not exist, “fearing that I may not be able
to restrain the popular excitement.”66 He begs Wildman to use his influence on his
government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the fate of the people
“without considering their will duly represented by my government.” Is it conceivable that,
if there had been any ground for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have
failed to mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:—

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy with the ambition of the
Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and would personally have profited from such a
result, but he refrained from compromising his government and made no promises in its
behalf.

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility of independence.

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral ever discussed
independence with any Filipino, much less made any promise concerning it.

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both were kept in ignorance
of the fact that it was desired up to the last possible moment.

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt made any promise
concerning it.

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these men is fully justified by
well-established facts.

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying, in any document which
Americans could read, that independence had been promised, and advanced this claim only
when the growing strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with
increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately openly threatening war if his
pretensions were not recognized. In doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully
prearranged plan, agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our “faithful allies” and
“coöperated” with us in the taking of Manila. We shall find that this subject richly repays
investigation.

1 Beginning with the letters “P.I.R.”
2 See pp. 53, 55, 68.

3 See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of this book for repetitions and variations of this charge of Aguinaldo.
4 See p. 31 of his book, “The American Occupation of the Philippines,” in referring to which I will hereafter use the
word Blount, followed by a page number.
5 U. S. Consul General Rounseville Wildman of Hongkong.
6 U. S. Consul O. F. Williams of Manila.

7 Blount, p. 43.
8 A term, more or less corresponding to mayor, then applied to the ranking municipal officer of a pueblo or town.

9 Eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars, the actual value of which constantly fluctuated.
10 The Ilocanos are one of the eight civilized peoples who collectively make up the Filipinos. They number 803,942, and
inhabit certain provinces in northern Luzon.

11 I have not felt at liberty to correct spelling, capitalization, punctuation or grammar in quotations, except in the case of
perfectly evident printer’s errors. It should be remembered that the results of Taylor’s work were left in the form of galley
proof.
12 Taylor, 42 F Z-43 F Z.

13 For the history of this document, see p. 51.

14 P.I.R., 1300.2.

15 Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, P. P. 341 et seq.
16 Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session; also P.I.R., 496.

17 Blount, pp. 11–12.
18 Pratt.
19 P.I.R., 516. 4.
20 “The Consul—after telling me that, before arriving in Hongkong harbor, a launch would be sent by the Admiral to
secretly take us to the North American squadron, a secrecy which pleased me also, as it would avoid giving publicity to my
acts—then advised me that I should appoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United States to promptly
secure the official recognition of our independence. I answered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed,
I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I considered that but small recompense for his aid, and that in case
of our having the good fortune to secure our independence I would bestow upon him a high post in the customs service
besides granting the commercial advantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which the Consul asked for his
Government in Washington, since the Filipinos agreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a proper testimonial
of gratitude.”—P.I.R., 1300. 2.
21 Blount, p. 12
22 Blount, pp. 8–9.

23 Ibid., p. 9.
24 The following is one of them:—

“H. Kong, May 16, 1898.
“Señor Don Jose Enrique Basa:
“My Dear Enrique: As an aid to the American policy in the Philippines,—America being the most liberal and
humanitarian nation in the world,—I earnestly recommend the widest possible circulation of the proclamation
which I send herewith in order that the Americans may be supported in the war against the tyrannical friars and
the Spaniards who have connived with them, and that public order, so necessary under the present conditions,
be preserved.
“Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant.
(Signed) “J. M. Basa.”

—P.I.R., 1204–10.

25 P.I.R., 1204–10.
26 Ibid., 1204–10.

27 P.I.R., 53–2.
28 Teodoro Sandico, an influential Tagálog leader, who spoke English well and afterward served as a spy while employed
by the Americans as an interpreter.

29 Señor Garchitorena was a wealthy Tagálog of Manila, and, at this time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta.
30 Dr. Galicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservative Tagálog physician. After Aguinaldo left Hongkong,
he was the leading member of the junta.

31 Sr. Graco Gonzaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the province of Cagayan.

32 There is an illegible word in the original.
33 P.I.R., 406–5.

34 P.I.R., 398. 9.
35
“Hongkong, 12 Jan. 1899,—2 P.M.
“Senator Hoar, Washington.
“As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government through the consul at Singapore,
I frankly state that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were
independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to this. The military party suborned correspondents
are deceiving the American nation by means of malevolent lying statements. If your powerful influence does
not change this insensate policy there will be a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous for the
Americans.
“Bray.”

—P.I.R., 853–4.
36 “Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States consul in Hongkong, in which he told him that he was
anxious to become an American citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowed to return to the Philippines and
place himself under the orders of Commodore Dewey. According to the brother of that Consul, who certainly must have
had opportunities for knowing the facts in the case, he made no demands for independence, but said that he hoped that the
Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but would annex the Philippines and protect them against the
Spaniards. He promised the Consul that he would fight with the Americans and not attempt to foment a revolution against
the United States. His highest expressed aim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and, that once accomplished, he would
abide by the decision of the United States as to the ultimate disposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had expressed his
real intentions of obtaining arms and using them only for his own purposes, and, if he found it expedient, against the United
States, it is not to be thought that he would have been returned to the Philippines on a United States vessel.”—Taylor, 44 F
Z.
37 P.I.R., 471. 7.

38 P.I.R., 1300. 2.
39 Admiral Dewey’s testimony, from which I quote extracts, will be found in Senate Documents, Vol. 25.57 Congress, 1st
session, pp. 2928, 2941.
40 P.I.R., 1300.2.
41 P.I.R., 1300.2.

42 Taylor, 4 MG., E.
43 Report of the Philippine commission to the President. January 31, 1900. Vol. I, p. 121.

44 P.I.R., 396. 3.
45 Ibid., 396. 3.

46 P.I.R., 461.4.
47
“My Dear Brother: I inform you that we arrived here in Cavite at eleven o’clock and disembarked at four
o’clock in the afternoon after our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appears to be favourable

for obtaining our independence. I cannot say more on that subject as it would take too long.
“I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and your companions to meet at once and arrange the
best way to entrap all the enemy in your town, employing deceit, for instance, make a present of whatever you
think best to the chiefs successively and then at once enter the houses and attack them, or if not this, do what
you think best. Show valor and resolution, brothers, the hour has arrived for the Philippines to belong to her
sons and not to them, only one step and we shall reach Independence; be constant, brothers, and be united in
feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces, whatever such people do sooner or later they will be slaves.
Respect foreigners and their property, also enemies who surrender.
“I want you to know that in respect to our conduct I have promised the American Admiral and other nations,
that we shall carry on modern war. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well and
then you will see that our reputation will be very good in all Europe which will declare for our Independence;
but if we do not conduct ourselves thus the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory as
they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure our liberty; rather the contrary; our own
soil will be delivered over to other hands.
“Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts, and let us fire our hearts with the idea of
vindicating our country. Many nations are on our side.”

—P.I.R., 12. 1.

48 Mabini was a Tagálog paralytic of exceptional ability. In my opinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution
produced.

49 P.I.R., 451. 1.
50 Extract from the Journal of Simeon Villa.

“The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was ‘master’ of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he
was a member of the ‘Katipúnan’ Society and the chief of the many members who were in the pueblo of Cavite
Viejo. What was to be done? Aguinaldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the fact that the curate there
knew positively that he was not only a mason, but also the chief of the Katipúnans of his pueblo, considered it
expedient on the night of August 29 to at once call a meeting of all the compromised persons in his town.
Aguinaldo made clear to them their grave situation.
“They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief, should make representations to the Governor
of Cavite; so he went away very early the following morning, presented himself to the governor, and in the
name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain, at the same time
requesting him to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for its security. The governor replied
that he would first consult the captain-general, and if the proposition was approved he would send the garrison
at once.
“As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, they offered him wine and sweetmeats. As
soon as this was over he took his leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the town he assembled all
the compromised persons and informed them of the brilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them that
then was the opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To this they unanimously replied by
saying it was terrible, because no arms were available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove to be a
disaster for them.
“But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented Candido Tirona, insisted on convincing them
with their strong arguments. They made them understand that Spanish cruelty would annihilate them without
fail, and for no other reason than that they were members of the Katipúnan.
“As it happened, at that very time there were two ‘Guardia Civil’ soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2
o’clock in the morning, Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving there, these two
determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards that they should surrender their equipments. These replied
that it was impossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a struggle ensued between the four men, which
lasted nearly an hour. But it resulted in favor of the insurgent chiefs who succeeded in taking the guns and
cartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two chiefs, accompanied by a number of the town
people, directed themselves to the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortunately for them, the

curate was no longer there when they arrived; he had made his escape. While the struggle was going on with
the guards in the court-house, he received the news and fled at once by embarking in a native boat.
“The insurgent chiefs then returned to the court-house and immediately prepared a communication to all the
municipal captains in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas and Laguna, inviting them to at once rise against
Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo was already freed from slavery.
“Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted courier, so that before the expiration of many
hours all the towns in Cavite Province were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo.
“On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the same time Aguinaldo, in company with many
people from his town, marched on Imus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When he arrived
in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and they all went to the convent, in which were the friars
and the soldiers of the ‘Guardia Civil.’ Just as he arrived at the atrium of the Church his companions did not
wish to follow him, for fear that the soldiers were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone
until he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called his companions to aid him. But these were not so
determined as he was, and only about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was, he commenced
breaking in the door which was soon open. They went upstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars and
soldiers had crossed over to the treasury building.
“Aguinaldo’s companions were now numerous, because the others followed him when they saw that nothing
happened to those who went up into the convent; and all of these went immediately to the treasury building, in
which were the friars and soldiers whom they were hunting. When they reached it they found the doors closed,
so they could not pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hiding inside the house were without any
other remedy and had to surrender; but meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a
lieutenant of the ‘Guardia Civil.’ By this victory Aguinaldo succeeded in taking 17 rifles and two 2½ pounder
guns.”

—P.I.R., 869.

51
“My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the agreement of peace proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno after his
consultation with the Captain-General of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in consequence thereof to
surrender our arms and disband the troops under my immediate command under certain conditions, as I
believed it more advantageous for the country than to continue the insurrection, for which I had but limited
resources, but as some of the said conditions were not complied with, some of the bands are discontented and
have not surrendered their arms. Five months have elapsed without the inauguration of any of the reforms
which I asked in order to place our country on a level with civilized people—for instance, our neighbor, Japan,
which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point where she has no reason to envy any one, her
strength and ascendency being shown in the last war with China. I see the impotence of the Spanish
Government to contend with certain elements which oppose constant obstacles to the progress of the country
itself and whose destructive influence has been one of the causes of the uprising of the masses, and as the great
and powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this
country, I again assume command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainment of our lofty aspirations,
inaugurating a dictatorial government to be administered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility
and with the advice of distinguished persons until the time when these islands, being under our complete
control, may form a constitutional republican assembly and appoint a president and cabinet, into whose hands I
shall then resign the command of the islands.
“Emilio Aguinaldo.
Given at Cavite, May 24, 1898.”

—P.I.R. 206.6.

52 “The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty and therefore the friend of our people oppressed and
enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly
disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves and our
unfortunate country. In order to maintain this high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation we should

abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to
persons or property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflict during the period of our campaign.”—P.I.R., 43. 3.

53 Of this extraordinary occurrence Taylor says:—

“Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independence were sent to Admiral Dewey; but neither he
nor any of his officers were present. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that some American should be
there whom the assembled people would consider a representative of the United States. ‘Colonel’ Johnson, ex-
hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was in the Philippines exhibiting a cinematograph, kindly consented to appear
on this occasion as Aguinaldo’s Chief of Artillery and the representative of the North American nation. His
name does not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguinaldo. It is possible that his position as colonel
and chief of artillery was a merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform which would befit
the character of the representative of a great people upon so solemn an occasion!”—Taylor, 26 A J.

54 P.I.R., 451.4.
55 P.I.R., 451.4.

56 See p. 50.
57 “They are aware that a Government has been established here from the beginning: first the Dictatorial, and afterwards,
when several provinces had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implanted in the same a proper organization,
and thus a new Government was established in the form best adapted to the principles of liberty; but notwithstanding all
this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize that government.

“The things they request involve the recognition of a right which we cannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize
our Government and unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined. If they wish us to recognize them in Cavite,
let them recognize our rights in Parañaque.

“The United States are our creditors more than any other nation; not only are they due the gratitude of the Filipino people,
but also they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this people can grant them without loss of our legitimate right to
a free and independent life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty or convention with them. They will be no longer
able to allege the lack of national character, for in the near future there is to be assembled the Revolutionary Congress
composed of the Representatives of the provinces.

“They should understand that they have come to make war on the Spaniards; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against
the same enemy to achieve their liberty and independence; and that in consequence they cannot exercise dominion over us
without violation of international law. If they persist in refusing to recognize our Government, we shall see ourselves
obliged to come to an agreement with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms.”—P.I.R.,
58.
58 Blount, p. 24.
59 P.I.R., 416. 1.
60 Ibid., 102. 5.
61 Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 9.
62 Taylor, 26 A J.

63 P.I.R., 5. 10.
64 “Going to Singapore, I had several interviews with the Consul of the United States, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed
me that the war was directed against Spain only and that in addition your action in the Philippines had as an object the

independence of my beloved country.

“The Commander of the MacCulloch telegraphed me also from Hongkong, offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to
take me to Cavite, in order to raise the Filipinos against Spain.

“Without any written treaty, counting only upon the sacred word of American citizens, I went to Hongkong, embarked on
the MacCulloch and a few days later had the honor to make the acquaintance of the victorious Commodore Dewey, who
likewise informed me that he had come to make war against Spain, that he had annihilated the fleet of Admiral Montojo
and that the United States desired to give the Philippines their independence.”—P.I.R., 441.2.
65 P.I.R., 102. 1.
66 P.I.R., Books C-1.

Chapter III

Insurgent “Coöperation”
I have previously1 called attention to the minutes of a session of the Hongkong junta
held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly appears that the Filipino leaders at that
time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them
later if it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by Aguinaldo and his
associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes wide open, knowing full well that they
had been promised nothing; prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral
Dewey, and intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used first
against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after they had been employed to
help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed “J.M.B.”2 believed to have been an outright
forgery, both from its tenor and from the fact that the signature “J.M.B.” is not in the
handwriting of Basa’s letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:—

“The true patriots have organized a committee to which I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and
Agoncillo as Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced diplomatic negotiations with the
Admiral and American Consul, and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although they said
they would give us independence. The Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same time
equipping ourselves with arms.

“We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be disembarked in the Philippines by the
squadron.

“A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with them in order to conceal our real intentions,
and part will be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, we shall reject such offer and
rise in arms.

“A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may be considered suitable.

“José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

“Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you will communicate with prudent and
intelligent chiefs who will recognize the gravity of the subject.”3

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa’s initials were forged in order to gain the
prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of
the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight
with them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo’s advice to Aguinaldo, given under date
of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly relations should be maintained with the
Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be
made to find out the future status of the islands “by deceitful means,” and that
confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to this letter, saying:—

“You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs should employ a policy of friendship toward
the Americans until our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially given. Try to mislead
them.”4

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris conference.5

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country
to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans,6 and adds that having helped us take the city of
Manila, they “felt that they had been ‘given the double cross,’” “believed that the
Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of
the war.”7

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly that the principal
thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the Philippines
by the United States; those which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a
result of a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of whether a
United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United States, might be considered,
was left open to a very late date.8

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards without our
assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty had practically
disappeared from the islands at the time Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged
that “decrepit” Spain “could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the
Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have ‘eaten them up.’”9

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means sanguine. Their more
intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win unaided. Señor
Antonio Regidor was at the time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual
intelligence and exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation,
and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:—

“In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a telegraphic message to MacKinley,
requesting him not to abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge him
our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form, would
mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore.

London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus
obliging them to remain.”10

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor’s views, but Agoncillo did not share them.
He replied on July 29:—

“Provisional government’s aspiration is independence. Make this campaign.”11

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his
communication to Basa:

“America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with natives international question other
difficulties necessary to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flag
great demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion show islands resolved united America high
circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible programme is protectorate.”12

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for on August 1 in a
letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements and inquiries:—

“If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which will arise are these: Have we sufficient
arms to maintain the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations are
opposed to our independence and wish that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we
sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If you think
that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept independence under the
American protectorate? And if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the United States? You
should carefully consider the preceding questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner,
consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank;
and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may know what they must do
in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to me by Regidor that he suggests to me to
send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them [the U. S.]
unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action which is against the
instructions of the government, I replied to him that the only desire of our government is independence.
This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply, he was, I think, somewhat
offended, as he afterwards sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, upon receiving
the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message to
MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who
protested against such measure. In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be present in the
meeting, since I am the representative of our government. At the meeting where I was present, I pointed
out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should await your
instructions in regard to the matter before sending any message of that character. So the message was not
sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would
not injure our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and went so far as to say to Basa
the following: ‘Many of us, especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for
what we hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs, but
none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.’ To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of
an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What union can you expect from
this people?”13

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were forged on the letter
quoted on page 67.

The Second Philippine Commission

From left to right: General Luke E. Wright, Professor Dean C. Worcester, Professor Bernard Moses, Judge William H.
Taft, and Judge Henry C. Ide.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once more to the
question of independence under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this late day
he did not know whether this was or was not what the Filipinos desired.14

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an easy matter to escape
from Spanish domination, much less that the islands were already rid of it, for he wrote
to Mabini that the United States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands
of Spain. He said that “if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark
and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and
bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from
Cuba and her other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here the
150,000 men she has in Cuba.”15 Apacible thought that the best thing was independence
under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should “not
accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because

we will see first if we can obtain independence.”16

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible
accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico
on August 10, 1898, he wrote:—

“The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for the independence of ‘the Philippines’ as
far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only when it can
be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is
impossible.”17

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary.18 He
was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with
Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come,
and desired to know on what terms it could be had.19

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:—

“I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents,
and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United
States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the
Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger
unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizenship if they
wished it.”20

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the
Islands must remain American,21 and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley
in Aguinaldo’s name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war,
commending the occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States of
the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos,22 but it is to be feared that the
sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong.23 Indeed we know that
some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:—

“In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano24 addressed to Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio
Rianzares Bautista a letter written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna, in reply to one
addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the
United States and said: ‘Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of
affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.’ Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the
ascendant in Aguinaldo’s government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the
Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before congress had promulgated a Philippine

constitution, Messrs. Arellano and Pardo25 still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as
secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States
to acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate through the mediation of General
Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day
Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been told
by him: ‘that if Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese Government would help.’
Aguinaldo believed Sandico’s story (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry out the
resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves
from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo,
dated Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to acknowledge the
independence of the Philippines and of Cuba.”26

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand
Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had
come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation.27

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the
assistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained
with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory,
and then they were to “show their teeth,” and see “who was deceiving whom,” resorting
to “force of arms” if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it
could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms
or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a
United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his
following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed
on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering
the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for
attacking the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged to have been asked
by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:—

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his
associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing them arms and ammunition; by
blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which
would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently
imported by the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the
arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which
surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus
rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible
bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it
might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey’s guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to
take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces,
and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo’s help? Let us consider his testimony on the
subject:—

“Senator Carmack. You did want a man there who could organize and rouse the people?

“Admiral Dewey. I didn’t want anybody. I would like to say now that Aguinaldo and his people were
forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn’t do anything—

“Senator Carmack. Did they have any power to force him upon you?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the official power, but one will yield after a while
to constant pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not think they would do anything. I would
not have taken them; I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because, when I left Hongkong, I was
led to suppose that the country was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Williams put
it, there would be a general uprising, and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would
play a very small part in it.”28

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready for battle, pestered by
officious consuls on the one hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic;
but it had its humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the
following:—

“Senator Patterson. Was there any communication between you and Pratt in which the matter of a written
pledge or agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the Philippine Islands?

“Admiral Dewey. No.

“Senator Patterson. What became of the correspondence, Admiral, if you know?

“Admiral Dewey. It is all in the Navy Department. When I turned over my command my official
correspondence was all sent to the Navy Department. “Senator Patterson. You retained all of your letters
from any United States officials?

“Admiral Dewey. No; they went to the Department.

“Senator Patterson. I mean you did not destroy them.

“Admiral Dewey. No; I did not destroy them.

“Senator Patterson. And you turned them over to the Navy Department?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say that for my own information I kept copies of
certain telegrams and cablegrams. I don’t think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt’s letters, as I did not consider
them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people’s business
and I don’t think his letters impressed me.

“Senator Patterson. He was the consul-general?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the attack on Manila, you know.

“Senator Patterson. I understand that.

“Admiral Dewey. I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible people.

“Senator Patterson. But Pratt was the consul-general of the Government there?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; he was consul-general.

“Senator Patterson. And he communicated with you, giving you such information as he thought you might
be interested in, and among other information he gave you was this concerning Aguinaldo?

“Admiral Dewey. I don’t remember; no, I really don’t remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo
more than that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see how much importance I attached
to him; I did not wait for him.

“Senator Patterson. What you said was: ‘Tell Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible.’

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

“Senator Patterson. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

“Admiral Dewey. I think more to get rid of him than anything else.

“Senator Carmack. Rid of whom?

“Admiral Dewey. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were bothering me. I was very busy getting my
squadron ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at Hongkong and taking a
good deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest importance to anything they could do, and they did
nothing; that is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk,
but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn’t go because he didn’t have any toothbrush.

“Senator Burrows. Did he give that as a reason?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; he said, ‘I have no toothbrush.’”29

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by Pratt and
Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to be brought to Manila.

Having them there he proposed to get assistance from them, not as allies, but as a
friendly force attacking a common enemy, in its own way.

The Return of Mr. Taft

This photograph, taken on the occasion of the return of Mr. Taft to the Philippines after his appointment as secretary of
war, shows him in a stand on the Luneta reviewing the procession organized in his honor, in which thousands of
Filipinos participated.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo and the naval
forces of the United States:—

“Senator Patterson. Then, Admiral, until you knew that they were going to send land forces to your
assistance you thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into land forces, did you?

“Admiral Dewey. No; not a necessity.

“Senator Patterson. You thought it might prove of value to you?

“Admiral Dewey. I testified here, I think, in a way that answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, ‘There is our
enemy; now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act independently.’ That was the wisest
thing I ever said.

“Senator Patterson. But you stated that you were using these people and they were permitted to organize,
that you might use them.

“Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us.

“Senator Patterson. Very well, they were to assist you. Did you not either permit them or encourage them
—I do not care which term you use—to organize into an army, such as it was, that they might render you
such assistance as you needed?

“Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us, but incidentally they were fighting their enemy; they were
fighting an enemy which had been their enemy for three hundred years. “Senator Patterson. I understand
that, Admiral.

“Admiral Dewey. While assisting us they were fighting their own battles, too.

“The Chairman. You were encouraging insurrection against a common enemy with which you were at
war?

“Admiral Dewey. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration furnished by the civil war. I was in the South
in the civil war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes, and we made use of them; they
assisted us on many occasions. I had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and ‘we have come
here and they will help us just exactly as the negroes helped us in the civil war.’

“Senator Patterson. The negroes were expecting their freedom—

“Admiral Dewey. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

“Senator Patterson. What were the Filipinos expecting?

“Admiral Dewey. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards; I do not think they looked much beyond that. I
cannot recall but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds was to get rid of the Spaniards
and then to accept us, and that would have occurred—I have thought that many times—if we had had
troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May before the insurrection got started; these people would
have accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our loyal friends—I don’t know for how long,
but they would have been our friends then.

“Senator Patterson. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, or Williams, very early, did you not, that the
Filipinos wanted their own country and to rule their own country; that that is what they were expecting?

“Admiral Dewey. I heard from Williams that there was an insurrection there against the Spaniards. The
Spaniards were very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond getting rid of them. There
was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the idea of independence, but I don’t think that Aguinaldo had much idea of
it.

“Senator Carmack. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino army serve; why did you want the Filipino
army at all?

“Admiral Dewey. I did not want them.

“Senator Carmack. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

“Admiral Dewey. No, not really. It was their own idea coming over there. We could have taken the city at
any moment we had the troops to occupy it.”

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the importance of
Aguinaldo’s military operations:—

“Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle
after battle, and finally put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted to take this up—
wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the city with it. I said, ‘Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until our
troops come.’ I knew he could not take the city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance,

and I knew that what he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was saving our own troops, because our
own men perhaps would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly terms;
we had never had any differences. He considered me as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the
highest admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who had been riding them down for three
hundred years.

“Senator Patterson (continuing). You sent this short dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy:—

“‘Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He expects to make general attack on
May 31. Doubt his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.’

“Do you recall that visit?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.

“Senator Patterson. He came to tell you, did he, that he was going to make a general attack, and you—

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.

“Senator Patterson. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

“Admiral Dewey. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted me to tow one of his guns up into position. I
knew he could not take the city; of course he could not.

“Senator Patterson. Did you urge that he should not make the attack?

“Admiral Dewey. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

“Senator Patterson. And was he not persuaded or restrained by you from doing so?

“Admiral Dewey. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I did not want to see a lot of them killed
unnecessarily, because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had no artillery, and they could
not take it, I knew very well, and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our troops came to occupy
it.

“Senator Patterson. But you found that whenever you expressed a strong objection to anything being done
at that time that Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

“Admiral Dewey. Up to the time the army came he did everything I requested. I had not much to do with
him after the army came.”30

But Dewey’s influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent his looting, as the
following extracts from his testimony show:—

“Senator Patterson. Is that what you mean when you say he looted—that he made reprisals for his army,
took provisions and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

“Admiral Dewey. That is one part of it.

“Senator Carmack. This was taking provisions for the use of the army?

“Admiral Dewey. That is one thing he did.

“Senator Carmack. You said you did not object to that at the time?

“Admiral Dewey. No. It would have been useless; he got beyond me very soon—he got out of my hands
very soon.31

“Senator Carmack. You said yesterday you suspected that Aguinaldo took the lion’s share of the
provisions that were gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you made that accusation?

“Admiral Dewey. Because he was living in Malolos like a prince, like a king, in a way that could only
have come about by his taking the lion’s share. Then, in regard to his looting, I repeat what I said
yesterday. He began within forty-eight hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything he
wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because I saw the loot brought in; and I know that
every dollar that was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at the threat of death.32

“Senator Patterson. Do you believe in this proclamation he was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there for gain—for money—that independence had
never up to that time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That is what I believe, since you
ask me my belief; I believe that implicitly.33

“Senator Patterson. And you found nothing to cause any doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after
Manila surrendered?

“Admiral Dewey. His loyalty to whom?

“Senator Patterson. To you and to the cause for which he was fighting?

“Admiral Dewey. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us about the time our troops arrived, when he
demurred at moving out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

“Senator Patterson. Do you mean by that that you feared that he was commencing to think more of
independence than the success of the American cause?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.”34

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine forces of the United
States. Now let us examine the claim that he cooperated with the land forces after their
arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished was the
maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions,
and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis and Dewey have stated that they
did this, but we learn from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion.35

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was not actively opposed by
the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately furnished by
Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks’ delay, and as a result of threats that
it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to make the attack on
that city were, in part at least, yielded to the Americans by the Filipinos upon the request
of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans, or the requests,
of the Americans. They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the
surrender of the city to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and on the very morning
of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. Disregarding the
request that they keep out of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after,
the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall while a flag of truce
was flying, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings and a share in
“the war booty.” They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, and
ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last
day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they would be
driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of “coöperation” outlined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a
letter dated June 30, 1898:—

“I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manila and I hope that General Augustín will
be obliged to turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitled to it
and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should declare the
independence of the Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be
Governor with full powers to establish a provisional government.

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior towns with their troops or any other act
which might be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

“After having written these lines, I had another conference with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent
for me regarding the question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme Judge of this
place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral
Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A
Government having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the
Philippines without committing a violation of international law. They are no longer fighting against the
Spaniards against whom they declared war. The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic
play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well aware of the false position said

General would find himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to take
it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet on the
high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed
by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no right to enter further. Under
certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must
not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of the
Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted to
garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and even therein care should be
observed ... You must not permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees.”36

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at
Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an “ally” might have been expected to do.
Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but
without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General
Anderson:—

“Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any
ceremony.”37

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his
coöperation in the following words:—

“For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your force
coöperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces.”38

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

“amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in the Great North American nation,”39

Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort

Up to the time of Governor-general Smith, no governor-general had ever penetrated the land of the Luzon head-hunters.
He crossed Bontoc and Ifugao, in company with the author, in 1907. This photograph shows him on the crewst of the
Polis range, at the boundary line between these two sub-provinces, sixty-four hundred feet above the sea.

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with
justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to coöperation in
his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in military
operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:—

“I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency in your welcome letter received
on the 5th instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to
both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer
that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I
would like to have Your Excellency’s advice and coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the
resources of the country.”40

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-
General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:—

“When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better
understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to coöperate. But he has declared
himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable,

but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a
provisional government.”41

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation,
did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as
follows:—

“We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc.
For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not
willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary
we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do
this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to
expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is
comparatively slight.

“General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must
supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred
horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.”

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was
sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that it was.
Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure
transportation except upon Aguinaldo’s order and that the natives had removed their cart
wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that the transportation requested
had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given orders against
furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-General of the
Army as follows:—

“Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his
assumed authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Go
this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo
(to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled.”

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

“General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your Excellency to give what assistance you
could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your
people. So far we have received no response.

“As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for five hundred horses
and fifty oxen and ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you and make requisition
directly on the people.

“I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

“I remain with great respect, etc.”42

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:—

“Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised
beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relative to the
assistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through
the bearer that I was disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these,
giving me notice in advance.

“I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within the shortest time possible horses be
brought for sale, but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need,
because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizoötic diseases in January,
February, and March last.

“Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to advise Your Excellency.

“I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition when you
need them, provided you give me previous notice four days in advance.”43

General Anderson replied:—

“Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that
there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring
of carromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am
pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.”44

From this series of communications it appears that it took three weeks, and a very direct
threat to seize transportation, to bring about Aguinaldo’s promise of assistance in
securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American officers in
making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice.45

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major J. F. Bell,46 who
was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him
to place at Bell’s disposal any available information about the force of the enemy and the
topography of the country.47

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who
were making a reconnaissance.48

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo
made to these several requests, but General Anderson’s original views as to the
willingness of the Insurgents to coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on
July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he makes the
following statement:—

“The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and self-appointed President. He has
declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

“We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and
gratitude to the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are
using every effort to take Manila without us.

“I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide
is in Manila.”49

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to
disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards
without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the
occupation.50

Aguinaldo’s assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not pass unnoticed. On
July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army concerning it:—

“His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not
recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I have made no
formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and
execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral
Dewey’s request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let
it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These people only respect force
and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not
ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work
in a given time than a regiment of volunteers.”

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a
parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the
Americans were tacitly recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:—

“On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the
reading of our declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.”51

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following year when the declaration
was read on the Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among whom were many
school children, and it has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Parañaque and their going into camp near that town
on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between
Insurgent officers followed.52

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans,53 and trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army whom we should obey; and that it
is your desire. We did not listen to him, awaiting your order.”

On the back of the telegram is written the following:—

“Reply.—You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be
deceived. You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers and
soldiers must be strict and not timid.”54

Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino troops at this
time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo’s request for information as to
places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of
disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became
desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arévalo telegraphed
Aguinaldo as follows:—

“In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you:
‘Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. El
Señor Noriel, General de Brigade. Sir: In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message
which Captain Arévalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the
intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o’clock this
morning. I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking
you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Brigadier
General, commanding.’”55

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction
referred to by Blount as “Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches.” He bases his
statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the
trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more
correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the
matter:—

“No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to
occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.”

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a
trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission
was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with
American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off
Admiral Dewey’s aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo’s
whereabouts.56

The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manila led to the
concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor.57

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo58 wrote to General Pío del Pilar that the Americans
were going to attack the next day and that,—

“It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night
annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the
contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it
is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that
the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers.”59

Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man’s Country

Mr. Forbes has made frequent trips through the wild man’s country in Northern Luzon, and knows it from end to end.
Its people know and like him. This photograph shows a crowd of Ifugaos welcoming him on his arrival at Banaue in
May, 1913. They are clapping their hands over their heads in true Ifugao fashion.

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the
13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:—

“(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

“Señor Don Artemio Ricarte:60

“My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank
you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours, most
truly and sincerely,

“Luis Martinez Alcobendas.

“Singalon, August 10, 1898.”61

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:—

“The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of
the American movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July 30, to the
Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the
Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way,
but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and
surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo’s information was correct,
and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire.”62

Taylor continues:—

“And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not probable that these were the only two
such letters written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered
Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did not want
the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they
did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He saw very early that it was
extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among
Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo’s point of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible
thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses,
small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos. There is no
reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards should
inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of
Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally.”63

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from
General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:—

“Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the
place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said
batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give
us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out. I await your reply.”64

This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Dewey and Generals
Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for themselves, not
only because of the “war booty,” for which they were hungry, but because of the status
which they felt that the taking of the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The
great importance which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written
by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others.65

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:—

“On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón García to negotiate the surrender of
Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning to enter Manila
by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R., 243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be
gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila
which he intended making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

“Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was growing steadily less, now
determined to force himself into the city with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance
he had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had not been
intentional. It was the result of the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of the
Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy of both; but the operations were not
joint operations, and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August 8
Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered him to respect
the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were
to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must
have warned the foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection of their flags
all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops
entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be injured. The
earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves
and their property shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as fair booty of
war.”66

There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had been agreed upon
in advance were correct, as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey:

“Senator Patterson. When did you reach an understanding with the Spanish commander upon the
subject,67—how long before the 12th or 13th of August?

“Admiral Dewey. Several days before.

“Senator Patterson. To whom did you communicate the arrangement that you had?

“Admiral Dewey. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own captains—General Merritt, and I think a
council of officers on board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army officers present when I
told the General that; and I may say here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

“Senator Patterson. What statement did you make to them, Admiral, in substance?

“Admiral Dewey. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, but before doing so I must engage one of the
outlying forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city.68 They said I must engage that and fire for a
while, and then I was to make a signal by the international code, ‘Do you surrender?’ Then they were to
hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white flag.

We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a
while, and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not see the white flag—it was
rather a thick day—but finally I discovered it on the south bastion; I don’t know how long it had been
flying there when I first saw it.”69

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo,
urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans might be obliged
to ask him to stop, with the result that the Insurgents would be included in the official
negotiations. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because
the Americans suspended theirs.70

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12, he received an order from
General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command from
entering Manila. This notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was
received by him with anger.71

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent attack of their
own, as planned.72 It promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 A.M.
Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his
troops enter Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south side of
the Pasig River.73

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request, except to direct General
Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a moment and
ask for an explanation, in writing if possible.74

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops were being
forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking
Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said
that he had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked by a
common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject of their entering Manila.75

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram to General Riego de
Dios, in which that officer communicated the views of Araneta76 and Buencamino, who
had been unable to find General Anderson. This important communication follows:—

“Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in regard to your telegram of to-day, they
confirm capitulation, and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson they are of the opinion,
first that we should continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that explanation should
be in the following terms: Inquire reason for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without
permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms of?) capitulation is given as the reason,
to answer that we do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation is not favourable to our
independence. General Anderson is not here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey
is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation in the proposed terms and to have a
conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt.”77

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above paper reads:
—

“I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we believe that we have the right to enter Manila
without permission as we have a part in the surrender of the Spaniards. They would not have surrendered
if our troops had not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us the landing of troops would have
cost them much blood. Obtain an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before the consuls in
case it is necessary.”78

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed to Aguinaldo:—

“Americans wish to put us out. Give directions.”79

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:—

“Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo and San José warn us that they will fire on
us when the time comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing with them. Since 5 o’clock this
morning we have been furiously attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No losses
yet.”80

At 3.52 he wired again:—

“General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: ‘Come here, if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of
Concepción are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any farther. We it was who
succeeded in capturing that place. Come here or there will be trouble, since they are driving me away, and
refusing to listen to what I say.’ I am at this very moment going to aforesaid place.”81

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional Exposition, Agricultural College and other
buildings are ours. Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón with his troops is in the Pérez
building, Paco. Colonels Julian Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. All houses
without flag are guarded by our soldiers.”82

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:—

“I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to me that our flag at Singalong church (visita)
was removed by the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us to approach thereto.
General Pío del Pilar is at present at the barrio of Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move on any
farther. How can he enter Manila?”83

No attention was paid to General Anderson’s request that the Insurgent troops should not
enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward with and after the American
forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive, they found American and Spanish troops
confronting each other but not firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the
neighbouring city wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless

the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire which killed and
wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General Greene has said:—

“At this point the California regiment a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the
Spaniards on the walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss in the California regiment of
1 killed and 2 wounded.”84

The Philippine Supreme Court

From left to right, Justice Moreland, Justice Johnson, Justice Torres, Chief-Justice Arlleano, Justice Mapa, Justice
Carson, and Justice Trent.

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General Anderson, for he sent
Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter at 6.35 P.M., as follows:—

“Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.—Manila,
taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your troops should not force
themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender then we will negotiate with you.

“Anderson, commanding.”85

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish
and Filipino officers and men.86

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention of Aguinaldo,
advanced in his “Reseña Verídica:—

“Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa
Lucía. The Spanish soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention of every one because
they did not fire on the former, a mystery which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news of the
capitulation of the place by General Señor Jáudenes87 to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation
which the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of what had been agreed upon with
Admiral Dewey, in regard to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila by the two armies,
American and Filipino, together and in combination.

“This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American officers was made clearer by the telegrams,
which General Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day, requesting that I should
order our troops not to enter Manila, which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what was
agreed upon, and to the high ends of the Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself the
immense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing thousands of lives and
millions in material interests, could not surely have done so with any object other than that of capturing
Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness and tenacity defended that place.”88

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:—

“My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could
appear in it, as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made
of money, and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed
against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs
many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Parañaque, Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig.
Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and
avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe
Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines and hold a conference with you, and that
they will be safe during the conference.”89

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint occupation. On August 13
Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed the government that since the occupation
of Manila and its suburbs the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked
how far they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President of the United
States had directed:—

“That there must be no joint occupation with the Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila
city, Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory
occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military
occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President.
Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end.”90

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises, and in any event
dual occupation was out of the question because of the lawlessness of the Insurgent
troops.

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which they occupied, and as
is abundantly shown by their own records were not confining their attacks to Spaniards,

but were assaulting their own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well.91
The continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the “war booty,” and asked certain
other extraordinary concessions as follows:—

“(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking of Manila being well known, it is just that we
should share in the war booty.

“(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacañang and the Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or
San Fernando de Dilao.

“(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but
if General Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if he will grant our President, Don
Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction of the
authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond the municipal radius.

“(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate our military positions without permission of the
respective commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions which they occupy at the present time
beyond the municipal radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of the commander will be
considered as spies.

“(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize
the sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are made necessary by the present war.”92

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be acceded to. Nor
could they have been acceded to had there been no such instructions. In this connection
the following extract from General Jáudenes’s cablegram for June 8th to his home
government is highly significant:—

“Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to
run risks of bombardment, which has not yet begun.”93

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high idea of Insurgent
discipline.

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage in a letter sent the
following day to Governor-General Augustin by Buencamino:—

“Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of assistance from anywhere, and Señor
Aguinaldo being disposed to make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency should prolong
the struggle with tenacity, I do not know, frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, but Your
Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians,94 inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and
with blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not be allowed to escape either women,
children, or Peninsular friars,—especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights of humanity, imperilled
in such a serious way, should be well considered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military

duty may be, although worth as much or more than existence itself there is no right by which they should
be won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter outweigh every consideration and all duty.”95

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they had in mind at
this time.

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as they had, and their
own records show it.

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages, threatening people with
their arms, and this was still going on a week after the fall of Manila.96

General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this misconduct, and
Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, and
they could not remove him by force, he be promoted.97

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases of kidnapping (dukut) occurring in Tondo, San
Sebastián and San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in the act of kidnapping a person. I have
also heard that many persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them98 that you know nothing of
all this and that if some persons are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the Spanish spies and
secret police, which is great.”99

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of preventing disorder, for
on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo from Manila as follows:—

“By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied by the War Auditor, Señor Urbano, we
entered a prison where the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo were kept. They were
almost prostrated. They had lately been released from Bilibid where they had been confined for political
crimes. On being asked the reason for their imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from
which blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment received from Major Carmona who, by the
way, is the same person of whom I spoke to you in one of my previous letters; I declared to you then that
he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in the middle of one of the most frequented streets of the suburb
of Paco on pure suspicion.

“The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the accusations made against them it was for fear of
greater punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard took the liberty of striking with his
fist the one who dared to express himself so.

“Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a
recommendation for a country that wished to be free and that they, the Americans, do not arrest any one
without just cause.100

“I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter in question and other abuses in order that the
measures you may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are making a target of ourselves in
the sight of all nations, especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of ours and judge us
secretly now in order to do so later in public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future injury to us,

because many will desire to place themselves under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours
refuses to defend the citizens’ individual rights.

“I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together with his accomplices in the matter so that it
may serve as a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like him.”101

Obviously Sandico’s protest of September 24 did not produce the desired result, for on
September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Manila personal
security did not exist, people were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft
were very frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers and
men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of such a nature that he
preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about them.102

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft—these are not pleasant things,
but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to prevent them, was
powerless to do so. He did not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him
from the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued to work their will
on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent forces to leave Manila.
The American commander showed great forbearance and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta)
telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring prior permission
of Insurgent officers before American troops could pass or approach their lines had
greatly displeased General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of
Noriel’s troops from Manila.103

An Unsanitary Well

This is a typical old-style well, with the family washing going on beside it. Under such
circumstances infection of the well water invariably resulted.

A Flowing Artesian Well

There is no way in which the water from such a well can become infected. More than eight
hundred fifty have been sunk, and the death rate in some towns fortunate enough to possess
them has fallen off fifty per cent, as a result.

Aguinaldo’s reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already made up his mind
to fight the Americans, for it contains the following significant words: “The conflict is
coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are
really our rights.”104

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with
a letter and also with a memorandum in which were the words:—

“In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to
him as follows: ...”

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special importance. It reads as
follows:—

“(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is
inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will
be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing
from these islands care will be taken to leave him in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the
Government.105

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:—

“I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored
portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me, and I
preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I
undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment
upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since
to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.”106

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up at once, a thing
which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water. I should be glad if
I could leave this matter here, but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further
statement:—

“Attention is invited to General Merritt’s promise made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that
in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave Aguinaldo
in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General made to
me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression ‘forces of the Government’ to mean the naval forces,
should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation.”107

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt’s intention. If this is not the
case, I must say in all frankness that in my opinion it was General Merritt’s intention to
indulge in sharp practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any “condition,” in the
sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they brought him from

Hongkong and assisted him in starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were
relative to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations took place,
and General Merritt’s promise could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything
else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would have resulted.
General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in the first
instance, and the only honourable course left open to him would have been to advise
Washington of his improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus
save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the offer. On the
contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he was committed to anything, and
sought to impose new conditions which were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called his attention to
the fact that in making this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in his reply to
Aguinaldo’s protest General Merritt says:—

“So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the
United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of
the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may
depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which you already know the
beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.”108

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum hereinbefore
referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his associates, and in
my opinion Merritt’s conduct in making such a proposal in the first instance was
inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called away, and
turned this matter, together with other unfinished business, over to his successor, General
E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as follows:—

“General Aguinaldo, Bacoor:

“Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I
desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being
unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the
earliest opportunity.

“Otis.”

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully discussing the whole
situation in the light of the complete information which he had meanwhile obtained.
Since so much has been made of this incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to
the following extracts from General Otis’s letter, which embody a fair and judicial
statement of the conditions which existed:—

“You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your
troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy,
and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to
your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations
between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named government the territory occupied by the
former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall
retire within the same.

“A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila,
involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once
refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained
in former correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is.
The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the
civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces,
was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the
United States Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila, and that Government
obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its
ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents the United States authority over Manila and
its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot escape the obligations which it has assumed.

“But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of
the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence
and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition—a joint occupation
—upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance
they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made
personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my
Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the
Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the
Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of
consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and
thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish
navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports
of the Island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

“Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those having their origin in personally conceived
ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint
occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent
judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might
result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close
proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might be the
means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shooting
affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our
subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that
permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in

violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In
pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have
arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the
insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the
contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to
which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

“... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for
dual occupation of the city’s suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty
resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts
on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on
my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated
‘booty,’ as have many European governments. No enemy’s property of any kind, public or private, can be
seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of
it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which
have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy’s money and property (all that is not
necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy’s territory) must be preserved for
final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My
troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy’s territory. I
make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which
occupation bestows.

“I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions
precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

“The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of
protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean
protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you
are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international recognition of the
belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the
United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are
concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and
commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my
Government is not assailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions
are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will
be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral
Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred
upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if
disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my
Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do
so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

“The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in
case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles; and
the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which
you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be
considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts
and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations
resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession
under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the concessions be
made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to
carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary
power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to
your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and
national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and

suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within
the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

“Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the
situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been
instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here,
and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor
conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its
sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the
principles which actuate your proceedings.

“It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that
your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and that I shall be
obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply
with my Government’s demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn
beyond the line of the city’s defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to
forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences
which may ensue.

“In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of
this communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects;
that the commands of our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our
respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.”

An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila

The condition of the streets formerly made it impossible to remove night-soil and garbage from this district, and
cholera was rampant there when this photograph was taken.

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with the firm statement of
intention with which it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the
events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:—

“On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was
the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of
discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing
that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that
unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw
the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he
would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant
would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents
would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to
withdraw to the lines which I designated—something which he could show to the troops and induce them
to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters—he would probably be able to
retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to
withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request,
whereupon I furnished them with the following:—

“‘Office U. S. Military Governor in the

“‘Philippine Islands,

“‘Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.

“‘The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces:

“‘Sir: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honour to inform you that I
have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your
revolutionary government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the
complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops
continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the
necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always
been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be
perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report
them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

“‘It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that
they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the
desire of yourself and associates.

“‘May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

“‘Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism
which will lead you to accede to this request.

“‘I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) “‘E. S. Otis,

“‘Major-General, U. S. V.,

“‘United States Military Governor in the Philippines.’

“In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:—

“‘Malolos, Bulacan, September 16, 1898.

“‘The Commanding General of the American Forces:

“‘My Dear Sir: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the
honour to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their
most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where
contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

“‘I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve
amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the
confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

“‘A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered
with the promptness desired.

“‘Your very respectful servant,

(Signed) “‘Emilio Aguinaldo.’

“On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its
suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This certain agents
of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the
general officer in command109 would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men
gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected
adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.”110

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one instance I have found
in which a promise was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was not
accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt
should never have made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it,
should be fully set forth.

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that Admiral Dewey and
he considered conditions critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the city
was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification
to Aguinaldo that unless the latter’s troops were withdrawn beyond the line of the
suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be obliged to resort to forcible action
and that the United States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate
consequences which might ensue.

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the United States, but
did not consider such recognition probable, and pushed preparations to attack if a
favorable opportunity should offer.

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly review the results of
our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation with the American forces up to this time.

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:—

“Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That
none of his attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports of casualties; but although he had
failed to secure the surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison occupied and within their
works. The American force on land was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far the
relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet
he could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the designs which he had by
this time frankly declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations, and had not answered them,
nor was it possible to answer them. The American forces were there under the instructions of the President
to make war on Spain and to establish a military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared
himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in his civil capacity, to have
dealt with him in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his government by the military
commander in the field—a thing impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces are not
empowered to recognize governments; that function is reserved to the President of the United States; and
in this case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19, copies of which were forwarded to
General Merritt for his guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent to the Philippines ‘for
the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order
and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.’ These instructions contemplated
the establishment of a military government in the archipelago by military officials of the United States.

“it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions General Merritt in San Francisco had received no
copy of them on August 28, three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what that officer knew
of them could only have been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of
them shown him at the White House, but they were in accordance with the practice of the United States
Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations
with Aguinaldo were guided by it.

“It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received the impression at this time from their
conversation with American officers that the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence
of the Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There was no
cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation.
That he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies,
for which they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel
does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity of
strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make
Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was with the aid of the Americans by whom he
would be supported in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain that he needed the
appearance of their support for the attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by
compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, as all American
officers serving there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and was never given except
under pressure. It is true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is born of
insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers that any government but that of the United
States, any colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain the hearty cooperation
of Aguinaldo and his followers by judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession which
would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition of the independence of the
Philippines under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of

the Katipúnan as dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise the
Government of the United States could not make. Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the
insurgents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them, except as fighting
men, no relations could be had.

“No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any
American commander, and no American commander ever rendered such returns to him. At the time of
General Merritt’s arrival, and until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and United
States troops were united solely by the fact that they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were
such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid doing anything which might cause
the insurgents to attack them and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his followers, in
order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to themselves, had to maintain such relations with the
Americans as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet was at his disposal,111 and also such
apparent harmony and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans that the recalcitrant among the
Filipinos would be forced to believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces to support
Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.

“General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately taking such steps as would lead to his
occupation of Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able to pass through the insurgent
lines between Camp Dewey and Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal from Aguinaldo.

“In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines
along their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The
approaches to the beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.

“‘This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces
and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with owing to the
peculiar conditions of our relations with the insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my
arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President
fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that “the powers
of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of
the inhabitants,” I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue
a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.
For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and the military operations
conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was
subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops at my command carried the Spanish
entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no
obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by
the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.’”112

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an enemy. They each
fought that enemy in their own way. There was no coöperation. On the part of the
Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit further evidence of this fact.

1 P. 39.
2 For J. M. Basa.

3 P.I.R., 507–7.
4 P.I.R., 477. 1.

5 “Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do well in not having any controversy with the
Americans. After having secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then liquidate accounts with the
United States in the event that they wish to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur, do not
allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters are in a very delicate state at the present time.”—P.I.R.,
398. 3.

In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:—

“America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that
you must be patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes and insanities, before the questions
before the Paris Congress are definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there would still be time to show
your teeth if they try to govern the country. I would not object at present to them taking up their residence there and
acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placing our trust for the future in Providence which will never
abandon the Philippines.”—P.I.R.

6 Blount, p. 283.
7 Ibid., p. 283.

8 See p. 74.
9 “Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her own coast cities. The death
knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not possibly have sent any
reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have ‘eaten them up.’”—Blount, p. 127.

10 P.I.R., 471.4.
11 Ibid., 471.4.
12 Ibid., 450. 2.
13 P.I.R., 471.4.

14 “You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of this letter; because I am of the opinion that those
questions should be well considered by all of you. If our people desire independence under the American protectorate,
it is necessary that our representatives to the United States be given instructions as to the conditions which we should
grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in
sending our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under a protectorate, you should recommend it at
once. I leave it, however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning the conditions of our
country.”—P.I.R., 471.4.
15 “My Dear Friend: ... The last telegrams from Europe which Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our
future. The preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, annexation of Porto Rico and the
Ladrone Islands, independence of Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling station in the
Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to
prevent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor; the American cabinet hesitates about
including us in the negotiations for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europe advise us to send
a message to America giving our unconditional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a
dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is
doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other powers will assure the

dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will send
here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will
be a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and
place all possible obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary labours. In view of
all this and bearing in mind the present urgency of the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish and
publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the only feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with
America, is independence under an American protectorate.”—P.I.R., 453.3.

16 “The policy which you will pursue in the United States is the following one:—

“Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the
sentiments of the people represented by the government, and they must first recognize it if we are to come to an
agreement. Still do not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will
see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shall endeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible
to do so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself but that once we are independent,
we will be able to make arrangements with them.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

17 P.I.R., 5. 7.
18 In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:—

“Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; thereby you will see that in addition to your representing
us at Washington, you may assist the commission they have formed for the purpose of determining the future
condition of the Philippines.

“But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say that we have accepted the said commission,
because it is my wish to protect [protest? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged with determining our
destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance
we should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think of protection or
annexation.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

19 On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:—

“It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the work of the Commission. On this account it is
important that you proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes place. If perchance we
should go back to Spanish control, ask them to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and ask
also the terms.”—P.I.R., Books C—1.

20 Taylor, 18 AJ.
21 See p. 61.

22 Ibid.
23 Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldo of which the postscript reads as follows:—

“P.S.—If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, please send me my credentials. There are also
annexationists here [i.e., in Manila.—D. C. W.].”—P.I.R., 416. 3.
24 Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. He is a man of excellent character, high
attainments and great ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanish government. In October, 1898, he

was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of the “Philippine Republic,” but never served as such officer. He was
given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University in 1904.

25 Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a
talented physician, and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member of the Philippine
Commission.
26 Taylor, 55 AJ.

27 Taylor, 26 AJ.
28 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 2969.

29 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931–2932.
30 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956.

31 Ibid., p. 2966.
32 Ibid., p. 2966.

33 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955.
34 Ibid., p. 2952.

35 The following passage is an extract from an unsigned order dated July 22, 1898:—

“For the preservation of peace and good order in the community and to put an end to the acts of those who within and
without the city of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control of the Spanish Government, are
evading the orders issued by these Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are storing and
monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but
whose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher prices for their merchandise, without
regard for the injury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit to decree the following: ...” P.I.R.,
45.5 and 125.3.

Relative to this matter, Taylor says:—

“The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective.
There were too many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo’s camp to make him desire to subject the
city to the hardships of an effective siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men have the
necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions
increased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take over all the stores of provisions in the city.
Indeed, there seems to have been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to the north. It was
a traffic in which it has been charged that certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it,
and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that food should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent
starvation in the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with this traffic (P.I.R., 1087–
4). The entrance of food supplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the Americans
who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments in front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too
much of Aguinaldo’s methods.”—Taylor, 14 AJ.

36 P.I.R., 398. 2.

37 Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902.

38 P.I.R., 102–10.
39 P.I.R., Books C-1.

40 P.I.R., 102–10.
41 Ibid.

42 P.I.R., 102. 10.
43 Ibid., Books C-1.

44 Ibid., 102–10.
45 P.I.R., 102–10.

46 Now a major-general.
47 P.I.R., 102–10.

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 “Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey
and (being) more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign
intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I
consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered
by tho Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet
exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North
American troops as a violation of its rights.

“I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have
advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the necessity that before
disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and (thus) prevent the commission of any
transgression against friendship.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.
51 Blount, p. 59.
52 On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is in Parañaque, of the following tenor: ‘I inform your
excellency that two cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I await orders from Your Excellency.’ Which
I hasten to communicate to Your Excellency for the proper action.”—P.I.R., 849.

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce with three hundred men waiting for more troops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to
attack.”—P.I.R., 849.
53 Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows:—

“I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and I incidentally questioned them about their purposes,
[they] replying that they will aid; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to encamp over here at Parañaque. I will
report to you any occurrence.”—P.I.R., 69.6.

54 P.I.R., 69. 5.
55 Ibid., 849.

56 “Admiral Dewey’s Aide was here to-day. I told him I was ignorant of your whereabouts and, if he had no
objection, he might talk with me as I am your representative; but he said that he could not do so, as he had orders to
speak with you personally, about something very important. He then departed.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.
57 The following telegram was addressed to the President or the Secretary of War by Sulpicio at Bacoor, on August
8, 1898:—

“Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking for 100 cavanes of rice which he needs immediately,
since he has ordered to send him all the troops here on account of the landing of Americans in Parañaque. General
Mascardo will send him the troops which are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice.—TR.] deposited in this
storehouse.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.
58 This man’s record is not known to me. Apparently he was an officer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported
as surrendering to the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 4, p. 104.
59 Taylor, 33 AJ.
60 Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking Insurgent generals directing operations against Manila.

61 P.I.R., 1087. 5.
62 Taylor, 30 AJ.

63 Taylor, 30 AJ.
64 P.I.R., 849.

65 On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini:—

“I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may
consider the best solution of our present political problem, which is an exceptional case in history. In my opinion, the
most critical moment, which I call agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture of Manila, where
General Merritt will constitute a provisional government, in compliance with the instructions from his Government. It
is unnecessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence, when this event occurs. Ascertain the real
wishes of the people in this conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those which you may count on during
the struggle until its termination.”

—P.I.R., 451.3.

In his document entitled “Means for Attaining Filipino Independence” Aguinaldo had written:—

“VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupy all Manila including the Walled City with the
object and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines according to the decision of the Powers will be forced to
come to an understanding with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood.”—P.I.R., 457. 5.
66 Taylor, 29 AJ.

67 That is, the surrender of Manila.
68 Fort San Antonio A′bad.
69 Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943.

70 “I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard to our government not having officially participated in the
capitulation of Manila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because, if we attack to-night, the
Americans, acting upon the request of the Spaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in the
capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations; hence we shall be included in the negotiations and this will
work to our advantage.

“To-night at 2 A.M. you will attack without fail in order that we may be included in the capitulation which the
Americans made to-day. You must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the opinion of our partisans
among the foreigners.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5 & 427. 5.

71 “Our Rule in the Philippines,” The North American Review, 1900, No. 170.
72 General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11.15 P.M.:

“Have received the telegram from your honourable person regarding attack at four o’clock in the morning, although
we will make the attack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pío Del Pilar begin firing cannon at the hour set. At the present
time we are making preparations and will also give orders to the chiefs of the columns.”—P.I.R., 849.
73
“August 13, 1898.
“Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding Philippine Forces, Bacoor: Do not let your
troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander on this side of Pasig river. You
will be under our fire.
“Anderson, Brig. General.”

—P.I.R., 102–10.
74 “Copy: Gen. Riego, Cavite: Have just received a note from Gen. Anderson saying to me he does not permit my
troops to enter Manila without permission from the American commander on this side of the Pasig River. They will be
under his fire. Go with Señor Buencamino and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive for said
note, without losing a moment. August 13, ’98. E.A.”

—P.I.R., 849.
75 “I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My
troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid
conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have
conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict
respect to American forces and to aid them in ease they are attacked by a common enemy.”
76 Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commission and Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was
Secretary of Justice under the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the Insurgent Congress. He was at this
time a bright young lawyer of good ability and character.
77 P.I.R., 849.

78 Ibid.

79 P.I.R., 849.
80 Ibid., 849.

81 Ibid., 1179. 5.
82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.
84 Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69.

85 Taylor, Exhibit 739.
86 The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilar to Aguinaldo at 9.30 P.M.:—

“I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented themselves before me when we entered Santa Ana this
afternoon, are: 4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, Major Fernando Acevedo,
Captain Licerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieutenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them I put under
your orders.”—P.I.R., 1179.5.

“Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers: 2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the
Spanish Infantry, 52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your orders and await your instructions.”—P.I.R.,
1179. 5.

87 The Spanish Governor-General.
88 P.I.R., 1300. 2.
89 Taylor, 58 HJ.
90 Ibid., 59.

91 See footnote 2, p. 108.
92 P.I.R., Books C-1.
93 Taylor, 15 AJ.
94 The word Indios, here translated “Indians,” means Malayan Filipinos of pure blood as distinguished from
mestizos or people of mixed blood.

95 P.I.R., 918. 2.
96 The following telegram was sent by Colonel José to Aguinaldo:—

“Urgent. August 20, 1898: Colonel López reports that our troops are still sacking and committing outrages in Malate,
Paco and Ermita, even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take proper measures to stop these abuses.”—
P.I.R., 1167. 3.
97 Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to Aguinaldo:

“Señor López, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many complaints regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says
that our officers carry off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If the foreigners should enter a protest
against such doings, I do not know what will be thought of our government.

“It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering
Manila, should no longer be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think well of it, for us to promote General Pío,
and make him your second in command. It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot remove
him by force; and do not reprimand him.

“If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing will succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to
comply.”

—P.I.R., 472. 13.

98 I.e. the Americans.
99 P.I.R., 458. 8.

100 Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip.
101 P.I.R., 1166. 12.

102 “I regret very much to have to inform you that as long as personal property is not respected here in Manila
especially, by some of our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long as prisoners are tortured, we
cannot hope to deserve the confidence of the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses, are very
frequent here, as is kidnapping, ...

“Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that is the zone of General Pío del Pilar, informed me
that the cruel officers of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who was formerly a barber.

“I know that the Government has ordered that private persons and property be respected and has withdrawn from the
military the power of trying civilians; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding this restriction some of them
continue to discharge powers of which they have been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention thereto, in
order that more energetic measures may be adopted so that other nations may not be led to believe that our
government is very weak.

“In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groups of officers, who devote themselves to summoning
persons before them and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo and Trozo. I have used all
friendly measures to secure their dissolution, but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn them over to
the American authorities, although I inform you that I shall not make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are
exhausted.

“I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses committed by our officers and by the Filipinos who
claim to belong to us, in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance; nevertheless, this does not
terrify me, because my duty to the country requires it.

“I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona and the barber lieutenant, to be very careful and call
General Pío del Pilar and come to an understanding with him as to the mode of punishment of these officers ....

“I have discovered grave cases which are occurring in the Presidio of Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I
shall have the honor to see you personally. The Americans are already aware of these cases, and are working in their
own interest untiringly.

“I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on account of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve
them until I can speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc.”

—P.I.R., 416. 7.

103 “General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposed agreement the clauses requiring the prior
permission of our commanders before American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased him very much.
Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel’s troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram is
in amplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, we sent through his telegraph station to your
excellency.”—P.I.R., 849.
104 “It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because if we order it they will ask the same thing from
General Pío and we shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have evacuated Manila and its environs
they will follow us up to our new positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from them any formal
statement of the concession signed in duo form. Tho conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by
asking as favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them as long as we are able, confiding in
Providence and in Justice. I confirm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold a meeting of the
council of Government in order to decide. Please return here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I
hope you will return.”—P.I.R., 427. 1.

105 Senate Document No. 208, p. 22.
106 Ibid., p. 23.
107 Ibid., p. 26.
108 Senate Document No. 208, p. 24.

109 Pío del Pilar.
110 Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5–10.
111 See Buencamino’s letter to Jáudines, p. 108.
112 Taylor 36 AJ. et seq.

Chapter IV

The Premeditated Insurgent Attack
It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong Kong junta at which
Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations with Pratt and received his instructions
relative to the trip to Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for
the expeditionary forces “to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans,” and that
provided with arms the Filipino people would be able to oppose themselves to the
United States and combat their demands if they attempted to colonize the country.1

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the United States troops was, it
is evident, clearly foreseen from the beginning. Active preparations for doing this now
soon began.

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at all times, Aguinaldo
wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna Province that he must not permit
Americans there without passes. He was to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep
them out and inform all authorities there of his instructions.

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded in Cavite by
Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officer in Cavite at the time
reported on his record of services that he—

“took part in the movement against the Americans on the afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders
of the commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post.”

This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptly realized that it
was ill advised.

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing for operations against the
Americans. He was ordered to suspend his preparations. The same day General P.
Mercado Rizal, commanding in Laguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they
were to consider the Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to know
whether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. This not because he
desired to ask questions about the secrets of the government, but because he wished to
prepare the minds of the people for the future. Mabini’s answer has not been found.

An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila

The construction of such streets and drains makes it possible successfully to combat disease.

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote General Pío del Pilar
recommending that he attack and annihilate the American troops; that on August 10 Pilar
wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that the Americans be attacked, and that on August 17
Aguinaldo stated” “The conflict is coming sooner or later.”2

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as an interpreter and acted as a
spy, endeavouring to keep his people fully informed relative to the plans and acts of his
employers. Incidentally he endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities really
committed by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetrated by enemies of the
Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it.

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflict will come sooner or
later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not be better for them to provoke it before the
Americans concentrate their troops.3

On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the previous night the
Americans had attempted to push back his line at San Lazaro, and that morning had
concentrated and penetrated the Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the
fields about Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication saying that
he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not be passed. He instructed

Garcia to throw troops in front of the Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave,
and to warn the bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent
attack.4

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo’s handwriting dated Malolos, September 13
(?), 1898,5 shows how tense was the situation while the question of withdrawal of the
Insurgent forces from the city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions
for General Pío del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or Colonel Cailles. Their
purpose is hardly open to doubt.

General Pío del Pilar was directed:—

“To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch of the river of Paco in a northerly direction
to the bridge and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan, the river serving as a line until
the suburb of Panque is reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to execute this order on its
receipt, posting detachments where they are necessary and trenches will be made without loss of time
working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist
in the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we especially expect something Wednesday
and Thursday, the 15th and 16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days, also in the
time that follows.

“Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders to leave that place, do not do so on any
account without my orders, happen what may....

“Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day arrives.

“Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards did, if possible have them calculate the
number of their antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison with the number of the
attacking force, in fact, there are occasions when each shot fired kills as many as four men.

“I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions and that you will maintain the honour of the
Philippines by your courage and in no way permit your rights to be trampled underfoot.”6

General Garcia was instructed as follows:—

“On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post detachments in the points indicated by lines on the
enclosed plan. On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed secretly to determine the
most suitable places to post detachments and immediately post our troops and have intrenchments made
employing day and night in this work. Beg this of our soldiers.”7

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:—

“At eight o’clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, withdraw your command from the town of
Malate as indicated on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a straight line from there to
the branch of the river in Paco will be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not be of one mind
in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to determine the most suitable places to post our troops even if
they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the detachments give instructions to have intrenchments
made immediately without resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious
aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times....

“Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so that all the troops may be in Pasay on
Wednesday night.

“In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave your posts, happen what may, but exercise
prudence and be prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no
instructions given you with regard to what they ask.”8

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender thread. On
September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our
troops for action to-morrow. I await a reply.”9

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote to Aguinaldo
advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until the result of the negotiations at Paris
should become known, giving way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could
take the offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling accounts
with the American soldiers.10

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and the Spanish
soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure of the latter.11

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September, Sandico wrote
Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing the “masons” and the
Katipúnan,12 and that all be furnished with knives, to be kept hidden so that they might
be “ready for any event.”

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling among them ran high,
and they wanted to fight.13 On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from
San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the
American troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the
affirmative.14

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch from
Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had ordered
that they be fired on if they attempted to land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind
their working at sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any
circumstances.15

On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the American troops has been adjusted without
prejudice. Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders.”16

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our position at Singalong. I do not know what
they wish; if they enter Pineda I open fire.”17

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the Americans, who had been
bearing their insults in silence, were cowards. Aguinaldo’s indorsement on this telegram
reads:—

“Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and
I believe you have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898.”18

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon Americans, Taylor has
made the following statement:19—

“Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the eight months during which the United
States had prevented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she might still
be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of
having to accept subordinate positions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the
door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the
governor-general in Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the coming of the Spanish
generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they knew
that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would
hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They held Luzón. They held the
people. They had no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and hunted men. The
United States force in Manila was small and America was far. It was true that they might have to fight for
the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in
case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American
soldiers had been seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been made
to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also
probable that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall
soldier from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did not
understand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely
submitted to insult worse than a blow.”

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the vicinity of Manila
all of the field guns in his possession.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the termination of
Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been waiting
for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely
planned for at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed
Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had directed him to assist
by entering that city as soon as they opened fire against the American troops.20

On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse No. 12, which
was within the American lines, and added the following significant statement:—

“The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl
themselves on the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with the
dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin.”21

San Quintin’s Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the massacre of the
French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents were planning something similar for
Manila.

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was no intention of
abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why?
On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Señor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:—

“I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten
you—I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.”22

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres
Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners
in Bilibid Prison, saying that it should by all means come “before the movement is
begun anywhere else,” and calling attention to the necessity of stationing men to prevent
the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre from coming to the rescue. On the
back of this letter there is a sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed,
ready to attack these soldiers.23

Disinfecting by the Acre

During the last cholera epidemic chemical fire engines were used to disinfect whole native sections of Manila.

In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:—

“I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed amendments, every one knows that our
newborn Republic now has to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in power.”24

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains the following
statement:—

“It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent and inevitable. Several of their vessels with
thousands of soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on December 20th last to take that
port together with the whole of Visayas and Mindanao.”25

On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:—

“Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Provincial Presidents, wherever there may be
Telegraphic Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.

“Malolos, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.

“To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinán:

“Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the American invasion. See that all the
inhabitants prepare their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national militia is organized,
each six of whom should be commanded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by a

second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, and each one hundred and four by a captain,
directing that the soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers, informing all that upon our
attitude depends our salvation.

Lingayen, January 4, 1899.”

There is a note thereon which reads:—

“Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the commanding general.”

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those of the Provincial President.)26

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains the following
statement:—

“The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness.
Thus it is, that with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of
acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my
govermnent.

“My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of
its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, ‘champion of oppressed nations.’ Thus it is
that my government is ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession
of the Visayan Islands. I announce these rights before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind
may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of
human kind.

“Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.”27

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like a declaration of
war, was reissued with a significant change in the last one of the passages quoted, the
words “attempt to take forcible possession of any part of the territory submitted to its
jurisdiction” being substituted for the words “attempt to take forcible possession of the
Visayan Islands.”

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Note.—In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins
the Americans should be driven into the Intramuros district and the Walled city should be set on fire.”28

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city of Manila, were now
rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor’s excellent summary of them:—

“After Aguinaldo’s proclamation of January 5 the number of organizations charged with an attack within
the city increased rapidly and it is possible that those which had been formed during Spanish rule had
never been disbanded. Sandico’s clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement formed a nucleus for
these bodies and the directing boards of the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while

some of the members became officers of the militia or sandatahan. On January 6 the commander of militia
in Trozo, Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the popular committee. On January 7
Bonifacio Arévalo forwarded to the head of the central committee a list of the officers of the battalion
which had just been organized in Sampaloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the same
time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of
the American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the street. He said:—

“‘Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to
authorize the creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional appointments of officers for 600
sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide themselves by force with the American rifles in the Zorrilla
Theatre.’

“He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there
to rob, to burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which they were serving sentences. The
political prisoners had been released....

“On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first battalion organized by the committees of
Sampaloc; on January 27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 two battalions had
been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on January
23 its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Aguinaldo for his approval.... On January 25 T.
Sandico, at Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of officers of the territorial militia in
the city of Manila. On January 30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was forwarded
approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for
permission to recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regiment of ‘Armas Blancas’ had already
been raised in Tondo and Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and may have been
originally organized to act against Spain. On February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila
reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico, for the purpose of receiving their
commissions and taking the oath to the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a multitude
of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was administered by Gen. Pantaleón García. There is no
reason for believing that this is a complete statement of sandatahan organized in Manila by the end of
January, and yet this statement gives a force of at least 6330 men. General Otis said that this force had
been reported to him as being 10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of them had rifles;
but armed with long knives and daggers they could have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in
the narrow and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Aguinaldo wrote his instructions for
the sandatahan of Manila. Members of this body were to enter the houses of the American officers on the
pretext of bringing them presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels at the gates of the barracks were
to be approached by men dressed as women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many
officers as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise throughout the city, and by
attacking in the rear the United States troops on the outer line were to aid in opening a way for
Aguinaldo’s force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish the natives who had not joined
them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.

“It is a fair deduction from Luna’s orders for an uprising in Manila, from Aguinaldo’s instructions for the
sandatahan, from other documents among the papers of the insurgents and from what was done in Manila
on February 22 that Aguinaldo and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a plan of
attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was
not carried out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.

“It is true that the instructions were general; but that particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo
himself for the murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back of a document presented to
him.29

“... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and the men about him in beginning a war by the
murder of the commanding general on the other side.

“... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on February 4 the Americans attacked the
unsuspecting Filipinos who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet here in Aguinaldo’s
own handwriting is the record of the fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the American
commander.

“The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such
as the bandits of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless towns. The plan was a piece of
calculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a purpose. The
servants were to kill their employers; organized bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city of
Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases employed by the Americans, were to
suddenly fall upon the barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; all Americans in the
streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo.
If this plan had been carried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. The
reinforcements from the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking ruins of Manila.
Buencamino had warned General Augustín what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians
drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the
capital not as it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tilly took
Magdeburg.

“The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European
schools, were men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty and assassination was not a matter of
savage impulse but of deliberate calculation; with them assassination was employed as an effective
addition to political propaganda, and murder as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres.”30

Some portions of Aguinaldo’s instructions to the sandatahan are particularly worthy of
perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideas as to the conduct which should be observed by
cultured, patriotic, honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:—

“Art. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present
for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretence of
looking for the same officer for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses
in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

“Art. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the
contrary, the attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and
courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel one
of them should dress as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his
piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are
approaching to assist in the general attack.

“Art. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead
enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there
remains no enemy who can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the
other.

“Art. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of the houses along the streets where the American
forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot
iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted
and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the passing American
troops. At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will attack
immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers
go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown

down, a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy’s column,
so that we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.

“Art. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the
inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having
assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy’s line and
unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided
against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I charge and order that the persons and
goods of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

“Art. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with
boiling water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who
pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be
the sandatahan who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.

“Art. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the sandatahan can provide
themselves with lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in
order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that in
withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

“Art. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner; nor will you forget the
promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor
thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and patriotism,
honourable and very humane.”31

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates.32

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if possible, to
provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire for
conflict, but increased their hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into
forbidden territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract from a
telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10, 1899:—

“Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces.
I shall not draw back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a little farther. He brings a letter
from his general, in which he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I knew that Maquinley
(McKinley) opposed our independence I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what
we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale.”33

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is a reply in his handwriting
which reads:—

“I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my
beloved officers and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of their
reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always on the alert.—E. A. Jan. 10, 1899.”34

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino Quitiongco to
assassinate General Otis.35

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention in your telegram, and we also wish to know
what reward our Government is arranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila.”

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo’s handwriting:

“As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroes will have as their rewards a large
quantity of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató, Marquis of Malate,
Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their
being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible, the chief of
them all who represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls to you, or, better said, to General
Noriel and Colonel Cailles.

“The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a few days.

(Signed) “E. A.

“Malolos, Jan. 14, 1899.”36

An Old-style Provincial Jail

Lieutenant Gilmore, of the United States Navy, and his fellow prisoners were detained in this building for a time.

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: “Death to the Americans,” and held a
review to celebrate the rupture of friendly relations with the United States.37

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon Manila and
telegraphed it to some of his officers. General García replied from Caloocan on January
17 that the dream would come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans began.38

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered that the Filipino
soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive
them, “since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived.”39

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards,40 and openly
boasted that when the attack began they would drive them into the sea.

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:—

“The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers,
calling to them that very shortly they will give us battle. My best information is that they have fully
determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the least
spark may start a conflagration.”41

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening the Insurgent
positions around Manila was pushed with all possible speed.42

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska Regiment upon
the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of conditions at this time, and of the
circumstances leading to the actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:—

“During the latter part of January General Otis was informed on good insurgent authority that the
insurgents meditated an attack upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them, as in their exposed
position they would kill them all. General MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, placed
two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that the insurgents would direct their attack upon that
point, as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts
extended along the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the line of delimitation between
the Americans and the insurgents.

“For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure of the insurgents was constant along this
position, so constant indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated a premeditated purpose on
the part of some one in the insurgent army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General
MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding
general of the Filipino troops in the third zone in front of him that—

“‘An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point
considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile
intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line is

crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may
deem necessary.’

“Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte, replied upon the receipt of this
communication that the action of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would give immediate
orders for them to retire. At about half past 8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered
the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol in
front of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from which the insurgents had been
compelled to retire on February 2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrol
continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from
which fire was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the American and
insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms.”43

General Otis’s account of the opening of active hostilities follows:—

“On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took
up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a
few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by
General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops
concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be
desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another
demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards
within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to
halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent
troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

“The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently
labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It
is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not
completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their
arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action.
They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American
troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.”44

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned for. We learn from the
Insurgent records that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark. There was no
reason why it should have provoked a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents had anticipated. The
Americans did not drive very well. It was but a short time before they themselves were
routed and driven from their positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had been wantonly
attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew the fire
of the American sentry, and this was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the
shot. Whether the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is not
definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita from Santa Ana on
February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

“I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the)
Americans open fire we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos.”45

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done to draw the
American fire.

Aguinaldo’s first statement relative to the opening of hostilities is embodied in a general
order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows:—

“Nine o’clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the
American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte
and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our
soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were
obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

“No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have
endeavoured to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of
occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

“... I order and command:—

“1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are
broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

“2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

“3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in
order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of
war.”46

Aguinaldo’s protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities are absurd, in view of
his own instructions concerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and without
the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which existed
immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled
from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong: “Recommend you await beginning
American aggression, justifying our conduct nations.”47

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on January 31 he wrote to
Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain on February 6, and said:—

“It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before the ratification of the treaty. A
conflict after the ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion.”48

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation that hostilities begin
before February 6 if America did not answer meanwhile. It was evidently well
understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo’s receipt of Apacible’s letter might cause war to
begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities of the
following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:—

“Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied Filipino circles supposed political move
influence vote Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation.

“Bray.”49

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape from the
conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been
carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.

Blount says:—

“It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us.”50

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but expect it they
certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers in check until after Spain had
been ousted from the Philippines by the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to
do. It now only remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid of the
Americans in one way or another.

General Otis states that “when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations for attack he
prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the full text of which was published at
Malolos on the evening, and very shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was
circulated in Manila on the morning of February 5.”51

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they received on
February 4 and 5.

Blount has stated52 that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon introduced on January 11,
1899, had passed, we never should have had any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions
in question concluded thus:—

“That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction,
or control over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their determination when an
independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to
said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by
Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.”

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions might have had if
passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully competent to bring about such
pacification of the islands as they deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were
presented in the Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack their
American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo himself could not have
held them much longer, and it is not impossible that they got away from him as it was.
They would have interpreted the passage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence
of weakness, and hastened their attack. As we have seen, “war, war, war” was what they
wanted.

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities to the
United States by claiming that certain words italicized by him in what he calls the
“Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” were necessarily, to the Insurgents, “fighting
words.” The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment of United States
sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control in the Philippine Islands.

These words were not “fighting words,” the Insurgent policy being, as I have shown by
the records, to consider the acceptance of a protectorate or of annexation in the event
that it did not prove possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the
American troops could be driven from the islands.

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip the cowardly
Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their part to push a struggle for
independence to the bitter end, led to their attack.

1 See p. 41.
2 P.I.R., 427. 1.

3 “The insolent commentary of the American Consul here, if it is true, clearly shows the intention of America to
impose her will upon us by force. In this case, the conflict will come sooner or later. Would it not be better for us to
provoke the conflict while the Americans have not as yet concentrated their troops there? Or would it be better to wait
for the results of the Congress of Paris? This question should be answered immediately by the committee on foreign
relations of the Congress of representatives and the decision should be sent at once to us so that we can proceed
according to your instructions.”—P.I.R., 453. 11.
4 “I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed, and to say frankly that it was by my order. To be
prepared to defend our rights you are ordered to place troops in front of American position at Sampaloc and to tell
them plainly to leave, to warn the Sandatahan [bolo men.—D. C. W.] and get everything ready; you must warn the
commanders of the zones about Manila. Do not forget, whenever in doubt.”—P.I.R., 849.

5 P.I.R., 88. 9.
6 P.I.R., 88. 9.

7 Ibid.

8 P.I.R., 88. 9.
9 Ibid., 849.
10 “Until the decision of the Paris Congress is known, all of us here are of the opinion that you should maintain a
defensive attitude regarding the Americans, giving way to them with regard to Manila and its suburbs or in anything
they may wish, although apparently only, and not show them your teeth. After the decision of the Congress is known,
you may take the offensive if advisable, and according to the information we may have of the American soldiers it
should not be difficult for you and your army to settle accounts with them.”—P.I.R., 398. 6.

11 “If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflict before the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it
might happen that the Yankees would enter into an alliance with them to combat the Filipinos. Think well over
this.”—P.I.R., 398. 6.
12 “It is also of urgent necessity, Señor President, to reëstablish committees in all the suburbs and that the masons
and the Katipúnan be reorganized, and it is advisable that all be provided with knives ready for any event, but it is
proper that these arms be hidden.”—P.I.R., 466. 9.

13 “Our soldiers are always desirous of fighting in order to bring affairs to an end, as they are very resentful with
regard to the evacuation of the suburbs mentioned.”—P.I.R., Books C–1.
14 “Most urgent. Have received telegraphic order from War Dept., which says: ‘Prevent American troops from
disembarking.’ In case they insist what am I to do? May I begin firing?”

This telegram was indorsed by Aguinaldo:—

“Answered affirmatively December 1, 1898.”—P.I.R., 849.

15 “Most urgent. According to despatch from Captain detached at Batangas, American divers are working
unceasingly. He says that he ordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await your reply.”

Aguinaldo’s reply ran as follows:—

“I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no conditions allow them to land troops; be brave for the sake
of your Tagálog heart. Approve your action.”—P.I.R., 1179. 2.
16 P.I.R., 849.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 56 AJ.
20 “We are constantly alarmed here by American troops who wish to come within the military line. To-day received
word from second chief, second zone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire against the American troops I assist by
entering Manila. I have no orders in this matter; I await your directions.”—P.I.R., 849.
21 P.I.R., 849.
22 Taylor, 70 AJ.
23 “It is absolutely necessary that an order be received here permitting the uprising of those in prison before the
movement is begun anywhere else; in the prison the word shall be given at the moment the bugle sounds retreat; it is
indispensable that some of our party be prepared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro street and Dulumbrayan

bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quartered in the Pennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those in
the prison.”—P.I.R., 73. 3.
24 P.I.R., 40. 8.
25 Ibid., Books C–1.
26 Ibid., 1141. 3.
27 P.I.R., 1186. 10.
28 Ibid., 849.
29 See p. 733.
30 Taylor, 68–69 AJ.
31 P.I.R., 206–207.

32 “Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of all nationalities, including
the Chinese; that you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the enemy who surrender. And that you be
on the sharp lookout for those traitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory.”
33 P.I.R., 849.
34 Ibid.
35 For the document on which this statement is based see p. 733.
36 P.I.R., 849.
37 Taylor, 81 AJ.
38 “In reply to your telegram concerning your dream of entering Manila after four hours of combat. I have the
honour to inform you for myself and the officers and soldiers under my command that your dream will come true as
soon as the conflict with the Americans begins, since we shall advance at any cost.”—P.I.R., 849.
39 On January 21, 1899, the commander of the fourth zone, Caloocan, wired Aguinaldo that:

“Julian Santo, commander of the territorial militia of Trozo, informs me that 400 native soldiers of the Spanish army
to-day incorporated in his militia. He lives in the walled city, and he wants to know your opinion upon the present
situation, since the Americans want to hold them as prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison.”

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) “Tell the Filipino soldiers in the walled city affiliated to our cause that they
must keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, and prevent their confining them, since the
hoped-for moment has not yet arrived.”—P.I.R., 849.

40 On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of the Insurgents abroad:

“In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos between Filipinos and Americans who wanted to tear
down the proclamation of our president while the people defended it with their bolos. They say that it amuses them to
see the Americans run when they draw their knives. It is said that some 10,000 servants have gone on strike. Some
Americans have already disappeared by the method of ‘dukut’ but it will not be proper to publish this in my
opinion.”—P.I.R., 980. 82.

41 Taylor, AJ. 73.

42 (Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

“To the President of the Republic, Malolos, from the Provincial Governor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29,
1899, 10.25 A.M.: I yesterday visited the military road in process of construction, Santa Ana to Pineda. Tomorrow it
will be sufficiently completed to permit passage, and in two days after it will be finished. Considering opening another
military road direct from Caloocan to San Juan. Desire authority.

(Endorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) “Telegram received. I am very much satisfied, and in the name of the
government I congratulate you and the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitants for their efforts for
the public good. You are authorized to open another military road from Caloocan to San Juan del Monte, and I want
you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain you will.”—P.I.R., 849.

(Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

“To the Secretary of the Interior, Malolos, from Sah Juan del Monte—Received Feb. 3, 1899 from the Provincial
Governor Manila: Road marked out; work began Wednesday. I shall put forth every effort to finish by middle of the
coming week.”—P.I.R., 849.

43 Taylor, 73 AJ.
44 Taylor, 73 AJ.

45 P.I.R., 2018.
46 Ibid., 1090. 5.

47 P.I.R., 453. 4.
48 P.I.R., 453. 2.
49 P.I.R., 493. 12.
50 Blount, p. 190.
51 Taylor, 86 AJ.
52 Blount, p. 175.

Chapter V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report
The Good Book says, “By their fruits ye shall know them, whether they be good or
evil,” and it seems proper to apply this test to the Insurgents and their government.

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the United States destroyed a republic in
the Philippines and erected an oligarchy on its ruins. Various writers and speakers who
have not gone so far as this have yet maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates
established a real, effective government throughout the archipelago during the interim
between his return and the outbreak of hostilities with the United States.

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, Judge Blount says:1—

“Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with complete machinery of government in
each province for all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 men at his beck, and his
whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated his permanent government—permanent
as opposed to the previous provisional government—with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned
after our own,2 just as the South American republics had done before him when they were freed from
Spain, at Malolos, the new capital.”

He refers to our utter failure to understand “what a wonderfully complete ‘going
concern’ Aguinaldo’s government had become throughout the Philippine Archipelago
before the Treaty of Paris was signed.”3

He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public order in the Insurgent territory at
this time on a report of Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent of the
United States Navy, who between October 8 and November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid
trip through northern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac,
Pangasinán, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan, South Ilocos and Union, in
the order named, thence proceeding to Dagupan and down the railroad through
Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan to Manila.

He says that these gentlemen found the authority of Aguinaldo’s government universally
acknowledged, the country in a state of perfect tranquillity and public order,4 with
profound peace and freedom from brigandage and the like.5

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete machinery of government
throughout all of Luzon outside of Manila for all matters of justice, taxes and police, so
that life and property were safe and peace, tranquillity and justice assured, we may well
dispense with quibbling as to whether the proper name was applied to such government.
But did he?

Let us examine with some care the history of the Wilcox-Sargent trip, and see if we can
gain further light from other sources relative to the condition of public order in the
territory which they traversed.

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured Insurgent records speak for themselves,
as it is fair to assume that Insurgent officers were at no pains to represent conditions as
worse than they really were. In view of the fragmentary character of these records, we
may also assume that the complete story would be still more interesting and instructive
than the one which I have been able to reconstruct.

Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere hospitably received, and were
entertained with dinners and dances after the inimitable fashion of the hospitable
Filipino everywhere. They gained a very favourable impression of the state of public
order in the provinces through which they passed for the reason that from the very start
their trip was strictly personally conducted. They saw exactly what it was intended that
they should see and very little more. Their progress was several times interrupted for
longer or shorter periods without adequate explanation. We now know that on these
occasions the scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had become a little
disarranged and needed to be straightened up. Facts which I will cite show that most
shocking and horrible events, of which they learned nothing, were occurring in the
territory through which they passed.

For a considerable time before their departure American visitors had been carefully
excluded from the Insurgent territory, but the Filipino leaders decided to let these two
men go through it to the end that they might make as favourable a report as possible.
How carefully the way was prepared for American visitors is shown by the following
telegram:—

“San Pedro, Macati,

“July 30, 1898.

“To the Local Presidente of Pasig:

“You are hereby informed that the Americans are going to your town and they will ask your opinion [of
what the people desire.—Tr.] You should answer them that we want a republican government. The same
answer must be given throughout your jurisdiction.

(Signed) “Pío Del Pilar,

“General of the Second Zone.”6

Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of killing people who did not obey his
orders, and under the rules of the Insurgent government he was abundantly justified in so
doing. His suggestions as to what visiting Americans should be told or shown would be
likely to be acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case in the present
instance, for on the same day General Noriel reported as follows:7

“President R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 30, 12.10 P.M.: I inform your excellency that
some commissioners of the American admiral are making investigations in the region around Pasay as to
the wishes and opinion of the people as to the government. To-day I received a statement from some,
giving the answer: ‘Free government under American protectorate [copy mutilated, two or three words
missing here] the President.’”

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey’s statement made shortly after the return of
Wilcox and Sargent that in his opinion their report “contains the most complete and
reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of
Luzon Island.”8 This was true.

The admiral might have gone further and said that it contained practically the only
information then obtainable in regard to conditions in the territory in question, but as I
shall conclusively show it was neither complete nor reliable.

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent naïvely
makes the statement that:

“The tourists were provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort, ‘which was continued
by relays all the way to Aparri.’”9

It certainly was!

Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela or Cagayan. What
opportunity had these two men, ignorant as they were of the native dialects, to learn the
sinister facts as to what had been and was occurring in the territory which they visited?

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, which was lavishly bestowed
upon them everywhere, and it is only natural that they should have reported favourably
upon what they saw. It was about this time that an order was issued10 that fronts of
buildings should be whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired with a view to
showing every one, and especially travellers through the territory of the Insurgents, that
they were “not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have.”
Doubtless the report of the two men from Dewey’s fleet was made in the best of faith. I
will now endeavour to show what were some of the actual conditions in the territory
through which they passed.

Bulacan

They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hearing of the activities of a Chinaman
named Ignacio Paua, who had been given the rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and assigned
the task of extorting contributions for the revolution from his countrymen. In a letter to
Aguinaldo written on July 6, 1898, Paua states that he has collected more than $1,000
from the Chinese of these small towns, but asks for an order “prohibiting the outrages
that are being committed against such merchants as are not our enemies.” He further
says, “When the contributions from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall have been
completed I wish to publish a proclamation forbidding any injury to the Chinamen and
any interference with their small business enterprises,” and adds that “the natives
hereabouts themselves are the people who are committing said abuses.”11

Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing of outrages against merchants that
were the enemies of the cause, nor does he seem to have objected to injury to Chinamen
before contributions were completed. His own methods were none too mild. On August
27, 1898, General Pío del Pilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent soldiers, under
a leader supposed to be Paua, had entered the store of a Chinaman, and tried to kidnap
his wife, but had left on the payment of $10 and a promise to pay $50 later, saying that
they would return and hang their fellow countryman if the latter amount was not
forthcoming.12

Paua was later made a general in consideration of his valuable services!

Pampanga

Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they apparently overlooked the fact that
Aguinaldo did not have “his whole people a unit at his back.” The citizens of Macabebe
seem not to have approved of the Aguinaldo regime, for the Insurgent records show that:
—

“Representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled in San Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the
presidency of General Maximino Hizon agreed to yield him complete ‘obedience as military governor of
the province and representative of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine Islands.’ The town of
Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this gathering.”13

It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has passed somewhat lightly over the fact
that he himself during his army days commanded an aggregation of sturdy citizens from
this town, known as Macabebe scouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes
whenever they got a chance. He incorrectly refers to them as a “tribe or clan.”14 It is
absurd to call them a tribe. They are merely the inhabitants of a town which has long
been at odds with the neighbouring towns of the province.

Things had come to a bad pass in Pampanga when its head wrote that the punishment of
beating people in the plaza and tying them up so that they would be exposed to the full
rays of the sun should be stopped. He argued that such methods would not lead the
people of other nations to believe that the reign of liberty, equality and fraternity had
begun in the Philippines.15

When it is remembered that persons tied up and exposed to the full rays of the sun in the
Philippine lowlands soon die, in a most uncomfortable manner, we shall agree with the
head of this province that this custom has its objectionable features!

Tarlac

While the failure of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to learn of the relations between the
Tagalogs of Macabebe and their neighbours, or of the fact that people were being
publicly tortured in Pampanga, is perhaps not to be wondered at under the

circumstances, it is hard to see how they could have failed to hear something of the
seriously disturbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the train there.

On August 24 the commissioner in charge of elections in that province asked for troops
to protect him, in holding them in the town of Urdaneta, against a party of two thousand
men of the place, who were going to prevent them.

On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered that the requirements of the decree
of June 18, establishing municipal governments, should be strictly complied with, as in
many of the towns “the inhabitants continue to follow the ancient methods by which the
friars exploited us at their pleasure and which showed their great contempt for the
law.”16

Bilibid Prison Hospital

The Philippine Government has been charged with the neglect of prisoners. The truth is that it has made the prisons of
the Philippines the most sanitary structures of their kind in the tropics, and gives its sick prisoners the best of care.

The following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomuceno, Representative from Tarlac,
speaks for itself as to conditions in that province on December 27, 1898, shortly after the
American travellers passed through it on their return:—

“I regret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that since Sunday the 25th instant scandalous acts
have been going on in the Province of Tarlac, which I represent. On the night of the Sunday mentioned the
entire family of the Local Chief of Bamban was murdered, and his house and warehouse were burned.
Also the Tax Commissioner and the Secretary, Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last night Señor
Jacinto Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona; and seven travellers were murdered at O’Donnel,
which town was pillaged, as well as the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paz. On that day

various suspicious parties were seen in the town of Pañique and in the same barrio, according to reliable
reports which I have just received.

“All this general demoralization of the province, according to the information which I have obtained, is
due to the fact that the province is dissatisfied with the Provincial Chief, Señor Alfonso Ramos, and with
Major Manuel de León; for this is substantiated by the fact that all the events described occurred since last
Sunday, when Señor Alfonso Ramos returned, to take charge of the Office of Provincial President, after
having been detained for several days in this town. Wherefore, I believe that in order to restore tranquillity
in the province, consideration be given to various documents that have been presented to the Government
and to the standing Committee of Justice; and that there be removed from office Señor Alfonso Ramos, as
well as said Señor Manuel de León, who has no prestige whatever in this province. Moreover on the day
when fifty-four soldiers of the command deserted, he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga.”17

On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent Aguinaldo a telegram18 from which it
evidently appears that there was an armed uprising in Tarlac which he was endeavouring
to quell and that he hoped for early success. Apparently, however, his efforts to secure
tranquillity were not entirely successful, for on December 18 he telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:—

“In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commanding a detachment at Camilin, informs me that last
night his detachment was attacked by Tulisanes (robbers). The fire lasted four hours without any casualties
among our men. This afternoon received another from the captain commanding said detachment,
informing me of the same, and that nothing new has occurred. The people of the town await with anxiety
the result of the charges they have made, especially against the local president and the justice of the peace,
the original of which I sent to your high authority.”19

Obviously the police machinery was not working quite smoothly when a detachment of
Insurgent troops could be kept under fire for four hours by a robber band, and perhaps
the attacking party were not all “robbers.” Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal.

We obtain some further information from the following telegram of December 27, 1898,
sent by the secretary of the interior to the President of the Revolutionary Government:—

“Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except in Bangbang, Tarlac, which at 12 A.M., 25th,
was attacked by Tulisanes [bandits or robbers,—D.C.W.]. The local presidente with his patrols arrested six
of them. On continuing the pursuit he met in Talacon a party too large to attack. At 7 A.M. of the 26th the
town was again attacked by criminals, who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt some houses,
among them that of the local presidente, and his stables, in which he lost two horses. I report this for your
information.”20

Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac.

Still further light is shed on the situation by a telegram from the secretary of the interior
to Aguinaldo, dated December 28, 1898:—

“According to my information the excitement in Tarlac increases. I do not think that the people of the
province would have committed such barbarities by themselves. For this reason the silence of General
Macabulos is suspicious; to speak frankly, it encourages the rebels. Some seven hundred of them, with one

hundred and fifty rifles, entered Pañique, seized the arms of the police, the town funds, and attacked the
houses of the people. I report this for your information. All necessary measures will be taken.”21

Note also the following from the secretary of the interior, under date of December 27,
1898, to Aguinaldo:—

“I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also in Gerona, Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men
have been assaulted by numerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos, who are killing and capturing the
inhabitants and attacking travellers, robbing them of everything they have. The President should declare at
once that that province is in state of siege, applying martial law to the criminals. That—(remainder
missing).”22

The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful view of the situation. Under date of
December 28 he telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a witness here worthy of credit, have arisen from
an attempt to procure vengeance on the local presidente, and robbery of Chinese shops. Hence they are
without political importance. The tax collector killed, and a countryman servant of the local presidente
wounded. They burnt two houses of the local presidente, a stable, and a warehouse for sugar-cane.”23

Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of a few individuals was at first
considered by the secretary of agriculture to be without political importance. Evidently
he changed his mind, however, for on the same day, December 28, 1898, he telegraphed
Aguinaldo as follows:—

“I think it necessary to send Aglipay24 to quiet Tarlac. Send for him. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to
investigate the causes of the disorders, in order to find a remedy for them.”25

At this stage of events Aguinaldo was summoned to Malolos by a telegram from Mabini
under date of December 29, which reads as follows:—

“Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trías is sick. We can come to no decision in regard to the
Tarlac matter. Cannot constitute a government without you.”26

The measures which were actually taken are set forth in another telegram of the same
date from the secretaries of war and interior to Aguinaldo, which reads as follows:—

“We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac; among them the Director of War and persons of
much moral influence, in order to stifle the disturbances. The necessary instructions have been given them
and full powers for the purpose, and as far as possible to satisfy the people. Have also sent there six
companies of soldiers with explicit instructions to their commander to guard only the towns, and make the
people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of attraction for the purpose.”27

Let us hope that the commander was able to attract the people with his six companies of
soldiers, and make them return to a peaceful life.

Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac by the following extract from
“Episodios de la Revolucion Filipina” by Padre Joaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian priest,
Manila, 1901, page 71:—

“At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been deceived of the emancipation promise, changed by
the Katipúnan into crimes and attacks on the municipality of the pueblos, discontent broke out in all parts,
and, although latent in some provinces, in that of Tarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant of the late
Spanish civil guard. A valorous and determined man, he lifted up his flag against that of Aguinaldo. One
hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorize the inhabitants of said province, crushing the enthusiastic
members of the revolutionary party.... Having taken possession of four towns, Pecheche would have been
everywhere successful if ambition and pride had not directed his footsteps. In January, 1899, the
Aguinaldista commander of Tarlac province, afraid that his whole province would espouse the cause of the
sergeant, attempted by every means in his power to interrupt his career, not hesitating to avail himself of
crime to destroy the influence of Pecheche with the many people who had been incensed by the Katipúnan
and had in turn become firm partisans of the Guards of Honour.

“The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at that time of Camiling, served as an admirable
instrument for this purpose.... Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity organized by Tranquilino, who
pretended to recognize him as his chief, and rendering himself a vassal by taking an oath to his flag. He
accepted the invitation, and after the mass which was celebrated went to a meal at the convent, where,
after the meal was over, the members of the K.K.K. surrounded Pecheche and 10 of his officers and killed
them with bolos or tied them and threw them out of the windows and down the staircase. Some priests
were held captive in the building where this took place and were informed of what had taken place
immediately afterwards.”

This extract shows how easy it then was for any man of determination to acquire a
following, especially if he could dispose of a few rifles. It also gives an excellent idea of
the methods employed by the Insurgents in dealing with those who opposed their rule.

General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amusement, of an interesting experience
during a fight on Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. His men took a trench and captured some of
its occupants. Several of these were impressed as guides and required to show the
attacking forces the locations of other trenches. At first they served unwillingly, but
presently became enthusiastic and rushed the works of their quondam fellow-soldiers in
the van of the American attack. Finally they begged for guns. Grant added that he could
start from Bacolor for San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles and pick up
volunteers enough to capture the place, and that on the return trip he could get enough
more to attack Bacolor!

Pangasinán

And now we come to Pangasinán, the most populous province of Luzon, and the third in
the Philippines in number of inhabitants.

“In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the commanding general of Tarlac Province that he would
like to know whom he was required to obey, as there were so many officials of all ranks who gave him
orders that it was impossible for him to know where he stood.”28

In a letter dated August 17, 1898, to Aguinaldo, Benito Legarda complained that a bad
impression had been produced by the news from Dagupan that when the Insurgents
entered there, after many outrages committed upon the inmates of a girls’ school, every
officer had carried off those who suited him.29

What should we say if United States troops entered the town of Wellesley and raped
numerous students at the college, the officers subsequently taking away with them the
young ladies who happened to suit them? Yet things of this sort hardly caused a ripple in
the country then under the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particular incident by
accident, although I have known Legarda for years.

I quote the following general description of conditions in Pangasinán from a letter
addressed by Cecilio Apóstol to General Aguinaldo on July 6, 1898:—

“You probably know that in the Province of Pangasinán, of one of the towns in which your humble servant
is a resident, the Spanish flag through our good fortune has not flown here for the past few months, since
the few Spaniards who lived here have concentrated in Dagupan, a place not difficult of attack, as is said.

“But this is what is going on in this Province” There exist here two Departmental Governments, one
calling itself that of Northern Luzón and of which Don Vicente del Prado is the President, and the other
which calls itself that of Northern and Central Luzón, presided over by Don Juliano Paraiso. Besides these
two gentlemen, there are two governors in the province(!) one Civil Political Military, living in Lingayen,
named Don Felipe J. Bartolomé, and another living in Real Guerrero, a town of Tayug, named Don
Vicente Estrella. And in addition there are a large number of Administrators, Inspectors, Military Judges,
Generals, ... they cannot be counted. It is a pandemonium of which even Christ, who permits it, cannot
make anything. Indeed, the situation is insupportable. It reminds me of the schism in the middle ages when
there were two Popes, both legitimate, neither true. Things are as clear as thick chocolate, as the Spaniards
say. In my poor opinion, good administration is the mother-in-law of disorder, since disorder is chaos and
chaos produces nothing but confusion, that is to say, death.

“I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend, to read the decree of that Government, dated
June 18th, of the present year, and the accompanying ‘Instructions for the government of towns and
provinces.’ Article 9 of the said decree says that the Superior Government will name a commissioner for
each province with the special duty of establishing there the organization set forth in the decree. Very well
so far: which of the so-called Presidents of Northern or of Northern and Central Luzón is the
commissioner appointed by that government to establish the new organization in that province? Are
military commanders named by you for Pangasinán? I would be very much surprised if either of them
could show his credentials. Aside from these, the fact remains that in those instructions no mention is
made of Presidents of Departments, there is a manifest contradiction in their jurisdictions, since while one
calls himself president of a Departmental Government, of Northern Luzón, the other governs the Northern
and Central portion of the Island, according to the seals which they use.

“And, nevertheless, a person calling himself the General Administrator of the Treasury and the said
Governor of the Province, both of whom live in Tayug, came to this town when the Spaniards voluntarily
abandoned it and gathered all the people of means, and drew up an act of election, a copy of which is
attached. From it you will see how this organization violates the provisions of the decree of the 18th of
June.

“Another item: They got up a contract with the people of means of this town, and did the same thing in the
other towns, in which contract they exact from us $1250 which they call contributions of war (see
document No. 2 attached). Among the doubtful powers of these gentlemen is the one to exact these sums
included?

“Have they express orders from that Government?

“Perhaps these blessed gentlemen—they are high flyers there is no doubt about that,—have struck the
clever idea of calling themselves generals, governors, etc., in order to enjoy a certain prestige and to give a
certain color of legality to their acts—this, although they don’t know an iota of what they are doing. But
what I am sure of, and many other men also, is that there is no order, that here there is not a single person
in authority whom to obey. This superfluity of rulers will finally lead to strained relations between them
and the towns of this province will end by paying the piper.

“But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican form of government is concerned, in order to
avoid worse evils took them at their word, obeyed them like automatons, hypnotized by the title of
‘Insurgents’ which they applied to themselves. But when I had an opportunity to read the said decree,
doubts were forced upon me, I began to suspect—may God and they pardon me—that they were trying to
impose upon us nicely, that, shielded by the motto, ‘have faith in and submit to the will of the country’
they came to these towns ‘for business.’

“In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with abuses, if there are abuses, I made up my mind
to send you this account of the condition of things here. I flatter myself that when you learn of the
lamentable situation of this province, you will soon deign to take steps to establish order, because thereon
depends the tranquillity of Pangasinan and in the end a strict compliance with your superior orders.

“There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this province if their petitions secure favourable
consideration and an immediate response from the high patriotism and honourable standpoint of the
Supreme Dictator of the Philippines.”30

Modern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro Hospital

It will be noted that the picture thus drawn by Señor Apóstol differs in certain important
particulars from that painted in such engaging colours by Judge Blount.

In September, 1898, the civil governor of Pangasinán had to have an escort of troops in
passing through his province.31

On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San Manuel wrote the provincial
governor that his people could no longer support the troops quartered on them, as the
adherents of the Katipúnan had burned or stolen all of their property.32

The sum total of Blount’s description of affairs in this, the most populous province of
Luzón, is derived from the narrative of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and reads as follows:
—

“In Pangasinán ‘the people were all very respectful and polite and offered the hospitality of their
homes.’”33

Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions perhaps a trifle sketchy.

Nueva Ecija

Nueva Ecija was the next province visited by Wilcox and Sargent. They have failed to
inform us that:—

“In December, 1899, certain men charged with being members of this society [Guards of Honour] were
interrogated in Nueva Ecija as to their purposes. One of those questioned said:—

“‘That their purpose was one day, the date being unknown to the deponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac
came, to rise up in arms and kill the Tagálos, both private individuals and public employees, excepting
those who agreed to the former, for the reason that honours were granted only to the Tagálos, and but few
to the Ilocanos.’”34

Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at Aguinaldo’s back and were and are
an united people, and here are the Ilocanos of Nueva Ecija spoiling his theory by
remembering that they are Ilocanos and proposing to kill whom? Not certain individual
Filipinos, who might have offended them, but the Tagálogs!

That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is shown by the following statement:—

“On January 7, 1899, the commissioner of Aguinaldo’s treasury sent to collect contributions of war in
Nueva Ecija Province reported that the company stationed in San Isidro had become guerillas under

command of its officers and opposed his collections, stating that they were acting in compliance with
orders from higher authority.”35

And now, in following the route taken by our tourist friends, we reach Nueva Vizcaya
and the Cagayan valley.

1 Blount, p. 98.
2 The constitution used was most certainly not patterned after our own. See p. 265.

3 Blount, p. 111.
4 “The light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then universal acknowledgment of the authority of the
Aguinaldo government and the perfect tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in the Cagayan valley.”—
Blount, pp. 114–115.
5 “The country in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period seeking recognition of his
government by the Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity—free from brigandage and the like.”—
Blount, p. 115.
6 P.I.R., 958. 11.
7 P.I.R., 849.
8 Blount, p. 108.
9 Ibid., p. 109.
10 “With a view to showing every one and especially foreigners travelling through the territory of the Republic, that
we are not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have, the fronts of buildings should be
whitewashed, streets should be cleaned and fences repaired.”—P.I.R., 292. 3.
11 “It would be a great satisfaction to me to aid you with all my strength; and the only thing that I see to object to is
that the Commanders and Generals in this province are getting pretty abusive toward our brethren and allow
themselves to be bribed by the Tagálog merchants so as to allow them to enter Manila with their goods, which is of
great assistance to our enemies.

“Concerning the contributions which I have collected from the Chinamen, it amounts to more than ₱2,000 here in
Tambobong, Meycauayan and Polo alone; and those from the other pueblos have not yet come to see me. Furthermore,
I would like an order from you prohibiting the outrages that are being committed against such merchants as are not our
enemies; and when the contributions from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall have been completed, I wish to
publish a proclamation forbidding any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with their small business
enterprises; since this is a disgrace to our government and to your name; for the natives of hereabouts themselves are
the people who are committing said abuses, and in hopes of putting a stop to them, I await your decision at the earliest
possible moment concerning the proclamation referred to.”—P.I.R., 355. 11.
12 “Last night in the place known as Santo Cristo (Manila?) the store of J. Ricafort, a Chinaman, was entered by five
soldiers of our army under an unknown commander supposed to be Colonel Paua. They tried to kidnap the wife of
Ricafort. At the request of P. García they desisted upon payment of 20 pesos and the agreement that 100 pesos would
be paid later. If this was not done they would return and hang them. To quiet these people I gave them a pass to assure

their personal safety, and exacted at the same time a promise that they should not report the matter to the Americans.
Pauline García is now at Pedro Macati.”—P.I.R., 1187.4.
13 P.I.R., 223.
14 “Early in the war we had availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes, who look nowise
different from all other Filipinos, but who had, under the Spanish government, by reason of long-standing feuds with
their more rebellious neighbours, come to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish authorities. When we came they had
transferred that loyalty to us, and had now become a recognized and valuable part of our military force.”—Blount, pp.
333–334.

15 “On July 28, 1898, the head of the province of Pampanga wrote that the punishment of beating people in the
plaza and tying them up so that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should be stopped. He complained
that these methods had been carried so far that even people of good social position had been so punished. It was
especially undesirable to employ such punishments, as the people of other nations weeing them would not believe that
the reign of liberty, equality, and fraternity had begun in the Philippines.”—P.I.R., 196.3.
16 Taylor, 47 AJ.

17 P.I.R., 944.
18 “I have the honour to inform you that I have been in this town since yesterday afternoon issuing, in a
proclamation, conciliatory orders to the populace that the people comprised in the uprising must present themselves
and express aversion and repudiation of it, promising them consideration and pardon as long as they lay aside arms. In
compliance with and following the earlier published proclamation, they presented two guns and innumerable bolos. I
hope soon for tranquillity among the people there through these efforts. I ask dispense with assembly of the Junta.
Camilin, November 30, 1898.”—P.I.R., 849.
19 P.I.R., 849.
20 Ibid.
21 P.I.R. 849.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Gregorio Aglipay, an Ilocano Catholic priest who became an active Insurgent leader. Later he abandoned the
Catholic faith and set up a new church which gained many adherents in the Philippines.
25 P.I.R., 849.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 P.I.R., 1231. 2.
29 Taylor, 62 AJ.
30 P.I.R., 77.
31 P.I.R., 47.7.

32 Ibid., 951.3.

33 Blount, p. 109.
34 P.I.R., 1006.

35 P.I.R., 870. 4.

Chapter VI

Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley
Nueva Vizcaya is drained by the Magát River, a branch of the Cagayan. While the provinces
of Isabela and Cagayan constitute the Cagayan valley proper, Blount includes Nueva
Vizcaya in the territory covered by this designation, and for the purpose of this discussion I
will follow his example.

Especial interest attaches to the history of Insurgent rule, in the Cagayan valley, as above
defined, for the reason that Blount himself served there as a judge of the court of first
instance. He says:1—

“The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history of that Cagayan valley as almost any other American.”

He was. For his action in concealing the horrible conditions which arose there under
Insurgent rule, with which he was perfectly familiar, and in foisting on the public the
account of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent, as portraying the conditions which actually existed
there, I propose to arraign him before the bar of public opinion. In so doing I shall consider
these conditions at some length. We have much documentary evidence concerning them in
addition to that furnished by the Insurgent records, although the latter quite sufficiently
demonstrate many of the more essential facts.

In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent in this region, Judge Blount
says:2—

“There3 they were met by Simeon Villa, military commander of Isabela province, the man who was chief of
staff to Aguinaldo afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with Aguinaldo in the spring of
1901.”

The facts as to Villa’s career in the Cagayan valley are especially worthy of note as they
seem to have entitled him, in the opinion of his superiors, to the promotion which was
afterward accorded him. He was an intimate friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him
on his long flight through northern Luzon.

On August 10, 1898, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native of Cavite Province and one of the
intimates of Aguinaldo, was ordered to proceed to Aparri in the Insurgent steamer Filipinas
and establish the revolutionary government in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold
elections for office-holders under Aguinaldo’s government and was authorized to approve or
disapprove the results, his action being subject to subsequent revision by Aguinaldo. His
forces were composed of four companies armed with rifles.

Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly secured the surrender of the Spaniards
there.

He was accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under discussion, and by Colonel Leyba,
who was also very close to Aguinaldo.

Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is claimed that the governor of North
Ilocos, who was among those captured, was grossly mistreated.

Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as follows:4—

“Whatever the treatment of the Spanish governor of Ilocos may really have been, there is testimony to show
that some of the other prisoners, especially the priests, were abused and outraged under the direction of S. Villa
and Colonel Leyba, both of whom were very close to Aguinaldo. Some of the Spanish civil officials were put
in stocks and beaten, and one of the officers who had surrendered at Aparri was tortured to death. This was
done with the purpose of extorting money from them, for it was believed that they had hidden funds in place of
turning them over. All the Spaniards were immediately stripped of everything they had. The priests were
subjected to a systematic series of insults and abuse under the direction of Villa in order to destroy their
influence over the people by degrading them in their eyes. It was for this that they were beaten and exposed
naked in the sun; and other torture, such as pouring tile wax of burning candles into their eyes, was used to
make them disclose where they had hidden church vessels and church funds. The testimony of a friar who
suffered these outrages is that the great mass of the people saw such treatment of their parish priests with
horror, and were present at it only through fear of the organized force of the Katipúnan.”

Taylor’s statement is mildness itself in view of the well-established facts.

The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including the friars, had previously been
seriously considered,5 but it was deemed wiser to keep most of the friars alive, extort money
from them by torture, and offer to liberate them in return for a large cash indemnity, or for
political concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa presided at, or himself
conducted, the torture of ill-fated priests and other Spaniards who fell into his hands. Even
Filipinos whom he suspected of knowing the where-abouts of hidden friar money did not
escape.

The following information relative to the conduct of the Insurgents in the Cagayan valley is
chiefly taken from manuscript copy of “Historia de la Conquista de Cagayan por los
Tagalos Revolucionarios,” in which the narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed
and compiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the Dominican Order.

The formal surrender of Aparri occurred on August 26. Tirona, his officers and his soldiers,
promptly pillaged the convento.6 The officers left the Bishop of Vigan ten pesos, but the
soldiers subsequently took them away from him. Wardrobes and trunks were broken open;
clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off. Even personal papers and prayer-books
were taken from some of the priests, many of whom were left with absolutely nothing save
the few remaining clothes in which they stood.

On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and Rafael Perea,7 went to the convento and
told the priests who were imprisoned there that their last hour had come. He shut all of them
except the bishop and five priests in a room near the church, then separated the
Augustinians, Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, Mariano Rodriguez, and Clemente

Hidalgo, from the others and took them into the lower part of the convento where he told
them that he intended to kill them if they did not give him more money. The priests told him
that they had given all they had, whereupon he had their arms tied behind their backs, kicked
them, struck them and whipped them with rattans.

Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely beaten. Meanwhile two shots were fired
over the heads of the others and a soldier called out “One has fallen,” badly frightening the
priests who had remained shut in the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room,
ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step forward to be shot. Father Mariano
Ortiz complied with this request, asking that he be the first victim. Villa, however, contented
himself with threatening him with a revolver and kicking and striking him until he fell to the
floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns.

Father José Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who had thrown some money into a privy to
keep it from falling into the hands of the Insurgents, was stripped and compelled to recover
it with his bare hands, after which he was kicked, and beaten with rattans.

Father Aquilino García was unmercifully kicked and beaten to make him give up money, and
this sort of thing continued until Villa, tired out with the physical exertion involved in
assaulting these defenceless men, departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others, who
continued it for some time.

The net result to the Insurgents of the sacking of the convento and of the tortures thus
inflicted was approximately $20,000 gold in addition to the silver, bank notes, letters of
credit, jewels, etc., which they obtained.

On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and Buenaventura Macia given fifty blows
each, although Father Juan was ill.

Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were imprisoned. On September 6 he
demanded money of them, causing them to be kicked and beaten. Father Angel was beaten
in an especially cruel manner for the apparent purpose of killing him, after which he was
thrust into a privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully abused. Stripped of his habit,
and stretched face down on the floor, he was horribly beaten, and was then kicked, and
struck with the butt of a revolver on the forehead.

A little later the priests were offered their liberty for a million dollars, which they were of
course unable to furnish. Meanwhile the torture continued from time to time.

On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents without resistance. Colonel Leyba
promptly proceeded to the convento and demanded the money of the friars as spoil of war.
He found only eight hundred pesos in the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened with death if
he did not give more. Other priests were threatened but not tortured at this time. The
prisoners in the jail were liberated, but many of them had promptly to be put back again

because of the disorder which resulted, and that same evening Leyba was obliged to publish
a notice threatening robbers with death.

At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was taken from the convento by Captain Diego
and was again asked for money. Replying that he had no more to give, he was beaten with
the hilt of a sabre and stripped of his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mock sentence
of death was pronounced on him and he was placed facing to the west to be shot in the back.
Diego ordered his soldiers to load, adding, “When I count three all fire,” but the fatal count
was not completed. Three priests from Alcala were given similar treatment.

The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao were sufficiently great, but they were
augmented a thousand fold when Villa arrived on September 11. He came to the building
where they were imprisoned, bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans. He
ordered the priests into the corner of the room in which they were confined, and beat those
who did not move quickly enough to suit him. He threatened them with a very rigorous
examination, at the same time assuring them that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop until
blood flowed from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do the same with them if they
did not tell him where they had their money hidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks
and blows, a number of the priests being obliged to take off their habits in order that they
might be punished more effectively.

Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors in educational institutions, he
ordered beaten because they were friars.

Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked and insulted. Both were gray-haired
old men and the latter was at the time very weak, and suffering from a severe attack of
asthma. Father Pedro Vincente was also brutally beaten.

The following is the description given by an eye-witness of conditions at Tuguegarao:—

“Even the Indios of Cagayan complained and were the victims of looting and robbery on the part of the
soldiery. So lacking in discipline and so demoralized was that army that according to the confession of a
prominent Filipino it was of imperative necessity to disarm them.8 On the other hand we saw with real
astonishment that instead of warlike soldiers accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits and
apprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless, only outrages, looting and all sorts of savagery
and injustice were to be expected. Witnesses to their demoralization are, aside from the natives themselves who
were the first to acknowledge it, the Chinese merchants whose losses were incalculable; not a single store or
commercial establishment remained that was not looted repeatedly. As to the Spaniards it goes without saying
because it is publicly known, that between soldiers and officers they despoiled them to their heart’s content,
without any right except that of brute force, of everything that struck their fancy, and it was of no avail to
complain to the officers and ask for justice, as they turned a deaf ear to such complaints. At Tuguegarao they
looted in a manner never seen before, like Vandals, and it was not without reason that a prominent Filipino
said, in speaking to a priest: ‘Vandalism has taken possession of the place.’ These acts of robbery were
generally accompanied by the most savage insults; it was anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm, who also
stated that no law was recognized except that of danger, and the vanquished were granted nothing but the
inevitable duty of bowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of that soulless rabble, skilled in crime.”

Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer of the priests proceeded to steal their
clothes, including shirts, shoes and even handkerchiefs. Isabela was taken without resistance
on September 12. Dimas Guzman9 swore to the priests on his life that he would work
without rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards might be respected, but he perjured
himself.

Filipina Trained Nurses

This photograph shows the members of the first class to graduate from the
government training school.

On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of Cabagan Viejo, where Villa promptly
assaulted Father Segundo Rodriguez, threatening him with a revolver, beating him

unmercifully, insulting him in every possible way and robbing him of his last cent. After the
bloody scene was over he sacked the convento, even taking away the priests’ clothes.

Villa also cruelly beat a Filipino, Quintin Agansi, who was taking care of money for masses
which the priests wished to save from the Insurgents.

After Father Segundo had suffered torture and abuse for two hours he was obliged to start at
once on a journey to Auitan. The suffering priest, after being compelled to march through
the street shouting “Vivas!” for the Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without a
mouthful of food or a drink of water.

Father Deogracias García, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo, was subjected to torture because he
had sent to Hongkong during May a letter of credit for $5000 which belonged to the Church.
Villa and Leyba entered his convento and after beating him ordered his hands and feet to be
tied together, then passed a pole between them and had him lifted from the ground, after
which two great jars of water were poured down his nose and throat without interruption.10
In order to make the water flow through his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood into the
nasal passages until it came out in his throat. From time to time the torture was suspended
while they asked him whether he would tell the truth as to where he had concealed his
money. This unfortunate priest was so sure he was going to die that while the torture was in
progress he received absolution from a fellow priest. After the torture with water there
followed a long and cruel beating, and the unhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy
privy.

Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of soldiers and badly beaten, after
which he was let down into the filth of a privy, first by the feet and afterwards by the head.

On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers entered the convento of Tumauini and as usual
demanded money of the occupants, who gave him $80, all they had at the time. This quantity
not being satisfactory, a rope was sent for and the hands of the two priests were tied while
they were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were, however, released when Father Bonet
promised to get additional money. They had a short respite until the arrival of Villa, who still
demanded more money of Father Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the father
had no more, leaped upon him and gave him a dreadful beating, his companions joining in
with whips, rattans and the butts of guns. They at last left their victim stretched on the
ground almost dead. This priest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months afterward.
Not satisfied with this, Villa gave him the so-called “water cure.”

Meanwhile his followers had also beaten Father Bonet. Villa started to do likewise but was
too tired, having exhausted his energies on Father Blanco. While the tortures were going on,
the convento was completely sacked. Father Blanco’s library was thrown out of the window.

Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8 o’clock at night. Hastening to the
convento, with a company of well-armed soldiers, he had his men surround the three priests

who awaited him there, then summoned the local priest to a separate room and demanded
money. The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied, Villa leaped upon him, kicking him,
beating him and pounding him with the butt of a gun. Many of his associates joined in the
disgraceful attack. The unfortunate victim was then stripped of his habit, obliged to lie down
and received more than a hundred lashes. When he was nearly senseless he was subjected to
torture by water, being repeatedly lifted up when filled with water, and allowed to fall on the
floor. While some were pouring water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax on
his face and head. The torment repeatedly rendered the priest senseless, but he was allowed
to recover from time to time so that he might suffer when it was renewed.

The torturing of this unhappy man lasted for three hours, and the horrible scene was
immediately succeeded by another quite as bad. Villa called Father Domingo Campo and,
after taking from him the little money that he had, ordered him stripped. He was then given
numberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and 150 lashes, after which he was
unable to rise. There followed the torture with water, on the pretext that he had money
hidden away.

Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of the Chinese were completely sacked,
and the men who objected were knocked down or cut down with bolos. Numerous girls and
women were raped.

On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya. I quote the
following from the narrative above referred to:—

“Delfin’s soldiers11 were the most depraved ever seen: their thieving instincts had no bounds; so they had
hardly entered Nueva Vizcaya when they started to give themselves up furiously to robbery, looking upon all
things as loot; in the very shadow of these soldiers the province was invaded by a mob of adventurous and
ragged persons from Nueva Ecija; between the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. When they had grown
tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayan people, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small
bands to the pueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan, giving themselves up to unbridled pillage of the
most unjust and disorderly kind. Some of these highwaymen demanded money and arms from the priest of
Angadanan, but Father Marciano informed them ‘that it could not be, as Leyba already knew what he had and
would be angry.’

“To this very day the people of Nueva Vizcaya have been unable to recover from the stupendous losses
suffered by them as regards their wealth and industries. How many curses did they pour forth and still continue
to level against the Katipúnan that brought them naught but tribulations!”

Confirmation of these statements is found in the following brief but significant passage from
the Insurgent records:—

“At the end of December, 1898, when the military commander of Nueva Vizcaya called upon the Governor of
that province to order the police of the towns to report to him as volunteers to be incorporated in the army
which was being prepared for the defence of the country, the Governor protested against it and informed the
government that his attempt to obtain volunteers was in fact only a means of disarming the towns and leaving
them without protection against the soldiers who did what they wanted and took what they wished and
committed every outrage without being punished for it by their officers.”12

The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba and Villa is thus described by Father
Malumbres:—

“Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company were like men who travelled flower-strewn paths,
crowned with laurels, and were acclaimed as victors in all the towns on their road, their intoxication of joy
taking a sudden rise when they came to believe themselves kings of the valley. It was then that their delirium
reached its brimful measure and their treatment of those whom they had vanquished began to be daily more
cruel and inhuman. In Cagayan their fear of the forces in Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such
unqualifiable excesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the triumph of the Katipúnan arms in Nueva
Vizcaya completely broke down the wall of restraint which somewhat repressed those sanguinary executioners
thirsting to fatten untrammelled on the innocent blood of unarmed and defenceless men. From that melancholy
time there began an era of unheard of outrages and barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they not proved by
evidence of every description. The savage acts committed in Isabela by the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot
possibly be painted true to life and in all their tragic details. The blackest hues, the most heartrending accents,
the most vigorous language and the most fulminating anathemas would be a pale image of the truth, and our
pen cannot express with true ardour the terrifying scenes and cruel torments brought about by such fierce
chieftains on such indefensive religious. It seems impossible that a fleshly heart could hold so much
wickedness, for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters of cruelty who surpassed a Nero; men who were
entire strangers to noble and humane sentiments and who in appearance having the figure of a man were in
reality tigers roaring in desperation, or mad dogs who gnashed their teeth in fury.”

On September 18 Leyba continued his march, while Villa remained behind at Ilagan to
torture the prisoners who might be brought in from Isabela.

On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the convento and as usual immediately
demanded money from the priests. Father Venancio gave him all he had. He was
nevertheless given a frightful whipping, six persons holding him while others rained blows
upon him. A determined effort was made to force the priest to recant, and when this failed
Leyba leaped upon him, kicking and beating him. He then ordered him thrown down face
uppermost, and asked for a knife with the apparent intention of mutilating him. He did not
use the knife, however, but instead, assisted by his followers, gave the unhappy priest
another terrific beating, even standing upon him and leaping up and down. The priest was
left unable to speak, and did not recover for months.

Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father Gregorio Cabrero and lay brother
Venancio Aguinaco, while Father Sabanda was savagely beaten.

On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of Reina Mercedes was horribly beaten in
his convento by a captain sent there to get what money he had.

In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and Aguirrezabal were beaten and compelled to
give up money by five emissaries of Leyba, and the latter priest was cut in the face with a
sabre. The convento was sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking and beating
Father Garcia compelled him to give up $1700. He then informed the priests that if it were
not for Aguinaldo’s orders he would kill all the Spaniards.

On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard named Soto arrived at Ilagan. The
following is the statement of an eye-witness as to what happened:—

“They led the priests to the headquarters of the commanding officer where the tyrant Villa, always eager to
inflict suffering on humanity, awaited them. The scene witnessed by the priests obeisant to the cruel judge was
horrifying in the extreme. Four lions whose thirst for vengeance was extreme in all, threw themselves, blind
with fury, without a word and with the look of a basilisk, upon poor Señor Soto giving him such innumerable
and furious blows on head and face that weary as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment received at
Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon thrown down by his executioners under the lintel of the
door getting a terrible blow on the head as he fell; even this did not satisfy nor tame down those fierce-hearted
men, who on the contrary continued with their infamous work more furious than before, and their cruelty did
not flag on seeing their victim at their feet. They could have done no worse had they been Silípan savages
dancing in triumph around the palpitating head cut from the body of some enemy.

“The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trembled like the weak reed before the gale, waiting their
turn to be tortured, but God willed that cruel Villa should be content with the butchery perpetrated upon
unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa dismissed the priests after despoiling them of their bags and clothes telling them, to
torment them: ‘Go to the convento until the missing ones turn up so that I may shoot you all together.’”

Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly going to the convento as usual and
demanding money of the priest, Father Mata. When the latter had given him all he had, he
received three terrific beatings at the hands of some twelve men armed with whips and
sticks, after which Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his sabre. He was finally
knocked down by a blow with the sabre and left disabled. It took six months for him to
recover.

Shortly after Leyba’s arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the afternoon of the 25th, five priests were
summoned to Solano and there abused in the usual fashion in an effort to extort money from
them. Only one escaped ill treatment and one was nearly killed.

Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the established programme with the priests.
There he found Governor Perez of Isabela, who had taken with him certain government
moneys and employed them to pay salaries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on
the return of the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez if it was not forthcoming. The
Spaniards of the vicinity subscribed $700 which they themselves badly needed and saved
him from being shot. The priests of the place were then summoned to Leyba’s quarters and
were beaten and tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and beaten nearly to death,
Leyba standing meanwhile with his foot on the unfortunate man’s neck. Another was given
six hundred lashes and countless blows and kicks. Leyba stood on this man’s neck also.
When the victim’s back ceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten. Leyba terminated
this period of diversion by kicking Father Diez in the solar plexus and then mocking him as
he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoon one of the priests, so badly injured that he could
not rise unaided, was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the hot sun to Solano.

Staff of the Bontoc Hospital

This photograph shows the doctors, nurses, and some of the servants. The man in the doorway is Dr. Rembe of the
Philippine General Hospital, who accompanied the author on his northern inspection trip in 1912, in order to study eye
troubles among the wild men.

Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown by the following description of the
torturing of Father Ceferino by Major Delfin at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on September 27:—

“They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the friar before Leyba left, and show him that they were
as brave as he when it came to oppressing and torturing the friar. This tragedy began by Jimenez again asking
Father Ceferino for the money. The priest answered as he had done before. Then Jimenez started to talk in
Tagalog to the commanding officer and surely it was nothing good that he told him, for suddenly Delfin left the
bench and darting fire from his eyes, fell in blind fury upon the defenceless priest; what harsh words he uttered
in Tagalog while he vented his fury on his victim, striking him with his clenched fist, slapping him and kicking
him, I do not know, but the religious man fell at the feet of his furious executioner who, being now the prey of
the most stupendous rage, could scarcely get his tongue to stutter and continued to kick the priest, without
seeing where he kicked him. Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhaps not knowing what he was
about, this petty chief made straight for a sabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the meantime
the priest had risen to his feet and awaited with resignation new torments which certainly were even worse than
the first, for he gave him so many and such hard blows with the sabre that the blade was broken close to the
hilt. This accident so infuriated Delfin that he again threw himself upon the priest, kicking him furiously and
striking him repeatedly until he again threw him to the ground, and not yet satisfied, his vengefulness led him
to throw himself upon his victim with the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the head with the hilt of
the saber until the blood ran in streams and formed pools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead than alive,
shuddered from head to foot, and appeared to be struggling in a tremendous fight between life and death; he
had hardly enough strength to get his tongue to ask for God’s mercy. At this most critical juncture, and when it

seemed as if death were inevitable, the martyr received absolution from Father Diez, who witnessed the blood-
curdling picture with his heart pierced with grief at the sight of the sufferings of his innocent brother, feeling as
must the condemned man preparing for death who sees the hours fly by with vertiginous rapidity. The blood
flowing from the wounds on the priest’s head appeared to infuriate and blind the heart of Delfin who, rising
from his victim’s body, sped away to the armory in the court house, seized a rifle, and came back furious to
brain him with the butt and finish killing the priest; but God willed to free his servant from death at the hands
of those cannibals, so that generous Lieutenant Navarro interfered, took the rifle away from him and caught
Delfin by the arm, threatening him with some words spoken in Tagalog. Then Navarro, to appease Delfin’s
anger, turned the priest over with his face to the ground and gave him a few strokes with the bamboo, and
feigning anger and indignation, ordered him away.

“Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality of the tyrant and the prostration of the friar were
persuaded that the latter would never survive his martyrdom. The religious man himself holds it as a veritable
portent that he outlived such a terrible trial; but even this did not satisfy them as subsequently the Secretary
again called Father Ceferino to subject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculous as it was malicious, though it did
not go beyond words or insults.”

Señor Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father Diez were compelled to go to Ilagan. After
they had arrived there on October 2d, Villa proceeded to torture them. At the outset ten
soldiers, undoubtedly instructed beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with the
butts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three times in the chest with the butt of a gun
and Father Diez gave him absolution, thinking he was dying. Father Diez was then knocked
down repeatedly with the butts of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in order
that he might be knocked down again. Not satisfied with this, Villa compelled the suffering
priest to kneel before him and kicked him in the nose, repeating the operation until he left
him stretched on the floor half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both victims put
in stocks with their weight supported by their feet alone. While in this position soldiers beat
them and jumped onto them and one set the governor’s beard on fire with matches. Father
Diez was kept in the stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao in order that personal
enemies there might take vengeance on him, Villa bidding him good-by with the following
words: “Go now to Tuguegarao and see if they will finish killing you there.” Señor Perez
was kept in the stocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die.

Upon the 25th of September Villa went to the convento in Ilagan prepared to torture the
priests, but he succeeded in compelling a number of them to sign indorsements in his favour
on various letters of credit payable by the Tabacalera Company and departed again in fairly
good humour, having done nothing worse than strike one of them.

Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado and Labanda had money hidden away, he
determined to torture them with water. The first to be tortured was Father Labanda. Villa had
him taken to the prison where the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants who had
been beaten cruelly and were then hanging from a beam, this having been done in order to
make them tell where his money was.

He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured down his nose and throat. During the
brief respites necessary in order to prevent his dying outright he was cruelly beaten. They
finally dragged him out of the prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail on the

stones. After he had been taken back to his companions, one of the men who had tortured
him came to beg his pardon, saying that he had been compelled to do it by Villa.

Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms of the convento. Villa finished the
day’s work by announcing to the band of priests that he would have them all shot the next
day on the plaza, and ordering them to get ready.

On the 29th the barbarities practised by this inhuman fiend reached their climax in the
torturing to death of Lieutenant Piera. The following description gives some faint idea of one
of the most diabolical crimes ever committed in the Philippines:—

“Villa’s cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let or hindrance from day to day; it seemed that this hyena
continually cudgelled his brains to invent new kinds of torture and to jeer at the friars. On the night of the 29th
of September the diabolical idea occurred to him of giving the coup de grace to the prestige of the friars by
making them pass through the streets of Ilagan conducting and playing a band of music. He carried out his
nonsensical purpose by calling upon Father Diogracias to play the big drum, and when this priest had started
playing Villa learned that Father Primo was a musician and could therefore play the drum and lead the band
with all skill, so he called upon Father Primo to come forward, and with one thing and another this ridiculous
function was carried on until the late hours of the night.

“While these two priests were serenading Villa and his gang, the most dreadful shrieks were heard from the
jail, accompanied by pitiful cries that would melt the coldest heart. The priests hearing these echoes of sorrow
and pain, and who did not know for what purpose Fathers Deogracias and Primo had been separated from
them, seemed to recognize the voices of these two priests among the groans, believing them to be cruelly
tortured; for this reason they began to say the rosary in order that the Most Holy Virgin might imbue them with
patience and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great was their surprise when these priests returned saying that they
had contented themselves with merely making fun of them by obliging them to play the big drum and lead the
band.

“Although this somewhat tempered their sorrow, a thorn remained in their hearts, fearing that the moving
lamentations and the mortal groans came from the lips of some hapless Spaniard. This fatidical presentiment
turned out unfortunately to be a fact. The victim sacrificed that melancholy night, still remembered with a
shudder by the priests, was Lieutenant Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who had made up his mind to die in
the breach rather than surrender the town of Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers and tears
of certain Spanish ladies who had been instructed to do so by a man who should have been the first one to
shoulder a rifle. After having been harassed in Aparri he was taken to Tuguegarao at the request of Esteban
Quinta or Isidoro Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirsting to revenge themselves on the Lieutenant, who
during the time of the Spanish government had justly laid his heavy hand upon them. In the latter part of
September they conducted him on foot and without any consideration whatever to the capital of Isabela. In this
town he was at once placed in solitary confinement in one of the rooms of the convento and allowed no
intercourse with any one. The sin for which they recriminated Piera was his having charged Dimas13 with
being a filibuster, and their revengefulness reached an incredible limit. The heartrending moans of this martyr
to his duty still resound in that convento converted into the scene of an orgy of blood. The unfortunate man was
heard to shout: ‘For God’s sake, for God’s sake, have pity,’ and trustworthy persons tell that under the strain of
torture he would challenge them to fight in a fair field by saying: ‘I will fight alone against twenty of you;’ but
the cowardly torturers, a reproach to the Filipino race, looked upon it as an amusement to glut their spite on a
defenceless man whose hands were tied. They had him strung up all night with but insignificant refreshment
and rest, sometimes being suspended by his arms which finally became disjointed and useless, and at others he
was hung up by his feet, the blood rushing to his head and placing him in imminent danger of sudden death. It
was the intention of these brutes to torture him as much as possible before killing him, just as a member of the
feline race plays with, tosses in the air and pirouettes around the victim which falls into his claws. If to the
torture of the rope are added the blows with cudgels and the butts of rifles which were frequently rained upon
the victim it will be no surprise that early on the morning of the 30th he was in the throes of death in the midst

of which the sufferer had just enough strength to say that he was hungry and thirsty; then those cannibals (the
heart is filled with fury in setting forth such cruelty) cut a piece of flesh from the calf of the dying man’s leg
and conveyed it to his mouth and instead of water they gave him to drink some of his own urine. What
savagery!

“The blood from the wound finished the killing of the fainting Piera. The blood shed served to infuriate more
the barbarous executioners who in order to give the finishing stroke to the martyr, as an unrivalled expression
of their savage ferocity, thrust a red-hot iron into his mouth and eyes. That same night these treacherous and
ferocious tyrants whose sin made them hate the light, buried the body in the darkness of the night in a patch of
cogon grass adjoining the convento.”

Piera’s torture was by no means confined to this last night of his life, as the following
account of it shows:—

“In the first days of this accursed month, while the padres were bemoaning their fate in jail, a dark drama was
being enacted in the convento, whose hair-raising scenes would have inspired terror to Montepiu himself.

“Lieutenant Salvador Piera of the Guardia Civil, commanding officer at Aparri, who, realizing that all
resistance was useless, gave way to the persistent solicitations of Spaniards and natives and surrendered that
town on honourable terms, which the Katipúnan forces did not respect after the capitulation had been signed,
was sent for by Villa, the military authority of Isabela. Something terrible was going to happen as Piera himself
felt confident, for it is said that before leaving Aparri he went to confession where he settled the important
business of his conscience in a Christian manner with a representative of God.

“And so it turned out, for as soon as he arrived in Ilagan he was taken to the convento and placed
incomunicado in one of its apartments. Soon after, three or four vile fiends,—for they do not deserve the name
of men,—bound him with strong cords and hanged him to a beam. Then they began to charge him with having
prosecuted a certain Mason, and inflicted upon him the most frightful tortures. The pen refuses to set forth so
many atrocities. For three days they had him in that position while his vile assassins made a martyr of him. Our
hair stands on end to think of such crimes. The heart-rending cries of this unfortunate man while prey to such
barbarous torments could be heard in every part of the town and carried panic to the homes of all the
inhabitants.

“The late hours of the night were always chosen by those treacherous fiends to give Piera the trato de cuerda
(this form of torture consists in tying the hands of the victim behind his back and hanging him by them by a
rope passed through a pulley attached to a beam; his body is lifted as high as it will go and then allowed to fall
by its own weight without reaching the ground); but this torture was administered to him in a form so terrible
that all the pictures of this kind of torment found in the dreadful narratives of the calumniators of the Holy
Office, pale into insignificance in comparison with the atrocious details of the tortures here recited; at each
violent jerk the unhappy victim feeling that his limbs were being torn asunder would cry out ‘My God! My
God!’ This terrifying cry reverberating through the jail would freeze the very blood of the poor priests therein
incarcerated.

“On the third day, when those infuriated hyenas appeared to have spent their diabolical rage; after they had
thrust a red-hot iron into his eyes and left him with sightless sockets; the poor martyr, the prey of delirium,
cried out that he was hungry, and one of those sicarii cut a piece of flesh from Piera’s thigh and was infamous
enough to carry it to his mouth. On the night of the seventh of the month very late a number of wretches buried
in the convento garden a body still dripping warm blood from the lips of which there escaped the feeble plaints
of anguish of a dying man.”

The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter is well shown by the following statement
of Father Malumbres:—

“This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man, and is still uninvestigated, crying to Heaven for
vengeance with greater reason than the blood of the innocent Abel. So long as the criminals remain unpunished
it will be a black and indelible stigma and an ugly stain on the race harbouring in its midst the perpetrators of

this unheard-of sin. Words of reprobation are not enough, justice demands exemplary and complete reparation,
and if the powers of earth do not take justice into their own hands, God will send fire from Heaven and will
cause to disappear from the face of the earth the criminals and even their descendants. A murder so cruel and
premeditated can be punished in no other way.

“If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persons it would not be a difficult task; the public points its
finger at those who dyed their hands in the blood of the heroic soldier, and we shall set them forth here echoing
the voice of the people. The soulless instigator was Dimas Guzman. The executioners were a certain José
Guzman (alias Pepin, a nephew of Dimas) and Cayetano Pérez.”

The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge Blount himself tried the cases.

The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of the occurrence. He says of it:14—

“Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Ventura Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the
author of the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for playing a minor part in the murder of an
officer of the Spanish army committed under Villa’s orders just prior to, or about the time of, the Wilcox-
Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and sentenced, but later liberated under President Roosevelt’s amnesty of
1902. He was guilty, but the deceased, so the people in the Cagayan Valley used to say, in being tortured to
death, got only the same sort of medicine he had often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad
theory of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases.”

He adds:—

“I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for being accessory to the murder of the Spanish
officer above named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on the grewsome occasion. I am quite sure
I would have hung Villa without any compunction at that time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried to get
hold of him, but Governor Taft’s attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me that Villa was somewhere over on the
mainland of Asia on British territory, and extradition would involve application to the London Foreign Office.
The intimation was that we had trouble enough of our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed
under our predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now practising medicine in Manila. More
than one officer of the American army that I know afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa
did to that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think President Roosevelt acted wisely
and humanely in wiping the slate. We had new problems to deal with, and were not bound to handicap
ourselves with the old ones left over from the Spanish régime.”15

But it happens that this was the Filipino régime. Piera’s torture occurred at the very time
when, according to Blount, Aguinaldo had “a wonderfully complete ‘going concern’
throughout the Philippine archipelago.”

Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where Blount says “perfect tranquillity and
public order” were then being maintained by “the authority of the Aguinaldo government” in
a country which Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarous
murder by torture four weeks later, found so “quiet and orderly.”

A Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with Salvarsan

The discovery that salvarsan was a specific for the disfiguring disease known as yaws was made by Dr. R.P. Strong of
the Bureau of Science. The effect of this drug is almost miraculous. A single injection usually cures completely.

Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every detail of this damnable crime, but he must
of necessity have known of the torturing of friars to extort money, which preceded and
followed it.

The following statement seems to sum up his view of the whole matter:—

“It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the Spaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge
for three centuries of tyranny. They do not prove unfitness for self-government. I, for one, prefer to follow the
example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over all those matters.”16

The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we have seen, over numerous other
pertinent matters which occurred in this land of “profound peace and tranquillity” just at the
time Wilcox and Sargent were making their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing the
veil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those in question demonstrate complete
and utter unfitness for self-government on the part of those who brought them about!

If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer of the American army who did things to
the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to Lieutenant Piera, why did he not report them and
have the criminals brought to justice?

Such an attack on the army, in the course of which there is not given a name or a fact which
could serve as a basis for an investigation, is cowardly and despicable.

I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the truth, but if he does, then his failure to
attempt to bring to justice the human fiends concerned brands him!

It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile allegations of this sort against officers
of the United States army, couching them in discreetly general terms. This is a contemptible
procedure, for it frees those who make reckless charges from danger of the criminal
proceedings which would otherwise doubtless be brought against them.

On arrival at Ilagan, the town where Piera was tortured to death, Blount says17 that Messrs.
Wilcox and Sargent were

“given a grand baile [ball] and fiesta [feast], a kind of dinner-dance, we would call it.... From Ilagan they
proceeded to Aparri, cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in fact, as Aguinaldo always
claimed in his proclamations of that period, seeking recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of
profound peace and tranquillity—free from brigandage and the like.”

Within sight of the banquet hall, within hearing of the music, lay a lighter on which were
huddled eighty-four priests of the Catholic Church, many of them gray-haired old men,
innocent of any evil conduct, who for weeks had suffered, mentally and physically, the
tortures of the damned.

Of the events of this evening and the following day Father Malumbres says:—

“From the river the convento could be seen profusely illuminated and the strains of music could be heard, an
evident sign that they were engaged in revelry. This gave us a bad start, as we came to fear that Villa had
returned from the expedition undertaken to come up with two Americans who had crossed the Caraballo range
and were thinking of coming down as far as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa our arrival at Ilagan, so that
we were obliged to pass the night on the lighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front of the pueblo of
Ilagan, where we were credibly informed that Villa had returned. This accursed news made us begin to fear
some disagreeable incident.

“Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official communication regarding our transfer to Villa, while we
waited impatiently for his decision. Sergeant Matias at length returned with orders for our disembarkation; we
put on the best clothes we had and the rowers placed a broad plank between the lighter and the arsenal and we
left our floating prison two abreast. Matias called the roll and the order to march, we were eighty-four friars in
a long column climbing the steep ascent to Ilagan.

“When we had arrived in front of the building used for headquarters, we faced about in front thereof, and the
first thing we saw in one of the windows were the sinister features of Falaris, who with a thundering brow and
black look was delighting himself in the contemplation of so many priests surrounded by bayonets and filled
with misery. Any other person but Villa would have melted on seeing such a spectacle, which could but incite
compassion. The two American tourists were also looking on at this horrible scene as if stupefied, but they
soon withdrew in order, perhaps, not to look upon such a painful picture. It was, indeed, heartrending to
contemplate therein old gray-haired men who had passed their lives in apostolic work side by side with young
men who had just arrived in this ungrateful land, and many sick who rather than men seemed to be marble
statues, who had no recourse but to stand in line, without one word of consolation; therein figured some who
wore religious garb, others in secular dress limited to a pair of rumpled trousers and a cast-off coat, the lack of
this luxurious garment being replaced in some instances by a native shirt.

“For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the street under the rays of a burning sun and to the
scandal of the immense crowd which had been gathered together to witness the denouement of the tragedy. The
priests had hardly come into the presence of Villa when Fathers Isidro and Florentino were called out for the
purpose of having heaped upon them a flood of insults and affronts. Father Isidro was ordered by Villa to

interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who, Villa supposed, would wreak his revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly
mistaken, as said gentleman treated the priest with great respect; the tyrant remained talking to Father
Florentino in the reception room of the headquarters building, and when it appeared that such talk would come
to blows, the elder of the Americans left one of the rooms toward the reception room, and the scene suddenly
changing, Villa arose and addressing the priest said: ‘I am pleased to introduce to you an American Brigadier-
General, Mr. N.’ The latter returned a cordial greeting in Spanish to the priest who made a courteous
acknowledgment; after this exchange of courtesies, Villa resumed his defamatory work, pouring out a string of
absurdities and infamous insults upon the friars, going so far as to say in so many words: ‘from the bishop
down you are all thieves and depraved’ he added another word which it would be shameful to write down, and
so he went on from one abyss to another without regard to reputations or the respect due to venerated persons.

“The American let his disgust be seen while Villa was talking, and the latter understood these protests and
ordered the priest to withdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the American shaking hands with the priest
and offering him assistance. Villa would not shake hands with him, as was natural, but the priest was able to
see that he was confused when he saw the distinction and courtesy with which an American general had treated
a helpless friar. What a narrow idea did the Americans form of the government of Aguinaldo, represented by
men as savage and inhuman as Villa!

“The natives averred that the Americans referred to were spies who had come to explore those provinces and
were making maps of the strategic points and principal roads, so that a very careful watch was kept upon them
and Villa took measures to have them go down the river without landing at any place between Echague and
Ilagan. At Ilagan they were given an entertainment and dance, Villa being a skilled hand in this sort of thing,
and a few days later he accompanied them to Aparri18 without allowing them to set foot on land. The
government of Aguinaldo no longer had everything its own way, and secret orders had been given to have
every step of the explorers followed. The commanding and other leading officers of the Valley, supporting the
orders of the government, circulated an order throughout the towns which read as follows:—

“‘To All Local Officers:

“‘You will not permit any maps to be made or notes to be taken of strategic points by Americans or
foreigners; nor will you allow them to become acquainted with the points of defence; you will
endeavour to report immediately to this Government any suspicious persons; you will make your
investigations secretly, accompanying suspected persons and feigning that their investigations are
approved, and finally when it shall seem to you that such suspected persons have finished their
work, you will advise without loss of time, in order that their notes may be seized.’

“Despite this order the Americans were able to inform themselves very thoroughly of the forces in
the Valley and its state of defence, and Filipinos were not lacking who for a few pesos would put
them abreast of all information regarding the plans and projects of Aguinaldo’s government.”

Relative to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor says:—

“In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox, U.S.N., and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U.S.N.,
travelled through Northern Luzon from which they returned with a favourable impression of the government
which had been set up by Aguinaldo’s agents.

“It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it was highly expedient that they should make a
favourable report and accordingly they were well received, and although constant obstacles were thrown in the
way of their seeing what it was not considered well for them to see yet the real reasons for the delays in their
journey were carefully kept from them. At least some of their letters to the fleet were taken, translated, and sent
to Aguinaldo, who kept them, and constant reports upon them and their movements were made.”

Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a characteristic story of Villa,19 whose
vengeful feeling toward the Spaniards showed on all occasions.

It would doubtless have interested the travellers to know that the “robbery” consisted in
taking the funds out of the province to save them from falling into Villa’s hands, and in
paying them to soldiers in Nueva Vizcaya to whom money was due. It would further have
interested them to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been twice tortured within an
inch of his life by Villa.

But let us continue our interrupted narrative:—

“The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us from certain forms of savagery and barbarous
intentions on the part of Villa. There can be no doubt that the tyrant was constantly cudgelling his brains to
invent new methods of showing his contempt for the friars; at the unlucky time we write of he conceived the
infamous plan of ordering a circular enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it—we trust the reader will
pardon the details—with a bell hung to his neck, blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the
enclosure with sticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous attitude, obliged them to strike about when the sound
of the bell appraised them of the animal’s proximity; it is obvious that the principal purpose of the fiendish
Villa was to have the priests lay about them in such a way as to deal each other the blows instead of the pig.
The tyrant also had the idea of making us and the other priests in Ilagan parade the streets of that town dancing
and playing the band. The wish to consummate his plan was not lacking but he was deterred by the presence of
the Americans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas Orros to whom we also owed the signal favour that Villa did not
take us to our prisons at Tumauini and Gamut on foot and with our clothing in a bundle at our backs.”

On October 2 a banquet was given in Villa’s honour at Ilagan and the pleasant idea occurred
to him to have four of the friars dance at it for his amusement. The people of the town put
their handkerchiefs before their faces to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo,
one of the priests who was obliged to dance, had great ulcers on his legs from the wounds
caused by the cords with which he had been bound when he was tortured with water, and
was at first unable to raise his feet from the floor; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until
he finally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst open so that the bones showed.

On the 3d of October a number of the friars were compelled to get up a band and go out and
meet Leyba with music on his arrival. The people of the towns closed their windows in
disgust at the sight. A great crowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests were
compelled to dance in the middle of the street, but this again only caused disgust. A couple
of priests were then beaten in the usual fashion in a private house. This caused murmuring
even among those of the soldiers who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same time
two other priests were horribly whipped in the prison.

This has been a long story, but the half has not been told. Those who escaped torture had
their feelings harrowed by the sight of the sufferings of their fellows. They were constantly
and grossly insulted; were often confined in the most unsanitary quarters; given poor and
insufficient food and bad water, or none at all; robbed of their clothing; compelled to march
long distances under a tropical sun when sick, wounded and suffering; obliged to do
servants’ work publicly; forced to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in the public
streets; ordered to recant, and heaven knows what not!

The torments practised on them had two principal objects: to compel them to give up money,
and to discredit them with the common people. They failed to accomplish this latter result.

There is abundant evidence that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fed them
when they could, and wept over the painful humiliations and the dreadful sufferings which
they were powerless to prevent or relieve.

The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with no possible personal grievances
against the priests whom they martyrized. Their action was the result, not of an “ebullition of
revenge for three centuries of tyranny” as stated by Blount, but of insensate greed of gold
and damnable viciousness. I believe the American people will hold that such cruelities brand
those who practise them as unfit to govern their fellows, or themselves.

Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on ex parte statements I will now return to the
Insurgent record of events in the Cagayan valley.

At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera Company20 fared comparatively well. In
a letter dated September 27, 1898, and addressed to the secretary of war of the revolutionary
government, Leyba says of the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of the surrender
were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty to seize all the money that the friars had
hidden, “which was accomplished by applying the stick.” He adds that they did nothing to
the agents of the great Tabacalera Company, then the most powerful commercial
organization in the Islands, for the significant reason that they had found that its stock was
largely held by Frenchmen and feared trouble.21

On December 4, 1898, Leyba, concerning whose ideas as to public order we are already
informed, wrote a most illuminating letter setting forth the conditions which had existed
there. He does not claim that there had been Octavian peace!

It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the very time during which Messrs. Wilcox
and Sargent passed through the Cagayan valley. It paints a vivid picture of conditions, and as
the painter was the ranking Insurgent officer in the valley during this entire period, he cannot
be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore give the letter in full’—

“Aparri, December 4, 1898.

“Don Baldomero Aguinaldo,

“The Secretary of War:

“Dear Sir and of My Greatest Esteem: I take the liberty of addressing this to you in order to state that owing
to the lack of discipline in the soldiers whom we have brought, since they are all volunteers and whom I am not
able to reduce to rigorous subordination, for the revolution would find itself without soldiers with whom to win
triumph, they committed many abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence, I was not able to punish,
although I knew of these abuses but had no proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige of the
Revolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the secret to any one, in this way avoiding the formation of an
atmosphere against the cause of our Independence to the grave injury of us all. But it happened that, in spite of
the good advice which I have given them and the punishments which I have given to some of the 3d Company
of Cauit, they did not improve their conduct but have gone to the extreme of committing a scandalous robbery
of 20,800 pesos which sum the German, Otto Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me to
work without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for I understood what a serious matter it was to take
money from a foreigner. After making many inquiries, it was discovered that a very large part of the money

which reached the sum of $10,000, a little more or less, was buried under the quarters which the said company
occupied, this with the sanction of all the officers, it appears to me, because it is impossible that such a sum
could be brought into a house where so many soldiers are living without the knowledge of the officers.

The Culion Leper Colony

Here all known Philippine lepers have been isolated and humanely cared for. As a result, leprosy is rapidly disappearing
from the Islands.

“Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the officers and preferred charges against the ones I
deemed to blame in the matter.

“Afterwards I found out that they had attempted to murder me for trying to find out the originators of the
crime. On account of this, and in order to prevent a civil war which would have broken out against the said
soldiers if precautions had not been taken, I decided to disarm them, to the great displeasure of the Colonel
who was not aware of my motives.

“This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the 4th Company stationed in Ilagan, and I believe the
Colonel, guided by my warning, will take the same measures in regard to them.

“As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and misdeeds, it is easily seen that the soldiers under their
orders, guided by them, will commit worse ones than the chiefs, and as these seem to lack the moral strength to
control and reprimand them, I propose to you, if it meets your approval, that all these soldiers and some of the
officers be returned to their homes by the steamer Luzon, if there should be sufficient coal, or in another if you
order it, since they tell me themselves that because they are far away from their homes they do not wish to
continue in the service in this province. This is easily arranged as there are now men stationed in this province
for instructing the native volunteers, many of whom have been students, and will therefore make good officers
and non-commissioned officers, and in this way a battalion could be formed, well disciplined from the
beginning and disgraceful things would be avoided not only towards the natives of this province but also
towards foreigners, which is the most important. Having stated my case, I place myself always at your
disposal, requesting you will attend to this affair.

“With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Province of Isabela, whose captain is Don Antonio
Monzon of Panamitan, there are many complaints of thefts and assaults committed by the soldiers, and in
answer to my questions, Don Simeón Adriano y Villa, Major and Sanitary Inspector and doctor of this
battalion, whom I have stationed there for lack of a competent person, tells me that he has always punished and
offered advice to officers and soldiers in order to prevent the recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he has never
been able to suppress them completely, because the soldiers are abandoned by their officers, and because of
lack of example on the part of the latter; they do not understand that it is a great blot when they commit these
abuses, since when they discover the goods or house of a Spaniard they believe they have a right to appropriate
everything which they encounter.

“I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in that province, among them some employees of the
Tobacco Factory, ‘El Oriente’ and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co., who have Spanish employees in various
pueblos of that province, have some very serious complaints to make of assaults committed against them
prejudicial to their interests; however, I hope that now with the arrival of General Tirona he will regulate
matters, although I believe that this gentleman is not sufficiently energetic in proceeding against the officers
and soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded and punished them for faults committed he has pardoned them,
and it appears that he censures energetic acts which we must use in order to subject them to rigorous discipline.
The same thing happened when Major Sr. Victa wished to discipline them; it appears that the Colonel
reprimanded him when he punished some soldiers for gambling in their quarters, since, as you know, that
gentleman believes that he who is right is the one who comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him.

“The Colonel has agreed with me that his first act on arrival at the province of Isabela should be to disarm and
take all the money he finds among the soldiers of the 4th Company (Panamitan) in order to serve as indemnity
for the property of the foreigners in case they should make any claim.

“I request that you send some leader or officer in order to superintend our actions, and to lift the doubt which
hangs over the person who has worked faithfully and honourably in the sacred cause of our Independence.

“I am filling the position of First Chief in the Port of Aparri temporarily on account of the absence of the
Colonel who has conferred on me all his duties and power. After the military operations which were carried on
as far as the last town in Isabela, being tired and somewhat sick, I was put in charge of these military
headquarters, which I found to be very much mixed up, the town, moreover, being desperate on account of the
assaults committed by my predecessor, Rafael Perca, who was appointed by the Colonel, and who was
formerly 2d Captain of the steamer Filipinas. After arriving and taking charge, having received numerous
complaints against him, I had him arrested and I found that he had been guilty of robbery, unlawful use of
insignia, illegal marriage, rape and attempted rape. I hold him in custody only awaiting the arrival of the
Colonel in order to convene a court-martial for his trial, in which the Colonel will act as President and I as
Judge Advocate.

“With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will attend to my just claim and send a special delegate to
investigate our acts and see the truth, for perhaps if a statement comes direct from me you will not believe it.

“I am your affectionate and faithful subordinate, who kisses your hand,

(Signed) “J. N. Leyba.”22

Blount states that conditions existed “just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan
Islands.”23 Unfortunately this was only too true!

The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of Aguinaldo’s fellow townsmen. They
never obeyed any one else, and left a trail of murder and rapine behind them. Aguinaldo
never punished them, and from the time when one of them tried to murder their commander
until a guard composed of them murdered General Antonio Luna in June, 1899, they are
mentioned only with fear and execration.

Blount describes with enthusiasm the establishment of civil government in Cagayan.

Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who was its head and how it worked. The
“elections” were held on December 9, 1898, and Dimas Guzman was chosen head of the
province. He was the man subsequently sentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for
complicity in the murder of Lieutenant Piera. In describing his method of conducting his
government he says that the people doubted the legality of attempts to collect taxes; that the
abuses of heads of towns caused rioting in the towns, in which only Ilocanos took part; and
that he not only did not report these things but contrived to conceal them from foreigners in
the province.24

His failure to report these troubles and disorders to his government is of interest, as Blount
alleges25 that differences between the local authorities were in a number of cases referred to
the Malolos government for settlement.

Blount says26 that General Otis’s reports were full of inexcusable blunders about the
Tagálogs taking possession of provinces and making the people do things, and cites the
relations between Villa and Dimas Guzman to illustrate the error of these allegations.

He has elsewhere27 referred to Villa as the “arch-fiend” in the matter of torturing the
unhappy Spaniards as well as the Filipinos who incurred his ill-will. We have seen that
Guzman proved an apt pupil and did credit to his instructor in connection with the torturing
of Lieutenant Piera, but it nevertheless appears from Guzman’s own statements that his
relations with the Insurgent officers and their subordinates involved some rather grave
difficulties. Of Major Canoy, for instance, he says:—

“I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable character that he saw fit to give my cook a beating
for not taking off his hat when he met him. He insulted the delegate of rents of Cabagan Viejo for the same
reason. He struck the head man of the town of Bagabag in the face. He put some of the members of the town
council of Echague in the stocks, and he had others whipped.”28

It was really incautious for Governor Guzman to complain of these conditions because
Major Canoy and his party won, and the Governor had to resign.

But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence of the atrocities committed by the
Tagálog soldiers in the Cagayan valley that Captain Batchelder was able a little later to
march practically unopposed through the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan
with one battalion of American negro troops, for whom he had neither food nor extra
ammunition, and that Tirona surrendered the Insurgent forces in the valley without
attempting resistance!

1 Blount, p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 111
3 At Carig, Isabela.

4 Taylor, 43 AJ.

5 See p. 731.
6 The parsonage, or residence of the priest.
7 Insurgent officers.
8 Their on commander so reported. See p. 202.
9 Shortly afterward “elected” governor.
10 This form of torture is commonly referred to in the Philippines as the “water cure.”
11 Major Delfin commanded the expedition which took Nueva Vizcaya.
12 P.I.R., 246. 3.
13 Dimas Guzman.
14 Blount, p. 112.

15 Blount, p. 114.
16 Blount, p. 113
17 Blount, p. 114.
18 A distance of 120 miles.
19 “The former Spanish Governor of the Province was of course a prisoner in Villa’s custody. Villa had the ex-Governor
brought in, for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them, ‘This is the man who robbed this province
of twenty-five thousand dollars during the last year of his office.’”—Blount, p. 115.
20 La Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a very strong commercial organization.
21 “I call your attention to the fact that the only terms to the surrender were to respect life, and it was for this reason that I
seized all the money they [i.e. the friars,—D.C.W.] had hidden away, which was accomplished by applying the stick. In this
capital I found thirty-four thousand dollars in silver and a draft on the Compañia General de Tabacos for twenty thousand
dollars which can be collected here...

“The bearer can give you more details concerning the abuses committed in this province of Vizcayana by the forces of
Mayor Duflin Esquizel. Also, I wish to inform you that we have done nothing to the Compañia General de Tabacos, for we
have learned from their records that much of their stock is held by Frenchmen, and consequently we fear a conflict. For this
reason we await your orders on this matter. We took all the arms we found in their possession, however.”—P.I.R., 271.2.
22 P.I.R. 192.4.
23 “I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor Taft in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly
would not have occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then existing, just like this, all over Luzon
and the Visayan Islands.”—Blount, p. 116.

24 “On account of this the vulgar people doubted the legality of our actions in the collection of taxes, and accordingly it
became difficult; and this, coupled with the inveterate abuses of the heads of the towns, which the head of the province was
not able to perceive in time to check, caused a tumult in Echague, which, owing to wise councils and efforts at pacification,
was appeased without it being followed by serious consequences; but I have no doubt that this tumult was due only to the
suggestions of ungovernable and passionate persons animated by the spirit of faction, since those who took part in it were
all Ilocanos, no native of Echague having any hand in it. The same thing occurred in Naguilian, where the disorders were

also quieted. Not only did I make no report of all this to the government of the republic on account of the abnormality of
the present conditions, but I also succeeded in concealing them from the foreigners here so that they should not succeed in
discovering the truth, which would be to the prejudice of our cause.”—Taylor, 42 AJ.
25 “I may add that as judge of that district in 1901–2 there came before me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact
would be brought out of this or that difference among the local authorities having been referred to the Malolos Government
for settlement. And they always awaited until they heard from it,”—Blount, p 112.
26 “General Otis’s reports are full of the most inexcusable blounders about how ‘the Tagals’ took possession of the
various provinces and just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent up to Vermont in the days of the American
Revolution to help organize the resistance there, in conjunction with one of the local leaders of the patriot cause in the
Green Mountain State.”—Blount, p. 112.

27 Blount, p. 114.
28 Taylor, 42 AJ.

Chapter VII

Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere
Referring to the conditions alleged to have been found by Sargent and Wilcox in the
Cagayan valley, Blount says:—

“Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through the provinces of southern Luzón about
this same time, under similar friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and misery, in the
name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now know, have found similar conditions.”1

So far as concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Palawan, and the great island of Mindanao,
he dodges the issue, alleging the unimportance of Mindoro and Palawan, and claiming that
“Mohammedan Mindanao” presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities he hides
the truth as to what happened in these regions.

I agree with him that there was essential identity between actual conditions in the Cagayan
valley and those which prevailed under Insurgent rule elsewhere in Luzón and in the
Visayas. I will go further and say that conditions in the Cagayan valley did not differ
essentially from those which prevailed throughout all portions of the archipelago which fell
under Insurgent control, except that in several provinces captured friars and other Spaniards
were quickly murdered whereas in the Cagayan valley no friar was quite killed outright by
torture. Those who ultimately died of their injuries lived for some time.

Let us now consider some of the actual occurrences in these other provinces, continuing to
follow the route of our tourists until it brings us back to Manila.

South Ilocos

The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent after leaving Aparri was South
Ilocos. The conditions which had prevailed at Vigan, the capital of the province, shortly
before their arrival, are described in a letter signed “Mariano” and addressed under date of
September 25, 1898, to Señor Don Mena Crisólogo, from which I quote extracts:—

“Dear Mena: I read with a happy heart your letter of the 3rd instant, and in answer I have to say:—

“On the 22nd of August a mass meeting was held for the election of the local presidente of this town, and I was
elected to the office; and on the 1st instant the Colonel appointed me Provisional Provincial President of this
province, so that you can imagine the position I am in and the responsibilities which weigh on me.

“Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact that it is not rented.

“I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests who escaped from here have not as yet been
returned, but it is known that they are prisoners in Cagayan, and as soon as they arrive here I will treat them as
they deserve.

“It is with great regret that I have to relate the events and misfortunes which we have been suffering here since
the arrival of the troops, as all the detachments are supported by the towns, and here in the capital where the
commissary is established, our resources are exhausted, owing to the unreasonable demands of the commissary,
because he never asks what is only just and necessary, but if he needs provisions for 200 men, he always asks
enough for 1000. And notwithstanding this, the most lamentable and sad occurrences are taking place almost
daily in the different barrios, and often in the town itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and disorderly
acts, such as rapes and murders, which usually remain unpunished by reason of the real authors thereof not
being found, and when they are found and reported to their commanders, the latter do nothing. One night the
house and estate of Sario Tinon in Anannam was sacked by six armed men, who threatened him and took his
money, his wife’s jewels and the best horses he had. Thank God that his family was at the time in the capital,
and it appears that now the authors of this act are being discovered.

Building the Benguet Road

In this, as in many other places, it proved necessary to blast the road out of
the solid rock.

“I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to have the forces stationed here replaced by our
volunteers which I am recruiting, in order to prevent in so far as possible the frequent acts of barbarity which
the former are committing in the province.

“When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made to publish the following proclamation:—

“‘Proclamation.—We, the friars, declare that all the acts committed by us against the honest Filipinos when we
discharged our respective offices, were false and in contravention of the rights of the Holy Church, because we
only wished to deceive and prejudice the honest inhabitants of the Philippines; for which reason we now suffer
what we are suffering, as you see, according to the old adage that “he who owes must pay.” And now we
inform all you honest Filipinos that we repent for the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of the
laws and good customs, and ask your pardon.—Vigan, September 13, 1898.’

“All of which I communicate to you in order that you may form an idea of what is taking place here, and take
such steps as may be proper for the common good, and especially for the good of this town, hoping that with
the aid of your valuable protection the abuses and disorders suffered by the residents will be stopped.”2

The province of Abra, now a subprovince of South Ilocos, was evidently no exception to the
general rule, for there is on file a letter to Aguinaldo with twenty-six signatures, protesting
bitterly against the oppression of the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute war
taxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered ostensibly for the soldiers, and
stating that the petitioners will be obliged to take refuge with the Igorots and Negritos, if not
granted relief.3

Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898, the “Director of Diplomacy”
telegraphed to Aguinaldo concerning it, saying:—

“Most urgent. The discontent in the provinces of Pangasinán, Tarlac and Yloco (Ilocos) is increasing. The town
of Bangbang rose in revolt the 25th and 26th of this month, and killed all of the civil officials. It is impossible
to describe the abuses committed by the military and civil authorities of the said provinces. I urge you to send a
force of 100 men and a diplomatic officer to reëstablish order. The matter is urgent.”4

I find nothing important in the Insurgent records concerning conditions in La Union at this
time. Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan, which were now revisited by our tourists,
have already been discussed.

The Province of Manila

Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from Manila City, left much to be desired.

Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the territory adjacent to the city and bay of
Manila in a cablegram to Washington dated October 14, 1898, which reads as follows:—

“It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands should be decided as soon as possible. . . . General
anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives appear unable to govern.”5

Of it Blount says:—

“In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true some wild rumours then currently accepted
by the Europeans and Americans at Manila which, of course, were impossible of verification. I say
‘unfortunately’ with some earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his message that they were
mere rumours. And, that they were wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared up in previous
chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order, and tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzón at that time
has been, it is believed, put beyond all doubt.”6

Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the admiral himself was in Manila Bay
and in Manila City at the time he sent this cablegram. The statements in question were not
rumours, they were deliberate expressions of opinion on the part of a man who had first-
hand information and knew what he was saying.

They were not the Admiral’s only allegations on this subject. When testifying before the
Senate committee he said:—

“Admiral Dewey. I knew that there was no government in the whole of the Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed
the only government there was, and there was no other government; there was a reign of terror throughout the
Philippines, looting, robbing, murdering; a reign of terror throughout the islands.”

La Laguna

Having brought our tourist friends safely back to Manila, we must now leave them there and
strike out by ourselves if we are to see other provinces.

La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that:

“Laguna Province was so overrun by bands of robbers that the head of the pueblo of San Pablo ordered the
people to concentrate in the town to avoid their attacks.”7

Bataan

The province of Bataan lies just across the bay from Manila.

“On January 10, 1899, the secretary of the interior directed the governor of Bataan Province to ascertain the
whereabouts of a number of men who had just deserted with their rifles from the commands there. He was to

appeal to their patriotism and tell them that if they would but return to their companies their complaints would
be attended to and they would be pardoned.”8

Zambales

Zambales joins Bataan on the west and north. On November 13, 1898, Wenceslao Vinvegra
wrote to Aguinaldo describing the state of affairs in this province. From his letter we learn
that two brothers named Teodoro and Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and
brigadier general respectively, who are charged with abandonment of their posts in the field,
disobedience and attempts against the union of the Insurgents, had been committing all
manner of abuses. They had organized a band of cut-throats, armed with rifles and bolos,
and were terrorizing the towns, committing robberies and murders and ordering that money
be furnished for themselves and food for their men.

They were also encouraging the people to disobey the local authorities and refuse to pay
taxes, and were promulgating a theory, popular with the masses, that the time had come for
the rich to be poor and the poor rich.

They had furthermore induced regular Insurgent troops to rise up in arms.9

From this communication it would appear that the Insurgent government had not been
entirely effective in Zambales up to November 13th, 1898.

From other communications we learn that the soldiers at Alaminos were about to desert on
November 30th, 1898;10 that it was deemed necessary to restrict travel between Tarlac,
Pampanga, Bataan and Zambales in order to prevent robberies;11 and that on January 9,
1899, the governor of the province found it impossible to continue the inspection of a
number of towns, as many of their officials had fled to escape the abuses of the military.12
Conditions were obviously very serious in Zambales at this time.

Cavite

Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila province as the latter was then constituted.
On August 24, 1898, the secretary of war wired Aguinaldo that two drunken Americans had
been killed by Insurgent soldiers.13 On the same day General Anderson advised the governor
of Cavite that one American soldier had been killed and three wounded by his people, and
demanded his immediate withdrawal, with his guard, from the town.14 The governor asked

Aguinaldo for instructions. Aguinaldo replied instructing the governor to deny that the
American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to claim that he had met death at the
hands of his own companions. The governor was further directed to give up his life before
leaving the place.15

In view of the definite statement from one of his own officers that the soldier in question
was killed by Filipino soldiers, Aguinaldo’s instructions to say that he was killed by
Americans are interesting as showing his methods.

Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to control their own soldiers in Cavite town
sufficiently to prevent them from committing murder, but conditions in the province of the
same name left much to be desired. On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo
that the town of Marigondong had risen in arms.16

It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed in Cavite. Of this matter Taylor
says:—

“In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of the other provinces, one of the first acts of the
insurgents who gathered about Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land titles which had been recorded and filed in
the Spanish administrative bureaus. In case the independence of the Philippines was won, the land of the friars,
the land of the Spaniards and of those who still stood by Spain, would be in the gift of Aguinaldo or of any
strong man who could impose his will upon the people. And the men who joined this leader would be rich in
the chief riches of the country, and those who refused to do so would be ruined men.”17

Sorsogón
“The native civil officials who took charge of the government of Sorsogón Province when the Spaniards
abandoned it did not think it worth while to hoist the insurgent flag until a force of four companies arrived
there to take station early in November, 1898. The officer in command promptly ordered the Chinamen in the
town of Sorsogón, who are prosperous people, to contribute to the support of his troops. They at once gave him
cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10,000 pesos. This was not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen. Ignacio
Paua, who seems to have been the insurgent agent in dealing with the Chinese, complained that the troops in
Sorsogón were pillaging the Chinamen there. They had killed 13, wounded 19, and ruined a number of
others.”18

In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that it was very difficult to collect taxes
as every one was taking what he could lay his hands on.19

Ambos Camarines

On September 18, 1898, Elias Angeles, a corporal of the guardia civil, headed an uprising
against the Spaniards. The Spanish officer in command, and all of his family, were killed by
shooting up through the floor of the room which they occupied. Angeles then assumed the
title of Politico-Military-Governor.

When the Tagálog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way to Samar, he ordered Angeles to meet
him at Magarao, with all his troops and arms, disarmed the troops, giving their rifles to his
own followers, marched into Nueva Caceres and took possession of the entire government.
Aguinaldo subsequently made Lucban a general, and sent him on his way to Samar.

Lucban was succeeded by another Tagálog, “General” Guevara, a very ignorant man, who
displayed special ability in making collections, and is reported to have kept a large part of
the funds which came into his possession.

Colonel Peña, who called himself “General,” was one of the worst of the Tagálog invaders,
for they were practically that. He threatened all who opposed him with death, and summarily
shot at least one man in Tigaon. That town subsequently rose against him, and he was badly
cut up by the Bicols.20 On getting out of the hospital he was sent away.

The daughters of prominent families suffered at the hands of these villains. Peña abducted
one, a son of Guevara another. Her brother followed young Guevara and killed him. If girls
of the best families were so treated, how must those of the common people have fared?

Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and Chinese at Minalabag. Some forty-eight
Spaniards were murdered.

Freight Autos on the Benguet Road

This road has been correctly described as “an automobile boulevard,” but the autos in use on it are not all pleasure
machines.

Many Chinese were killed at Pasacao; about thirty at Libmanan by order of Vicente Ursua a
Tagálog; more than twenty at Calabanga.

Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa Ana gathered around him all Bicols
who were willing to fight the Tag£logs, but the troubles were finally patched up.

American troops had little difficulty in occupying Ambos Camarines and other Bicol
provinces, owing to the hatred in which the Tagálogs were held.

Mindoro

Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be inferred from the fact that it became
necessary for its governor to issue a decree on November 10, 1898, which contained the
following provisions among others:—

“2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit any one belonging to their jurisdiction to pass from
one pueblo to another nor to another province without the corresponding pass, with a certificate upon its back
that the taxes of its holder have been paid.

“3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to absent himself from his pueblo without previously
informing its head who will give him an authorization on which will be noted the approval of the presidente of
the pueblo....

“5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or province in any pueblo of this province will immediately
present themselves before the presidente of said pueblo with their passes. He will without charge, stamp them
with his official seal.”21

These are peculiar regulations for a province which is at peace, and as Major Taylor has
truly remarked:—

“The form of liberty contemplated by the founders of the Philippine Republic was not considered incompatible
with a very considerable absence of personal freedom.”22

Later, when travelling through Mindoro, I was told how an unfortunate legless Spaniard,
who had been running a small shop in one of the towns and who was on good terms with his
Filipino neighbors, was carried out into the plaza, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces
with bolos in the presence of his wife and children who were compelled to witness the
horrible spectacle!

On this same trip Captain R.G. Offley, then the American Governor of Mindoro, told me
while I was at Pinamalayan that the people there were greatly alarmed because a murderer,
liberated under the amnesty, had returned and was prowling about in that vicinity. This man
had a rather unique record. He had captured one of his enemies, and after stripping him
completely had caused the top of an immense ant-hill to be dug off. The unfortunate victim
was then tied, laid on it, and the earth and ants which had been removed were shovelled
back over his body until only his head projected. The ants did the rest! Another rather
unusual achievement of this interesting individual was to tie the feet of one of his enemies to
a tree, fasten a rope around his neck, hitch a carabao to the rope, and start up the carabao,
thus pulling off the head of his victim. Yet this man and others like him were set at liberty
under the amnesty proclamation, in spite of the vigorous protests of the Philippine
Commission, who thought that murderers of this type ought to be hanged.

And now I wish to discuss briefly an interesting and highly characteristic statement of Judge
Blount. In referring to conditions in the Visayan Islands, he says:—

“Of course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzón goes, so go the rest. The rest of the
archipelago is but the tail to the Luzón kite. Luzón contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out there, and
Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French and to France. Luzón is about the size of Ohio, and
the other six islands that really matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode Islands, and in population
mere Arizonas or New Mexicos.”23

This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that the statements of this author will not
bear analysis. One of the other six islands that he says really matters is Samar. Its area is
5031 square miles. The area of Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest of the six
islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square miles. It cannot be called a little Rhode
Island.

As regards population, Arizona has 122,931. It is hardly proper to call either Panay with a
population of 743,646, Cebu with 592,247, Negros with 460,776, Leyte with 357,641, Bohol
with 243,148 or even Samar with only 222,690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with
195,310 is also a bit behind.

Luzón really has an area of 40,969 square miles and a population of 3,798,507.24 What
Blount is pleased to call “the tail to the Luzón kite,” is made up as follows:—

Island Area (Square Miles) Population
Samar 5,031 222,690
Negros 4,881 460,776
Panay 4,611 743,646
Leyte 2,722 357,641
Cebu 1,762 592,247
Bohol 1,411 243,148
Totals 20,419 2,620,148

Even so, the tail is a trifle long and heavy for the kite, but if we are going to compare Luzón
with “the Southern Islands,” by which Blount can presumably only mean the rest of the
archipelago, why not really do it? The process involves nothing more complicated than the
subtraction of its area and population from those of the archipelago as a whole.

Area (Square Miles) Population
Philippines 115,026 7,635,426
Luzón 40,969 3,798,507
Difference 74,057 3,836,919

Performing this operation, we discover that the tail would fly away with the kite, as Luzón
has less than half of the total population and only a little more than a third of the total area.

To compare the area or the population of one large island with those of individual small
ones, in determining the relative importance of the former in the country of which it makes
up a part, is like comparing the area and population of a great state with those of the
individual counties going to make up other states.

Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in trying to show the insignificance of
Mindoro and Palawan. There are an island of Mindoro and a province of Mindoro; an island
of Palawan and a province of Palawan. In each case the province, which includes numerous
small islands, as well as the large one from which it takes its name, is much larger and more
populous than is the main island, and obviously it is the province with which we are
concerned.

Even if Blount wished to limit discussion to the Christian natives commonly called
Filipinos, his procedure is still wholly unfair. Of these there are 3,575,001 in Luzón and
3,412,685 in the other islands. In other words, the Filipino population is almost equally
divided between the two regions.

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss the conditions which arose in Mindanao
under Insurgent rule, he attempts to show that no political importance attaches to them. In
the passage above quoted he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Palawan
(Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to justify his action by making the following
statements:—

“The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141 islands to eleven, the last three25 of the
nine contained in the above table may also be eliminated as follows:26—

“Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzón, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east
of Greenwich, is thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part of its area, has a reputation
of being very unhealthy (malarious), is also very sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any
figure politically as a disturbing factor.”27

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved in the government of the important
islands which Blount would thus leave out of consideration, is not solved by ignoring it,
certain of his further statements cannot be allowed to go uncorrected.

The allegation that the island has never “cut any figure politically as a disturbing factor” is
absurd. In the Spanish days its forests furnished a safe refuge for evildoers who were from
time to time driven out of Cavite and Batangas. A large proportion of its Filipino inhabitants
were criminals who not infrequently organized regular piratical expeditions and raided
towns in Masbate, Romblon and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and Calamianes groups
lived in constant terror of the Mindoro pirates, and tulisanes,28 who paid them frequent
visits. I myself have been at Calapan, the capital of the province, when the Spanish officials
did not dare to go without armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear of being
captured and held for ransom. During considerable periods they did not really pretend to
exercise control over the criminal Filipinos inhabiting the west coast of the island.
Conditions as to public order were worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the archipelago
north of Mindanao and Joló.

No less absurd are Blount’s suggestions as to the general worthlessness of the island. There
are high mountains in its interior, and there are great stretches of the most fertile land in the
world along its coast. Its northern and eastern portions have a very heavy and evenly
distributed rainfall, and are admirably suited to the growing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao,
rubber and similar tropical products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully without
irrigation. There was a time in the past when Mindoro was known as “the granary of the
Philippines.” Later its population was decimated by constant Moro attacks, and cattle
disease destroyed its draft animals, with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned
to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, from which, however, it is easy to
redeem them. The west coast has strongly marked wet and dry seasons similar to those at
Manila. There is abundant water available for irrigation, furnished by streams which never
run dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of sugar in large quantity. The
forests, which now cover extensive areas, abound in fine woods, and produce rubber and
other valuable gums. There are outcroppings of lignite at numerous points on the island, and
in the vicinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet discovered in this part of the
world. Gold is also present in some quantity at various places. In short, Mindoro is naturally
one of the richest islands in the Archipelago. If its tillable lands were under high cultivation,
it would support half the population of the Philippines.

Palawan

In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without political importance Blount has followed
precisely the procedure which he adopted in the case of Mindoro. First, he gives the area and

the population of the island, when he should concern himself with the province. The area of
the island is 4027 square miles; that of the province, 5238 square miles. According to the
1903 census, the population of the island was 10,918, while that of the province, which
contains such thickly settled and fertile islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39,582. Of course,
if one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, it is more convenient to take the
figures for the island.

Blount says:—

“Paragua,29 the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of any map of the archipelago, extending
northeast-southwest at an angle of about 45°, is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much except a penal
colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used.”30

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even if we limit our consideration to the
island of Palawan. Only 159 of its 4027 square miles are utilized for a penal colony. Its
natural wealth is simply enormous. It is covered throughout the greater part of its extent with
virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the best timber. Damar, a very valuable
varnish gum, is abundant in its mountains. Much of the so-called “Singapore cane,” so
highly prized by makers of rattan and wicker furniture, comes from its west coast. It is a
well-watered island, and its level plains, which receive the wash from its heavily forested
mountains, have a soil of unsurpassed fertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five
years or even less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island lies south of the typhoon belt.
Malampaya Sound, situated near its northwestern extremity, is one of the world’s great
harbors. But should we wish to rid ourselves of this wonderful island, I may say, without
violating any official confidences, that there was a time when Germany would have been
more than pleased to take it off our hands; and indeed our British friends, who were
sufficiently interested in it to survey it some decades ago, might possibly be prevailed upon
to accept it!

There are good reasons why Blount thought it convenient to make it appear that Palawan
was politically unimportant. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with Spain the Filipino
garrison at Puerto Princesa mutinied, and the things which they did were not nice. Among
others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being at the time a penal colony, and the
latter, together with some of the soldiers, started up the east coast of the island, leaving a
trail of devastation in their wake. The prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they
approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them that it has never since been
reoccupied except by a few stragglers. Other towns, including Tay-Tay, were raided.

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo’s representative in this province wrote him that the
inhabitants were preparing to kill all the Tagálogs and revolt against Insurgent rule.31 Later
when some of the latter were anxious to get the people of one of the northern settlements to
take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans consented to give them a lift only on
condition that they first allow themselves to be bound, and then took them out to sea and
threw them overboard.

The Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet Road

Another thing which Blount would have found it inconvenient to discuss is the conduct of
the people of Cuyo, at one time the capital of the province. On this island, which contains
but twenty-one square miles, there were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated
and feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers to Iloilo, after the Americans had
occupied that place, to beg for a garrison of American troops, and to say that if furnished
with an American flag they themselves would defend it. For some reason they were not
given the flag, and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having grown weary of
waiting, they made an American flag of their own, hoisted it, and when the Insurgents from
Mindoro came intrenched themselves and defended it. They were actually being besieged
when the American garrison finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with the
theory that the Filipino people were a unit at Aguinaldo’s back, and of course the easiest way
to get around such an occurrence is to forget to mention it!

Mindanao

And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, which all but equals Luzón in size,
having an area of 36,292 square miles as against the 40,969 of Luzón. Blount’s first mention
of it is peculiar.

In connection with the words “the other six islands that really matter,” in the passage above
cited on page 116 of his book, he has inserted a foot-note reading as follows:—

“The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealt with in this book as a separate and
distinct problem.”32

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this great island, which is a little continent by
itself, quite so cavalierly and I will quote the more important of his further and later
statements regarding it:—

“While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its 36,000 square miles of area, requires
that the Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more than one thousand miles from north to
south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains about 500,000 people all told, half of them semi-civilized, the
governmental problem it presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether, if ever, we are to grant
independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of the other islands, than the questions that have to be passed on by
our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff. Mindanao’s 36,000 square miles constitute
nearly a third of the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that fraction of the 97,500 square
miles of territory to a consideration of which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination above
indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized Moros would indeed be ‘like
granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief,’ as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign
of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to grant self-government to Luzón under Aguinaldo. Furthermore, the
Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects of,
some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have no moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they
would, the latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by
the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed principles has not a leg to
stand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it, we have a distinct separate
problem, which cannot be solved in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not in
the least delay the advent of independence for the other fourteen fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago
—all Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is true that there are some Christian Filipinos on
Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our government would of course protect them from the Moros. If they
did not like our government, they could move to such parts of the islands as we might permit to be
incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan
island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo (the ‘Sulu archipelago,’ so called, ‘reigned over’ by the
sultan of comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always present, a distinct and separate problem,
and never did have anything more to do with the Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins and co-
religionists over in near-by Borneo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the
suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant practically the subjugation of one big island, Luzón,
containing half the population and one third of the total area of the archipelago, and six neighbouring small
ones, the Visayan Islands.”33

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means Mohammedan. The Mohammedan
Malays, called Moros, are found here and there along the western coast of the Zamboanga
peninsula and along the southern coast of the island as far as Davao. They also extend far up
the Cotabato River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that is all. The interior of the
island is for the most part occupied by the members of a number of non-Christian, non-
Mohammedan tribes, while its northern and eastern coasts are inhabited by Visayan
Filipinos, of whom there are many in Zamboanga itself.

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the insurrection against the United States,
the Visayans of Mindanao did, and we had some lively tussles with them in Misamis and in
Surigao.

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao over to the Moros. Abandonment of it
by us would in the end result in this, as they would take possession of the entire island in the
course of time. Neither the other wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand against them. I
heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retain this island for many years before we
can settle the problems which it presents. It is further true that we might retain it and still
grant independence to the remainder of the Philippine Archipelago, but if we are to eliminate
Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos have no right to control the Moros, of
whom there are in reality only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand34 on the island, and
could not if they would, what about Luzón, where there are in reality no less than four
hundred and sixty thousand non-Christians,35 many of whom, like the Ifugaos, Bontoc
Igorots, Kalingas and wild Tingians, are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are
bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by Filipinos, while most of
them welcome American rule?

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control them than they have to control the
Moros? Could they control them if they would? And has the most uncompromising advocate
of the consent of the governed principle “a leg to stand on” in the one case if he lacks it in
the other?

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that Filipinos could not satisfactorily govern
Moros and have even alleged that they did so govern them during the period now under
discussion. Let us examine the facts.

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with the Sultan of Joló, addressing him as his
“great and powerful brother,”36 but this brother does not seem to have received his advances
with enthusiasm, and the other brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at the first
opportunity.

José Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of conditions in the province of
Misamis says:37—

“Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 28th of last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans
of the interior, our mortal enemies since times immemorial on account of their religious fanaticism which they
carry to extremes, as do their co-religionists in Europe and Asia, and on account of their objection to leading a
civilized life, began to harry the town of Iligan which is the nearest town to the lake around which is the
densest Moro population. Due to the prestige of the local president of that town, Señor Carloto Sariol, and the
energy that he showed, after some days of constant firing against groups who descended upon the suburbs of
the town, he was successful in having them abandon their hostile attitude and promise to live in peace and
harmony with said towns, this verbal agreement being participated in by the Dattos of some settlements who
did not wish to treat with the Spanish Government.

“Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know by experience that the more friendly they appear,
the more we must watch against them, because as soon as they find a good opportunity they do not fail to take
advantage of it to enter the towns for the purpose of sacking them and kidnapping as many of their inhabitants
as possible in order to reduce them to slavery.”

Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards the Filipino residents set
up a government there. A few days later the Moro datos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan,
dropped in with their followers, cut off the head of the Filipino presidente, served a few
other leading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded to set up a
government of their own which was the only government that the place had prior to the
arrival of the American troops.

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place to be stripped and
compelled to march before him on the public plaza in a state of nudity.

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time after the Spaniards left had
they desired to do so. On the arrival of the Americans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn
it over to them, but his proposition was declined.

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions under Insurgent rule. It reads as
follows:—

“We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during the revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899,
when for seven or eight months there was in existence the so-called Filipino Republic. During that time there
was much robbing and killing; the life of a man was worth no more than that of a chicken; men killed one
another for personal gain; enemies fought one another with the bolo instead of settling their differences before
the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror. There was no justice. Because of this the Moros were opposed to
the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better class of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained
control of the local government.”38

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who did not promptly make their
escape were murdered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the lamb lay down together, with
the lamb inside as usual.

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinos to govern Moros did not result
in complete success.

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communication with the Sultan of
Joló, authorizing him to establish in all the rancherias of Mindanao and Joló a government
in accordance with a decree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result
of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms, and was advised that, “if
in this war, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence and with the
opposition of our brothers in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful in
preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country will always render a
tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory.”39 Curiously, the Sultan seems to have
remained unmoved by the appeal.

Masbate

This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayan population of 29,451. Its
people are all Filipinos, and are on the whole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set.
There is no reason why it should have been excluded in considering “the human problem in
its broader governmental aspect,” whatever that may be, nor can I understand why Blount
should have desired to exclude it except that he seems to have been endeavouring to exclude
everything possible outside of Luzón, in order to increase the apparent importance of the
Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be taken into account in
connection with the Visayan Islands, of which it is one.

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as “The Visayas” from the ancient tribal
name of the civilized Filipino people who inhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar,
Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebú, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor and
numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although their inhabitants are all rated as
one people, they speak a number of more or less distinct dialects. Only Panay, Negros,
Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan have non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last
named their number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panay and Negros,
however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers, as are the representatives of a
tribe sometimes called Monteses40 and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I
have thought it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao.

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldo was established at
various places and different times, without consulting or considering the will of the people.
The men who went as his delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authority
was not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings which might easily have grown
into a war cry.

The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in the following extract from a
letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabini discussed the advisability of putting the
constitution in force:—

“And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and Iloílo will form a federal Republic and not one in
conformity with the centralized Republic provided for by the Constitution.”41

The action later taken by Negros shows that there was abundant reason for this fear.

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was still ignorant as to the real
conditions in Negros and Mindanao.42

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, we learn that Aguinaldo
and his followers were even then still uninformed as to events in the Visayan Islands.43 In
view of these facts, how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that the
Malolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And what shall we say of the
following statement, remembering that the Treaty of Paris was signed December 10, 1899?

“When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than
twenty thousand men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all of the rest of the
archipelago with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, and the whole
Filipino population were in sympathy with the army of their country.”44

Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by the use of armed emissaries, the Visayan
Islands, with the exception of Negros, were brought into the Insurgent fold.

A Typical Baguio Road

The roads in Baguio were originally built with money obtained from the sale of lots. Some insular government funds
have been expended in surfacing them.

Mabini’s fear that Negros and Iloilo would form a federal republic was not realized, but
Negros set up its own government, applied to the local commander of the United States
forces for help, endeavoured with almost complete success to keep out Tagálog invaders,
and presently settled down contentedly under American rule, facts of which Blount makes
no mention. On the contrary, without just cause, he includes this great island, with its 4881
square miles of territory and its 560,776 inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that
Aguinaldo exercised complete control.

At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition when they planned to land.
Negotiations had been entered into with the local Filipino officers, but the latter, under the
influence of representatives whom Aguinaldo had sent from Luzón, announced themselves
as adherents of his government, and when the American troops finally disembarked fired the
town ahead of them. It has been claimed that in doing this they were inspired by pure
patriotism, but the facts shown by their own records present a very different picture.

In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says:

“We have received a communication forwarded from Iloílo, from General Martin Delgado and Francisco
Soriano, your commissioner. Soriano states that the troops of Diocno have done nothing except commit
excesses and steal money during the attack by the Americans upon the town of Iloílo, even going so far as to
break their guns by using them as poles to carry the stolen money which they took to Cápiz. It is said that these
forces, besides being unwilling to fight the Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to fight
and do not want Cápiz to aid the people of Iloílo, who are the ones who support the entire forces, including the
troops of Diocno who went there.”45

This same letter contains the following brief reference to conditions in Cebu and Leyte:—

“Also a native priest, Señor Pascual Reyes, has arrived here from Cebú, and says that in Leyte General Lucban
is committing many abuses and that Colonel Mójica is only a mere figurehead. In Cebú, he says, things are also
in a chaotic condition, because the military chief, Magsilum [Maxilom,—TR.], and the people are not in
harmony.”

Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a letter to Aguinaldo from the
commissioner whom he put in charge of elections in that island, who on February 19, 1899,
writes:46—

“Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I left on the 11th for the northern pueblos of this Island
to hold the elections for the offices ordered by the Superior Decree of June 18, last.

“The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos I visited later I found that almost all of the
residents were in their homes, so that when the elections were held in the town hall, all the principal residents
attended, requesting me to inform you that they were disposed to sacrifice even their dearest affections
whenever necessary for our sacred cause; they only asked me to inform those who hold the reins of
government at the present time in this province, that some steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts
which had been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains, Majors, Colonels, Generals and
Captains General, who abusing in the most barefaced manner the positions they claimed to hold, were
depriving them of their horses and their carabaos, or cattle. I promised them that I would do this, as I do now,
by sending a communication at once to Sres. Flores and Maxilom, who are at the head of the provincial
government, impressing upon them the fact that if they continue to grant ranks and titles to persons of this
character, as they have done, it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province.”

He adds that these men did not remedy the evils complained of. It would be possible to
cover in detail all of this and the remaining Insurgent territory, and to show that Judge
Blount was quite right in stating that conditions similar to those encountered in Luzón arose
there, but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must ask my readers to accept on
faith the statements of Blount and myself that such was the case!

Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately arose:—

“The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they would have lived in a conquered country. They were
quartered on the towns and the towns had to feed them whether they would or not.

“Peace there was where Aguinaldo’s soldiers had not penetrated, but there does not seem to have been
progress. Life went very well in a long siesta in the shady villages under the palm trees, but not only the
structure of the State, its very foundations were falling apart. When Aguinaldo’s soldiers came they brought

cruelty and license with them. Proud of their victories and confident in themselves they felt that the labourers
in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for the purpose of administering to their necessities and their
desires. Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him, was forced to entreat it, to appeal to it; he was
never strong enough to enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it.”

Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over his inability to maintain a decent state
of public order in the territory which he claimed to govern, and in December, 1898, tendered
his resignation, giving among other reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of the
military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich themselves by improper means, such as
accepting bribes, making prisoners a source of gain, and decreasing the allowance of the
soldiers. He said that many soldiers had received sums of money as their share of booty, and
intimated that officers must have done the same. He made charges against civil as well as
military officers and ended by saying that he retained the evidence for presentation when
called on.47

Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resignation. No wonder that he wished to
tender it!

In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount has said:—

“This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under date of November 23, 1898, and by him
forwarded to the Navy Department for its information, with the comment that it ‘in my opinion contains the
most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon
Island.’ The Admiral’s indorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report.”48

He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral believed that the report truthfully set forth
the conditions which actually existed in these provinces, and that his indorsement was
suppressed. Not only was it true that this report when rendered contained the most complete
and reliable information then available in regard to the existing state of the northern part of
Luzon Island, but it contained the only first-hand information available. The facts ultimately
leaked out and led the admiral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions which
arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later said:—

“There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for the first time
in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to
my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he
would.”

I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of these statements. Blount was thoroughly
familiar with Dewey’s testimony before the Senate Committee, in which they occur, but he
did not mention them.

I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without quoting extracts from a remarkable
document written by Isabelo Artacho in October,49 1899. It was entitled “Declaration Letter
and Proclamation” and was addressed to the Filipino people. While it is probable that

Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred for Aguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and
his rank and standing entitle his statements to consideration:—

“Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said, the faithful interpretation of your wishes and desires.

“Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever you see an insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls
and faithful wives violated, parents and brothers crying for the murder of a son or of a brother; honest families
robbed and in misery; villages burned and plundered for the benefit of a chief or a General; you will see fresh
and living signs yet of those horrible crimes perpetrated with the greatest cynicism by those who call
themselves your liberators! Liberators because they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hats a piece
of red cloth or a triangular figure!

“Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of the village, simply for having implored mercy for a
creature arbitrarily inflicted with the cepo [an oblong square piece of heavy wood divided into two parts, with a
lock at each end and six or more holes in the middle to confine the feet of prisoners]; there, a dying man,
suspended by the feet in a cepo, raised from the level of the ground, by another president who has charged him
with an unproved crime; there a poor woman falsely charged and driven by petty officers with their bayonets
for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop, they being supposed to be, each, Justice itself,
‘Justicia,’ and to be obeyed as images of the Gods; there, generals who murder without fear, for an
insignificant motive, creatures whose members are being mutilated, or their flesh cut in slices and afterwards
roasted and given them to eat; there, officers braining a girl who has refused to accede to their sensual wishes,
the lifeless body of the victim, pierced with shots, after having been made use of, is thrown into the river. It is
not unusual to witness officers burying people alive in a tomb prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer;
it is not unusual to see a Puisne-Judge pointing a revolver at a man who is about to give evidence, and
threatening to brain him for having dared to ask: ‘Why and to whom am I to declare?’ And finally, on his
tottering throne, you will see the Magistrate of the Philippines, so called by his worshippers, with his
mephistophelian smile, disposing and directing the execution of a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, or the
execution of some other crimes against those who are indifferent or do not care to worship him, such
indifference being considered a crime.

“Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention that one recently committed on the person of the
renowned and by many called the worthy General, Antonio Luna, which took place just at the entrance of the
palace of the Republic Presidency, and also the assassination at Kavite of the ever remembered martyr, Andrés
Bonifacio, the founder of the ‘Katipúnan’ Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution of 1896; against
the memory of whom it has been committed, in the proclamation of that falsely called Republic, the criminal
and unjust omission to render the smallest manifestation of Filipinos’ feelings towards him, to prevent that
same might dislike his murderers!

“Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called democratic Government of the Republic, that grand
work of the wise Filipinos; admire with me that beautiful monument erected on a sheet of paper and
consecrated to the conquest of reason and labour, especially in connection with human rights and property, the
basis for the well-being of social life; but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity when brought to
practice and you will again see that the laws were made for the people and not the people for the laws!

“Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think, to wish, to say, anything which does not agree
with what the said Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing is attended to, whilst those who have your
lives in their hands must be respected.

“Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice taken of family, property, morality and justice, but
confusion and disorder appear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, produced by the ignorance of the
subordinate officers, and of the powers that be in the villages and provinces, who are supported by a special
committee, or special commissioners empowered to impoverish and to ruin all and with the right of disposing,
at their own accord, life, family and individual property without responsibility whatsoever on their part.

“Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern Islands of Joló, Mindanao, Iloílo, Negros, Cebú and
others where now the American flag is hoisted and under whose shadow tranquillity and well-being are

experienced, speak for itself.

“Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the whole people of Imus, who were asking protection
when the American troops took possession of the town of Bacoor, whilst the insurgent troops there located
were hostile.

“Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the war made by the numerous persons of S. Francisco de
Malabón, Sta. Cruz de Malabón, Perez Dasmariñias and other towns, before the Worthy Chief Mariano Trías,
who ultimately refused, with dignity, the high position of Secretary of War, for which rank he was promoted for
reasons which are not worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the non-resistance shown by the
people of Old Kavite [Kawit], Noveleta, and Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, notwithstanding the
many intrenchments and troops there located, as well as the identical behaviour observed by other towns of
Luzon provinces who are ready to follow when the American troops are in them.

“In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people are tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino
will shake a napkin to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and lightning and troops of dangerous insects;
that day in which they will witness the realization of that famous telegraphed dream to the effect that two hours
after the commencement of the war the insurgents will take their breakfast in the Palace of ‘Malacañang,’ their
tiffin in the Senate House, and their dinner on board the Olympia or in Kavite; that day in which the celebrated
Pequenines army, with their invisible Chief-leader, will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls
of dust and sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has caused the smallpox to the Americans; that day
in which the Colorum army will capture the American fleet with the cords their troops are provided with, in
combination with a grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of husks of paddy, by a Nazarene, who will then, by
merely touching, convert each husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in which the insurgents, like their
leaders, provided with hosts of flour, or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy water, pieces
of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging to a miraculous Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or
talisman or amuletos, will make themselves invulnerable to bullets; also have power to convert into any of the
four elements, like those personages of the Philippine legends and comedies,—Ygmidio, Teñoso, Florante,
Barnardo, Carpio, etc.

One of the First Benguet Government Cottages

“Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting for the predicted European conflict, which it is
said would give them their independence; if not, perhaps, divide the Islands as they are now amongst cousins,
brothers, nephews, uncles and godfathers.

“In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary political and social education and the habit of
behaving justly towards ourselves and towards our fellow-brothers; when free from all superstition, healthy,
strong and vigorous, we find ourselves capable of governing ourselves, without there being the possibility of
the preponderance of our passions in the consideration, direction, and administration of the interests of our
country, then, and only then, we will be free! we will be independent!50

“Hongkong, 1st October, 1899.”

Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have detailed are alive to-day, and are
powers in their respective communities. Simeon Villa was recently elected a member of the
municipal board from the south district of Manila, but fortunately an American governor-
general prevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my departure from Manila he was
appointed, by Speaker Osmeña, a member of a committee on reception for Governor-
General Harrison.

The kind of independent “government” these men established is the kind that they would
again establish if they had the chance,51 but among the persons to be tortured and murdered
would now be those Americans who failed to escape seasonably. I do not mean to say that
such a state of affairs would come about immediately, but it would certainly arise within a
comparatively short time. Sooner yet “the united Filipino people” would split up on old
tribal lines, and fly at each other’s throats.

1 Blount, p. 111.
2 P.I.R., 974. 3.
3
“December 20, 1898.
“To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government.
“The undersigned residents of the barangay of D. Francisco Querubín and D. Melchor Balueg, of Bucay, of the
province of Abra, appeal to you with the utmost subjection from their place of residence and state: That their
heads or representatives, D. Francisco Querubín and Melchor Balueg, respectively, force them to pay two pesos
each as a war tax, your humble vassals above cited being hardly able to earn their own livelihood and support
their families, and, notwithstanding their labor, some of them cannot get anything to eat without appealing to
the charity of their richer neighbours; but notwithstanding this sad situation, they offer a peseta each as a mark
of gratitude to the mother country, Filipinas, but said gentlemen, the representatives mentioned, have not the
slightest pity and worry us to the extent of having kept us in our houses a day and a night without anything to
eat, not even permitting us to go out to get a drink.
“We must inform you that the head of the barangay, D. Melchor Balueg, when he gathers the supplies for the
troops stationed in his town, said supplies consisting of rice, pigs, chickens and eggs, uses one-half of what is
gathered, and then again orders his assistants to save.”
“In fact, the undersigned request you to direct that the peseta which they offer be accepted and that the said
Don Francisco Querubín and Don Melchor Balueg be relieved of their duties, in order to put a stop to the
abuses constantly committed by them; and if this be not done, the petitioners will be obliged to leave their
homes and property in the town and take up their residences in the mountains with the Negritos and Igorots, in
order that the others may remain in the town and live tranquilly.

“This is a grace which we do not doubt we will receive from you, whose life may God preserve for many years.
“Bucay, November 12, 1898.” (26 signatures)
(In blue pencil in the handwriting of Aguinaldo:) “It will be approved.
“Dec. 20, 1898.
“E. A.”

—P.I.R., 991. 4.
4 P.I.R., 849.
5 Blount, p. 130.
6 Ibid., pp. 130–131.
7 P.I.R., 1142. 4.
8 Ibid., 2002. 3.

9 P.I.R., 964. 3.
10 On November 30, 1898, the commander in Alaminos, Zambales Province, telegraphed that his soldiers were all about
to desert as the head of the town would not furnish rations or pay without orders from the governor.”—P.I.R., 2002.3.

11 “On December 22, Aguinaldo, in accordance with a request from the governor of Zambales Province, ordered the
heads of the provinces of Pangasinán, Tarlac, Bataan, and Pampanga to prohibit the people of their provinces from going to
Zambales without passports signed by them, stating the route they were to take in going and returning and the length of
time to be spent in the journey. The governor of Zambales had asked for this regulation in order to prevent the commission
of robberies in Zambales and to distinguish persons justly subject to suspicion from those of good conduct.”—P.I.R., 266.
3.
12 “On January 9, the governor of Zambales found it impossible to continue the inspection of certain towns of his
province and to continue holding elections, as many of the officials had fled to escape the exactions and abuses of the
military commanders.”—P.I.R., 988. 2.
13 “The Governor of Cavite reports two drunken Americans have been killed by our soldiers. I tell him to have an
investigation immediately and report the fact to the American commander.”—P.I.R., 849.
14 “Most urgent. Gen. Anderson informs me in a letter that, ‘in order to avoid the very serious misfortune of an encounter
between our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with your guard from Cavite. One of my men has been killed and
three wounded by your people.’ This is positive and does not admit of explanation or delay. I ask you to inform me of your
decision.”—P.I.R., 849.

15 “Gen. Riego de Dios, Cavite: Telegram received. Do not leave the post, and say that you cannot abandon the city
without my orders, and say that he was not killed by our soldiers, but by them themselves [the Americans.—D. C. W.],
since they were drunk, according to your telegram. Give up your life before abandoning that place, and investigate
matters.”—P.I.R., 849.
16 “Urgent. Gen. Alvarez telegraphed that Riego de Dios informed him that the town of Maragondong had risen in arms
on account of abuses committed by the local President against Salvador Riego. This is the reason the town took up arms.
Will go there to-morrow.”—P.I.R., 849.
17 Taylor, 19 AJ.
18 P.I.R., 1057. 4.

19 Taylor, 95 HS.
20 The name applied to the Filipinos of Ambos Camarines, Albay and Sorsogón.
21 P.I.R., 262. 3.

22 Taylor, 48 AJ.
23 Blount, p. 116.

24 Accepting the 1903 census figures.
25 Aguinaldo considered Mindanao important enough to form one of the three federal states into which he proposed to
divide the Philippines.

26 Blount, p. 228.
27 Ibid., p. 229.

28 Bandits, or organized robbers.
29 The old Spanish name for Palawan.

30 Blount, p. 228.
31 P.I.R., 944. 10.
32 Blount, p. 116.
33 Blount, p. 229.
34 According to the census of 1903, 154,706.
35 See table on p. 651.

36 (Contemporary copy in Spanish.—P.I.R., Books C-L:)

“January 19, 1899.

“The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets his great and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo, and
makes known:—

“That the Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign domination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom
they are bound by the ties of race, interests, security and defense in this region of the Far East.

“The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely the beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on
solid bases the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests.

“I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer to the powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who
acknowledge his great authority, the highest assurance of friendship, consideration and esteem.

“Malolos, January 18, 1899.”

(No signature.)
37 P.I.R., 76. 1.
38 From an official document on file at Manila.

39
“Being brothers, the descendants of the same race and of one soul, the same sun shines upon us and we breathe
the same air, so that our sentiments are also one, and we aspire to the independence and liberty of our country
in order to secure its progress and place it on a level with other civilized nations; and with this assurance I have