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Title: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel,
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THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA

A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES,
LITERATURE AND GENERAL
INFORMATION
ELEVENTH EDITION

VOLUME II SLICE VI

Armour Plates to Arundel, Earls of

Articles in This Slice

ARMOUR PLATES ARRONDISSEMENT
ARMS AND ARMOUR ARROWROOT
ARMSTEAD, HENRY HUGH ARROWSMITH
ARMSTRONG, ARCHIBALD ARROYO
ARMSTRONG, JOHN (British physician) ARSACES
ARMSTRONG, JOHN (American diplomat) ARS-AN-DER-MOSEL
ARMSTRONG, SAMUEL CHAPMAN ARSCHOT, PHILIPPE DE CROY,
DUKE OF

ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM GEORGE ARSENAL
ARMSTRONG
ARMY ARSENIC
ARNAL, ÉTIENNE ARSENIUS
ARNALDUS DE VILLA NOVA ARSENIUS AUTORIANUS
ARNAUD, HENRI ARSES
ARNAULD ARSINOË
ARNAULT, ANTOINE VINCENT ARSINOITHERIUM
ARNDT, ERNST MORITZ ARSON
ARNDT, JOHANN ARSONVAL
ARNE, THOMAS AUGUSTINE ARSOT
ARNETH, ALFRED ARSUF
ARNHEM ARSURE
ARNICA ARSURES
ARNIM, ELISABETH ART
ARNIM, HARRY KARL KURT EDUARD ARTA
VON
ARNIM, LUDWIG ACHIM (JOACHIM) ARTA, GULF OF
VON
ARNIM-BOYTZENBURG, HANS GEORG ARTABANUS
VON
ARNO (bishop of Salzburg) ART AND PART
ARNO (river of Italy) ARTAPHERNES
ARNOBIUS (early Christian writer) ARTAXERXES
ARNOBIUS (Christian priest) ARTEDI, PETER
ARNOLD ARTEGA
ARNOLD, BENEDICT ARTEL
ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN ARTEMIDORUS
ARNOLD, GOTTFRIED ARTEMIS
ARNOLD, MATTHEW ARTEMISIA (daughter of Lygdamis)
ARNOLD, SAMUEL ARTEMISIA (wife of Mausolus)
ARNOLD, THOMAS ARTEMON
ARNOTT, NEIL ARTENA

ARNOULD-PLESSY, JEANNE SYLVANIE ARTERIES
ARNSBERG ARTERN
ARNSTADT ARTESIAN WELLS
ARNSWALDE ARTEVELDE, JACOB VAN
ARNULF ARTEVELDE, PHILIP VAN
AROIDEAE ART GALLERIES
AROLSEN ARTHRITIS
ARONA ARTHROPODA
ARPEGGIO ARTHUR
ARPI ARTHUR I
ARPINO ARTHUR III
ARQUÀ PETRARCA ARTHUR, CHESTER ALAN
ARQUEBUS ARTHURIAN LEGEND
ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE ARTICHOKE
ARRACK ARTICLE
ARRAH ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
ARRAIGNMENT ARTICULATA
ARRAN, EARLS OF ARTICULATION
ARRAN ARTILLERY
ARRANT ARTIODACTYLA
ARRAS ARTISAN
ARRAY ARTOIS
ARRENOTOKOUS, ARRENOTOKY ART SALES
ARREST ARTS AND CRAFTS
ARRESTMENT ART SOCIETIES
ARRETIUM ART TEACHING
ARRHENIUS, SVANTE AUGUST ARTUSI, GIOVANNI MARIA
ARRIA ARU ISLANDS
ARRIAN ARUNDEL, EARLDOM OF
ARRIS ARUNDEL, EARLS OF

ARMOUR PLATES. The earliest recorded proposal to employ armour
for ships of war (for body armour, &c., see Arms and Armour) appears to
have been made in England by Sir William Congreve in 1805. In The Times
of the 20th of February of that year reference is made to
Defence for ships. Congreve’s designs for an armoured, floating mortar
battery which the inventor considered would be proof
against artillery fire. Among Congreve’s unpublished papers there is also a
suggestion for armour-plating the embrasures of casemates. Nothing,
however, seems to have come of these proposals, and a similar lack of
appreciation befell the next advocate of armour, John Stevens of New
Jersey, U.S.A., who submitted the plans of an armoured vessel to Congress
in 1812. The Stevens family, however, continued to work at the subject, and
by 1841 had determined by actual experiment the thickness of wrought-iron
armour which was proof against the projectiles then in use. The necessity
for armouring ships as a protection against shell fire was again pointed out
by General Paixhans in 1841, and in 1845 Dupuy de
History. Lôme had prepared the designs of an armoured frigate
for the French government. During the period between
1827 and 1854, experiments in connexion with the proposed application of
armour to both ships and forts were carried out in England, the United
States and France, but the question did not get beyond the experimental
stage until the latter year, when armoured floating batteries were laid down
in all three countries, probably as the immediate outcome of the destruction
of the Turkish fleet by shell fire at Sinope on the 30th of November 1853.

Three of the French floating batteries were in action at the bombardment
of Kinburn in 1855, where they achieved a conspicuous success, silencing
the Russian forts after a four hours’ engagement, during which they
themselves, although frequently struck, were practically uninjured, their
loss in personnel being but trifling. To quote Very: “This comparatively
insignificant action, which had little if any effect upon the course of the

Crimean War, changed the whole condition of armour for naval use from
one of speculation to one of actual and constant necessity.” The military
application of armour for the protection of guns mounted in permanent
fortifications followed. Its development, however, took rather a different
course, and the question of armour generally is of less importance for the
military engineer than for the naval constructor. For the employment of
armour in ship construction and in permanent works on land, see the articles
Shipbuilding; Fortification and Siegecraft; the present article is concerned
solely with the actual armour itself.

The earliest armour, both for ships and forts, was made of wrought iron,
and was disposed either in a single thickness or in successive layers
sandwiched with wood or concrete. Such armour is now wholly obsolete,
though examples of it may still be found in a few forts of
Construction and early date. The chief application of armour in modern
testing. land defences is in the form of shields for the protection
of guns mounted en barbette. Examples of such shields
are shown in figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 shows a 4.5-in. steel shield for the U.S.A.
government, face-hardened by the Harvey process, to which reference is
made below. It was attacked by 5-in. and 6-in. armour-piercing shot, and
proved capable of keeping out the 5-in. up to a striking velocity of nearly
1800 ft. per second, but was defeated by a 6-in. capped A.P. shot with a
striking velocity of 1842 ft. per second. The mounting was not seriously
damaged by the firing, but could be operated after the impact of one 3.2-in.,
five 5-in. and three 6-in. projectiles. Fig. 2 shows a gun-shield,
manufactured by Messrs Hadfield of Sheffield, after attack by 4.1-in., 4.7-
in. and 6-in. armour-piercing and other projectiles. The limit of the shield’s
resistance was just reached by an uncapped 4.7-in. A.P. shell with a striking
velocity of 2128 ft. per second. The shield (the average maximum thickness
of which was 5.8 in.) showed great toughness, and although subjected to a
severe battering, and occasionally outmatched by the attacking projectiles,

developed no visible crack. It is chiefly remarkable for the fact that it was
cast and not forged. As is evident from the fringing around the hole made
by the 6-in. A.P. shell, the shield was not face-hardened. A more highly
developed form of the gun-shield is to be found in the armoured cupola,
which has been employed to a very considerable extent in permanent
fortifications, and whose use is still strongly advocated by continental
European military engineers. The majority of the cupolas to be found in
continental forts are not, however, of very recent date, those erected in 1894
at Molsheim near Strassburg being comparatively modern instances. Any
cupolas constructed nowadays would be of steel, either forged or cast, and
would probably be face-hardened, but a large number of those extant are of
compound or even of iron armour. Many of those on sea-fronts are made of
chilled cast iron. Such armour, which was introduced by Gruson of
Magdeburg in 1868, is extremely hard, and cannot be perforated, but must
be destroyed by fracture. It is thus the antithesis of wrought iron, which,
when of good quality, does not break up under the impact of the shot but
yields by perforation. Armour of the Gruson type is well adapted for curved
surfaces such as cupolas, which on account of their shape are scarcely liable
to receive a direct hit, except at distant ranges, and its extreme hardness
would greatly assist it to throw off shot striking obliquely, which have
naturally a tendency to glance. Chilled iron, on account of its liability to
break up when subjected to a continuous bombardment by the armour-
piercing steel projectiles of guns of even medium calibre, was usually
considered unsuitable for employment in inland forts, where wrought iron,
mild steel or compound armour was preferred. On the other hand, as
pointed out by the late Captain C. Orde Browne, R.A., it was admirably
adapted to resist the few rounds that the heavy guns of battleships might be
expected to deliver during an attack of comparatively limited duration.

Chilled iron was never employed for naval purposes, and warship armour
continued to be made exclusively of wrought iron until 1876 when steel

was introduced by Schneider. In an important trial at Spezzia in that year
the superiority in resisting power of steel to wrought iron was conclusively
proved, but, on the other hand, steel showed a great tendency to through-
cracking, a defect which led Messrs Cammell of Sheffield in 1877 to
introduce compound armour consisting of a steel surface in intimate union
with a wrought-iron foundation plate. In Cammell plates, which were made
by the Wilson process, the steel face was formed by running molten steel on
to a white-hot foundation plate of iron, while in the compound plates, made
by Messrs John Brown & Co. according to the patent of J.D. Ellis, a thin
steel surface plate was cemented on to the wrought-iron foundation by
running in molten steel between. Compound armour possessed the
advantages of a harder face than was then possible in a homogeneous steel
plate, while, on the other hand, the back was softer and less liable to crack.
Its weak point was the liability of the surface plate to crack through under
fire and become detached from its iron backing. The manufacture of steel,
however, continued to improve, so that in 1890 we find steel plates being
made which were comparatively free from liability to through-cracking,
while their power to resist perforation was somewhat greater than that of
the best compound. The difference, however, was at no time very marked,
and between 1880 and 1890 the resistance to perforation of either steel or
compound as compared with wrought iron may be taken as about 1.3 to 1.

Compound armour required to be well backed to bring out its best
qualities, and there is a case on record in 1883 when a 12-in. Cammell plate
weighing 10½ tons, backed by granite, stopped a 16-in. Palliser shot with a
striking energy of nearly 30,000 foot tons and a calculated perforation of 25
inches of wrought iron. As steel improved, efforts were made to impart an
even greater hardness to the actual surface or skin of compound armour,
and, with this object in view, Captain T.J. Tresidder, C.M.G., patented in
1887 a method of chilling the heated surface of a plate by means of jets of
water under pressure. By this method it was found possible to obtain a

degree of hardness which was prevented in ordinary plunging by the
formation of a layer of steam between the water and the heated surface of
the plate. Compound plates face-hardened on this system gave excellent
results, and forged-steel armour-piercing projectiles were in some cases
broken up on their surfaces as if they had been merely chilled iron.
Attempts were also made to increase the toughness of the back by the
substitution of mild nickel steel for wrought iron. The inherent defect of
compound armour, however—its want of homogeneity,—remained, and in
the year 1891 H.A. Harvey of Newark, N.J., introduced a process whereby
an all steel plate could be face-hardened in such a way that the advantages
of the compound principle were obtained in a homogeneous plate. The
process in question consisted in carburizing or cementing the surface of a
steel plate by keeping it for a fortnight or so at a high temperature in contact
with finely divided charcoal, so that the heated surface absorbed a certain
amount of carbon, which penetrated to a considerable depth, thus causing a
difference in chemical composition between the front and back of the plate.
After it had been left a sufficient time in the cementation furnace, the plate
was withdrawn and allowed to cool slowly until it reached a dull red heat,
when it was suddenly chilled by the application of water, but by a less
perfect method than that employed by Tresidder. Steel plates treated by the
Harvey and Tresidder processes, which shortly became combined,
possessed about twice the resisting power of wrought iron. The figure of
merit, or resistance to penetration as compared with wrought iron, varied
with the thickness of the plate, being rather more than 2 with plates from 6
to 8 in. thick and rather less for the thicker plates. In 1889 Schneider
introduced the use of nickel in steel for armour plates, and in 1891 or 1892
the St Chamond works employed a nickel steel to which was added a small
percentage of chromium.

All modern armour contains nickel in percentages varying from 3 to 5,
and from 1.0 to 2.0% of chromium is also employed as a general rule.

Nickel in the above quantities adds greatly to the toughness as well as to the
hardness of steel, while chromium enables it to absorb carbon to a greater
depth during cementation, and increases its susceptibility to tempering,
besides conducing to a tough fibrous condition in the body of a plate. Alloy
steels of this nature appear to be very susceptible to thermal treatment, by
suitable variation of which, with or without oil quenching, the physical
condition of the same steel may be made to vary to an extraordinary extent,
a peculiarity which is turned to good account in the manufacture of the
modern armour plate.

The principal modern process is that introduced by Krupp in 1893.
Although it is stated that a few firms both in Great Britain and in other
countries use special processes of their own, it is probable that they differ
only in detail from the Krupp process, which has been adopted by the great
majority of makers. Krupp plates are made of nickel-chrome steel and
undergo a special heat treatment during manufacture which is briefly
described below. They can either be cemented or, as was usual in England
until about 1902 in the case of the thinner plates (4 in. and under) and those
used for curved structures such as casemates, non-cemented. They are in
either case face-hardened by chilling. Messrs Krupp have, however,
cemented plates of 3 in. and upward since 1895. Although the full process is
now applied to plates of as little as 2 in. in thickness, there is some
difference of opinion between manufacturers as to the value of cementing
these very thin plates. The simple Harvey process is still employed to some
extent in the case of plates between 5 and 3 in. in thickness, and excellent
results are also stated to have been obtained with plates from 2 to 4 in. in
thickness, manufactured from a special steel by the process patented by M.
Charpy of the St Jacques steel works at Montluçon. A Krupp cemented
(K.C.) plate is not perhaps harder as regards surface than a good Harveyed
plate, but the depth of hard face is greater, and the plate is very much
tougher in the back, a quality which is of particular importance in the

thicker plates. The figure of merit varies, as in Harveyed plates, with the
thickness of the armour, being about 2.7 in the case of good 6-in. plates
while for the thicker plates the value gradually falls off to about 2.3 in the
case of 12-in. armour. This figure of merit is as against uncapped armour-
piercing shot of approximately the same calibre as the thickness of the
plate. The resisting power of the non-cemented Krupp plates is usually
regarded as being considerably less than that of the cemented plates, and
may be taken on an average to be 2.25 times that of wrought iron.

Figs. 3, 4 and 5 are illustrations of good cemented plates of the Krupp
type. Fig. 3 shows an 11.8-in. plate, tried by Messrs Krupp in 1895, after
attack by three 12-in. steel armour-piercing projectiles of from 712.7 to
716.1 ℔ in weight. In the third round the striking velocity of the projectile
was 1993 ft. per second, the calculated perforation of wrought iron by
Tresidder’s formula being 25.9 in. The attack was successfully resisted, all
the projectiles being broken up without effecting perforation, while there
were no serious cracks. The figure of merit of the plate was thus well in
excess of 2.2. The great toughness of the plate is perhaps even more
remarkable than its hardness; its width was only 6.28 ft., so that each shot
head formed a wedge of approximately one-sixth of its width. The
excellence of the metal which is capable of withstanding such a strain is
apparent.

Fig. 4 is of a 9-in. K.C. plate, made by Messrs Armstrong, Whitworth &
Co. for the Japanese government, after undergoing an unusually severe
official test. The fourth round was capable of perforating 22 in. of wrought
iron, so that the figure of merit of the plate must have been considerably in
excess of 2.45, as there were no through-cracks, and the limit of resistance
was far from being reached.

Fig. 5 shows the front of an excellent 6-in. cemented plate of Messrs
Beardmore’s manufacture, tried at Eskmeals on the 11th of October 1901. It

withstood the attack of four armour-piercing 6-in. shot of 100 ℔ weight,
with striking velocities varying from 1996 to 2177 ft. per second. Its limit
of resistance was just passed by the fifth round in which the striking
velocity was no less than 2261 ft. per second. The projectile, which broke
up in passing through the plate, did not get through the skin plate behind the
wood backing, and evidently had no surplus energy left. The figure of merit
of this plate was between 2.6 and 2.8, but was evidently much closer to the
latter than to the former figure. A sixth round fired with a Johnson capped
shot weighing 105.9 ℔ easily perforated both plate and backing with a
striking velocity of 1945 ft. per second, thus reducing the figure of merit of
the plate to below 2.2 and illustrating very clearly the advantage given by
capping the point of an armour-piercing projectile. There were no through-
cracks in the plate after this severe trial, the back being evidently as tough
as the face was hard.

Fig. 6 shows a 3-in. K.N.C. plate of Messrs Vickers, Sons & Maxim’s
manufacture, tested privately by the firm in November 1905. It proved to be
of unusual excellence, its limit of resistance being just reached by a 12½-℔
armour-piercing shell of 3 in. calibre with a striking velocity of 2558 ft. per
second, a result which, even if the projectiles used were not relatively of the
same perforating power as those used in the proof of 6-in. and thicker
plates, shows that its resisting power was very great. At a low estimate its
figure of merit against 3-in. A.P. shot may be taken as about 2.6, which is
exceptionally high for a non-cemented, or indeed for any but the best K.C.
plates.

The plate also withstood the attack of a 4.7-in. service pattern steel
armour-piercing shell of 45 ℔ weight striking the unbacked portion with a
velocity of 1599 ft. per second, and was only just beaten by a similar shell
with a velocity of 1630 ft. per second. The effect of all the above-mentioned
rounds is shown in the photograph. The same plate subsequently kept out

two 6-in. common shell filled up to weight with salt and plugged, with
striking velocities of 1412 and 1739 ft. per second respectively, the former
being against the unbacked and the latter against the backed half of the
plate,—the only effect on the plate being that round 6 caused a fragment of
the right-hand top corner of the plate to break off, and round 7 started a few
surface cracks between the points of impact of rounds 1, 2 and 3.

Within the limitations referred to below, the resisting power of all hard-
faced plates is very much reduced when the armour-piercing projectiles
used in the attack are capped, the average figure of merit of Krupp
cemented plates not being more than 2 against capped shot as compared
with about 2.5 against uncapped. So long ago as 1878 it was suggested by
Lt.-Col. (then Captain) T. English, R.E., that armour-piercing projectiles
would be assisted in attacking compound plates if caps of wrought iron
could be fitted to their points. Experiments at Shoeburyness, however, did
not show that any advantage was gained by this device, and nothing further
was heard of the cap until 1894, when experiments carried out in Russia
with so-called “magnetic” shot against plates of Harveyed steel showed that
the perforating power of an armour-piercing projectile was considerably
augmented where hard-faced plates were concerned, if its point were
protected by a cap of wrought iron or mild steel. The conditions of the
Russian results (and of subsequent trials in various parts of the world which
have confirmed them) differed considerably from the earlier English ones.
The material of both projectiles and plates differed, as did also the
velocities employed—the low velocities in the earlier trials probably
contributing in large measure to the non-success of the cap. The cap, as now
used, consists of a thimble of comparatively soft steel of from 3 to 5% of
the weight of the projectile, attached to the point of the latter either by
solder or by being pressed hydraulically or otherwise into grooves or
indentations in the head. Its function appears to be to support the point on
impact, and so to enable it to get unbroken through the hard face layers of

the plate. Once through the cemented portion with its point intact, a
projectile which is strong enough to remain undeformed, will usually
perforate the plate by a true boring action if its striking velocity be high
enough. In the case of the uncapped projectile, on the other hand, the point
is almost invariably crushed against the hard face and driven back as a
wedge into the body of the projectile, which is thus set up so that, instead of
boring, it acts as a punch and dislodges or tends to dislodge a coned plug or
disk of metal, the greatest diameter of which may be as much as four times
the calibre of the projectile. The disproportion between the maximum
diameter of the disk and that of the projectile is particularly marked when
the calibre of the latter is much in excess of the thickness of the plate. When
plate and projectile are equally matched, e.g. 6″ versus 6″, the plug of metal
dislodged may be roughly cylindrical in shape, and its diameter not greatly
in excess of that of the projectile. In all cases the greatest width of the plug
or disk is at the back of the plate.

A stout and rigid backing evidently assists a plate very much more
against this class of attack than against the perforating attack of a capped
shot. Fig. 7 shows the back of a 6-in. plate attacked in 1898, and affords an
excellent illustration of the difference in action of capped and uncapped
projectiles. In round 7 the star-shaped opening made by the point of a
capped shot boring its way through is seen, while rounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 show
disks of plate partially dislodged by uncapped projectiles. The perforating
action of capped armour-piercing projectiles is even better shown in fig. 8,
which shows a 250-mm. (9.8 in.) Krupp plate after attack by 150-mm. (5.9
in.) capped A.P. shot. In rounds 5 and 6 the projectiles, with striking
velocities of 2302 and 2281 ft. per second, perforated. Round 7, with a
striking velocity of 2244 ft. per second, just got its point through and
rebounded, while round 8, with a striking velocity of 2232, lodged in the
plate. In many cases a capped projectile punches out a plug, usually more or
less cylindrical in shape and of about the same diameter as the projectile,

from a plate, and does not defeat it by a true boring action. In such cases it
will probably be found that the projectile has been broken up, and that only
the head, set up and in a more or less crushed condition, has got through the
plate. This peculiarity of action can best be accounted for by attributing
either abnormal excellence to the plate or to that portion of it concerned—
for plates sometimes vary considerably and are not of uniform hardness
throughout,—or comparative inferiority to the projectile. Whichever way it
may be, what has happened appears to be that after the cap has given the
point sufficient support to get it through the very hard surface layers, the
point has been flattened in the region of extreme hardness and toughness
combined, which exists immediately behind the deeply carburized surface.
The action from this point becomes a punching one, and the extra strain
tends to break up the projectile, so that the latter gets through wholly or
partially, in a broken condition, driving a plug of plate in front of it. At low
striking velocities, probably in the neighbourhood of 1700 ft. per second,
the cap fails to act, and no advantage is given by it to the shot. This is
probably because the velocity is sufficiently low to give the cap time to
expand and so fail to grip the point as the latter is forced into it. The cap
also fails as a rule to benefit the projectile when the angle of incidence is
more than 30° to the normal.

Plate I.

Fig. 1.—HARVEYIZED SHIELD, 4.5 INCHES THICK, ON 6-INCH PEDESTAL MOUNT,
AFTER ATTACK BY 5-INCH AND 6-INCH CAPPED ARMOUR-PIERCING SHOT.

Fig. 2.—GUN SHIELD, 6 INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK.
(HADFIELD.)

Fig. 3.—KRUPP-CEMENTED PLATE, 11.8 INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK.
(KRUPP, MEPPEN.)

Fig. 4.—KRUPP-CEMENTED PLATE, 9 INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK.
(ARMSTRONG, WHITWORTH & CO.)]

Plate II.

Fig. 5.—BEARDMORE CEMENTED PLATE, 6-INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK BY 6-
INCH SHOT.

(From Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1902 by permission.)

Fig. 6.—KRUPP-CEMENTED PLATE, 3 INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK.
(VICKERS, SONS & MAXIM.)

Fig. 7.—BACK OF A 6-INCH PLATE SHOWING ACTION OF CAPPED AND UNCAPPED
PROJECTILES.

Fig. 8.—BACK OF KRUPP PLATE 9.8 INCHES THICK, AFTER ATTACK, WITH CAPPED
PROJECTILE. (KRUPP, MEPPEN.)

(From Brassey’s Naval Annual, by permission.)

The laws governing the resistance of armour to perforation have been the
subject of investigation for many years, and a considerable number of
formulae have been put by means of which the thickness of armour
perforable by any given projectile at any given striking
Laws of velocity may be calculated. Although in some cases
Resistance. based on very different theoretical considerations, there
is a general agreement among them as far as perforation
proper is concerned, and Tresidder’s formula for the perforation of wrought
iron, t2 = wv3/dA, may be taken as typical. Here t represents the thickness
perforable in inches, w the weight of the projectile in pounds, v its velocity
in foot seconds, d its diameter in inches and A the constant given by log A =
8.8410.

For the perforation of Harveyed or Krupp cemented armour by capped
armour-piercing shot, this formula may be employed in conjunction with a
suitable constant according to the nature of armour attacked. In the case of
K. C. armour the formula becomes t2 = wv3/4dA. A useful rough rule is t/d
= v/1900.

Hard armour, such as chilled cast iron, cannot be perforated but must be
destroyed by fracture, and its destruction is apparently dependent solely
upon the striking energy of the projectile and independent of its diameter.
The punching of hard-faced armour by uncapped projectiles is intermediate
in character between perforation and cracking, but approaches the former
more nearly than the latter. The formula most used in England in this case is
Krupp’s formula for K.C., viz. t2 = wv2/dA1, where t, w, v and d are the
same as before, and log A1 = 6.3532. This, if we assume the sectional
density (w/d3) of projectiles to be constant and equal to 0.46, reduces to the
very handy rule of thumb t/d = v/2200, which, within the limits of striking
velocity obtainable under service conditions, is sufficiently accurate for
practical purposes. For oblique attack up to an angle of 30° to the normal,
the same formula may be employed, t sec θ being substituted for t, where θ
is the angle of incidence and t the normal thickness of the plate attacked.
More exact results would be obtained, however, by the use of Tresidder’s
W.I. formula, given above, in conjunction with a suitable figure of merit,
according to the nature and thickness of the plate. It should be remembered
in this connexion that the figure of merit of a plate against a punching
attack falls off very much when the thickness of the plate is considerably
less than the calibre of the attacking projectile. For example, the F.M. of a
6-in. plate may be 2.6 against 6-in. uncapped A.P. projectiles, but only 2.2
against 9.2-in. projectiles of the same character. In the case of the
perforating action of capped projectiles, on the other hand, the ratio of d and
t does not appear to affect the F.M. to any great extent, though according to

Tresidder, the latter is inclined to fall when d is considerably less than t,
which is the exact opposite of what happens with punching.

Another method of measuring the quality of armour, which is largely
employed upon the continent of Europe, is by the ratio, r, between the
velocity requisite to perforate any given plate and that needed to pierce a
plate of mild steel of the same thickness, according to the formula of
Commandant Jacob de Marre, viz. v = Ae0.7·a0.75/p0.5 where e = the
thickness of the plate in centimetres, a = the calibre of the projectile in
centimetres, p = the weight of the projectile in kilogrammes, v = the
striking velocity of the projectile in metres per second, and log A = 1.7347.
Converted into the usual English units and notation, this formula becomes v
= A1t0.7·d0.75/w0.5, in which log A1 = 3.0094; in this form it constitutes the
basis of the ballistic tests for the acceptance of armour plates for the U.S.
navy.

Common shell, which are not strong enough to remain undeformed on
impact, derive little benefit from the cap and usually defeat a plate by
punching rather than by perforation. Their punching power may be taken
roughly as about 2⁄3 that of an uncapped armour-piercing shot. Shells filled
with high explosives, unless special arrangements are made to deaden the
bursting charge and so obviate detonation upon impact, are only effective
against the thinnest armour.

With regard to manufacture, a brief account of the Krupp process as
applied in one of the great English armour plate works (omitting
confidential details of temperature, &c.) will illustrate the great complexity
of treatment which the modern armour plate has to
Manufacture. undergo before its remarkable qualities of combined
hardness and toughness can be developed. The
composition of the steel probably differs slightly with the manufacturer, and

also with the thickness of the armour, but it will usually contain from 3 to
4% of nickel, from 1.0 to 2.0% of chromium and about 0.25 to 0.35% of
carbon, together with from 0.3 to 0.7% of manganese. After being cast, the
ingot is first heated to a uniform degree of temperature throughout its mass
and then generally forged under the hydraulic forging press. It is then
reheated and passed through the rolls. After rolling, the plate is allowed to
cool, and is then subjected to a thermal treatment preparatory to surfacing
and cutting. Its surface is then freed from scale and planed. After planing,
the plate is passed into the cementation furnace, where its face remains for
some weeks in contact with specially prepared carbon, the temperature
being gradually raised to that required for cementation and as gradually
lowered after that is effected. After cementation the plate is heated to a
certain temperature and is then plunged into an oil bath in order to toughen
it. After withdrawal from the oil bath, the plate is cooled, reheated to a
lower temperature, quenched again in water, reheated and passed to the
bending press, where it is bent to shape while hot, proper allowance being
made for the slight change of curve which takes place on the final chilling.
After bending it is again heated and then allowed to get cold, when the final
machining, drilling and cutting are carried out. The plate is now placed in a
furnace and differentially heated so that the face is raised to a higher
temperature than the back. After being thus heated for a certain period the
plate is withdrawn, and both back and face are douched simultaneously
with jets of cold water under pressure, the result being that the face is left
glass-hard while the back is in the toughest condition possible for such hard
steel.

The cast-steel armour made by Hadfield has already been alluded to. That
made by Krupp (the only other maker at present of this class of armour) is
of face-hardened nickel steel. A 5.9-in. plate of this material tried in 1902
had a figure of merit of more than 2.2 against uncapped 5.9-in. armour-
piercing projectiles of 112 ℔ in weight. The main advantage of cast armour

is that it is well adapted to armoured structures of complicated design and
of varying thickness, which it would be difficult or impossible to forge in
one piece. It should also be cheaper than forged armour, and, should time be
a consideration, could probably be turned out more quickly; on the other
hand, it is improbable that heavy castings such as would be required could
be as regular in quality and as free from flaws as is possible when forged
material is used, and it is unlikely that the average resistance to attack of
cast-steel armour will ever be equal to that of the best forged steel.

Of recent years there has been a considerable demand for thin steel
plating proof against small-arm bullets at close ranges. This class of steel is
used for field-gun shields and for sap shields, to afford cover for men in
field-works, for armoured trains, motor-cars and
Defence against ambulances, and also very largely for armouring
small-arms. shallow-draught river-gunboats. Holtzer made chrome
steel breastplates in 1890, 0.158 in. of which was proof
against the 0.43-in. hard lead bullet of the Gras rifle at 10 metres range,
while 0.236 in. was proof against the 0.32 in. 231-grain Lebel bullet at the
same distance, the striking velocities being approximately 1490 and 2070 ft.
per second respectively. The bullet-proof steel made by Messrs Cammell,
Laird & Co. in Great Britain may be taken as typical of that produced by
the best modern manufacturers. It is proof against the 215-grain Lee-Enfield
bullet of 0.303 in. calibre striking directly, as under:

Range. Thickness of Striking
Plate. Velocity.
10 0.187 inch 2050 f.s.
yards
100 ” 0.167 ” 1865 ”
560 ” 0.080 ” 1080 ”

The weight of the 0.08 in. plating is only 3.2 ℔ per sq. ft. The material is
stated to be readily adaptable to the ordinary operation of bending,

machining, drilling, &c., and is thus very suitable for the purposes indicated
above.
(W. E. E.)

ARMS AND ARMOUR (Lat. arma, from the Aryan root ar, to join or
fit; cf. Gr. ἁρμός, joint; the form armour, from Lat. armatura, should
strictly be armure). Under this heading are included weapons of offence
(arms) and defensive equipment (armour). The history of the development
of arms and armour begins with that of the human race; indeed, combined
with domestic implements, the most primitive weapons which have been
found constitute the most important, if not the only, tangible evidence on
which the history of primitive man is based. It is largely from the materials
and characteristics of the weapons and utensils found in caves, tombs and
various strata of the earth’s crust, coupled with geological considerations,
that the ethnological and chronological classifications of prehistoric man
have been deduced. For a detailed account of this classification and the
evidence see Archaeology; Bronze Age; Flint Implements, &c., and
articles on special weapons.

Offensive weapons may be classified roughly, according to their shape
(i.e. the kind of blow or wound which they are intended to inflict), and the
way in which they are used, as follows:—(1) Arms which are wielded by
hand at close quarters. These are subdivided into (a)
Classification. cleaving weapons, e.g. axes; (b) crushing, e.g. clubs,
maces and all hammer-like arms; (c) thrusting, e.g.
pointed swords and daggers; (d) cutting, e.g. sabres (such weapons

frequently combine both the cut and the thrust, e.g. swords with both edge
and point); (e) those weapons represented by the spear, lance, pike, &c.,
which deal a thrusting blow but are distinguished from (c) by their greater
length. (2) Purely missile weapons, e.g. darts, javelins and spears.
Frequently these weapons are used also at close quarters as thrusting
weapons; the typical example of these is the medium-length spear of not
more than about 6 ft. in length. (3) Arms which discharge missiles, e.g.
bows, catapults and fire-arms generally. (See Archery and section Fire-
arms below.) The weapons in (2) and (3) are designed to avoid hand-to-
hand fighting.

Weapons are also classified in a variety of other ways. Thus we have
small-arms, i.e. all weapons in classes (1) and (2) with those in (3) which
do not require carriages. Side-arms are those which, when not in use, are
worn at the side, e.g. daggers, swords, bayonets. Armes blanches is a term
used for offensive weapons of iron and steel which are used at close
quarters.

Defensive armour consists of body armour, protections for the head and
the limbs, and various types of shield.

1. Stone Age.—One of the chief
problems which have perplexed
archaeologists is that of finding a
criterion which will enable them to Fig. 1.—Leaf-shaped Flint
Dagger.
distinguish the most primitive products of
human skill from similar objects whose form is due to
History. the forces of nature. It is often impossible to say
precisely whether a rough piece of flint is to be regarded
as a weapon (except so far as it could be used as a missile) or merely as a
fragment of rock. Passing over these doubtful cases, we come first to
indubitable examples of weapons deliberately fashioned in stone for

offensive purposes. The use of stone weapons appears to have been
universally characteristic of the earliest races of mankind, as it is still
distinctive of those savage races which are most nearly allied to primitive
man. These weapons were naturally simple in form and structure. The
earliest examples (Palaeolithic) found in river-drift gravel in various parts
of Europe are merely chipped flints, celts, &c. Later on we find polished
implements (Neolithic) progressively more elaborate in design and
workmanship, such as socketed stones with wooden handles and knives or
daggers of flaked flint with handles. Besides flint the commonest materials
are diorite, greenstone, serpentine and indurated clay-slate; there are also
weapons of horn and bone (daggers and spear-heads). Spear-heads and
arrow-points (leaf-shaped, lozenge-shaped, tanged and triangular) were
chipped in flint with such skill as to be little inferior to their metal
successors. They have accurately flaked barbs and tangs, and in some cases
their edges are minutely chipped. The heads appear to have been fastened to
the shafts by vegetable fibre and bitumen. Knife-daggers of flint, though
practically of one single type, exhibit much variety of form. They vary in
size also, but seldom exceed 12 in. in length. They are sometimes obtuse-
edged like a scraping-tool, sometimes delicately chipped to a straight edge,
while the flakes are so regularly removed from the convex part of the blade
as to give a wavy surface, and the corners of the handle are delicately
crimped. The daggers attain their highest perfection in the short, leaf-shaped
form,—the precursor of the leaf-shaped sword which is peculiarly
characteristic of the Bronze Age,—and the curved knives found especially
in Great Britain and Russia, and also in Egypt. The precise object of the
sharpening of both convex and concave edges in the curved variety is not
clear. There have also been found sling-stones, and, in Scotland and Ireland,
balls of stone with their “surfaces divided into a number of more or less
projecting circles with channels between them.” These latter, Sir John
Evans suggests, were attached to a thong which passed through the surface

channels, and used like the bolas of South America. The weapon could thus
deal a blow at close quarters, or could be thrown so as to entangle the limbs
of an enemy. Of defensive armour of stone there is none. The only
approximation is to be found in the small rectangular plates of slate, &c.,
perforated with holes at the corners, which are supposed to have been
bound on to the arm to protect it from the recoil of the bow-string. Similar
wristlets or bracers are in use among the Eskimos (of bone) and in India (of
ivory). These plates measure generally about 4 in. by 1½ in.

Fig. 2.—Leaf-shaped Bronze Sword.

2. Bronze Age.—It is impossible to assign any date as the beginning of
the Bronze Age; indeed, archaeology has shown that the adoption of metal
for weapons was very gradual. The stone weapon perseveres alongside the
bronze, and there exist stone axes which, by their shape, suggest that they
have been copied from metal axes. In the earliest interments in which the
weapons deposited with the dead are of other materials than stone, a
peculiar form of bronze dagger occurs. It consists of a well-finished, thin,
knife-like blade, usually about 6 in. in length, broad at the hilt and tapering
to the point, and attached to the handle by massive rivets of bronze. It has
been found associated with stone celts; both of the roughly chipped and the
highly polished kind, showing that these had not been entirely disused when
bronze became available. A later type of bronze dagger is a broad, heavy,
curved weapon, usually from 9 to 15 in. in length, with massive rivets for
attachment to an equally massive handle. The leaf-shaped sword, however,
is the characteristic weapon of the Bronze Age. It is found all over Europe,
from Lapland to the Mediterranean. No warlike weapon of any period is
more graceful in form or more beautifully finished. The finish seems to

have been given in the mould without the aid of hammer or file, the edge
being formed by suddenly reducing the thickness of the metal, so as to
produce a narrow border of extreme thinness along both sides of the blade
from hilt to point. The handle-plate and blade were cast in one piece, and
the handle itself was formed by side plates of bone, horn or wood, riveted
through the handle-plates. There was no guard, and the weapon, though
short, was well balanced, but more fitted for stabbing and thrusting than for
cutting with the edge. The Scandinavian variety is not so decidedly leaf-
shaped, and is longer and heavier than the common British form; and
instead of a handle-plate, it was furnished with a tang on which a round,
flat-topped handle was fastened, like that of the modern Highland dirk,
sometimes surmounted by a crescent-like ornament of bronze. A narrow,
rapier-shaped variety, tapering from hilt to point, was made without a
handle-plate, and attached to the hilt by rivets like the bronze daggers
already mentioned. This form is more common in the British Isles than in
Scandinavia, and is most abundant in Ireland. The spear-heads of the
Bronze Age present a considerable variety of form, though the leaf-shaped
predominates, and barbed examples are extremely rare. Some British
weapons of this form occasionally reach a length of 27 in. The larger
varieties are often beautifully designed, having segmental openings on both
sides of the central ridge of the blade, and elaborately ornamented with
chevron patterns of chased or inlaid work both on the socket and blade.
Arrow-points are much rarer in bronze than in flint. In all probability the
flint arrow-point (which was equally effective and much more easily
replaced when lost) continued to be used throughout the Bronze Age.
Shields of bronze, circular, with hammered-up bosses, concentric ridges and
rows of studs, were held in the hand by a central handle underneath the
boss. The transition period between the Bronze and Iron Ages in central
Europe is well defined by the occurrence of iron swords, which are simple
copies of the leaf-shaped weapon, sometimes with flat handle-plate of

bronze. These have been found associated with articles assigned to the 3rd
or 4th century b.c.

Fig. 3.—Bronze Spear-Head, length 19 inches.

An important distinction between the characteristic bronze swords
peculiar to southern peoples and the swords both of iron and of bronze
found together in the Hallstatt cemeteries (in the Salzkammergut, Austria,
ancient Noricum) is that whereas the former invariably
Hallstatt Weapons. have short handles (2¼ to 2½ in.), the latter are provided
with handles from 3 to 3½ in. long, terminating in a
round or oval pommel; the grip of one of the bronze swords even reaches a
length of 4 in. The hilts are decorated with ivory, amber, wood, bronze,
horn, and the decoration of blade and scabbard is often elaborate. The
length of these swords is sometimes as much as 30 to 33 in. Again at La
Tène on Lake Neuchâtel iron swords have been found to the number of one
hundred, with handles of 4 to 7½ in. long and a total length varying from 30
to 38 in. Similar remains have been found in France at Bibracte and Alesia,
and even in Ireland (cf. Munro, The Lake-dwellings of Europe, pp. 282,
383).

The occurrence at Hallstatt of bronze swords together with iron, having
the characteristic long handle, has led to the hypothesis that the graves are
those of an immigrant (probably Celtic) people of northern extraction which
had conquered and overlaid a smaller-framed Bronze Age people, and had
introduced the use of iron while continuing to use the bronze of their
predecessors with the necessary modifications. This theory derived from

tangible remains is corroborated by literary evidence. Thus Polybius (ii. 33,
iii. 114) describes the Celtic peoples as fighting with a long pointless iron
sword, which easily bent and was in any case too large to be used easily in a
mêlée.

The graves at Hallstatt yielded in addition to these important swords a
much larger number of spears. Of these two only were of bronze, the head
of the larger being 7½ in. long. The much more numerous iron heads range
up to as much as 2 ft. in length, and are all fastened to the shaft by rivets.
All the arrow-heads found are of bronze, while of the axes the great
majority are of iron; a few have iron edges fitted in a bed of bronze.

These examples are sufficient to show that the transition from bronze to
iron was very slow. The fact that they were found in a district which is
known to have been directly in the line of march pursued by invaders from
the north tends to confirm the theory that the introduction of iron was the
work of such invaders.

See Sir John Evans, Ancient Stone Implements (2nd. ed., 1897),
Bronze Implements; W. Ridgeway, Early Age of Greece; and works
quoted under Archaeology.

3. Early Greek Weapons.—The character of the weapons used by the
early peoples of the Aegean in the periods known as Minoan, Mycenaean
and Homeric is a problem which has given rise of recent years to much
discussion. The controversy is an important part of the
Mycenaean and Homeric question as a whole, and the various theories of
Homeric. the weapons used in the Trojan War hinge on wider
theories as to the date and authorship of the Homeric
poems. One widely accepted hypothesis, based on the important monograph
by Dr Wolfgang Reichel, Über homerische Waffen. Archäologische
Untersuchungen (Vienna, 1894), is that the Homeric heroes, like those who

created the civilization known as Mycenaean, had no defensive armour
except the Mycenaean shield, and used weapons of bronze. This view is
derived to a great extent from the Homeric poems themselves, in which the
metal most frequently mentioned is χαλκός (bronze), and involves the
assumption that all passages which describe the use of corslets, breastplates,
small shields and greaves are later interpolations. It is maintained on the
other hand (e.g. by Prof. W. Ridgeway, Early Age of Greece, i. chap. 3), that
the Homeric Achaeans (whom he regards as the descendants of the central
European peoples, the makers of the Hallstatt iron swords) were far
advanced into the Iron Age, and that the use of bronze weapons is merely
another instance of the fact that the introduction of a new element does not
necessarily banish the older. This theory would separate the Homeric from
the Mycenaean altogether, and is part of a much more comprehensive
ethnological hypothesis. According to another hypothesis, the Homeric
poems are true descriptions of a single age, or, in other words, the weapons
of the Homeric age were far more diverse and elaborate than is supposed by
Reichel.

Very few traces of iron have been found in the Mycenaean settlements,
nor have any examples of body armour been found except the ceremonial
gold breastplates at Mycenae. The Mycenaean soldiers carried apparently a
bronze spear, a bronze sword and a bow and arrows. The arrow-heads are
first of obsidian and later of bronze. It would appear that only the chief
warriors used spear and shield, while the majority fought with bows. The
swords found at Mycenae are two-edged, of rigid bronze, and as long as 3
ft. or even more; from representations of battles it would seem that they
were perhaps used for thrusting mainly. They are highly ornamented and
some have hilts of wood, bone or ivory, or even gold mounting. Later
swords became shorter and of a type like that of early iron swords found in
Greece. Moreover in a few cases there have been found in pre-Mycenaean
(late Minoan III.) tombs a few examples of short iron swords together with

bronze remains. All Mycenaean spears are of bronze and, apparently, their
shafts, unlike the Homeric, had no butt-piece. In the absence of any metal
helmets in the tombs we may perhaps assume that the Mycenaean helmet
was a leather cap, possibly strengthened with tusks, such as appears in
Homer (Iliad, x.) also. The Mycenaean shield (generally, perhaps, made of
leather) has given rise to much controversy, which hinges largely on the
interpretation of the evidence provided by the representation on the Warrior
Vase and the Painted Stele from Mycenae and pottery found at Tiryns.
Professor Ridgeway regards these as describing post-Mycenaean
conditions, and maintains that the true Mycenaean shield was always long
(from neck to feet), and that it was either in the form of a figure-of-eight
targe, or rectangular and sometimes incurved like the section of a cylinder;
whereas the Homeric shield was round (e.g. κυκλότερος, εὔκυκλος, &c.).
Dr Reichel’s followers believe that the Homeric shield was long (“like a
tower”) and incurved in the centre like the Mycenaean, that Homer knew
nothing of the small round shield, and that the epithets implying roundness
used in the poems are to be explained as meaning “well-balanced” or as late
interpolations. On the whole we must conclude that the Mycenaean age is
by no means a single homogeneous whole (see Aegean Civilization), and
that the weapons are not exclusively of bronze, nor of any single type.

The Homeric warrior in full armour, according to the Homeric poems,
wore: (1) shield (ἀσπίς, σάκος), (2) greaves (κνημῖδες), (3) band (ζῶμα),
(4) belt (ζωστήρ)and mitrē, (5) tunic (χιτών), (6) helmet (κορύς), (7)
breastplate (θώρηξ), (8) sword (ξίφος). The λαισήΐον was a protection
worn by the archers in place of a shield. According to the usual view, the
Homeric shield was, as we have seen, bent in about half way up each side
(in the form of a figure-of-eight) to give freedom to the arms, and large
enough to protect the whole body. The two curves were held rigid by two
Wooden (probably) staves inside. It was composed of layers of ox-hide
overlaid with bronze, forming a boss in the centre, and sometimes had studs

upon it. Reichel’s view is that it was the weight of these huge shields which
led to the use of the chariot as a means of going rapidly from one part of the
field to another (though Professor Ridgeway and others contest this, and
Helbig mentions more than one case of long journeys on foot under shield),
and further that the round shield is entirely unknown to Homer. This large
shield was clearly the natural protection against showers of missiles, rather
than against enemies fighting with the sword.

The greaves were, no doubt, generally of hide, protected the leg all
round, and were fastened at the knee with cords. On the other hand
Mycenaean bronze greaves have been found at Enkomi (Cyprus) and at
Glassinatz (Glasinac), and therefore it is not necessary, following Reichel,
to cut out Homer’s references to the “bronze-greaved” Achaeans (Iliad, vii.
41), a phrase which has been taken as evidence for regarding the passage as
spurious. The tin greaves of Achilles are obviously exceptional.

The thorex again is the subject of controversy. Reichel, arguing that the
great shield rendered any breastplate unnecessary, regarded the word as a
general term for body clothing, but Ridgeway strongly maintains the older
theory that it was a bronze breastplate, and Andrew Lang points out that, on
Reichel’s theory, a word which originally meant the “breast” was
transferred to mean “loin-cloth” (which, to judge from the artistic
representations, was all that the Mycenaean warrior wore), and
subsequently in historic times returned to its natural use for the breastplate
—a most unlikely evolution. The passages in Homer which describe it as a
breastplate are regarded by Reichel’s school as later interpolations. Gilbert
Murray thinks that the Homeric poems must be regarded as belonging to
different periods of development, and therefore attributes the more
elaborate armour to the “surface” (late Ionian) stratum. The zoma was
probably a loin-cloth, and the mitrē a metal band about a foot wide in front
and narrow behind to protect the lower part of the body. As a matter of fact,

however, the big shield does not exclude the use of body armour, and it is
quite likely that the Homeric warrior wore a bronze corslet, i.e. a somewhat
improved form of the λινοθώρηξ, or stiffened shirt. On the other hand, it is
probable, as we gather from the poems, that this corslet was not strong
enough to do more than stop a spent spear. The chiton was worn over the
mitrē, and reached the knees; it was held to the body by the zostēr, a metal-
plated belt. Helmets were both of metal on leather, and of leather
throughout; the crests were of horsehair (not of metal like the later Greek
helmets) and there were no cheek-pieces.

The sword has already been mentioned. Ridgeway, in spite of the almost
invariable mention of bronze as the material of the Homeric weapons,
believes that it was generally of iron, but, while the presence of iron in the
Homeric age is admitted in the case of implements, it is generally held that
weapons were all of bronze. Except for one arrow-head (Iliad, iv. 123), and
the mace of Areithoüs, mentioned as a unique example by Nestor (Iliad, vii.
141), no reference to an iron weapon proper occurs in the Homeric poems.
But the sword was used only when the favourite spear or javelin had failed
to decide the contest.

It must be admitted that the problem of pre-Homeric armour and
Homeric armour must always be largely a matter of inference, based on a
comparative study of the evidence literary and archaeological. Unless we
are prepared to adopt the theory that the Homeric poems consist of a mosaic
of interpolation informed by an archaizing editor, we must assume that they
describe a single period of transition intermediate between the Mycenaean
prime and the dawn of history proper. In this case we shall believe that the
Homeric warrior has so far adapted to changing conditions the simple
appliances of the Mycenaean that he has evolved a feeble corslet with
minor pieces of body armour, while retaining the big double-bellied shield
as a protection against the arrows which are still the chief weapon of the

rank and file and are even used on occasion by the chiefs. If we further
believe that the iron at his disposal was similar to that used by the Celts of
Polybius, it is natural to believe also that he preferred the harder bronze for
his weapons, though iron was common for domestic and other implements.

On early Greek arms in general see, besides Reichel and Ridgeway
op. cit.: A. Lang, Homer and his Age (London, 1906; and criticisms in
Classical Review, February 1907); G.G.A. Murray, The Rise of the
Greek Epic (Oxford, 1907), chap. vi; R.M. Burrows, Discoveries in
Crete (2nd ed., London, 1907); Leaf and Bayfield, Iliad, i.-xii.
Appendix A (follows Reichel); W. Helbig, Homerische Epos (1884 and
1899), and La Question mycénienne (1896); C. Robert, Studien zur
Ilias (Berlin, 1901); Chr. Tsountas and J.I. Manatt, The Mycenaean Age
(1897); V. Bérard, Les Phéniciens et l’Odyssée (Paris, 1902); Cauer,
Grundfrager d. Homerkritik (Leipzig, 1895); much valuable discussion
will be found in articles in Journ. Hell, Stud., Classical Rev. and Journ.
of Anthropol. Instit.; see also editions of Iliad and Odyssey (espec. D.B.
Monro), and works quoted under Aegean Civilization; Homer;
Mycenae.

4. Greek, Historical.—The equipment does not differ generically from
that described in the Homeric poems, except when we come to the reforms
of the Macedonians. The hoplites, who formed the main army, wore helmet,
body armour, greaves and shield, and fought with pike and sword. The
helmets were (1) the Corinthian, which covered the face to the chin, with
slits for the eyes, and often had no plume or crest; (2) the Athenian, which
did not cover the face (though sometimes it had cheek-plates which could
be turned up if necessary), had crests, sometimes triple, with plumes of
feathers, horsehair or leather; (3) a steel cap (πῖλος) without crest, plumes
or cheek-plates. The last seems to have been most common in the Spartan
army. The body armour consisted of breast and back plates fastened

together by thongs or straps and buckles; sometimes poverty compelled a
man to be content with a leather jerkin (σπολάς) partly strengthened by
metal plates, or even a quilted linen or stuffed shirt. Greaves were of pliant
bronze fastened at the back above the ankle and below the knee. Shields
were of the small round or oval type, adapted to the new conditions in
which the bow and arrow had given place to hand-to-hand fighting. They
were held by means of two handles (ὄχανα), the left hand being thrust
through the first and grasping the second. In the 5th and 4th centuries the
shield bore a device or initial representing the state and also the individual’s
own crest. The hoplite’s pike, about 8 ft. long, unlike the Homeric weapon,
was hardly ever thrown. In the Macedonian phalanx a pike (σάρισσα),
certainly 18 ft., and perhaps later in the 3rd and and 2nd centuries even 24
ft. long, was introduced. The sword was straight, sharp-pointed, short,
sometimes less than 20 in., and rarely more than 2 ft. long. It was double-
edged and used for both cut and thrust. A less common type was the
μάχαιρα or curved sabre used by the Spartans, with one sharp edge. The
hoplite had no other offensive weapons.

The cavalry were heavy-armed like the hoplites except that they carried a
smaller shield, or, more usually, none at all. They were armed with a lance
which they wielded freely (i.e. not “in rest”) and occasionally threw. The
Macedonian cavalry had a σάρισσα. The light-armed (γυμνῆτες, ψιλοί)
were (1) ἀκοντισταί, armed with a javelin (3 to 5 ft. long) and a small
shield; (2) τοξόται, archers; and (3) σφενδονῆται, slingers, whose missiles
were balls of lead, stones and hardened clay pellets. Between the heavy and
the light armed were the peltasts. The pelta, from which they took the name,
was a light shield or target, made of skin or leather on a wooden or
wickerwork frame. The Athenian Iphicrates armed them with linen corslet
and a larger spear and sword than those of the hoplites; he also invented a
new footgear (called after him iphicratides) to replace the older greaves.

5. Roman.—The equipment of the Roman soldier, like the organization of
the army (see Roman Army), passed through a great number of changes,
and it is quite impossible to summarize it as a single subject. In the period
of the kings the legion was the old Greek phalanx with Greek armour; the
front ranks wore the Greek panoply and fought with long spears and the
circular Argolic shield. The early Roman sword, like that of the Greeks,
Egyptians and Etruscans, was of bronze. We have no direct statement as to
its form, but in all probability it was of the ordinary leaf-shape. We gather
from the monuments that, in the 1st century b.c., the Roman sword was
short, worn on the right side (except by officers, who carried no shield),
suspended from a shoulder-belt (balteus) or a waist-belt (cingulum), and
reaching from the hollow of the back to the middle of the thigh, thus
representing a length of from 22 in. to 2 ft. The blade was straight, double-
edged, obtusely-pointed. On the Trajan column (a.d. 114) it is considerably
longer, and under the Flavian emperors the long, single-edged spatha
appears frequently along with the short sword.

The second period ending with the Punic wars witnessed a change. The
hastati and the principes are both heavily armed, but the round shield has
given way to the oblong (scutum), except for one-third of the hastati who
bore only the spear and the light javelin (gaesa). The third period—that
described by Polybius—is characterized by greater complexity of armour,
due no doubt in part to the experience gained in conflicts with a wider range
of peoples, and in part to the assimilation of the methods peculiar to the
new Italian allies. Thus we find the skirmishers (velites) armed with a light
javelin 3 ft. long and ¾ in. thick, with an iron point 9 in. long; this point
was so fragile that it was rendered useless by the first cast. For defence they
wore a hide-covered headpiece and a round buckler 3 ft. in diameter. The
heavy-armed carried a scutum formed of two boards glued together, covered
with canvas and skin, and incurved into the shape of a half-cylinder; its
upper and lower edges were strengthened with iron rims and its centre with

a boss (umbo). A greave was worn on the right leg, and the helmet was of
bronze with a crest of three feathers. The wealthier soldiers wore the full
cuirass of chain armour (lorica), the poorer a brass plate 9 in. square. For
offence they carried a sword and two javelins. The former was the Spanish
weapon, straight, double-edged and pointed, for both thrust and cut, in place
of the old Greek sword.

The characteristic weapon, however, was the pilum (Gr. ὑσσός). The
form of this weapon and the mode of using it have been minutely described
by Polybius (vi. 23), but his description has been much misunderstood in
consequence of the rarity of representations or remains of the pilum. It is
shown on a monument of St Rémy in Provence, assigned to the age of the
first emperors, and in a bas-relief at Mainz, on the grave-stone of Quintus
Petilius Secundus, a soldier of the 15th legion. A specimen of the actual
weapon is in the museum at Wiesbaden. It is a javelin with a stout iron head
(7 in.), carried on an iron rod, about 20 in. in length, which terminates in a
tang for insertion in the wooden shaft. As represented on the monuments,
the iron part of the weapon is about one-third of its entire length (6¾ ft.). It
was used primarily as a missile. When the point pierced the shield the
weight of the stave pulled the shield downwards and rendered it useless. At
close quarters it answered all the purposes, offensive and defensive, of the
modern bayonet when “fixed.” Vegetius, in his Rei militaris instituta,
describes it in a modified form as used in the armies of the lower empire,
and in a still more modified form it reappears as the “argon” of the Franks.
This equipment was characteristic of hastati, principes and triarii (save that
the latter used the hasta instead of the pilum). We thus see how great is the
change from the time when the hastati were the light-armed (from hasta) of
the Greek phalanx.

The cavalry, which had originally been protected only by a light ox-hide
shield and the most fragile spears, adopted, about Polybius’s time, the full

Greek equipment of buckler, strong spear and breastplate.

In the last period of the republic the pilum became the universal weapon
of the heavy-armed, while the auxiliaries (all foreigners, the velites having
disappeared) used the hasta and the long single-edged sword (spatha).
Under the empire the heavy-armed, according to Josephus, had helmet,
cuirass, a long sword worn on the left side, and a dagger on the right, pilum
and scutum. The special detachment detailed to attend the commander had a
round shield (clipeus) and a long spear. The cavalry wore armour like that
of the infantry, with a broadsword, a buckler slung from the horse’s side, a
long pole for thrusting, and several javelins, almost as large as spears, in a
sheath or quiver. Arrian, writing of a period some fifty years later, gives
further particulars from which we gather that of the cavalry some were
bowmen, some polemen, while others wielded lances and axes.

For the arms and armour of other peoples of antiquity see e.g.
Persia: History, Ancient, section v. “The Persian Empire of the
Achaemenids”; Britain, Anglo-Saxon, section v. “Warfare”; Etruria;
Egypt, &c.
(J. M. M.)

6. English from the Norman Conquest.—It is unnecessary here to trace in
detail the history of European armour in the middle ages and after, but its
use and fashion in England may illustrate the broad lines of the gradual
perfection and the hurried abandonment of the ancient war-harness. Each
country gave its armour something of the national character, the Spanish
harness being touched with the Moorish taste, the Italian with the classical
note borrowed from the monuments of old time, and the German with the
Teutonic feeling for the grotesque.

To understand the development of English arms and armour it is well for
us to consider carefully the fashion of these things at the time of that
landmark of history, the Norman Conquest. Poets, chroniclers and law-

makers give us material
11th-century for their description, and
Bayeux tapestry. in the great embroidery
of Bayeux, with its more
than six hundred lively figures, we have
pictured all the circumstances of war. We
find that weapons and war gear have
advanced little or nothing beyond the age
which saw the Dacian warrior armed from
crown to foot. A knight is reckoned fully
armed if he have helmet, hawberk and
shield; his weapons are sword and lance,
although he sometimes carries axe or mace
Fig. 4.—From the Bayeux
and, more rarely, a bow. The coat of fence, Tapestry.
which the Norman called hawberk and the
English byrnie, hangs from neck to knee, the sleeves loose and covering the
elbow only, the skirt slit before and behind for ease in the saddle. The
Bayeux artists (see fig. 4) commonly show these skirts as though they were
short breeches, the hawberk taking the fashion at first sight of a man’s
swimming dress, but other authorities set us right, and towards the end of
the tapestry we see men stripping hawberks from the slain by pulling them
over the head. Back and front are so much alike that he who armed Duke
William for the fight slipped on the armour hind side before, an omen that
he should change his state of a duke for that of a king. The hawberk might
be mail of woven rings, of rings sewn upon leather or cotton, of overlapping
scales of leather, horn or iron, of that jazerant work which was formed of
little plates sewn to canvas or linen, or of thick cotton and old linen padded
and quilted in lozenges, squares or lines. There are indications that the
hawberk was sometimes reinforced at the breast probably by a small oblong
plate fastened underneath. Its weight is shown in the scene where William’s

men carry arms to the ships, each hawberk being borne between two men
upon a pole thrust through the sleeves.

The helmet is a brimless and pointed cap, either all of metal or of leather
or even wood framed and strengthened with metal. Its characteristic piece is
the guard which protects the nose and brow from swinging cuts, so
disguising the knight that William must needs take off his helmet to show
his men that he had not fallen. Such a nasal appears in a 10th-century
illumination; at the time of the Conquest it was all but universal. It grows
rare and all but disappears in the 13th century, although examples are found
to the end of the middle ages. The helmet is laced under the chin, and under
it the knight often wore a hood of mail or quilting which covered the top of
the head, the ears and neck, but left the chin free—in two or three cases he
has this hood without the helmet. A close coif was probably worn beneath it
when it was of ringed mail, to spare the fretting of the metal on the head.

The knights’ legs are shown in most cases as unprotected save by stout
hose or leg-bands: only in two or three instances does the tapestry picture a
warrior with armed legs, and it is perhaps significant of the rarity of this
defence that the duke is so armed. The feet are covered only by the leather
boot, the heels having prick spurs.

Broad-bladed swords with cross-hilts of straight or drooping quills are
fastened with a strap and buckle girdle to the left side. They have a short
grip, and the blade would seem to be from 2½ to 3 ft. in length. The
chieftain unarmed in his house is often seen with unbuckled and sheathed
sword sceptre-wise in his hands, carrying it as an Indian raja will nurse his
sheathed tulwar. The ash spears brandished or couched by the knights as
they charge seem from 7 to 8 or 9 ft. in length. In a few cases a three-forked
pennon flutters at the end. The axe, a weapon which the Normans, in spite
of their Norse ancestry, do not carry in the battle, is of the type called the
Danish axe, long-shafted, the large blade boldly curved out. Maces, such as

that with which the bishop of Bayeux rallies his young men, seem knotted
clubs of simple form. Short and strong bows are drawn to the breast by the
Norman archers.

Of the shields in the fight, four or five borne by the English are of the old
English form—large, round bucklers of linden-wood, bossed and ribbed
with iron. For the rest the horsemen bear the Norman shield, kite-shaped,
with tapering foot, and long enough to carry a dead warrior from the field.
On the inner side are straps for the hand to grip and a long strap allowed the
knight to hang the shield from his neck. Let us note that although wyvern-
like monsters, crosses, roundels and other devices appear on these shields,
none of them has any indication of true armory, whose origins must be
placed in the next century.

The 12th century, although an age of riding and warring, affects but little
the fashion of armour. The picture of a king on his seal may well stand for
the full-armed knight of his age, but Henry Beauclerc, Stephen and Henry
II. are shown in harness not much unlike that of the
12th Century. Bayeux needlework. But the sleeve of the hawberk goes
to the wrist, and the kite shield grows less, Stephen’s
shield being 30 in. long at the most. On Stephen’s second seal the mail hood
is drawn over the point of the chin, and Henry II.’s seals show the chin
covered to the lips. At least one seal of this king has the legs and feet armed
with hose of ringed mail, probably secured by lacing at the back of the leg
as a modern boot is laced. The first seal of Richard Lionheart marks an
important movement. His hawberk, hood and hose clothe him, like his
father, from crown to toe, and to this equipment he adds gloves of mail.
Under the hawberk flows out to the heels the skirt of a long gown slit in
front. But helm and shield are the most remarkable points. The shield has
become flatter at the top, and at last the shield of an English king bears
those armorial devices whose beginnings are seen elsewhere a generation

before. The earlier seal has the shield with a rampant lion ramping to the
sinister side and closely resembling that on the shield of Philip of Alsace,
long believed to be the earliest example of true armory. But the shield in the
second seal bears the three leopards which have been ever since the arms of
the kings of England, and from this time to the end of the middle ages
armorial devices become the common decorations of the knight’s shield,
coat, saddle and horse-trapper. The helmet of the first seal is a high thimble-
topped cap, without a nasal guard, but the second has the king’s head
covered with the great helm, barrel-shaped and reinforced in front with a
flat ventaile pierced in slits for the sight. This helm is crested with a
semicircular ridge from which spring two wings, or rows of feathers fan-
wise. On its side the ridge bears a single leopard, the forerunner of the
coming crests.

For 13th-century arms, although but poor scraps remain of original
material, we have authority in plenty—pictures, seals and carving, and,
above all, the effigies in stone or brass which give us each visible link, strap
and ornament. All these have for a commentary
13th Century. chronicles, poems and account books, so that the history
of armour may be followed in detail.

The long, sleeveless surcoat seen over King John’s mail on his broad seal
goes through the century and is often embroidered with arms. The shield
becomes flat-topped the better to receive armorial charges. The great helm
is common, although many knights on the day of battle like better the
freedom of the mail hood with a steel cap worn over or under its crown,
keeping for the tourney-yard the great helm which towards the century-end
begins to carry its towering crest. Great variety is seen in the forms of the
flat or round-topped helm, some being in one piece, pierced for sight and
air, others having hinged or movable ventailes. At the end of the century a
sugar-loaf type is the established form. The knight’s hawberk is worn over a

gambeson of linen, quilted linen or cotton, which lesser men wear with a
steel cap for all defence. Breast and back plates also are sometimes borne
under the hawberk, and the first plates in sight at last appear in those knee-
cops which protect the joining of the upper and lower hose, and in a few
examples of bainbergs or greaves of metal or leather. At the end of Henry
III.’s reign we have the admirable illustrations of a manuscript of Matthew
Paris’s Lives of the Offas, with many pictures of knights. (See fig 5.) Here
we see knights with knee-cop and greave and a plenty of curious
headpieces, the plain mail hood and mail hoods with a plate ventaile to
cover the face, barrel-helms and round-topped helms and even round-
topped helmets with the Norman nose-guard.

From The Ancestor, by permission of A Constable & Co. Ltd.
Fig. 5.—Knights’ Armour, c. 1250.

In the last half of the 13th century appears the curious defence known as
alettes. This name is given to a pair of leather plates generally oblong in
form and tagged to the back of the shoulder. As a rule they are borne to
display the wearer’s arms, but being sometimes plain they may have had
some slight defensive value, covering a weak spot at the armpit and turning

a sweeping sword-cut at the neck. They disappear in the earlier years of
Edward III.

Surcoat, shield and trapper have the arms of their owner. The rowel-spur
makes a rare appearance. Weapons change little. although the sword is often
longer and heavier. Richard I. had favoured the cross-bow, in spite of papal
denunciations of that weapon hateful to God, and its use is common through
all the 13th century, after which it makes way for the national weapon of the
long-bow.

In the 14th century, the high-day of chivalry, the age of Creçy and
Poitiers, of the Black Prince and Chandos, the age which saw enrolled the
noble company of the Garter, the art of the armourer and weapon-smith
strides forward. At its beginning we see many knights
14th century. still clad in chain mail with no visible plate. At its end
the knight is often locked in plates from head to foot, no
chainwork showing save the camail edge under the helm and the fringe of
the mail skirt or hawberk.

Before the first quarter of the 14th century is past many of these plates
are in common use. Sir John de Creke’s brass, about 1325-1330, is a fair
example (fig. 6). His helmet is a basinet, pointed at the top, probably worn
over a complete hood of mail flowing to the mid-breast. This hood was
soon to lose its crown, the later basinets having the camail, a defence of
mail covering neck, cheeks and chin and secured to the basinet with eyelet
holes and loops through which a lace was passed. A rerebrace of plate
defends the outer side of the upper arm, plain elbow-cops the elbow, and
round bosses in the form of leopard heads guard the shoulder and the crook
of the elbow. The fore-arm is covered with the plates of a vambrace which
appears from under the hawberk sleeve. Large and decorated knee-cops
cover the knees, ridged greaves the shins, and the upper part of the foot
from pointed toe to ankle is fenced with those articulated and overlapping

plates the perfection of which in the next century
enabled the full-harnessed knight to move his body as
freely as might an unarmed man. Under the plates the
mail hose show themselves and the heels have
rowelled spurs. He has a hawberk of mail whose front
skirt ends in a point between the knees, the loose
sleeves between wrist and elbow. Under this is a
haketon of some soft material whose folds fall to a line
above the height of the knee. Over the hawberk is a
garment, perhaps of leather with a dagged skirt-edge,
and over this again is a sleeveless gambeson or
pourpoint of leather or quilted work, studded and
enriched. Over all is the sleeveless surcoat, the skirt
before cut squarely off at the height of the fork of the
leg, the skirt behind falling to below the knee. The
loose folds of this surcoat are gathered at the waist by a
narrow belt, the sword hanging from a broader belt
carried across the hip. Before 1350 the long surcoat of Fig. 6.—Brass
the 13th century was still further shortened, the tails of Sir John de
Creke.
being cut off squarely with the front. The fate of Sir
From Waller’s
John Chandos, who in 1369 stumbled on a slippery Monumental Brasses.
road, his long coat “armed with his arms” becoming
tangled with his legs, points to the fact that an old soldier might cling to an
old fashion.

The desire for a better defence than a steel cap and camail and a less
cumbrous one than the great helm, in which the knight rode half stifled and
half blind, brought in as a fighting headpiece the basinet with a movable
viser. This is found throughout this century, disappearing in the next when
the salet and its varieties displaced it. But there were many knights who still
fought with the great helm covering basinet and camail, a fact which speaks

eloquently of the mighty blows given in this warlike age. The many
monumental brasses of the last half of the 14th century show us for the
most part knights in basinet and camail with the face exposed, but their
heads are commonly pillowed on the great helm and in any case the viser
would hinder the artist’s desire to show the knight’s features.

The fully-armed man of the latter half of the 14th
century seems to have worn a rounded breastplate
and a back-plate over his chain hawberk. Chaucer’s
Sir Thopas must always be cited for the defences of
this age, the hero wearing the quilted haketon next
his shirt, and over that the habergeon, a lesser
hawberk of chain mail. His last defence is a fine
hawberk “full strong of plate” showing that
“hawberk” sometimes served as a word for the body
plates. Over all this is the “cote-armure” or surcoat.
Many passages from the chroniclers show that the
three coats of fence one over the other were in
common use in the field, and Froissart tells a tale of
a knight struck by a dart in such wise that the head
pierced through his plates, his coat of mail and his
haketon stuffed with twisted silk. The surcoat in the
age of Edward III. became a scanty garment sitting
Fig. 7.—Brass of tightly to the body, laced up the back or sides, the
Sir John de Foxley.
close skirts ending at the fork of the leg with a
From Waller’s
Monumental Brasses. dagged or slittered edge. The waistbelt is rarely in
sight, but the broad belt across the hips, on which
the dagger comes to hang as a balance to the sword, grows richer and
heavier, the best work of the goldsmith or silversmith being spent upon it.
Arms and legs and feet become cased in plate of steel or studded leather,
and before the mid-century the shoulder-plates, like the steel shoes, are of

overlapping pieces and the elbow also moves easily under the same
defence. (See fig. 7.)

Such harness, ever growing more beautiful in its
rich details, serves our champions until the
beginning of the 15th century, when the fashion
begins to turn. The scanty surcoat tends to
disappear. It may be that during the bitter feuds and
fierce slaughters of the Wars of
15th century. the Roses men were unwilling to
display on their breasts the
bearings by which their mortal foe might know
them afar. The horseman’s shield went with the
surcoat, its disuse hastened by the perfection of
armour, and the banners of leaders remained as the
only armorial signs commonly seen in war. But at
jousts and tourneys, where personal distinction was
eagerly sought, the loose tabard, which, after the
middle of the century, bore the arms of the wearer
Fig. 8.—Brass of
on back, front and both sleeves, was still to be Sir John Lisle at
Thruxton.
seen, with the crest of parchment or leather
towering above a helm whose mantle, from the
ribbon-like strip of the early 13th century, had grown into a fluttering cloak
with wildly slittered edge streaming out behind the charging knight.

When a score of years of this 15th century had run we find the knight
closed in with plates, no edge of chain mail remaining in sight. The surcoat
being gone we see him armed in breast and back plate, his loins covered by
a skirt of “tonlets,” as the defence of overlapping horizontal bands comes to
be named (fig. 8). The chain camail has gone out of fashion, the basinet
continuing itself with a chin and cheek plate which joins a gorget of plate

covering the collar-bone, a movable viser shutting in the whole head with
steel. The gussets of chain mail sewn into the leathern or fustian doublet
worn below the body armour are unseen even at the gap at the hollow of the
arm where the plates must be allowed to move freely, for a little plate,
round, oval or oblong, is tagged to each side to fence the weak point. These
plates often differ in size and shape one from the other, the sword-arm side
carrying the smaller one.

Fig. 9.—Gothic Style of Armour. Monument of Count Otto IV. of Henneberg.

Soon after this the six or eight “tonlets” grow fewer, being continued on
the lower edge by the so-called tuilles, small plates strapped to the tonlets
and swinging with the movement of the legs. A fine suit of armour is shown
in the monument of Count Otto IV. of Henneberg (fig. 9). Knightly armour
takes perhaps its last expression of perfection in such a noble harness as that
worn by Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, whose armed effigy was
wrought between 1451 and 1454 (fig. 10). In this we see the characteristic
feature of the great elbow-cops, whose channelled and fluted edges
overlapping vambrace and rerebrace become monstrous fan-like shapes in
the brass of Richard Quartremayns, graven about 1460. At this time the
harness of the left shoulder is often notably reinforced, as compared with
that of the sword-arm shoulder. Towards the latter part of the century chain
mail reappears as a skirt or breech of mail, showing itself under the
diminished tonlets, and, when helm and gorget are removed, as a high-
standing collar. The articulation by overlapping plates extends even to the
breastplate, whose front is thus in two or more pieces. Very long-necked
rowel-spurs are often found, and the toes of the sabbatons or steel shoes are
sharply pointed. The characteristic helmet of the latter half of the century is
the salet or salade, a large steel cap, whose edge is carried out from the
brows and still more boldly at the back of the neck.

Knights abandon the great helm in war, but it is perfected for use in the
tilt-yard, taking for that purpose an enormous size, to enable two good
inches of stuffing to come between head or face and the steel plate. Such a
helm sits well down on the shoulders, to which it is locked before and
behind by strong buckles or rivets. The note of the 15th century in armour is
that of fantastically elaborate forms boldly outlined and a splendour of
colour which gained much from the custom of wearing over the full harness
short cloaks or rich coats turned up with furs, or from another fashion of

covering the body plates or brigandines with
rich velvets studded with gold. The details of
the harness take a thousand curious shapes,
and even amongst the simpler jacks and steel
caps of the archers the same glorious variety
is seen.

If the note of the 15th century be variety of
form, that of the 16th century, the last
important chapter in the history of armour, is
surface decoration, the harness of great folk
atoning in some measure for loss of the
beautiful medieval sense
16th century. of line by elaborate
enrichment. Plain
engraving, niello, russet work, golden inlay
and beaten ornament are common methods of
enrichment. The great plume of ostrich
Fig. 10.—Brass of Richard
feathers flows from the helmet crown of Beachamp, earl of
leaders in war. As in the reign of Edward III., Warwick.

costume’s fashion affects the forms of From Stothard’s Monumental
Effigies.
armour, the broad toe of the Henry VIII. shoe
being imitated in steel, as the wide fluted
skirts of the so-called Maximilian armour imitate the German fashion in
civil dress which the Imperial host popularized through northern Europe
(fig. 11). These skirts have been called “lamboys” by modern writers on
military antiquities, but the word seems an antiquarianism of no value,
apparently a misreading of the word “jambeis” in some early document. So
many notable examples of the armour of this 16th century are accessible in
European collections, other illustrations occurring in great plenty, that its
details call for little discussion; a fine and characteristic suit is that by the

famous English armourer, Jacob Topf (fig. 12), which belonged to Sir
Christopher Hatton. Into this century the arquebusier marches, demanding a
chief place in the line of battle, although it is a common error that the
improvement in fire-arms drove out the fully armed warrior, whose plates
gave him no protection. Until the rifle came to the soldier’s hands, plate
armour could easily be made shot-proof. It was driven from the field by the
new strategy which asked for long marches and rapid movements of armies.
This century’s armour for the tilt-yard gives such protection to the
champion, with its many reinforcing pieces, that unless the caged helm
were used—the same which cost Henry II. of France his life—the risks of
the tilt-yard must have fallen much below those of the polo-field. The horse
with crinet, chafron and bards of steel was as well covered from harm.

From Hewitt’s Arms and Armour.
Fig. 11.—Meeting of Henry VIII. and Maximilian.

Before the end of the
16th century the full suit of
war harness is an antique
survival. Long boots take
the place of greaves and
steel shoes, and early in the
16th century the military
pedants are heard to bewail
the common laying aside of
other pieces. The mounted
cavalier—cuirassier or
pistolier—might take the
field, even as late as the
Great Rebellion, armed at
all points save the backs of
the thighs and the legs
below the knee; but a
combed and brimmed cap,
breast and back plate and
tassets equipped the
pikeman, and the
musketeer would march
without any metal on him
save his headpiece, for it
was soon found that
heavily armed musketeers,
after a long trudge through
summer dust or winter
mud, were readier to rest
than to shoot. Everywhere

there was revolt against the
burden of plates, and as
early as 1593 Sir Richard
Hawkins found that his
adventurers would not use
even the light corslets
provided by him,
“esteeming a pot of wine a
better defence.” Gervase
Markham, in his Souldier’s
Accidence of 1645, asks
that at least the captain of
cuirassiers should be armed
“at all peeces, cap a pee,”
but he would have found
few such captains, and
Markham is a great praiser
of noble old custom. The
famous figure of a pikeman
of 1668 (fig. 13) in Elton’s
Art Military has steel cap,
corslet and tassets, but he
stands for a fashion dead or
dying. The last noteworthy
helmet was what is now
termed the lobster-tail
helmet, a headpiece with
round top, flat brim before,
a broad articulated brim
behind, cheek-pieces

hanging by straps and a
Fig. 12—Suit by Jacob Topf, nearly complete, the
gorget does not belong to it. Below is the placcate.
grate of upright bars to
cover the face, some having in place of the grate a movable nose-guard to
be raised or lowered at will. The close resemblance of this helmet to that
worn by the Japanese, with whom the Dutch were then trading, is worth
remark, although each of the two pieces seems to have had its separate
origin. Thus, save for a steel cap here and a corslet there, especially to be
found amongst the guards of sovereigns who must cling to something of
antique tradition, armour departs out of the civilized world.

When in the reign of Queen Victoria her
mounted guardsmen were given back their
breast and back plates, the last piece of
body armour had been the tiny gilt crescent
worn at the throat by officers of foot,
which crescent was the
Survival of shrunken symbol of that
armour. great gorget of plate that
came in with the 13th
century. The shining plates of the Guards
are parade pieces only, but a curious
revival of an old defence was carried by
English cavalry in the field at the end of
the 19th century, when small gussets of
chain mail were attached to the shoulders
of certain cavalrymen as a defence against
sword cuts. Through all the age of modern
warfare inventors have pressed the claims Fig. 13—Pikeman.

of various bullet-proof breastplates, but From The Compleat Body of the Art
Military, by Lieut. Col. Elton (1668).
where they have been effective against rifle
fire their weight has made them too heavy

an addition to the soldier’s burden. (See, however, Armour Plates, ad fin.)
Last of all we may reckon those secret coats of mail which are said to be
worn on occasion by modern rulers in dread of the assassin. The London
detective department has such coats of fence in its armoury; and on the
other side it may be remembered that the Kelly gang of bushrangers, driven
to bay, were found to have forged suits of plate for themselves out of sheets
of boiler-iron.

Ancient arms and armour are now eagerly sought by European and
American collectors, and high prices are paid down for every noteworthy
piece. The supply is assisted by the efforts of many forgers of false pieces,
the most cunning of whom bring all archaeological skill
Collections. to their aid, and few great national or private collections
are free from some example of this industry. For the
genuine pieces competition runs high. Suits of plate of the earliest period
may be sought in vain, and the greatest collectors may hardly hope for such
a panoply of the late Gothic period as that which is the ornament of the
Wallace collection. Even this famous harness is not wholly free from
suspicion of restoration. Armour of the latter half of the 16th century,
however, often appears in the sale-rooms and is found in many private
collections, although the “ancestral armour” which decorates so many
ancient halls in England is generally the plates and pots which served the
pikemen of the 17th-century militia.

It is not hard to understand this scarcity of ancient pieces. In the first
place it must be remembered that the fully armed man was always a rare
figure in war, and only the rich could engage in the costly follies of the later
tournaments. The novelists have done much to encourage the belief that
most men of gentle rank rode to the wars lance in hand, locked up in full
harness of plate; but the country gentleman, serving as light horseman or
mounted archer, would hold himself well armed had he a quilted jack or

brigandine and a basinet or salet. Men armed cap a pee crowd the
illuminations of chronicle books, the artists having the same tastes as the
boy who decorates his Latin grammar with battles which are hand-to-hand
conflicts of epauletted generals. Monuments and brasses also show these
fully armed men, but here again we must recognize the tendency which
made the last of the cheap miniaturists endow their clients lavishly with
heavy watch-chains and rings. As late as the 18th century the portrait
painters drew their military or naval sitters in the breastplates and
pauldrons, vambraces and rerebraces of an earlier age. Ancient wills and
inventories, save those of great folk or military adventurers, have scanty
reference to complete harnesses. Ringed hawberks, in a damp northern
climate, will not survive long neglect, and many of them must have been
cut in pieces for burnishers or for the mail skirts and gussets attached to the
later arming doublets. As the fashion of plate armour changed, the smith
might adapt an old harness to the new taste, but more often it would be cast
aside. Men to whom the sight of a steel coat called up the business of their
daily life wasted no sentimentality over an obsolete piece. The early
antiquaries might have saved us many priceless things, but it was not until a
few virtuosi of the 18th century were taken with the Gothic fancy that
popular archaeology dealt with aught but Greek statuary and Roman
inscriptions. The 19th century was well advanced before an interest in
medieval antiquities became common amongst educated men, and for most
contemporaries of Dr Johnson a medieval helm was a barbarous curiosity
exciting the same measure of mild interest as does the Zulu knobkerry seen
by us as we pass a pawnbroker’s window.
(O. Ba.)

7. Fire-arms. (For the development of cannon, see Artillery and
Ordnance.)—Hand-cannons appear almost simultaneously with the larger
bombards. They were made by the Flemings in the 14th century. An early
instance of the use of hand fire-arms in England is the siege of

Huntercombe Manor in 1375. These were simply small cannon, provided
with a stock of wood, and fired by the application of a match to the touch-
hole. During the 15th century the hand-gun was steadily improved, and its
use became more general. Edward IV., landing in England in 1471 to
reconquer his throne, brought with him a force of Burgundian hand-gun
men (mercenaries), and in 1476 the Swiss at Morat had no less than 6000 of
their men thus armed. The prototype of the modern military weapon is the
arquebus (q.v.), a form of which was afterwards called in England the
caliver. Various dates are given for the introduction of the arquebus, which
owed many of its details to the perfected crossbow which it superseded. The
Spanish army in the Italian wars at the beginning of the 16th century was
the first to make full and effective use of the new weapon, and thus to make
the fire action of infantry a serious factor in the decision of battles. The
Spaniards also took the next step in advance. The musket (q.v.) was heavier
and more powerful than the arquebus, and, in the hands of the duke of
Alva’s army in the Netherlands, so conclusively proved its superiority that
it at once replaced its rival in the armies of Europe. Both the arquebus and
the musket had a touch-hole on the right side of the barrel, with a pan for
the priming, with which a lighted quick match was brought in contact by
pressing a trigger. The musket, on account of its weight, was provided with
a long rest, forked in the upper part and furnished with a spike to stick in
the ground. The matchlock (long-barrelled matchlocks are still used by
various uncivilized peoples, notably in India) was the typical weapon of the
soldier for two centuries. The class of hand fire-arms provided with an
arrangement for striking a spark to ignite the powder charge begins with the
wheel-lock. This lock was invented at Nuremberg in 1515, but was seldom
applied to the arquebus and musket on account of the costliness of its
mechanism and the uncertainty of its action. The early forms of flint-lock
(snaphance) were open to the same objections, and the fire-lock (as the
flint-lock was usually called) remained for many years after its introduction

the armament of special troops only, till about the beginning of the 18th
century it finally superseded the old matchlock. Thenceforward the fire-lock
(called familiarly in England “Brown Bess”) formed with the bayonet (q.v.)
the armament of all infantry, and the fire-arms carried by other troops were
constructed on the same principle. Flint-lock muskets were supplanted
about 1830-1840 by the percussion musket, in which a fulminate cap was
used. A Scottish clergyman, Alexander Forsyth, invented this method of
ignition in 1807, but it was not till 1820 that it began to come into general
use. (See Gun.) The system of firing the charge by a fulminate was
followed by the invention of the needle-gun (q.v.). The muzzle-loading rifle,
employed by special troops since about 1800, came into general use in the
armies of Europe about 1854-1860. It was superseded, as a result of the
success of the needle-gun in the war of 1866, by the breech-loading rifle,
this in its turn giving way to the magazine rifle about 1886-1890. (See
Rifle.) Neither breech-loaders nor revolvers, however, are inventions of
modern date. Both were known in Germany as early as the close of the 15th
century. There are in the Musée d’Artillerie at Paris wheel-lock arquebuses
of the 16th century which are breech-loaders; and there is, in the Tower
armoury, a revolver with the old matchlock, the date of which is about
1550. A German arquebus of the 16th century, in the museum of
Sigmaringen, is a revolver of seven barrels. Nor is rifling a new thing in
fire-arms, for there was a rifled arquebus of the 15th century, in which the
balls were driven home by a mallet, and a patent was taken out in England
for rifling in 1635. All these systems were thus known at an early period in
the history of fire-arms, but for want of the minutely accurate workmanship
required and, above all, of a satisfactory firing arrangement, they were left
in an undeveloped state until modern times. The earliest pistols were merely
shorter handguns, modified for mounted men, and provided with a straight
stock which was held against the breastplate (poitrinal or petronel). The
long-barrelled pistol was the typical weapon of the cavalry of the 16th

century. (See Cavalry.) With the revival of shock tactics initiated by
Gustavus Adolphus the length of the pistol barrel became less and less, and
its stock was then shaped for the hand alone. (See Pistol.)
(C. F. A.)

ARMSTEAD, HENRY HUGH (1828-1905), English sculptor, was first
trained as a silversmith, and achieved the highest excellence with the “St
George’s Vase” and the “Outram Shield.” He rose to the front rank among
contemporary sculptors, his chief works being the external sculptural
decorations of the colonial office in Whitehall, the sculptures on the
southern and eastern sides of the podium of the Albert Memorial, the large
fountain at King’s College, Cambridge, and numerous effigies, such as
“Bishop Wilberforce” at Winchester, and “Lord John Thynne” at
Westminster, with smaller portraiture and much ideal work. His sense of
style and nobility was remarkable; and he was besides gifted with a fine
power of design and draughtsmanship, which he put to good use in his early
years for book illustration. He was elected associate of the Royal Academy
in 1875 and a full member in 1880.

ARMSTRONG, ARCHIBALD (d. 1672), court jester, called “Archy,”
was a native of Scotland or of Cumberland, and according to tradition first

distinguished himself as a sheep-stealer; afterwards he entered the service
of James VI., with whom he became a favourite. When the king succeeded
to the English throne, Archy was appointed court jester. In 1611 he was
granted a pension of two shillings a day, and in 1617 he accompanied James
on his visit to Scotland. His influence was considerable and he was greatly
courted and flattered, but his success appears to have turned his head. He
became presumptuous, insolent and mischievous, excited foolish jealousies
between the king and Henry, prince of Wales, and was much disliked by the
members of the court. In 1623 he accompanied Prince Charles and
Buckingham in their adventure into Spain, where he was much caressed and
favoured by the Spanish court and, according to his own account, was
granted a pension. His conduct here became more intolerable than ever. He
rallied the infanta on the defeat of the Armada and censured the conduct of
the expedition to Buckingham’s face. Buckingham declared he would have
him hanged, to which the jester replied that “dukes had often been hanged
for insolence but never fools for talking.” On his return he gained some
complimentary allusions from Ben Jonson by his attacks upon the Spanish
marriage. He retained his post on the accession of Charles I., and
accumulated a considerable fortune, including the grant by the king of 1000
acres in Ireland. After the death of Buckingham in 1628, whom he declared
“the greatest enemy of three kings,” the principal object of his dislike and
rude jests was Laud, whom he openly vilified and ridiculed. He pronounced
the following grace at Whitehall in Laud’s presence: “Great praise be given
to God and little laud to the devil,” and after the news of the rebellion in
Scotland in 1637 he greeted Laud on his way to the council chamber at
Whitehall with: “Who’s fool now? Does not your Grace hear the news from
Stirling about the liturgy?” On Laud’s complaint to the council, Archy was
sentenced the same day “to have his coat pulled over his head and be
discharged the king’s service and banished the king’s court.” He settled in
London as a money-lender, and many complaints were made to the privy

council and House of Lords of his sharp practices. In 1641 on the occasion
of Laud’s arrest, he enjoyed a mean revenge by publishing Archy’s Dream;
sometimes Jester to his Majestie, but exiled the Court by Canterburie’s
malice. Subsequently he resided at Arthuret in Cumberland, according to
some accounts his birthplace, where he possessed an estate, and where he
died in 1672, his burial taking place on the 1st of April. He was twice
married, his second wife being Sybilla Bell. There is no record of any legal
offspring, but the baptism of a “base son” of Archibald Armstrong is
entered in the parish register of the 17th of December 1643. A Banquet of
Jests: A change of Cheare, published about 1630, a collection chiefly of
dull, stale jokes, is attributed to him, and with still less reason probably A
choice Banquet of Witty Jests ... Being an addition to Archee’s Jests, taken
out of his Closet but never published in his Lifetime (1660).

ARMSTRONG, JOHN (1709-1779), British physician and writer, was
born about 1709 at Castletown, Roxburghshire, where his father was parish
minister. He graduated M.D. (1732) at Edinburgh University, and soon
afterwards settled in London, where he paid more attention to literature than
to medicine. He was, in 1746, appointed one of the physicians to the
military hospital behind Buckingham House; and, in 1760, physician to the
army in Germany, an appointment which he held till the peace of 1763,
when he retired on half-pay. For many years he was closely associated with
John Wilkes, but quarrelled with him in 1763. He died on the 7th of
September 1779. Armstrong’s first publication, an anonymous one, entitled
An Essay for Abridging the Study of Physic (1735), was a satire on the

ignorance of the apothecaries and medical men of his day. This was
followed two years after by the Economy of Love, a poem the indecency of
which damaged his professional practice. In 1744 appeared his Art of
Preserving Health, a very successful didactic poem, and the one production
on which his literary reputation rests. His Miscellanies (1770) contains
some shorter poems displaying considerable humour.

ARMSTRONG, JOHN (1738-1843), American soldier, diplomatist and
political leader, born at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 25th of November
1758. His father, also named John Armstrong (1725-1795), a native of the
north of Ireland, who had emigrated to the Pennsylvania frontier between
1745 and 1748, served successively as a brigadier-general in the
Continental army (1776-77), as brigadier-general and then major-general of
the Pennsylvania militia (1777-83), during the War of Independence, and
was a member of the Continental Congress in 1779-1780 and again in
1787-1788. The son studied for a time at the College of New Jersey (now
Princeton University), and served as a major in the War of Independence. In
March 1783, while the Continental army was stationed at Newburgh (q.v.),
New York, he wrote and issued, anonymously, the famous “Newburgh
Addresses.” In 1784 he led a force of Pennsylvania militia against the
Connecticut settlers in Wyoming Valley, and treated them in such a high-
handed manner as to incur the disapproval even of the Pennsylvania
legislature. In 1789 he married the sister of Chancellor Robert R.
Livingston of New York, and removed to New York city, where his own
ability and his family connexion gave him great political influence. In

1801-2 and again in 1803-4 he was a member of the United States Senate.
From 1804 to 1810 he was the United States minister to France, and in
March 1806 he was joined with James Bowdoin as a special minister to
treat through France with Spain concerning the acquisition of Florida,
Spanish spoliations of American commerce, and the “Louisiana” boundary.
During the War of 1812, he was a brigadier-general in the United States
army from July 1812 until January 1813, and from then until August 1814
secretary of war in the cabinet of President Madison, when his unpopularity
forced him to resign. “In spite of Armstrong’s services, abilities and
experience,” says Henry Adams, “something in his character always created
distrust. He had every advantage of education, social and political
connexion, ability and self-confidence; ... but he suffered from the
reputation of indolence and intrigue.” Nevertheless, he “introduced into the
army an energy wholly new,” an energy the results of which were apparent
“for half a century.” After his resignation he lived in retirement at Red
Hook, New York, where he died on the 1st of April 1843. He published
Notices of the War of 1812 (2 vols., 1836; new ed., 1840), the value of
which is greatly impaired by its obvious partiality.

The best account of Armstrong’s career as minister to France and as
secretary of war may be found in Henry Adams’s History of the United
States, 1801-1817 (9 vols., New York, 1889-1890).

ARMSTRONG, SAMUEL CHAPMAN (1839-1893), American
soldier, philanthropist and educator, was born on Maui, one of the Hawaiian
Islands, on the 30th of January 1839, his parents Richard and Clarissa

Armstrong, being American missionaries. He was educated at the Punahou
school in Honolulu, at Oahu College, into which the Punahou school
developed in 1852, and at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts,
where he graduated in 1862. He served in the Civil War, on the Union side,
from 1862 to 1865, rising in the volunteer service to the regular rank of
colonel and the brevet rank of brigadier-general, and, after December 1863,
acted as one of the officers of the coloured troops commanded by General
William Birney. In November 1865 he was honourably mustered out of the
volunteer service. His experience as commander of negro troops had added
to his interest, always strong, in the negroes of the south, and in March
1866 he became superintendent of the Ninth District of Virginia, under the
Freedman’s Bureau, with headquarters near Fort Monroe. While in this
position he became convinced that the only permanent solution of the
manifold difficulties which the freedmen encountered lay in their moral and
industrial education. He remained in the educational department of the
Bureau until this work came to an end in 1872; though five years earlier, at
Hampton, Virginia, near Fort Monroe, he had founded, with the aid
principally of the American Missionary Association, an industrial school for
negroes, Hampton Institute, which was formally opened in 1868, and at the
head of which he remained until his death, there, on the 11th of May 1893.
After 1878 Indians were also admitted to the Institute, and during the last
fifteen years of his life Armstrong took a deep interest in the “Indian
question.” Much of his time after 1868 was spent in the Northern and
Eastern states, whither he went to raise funds for the Institute. See Samuel
Chapman Armstrong, a Biographical Study (New York, 1904), by his
daughter, Edith Armstrong Talbot.

His brother, William N. Armstrong, was attorney-general in the cabinet
of the Hawaiian king Kalakaua I. He accompanied that monarch on a
prolonged foreign tour in 1881, visiting Japan, China, Siam, India, Europe

and the United States, and in 1904 published an amusing account of the
journey, called Round the World with a King.

ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM GEORGE ARMSTRONG, Baron (1810-
1900), British inventor, founder of the Elswick manufacturing works, was
born on the 26th of November 1810, at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and was
educated at a school in Bishop Auckland. The profession which he adopted
was that of a solicitor, and from 1833 to 1847 he was engaged in active
practice in Newcastle as a member of the firm of Donkin, Stable &
Armstrong. His sympathies, however, were always with mechanical and
scientific pursuits, and several of his inventions date from a time anterior to
his final abandonment of the law. In 1841-1843 he published several papers
on the electricity of effluent steam. This subject he was led to study by the
experience of a colliery engineman, who noticed that he received a sharp
shock on exposing one hand to a jet of steam issuing from a boiler with
which his other hand was in contact, and the inquiry was followed by the
invention of the “hydro-electric” machine, a powerful generator of
electricity, which was thought worthy of careful investigation by Faraday.
The question of the utilization of water-power had engaged his attention
even earlier, and in 1839 he invented an improved rotary water motor. Soon
afterwards he designed a hydraulic crane, which contained the germ of all
the hydraulic machinery for which he and Elswick were subsequently to
become famous. This machine depended simply on the pressure of water
acting directly in a cylinder on a piston, which was connected with suitable
multiplying gear. In the first example, which was erected on the quay at

Newcastle in 1846, the necessary pressure was obtained from the ordinary
water mains of the town; but the merits and advantages of the device soon
became widely appreciated, and a demand arose for the erection of cranes
in positions where the pressure afforded by the mains was insufficient. Of
course pressure could always be obtained by the aid of special reservoirs,
but to build these was not always desirable, or even practicable. Hence,
when in 1850 a hydraulic installation was required for a new ferry station at
New Holland, on the Humber estuary, the absence of water mains of any
kind, coupled with the prohibitive cost of a special reservoir owing to the
character of the soil, impelled him to invent a fresh piece of apparatus, the
“accumulator,” which consists of a large cylinder containing a piston that
can be loaded to give any desired pressure, the water being pumped in
below it by a steam-engine or other prime mover. This simple device may
be looked upon as the crown of the hydraulic system, since by its various
modifications the installation of hydraulic power became possible in almost
any situation. In particular, it was rendered practicable on board ship, and
its application to the manipulation of heavy naval guns and other purposes
on warships was not the least important of Armstrong’s achievements.

The Elswick works were originally founded for the manufacture of this
hydraulic machinery, but it was not long before they became the birthplace
of a revolution in gunmaking; indeed, could nothing more be placed to
Armstrong’s credit than their establishment, his name would still be worthy
of remembrance. Modern artillery dates from about 1855, when
Armstrong’s first gun made its appearance. This weapon embodied all the
essential features which distinguish the ordnance of to-day from the cannon
of the middle ages—it was built up of rings of metal shrunk upon an inner
steel barrel; it was loaded at the breech; it was rifled; and it threw, not a
round ball, but an elongated projectile with ogival head. The guns
constructed on this principle yielded such excellent results, both in range
and accuracy, that they were adopted by the British government in 1859,

Armstrong himself being appointed engineer of rifled ordnance and
receiving the honour of knighthood. At the same time the Elswick Ordnance
Company was formed to manufacture the guns under the supervision of
Armstrong, who, however, had no financial interest in the concern; it was
merged in the Elswick Engineering Works four years later. Great Britain
thus originated a principle of gun construction which has since been
universally followed, and obtained an armament superior to that possessed
by any other country at that time. But while there was no doubt as to the
shooting capacities of these guns, defects in the breech mechanism soon
became equally patent, and in a few years caused a reversion to muzzle-
loading. Armstrong resigned his position in 1863, and for seventeen years
the government adhered to the older method of loading, in spite of the
improvements which experiment and research at Elswick and elsewhere had
during that period produced in the mechanism and performance of heavy
guns. But at last Armstrong’s results could no longer be ignored; and wire-
wound breech-loading guns were received back into the service in 1880.
The use of steel wire for the construction of guns was one of Armstrong’s
early ideas. He perceived that to coil many turns of thin wire round an inner
barrel was a logical extension of the large hooped method already
mentioned, and in conjunction with I.K. Brunel, was preparing to put the
plan to practical test when the discovery that it had already been patented
caused him to abandon his intention, until about 1877. This incident well
illustrates the ground of his objection to the British system of patent law,
which he looked upon as calculated to stifle invention and impede progress;
the patentees in this case did not manage to make a practical success of
their invention themselves, but the existence of prior patents was sufficient
to turn him aside from a path which conducted him to valuable results when
afterwards, owing to the expiry of those patents, he was free to pursue it as
he pleased.

Lord Armstrong, who was raised to the peerage in 1887, was the author
of A Visit to Egypt (1873), and Electric Movement in Air and Water (1897),
besides many professional papers. He died on the 27th of December 1900,
at Rothbury, Northumberland. His title became extinct, but his grand-
nephew and heir, W.H.A.F. Watson-Armstrong (b. 1863), was in 1903
created Baron Armstrong of Bamburgh and Cragside.

ARMY (from Fr. armée, Lat. armata), a considerable body of men
armed and organized for the purpose of warfare on land (Ger. Armee), or
the whole armed force at the disposal of a state or person for the same
purpose (Ger. Heer = host). The application of the term is sometimes
restricted to the permanent, active or regular forces of a state. The history of
the development of the army systems of the world is dealt with in this
article in sections 1 to 38, being followed by sections 39 to 59 on the
characteristics of present-day armies. The remainder of the article is
devoted to sections on the history of the principal armies of Europe, and
that of the United States. For the Japanese Army see Japan, and for the
existing condition of the army in each country see under the country
heading.

General History

1. Early Armies.—It is only with the evolution of the specially military
function in a tribe or nation, expressed by the separation of a warrior-class,
that the history of armies (as now understood) commences. Numerous

savage tribes of the present day possess military organizations based on this
system, but it first appears in the history of civilization amongst the
Egyptians. By the earliest laws of Egypt, provision was made for the
support of the warriors. The exploits of her armies under the legendary
Sesostris cannot be regarded as historical, but it appears certain that the
country possessed an army, capable of waging war in a regular fashion, and
divided thus early into separate arms, these being chariots, infantry and
archers. The systems of the Assyrians and Babylonians present no particular
features of interest, save that horsemen, as distinct from charioteers, appear
on the scene. The first historical instance of a military organization
resembling those of modern times is that of the Persian empire.

2. Persia.—Drawn from a hardy and nomadic race, the armies of Persia
at first consisted mainly of cavalry, and owed much of their success to the
consequent ease and rapidity of their movements. The warlike Persians
constantly extended their power by fresh conquests, and for some time
remained a distinctly conquering and military race, attaining their highest
power under Cyrus and Cambyses. Cyrus seems to have been the founder of
a comprehensive military organization, of which we gather details from
Xenophon and other writers. To each province was allotted a certain
number of soldiers as standing army. These troops, formed originally of
native Persians only, were called the king’s troops. They comprised two
classes, the one devoted exclusively to garrisoning towns and castles, the
other distributed throughout the country. To each province was appointed a
military commander, responsible for the number and efficiency of the
troops in his district, while the civil governor was answerable for their
subsistence and pay. Annual musters were held, either by the king in person
or by generals deputed for the purpose and invested with full powers. This
organization seems to have fully answered its original purpose, that of
holding a vast empire acquired by conquest and promptly repelling inroads
or putting down insurrections. But when a great foreign war was

contemplated, the standing army was augmented by a levy throughout the
empire. The extent of the empire made such a levy a matter of time, and the
heterogeneous and unorganized mass of men of all nations so brought
together was a source of weakness rather than strength. Indeed, the vast
hosts over which the Greeks gained their victories comprised but a small
proportion of the true Persians. The cavalry alone seems to have retained its
national character, and with it something of its high reputation, even to the
days of Alexander.

3. Greece.—The Homeric armies were tribal levies of foot, armed with
spear, sword, bow, &c., and commanded by the chiefs in their war-chariots.
In historic times all this is changed. Greece becomes a congeries of city-
states, each with its own citizen-militia. Federal armies and permanent
troops are rare, the former owing to the centrifugal tendency of Greek
politics, the latter because the “tyrannies,” which must have relied very
largely on standing armies to maintain themselves, had ultimately given
way to democratic institutions. But the citizen-militia of Athens or Sparta
resembled rather a modern “nation in arms” than an auxiliary force. Service
was compulsory in almost all states, and as the young men began their
career as soldiers with a continuous training of two or three years, Hellenic
armies, like those of modern Europe, consisted of men who had undergone
a thorough initial training and were subsequently called up as required.
Cavalry, as always in the broken country of the Peloponnesus, was not of
great importance, and it is only when the theatre of Greek history is
extended to the plains of Thessaly that the mounted men become numerous.
In the 4th century the mainstay of Greek armies was the hoplite (ὁπλίτης),
the heavy-armed infantryman who fought in the corps de bataille; the light
troops were men who could not provide the full equipment of the hoplite,
rather than soldiers trained for certain special duties such as skirmishing.
The fighting formation was that of the phalanx, a solid corps of hoplites
armed with long spears. The armies were recruited for each war by calling

up one or more classes of men in reserve according to age. It was the duty
and privilege of the free citizen to bear arms; the slaves were rarely trusted
with weapons.

4. Sparta.—So much is common to the various states. In Sparta the idea
of the nation in arms was more thoroughly carried out than in any other
state in the history of civilization. In other states the individual citizen often
lived the life of a soldier, here the nation lived the life of a regiment. Private
homes resembled the “married quarters” of a modern army; the unmarried
men lived entirely in barracks. Military exercises were only interrupted by
actual service in the field, and the whole life of a man of military age was
devoted to them. Under these circumstances, the Spartans maintained a
practically unchallenged supremacy over the armies of other Greek states;
sometimes their superiority was so great that, like the Spanish regulars in
the early part of the Dutch War of Independence, they destroyed their
enemies with insignificant loss to themselves. The surrender of a Spartan
detachment, hopelessly cut off from all assistance, and the victory of a body
of well-trained and handy light infantry over a closed battalion of Spartiates
were events so unusual as seriously to affect the course of Greek history.

5. Greek Mercenaries.—The military system of the 4th century was not
called upon to provide armies for continuous service on distant expeditions.
When, after the earlier campaigns of the Peloponnesian War, the necessity
for such expeditions arose, the system was often strained almost to breaking
point, (e.g. in the case of the Athenian expedition to Syracuse), and
ultimately the states of Greece were driven to choose between unprofitable
expenditure of the lives of citizens and recruiting from other sources.
Mercenaries serving as light troops, and particularly as peltasts (a new form
of disciplined “light infantry”) soon appeared. The corps de bataille
remained for long the old phalanx of citizen hoplites. But the heavy losses
of many years told severely on the resources of every state, and ultimately

non-national recruits—adventurers and soldiers of fortune, broken men who
had lost their possessions in the wars, political refugees, runaway slaves,
&c.—found their way even into the ranks of the hoplites, and Athens at one
great crisis (407) enlisted slaves, with the promise of citizenship as their
reward. The Arcadians, like the Scots and the Swiss in modern history,
furnished the most numerous contingent to the new professional armies. A
truly national army was indeed to appear once more in the history of the
Peloponnesus, but in the meantime the professional soldier held the field.
The old bond of strict citizenship once broken, the career of the soldier of
fortune was open to the adventurous Greek. Taenarum and Corinth became
regular entrepôts for mercenaries. The younger Cyrus raised his army for
the invasion of Persia precisely as the emperors Maximilian and Charles V.
raised regiments of Landsknechte—by the issue of recruiting commissions
to captains of reputation. This army became the famous Ten Thousand. It
was a marching city-state, its members not desperate adventurers, but men
with the calm self-respect of Greek civilization. On the fall of its generals, it
chose the best officers of the army to command, and obeyed implicitly.
Cheirisophus the Spartan and Xenophon the Athenian, whom they chose,
were not plausible demagogues; they were line officers, who, suddenly
promoted to the chief command under circumstances of almost
overwhelming difficulty, proved capable of achieving the impossible. The
merit of choosing such leaders is not the least title to fame of the Ten
Thousand mercenary Greek hoplites. About the same time Iphicrates with a
body of mercenary peltasts destroyed a mora or corps of Spartan hoplites
(391 b.c.).

6. Epaminondas.—Not many years after this, Spartan oppression roused
the Theban revolt, and the Theban revolt became the Theban hegemony.
The army which achieved this under the leadership of Epaminondas, one of
the great captains of history, had already given proofs of its valour against

Xenophon and the Cyreian veterans. Still earlier it had won the great
victory of Delium (424 b.c.).

It was organized, as were the professional armies, on the accepted model
of the old armies, viz. the phalangite order, but the addition of peltasts now
made a Theban army, unlike the Spartans, capable of operating in broken
country as well as in the plain. The new tactics of the phalanx, introduced
by Epaminondas, embodied, for the first time in the history of war, the
modern principle of local superiority of force, and suggested to Frederick
the Great the famous “oblique order of battle.” Further, the cavalry was
more numerous and better led than that of Peloponnesian states. The
professional armies had well understood the management of cavalry;
Xenophon’s handbook of the subject is not without value in the 20th
century. In Greek armies the dearth of horses and the consequent numerical
weakness of the cavalry prevented the bold use of the arm on the battlefield
(see Cavalry). But Thebes had always to deal with nations which possessed
numerous horsemen. Jason of Pherae, for instance, put into the field against
Thebes many thousands of Thessalian horse; and thus at the battle of Tegyra
in 375 the Theban cavalry under Pelopidas, aided by the corps d’êlite of
infantry called the Sacred Band, carried all before them. At Leuctra
Epaminondas won a glorious victory by the use of his “oblique order”
tactics; the same methods achieved the second great victory of Mantineia
(362 B.c.) at which Epaminondas fell. Pelopidas had already been slain in a
battle against the Thessalians, and there was no leader to carry on their
work. But the new Greek system was yet to gain its greatest triumphs under
Alexander the Great.

7. Alexander.—The reforms of Alexander’s father, Philip of Macedon,
may most justly be compared to those of Frederick William I. in Prussia.
Philip had lived at Thebes as a hostage, and had known Iphicrates,
Epaminondas and Pelopidas. He grafted the Theban system of tactics on to

the Macedonian system of organization. That the latter—a complete
territorial system—was efficient was shown by the fact that Philip’s blow
was always struck before his enemies were ready to meet it. That the new
Greek tactics, properly used, were superior to the old was once more
demonstrated at Chaeronea (338 b.c.), where the Macedonian infantry
militia fought in phalanx, and the cavalry, led by the young Alexander,
delivered the last crushing blow. On his accession, like Frederick the Great,
Alexander inherited a well-trained and numerous army, and was not slow to
use it. The invasion of Asia was carried out by an army of the Greek
pattern, formed both of Hellenes and of non-Hellenes on an exceedingly
strong Macedonian nucleus. Alexander’s own guard was composed of
picked horse and foot. The infantry of the line comprised Macedonian and
Greek hoplites, the Macedonians being subdivided into heavy and medium
troops. These fought in a grand phalanx, which was subdivided into units
corresponding to the modern divisions, brigades and regiments, the fighting
formation being normally a line of battalion masses. The arm of the infantry
was the 18-foot pike (sarissa). The peltasts, Macedonian and Greek, were
numerous and well trained, and there was the usual mass of irregular light
troops, bowmen, slingers, &c. The cavalry included the Guard (ἄγημα), a
body of heavy cavalry composed of chosen Macedonians, the line cavalry
of Macedonia (ἑταῖροι) and Thessaly, the numerous small contingents of
the Greek states, mercenary corps and light lancers for outpost work. The
final blow and the gathering of the fruits of victory were now for the first
time the work of the mounted arm. The solid phalanx was almost
unbreakable in the earlier stages of the battle, but after a long infantry fight
the horsemen had their chance. In former wars they were too few and too
poorly mounted to avail themselves of it, and decisive victories were in
consequence rarely achieved in battles of Greek versus Greek. Under
Epaminondas, and still more under Philip and Alexander, the cavalry was
strong enough for its new work. Battles are now ended by the shock action

of mounted men, and in Alexander’s time it is noted as a novelty that the
cavalry carried out the pursuit of a beaten army. There were further, in
Alexander’s army, artillerymen with a battering train, engineers and
departmental troops, and also a medical service, an improvement attributed
to Jason of Pherae. The victories of this army, in close order and in open,
over every kind of enemy and on every sort of terrain, produced the
Hellenistic world, and in that achievement the history of Greek armies
closes, for after the return of the greater part of the Europeans to their
homes the armies of Alexander and his successors, while preserving much
of the old form, become more and more orientalized.

The decisive step was taken in 323, when a picked contingent of
Persians, armed mainly with missile weapons, was drafted into the phalanx,
in which henceforward they formed the middle ranks of each file of sixteen
men. But, like the third rank of Prussian infantry up to 1888, they normally
fought as skirmishers in advance, falling into their place behind the pikes of
the Macedonian file-leaders only if required for the decisive assault. The
new method, of course, depended for success on the steadiness of the thin
three-deep line of Macedonians thus left as the line of battle. Alexander’s
veterans were indeed to be trusted, but as time went on, and little by little
the war-trained Greeks left the service, it became less and less safe to array
the Hellenistic army in this shallow and articulated order of battle. The
purely formal organization of the phalanx sixteen deep became thus the
actual tactical formation, and around this solid mass of 16,384 men
gathered the heterogeneous levies of a typical oriental army. Pyrrhus, king
of Epirus, retained far more of the tradition of Alexander’s system than his
contemporaries farther east, yet his phalanx, comparatively light and mobile
as it was, achieved victories over the Roman legion only at the cost of self-
destruction. Even elephants quickly became a necessary adjunct to
Hellenistic armies.

8. Carthage.—The military systems of the Jews present few features of
unusual interest. The expedient of calling out successive contingents from
the different tribes, in order to ensure continuity in military operations,
should, however, be noticed. David and Solomon possessed numerous
permanent troops which served as guards and garrisons; in principle this
organization was identical with that of the Persians, and that of Europe in
the 16th and 17th centuries. Particular interest attaches to the Carthaginian
military forces of the 3rd century b.c. Rarely has any army achieved such
renown in the short space of sixty years (264-202 b.c.). Carthage produced
a series of great generals, culminating in Hannibal, who is marked out, even
by the little that is known of him, as the equal of Napoleon. But Napoleon
was supported by a national army, Hannibal and his predecessors were
condemned to work with armies of mercenaries. For the first time in the
world’s history war is a matter with which the civil population has no
concern. The merchants of Carthage fought only in the last extremity; the
wars in which their markets were extended were conducted by non-national
forces and directed by the few Carthaginian citizens who possessed military
aptitudes. The civil authorities displayed towards their instruments a spirit
of hatred for which it is difficult to find a parallel. Unsuccessful leaders
were crucified, the mercenary soldiers were cheated of their pay, and broke
out into a mutiny which shook the empire of Carthage to its foundations.
But the magnetism of a leader’s personality infused a corporate military
spirit into these heterogeneous Punic armies, and history has never
witnessed so complete an illustration of the power of pure and unaided
esprit de corps as in the case of Hannibal’s army in Italy, which, composed
as it was of Spaniards, Africans, Gauls, Numidians, Italians and soldiers of
fortune of every country, was yet welded by him into thorough efficiency.
The army of Italy was as great in its last fight at Zama as the army of Spain
at Rocroi; its victories of the Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae were so

appalling that, two hundred years later, the leader to whom these soldiers
devoted their lives was still, to a Roman, the “dire” Hannibal.

In their formal organization the Carthaginian armies resembled the new
Greek model, and indeed they were created in the first instance by
Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier in the service of Carthage, who was called
upon to raise and train an army when the Romans were actually at the gates
of Carthage, and justified his methods in the brilliant victory of Tunis (255
b.c.). For the solid Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 spears Xanthippus

substituted a line of heavy battalions equal in its aggregate power of
resistance to the older form, and far more flexible. The triumphs of the
cavalry arm in Hannibal’s battles far excelled those of Alexander’s
horsemen. Hannibal chose his fighting ground whenever possible with a
view to using their full power, first to defeat the hostile cavalry, then to ride
down the shaken infantry masses, and finally to pursue au fond. At Cannae,
the greatest disaster ever suffered by the Romans, the decisive blow and the
slaughter were the work of Hannibal’s line cavalry, the relentless pursuit
that of his light horse. But a professional long-service army has always the
greatest difficulty in making good its losses, and in the present case it was
wholly unable to do so. Even Hannibal failed at last before the sustained
efforts of the citizen army of Rome.

9. Roman Army under the Republic.—The earliest organization of the
Roman army is attributed to Romulus, who formed it on the tribal principle,
each of the three tribes contributing its contingent of horse and foot. But it
was to Servius Tullius that Rome owed, traditionally, the complete
classification of her citizen-soldiers. For the details of the Roman military
system, see Roman Army. During the earlier period of Roman history the
army was drawn entirely from the first classes of the population, who
served without pay and provided their own arms and armour. The wealthiest
men (equites) furnished the cavalry, the remainder the infantry, while the

poorer classes either fought as light troops or escaped altogether the
privilege and burden of military service. Each “legion” of 3000 heavy foot
was at first formed in a solid phalanx. The introduction of the elastic and
handy three-line formation with intervals (similar in many respects to
Alexander’s) was brought about by the Gallic wars, and is attributed to M.
Furius Camillus, who also, during the siege of Veii, introduced the practice
of paying the soldiers, and thus removed the chief obstacle to the
employment of the poorer classes. The new order of battle was fully
developed in the Pyrrhic Wars, and the typical army of the Republic may be
taken as dating from the latter part of the 3rd century b.c. The legionary was
still possessed of a property qualification, but it had become relatively
small. An annual levy was made at Rome to provide for the campaign of the
year. Discipline was severe, and the rewards appealed as much to the
soldier’s honour as to his desire of gain. A legion now consisted of three
lines (Hastati, Principes, Triarii), each line composed of men of similar age
and experience, and was further subdivided into thirty “maniples,” each of
two “centuries.” The normal establishment of 300 cavalry, 3000 heavy and
1200 light infantry was still maintained, though in practice these figures
were often exceeded. In place of the old light-armed and somewhat inferior
rorarii, the new velites performed light infantry duties (211 b.c.), at the
same time retaining their place in the maniples, of which they formed the
last ranks (compare the Macedonian phalanx as reorganized in 323, § 7
above). The 300 cavalry of the legion were trained for shock action. But the
strength of the Roman army lay in the heavy legionary infantry of citizens.
The thirty maniples of each legion stood in three lines of battle, but the
most notable point of their formation was that each maniple stood by itself
on its own small manœuvre-area, free to take ground to front or flank. To
the Roman legion was added a legion of allies, somewhat differently
organized and possessing more cavalry, and the whole force was called a
“double legion” or briefly a “legion.” A consul’s army consisted nominally

of two double legions, but in the Punic wars military exigencies rather than
custom dictated the numbers of the army, and the two consuls at Cannae
(216 b.c.) commanded two double consular armies, or eight double legions.

10. Characteristics of the Roman Army.—Such in outline was the Roman
military organization at the time when it was put to the severe test of the
Second Punic War. Its elements were good, its military skill superior to that
of any other army of ancient history, while its organization was on the
whole far better than any that had gone before. The handy formation of
maniples at open order was unique in the ancient world, and it did not
reappear in history up to the advent of Gustavus Adolphus. In this
formation, in which everything was entrusted to the skill of subordinates
and the individual courage of the rank and file, the Romans met and
withstood with success every type of impact, from the ponderous shock of
the Macedonian phalanx and the dangerous rush of Celtic savages to the
charge of elephants. Yet it was no particular virtue in the actual form
employed that carried the Roman arms to so many victories. There would
have been positive danger in thus articulating the legion had it been
composed of any but the most trustworthy soldiers. To swiftness and
precision of manœuvre they added a dogged obstinacy over which nothing
but overwhelming disaster prevailed. It is, therefore, not unnatural to ask
wherein the system which produced these soldiers failed, as it did within a
century after the battle of Zama. The greatest defect was the want of a
single military command. The civil magistrates of Rome were ex officio
leaders of her armies, and though no Roman officer lacked military training,
the views of a consul or praetor were almost invariably influenced by the
programme of his political party. When, as sometimes happened, the men
under their command sided in the political differences of their leaders, all
real control came to an end. The soldiers of the Republic hardly ever forgot
that they were citizens with voting powers; they served as a rule only during
a campaign; and, while there could be little question as to their patriotism

and stubbornness, they lacked almost entirely that esprit de corps which is
found only amongst the members of a body having a permanent corporate
existence. Thus they had the vices as well as the virtues of a nation in arms,
and they fell still further short of the ideal because of the dubious and
precarious tenure of their generals’ commands. The great officers were
usually sent home at the end of a campaign, to be replaced by their elected
successors, and they showed all the hesitation and fear of responsibility
usually found in a temporary commander. Above all, when two armies, each
under its own consul or praetor, acted together, the command was either
divided or exercised on alternate days.

11. Roman Empire.—The essential weaknesses of militia forces and the
accidental circumstances of that under consideration led, even in earlier
times, to the adoption of various expedients which for a time obviated the
evils to which allusion has been made. But a change of far greater
importance followed the final exploits of the armies of the old system. The
increasing dominions of the Republic, the spread of wealth and luxury, the
gradual decadence of the old Roman ideas, all tended to produce an army
more suited to the needs of the newer time than the citizen militia of the 3rd
century. Permanent troops were a necessity; the rich, in their newly
acquired dislike of personal effort, ceased to bear their share in the routine
life of the army, and thus the proletariat began to join the legions with the
express intention of taking to a military career. The actual change from the
old régime to the new was in the main the work of Gaius Marius. The
urgent demand for men at the time of the Teutonic invasions caused the
service to be thrown open to all Roman citizens irrespective of census. The
new territories furnished cavalry, better and more numerous than the old
equites, and light troops of various kinds to replace the velites. Only the
heavy foot remained a purely Italian force, and the spread of the Roman
citizenship gradually abolished the distinction between a Roman and an
allied legion. The higher classes had repeatedly shown themselves

unwilling to serve under plebeians (e.g. Varro and Flaminius); Marius
preferred to have as soldiers men who did not despise him as an inferior.
Under all these influences for good or for evil, the standing army was
developed in the first half of the 1st century b.c. The tactical changes in the
legion indicate its altered character. The small maniples gave way to heavy
“cohorts,” ten cohorts forming the legion; as in the Napoleonic wars, light
and handy formations became denser and more rigid with the progressive
decadence in moral of the rank and file. It is more significant still that in the
days of Marius the annual oath of allegiance taken by the soldier came to be
replaced by a personal vow, taken once and for all, of loyalty to the general.
Ubi bene, ibi patria was an expression of the new spirit of the army, and
Caesar had but to address his men as quirites (civilians) to quell a mutiny.
Hastati, principes and triarii were now merely expressions in drill and
tactics. But perhaps the most important of all these changes was the growth
of regimental spirit and tradition. The legions were now numbered
throughout the army, and the Tenth Legion has remained a classic instance
of a “crack” corps. The moral of the Roman army was founded no longer
on patriotism, but on professional pride and esprit de corps.

With this military system Rome passed through the era of the Civil Wars,
at the end of which Augustus found himself with forty-five legions on his
hands. As soon as possible he carried through a great reorganization, by
which, after ruthlessly rejecting inferior elements, he obtained a smaller
picked force of twenty-five legions, with numerous auxiliary forces. These
were permanently stationed in the frontier provinces of the Empire, while
Italy was garrisoned by the Praetorian cohorts, and thus was formed a
regular long-service army, the strength of which has been estimated at
300,000 men. But these measures, temporarily successful, produced in the
end an army which not only was perpetually at variance with the civil
populations it was supposed to protect, but frequently murdered the
emperors to whom it had sworn allegiance when it raised them to the

throne. The evil fame of the Italian cohorts has survived in the phrase
“praetorianism” used to imply a venal military despotism. The citizens
gradually ceased to bear arms, and the practice of self-mutilation became
common. The inevitable dénouement was delayed from time to time by the
work of an energetic prince. But the ever-increasing inefficiency and
factiousness of the legions, and the evanescence of all military spirit in the
civil population, made it easy for the barbarians, when once the frontier was
broken through, to overrun the decadent Empire. The end came when the
Gothic heavy horse annihilated the legions of Valens at Adrianople (a.d.
378).

There was now no resource but to take the barbarians into Roman pay.
Under the name of foederati, the Gothic mercenary cavalry played the most
conspicuous part in the succeeding wars of the Empire, and began the reign
of the heavy cavalry arm, which lasted for almost a thousand years. Even so
soon as within six years of the death of Valens twenty thousand Gothic
horse decided a great battle in the emperor’s favour. These men, however,
became turbulent and factious, and it was not until the emperor Leo I. had
regenerated the native Roman soldier that the balance was maintained
between the national and the hired warrior. The work of this emperor and of
his successors found eventual expression in the victories of Belisarius and
Narses, in which the Romans, in the new role of horse-archers, so well
combined their efforts with those of the foederati that neither the heavy
cavalry of the Goths nor the phalanx of Frankish infantry proved to be
capable of resisting the imperial forces. At the battle of Casilinum (553)
Roman foot-archers and infantry bore no small part of the work. It was thus
in the Eastern Empire that the Roman military spirit revived, and the
Byzantine army, as evolved from the system of Justinian, became
eventually the sole example of a fully organized service to be found in
medieval history.

12. The “Dark Ages.”—In western Europe all traces of Roman military
institutions quickly died out, and the conquerors of the new kingdoms
developed fresh systems from the simple tribal levy. The men of the plains
were horsemen, those of marsh and moor were foot, and the four greater
peoples retained these original characteristics long after the conquest had
been completed. In organization the Lombards and Franks, Visigoths and
English scarcely differed. The whole military population formed the mass
of the army, the chiefs and their personal retainers the élite. The Lombards
and the Visigoths were naturally cavalry; the Franks and the English were,
equally naturally, infantry, and the armies of the Merovingian kings differed
but little from the English fyrd with which Offa and Penda fought their
battles. But in these nations the use of horses and armour, at first confined
to kings and great chiefs, gradually spread downwards to the ever-growing
classes of thegns, comites, &c. Finally, under Charlemagne were developed
the general lines of the military organization which eventually became
feudalism. For his distant wars he required an efficient and mobile army.
Hence successive “capitularies” were issued dealing with matters of
recruiting, organization, discipline and field service work. Very noticeable
are his system of forts (burgi) with garrisons, his military train of artillery
and supplies, and the reappearance of the ancient principle that three or four
men should equip and maintain one of themselves as a warrior. These and
other measures taken by him tended to produce a strong veteran army, very
different in efficiency from the tumultuary levy, to which recourse was had
only in the last resort. While war (as a whole) was not yet an art, fighting
(from the individual’s point of view) had certainly become a special
function; after Charlemagne’s time the typical feudal army, composed of
well-equipped cavalry and ill-armed peasantry serving on foot, rapidly
developed. Enemies such as Danes and Magyars could only be dealt with
by mounted men who could ride round them, compel them to fight, and
annihilate them by the shock of the charge; consequently the practice of

leaving the infantry in rear, and even at home, grew up almost as a part of
the feudal system of warfare. England, however, sought a different remedy,
and thus diverged from the continental methods. This remedy was the
creation of a fleet, and, the later Danish wars being there carried out, not by
bands of mounted raiders, but by large armies of military settlers, infantry
retained its premier position in England up to the day of Hastings. Even the
thegns, who there, as abroad, were the mainstay of the army, were heavy-
armed infantry. The only contribution made by Canute to the military
organization of England was the retention of a picked force of hus carles
(household troops) when the rest of the army with which he had conquered
his realm was sent back to Scandinavia. At Hastings, the forces of Harold
consisted wholly of infantry. The English array was composed of the king
and his personal friends, the hus carles, and the contingents of the fyrd
under the local thegns; though better armed, they were organized after the
manner of their forefathers. On that field there perished the best infantry in
Europe, and henceforward for three centuries there was no serious rival to
challenge the predominance of the heavy cavalry.

13. The Byzantines (cf. article Roman Empire, Later).—While the west of
Europe was evolving feudalism, the Byzantine empire was acquiring an
army and military system scarcely surpassed by any of those of antiquity
and not often equalled up to the most modern times. The foederati
disappeared after the time of Justinian, and by a.d. 600 the army had
become at once professional and national. For generations, regiments had
had a corporate existence. Now brigades and divisions also appeared in war,
and, somewhat later, in peace likewise. With the disappearance of the
barbarians, the army became one homogeneous service, minutely
systematized, and generally resembling an army in the modern sense of the
word. The militia of the frontier districts performed efficiently the service
of surveillance, and the field forces of disciplined regulars were moved and
employed in accordance with well-reasoned principles of war; their

maintenance was provided for by a scutage, levied, in lieu of service, on the
central provinces of the empire. Later, a complete territorial system of
recruiting and command was introduced. Each “theme” (military district)
had its own regular garrison, and furnished a field division of some 5000
picked troopers for a campaign in any theatre of war. Provision having been
made in peace for a depot system, all weakly men and horses could be left
behind, and local duties handed over to second line troops; thus the field
forces were practically always on a war footing. Beside the “themes” under
their generals, there were certain districts on the frontiers, called
“clissuras,” placed under chosen officers, and specially organized for
emergency service. The corps of officers in the Byzantine army was
recruited from the highest classes, and there were many families (e.g. that
from which came the celebrated Nicephorus Phocas) in which soldiering
was the traditional career. The rank and file were either military settlers or
men of the yeoman class, and in either case had a personal interest in the
safety of the theme which prevented friction between soldiers and civilians.
The principal arm was, of course, cavalry, and infantry was employed only
in special duties. Engineer, train and medical services were maintained in
each theme. Of the ensemble of the Byzantine army it has been said that
“the art of war as it was understood at Constantinople ... was the only
system of real merit existing. No western nation could have afforded such a
training to its officers till the 16th or ... 17th century.” The vitality of such
an army remained intact long after the rest of the empire had begun to
decay, and though the old army practically ceased to exist after the great
disaster of Manzikert (1071), the barbarians and other mercenaries who
formed the new service were organized, drilled and trained to the same
pitch of military efficiency. Indeed the greatest tactical triumph of the
Byzantine system (Calavryta, 1079) was won by an army already largely
composed of foreigners. But mercenaries in the end developed

praetorianism, as usual, and at last they actually mutinied, in the presence of
the enemy, for higher pay (Constantinople, 1204).

14. Feudalism.—From the military point of view the change under
feudalism was very remarkable. For the first time in the history of western
Europe there appears, in however rough a form, a systematized obligation
to serve in arms, regulated on a territorial basis. That army organization in
the modern sense—organization for tactics and command—did not develop
in any degree commensurate with the development of military
administration, was due to the peculiar characteristics of the feudal system,
and the virtues and weaknesses of medieval armies were its natural
outcome. Personal bravery, the primary virtue of the soldier, could not be
wanting in the members of a military class, the métier of which was war
and manly exercises. Pride of caste, ambition and knightly emulation, all
helped to raise to a high standard the individual efficiency of the feudal
cavalier. But the gravest faults of the system, considered as an army
organization, were directly due to this personal element. Indiscipline,
impatience of superior control, and dangerous knight-errantry, together with
the absence of any chain of command, prevented the feudal cavalry from
achieving results at all proportionate to the effort expended and the
potentialities of a force with so many soldierly qualities. If such defects
were habitually found in the best elements of the army—the feudal tenants
and subtenants who formed the heavy cavalry arm—little could be expected
of the despised and ill-armed foot-soldiery of the levy. The swift raids of the
Danes and others (see above) had created a precedent which in French and
German wars was almost invariably followed. The feudal levy rarely
appeared at all on the battlefield, and when it was thus employed it was
ridden down by the hostile knights, and even by those of its own party,
without offering more than the feeblest resistance. Above all, one
disadvantage, common to all classes of feudal soldiers, made an army so
composed quite untrustworthy. The service which a king was able to exact

from his feudatories was so slight (varying from one month to three in the
year) that no military operation which was at all likely to be prolonged
could be undertaken with any hope of success.

15. Medieval Mercenaries.—It was natural, therefore, that a sovereign
who contemplated a great war should employ mercenaries. These were
usually foreigners, as practically all national forces served on feudal terms.
While the greater lords rode with him on all his expeditions, the bulk of his
army consisted of professional soldiers, paid by the levy of scutage
imposed upon the feudal tenantry. There had always been soldiers of
fortune. William’s host at Hastings contained many such men; later, the
Flemings who invaded England in the days of Henry I. sang to each other—
“Hop, hop, Willeken, hop! England is mine and thine,”—

and from all the evidence it is clear that in earlier days the hired soldiers
were adventurers seeking lands and homes. But these men usually proved to
be most undesirable subjects, and sovereigns soon began to pay a money
wage for the services of mercenaries properly so called. Such were the
troops which figured in English history under Stephen. Such troops,
moreover, formed the main part of the armies of the early Plantagenets.
They were, as a matter of course, armed and armoured like the knights, with
whom they formed the men-at-arms (gendarmes) of the army. Indeed, in the
11th and 12th centuries, the typical army of France or the Empire contains a
relatively small percentage of “knights,” evidence of which fact may be
found even in so fanciful a romance as Aucassin and Nicolete. It must be
noted, however, that not all the mercenaries were heavy cavalry; the
Brabançon pikeman and the Italian crossbowman (the value of whose
weapon was universally recognized) often formed part of a feudal army.

16. Infantry in Feudal Times.—These mercenary foot soldiers came as a
rule from districts in which the infantry arm had maintained its ancient

predominance in unbroken continuity. The cities of Flanders and Brabant,
and those of the Lombard plain, had escaped feudal interference with their
methods of fighting, and their burgher militia had developed into solid
bodies of heavy-armed pikemen. These were very different from those of
the feudal levy, and individual knightly bravery usually failed to make the
slightest impression on a band of infantry held together by the stringent
corporate feeling of a trade-gild. The more adventurous of the young men,
like those of the Greek cities, took service abroad and fought with credit in
their customary manner. The reign of the “Brabançon” as a mercenary was
indeed short, but he continued, in his own country, to fight in the old way,
and his successor in the profession of arms, the Genoese crossbowman, was
always highly valued. In England, moreover, the infantry of the old fyrd
was not suffered to decay into a rabble of half-armed countrymen, and in
France a burgher infantry was established by Louis VI. under the name of
the milice des communes, with the idea of creating a counterpoise to the
power of the feudatories. Feudalism, therefore, as a military system, was
short-lived. Its limitations had always necessitated the employment of
mercenaries, and in several places a solid infantry was coming into
existence, which was drawn from the sturdy and self-respecting middle
classes, and in a few generations was to prove itself a worthy opponent not
only to the knight, but to the professional man-at-arms.

17. The Crusades.—It is an undoubted fact that the long wars of the
Crusades produced, directly, but slight improvement in the feudal armies of
Europe. In the East large bodies of men were successfully kept under arms
for a considerable period, but the application of crusading methods to
European war was altogether impracticable. In the first place, much of the
permanent force of these armies was contributed by the military orders,
which had no place in European political activities. Secondly, enthusiasm
mitigated much of the evil of individualism. In the third place, there was no
custom to limit the period of service, since the Crusaders had undertaken a

definite task and would merely have stultified their own purpose in leaving
the work only half done. There were, therefore, sharp contrasts between
crusading and European armies. In the latter, systematization was confined
to details of recruiting; in the armies of the Cross, men were from time to
time obtained by the accident of religious fervour, while at the same time
continuous service produced a relatively high system of tactical
organization. Different conditions, therefore, produced different methods,
and crusading unity and discipline could not have been imposed on an
ordinary army, which indeed with its paid auxiliaries was fairly adequate
for the somewhat desultory European wars of that time. The statement that
the Crusaders had a direct influence on the revival of infantry is hardly
susceptible of convincing demonstration, but it is at any rate beyond
question that the social and economic results of the Crusades materially
contributed to the downfall of the feudal knight, and in consequence to a
rise in the relative importance of the middle classes. Further, not only were
the Crusading knights compelled by their own want of numbers to rely on
the good qualities of the foot, but the foot themselves were the “survivors of
the fittest,” for the weakly men died before they reached the Holy Land, and
with them there were always knights who had lost their horses and could
not obtain remounts. Moreover, when “simple” and “gentle” both took the
Cross there could be no question of treating Crusaders as if they were the
mere feudal levy. But the little direct influence of the whole of these wars
upon military progress in Europe is shown clearly enough by the fact that at
the very close of the Crusades a great battle was lost through knight-
errantry of the true feudal type (Mansurah).

18. The Period of Transition (1290-1490).—Besides the infantry already
mentioned, that of Scotland and that of the German cities fought with credit
on many fields. Their arm was the pike, and they were always formed in
solid masses (called in Scotland, schiltrons). The basis of the medieval
commune being the suppression of the individual in the social unit, it was

natural that the burgher infantry should fight “in serried ranks and in better
order” than a line of individual knights, who, moreover, were almost
powerless before walled cities. But these forces lacked offensive power, and
it was left for the English archers, whose importance dates from the latter
years of the 13th century, to show afresh, at Creçy, Poitiers and Agincourt,
the value of missile action. When properly supported by other arms, they
proved themselves capable of meeting both the man-at-arms and the
pikeman. The greatest importance attaches to the evolution of this idea of
mutual support and combination. Once it was realized, war became an art,
and armies became specially organized bodies of troops of different arms. It
cannot be admitted, indeed, as has been claimed, that the 14th century had a
scientific system of tactics, or that the campaign of Poitiers was arranged by
the French “general staff.” Nevertheless, during this century armies were
steadily coming to consist of expert soldiers, to the exclusion of national
levies and casual mercenaries. It is true that, by his system of “indents,”
Edward III. of England raised national armies of a professional type, but the
English soldier thus enrolled, when discharged by his own sovereign,
naturally sought similar employment elsewhere. This system produced,
moreover, a class of unemployed soldiers, and these, with others who
became adventurers from choice or necessity, and even with foreign troops,
formed the armies which fought in the Wars of the Roses—armies which
differed but slightly from others of the time. The natural result of these wars
was to implant a hatred of soldiery in the heart of a nation which had
formerly produced the best fighting men in Europe, a hatred which left a
deep imprint on the constitutional and social life of the people. In France,
where Joan of Arc passed like a meteor across the military firmament, the
idea of a national regular army took a practical form in the middle of the
15th century. Still, the forces thus brought into existence were not
numerous, and the soldier of fortune, in spite of such experiences of his

methods as those of the Wars of the Roses, was yet to attain the zenith of his
career.

19. The Condottieri.—The immediate result of this confused period of
destruction and reconstruction was the condottiere, who becomes important
about 1300. In Italy, where the condottieri chiefly flourished, they were in
demand owing to the want of feudal cavalry, and the inability of burgher
infantry to undertake wars of aggression. The “free companies” (who
served in great numbers in France and Spain as well as in Italy) were
“military societies very much like trade-gilds,” which (so to speak) were
hawked from place to place by their managing directors, and hired
temporarily by princes who needed their services. Unlike the older
hirelings, they were permanently organized, and thus, with their experience
and discipline, became the best troops in existence. But the carrying on of
war “in the spirit of a handicraft” led to bloodless battles, indecisive
campaigns, and other unsatisfactory results, and the reign of the condottieri
proper was over by 1400, subsequent free companies being raised on a
more strictly national basis. With all their defects, however, they were the
pioneers of modern organization. In the inextricable tangle of old and new
methods which constitutes the military system of the 15th century, it is
possible to discern three marked tendencies. One is the result of a purely
military conception of the now special art of war, and its exposition as an
art by men who devote their whole career to it. The second is the idea of a
national army, resulting from many social, economical and political causes.
The third is the tendency towards minuter organization and subdivision
within the army. Whereas the individual feudatories had disliked the close
supervision of a minor commander, and their army had in consequence
remained always a loosely-knit unit, the men who made war into an art
belonged to small bands or corps, and naturally began their organization
from the lower units. Herein, therefore, was the germ of the regimental
system of the present day.

20. The Swiss.—The best description of a typical European army at the
opening of the new period of development is that of the French army in
Italy in 1494, written by Paolo Giovio. He notes with surprise that the
various corps of infantry and cavalry are distinct, the usual practice of the
time being to combine one lancer, one archer, one groom, &c., into a small
unit furnished and commanded by the lancer. There were Swiss and German
infantry, armed with pike and halbert, with a few “shot,” who marched in
good order to music. There were the heavy men-at-arms (gendarmes),
accompanied as of old by mounted archers, who, however, now fought
independently. There were, further, Gascon slingers and crossbowmen, who
had probably acquired, from contact with Spain, some of the lightness and
dash of their neighbours. The artillery train was composed of 140 heavy
pieces and a great number of lighter guns; these were then and for many
generations thereafter a special arm outside the military establishments (see
Artillery). In all this the only relic of the days of Creçy is the
administrative combination of the men-at-arms and the horse archers, and
even this is no longer practised in action. The most important element in the
army is the heavy infantry of Swiss and Germans. The Swiss had for a
century past gradually developed into the most formidable troops of the
day. The wars of Žižka (q.v.) in Bohemia (1420) materially assisted in the
downfall of the heavy cavalry; and the victories of the Swiss, beginning
with Sempach (1382), had by 1480 proved that their solid battalions, armed
with the long pike and the halberd, were practically invulnerable to all but
missile and shock action combined. By fortune of war, they never met the
English, who had shown the way to deal with the schiltron as early as
Falkirk. So great was their confidence against ordinary troops, that on one
occasion (1444) they detached 1600 men to engage 50,000. It was natural
that a series of victories such as Granson, Morat and Nancy should place
them in the forefront of the military nations of Europe. The whole people
devoted itself thereupon to professional soldiering, particularly in the

French service, and though their monopoly of mercenary employment
lasted a short time only, they continued to furnish regiments to the armies of
France, Spain and the Pope up to the most modern times. But their
efficiency was thoroughly sapped by the growth of a mutinous and
insubordinate spirit, the memory of which has survived in the proverb Point
d’argent, point de Suisse, and inspired Machiavelli with the hatred of
mercenaries which marks every page of his work on the art of war. One of
their devices for extorting money was to appear at the muster with many
more soldiers than had been contracted for by their employers, who were
forced to submit to this form of blackmail. At last the French, tired of these
caprices, inflicted on the Swiss the crushing defeat of Marignan (q.v.), and
their tactical system received its death-blow from the Spaniards at Pavia
(1525).

21. The Landsknechts.—The modern army owes far more of its
organization and administrative methods to the Landsknechts (“men of the
country,” as distinct from foreigners) than to the Swiss. As the latter were
traditionally the friends of France, so these Swabians were the mainstay of
the Imperial armies, though both were mercenaries. The emperor
Maximilian exerted himself to improve the new force, which soon became
the model for military Europe. A corps of Landsknechts was usually raised
by a system resembling that of “indents,” commissions being issued by the
sovereign to leaders of repute to enlist men. A “colour” (Fähnlein)
numbered usually about 400 men, a corps consisted of a varying number of
colours, some corps having 12,000 men. From these troops, with their
intense pride, esprit de corps and comradeship, there has come down to
modern times much of present-day etiquette, interior economy and
“regimental customs”—in other words, nearly all that is comprised in the
“regimental” system. Amongst the most notable features of their system
were the functions of the provost, who combined the modern offices of
provost-marshal, transport and supply officer, and canteen manager; the

disciplinary code, which admitted the right of the rank and file to judge
offences touching the honour of the regiment; and the women who, lawfully
or unlawfully attached to the soldiers, marched with the regiment and had a
definite place in its corporate life. The conception of the regiment as the
home of the soldier was thus realized in fact.

22. The Spanish Army.—The tendencies towards professional soldiering
and towards subdivision had now pronounced themselves. At the same
time, while national armies, as dreamed of by Machiavelli; were not yet in
existence, two at least of the powers were beginning to work towards an
ideal. This ideal was an army which was entirely at the disposal of its own
sovereign, trained to the due professional standard, and organized in the
best way found by experience to be applicable to military needs. On these
bases was formed the old Spanish army which, from Pavia (1525) to Rocroi
(1643), was held by common consent to be the finest service in existence.
Almost immediately after emerging from the period of internal
development, Spain found herself obliged to maintain an army for the
Italian wars. In the first instance this was raised from amongst veterans of
the war of Granada, who enlisted for an indefinite time. Probably the oldest
line regiments in Europe are those descended from the famous tercios,
whose formation marks the beginning of military establishments, just as the
Landsknechts were the founders of military manners and customs. The
great captains who led the new army soon assimilated the best points of the
Swiss system, and it was the Spanish army which evolved the typical
combination of pike and musket which flourished up to 1700. Outside the
domain the tactics, it must be credited with an important contribution to the
science of army organization, in the depot system, whereby the tercios in
the field were continually “fed” and kept up to strength. The social position
of the soldier was that of a gentleman, and the young nobles (who soon
came to prefer the tercios to the cavalry service) thought it no shame, when
their commands were reduced, to “take a pike” in another regiment. The

provost and his gallows were as much in evidence in a Spanish camp as in
one of Landsknechts, but the comradeship and esprit de corps of a tercio
were the admiration of all contemporary soldiers. With all its good qualities,
however, this army was not truly national; men soon came from all the
various nations ruled by the Habsburgs, and the soldier of fortune found
employment in a tercio as readily as elsewhere. But it was a great gain that
corps, as such, were fully recognized as belonging to the government,
however shifting the personnel might be. Permanence of regimental
existence had now been attained, though the universal acceptance and
thorough application of the principle were still far distant. During the 16th
century, the French regular army (originating in the compagnies
d’ordonnance of 1445), which was always in existence, even when the
Swiss and gendarmes were the best part of the field forces, underwent a
considerable development, producing amongst other things the military
terminology of the present day. But the wars of religion effectually checked
all progress in the latter part of the century, and the European reputation of
the French army dates only from the latter part of the Thirty Years’ War.

23. The Sixteenth Century.—The battle of St Quentin (1557) is usually
taken as the date from which the last type of a purely mercenary arm (as
distinct from corps) comes into prominence. “Brabançon” or “Swiss”
implied pikemen without further qualification, the new term “Reiter”
similarly implied mercenary cavalry fighting with the pistol. Heavy cavalry
could disperse arquebusiers and musketeers, but it was helpless against
solid masses of pikemen; the Reiters solved the difficulty by the use of the
pistol. They were well armoured and had little to fear from musket-balls.
Arrayed in deep squadrons, therefore, they rode up to the pikes with
impunity, and fired methodically dans le tas, each rank when it had
discharged its pistols filing to the rear to reload. These Reiters were
organized in squadrons of variable strength, and recruited in the same
manner as were the Landsknechts. They were much inferior, however, to

the latter in their discipline and general conduct, for cavalry had many more
individual opportunities of plunder than the foot, and the rapacity and
selfishness of the Reiters were consequently in marked contrast to the good
order and mutual helpfulness in the field and in quarters which
characterized the regimental system of the Landsknechts.

24. Dutch System.—The most interesting feature of the Dutch system,
which was gradually evolved by the patriots in the long War of
Independence, was its minute attention to detail. In the first years of the
war, William the Silent had to depend, for field operations, on mutinous and
inefficient mercenaries and on raw countrymen who had nothing but
devotion to oppose to the discipline and skill of the best regular army in the
world. Such troops were, from the point of view of soldiers like Alva, mere
canaille, and the ludicrous ease with which their armies were destroyed (as
at Jemmingen and Mookerheyde), at the cost of the lives of perhaps a dozen
Spanish veterans, went far to justify this view. But, fortunately for the
Dutch, their fortified towns were exceedingly numerous, and the individual
bravery of citizen-militia, who were fighting for the lives of every soul
within their walls, baffled time after time all the efforts of Alva’s men. In
the open, Spanish officers took incredible liberties with the enemy; once, at
any rate, they marched for hours together along submerged embankments
with hostile vessels firing into them from either side. Behind walls the
Dutch were practically a match for the most furious valour of the assailants.

The insurgents’ first important victory in the open field, that of Rymenant
near Malines (1577), was won by the skill of “Bras de Fer,” de la Noue, a
veteran French general, and the stubbornness of the English contingent of
the Dutch army—for England, from 1572 onwards, sent out an ever-
increasing number of volunteers. This battle was soon followed by the great
defeat of Gembloux (1578), and William the Silent was not destined to see
the rise of the Dutch army. Maurice of Nassau was the real organizer of

victory. In the wreck of all feudal and burgher military institutions, he
turned to the old models of Xenophon, Polybius, Aelian and the rest. Drill,
as rigid and as complicated as that of the Macedonian phalanx, came into
vogue, the infantry was organized more strictly into companies and
regiments, the cavalry into troops or cornets. The Reiter tactics of the pistol
were followed by the latter, the former consisted of pikes, halberts and
“shot.” This form was generally followed in central Europe, as usual,
without the spirit, but in Holland it was the greater trustworthiness of the
rank and file that allowed of more flexible formations, and here we no
longer see the foot of an army drawn up, as at Jemmingen, in one solid and
immovable “square.” In their own country and with the system best suited
thereto, the Dutch, who moreover acquired greater skill and steadiness day
by day, maintained their ground against all the efforts of a Parma and a
Spinola. Indeed, it is the best tribute to the vitality of the Spanish system
that the inevitable débâcle was so long delayed. The campaigns of Spinola
in Germany demonstrated that the “Dutch” system, as a system for general
use, was at any rate no better than the system over which it had locally
asserted its superiority, and the spirit, and not the form, of Maurice’s
practice achieved the ultimate victory of the Netherlanders. In the Thirty
Years’ War, the unsuccessful armies of Mansfeld and many others were
modelled on the Dutch system,—the forces of Spinola, of Tilly and of
Wallenstein, on the Spanish. In other words, these systems as such meant
little; the discipline and spirit behind them, everything. Yet the contribution
made by the Dutch system to the armies of to-day was not small; to
Maurice and his comrades we owe, first the introduction of careful and
accurate drill, and secondly the beginnings of an acknowledged science of
war, the groundwork of both being the theory and practice of antiquity. The
present method of “forming fours” in the British infantry is ultimately
derived from Aelian, just as the first beats of the drums in a march represent

the regimental calls of the Landsknechts, and the depots and the drafts for
the service battalions date from the Italian wars of Spain.

25. The Thirty Years’ War.—Hitherto all armies had been raised or
reduced according to the military and political situation of the moment.
Spain had indeed maintained a relatively high effective in peace, but
elsewhere a few personal guards, small garrisons, and sometimes a small
regular army to serve as a nucleus, constituted the only permanent forces
kept under arms by sovereigns, though, in this era of perpetual wars, armies
were almost always on a war footing. The expense of maintenance at that
time practically forbade any other system than this, called in German
Werbe-system, a term for which in English there is no nearer equivalent
than “enlistment” or “levy” system. It is worth noticing that this very
system is identical in principle with that of the United States at the present
day, viz., a small permanent force, inflated to any required size at the
moment of need. The exceptional conditions of the Dutch army, indeed,
secured for its regiments a long life; yet when danger was finally over, a
large portion of the army was at once reduced. The history of the British
army from about 1740 to 1820 is a most striking, if belated, example of the
Werbe-system in practice. But the Thirty Years’ War naturally produced an
unusual continuity of service in corps raised about 1620-1630, and fifty
years later the principle of the standing army was universally accepted. It is
thus that the senior regiments of the Prussian and Austrian armies date from
about 1630. At this time an event took place which was destined to have a
profound influence on the military art. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
landed in Germany with an army better organized, trained and equipped
than any which had preceded it. This army, by its great victory of
Breitenfeld (1631), inaugurated the era of “modern” warfare, and it is to the
system of Gustavus that the student must turn for the initial point of the
progressive development which has produced the armies of to-day. Spanish

and Dutch methods at once became as obsolete as those of the
Landsknechts.

26. The Swedish Army.—The Swedish army was raised by a carefully
regulated system of conscription, which was “preached in every pulpit in
Sweden.” There were indeed enlisted regiments of the usual type, and it
would seem that Gustavus obtained the best even of the soldiers of fortune.
But the national regiments were raised on the Indelta system. Each officer
and man, under this scheme, received a land grant within the territorial
district of his corps, and each of these districts supplied recruits in numbers
proportionate to its population. This curious mixture of feudal and modern
methods produced the best elements of an army, which, aided by the tactical
and technical improvements introduced by Gustavus, proved itself
incomparably superior to its rivals. Of course the long and bloody
campaigns of 1630-34 led to the admission of great numbers of mercenaries
even into the Swedish corps; and German, Scottish and other regiments
figured largely, not only in the armies of Duke Bernhard and his successors,
but in the army of Gustavus’ own lifetime. As early as 1632 one brigade of
the army was distinguished by the title “Swedish,” as alone containing no
foreigners. Yet the framework was much the same as it had been in 1630.
The battle-organization of two lines and two wings, which was typical of
the later “linear” tactics, began to supplant the system of the tercios. How
cumbrous the latter had become by 1630 may be judged from any battle-
plan of the period, and notably from that of Lützen. Gustavus’ cavalry
fought four or three deep only, and depended as little as possible on the
pistol. The work of riding down the pikes was indeed rendered easier by the
improved tactical handiness of the musketeers, but it was fiery leading
which alone compelled victory, for there were relatively few Swedish horse
and many squadrons of Germans and others, who in themselves were far
less likely to charge boldly than the “Pappenheimers” and other crack corps
of the enemy. The infantry was of the highest class, and only on that

condition could loose and supple lines be trusted to oppose the solid tercios
of Tilly and Wallenstein. Cumbrous indeed these were, but by long practice
they had acquired no small manœuvring power, of which Breitenfeld
affords a striking example. The Swedes, however, completely surpassed
them. The progress thus made may be gauged from the fact that under
Gustavus the largest closed body of infantry was less than 300 strong.
Briefly, the genius of a great commander, the ardour of a born cavalry
leader, better arms and better organization, carried the Swedes to the end of
their career of victory, but how personal was the vis viva which inspired the
army was quickly noticeable after the death of Gustavus. Even a Bernhard
could, in the end, evoke no more heroism from a Swedish army than from
any other, and the real Swedish troops fought their last battle at Nördlingen
(1634). After this, little distinguished the “Swedish” forces from the general
mass of the armies of the time, save their system, to which, and to its
influence on the training of such leaders as Banér, Torstensson and
Wrangel, all their later victories were due. So much of Gustavus’ work
survived even the carnage of Nördlingen, and his system always obtained
better results, even with the heterogeneous troops of this later period, than
any other of the time.

27. The English Civil War (see Great Rebellion).—The armies on either
side which, about the same time, were fighting out the constitutional quarrel
in England were essentially different from all those of the continent, though
their formal organization was similar to that of the Swedes. The military
expression of a national conscience had appeared rarely indeed in the Thirty
Years’ War, which was a means of livelihood for, rather than an assertion of
principle by, those who engaged in it. In England, on the other hand, there
were no mercenaries, and the whole character of the operations was settled
by the burning desire of a true “nation in arms” to decide at once, by the
arbitrament of battle, the vital points at issue. A German critic (Fritz
Hoenig) has indicated Worcester as the prototype of Sedan; at any rate,

battles of this kind invariably resulted in failure when entrusted to a
“standing” army of the 18th century. But the national armies disappeared at
the end of the struggle; after the Restoration, English political aims became,
so far as military activity was concerned, similar in scope and execution to
those of the continent; and the example of Cromwell and the “New Model,”
which might have revolutionized military Europe, passed away without
having any marked influence on the armies of other nations.

28. Standing Armies.—Nine years after Nördlingen, the old Spanish army
fought its last and most honourable battle at Rocroi. Its conquerors were the
new French troops, whose victory created as great a sensation as Pavia and
Creçy had done. Infusing a new military spirit into the formal organization
of Gustavus’ system, the French army was now to “set the fashion” for a
century. France had been the first power to revive regular forces, and the
famous “Picardie” regiment disputed for precedence even with the old
tercios. The country had emerged from the confusion of the past century
with the foreign and domestic strength of a practically absolute central
power. The Fronde continued the military history of the army from the end
of the Thirty Years’ War; and when the period of consolidation was finally
closed, all was prepared for the introduction of a “standing army,”
practically always at war strength, and entirely at the disposal of the
sovereign. The reorganization of the military establishments by Louvois
may be taken as the formal date at which standing armies came into
prominence (see historical sketch of the French army below). Other powers
rapidly followed the lead of France, for the defects of enlisted troops had
become very clear, and the possession of an army always ready for war was
an obvious advantage in dynastic politics. The French proprietary system of
regiments, and the general scheme of army administration which replaced
it, may be taken as typical of the armies of other great powers in the time of
Louis XIV.

29. Character of the Standing Armies.—A peculiar character was from
the first imparted to the new organizations by the results of the Thirty
Years’ War. A well-founded horror of military barbarity had the effect of
separating the soldier from the civilian by an impassable gulf. The drain of
thirty years on the population, resources and finances of almost every
country in middle Europe, everywhere limited the size of the new armies;
and the decision in 1648 of all questions save those of dynastic interest
dictated the nature of their employment. The best soldiers of the time
pronounced in favour of small field armies, for in the then state of
communications and agriculture large forces proved in practice too
cumbrous for good work. In every country, therefore, the army took the
form of a professional body, nearly though not quite independent of extra
recruits for war, set apart entirely from all contact with civil life, rigidly
restricted as to conduct in peace and war, and employed mostly in the
“maintenance” of their superiors’ private quarrels. Iron discipline produced
splendid tenacity in action, and wholesale desertion at all times. In the
Seven Years’ War, for instance, the Austrians stated one-fifth of their total
loss as due to desertion, and Thackeray’s Barry Lyndon gives no untrue
picture of the life of a soldier under the old regime. Further, since men were
costly, rigid economy of their lives in action, and minute care for their
feeding and shelter on the march, occupied a disproportionate amount of the
attention of their generals. Armies necessarily moved slowly and remained
concentrated to facilitate supply and to check desertion, and thus, when a
commander had every unit of his troops within a short ride of his
headquarters, there was little need for intermediate general officers, and still
less for a highly trained staff.

30. Organization in the 18th Century.—All armies were now almost
equal in fighting value, and war was consequently reduced to a set of rules
(not principles), since superiority was only to be gained by methods, not by
men. Soldiers such as Marlborough, who were superior to these jejune

prescriptions, met indeed with uniform success. But the methods of the 18th
century failed to receive full illustration, save by the accident of a great
captain’s direction, even amidst the circumstances for which they were
designed. It is hardly to be wondered at, therefore, that they failed, when
forced by a new phase of development to cope with events completely
beyond their element. The inner organization was not markedly altered.
Artillery was still outside the normal organization of the line of battle,
though in the period 1660-1740 much was done in all countries to improve
the material, and above all to turn the personnel into disciplined soldiers.
Cavalry was organized in regiments and squadrons, and armed with sabre
and pistol. Infantry had by 1703 begun to assume its three-deep line
formation and the typical weapons of the arm, musket and bayonet.
Regiments and battalions were the units of combat as well as organization.
In the fight the company was entirely merged in the higher unit, but as an
administrative body it still remained. As for the higher organization, an
army consisted simply of a greater or less number of battalions and
squadrons, without, as a rule, intermediate commands and groupings. The
army was arrayed as a whole in two lines of battle, with the infantry in the
centre and the cavalry on the flanks, and an advanced guard; the so-called
reserve consisting merely of troops not assigned to the regular commands.
It was divided, for command in action, into right and left wings, both of
cavalry and infantry, of each line. This was the famous “linear”
organization, which in theory produced the maximum effort in the
minimum time, but in practice, handled by officers whose chief care was to
avoid the expenditure of effort, achieved only negative results. To see its
defects one need only suppose a battalion of the first line hard pressed by
the enemy. A battalion of the second line was directly behind it, but there
was no authority, less than that of the wing commander, which could order
it up to support the first. All the conditions of the time were opposed to
tactical subdivision, as the term is now understood. That the 18th century

did not revive schiltrons was due to the new fire tactics, to which
everything but control was sacrificed. This “control,” as has been said,
implied not so much command as police supervision. But far beyond any
faults of organization and recruiting, the inherent vice of these armies was,
as Machiavelli had pointed out two centuries previously, and as Prussia was
to learn to her cost in 1806, that once they were thoroughly defeated, the
only thing left to be done was to make peace at once, since there was no
other armed force capable of retrieving a failure.

31. Frederick the Great.—The military career of Frederick the Great is
very different from those of his predecessors. With an army organized on
the customary system, and trained and equipped, better indeed, but still on
the same lines as those of his rivals, the king of Prussia achieved results out
of all proportion to those imagined by contemporary soldiers. It is to his
campaigns, therefore, that the student must refer for the real, if usually
latent, possibilities of the army of the 18th century. The prime secret of his
success lay in the fact that he was his own master, and responsible to no
superior for the uses to which he put his men. This position had never, since
the introduction of standing armies, been attained by any one, even Eugene
and Leopold of Dessau being subject to the common restriction; and with
this extraordinary advantage over his opponents, Frederick had further the
firmness and ruthless energy of a great commander. Prussia, moreover, was
more strictly organized than other countries, and there was relatively little
of that opposition of local authorities to the movement of troops which was
conspicuous in Austria. The military successes of Prussia, therefore, up to
1757, were not primarily due to the system and the formal tactics, but were
the logical outcome of greater energy in the leading, and less friction in the
administration, of her armies. But the conditions were totally different in
1758-1762, when the full force of the alliance against Prussia developed
itself in four theatres of war. Frederick was driven back to the old methods
of making war, and his men were no longer the soldiers of Leuthen and

Hohenfriedberg. If discipline was severe before, it was merciless then; the
king obtained men by force and fraud from every part of Germany, and had
both to repress and to train them in the face of the enemy. That under such
conditions, and with such men, the weaker party finally emerged
triumphant, was indeed a startling phenomenon. Yet its result for soldiers
was not the production of the national army, though the dynastic forces had
once more shown themselves incapable of compassing decisive victories,
nor yet the removal of the barrier between army and people, for the
operations of Frederick’s recruiting agents made a lasting impression, and,
further, large numbers of men who had thought to make a profession of
arms were turned adrift at the end of the war. On the contrary, all that the
great and prolonged tour de force of these years produced was a tendency,
quite in the spirit of the age, to make a formal science out of the art of war.
Better working and better methods were less sought after than
systematization of the special practices of the most successful commanders.
Thus Frederick’s methods, since 1758 essentially the same as those of
others, were taken as the basis of the science now for the first time called
“strategy,” the fact that his opponents had also practised it without success
being strangely ignored. Along with this came a mania for imitation.
Prussian drill, uniforms and hair-powder were slavishly copied by every
state, and for the next twenty years, and especially when the war-trained
officers and men had left active service, the purest pedantry reigned in all
the armies of Europe, including that of Prussia. One of the ablest of
Frederick’s subordinates wrote a book in which he urged that the cadence of
the infantry step should be increased by one pace per minute. The only
exceptions to the universal prevalence of this spirit were in the Austrian
army, which was saved from atrophy by its Turkish wars, and in a few
British and French troops who served in the American War of
Independence. The British regiments were sent to die of fever in the West

Indies; when the storm of the French Revolution broke over Europe, the
Austrian army was the only stable element of resistance.

32. The French Revolution.—Very different were the armies of the
Revolution. Europe, after being given over to professional soldiers for five
hundred years, at last produced the modern system of the “nation in arms.”
The French volunteers of 1792 were a force by which the routine generals
of the enemy, working with instruments and by rules designed for other
conditions, were completely puzzled, and France gained a short respite. The
year 1793 witnessed the most remarkable event that is recorded in the
history of armies. Raw enthusiasm was replaced, after the disasters and
defections which marked the beginning of the campaign, by a systematic
and unsparing conscription, and the masses of men thus enrolled, inspired
by ardent patriotism and directed by the ferocious energy of the Committee
of Public Safety, met the disciplined formalists with an opposition before
which the attack completely collapsed. It was less marvellous in fact than in
appearance that this should be so. Not to mention the influence of pedantry
and senility on the course of the operations, it may be admitted that
Frederick and his army at their best would have been unable to accomplish
the downfall of the now thoroughly roused French. Tactically, the fire of the
regulars’ line caused the Revolutionary levies to melt away by thousands,
but men were ready to fill the gaps. No complicated supply system bound
the French to magazines and fortresses, for Europe could once more feed an
army without convoys, and roads were now good and numerous. No fear of
desertion kept them concentrated under canvas, for each man was
personally concerned with the issue. If the allies tried to oppose them on an
equal front, they were weak at all points, and the old organization had no
provision for the working of a scattered army. While ten victorious
campaigns had not carried Marlborough nearer to Paris than some marches
beyond the Sambre, two campaigns now carried a French army to within a
few miles of Vienna. It was obvious that, before such forces and such

mobility, the old system was doomed, and with each successive failure the
old armies became more discouraged. Napoleon’s victories finally closed
this chapter of military development, and by 1808 the only army left to
represent it was the British. Even to this the Peninsular War opened a line of
progress, which, if different in many essentials from continental practice,
was in any case much more than a copy of an obsolete model.

33. The Conscription.—In 1793, at a moment when the danger to France was so great as to produce the rigorous
emergency methods of the Reign of Terror, the combined enemies of the Republic had less than 300,000 men in
the field between Basel and Dunkirk. On the other hand, the call of the “country in danger” produced more than
four times this number of men for the French armies within a few months. Louis XIV., even when all France had
been awakened to warlike enthusiasm by a similar threat (1709), had not been able to put in the field more than
one-fifth of this force. The methods of the great war minister Carnot were enforced by the ruthless committee, and
when men’s lives were safer before the bayonets of the allies than before the civil tribunals at home, there was no
difficulty in enlisting the whole military spirit of France. There is therefore not much to be said as to the earliest
application of the conscription, at least as regards its formal working, since any system possessing elasticity would
equally have served the purpose. In the meanwhile, the older plans of organization had proved inadequate for
dealing with such imposing masses of men. Even with disciplined soldiers they had long been known as applicable
only to small armies, and the deficiencies of the French, with their consequences in tactics and strategy, soon
produced the first illustrations of modern methods. Unable to meet the allies in the plain, they fought in broken
ground and on the widest possible front. This of course produced decentralization and subdivision; and it became
absolutely necessary that each detachment on a front of battle 30 m. long (e.g. Stokach) should be properly
commanded and self-sufficing. The army was therefore constituted in a number of divisions, each of two or more
brigades with cavalry and artillery sufficient for its own needs. It was even more important that each divisional
general, with his own staff, should be a real commander, and not merely the supervisor of a section of the line of
battle, for he was almost in the position that a commander-in-chief had formerly held. The need of generals was
easily supplied when there was so wide a field of selection. For the allies the mere adoption of new forms was
without result, since it was contrary both to tradition and to existing organization. The attempts which were made
in this direction did not tend to mitigate the evils of inferior numbers and moral. The French soon followed up the
divisional system with the further organization of groups of divisions under specially selected general officers; this
again quickly developed into the modern army corps.

34. Napoleon.—Revolutionary government, however, gave way in a few years to more ordinary institutions, and
the spirit of French politics had become that of aggrandizement in the name of liberty. The ruthless application of
the new principle of masses had been terribly costly, and the disasters of 1799 reawakened in the mass of the
people the old dislike of war and service. Even before this it had been found necessary to frame a new act, the
famous law proposed by General Jourdan (1798). With this the conscription for general service began. The legal
term of five years was so far exceeded that the service came to be looked upon as a career, or servitude, for life; it
was therefore both unavoidable and profitable to admit substitutes. Even in 1806 one quarter of Napoleon’s
conscripts failed to come up for duty. The Grande Armée thus from its inception contained elements of doubtful
value, and only the tradition of victory and the 50% of veterans still serving aided the genius of Napoleon to win
the brilliant victories of 1805 and 1806. But these veterans were gradually eliminated by bloodshed and service
exposure, and when, after the peace of Tilsit, “French” armies began to be recruited from all sorts of nations, decay
had set in. As early as 1806 the emperor had had to “anticipate” the conscription, that is, call up the conscripts
before their time, and by 1810 the percentage of absentees in France had grown to about 80, the remainder being
largely those who lacked courage to oppose the authorities. Finally, the armies of Napoleon became masses of men
of all nations fighting even more unwillingly than the armies of the old régime. Little success attended the
emperor’s attempt to convert a “nation in arms” into a great dynastic army. Considered as such, it had even fewer
elements of solidity than the standing armies of the 18th century, for it lacked the discipline which had made the
regiments of Frederick invincible. After 1812 it was attacked by huge armies of patriots which possessed
advantages of organization and skilful direction that the levée en masse of 1793 had lacked. Only the now fully
developed genius and magnificent tenacity of Napoleon staved off for a time the débâcle which was as inevitable
as had been that of the old régime.

35. The Grande Armée.—In 1805-1806, when the older spirit of the Revolution was already represented by one-
half only of French soldiers, the actual steadiness and manœuvring power of the Grande Armée had attained its
highest level. The army at this time was organized into brigades, divisions and corps, the last-named unit being as
a rule a marshal’s command, and always completed as a small army with all the necessary arms and services.
Several such corps (usually of unequal strength) formed the army. The greatest weakness of the organization,
which was in other respects most pliant and adaptable, was the want of good staff-officers. The emperor had so far
cowed his marshals that few of them could take the slightest individual responsibility, and the combatant staff-
officers remained, as they had been in the 18th century, either confidential clerks or merely gallopers. No one but a
Napoleon could have managed huge armies upon these terms; in fact the marshals, from Berthier downwards,
generally failed when in independent commands. Of the three arms, infantry and cavalry regiments were organized
in much the same way as in Frederick’s day, though tactical methods were very different, and discipline far
inferior. The greatest advance had taken place in the artillery service. Field and horse batteries, as organized and
disciplined units, had come into general use during the Revolutionary wars, and the division, corps and army
commanders had always batteries assigned to their several commands as a permanent and integral part of the
fighting troops. Napoleon himself, and his brilliant artillery officers Sénarmont and Drouot, brought the arm to
such a pitch of efficiency that it enabled him to win splendid victories almost by its own action. As a typical
organization we may take the III. corps of Marshal Davout in 1806. This was formed of the following troops:—

Cavalry brigade—General Vialannes—three regiments, 1538 men. Corps artillery, 12 guns.

1st Division—General Morand—five infantry regiments in three brigades, 12 guns, 10,820 men.

2nd Division—General Friant—five regiments in three brigades, 8 guns, 8758 men.

3rd Division—General Gudin—four regiments in three brigades, 12 guns, 9077 men.

A comparison of this ordre de bataille with that of a modern army corps will show that the general idea of corps
organization has undergone but slight modification since the days of Napoleon. More troops allotted to
departmental duties, and additional engineers for the working of modern scientific aids, are the only new features
in the formal organization of a corps in the 20th century. Yet the spirit of 1806 and that of 1906 were essentially
different, and the story of the development of this difference through the 19th century closes for the present the
history of progress in tactical organization.

36. The Wars of Liberation.—The Prussian defeat at Jena was followed by a national surrender so abject as to
prove conclusively the eternal truth, that a divorce of armies from national interests is completely fatal to national
well-being. But the oppression of the victors soon began to produce a spirit of ardent patriotism which, carefully
directed by a small band of able soldiers, led in the end to a national uprising of a steadier and more lasting kind
than that of the French Revolution. Prussia was compelled, by the rigorous treaty of peace, to keep a small force
only under arms, and circumstances thus drove her into the path of military development which she subsequently
followed. The stipulation of the treaty was evaded by the Krümper system, by which men were passed through the
ranks as hastily as possible and dismissed to the reserve, their places being taken by recruits. The regimental
establishments were therefore mere cadres, and the personnel, recruited by universal service with few exemptions,
ever-changing. This system depended on the willingness of the reserves to come up when called upon, and the
arrogance of the French was quite sufficient to ensure this. The dénouement of the Napoleonic wars came too
swiftly for the full development of the armed strength of Prussia on these lines; and at the outbreak of the Wars of
Liberation a newly formed Landwehr and numerous volunteer corps took the field with no more training than the
French had had in 1793. Still, the principles of universal service (allgemeine Wehrpflicht) and of the army reserve
were, for the first time in modern history, systematically put into action, and modern military development has
concerned itself more with the consolidation of the Krümper system than with the creation of another. The début of

the new Prussian army was most unsuccessful, for Napoleon had now attained the highest point of soldierly skill,
and managed to inflict heavy defeats on the allies. But the Prussians were not discouraged; like the French in 1793
they took to broken ground, and managed to win combats against all leaders opposed to them except Napoleon
himself. The Russian army formed a solid background for the Prussians, and in the end Austria joined the
coalition. Reconstituted on modern lines, the Austrian army in 1813, except in the higher leading, was probably the
best-organized on the continent. After three desperate campaigns the Napoleonic régime came to an end, and men
felt that there would be no such struggle again in their lifetime. Military Europe settled down into grooves along
which it ran until 1866. France, exhausted of its manhood, sought a field for military activities in colonial wars
waged by long-service troops. The conscription was still in force, but the citizens served most unwillingly, and
substitution produced a professional army, which as usual became a dynastic tool. Austria, always menaced with
foreign war and internal disorder, maintained the best army in Europe. The British army, though employed far
differently, retained substantially the Peninsular system.

37. European Armies 1815-1870.—The events of the period 1815-1859 showed afresh that such long-service
armies were incomparably the best form of military machine for the purpose of giving expression to a hostile
“view” (not “feeling”). Austrian armies triumphed in Italy, French armies in Spain, Belgium, Algeria, Italy and
Russia, British in innumerable and exacting colonial wars. Only the Prussian forces retained the characteristics of
the levies of 1813, and the enthusiasm which had carried these through Leipzig and the other great battles was
hardly to be expected of their sons, ranged on the side of despotism in the troubled times of 1848-1850. But the
principle was not permitted to die out. The Bronnzell-Olmütz incident of 1850 (see Seven Weeks’ War) showed
that the organization of 1813 was defective, and this was altered in spite of the fiercest opposition of all classes.
Soon afterwards, and before the new Prussian army proved itself on a great battlefield, the American Civil War, a
fiercer struggle than any of those which followed it in Europe, illustrated the capabilities and the weaknesses of
voluntary-service troops. Here the hostile “view” was replaced by a hostile “feeling,” and the battles of the
disciplined enthusiasts on either side were of a very different kind from those of contemporary Europe. But, if the
experiences of 1861-1865 proved that armies voluntarily enlisted “for the war” were capable of unexcelled feats of
endurance, they proved further that such armies, whose discipline and training in peace were relatively little, or
indeed wholly absent, were incapable of forcing a swift decision. The European “nation in arms,” whatever its
other failings, certainly achieved its task, or failed decisively to do so, in the shortest possible time. Only the
special characteristics of the American theatre of war gave the Union and Confederate volunteers the space and
time necessary for the creation of armies, and so the great struggle in North America passed without affecting
seriously the war ideas and preparations of Europe. The weakness of the staff work with which both sides were
credited helped further to confirm the belief of the Prussians in their system, and in this instance they were
justified by the immense superiority of their own general staff to that of any army in existence. It was in this
particular that a corps of 1870 differed so essentially from a corps of Napoleon’s time. The formal organization had
not been altered save as the varying relative importance of the separate arms had dictated. The almost intangible
spirit which animates the members of a general staff, causes them not merely to “think”—that was always in the
quartermaster-general’s department—but to “think alike,” so that a few simple orders called “directives” sufficed
to set armies in motion with a definite purpose before them, whereas formerly elaborate and detailed plans of battle
had to be devised and distributed in order to achieve the object in view. A comparison of the number of orders and
letters written by a marshal and by his chief of staff in Napoleon’s time with similar documents in 1870 indicates
clearly the changed position of the staff. In the Grande Armée and in the French army of 1870 the officers of the
general staff were often absent entirely from the scene of action. In Prussia the new staff system produced a far
different result—indeed, the staff, rather than the Prussian military system, was the actual victor of 1870. Still, the
system would probably have conquered in the end in any case, and other nations, convinced by events that their

departure from the ideal of 1813, however convenient formerly, was no longer justified, promptly copied Prussia
as exactly, and, as a matter of fact, as slavishly, as they had done after the Seven Years’ War.

38. Modern Developments.—Since 1870, then, with the single exception of Great Britain, all the major
European powers have adopted the principle of compulsory short service with reserves. Along with this has come
the fullest development of the territorial system (see below). The natural consequence therefore of the heavy work
falling upon the shoulders of the Prussian officer, who had to instruct his men, was, in the first place, a general
staff of the highest class, and in the second, a system of distributing the troops over the whole country in such a
way that the regiments were permanently stationed in the district in which they recruited and from which they
drew their reserves. Prussia realized that if the reservists were to be obtained when required the unit must be
strictly localized; France, on the contrary, lost much time and spent much trouble, in the mobilization of 1870, in
forwarding the reservists to a regiment distant, perhaps, 300 m. The Prussian system did not work satisfactorily at
first, for until all the district staff-officers were trained in the same way there was great inequality in the efficiency
of the various army corps, and central control, before the modern development of railways, was relatively slight.
Further, the mobilization must be completed, or nearly so, before concentration begins, and thus an active
professional army, always at war strength, might annihilate the frontier corps before those in the interior were
ready to move. But the advantages far outweighed the defects of the system, and, such professional armies having
after 1870 disappeared, there was little to fear. Everywhere, therefore, save in Great Britain (for at that time the
United States was hardly counted as a great military power, in spite of its two million war-trained veterans in civil
life), the German model was followed, and is now followed, with but slight divergence. The period of reforms after
the Prussian model (about 1873-1890) practically established the military systems which are treated below as those
of the present day. The last quarter of the century witnessed a very great development of military forces, without
important organic changes. The chief interest to the student of this period lies in the severe competition between
the great military powers for predominance in numbers, expressed usually in the reduction of the period of service
with the colours to a minimum. The final results of this cannot well be predicted: it is enough to say that it is the
Leitmotiv in the present stage in the development of armies. Below will be found short historical sketches of
various armies of the present day which are of interest in respect of their historical development. Details of
existing forces are given in articles dealing with the several states to which they belong. Historical accounts of the
armies of Japan and of Egypt will be found in the articles on those states. The Japanese wars of 1894-95 and 1904-
5 contributed little to the history of military organization as a pure science. The true lessons of this war were the
demonstration of the wide applicability of the German methods, upon which exclusively the Japanese army had
formed itself, and still more the first illustration of the new moral force of nationalities as the decisive factor. The
form of armies remained unaltered. Neither the events of the Boer War of 1899-1902 nor the Manchurian
operations were held by European soldiers to warrant any serious modifications in organization. It is to the moral
force alluded to above, rather than to mere technical improvements, that the best soldiers of Europe, and notably
those of the French general staff (see the works of General H. Bonnal), have of late years devoted their most
earnest attention.

Present-Day Armies

39. The main principles of all military organization as developed in history would seem to be national recruiting
and allegiance, distinctive methods of training and administration, continuity of service and general homogeneity
of form. The method of raising men is of course different in different states. In this regard armies may
conveniently be classed as voluntarily enlisted, levied or conscript, and militia, represented respectively by the
forces of Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland. It must not be forgotten, however, that voluntary troops may be

and are maintained even in states in which the bulk of the army is levied by compulsion, and the simple militia
obligation of defending the country is universally recognized.

40. Compulsory Service.—Universal liability to service (allgemeine Wehrpflicht) draws into the active army all,
or nearly all, the men of military age for a continuous period of short service, after which they pass successively to
the reserve, the second and the third line troops (Landwehr, Landsturm, &c.). In this way the greatest number of
soldiers is obtained at the cheapest rate and the number of trained men in reserve available to keep the army up to
strength is in theory that of the able-bodied manhood of the country. In practice the annual levy is, however, not
exhaustive, and increased numerical strength is obtained by reducing the term of colour-service to a minimum.
This may be less in a hard-worked conscript army than in one which depends upon the attractions of the service to
induce recruits to join. In conscript armies, training for war is carried out with undeviating rigour. In these
circumstances the recruits are too numerous and the time available is too limited for the work of training to be
committed to a few selected instructors, and every officer has therefore to instruct his own men. The result is
usually a corps of officers whose capacity is beyond question, while the general staff is composed of men whose
ability is above a high general average. As to the rank and file, the men taken for service are in many respects the
best of the nation, and this superiority is progressively enhanced, since increase of population is not often
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the military establishments. In Germany in 1905, it is stated, nearly
half the contingent was excused from serving in peace time, over and above the usual numbers exempted or
medically rejected. The financial aspect of compulsory service may be summed up in a few words. The state does
not offer a wage, the pay of the soldier is a mere trifle, and, for a given expenditure, at least three times as many
men may be kept under arms as under any known “voluntary” system. Above all, the state has at its disposal for
war an almost inexhaustible supply of trained soldiers. This aspect of compulsory service has indeed led its
admirers sometimes to sacrifice quality to quantity; but, provided always that the regular training is adequate, it
may be admitted that there is no limit to the numbers which are susceptible of useful employment. There are,
however, many grave defects inherent in all armies raised by compulsory levy (see Conscription, for a discussion
of the chief economical and social questions involved). Most of the advantages of universal service result, not from
the compulsory enlistment, but from the principle of short service and reserves. But the cost of maintaining huge
armies of the modern European type on the voluntary system would be entirely prohibitive, and those nations
which have adopted the allgemeine Wehrpflicht have done so with full cognizance of the evil as well as of the good
points of the system.

The chief of these evils is the doubtful element which exists in all such armies. Under the merciless discipline of
the old régime the most unwilling men feared their officers more than the enemy. Modern short service, however,
demands the good-will of all ranks and may fail altogether to make recalcitrants into good soldiers, and it may be
taken for granted that every conscript army contains many men who cannot be induced to fight. Herein lies the
justification of the principle of “masses,” and of reduced colour-service; by drawing into the ranks the maximum
number of men, the government has an eventual residuum of the bravest men in the nation left in the ranks. What
has been said of the officers of these armies cannot be applied to the non-commissioned officers. Their promotion
is necessarily rapid, and the field of selection is restricted to those men who are willing to re-engage, i.e. to serve
beyond their compulsory term of two or three years. Many men do so to avoid the struggles of civil life, and such
“fugitive and cloistered virtue” scarcely fosters the moral strength required for command. As the best men return to
civil life, there is no choice but to promote inferior men, and the latter, when invested with authority, not
infrequently abuse it. Indeed in some armies the soldier regards his officer chiefly as his protector from the
rapacity or cruelty of his sergeant or corporal. A true short-service army is almost incapable of being employed on
peace service abroad; quite apart from other considerations, the cost of conveying to and from home annually one-
third or one-half of the troops would be prohibitive. If, as must be the case, a professional force is maintained for
oversea service many men would join it who would otherwise be serving as non-commissioned officers at home

and the prevailing difficulty would thus be enhanced. When colonial defence calls for relatively large numbers of
men, i.e. an army, home resources are severely strained.

41. Conscription in the proper sense, i.e. selection by lot of a proportion of the able-bodied manhood of a
country, is now rarely practised. The obvious unfairness of selection by lot has always had the result of admitting
substitutes procured by those on whom the lot has fallen; hence the poorer classes are unduly burdened with the
defence of the country, while the rich escape with a money payment. In practice, conscription invariably produces
a professional long-service army in which each soldier is paid to discharge the obligations of several successive
conscripts. Such an army is therefore a voluntary long-service army in the main, plus a proportion of the unwilling
men found in every forced levy. The gravest disadvantage is, however, the fact that the bulk of the nation has not
been through the regular army at all; it is almost impossible to maintain a large and costly standing army and at the
same time to give a full training to auxiliary forces. The difference between a “national guard” such as that of the
siege of Paris in 1870-71 and a Landwehr produced under the German system, was very wide. Regarded as a
compromise between universal and voluntary service, conscription still maintains a precarious existence in Europe.
As the cardinal principle of recruiting armies, it is completely obsolete.

42. Voluntary Service.—Existing voluntary armies have usually developed from armies of the old régime, and
seem to owe their continued existence either to the fact that only comparatively small armaments are maintained in
peace, other and larger armies being specially recruited during a war (a modification of the “enlistment system”),
or to the necessities of garrisoning colonial empires. The military advantages and disadvantages of voluntary
service are naturally the faults and merits of the opposite system. The voluntary army is available for general
service. It includes few unwilling soldiers, and its resultant advantage over an army of the ordinary type has been
stated to be as high as 30%. At all events, we need only examine military history to find that with conscript armies
wholesale shirking is far from unknown. That loss from this cause does not paralyse operations as it paralysed
those of the 18th century, is due to the fact that such fugitives do not desert to the enemy, but reappear in the ranks
of their own side; it must not therefore be assumed that men have become braver because the “missing” are not so
numerous. In colonial and savage warfare the superior personal qualities of the voluntary soldier often count for
more than skill on the part of the officers. These would be diminished by shortening the time of service, and this
fact, with the expense of transport, entails that a reasonably long period must be spent with the colours. On the
other hand, the provision of the large armies of modern warfare requires the maintenance of a reserve, and no
reserve is possible if the whole period for which men will enlist is spent with the colours. The demand for long
service in the individual, and for trained men in the aggregate, thus produces a compromise. The principle of long
service, i.e. ten years or more with the colours, is not applicable to the needs of the modern grande guerre; it gives
neither great initial strength nor great reserves. The force thus produced is costly and not lightly to be risked; it
affords relatively little opportunity for the training of officers, and tends to become a class apart from the rest of
the population. On the other hand, such a force is the best possible army for foreign and colonial service. A state
therefore which relies on voluntary enlistment for its forces at home and abroad, must either keep an army which is
adaptable to both functions or maintain a separate service for each.

In a state where relatively small armaments are maintained in peace, voluntary armies are infinitely superior to
any that could be obtained under any system of compulsion. The state can afford to give a good wage, and can
therefore choose its recruits carefully. It can thus have either a few incomparable veteran soldiers (long-service), or
a fairly large number of men of superior physique and intelligence, who have received an adequate short-service
training. Even the youngest of such men are capable of good service, while the veterans are probably better
soldiers than any to be found in conscript armies. This is, however, a special case. The raw material of any but a
small voluntary army usually tends to be drawn from inferior sources; the cost of a larger force, paid the full wages
of skilled labourers, would be very great, and numbers commensurate with those of an army of the other model

could only be obtained at an exorbitant price. The short-service principle is therefore accepted. Here, however, as
recruiting depends upon the good-will of the people, it is impossible to work the soldiers with any degree of rigour.
Hence the voluntary soldier must serve longer than a conscript in order to attain the same proficiency. The reserve
is thus weakened, and the total trained regular force diminished. Moreover, as fewer recruits are required annually,
there is less work for the officers to do. In the particular case of Great Britain it is practically certain that in future,
reliance will be placed upon the auxiliary forces and the civil population for the provision of the enormous
reserves required in a great war; this course is, however, only feasible in the case of an insular nation which has
time to collect its strength for the final and decisive blow overseas. The application of the same principle to a
continental military power depends on the capacity for stern and unflagging resistance displayed by the corps de
couverture charged with the duty of gaining the time necessary for the development and concentration of the
national masses. In Great Britain (except in the case of a surprise invasion) the place of this corps would be taken
by “command of the sea.” Abroad, the spirit of the exposed regiments themselves furnishes the only guarantee, and
this can hardly be calculated with sufficient certainty, under modern conditions, to justify the adoption of this new
“enlistment system.” Voluntary service, therefore, with all its intrinsic merits, is only applicable to the conditions
of a great war when the war reserve can be trained ad hoc.

43. The militia idea (see Militia) has been applied most completely in Switzerland, which has no regular army,
but trains almost the whole nation as a militia. The system, with many serious disadvantages, has the great merit
that the maximum number of men receives a certain amount of training at a minimum cost both to the state and to
the individual. Mention should also be made of the system of augmenting the national forces by recruiting “foreign
legions.” This is, of course, a relic of the Werbe-system; it was practised habitually by the British governments of
the 18th and early 19th centuries. “Hessians” figured conspicuously in the British armies in the American War of
Independence, and the “King’s German Legion” was only the best and most famous of many foreign corps in the
service of George III. during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. A new German Legion was raised during the
Crimean War, but the almost universal adoption of the Krümper system has naturally put an end to the old method,
for all the best recruits are now accounted for in the service of their own countries.

Army Organization

44. Arms of the Service.—Organization into “arms” is produced by the multiplicity of the weapons used, their
functions and their limitations. The “three arms”—a term universally applied to infantry (q.v.), cavalry (q.v.) and
artillery (q.v.)—coexist owing to the fact that each can undertake functions which the others cannot properly fulfil.
Thus cavalry can close with an enemy at the quickest pace, infantry can work in difficult ground, and artillery is
effective at great ranges. Infantry indeed, having the power of engaging both at close quarters and at a distance,
constitutes the chief part of a fighting force. Other “arms,” such as mounted infantry, cyclists, engineers, &c., are
again differentiated from the three chief arms by their proper functions. In deciding upon the establishment in
peace, or the composition of a force for war, it is therefore necessary to settle beforehand the relative importance of
these functions in carrying out the work in hand. Thus an army operating in Essex would be unusually strong in
infantry, one on Salisbury Plain would possess a great number of guns, and an army operating on the South African
veldt would consist very largely of mounted men. The normal European war has, however, naturally been taken as
the basis upon which the relative proportions of the three arms are calculated. At the battle of Kolin (1757) the
cavalry was more than half as strong as the infantry engaged. At Borodino (1812) there were 39 cavalry to 100 of
other arms, and 5 guns per 1000 men. In 1870 the Germans had at the outset 7 cavalrymen to every 100 men of
other arms, the French 10. As for guns, the German artillery had 3, the French 3½ per 1000 men. In more modern
times the proportions have undergone some alteration, the artillery having been increased, and the cavalry brought
nearer to the Napoleonic standard. Thus the relative proportions, in peace time, now stand at 5 or 6 guns per 1000

men, and 16 cavalry soldiers to 100 men of other arms. It must be borne in mind that cavalry and artillery are
maintained in peace at a higher effective than infantry, the strength of the latter being much inflated in war, while
cavalry and artillery are not easily extemporized. Thus in the Manchurian campaign these proportions were very
different. The Russian army on the eve of the battle of Mukden (20th of February 1905) consisted of 370
battalions, 142 squadrons and 153 field batteries (1200 guns), with, in addition, over 200 heavy guns. The strength
of this force, which was organized in three armies, was about 300,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry and Cossacks,
with 3½ guns per 1000 men of other arms. The Japanese armies consisted of 300,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry, 900
field and 170 heavy guns, the proportion of field artillery being 2½ guns per 1000 men.

It is perhaps not superfluous to mention that all the smaller units in a modern army consist of one arm only.
Formerly several dissimilar weapons were combined in the same unit. The knight with his four or five variously
armed retainers constituted an example of this method of organization, which slowly died out as weapons became
more uniform and their functions better defined.

45. Command.—The first essential of a good organization is to ensure that each member of the organized body,
in his own sphere of action, should contribute his share to the achievement of the common object. Further, it is
entirely beyond the power of one man, or of a few, to control every action and provide for every want of a great
number of individuals. The modern system of command, therefore, provides for a system of grades, in which,
theoretically, officers of each grade control a group of the next lower units. A lieutenant-colonel, for instance, may
be in charge of a group of eight companies, each of which is under a captain. In practice, all armies are
permanently organized on these lines, up to the colonel’s or lieutenant-colonel’s command, and most of them are
permanently divided into various higher units under general officers, the brigade, division and army corps. The
almost invariable practice is to organize infantry into companies, battalions and regiments. Cavalry is divided into
troops, squadrons and regiments. Artillery is organized in batteries, these being usually grouped in various ways.
The other arms and departments are subdivided in the same general way. The commands of general officers are the
brigade of infantry, cavalry, and in some cases artillery, the division of two or more infantry brigades and a force
of artillery and mounted troops, or of cavalry and horse artillery, and the army corps of two or more divisions and
“corps troops.” Armies of several corps, and groups of armies are also formed.

46. A brigade is the command of a brigadier or major-general, or of a colonel. It consists almost invariably of
one arm only. In armies of the old régime it was not usual to assign troops of all arms to the subordinate generals.
Hence the brigade is a much older form of organization than the division of all arms, and in fact dates from the
16th century. The infantry brigade consists, in the British service, of the brigadier and his staff, four battalions of
infantry, and administrative and medical units, the combatant strength being about 4000 men. In Germany and
France the brigade is composed of the staff, and two regiments (6 battalions) with a total of over 6000 combatants
at war strength. The cavalry brigade is sometimes formed of three, sometimes of two regiments; the number of
squadrons to a regiment on service is usually four, exceptionally three, and rarely five and six. The “brigade” of
artillery in Great Britain is a lieutenant-colonel’s command, and the term here corresponds to the Abtheilung of the
German, and the groupe of the French armies (see Artillery). In Germany and France, however, an artillery
brigade consists of two or more regiments, or twelve batteries at least, under the command of an artillery general
officer.

47. A division is an organization containing troops of all arms. Since the virtual abolition of the “corps artillery”
(see Artillery), the force of field artillery forming part of an infantry division is sometimes as high as 72 guns
(Germany); in Great Britain the augmented division of 1906 has 54 field guns, 12 field howitzers, and 4 heavy
guns, a total of 70. The term “infantry” division is, in strictness, no longer applicable, since such a unit is a
miniature army corps of infantry, artillery and cavalry, with the necessary services for the supply of ammunition,
food and forage, and for the care of the sick and wounded. A more exact title would be “army” division. In general

it is composed, so far as combatants are concerned, of the divisional commander and his staff, two or more infantry
brigades, a number of batteries of field artillery forming a regiment, brigade or group, a small force, varying from
a squadron to a regiment, of cavalry (divisional cavalry), with some engineers. The force of the old British division
(1905) may be taken, on an average, as 10,000 men, increased in the 1906 reorganization to about 15,000
combatants. In other armies the fighting force of the division amounts to rather more than 14,000. The cavalry
division (see Cavalry) is composed of the staff, two or three cavalry brigades, horse artillery, with perhaps
mounted infantry, cyclists, or even light infantry in addition. In many, if not most, armies cavalry divisions are
formed only in war. In the field the cavalry division is usually an independent unit with its own commander and
staff. “Cavalry corps” of several divisions have very rarely been formed in the past, a division having been
regarded as the largest unit capable of being led by one man. There is, however, a growing tendency in favour of
the corps organization, at any rate in war.

48. Army Corps.—The “corps” of the 18th century was simply a large detachment, more or less complete in
itself, organized for some particular purpose (e.g. to cover a siege), and placed for the time being under some
general officer other than the chief commander. The modern army corps is a development from the division of all
arms, which originated in the French Revolutionary wars. It is a unit of considerable strength, furnished with the
due proportion of troops of all arms and of the auxiliary and medical services, and permanently placed under the
command of one general. The corps organization (though a corps d’armée was often spoken of as an armée) was
used in Napoleon’s army in all the campaigns of the Empire. It may be mentioned, as a curious feature of
Napoleon’s methods, that he invariably constituted each corps d’armée of a different strength, so that the enemy
would not be able to estimate his force by the simple process of counting the corps flags which marked the
marshals’ headquarters. Thus in 1812 he constituted one corps of 72,000 men, while another had but 18,000. After
the fall of Napoleon a further advance was made. The adoption of universal service amongst the great military
nations brought in its train the territorial organization, and the corps, representing a large district, soon became a
unit of peace formation. For the smooth working of the new military system it was essential that the framework of
the war army should exist in peace. The Prussians were the first to bring the system to perfection; long before 1866
Prussia was permanently divided into army corps districts, all the troops of the III. army corps being
Brandenburgers, all those of the VI. Silesians, and so on, though political reasons required, and to some extent still
require, modifications of this principle in dealing with annexed territory (e.g. Hanover and Alsace-Lorraine). The
events of 1866 and of 1870-71 caused the almost universal adoption of the army corps regional system. In the case
of the British army, operating as it usually did in minor wars, and rarely having more than sixty or seventy
thousand men on one theatre even in continental wars, there was less need of so large a unit as the corps. Not only
was a British army small in numbers, but it preserved high traditions of discipline, and was sufficiently well
trained to be susceptible as a unit to the impulse given by one man. Even where the term “corps” does appear in
Peninsular annals, the implication is of a corps in the old sense of a grand detachment. Neither cavalry nor artillery
was assigned to any of the British “corps” at Waterloo.

49. Constitution of the Army Corps.—In 1870-71 the III. German army corps (with which compare Marshal
Davout’s ordre de bataille above) consisted of the following combatant units: (a) staff; (b) two infantry divisions
(4 brigades. 8 regiments or 24 battalions), with, in each division, a cavalry regiment, 4 batteries of artillery or 24
guns, and engineers; (c) corps troops, artillery (6 field batteries), pioneer battalion (engineers), train battalion
(supply and transport). A rifle battalion was attached to one of the divisions.

This ordre de bataille was followed more or less generally by all countries up to the most modern times, but
between 1890 and 1902 came a very considerable change in the point of view from which the corps was regarded
as a fighting unit. This change was expressed in the abolition of the corps artillery. Formerly the corps commander
controlled the greater part of the field artillery, as well as troops of other arms; at the present time he has a mere

handful of troops. Unless battalions are taken from the divisions to form a corps reserve, the direct influence of the
corps organization on the battle is due almost solely to the fact that the commander has at his disposal the special
natures of artillery and also some horse artillery. Thus the (augmented) division is regarded by many as the
fighting unit of the 20th, as the corps was that of the 19th century. In Europe there is even a tendency to substitute
the ancient phrase “reserve artillery” for “corps artillery,” showing that the role to be played by the corps batteries
is subordinated to the operations of the masses of divisional artillery, the whole being subject, of course, to the
technical supervision of the artillery general officer who accompanies the corps headquarters. Thus limited, the
army corps has now come to consist of the staff, two or more divisions, the corps or reserve artillery (of special
batteries), a small force of “corps” cavalry, and various technical and departmental troops. The cavalry is never
very numerous, owing to the demands of the independent cavalry divisions on the one hand and those of the
divisional cavalry on the other. The engineers of an army corps include telegraph, balloon and pontoon units.
Attached to the corps are reserves of munitions and supplies in ammunition columns, field parks, supply parks, &c.
The term and the organization were discontinued in England in 1906, on the augmentation of the divisions and the
assignment of certain former “corps troops” to the direct control of the army commanders. It should be noticed that
the Japanese, who had no corps organization during the war of 1904-5, afterwards increased the strength of their
divisions from 15,000 to 20,000; the augmented “division,” with the above peace strength, becomes to all intents
and purposes a corps, and the generals commanding divisions were in 1906 given the title of generals-in-chief.

50. Army.—The term “army” is applied, in war time, to any command of several army corps, or even of several
divisions, operating under the orders of one commander-in-chief. The army in this sense (distinguished by a
number or by a special title) varies, therefore, with circumstances. In the American Civil War, the Army of the
Ohio consisted in 1864 only of the army staff and the XXIII. corps. At the other extreme we find that the German
II. Army in 1870 consisted of seven army corps and two cavalry divisions, and the III. Army of six army corps and
two cavalry divisions. The term “army” in this sense is therefore very elastic in its application, but it is generally
held that large groups of corps operating in one theatre of war should be subdivided into armies, and that the
strength of an army should not exceed about 150,000 men, if indeed this figure is reached at all. This again
depends upon circumstances. It might be advisable to divide a force of five corps into two armies, or on the other
hand it might be impossible to find suitable leaders for more than two armies when half a million men were
present for duty. In France, organization has been carried a step further. The bulk of the national forces is, in case
of war, organized into a “group of armies” under a commander, usually, though incorrectly, called the
generalissimo. This office, of course, does not exist in peace, but the insignia, the distinctive marks of the
headquarters flag, &c., are stated in official publications, and the names of the generalissimo and of his chief of
staff are known. Under the generalissimo would be four or five army commanders, each with three or four army
corps under him. Independent of this “group of armies” there would be other and minor “armies” where required.

51. Chief Command.—The leading of the “group of armies” referred to above does not, in France, imply the
supreme command, which would be exercised by the minister of war in Paris. The German system, on the other
hand, is based upon the leadership of the national forces by the sovereign in person, and even though the
headquarters of the “supreme war lord” (Oberste Kriegsherr) are actually in the field in one theatre of operations,
he directs the movements of the German armies in all quarters. Similarly, in 1864, General Grant accompanied and
controlled as a “group” the Armies of the Potomac and the James, supervising at the same time the operations of
other groups and armies. In the same campaign a subordinate general, Sherman, commanded a “group” consisting
of the Armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio. The question as to whether the supreme command
and the command of the principal group of armies should be in the same hands is very difficult of solution. In
practice, the method adopted in each case usually grows out of the military and political conditions. The advantage
of the German method is that the supreme commander is in actual contact with the troops, and can therefore form
an accurate judgment of their powers. Under these conditions the risk of having cabinet strategy forced upon the

generals is at its minimum, and more especially so if the supreme commander is the head of the state. On the other
hand, his judgment is very liable to be influenced unduly by facts, coming under his own notice, which may in
reality have no more than a local significance. Further, the supreme commander is at the mercy of distant
subordinates to a far greater degree than he would be if free to go from one army to another. Thus, in 1870 the king
of Prussia’s headquarters before Paris were subjected to such pressure from subordinate army commanders that on
several occasions selected staff-officers had to be sent to examine, for the king’s private information, the real state
of things at the front. The conduct of operations by one group commander in the campaign of 1864 seemed, at a
distance, so eccentric and dangerous that General Grant actually left his own group of armies and went in person to
take over command at the threatened point. Balanced judgment is thus often impossible unless the supreme
command is independent of, and in a position to exercise general supervision over, each and every group or army.
At the other end of the scale is the system of command employed by the Turks in 1877, in which four armies, three
of them being actually on the same theatre of war, were directed from Constantinople. This system may be
condemned unreservedly. It is recognized that, once the armies on either side have become seriously engaged, a
commander-in-chief on the spot must direct them. Thus in 1904, while the Japanese and Russian armies were
under the supreme command of their respective sovereigns, General Kuropatkin and Marshal Oyama personally
commanded the chief groups of armies in the field. This is substantially the same as the system of the French army.
It is therefore permissible to regard the system pursued by the Germans in 1870, and by the Union government in
1864, more as suited to special circumstances than as a general rule. As has been said above, the special feature of
the German system of command is the personal leadership of the German emperor, and this brings the student at
once to the consideration of another important part of the “superior leading.”

52. The Chief of the General Staff is, as his title implies, the chief staff officer of the service, and as such, he has
duties of the highest possible importance, both in peace and war. For the general subject of staff duties see Staff.
Here we are concerned only with the peculiar position of the chief of staff under a system in which the sovereign is
the actual commander-in-chief. It is obvious in the first place that the sovereign may not be a great soldier, fitted
by mental gifts, training and character to be placed at the head of an army of, perhaps, a million men. Allowing
that it is imperative that, whatever he may be in himself, the sovereign should ex officio command the armies, it is
easy to see that the ablest general in these armies must be selected to act as his adviser, irrespective of rank and
seniority. This officer must therefore be assigned to a station beyond that of his army rank, and his orders are in
fact those of the sovereign himself. Nor is it sufficient that he should occupy an unofficial position as adviser, or ad
latus. If he were no more than this, the sovereign could act without his adviser being even aware of the action
taken. As the staff is the machinery for the transmission of orders and despatches, all orders of the commander-in-
chief are signed by the chief of staff as a matter of course, and this position is therefore that in which the adviser
has the necessary influence. The relations between the sovereign and his chief military adviser are thus of the first
importance to the smooth working of the great military machine, and never have the possibilities of this apparently
strange system been more fully exploited than by King William and his chief of staff von Moltke in 1866 and in
1870-71. It is not true to say that the king was the mere figurehead of the German armies, or that Moltke was the
real commander-in-chief. Those who have said this forget that the sole responsibility for the consequences of every
order lay with the king, and that it is precisely the fear of this responsibilty that has made so many brilliant
subordinates fail when in chief command. The characters of the two men supplemented each other, as also in the
case of Blücher and Gneisenau and that of Radetzky and Hess. Under these circumstances, the German system of
command works, on the whole, smoothly. Matters would, however, be different if either of the two officers failed
to realize their mutual interdependence, and the system is in any case only required when the self-sufficing great
soldier is not available for the chief executive command.

53. First and Second Lines.—The organization into arms and units is of course maintained in peace as well as
for war. Military forces are further organized, in peace, into active and reserve troops, first and second lines, &c.,

according to the power possessed by the executive over the men. Broadly speaking, the latter fall into three classes,
regulars, auxiliary forces and irregular troops. The regulars or active troops are usually liable to serve at all times
and in any country to which they may be sent. Auxiliary forces may be defined as all troops which undergo actual
military training without being constantly under arms, and in Great Britain these were until 1908 represented by
the Militia, the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, and now by the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve. In a
country in which recruiting is by voluntary enlistment the classification is, of course, very different from that
prevailing in a conscript army. The various “lines” are usually composed of separate organizations; the men are
recruited upon different engagements, and receive a varying amount of training. Of the men not permanently
embodied, only the reserve of the active army has actually served a continuous term with the colours. Other troops,
called by various appellations, of which “militia” may be taken as generic, go through their military training at
intervals. The general lines of army organization in the case of a country recruiting by universal service are as
follows:—The male population is divided into classes, by ages, and the total period of liability to service is usually
about 25 years. Thus at any given time, assuming two years’ colour-service, the men of 20 and 21 years of age
would constitute the active army serving with the colours, those of, say, 22 and 23, the reserve. The Landwehr or
second line army would consist of all men who had been through the active army and were now aged 24 to 36. The
third line would similarly consist of men whose ages were between 36 and 44. Assuming the same annual levy, the
active army would consist of 200,000 men, its reserve 200,000, the second line of 1,300,000, and the third of
800,000. Thus of 2,500,000 men liable to, and trained for, military service, 200,000 only would be under arms at
any given time. The simple system here outlined is of course modified and complicated in practice owing to re-
engagements by non-commissioned officers, the speedy dismissal to the reserve of intelligent and educated men,
&c.

54. War Reserves.—In war, the reserves increase the field armies to 400,000 men, the whole or part of the
second line is called up and formed into auxiliary regiments, brigades and divisions, and in case of necessity the
third line is also called upon, though usually this is only in the last resort and for home defence only. The
proportion of reservists to men with the colours varies of course with the length of service. Thus in France or
Germany, with two years’ service in force, half of the rank and file of a unit in war would be men recalled from
civil life. The true military value of reservists is often questioned, and under certain circumstances it is probable
that units would take the field at peace strength without waiting for their reservists. The frontier guards of the
continental military powers, which are expected to move at the earliest possible moment after hostilities have
begun, are maintained at a higher effective than other units, and do not depend to any great extent on receiving
reservists. The peace footing of cavalry and artillery units is similarly maintained at an artificial level. An
operation of the nature of a coup de main would in any case be carried out by the troops available at the moment,
however large might be the force required—twenty weak battalions would, in fact, be employed instead of ten
strong ones. There is another class of troops, which may be called depot troops. These consist of officers and men
left behind when the active corps completed with reserves takes the field, and they have (a) to furnish drafts for the
front—and (b) to form a nucleus upon which all later formations are built up. The troops of the second line
undertake minor work, such as guarding railways, and also furnish drafts for the field army. Later, when they have
been for some time under arms, the second line troops are often employed by themselves in first line. A year’s
training under war conditions should bring such troops to the highest efficiency. As for irregulars, they have real
military value only when the various permanent establishments do not take up the whole fighting strength of the
nation, and thus states having universal service armies do not, as a rule, contemplate the employment of
combatants other than those shown on the peace rolls. The status of irregulars is ill defined, but it is practically
agreed that combatants, over whose conduct the military authorities have no disciplinary power, should be denied
the privileges of recognized soldiers, and put to death if captured. So drastic a procedure is naturally open to abuse
and is not always expedient. Still, it is perfectly right that the same man shall not be allowed, for example, to shoot

a sentry at one moment, and to claim the privileges of a harmless civilian at the next. The division into first,
second and third lines follows generally from the above. The first line troops, in a conscript army, are the “active
army” or regulars, permanently under arms in peace time, and its reserves, which are used on the outbreak of war
to complete the existing units to full strength. The German terms Landwehr and Landsturm are often applied to
armies of the second and the third lines.

55. The military characteristics of the various types of regular troops have been dealt with in considering the
advantages and disadvantages of the several forms of recruiting. It only remains to give some indication of the
advantages which such forces (irrespective of their time of service) possess over troops which only come up for
training at intervals. Physically, the men with the colours are always superior to the rest, owing to their constant
exercise and the regularity and order under which they live; as soldiers, they are more under the control of their
officers, who are their leaders in daily life, in closer touch with army methods and discipline, and, as regards their
formal training, they possess infinitely greater power of strategic and tactical manœuvre. Their steadiness under
fire is of course more to be relied upon than that of other troops. Wellington, speaking of the contrast between old
and young soldiers (regulars), was of opinion that the chief difference lay in the greater hardiness, power of
endurance, and general campaigning qualities given by experience. This is of course more than ever true in respect
of regular and auxiliary troops, as was strikingly demonstrated in the Spanish-American War. On the whole, it is
true to say that only a regular army can endure defeat without dissolution, and that volunteers, reservists or
militiamen fresh from civil life may win a victory but cannot make the fullest use of it when won. At the same
time, when they have been through one or two arduous campaigns, raw troops become to all intents and purposes
equal to any regulars. On the other hand, the greatest military virtue of auxiliary forces is their enthusiasm. With
this quality were won the great victories of 1792-94 in France, those of 1813 in Germany, and the beginnings of
Italian unity at Calatafimi and Palermo. The earlier days of the American Civil War witnessed desperate fighting,
of which Shiloh is the best example, between armies which had had but the slightest military training. In the same
war the first battle of Bull Run illustrated what has been said above as to the weaknesses of unprofessional armies.
Both sides, raw and untrained, fought for a long time with the greatest determination, after which the defeated
army was completely dissolved in rout and the victors quite unable to pursue. So far it is the relative military value
of the professional soldier and the citizen-soldier that has been reviewed. A continental army of the French or
German stamp is differently constituted. It is, first of all, clear that the drilled citizen-soldier combines the qualities
of training and enthusiasm. From this it follows that a hostile “feeling” as well as a hostile “view” must animate
such an army if it is to do good service. If a modern “nation in arms” is engaged in a purely dynastic quarrel
against a professional army of inferior strength, the result will probably be victory for the latter. But the active
army of France or Germany constitutes but a small part of the “nation in arms,” and the army for war is composed
in addition of men who have at some period in the past gone through a regular training. Herein lies the difference
between continental and British auxiliary forces. In the French army, an ex-soldier during his ten years of reserve
service was by the law of 1905 only liable for two months’ training, and for the rest of his military career for two
weeks’ service only. The further reduction of this liability was proposed in 1907 and led to much controversy. The
question of the value of auxiliary forces, then, as between the continuous work of, say, English territorials, and the
permanent though dwindling influence of an original period of active soldiering, is one of considerable
importance. It is largely decided in any given case by the average age of the men in the ranks.

56. The transfer of troops from the state of peace to that of war is called mobilization. This is, of course, a matter
which primarily depends on good administration, and its minutest details are in all states laid down beforehand.
Reservists have to be summoned, and, on arrival, to be clothed and equipped out of stores maintained in peace.
Officers and men of the regular army on leave have to be recalled, the whole medically examined for physical
fitness to serve, and a thousand details have to be worked out before the unit is ready to move to its concentration
station. The concentration and the strategic deployment are, of course, dependent upon the circumstances of each

war, and the peace organization ceases to be applicable. But throughout a war the depots at home, the recruiting
districts of second-line troops, and above all the various arsenals, manufactories and offices controlled by the war
department are continually at work in maintaining the troops in the field at proper strength and effectiveness.

57. Territorial System.—The feudal system was of course a territorial system in principle. Indeed, as has been
shown above, a feudal army was chiefly at fault owing to the dislocation of the various levies. Concentration was
equally the characteristic of the professional armies which succeeded those of feudalism, and only such militia
forces as remained in existence preserved a local character. The origin of territorial recruiting for first-line troops is
to be found in the “cantonal” system, said to have been introduced by Louis XIV., but brought to the greatest
perfection in Prussia under Frederick William I. But long service and the absence of a reserve vitiated the system
in practice, since losses had to be made good by general recruiting, and even the French Revolution may hardly be
said to have produced the territorial system as we understand it to-day. It was only in the deliberate preparation of
the Prussian army on short-service lines that we find the beginning of the “territorial system of dislocation and
command.” This is so intimately connected with the general system of organization that it cannot be considered
merely as a method of recruiting by districts. It may be defined as a system whereby, for purposes of command in
peace, recruiting, and of organization generally, the country is divided into districts, which are again divided and
subdivided as may be required. In a country in which universal service prevails, an army corps district is divided
into divisional districts, these being made up of brigade and of regimental districts. Each of these units recruits,
and is in peace usually stationed, in its own area; the artillery, cavalry and special arms are recruited for the corps
throughout the whole allotted area, and stationed at various points within the same. Thus in the German army the
III. army corps is composed entirely of Brandenburgers. The infantry of the corps is stationed in ten towns, the
cavalry in four and the artillery in five. In countries which adhere to voluntary recruiting, the system, depending as
it does on the calculable certainty of recruiting, is not so fully developed, but in Great Britain the auxiliary forces
have been reorganized in divisions of all arms on a strictly territorial basis. The advantage of the system as carried
into effect in Germany is obvious. Training is carried out with a minimum of friction and expense, as each unit has
an ample area for training. Whilst the brigadiers can exercise general control over the colonels, and the divisional
generals over the brigadiers, there is little undue interference of superior authority in the work of each grade, and
the men, if soldiers by compulsion, at any rate are serving close to their own homes. Most of the reservists required
on mobilization reside within a few miles of their barracks. Living in the midst of the civil population, the troops
do not tend to become a class apart. Small garrisons are not, as formerly, allowed to stagnate, since modern
communications make supervision easy. Further, it must be borne in mind that the essence of the system is the
organization and training for war of the whole military population. Now so great a mass of men could not be
administered except through this decentralization of authority, and the corollary of short service universally
applied is the full territorial system, in which the whole enrolled strength of the district is subjected to the authority
of the district commander. Practice, however, falls short of theory, and the dangers of drawing whole units from
disaffected or unmilitary districts are often foreseen and discounted by distributing the recruits, non-regionally,
amongst more or less distant regiments.

58. Army Administration.—The existing systems of command and organization, being usually based upon
purely military considerations, have thus much, indeed almost all, in common. Administration differs from them in
one important respect. While the methods of command and organization are the result of the accumulated
experience of many armies through many hundred years, the central administration in each case is the product of
the historical evolution of the particular country, and is dependent upon forms of government, constitutions and
political parties. Thus France, after 1870, remodelled the organization of her forces in accordance with the
methods which were presumed to have given Germany the victory, but the headquarters staff at Paris is very
different in all branches from that of Berlin. Great Britain adopted German tactics, and to some extent even
uniform, but the Army Council has no counterpart in the administration of the German emperor’s forces.

The first point for consideration, therefore, is, what is the ultimate, and what is the proximate, authority
supervising the administration? The former is, in most countries, the people or its representatives in parliament, for
it is in their power to stop supplies, and without money the whole military fabric must crumble. The constitutional
chief of the army is the sovereign, or, in republics, the president, but in most countries the direct control of army
matters by the representatives of the people extends over all affairs into which the well-being of the civil
population, the expenditure of money, alleged miscarriages of military justice, &c., enter, and it is not unusual to
find grand strategy, and even the technical deficiencies of a field-gun or rifle, the subject of interpellation and
debate. The peculiar influence of the sovereign is in what may be termed patronage (that is, the selection of
officers to fill important positions and the general supervision of the officer-corps), and in the fact that loyalty is
the foundation of the discipline and soldierly honour which it is the task of the officers to inculcate into their men.
In all cases the head of the state is ipso facto the head of the army. The difference between various systems may
then be held to depend on the degree of power allowed to or held by him. This reacts upon the central
administration of the army, and is the cause of the differences of system alluded to. For the civil chief of the
executive is not necessarily a soldier, much less an expert and capable soldier; he must, therefore, be provided with
technical advisers. The chief of the general staff is often the principal of these, though in some cases a special
commander-in-chief, or the minister for war, or, as in France and England, a committee or council, has the duty of
advising the executive on technical matters.

59. Branches of Administration.—In these circumstances the only general principle of army administration
common to all systems is the division of the labour between two great branches. Military administration, in respect
of the troops and material which it has to control, is divided between the departments of the War Office and the
General Staff. In the staff work of subordinate units, e.g. army corps and divisions, the same classification of
duties is adopted, “general staff” duties being performed by one set of officers, “routine staff” duties by another.

The work of a General Staff may be taken as consisting in preparation for war, and this again, both in Great
Britain and abroad, consists of military policy in all its branches, staff duties in war, the collection of intelligence,
mobilization, plans of operations and concentration, training, military history and geography, and the preparation
of war regulations. These subjects are usually subdivided into four or five groups, each of which is dealt with by a
separate section of the general staff, the actual division of the work, of course, varying in different countries. Thus,
the second section of the French staff deals with “the organization and tactics of foreign armies, study of foreign
theatres of war, and military missions abroad.” A War Office is concerned with peace administration and with the
provision of men and material in war. Under the former category fall such matters as “routine” administration,
finance, justice, recruiting, promotion of officers (though not always), barracks and buildings generally, armament,
equipment and clothing, &c., in fact all matters not directly relevant to the training of the troops for and the
employment of the troops in war. In war, some of the functions of a war office are suspended, but on the other
hand the work necessary for the provision of men and material to augment the army and to make good its losses is
vastly increased. In 1870 the minister of war, von Roon, accompanied the headquarters in the field, but this
arrangement did not work well, and will not be employed again. The chief duties other than those of the general
staff fall into two classes, the “routine staff,” administration or adjutant-general’s branch, which deals with all
matters affecting personnel, and the quartermaster-general’s branch, which supervises the provision and issue of
supplies, stores and matériel of all kinds. Over and above these, provision has to be made for control of all the
technical parts of administration, such as artillery and engineer services (in Great Britain, this, with a portion of the
quartermaster-general’s department, is under the master-general of the ordnance), and for military legislation,
preparation of estimates, &c. These are, of course, special subjects, not directly belonging to the general
administrative system. It is only requisite that the latter should be sufficiently elastic to admit of these departments
being formed as required. However these subordinate offices may be multiplied, the main work of the war office is
in the two departments of the adjutant-general (personnel) and the quartermaster-general (matériel). Beyond and

wholly distinct from these is the general staff, the creation of which is perhaps the most important contribution of
the past century to the pure science of military organization.

Comparative Strength of Various Armies
(a) Compulsory Service (1906).

Austria
France. Germany. Russia.
Hungar
Annual Contingent for the Colours 230,000 222,000 254,000 128,
Medically unfit and exempt 90,000 127,000 120,000 57,
Excused from Service in Peace, able-bodied ·· 291,000 606,000 285,
Total of Men becoming liable for service in 1907 320,000 540,000 980,000 470,
Total Permanent Armed Force in Peace 610,000 610,000 1,226,000 356,
(not includ-
ding colonial
troops)
First-Line Troops, war-strength (estimated) 1,350,000 1,675,000 2,187,000 950,
Second-Line Troops, war-strength (estimated) 3,000,000 2,275,000 1,429,000 1,450,
Numbers available in excess of these (estimated) 450,000 3,950,000 9,384,000 5,000,
Total War Resources of all kinds 4,800,000 7,900,000 13,000,000 7,400,
Annual Military Expenditure—total £27,720,000 £32,228,000 £36,080,000 £15,840,
Annual Military Expenditure—per head of
population (approx.) 13s. 9d. 10s. 9d. 5s. 3d. 6s. 8d

(b) Authorized Establishments and Approximate Military Resources of the British Empire (1906-1907).

Native
Reserves
British Troops
for Auxiliary
Regular (Regular,
Regular Forces.
Army. Reserve,
Army.
&c.).
Great Britain 117,000 120,000 500,000 ··
Channel Islands, Malta, Bermuda, Colonies and Dependencies 65,000 ·· 6,000 ··
India 75,000 ·· 30,000 202,000
Canadian Forces ·· ·· 46,000 ··

Australian Forces (including New Zealand) ·· ·· 70,000 ··
(appr.)
South African Forces ·· ·· 20,000 ··
(appr.)
Totals 257,000 120,000 672,000 202,000

Note.—Ex-soldiers of regular and auxiliary forces, still fit for service, and estimated levées en masse, are
not counted. Enlistment chiefly voluntary.

(c) The Regular Army of the United States has a maximum authorized establishment (1906) of 60,000
enlisted men; the Organized Militia was at the same date 110,000 strong. Voluntary enlistment throughout.
(See United States.) In 1906-1907 the total numbers available for a levée en masse were estimated at
13,000,000.

British Army

60. Prior to the Norman Conquest the armed force of England was essentially a national militia. Every freeman
was bound to bear arms for the defence of the country, or for the maintenance of order. To give some organization
and training to the levy, the several sheriffs had authority to call out the contingents of their shires for exercise. The
“fyrd,” as the levy was named, was available for home service only, and could not be moved even from its county
except in the case of emergency; and it was principally to repel oversea invasions that its services were required.
Yet even in those days the necessity of some more permanent force was felt, and bodies of paid troops were
maintained by the kings at their own cost. Thus Canute and his successors, and even some of the great earls kept
up a household force (huscarles). The English army at Hastings consisted of the fyrd and the corps of huscarles.

The English had fought on foot; but the mailed horseman had now become the chief factor in war, and the
Conqueror introduced into England the system of tenure by knight-service familiar in Normandy. This was based
on the unit of the feudal host, the constabularia of ten knights, the Conqueror granting lands in return for finding
one or more of these units (in the case of great barons) or some fraction of them (in the case of lesser tenants). The
obligation was to provide knights to serve, with horse and arms, for forty days in each year at their own charges.
This obligation could be handed on by sub-enfeoffment through a whole series of under-tenants. The system being
based, not on the duty of personal service, but on the obligation to supply one or more knights (or it might be only
the fraction of a knight), it was early found convenient to commute this for a money payment known as “scutage”
(see Knight Service and Scutage). This money enabled the king to hire mercenaries, or pay such of the feudal
troops as were willing to serve beyond the usual time. From time to time proclamations and statutes were issued
reminding the holders of knights’ fees of their duties; but the immediate object was generally to raise money rather
than to enforce personal service, which became more and more rare. The feudal system had not, however,
abrogated the old Saxon levies, and from these arose two national institutions—the posse comitatus, liable to be
called out by the sheriff to maintain the king’s peace, and later the militia (q.v.). The posse comitatus, or power of
the county, included all males able to bear arms, peers and spiritual men excepted; and though primarily a police
force it was also bound to assist in the defence of the country. This levy was organized by the Assize of Arms
under Henry II. (1181), and subsequently under Edward I. (1285) by the so-called “Statute of Winchester,” which
determined the numbers and description of weapons to be kept by each man according to his property, and also
provided for their periodical inspection. The early Plantagenets made free use of mercenaries. But the weakness of
the feudal system in England was preparing, through the 12th and 13th centuries, a nation in arms absolutely
unique in the middle ages. The Scottish and Welsh wars were, of course, fought by the feudal levy, but this levy
was far from being the mob of unwilling peasants usual abroad, and from the fyrd came the English archers, whose
fame was established by Edward I.’s wars, and carried to the continent by Edward III. Edward III. realized that
there was better material to be had in his own country than abroad, and the army with which he invaded France
was an army of national mercenaries, or, more simply, of English soldiers. The army at Creçy was composed
exclusively of English, Welsh and Irish. From the pay list of the army at the siege of Calais (1346) it appears that
all ranks, from the prince of Wales downward, were paid, no attempt being made to force even the feudal nobles to

serve abroad at their own expense. These armies were raised mainly by contracts entered into “with some knight or
gentleman expert in war, and of great revenue and livelihood in the country, to serve the king in war with a number
of men.” Copies of the indentures executed when Henry V. raised his army for the invasion of France in 1415 are
in existence. Under these the contracting party agreed to serve the king abroad for one year, with a given number
of men equipped according to agreement, and at a stipulated rate of pay. A certain sum was usually paid in
advance, and in many cases the crown jewels and plate were given in pledge for the rest. The profession of arms
seems to have been profitable. The pay of the soldier was high as compared with that of the ordinary labourer, and
he had the prospect of a share of plunder in addition, so that it was not difficult to raise men where the commander
had a good military reputation. Edward III. is said to have declined the services of numbers of foreign mercenaries
who wished to enrol under him in his wars against France.

The funds for the payment of these armies were provided partly from the royal revenues, partly from the fines
paid in lieu of military service, and other fines arbitrarily imposed, and partly by grants from parliament. As the
soldier’s contract usually ended with the war, and the king had seldom funds to renew it even if he so wished, the
armies disbanded of themselves at the close of each war. To secure the services of the soldier during his contract,
acts were passed (18 Henry VI. c. 19; and 7 Henry VII. c. 1) inflicting penalties for desertion; and in Edward VI.’s
reign an act “touching the true service of captains and soldiers” was passed, somewhat of the nature of a Mutiny
Act.

61. It is difficult to summarize the history of the army between the Hundred Years’ War and 1642. The final
failure of the English arms in France was soon followed by the Wars of the Roses, and in the long period of civil
strife the only national force remaining to England was the Calais garrison. Henry VIII. was a soldier-king, but he
shared the public feeling for the old bow and bill, and English armies which served abroad did not, it seems, win
the respect of the advanced professional soldiers of the continent. In 1519 the Venetian ambassador described the
English forces as consisting of 150,000 men whose peculiar, though not exclusive, weapon was the long bow
(Fortescue i. 117). The national levy made in 1588 to resist the Armada and the threat of invasion produced about
750 lancers (heavy-armed cavalry), 2000 light horse and 56,000 foot, beside 20,000 men employed in watching the
coasts. The small proportion of mounted men is very remarkable in a country in which Cromwell was before long
to illustrate the full power of cavalry on the battlefield. It is indeed not unfair to regard this army as a
miscellaneous levy of inferior quality.

It was in cavalry that England was weakest, and by three different acts it was sought to improve the breed of
horses, though the light horse of the northern counties had a good reputation, and even won the admiration of the
emperor Charles V. Perhaps the best organized force in England at this time was the London volunteer association
which ultimately became the Honourable Artillery Company. At Floddon the spirit of the old English yeomanry
triumphed over the outward form of continental battalions which the Scots had adopted, and doubtless the great
victory did much to retard military progress in England. The chief service of Henry VIII. to the British army was
the formation of an artillery train, in which he took a special interest. Before he died the forces came to consist of a
few permanent troops (the bodyguard and the fortress artillery service), the militia or general levy, which was for
home, and indeed for county, service only, and the paid armies which were collected for a foreign war and
disbanded at the conclusion of peace, and were recruited on the same principle of indents which had served in the
Hundred Years’ War. In the reign of Mary, the old Statute of Winchester was revised (1553), and the new act
provided for a readjustment of the county contingents and in some degree for the rearmament of the militia. But,
from the fall of Calais and the expedition to Havre up to the battle of the Dunes a century later, the intervention of
British forces in foreign wars was always futile and generally disastrous. During this time, however, the numerous
British regiments in the service of Holland learned, in the long war of Dutch independence, the art of war as it had
developed on the continent since 1450, and assimilated the regimental system and the drill and armament of the

best models. Thus it was that in 1642 there were many hundreds of trained and war-experienced officers and
sergeants available for the armies of the king and the parliament. By this time bows and bills had long disappeared
even from the militia, and the Thirty Years’ War, which, even more than the Low Countries, offered a career for the
adventurous man, contributed yet more trained officers and soldiers to the English and Scottish forces. So closely
indeed was war now studied by Englishmen that the respective adherents of the Dutch and the Swedish systems
quarrelled on the eve of the battle of Edgehill. Francis and Horace Vere, Sir John Norris, and other Englishmen had
become generals of European reputation. Skippon, Astley, Goring, Rupert, and many others soon to be famous
were distinguished as company and regimental officers in the battles and sieges of Germany and the Low
Countries.

The home forces of England had, as has been said, little or nothing to revive their ancient renown. Instead, they
had come to be regarded as a menace to the constitution. In Queen Elizabeth’s time the demands of the Irish wars
had led to frequent forced levies, and the occasional billeting of the troops in England also gave rise to murmurs,
but the brilliancy and energy of her reign covered a great deal, and the peaceful policy of her successor removed
all immediate cause of complaint. But after the accession of Charles I. we find the army a constant and principal
source of dispute between the king and parliament, until under William III. it is finally established on a
constitutional footing. Charles, wishing to support the Elector Palatine in the Thirty Years’ War, raised an army of
10,000 men. He was already encumbered with debts, and the parliament refused all grants, on which he had
recourse to forced loans. The army was sent to Spain, but returned without effecting anything, and was not
disbanded, as usual, but billeted on the inhabitants. The billeting was the more deeply resented as it appeared that
the troops were purposely billeted on those who had resisted the loan. Forced loans, billeting and martial law—all
directly connected with the maintenance of the army—formed the main substance of the grievances set forth in the
Petition of Right. In accepting this petition, Charles gave up the right to maintain an army without consent of
parliament; and when in 1639 he wished to raise one to act against the rebellious Scots, parliament was called
together, and its sanction obtained, on the plea that the army was necessary for the defence of England. This army
again became the source of dispute between the king and parliament, and finally both sides appealed to arms.

62. The first years of the Great Rebellion (q.v.) showed primarily the abundance of good officers produced by
the wars on the continent, and in the second place the absolute inadequacy of the military system of the country;
the commissions of array, militia ordinances, &c., had at last to give way to regular methods of enlistment and a
central army administration. It was clear, at the same time, that when the struggle was one of principles and not of
dynastic politics, excellent recruits, far different from the wretched levies who had been gathered together for the
Spanish war, were to be had in any reasonable number. These causes combined to produce the “New Model”
which, originating in Cromwell’s own cavalry and the London trained bands of foot, formed of picked men and
officers, severely disciplined, and organized and administered in the right way, quickly proved its superiority over
all other armies in the field, and in a few years raised its general to supreme civil power. The 15th of February
1645 was the birthday of the British standing army, and from its first concentration at Windsor Park dates the
scarlet uniform. The men were for the most part voluntarily enlisted from existing corps, though deficiencies had
immediately to be made good by impressment.

Four months later the New Model decided the quarrel of king and parliament at Naseby. When Cromwell, the
first lieutenant-general and the second captain-general of the army, sent his veterans to take part in the wars of the
continent they proved themselves a match for the best soldiers in Europe. On the restoration of the monarchy in
1660 the army, now some 80,000 strong, was disbanded. It had enforced the execution of Charles I., it had
dissolved parliament, and England had been for years governed under a military regime. Thus the most popular
measure of the Restoration was the dissolution of the army. Only Monk’s regiment of foot (now the Coldstream
Guards) survived to represent the New Model in the army of to-day. At the same time the troops (now regiments)

of household cavalry, and the regiment of foot which afterwards became the Grenadier Guards, were formed,
chiefly from Royalists, though the disbanded New Model contributed many experienced recruits. The permanent
forces of the crown came to consist once more of the “garrisons and guards,” maintained by the king from the
revenue allotted to him for carrying on the government of the country. The “garrisons” were commissioned to
special fortresses—the Tower of London, Portsmouth, &c. The “guards” comprised the sovereign’s bodyguards
(“the yeomen of the guard” and “gentlemen-at-arms,” who had existed since the times of Henry VII. and VIII.),
and the regiments mentioned above. Even this small force, at first not exceeding 3000 men, was looked on with
jealousy by parliament, and every attempt to increase it was opposed. The acquisition of Tangier and Bombay, as
part of the dower of the infanta of Portugal, led to the formation of a troop of horse (now the 1st Royal Dragoons)
and a regiment of infantry (the 2nd, now Queen’s R.W. Surrey, regiment) for the protection of the former; and a
regiment of infantry (afterwards transferred to the East India Company) to hold the latter (1661). These troops, not
being stationed in the kingdom, created no distrust; but whenever, as on several occasions during Charles’s reign,
considerable armies were raised, they were mostly disbanded when the occasion ceased. Several regiments,
however, were added to the permanent force, including Dumbarton’s regiment (the 1st or Royal Scots, nicknamed
Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard)—which had a long record of service in the armies of the continent, and represented
the Scots brigade of Gustavus Adolphus’s army—and the 3rd Buffs, representing the English regiments of the
Dutch army and through them the volunteers of 1572, and on Charles’s death in 1685 the total force of “guards and
garrisons” had risen to 16,500, of whom about one-half formed what we should now call the standing army.

63. James II., an experienced soldier and sailor, was more obstinate than his predecessor in his efforts to
increase the army, and Monmouth’s rebellion afforded him the opportunity. A force of about 20,000 men was
maintained in England, and a large camp formed at Hounslow. Eight cavalry and twelve infantry regiments (the
senior of which was the 7th “Royal” Fusiliers, formed on a new French model) were raised, and given the numbers
which, with few exceptions, they still bear. James even proposed to disband the militia, which had not
distinguished itself in the late rebellion, and further augment the standing army; and although the proposal was
instantly rejected, he continued to add to the army till the Revolution deprived him of his throne. The army which
he had raised was to a great extent disbanded, the Irish soldiers especially, whom he had introduced in large
numbers on account of their religion, being all sent home.

The condition of the army immediately engaged the attention of parliament. The Bill of Rights had definitely
established that “the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom, unless it be by the consent of
parliament, is against the law,” and past experience made them very jealous of such a force. But civil war was
imminent, foreign war certain; and William had only a few Dutch troops, and the remains of James’s army, with
which to meet the storm. Parliament therefore sanctioned a standing army, trusting to the checks established by the
Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, and by placing the pay of the army under the control of the Commons. An
event soon showed the altered position of the army. A regiment mutinied and declared for James. It was
surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms; but William found himself without legal power to deal with the
mutineers. He therefore applied to parliament, and in 1689 was passed the first Mutiny Act, which, after repeating
the provisions regarding the army inserted in the Bill of Rights, and declaring the illegality of martial law, gave
power to the crown to deal with the offences of mutiny and desertion by courts-martial. From this event is often
dated the history of the standing army as a constitutional force (but see Fortescue, British Army, i. 335).

64. Under William the army was considerably augmented. The old regiments of James’s army were reorganized,
retaining, however, their original numbers, and three of cavalry and eleven of infantry (numbered to the 28th) were
added. In 1690 parliament sanctioned a force of 62,000 men, further increased to 65,000 in 1691; but on peace
being made in 1697 the Commons immediately passed resolutions to the effect that the land forces be reduced to
7000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The War of the Spanish Succession quickly obliged Great Britain

again to raise a large army, at one time exceeding 200,000 men; but of these the greater number were foreign
troops engaged for the continental war. Fortescue (op. cit. i. 555) estimates the British forces at home and abroad
as 70,000 men at the highest figure. After the peace of Utrecht the force was again reduced to 8000 men in Great
Britain and 11,000 in the plantations (i.e. colonies) and abroad. From that time to the present the strength of the
army has been determined by the annual votes of parliament, and though frequently the subject of warm debates in
both houses, it has ceased to be a matter of dispute between the crown and parliament. The following table shows
the fluctuations from that time onward—the peace years showing the average peace strength, the war years the
maximum to which the forces were raised:—

Peace. War.
Year. Number. Year. Number.
1750 18,857 1745 74,187
1793 17,013 1761 67,776
1822 71,790 1777 90,734
1845 100,011 1812 245,996
1857 156,995 1856 275,079
1866 203,404 1858 222,784

Note.—Prior to 1856 the British forces serving in India are not included.

During William’s reign the small English army bore an honourable part in the wars against Louis XIV., and
especially distinguished itself under the king at Steinkirk, Neerwinden and Namur. Twenty English regiments took
part in the campaign of 1694. In the great wars of Queen Anne’s reign the British army under Marlborough
acquired a European reputation. The cavalry, which had called forth the admiration of Prince Eugene when passed
in review before him after its long march across Germany (1704), especially distinguished itself in the battle of
Blenheim, and Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet were added to the list of English victories. But the army as
usual was reduced at once, and even the cadres of old regiments were disbanded, though the alarm of Jacobite
insurrections soon brought about the re-creation of many of these. During the reign of the first and second Georges
an artillery corps was organized, and the army further increased by five regiments of cavalry and thirty-five of
infantry. Fresh laurels were won at Dettingen (1743), in which battle twenty English regiments took part; and
though Fontenoy (q.v.) was a day of disaster for the English arms, it did not lower their reputation, but rather added
to it. Six regiments of infantry won the chief glory of Prince Ferdinand’s victory of Minden (q.v.) in 1759, and
throughout the latter part of the Seven Years’ War the British contingent of Ferdinand’s army served with almost
unvarying distinction in numerous actions. About this time the first English regiments were sent to India, and the
39th shared in Clive’s victory at Plassey. During the first half of George III.’s reign the army was principally
occupied in America; and though the conquest of Canada may be counted with pride among its exploits, this page
in its history is certainly the darkest. English armies capitulated at Saratoga and at Yorktown, and the war ended by
the evacuation of the revolted states of America and the acknowledgment of their independence.

65. Before passing to the great French Revolutionary wars, from which a fresh period in the history of the army
may be dated, it will be well to review the general condition of the army in the preceding century, injured as it was
by the distrust of parliament and departmental weakness and corruption which went far to neutralize the good work
of the duke of Cumberland as commander-in-chief and of Pitt as war administrator. Regiments were raised almost
as in the days of the Edwards. The crown contracted with a distinguished soldier, or gentleman of high position,
who undertook to raise the men, receiving a certain sum as bounty-money for each recruit. In some cases, in lieu of
money, the contractor received the nomination of all or some of the officers, and recouped himself by selling the
commissions. This system—termed “raising men for rank”—was retained for many years, and originally helped to
create the “purchase system” of promotion. For the maintenance of the regiment the colonel received an annual

sum sufficient to cover the pay of the men, and the expenses of clothing and of recruiting. The colonel was given a
“beating order,” without which no enlistment was legal, and was responsible for maintaining his regiment at full
strength. “Muster masters” were appointed to muster the regiments, and to see that the men for whom pay was
drawn were really effective. Sometimes, when casualties were numerous, the allowance was insufficient to meet
the cost of recruiting, and special grants were made. In war time the ranks were also filled by released debtors,
pardoned criminals, and impressed paupers and vagrants. Where the men were raised by voluntary enlistment, the
period of service was a matter of contract between the colonel and the soldier, and the engagement was usually for
life; but exceptional levies were enlisted for the duration of war, or for periods of three or five years. As for the
officers, the low rate of pay and the purchase system combined to exclude all but men of independent incomes.
Appointments (except when in the gift of the colonel) were made by the king at home, and by the commander-in-
chief abroad; even in Ireland the power of appointment rested with the local commander of the forces until the
Union. The soldier was clothed by his colonel, the charge being defrayed from the “stock fund.” The army lived in
barracks, camps or billets. The barrack accommodation in Great Britain at the beginning of the 18th century only
sufficed for five thousand men; and though it had gradually risen to twenty thousand in 1792, a large part of the
army was constantly in camps and billets—the latter causing endless complaints and difficulties.

66. The first efforts of the army in the long war with France did not tend to raise its reputation amongst the
armies of Europe. The campaigns of allied armies under the duke of York in the Netherlands, in which British
contingents figured largely, were uniformly unsuccessful (1793-94 and 1799), though in this respect they
resembled those of almost all soldiers who commanded against the “New French” army. The policy of the younger
Pitt sent thousands of the best soldiers to unprofitable employment, and indeed to death, in the West Indies. At
home the administration was corrupt and ineffective, and the people generally shared the contemptuous feeling
towards the regular army which was then prevalent in Europe. But a better era began with the appointment of
Frederick Augustus, duke of York, as commander-in-chief of the army. He did much to improve its organization,
discipline and training, and was ably seconded by commanders of distinguished ability. Under Abercromby in
Egypt, under Stuart at Maida, and under Lake, Wellesley and others in India, the British armies again attached
victory to their standards, and made themselves feared and respected. Later, Napoleon’s threat of invading England
excited her martial spirit to the highest pitch to which it had ever attained. Finally, her military glory was raised by
the series of successful campaigns in the Peninsula, until it culminated in the great victory of Waterloo; and the
army emerged from the war with the most solidly founded reputation of any in Europe.

The events of this period belong to the history of Europe, and fall outside the province of an article dealing only
with the army. The great augmentations required during the war were effected partly by raising additional
regiments, but principally by increasing the number of battalions, some regiments being given as many as four. On
the conclusion of peace these battalions were reduced, but the regiments were retained, and the army was
permanently increased from about twenty thousand, the usual peace establishment before the war, to an average of
eighty thousand. The duke of York, on first appointment to the command, had introduced a uniform drill
throughout the army, which was further modified according to Sir David Dundas’s system in 1800; and, under the
direction of Sir John Moore and others, a high perfection of drill was attained. At the beginning of the war, the
infantry, like that of the continental powers, was formed in three ranks; but a two-rank formation had been
introduced in America and in India and gradually became general, and in 1809 was finally approved. In the
Peninsula the army was permanently organized in divisions, usually consisting of two brigades of three or four
battalions each, and one or two batteries of artillery. The duke of Wellington had also brought the commissariat
and the army transport to a high pitch of perfection, but in the long peace which followed these establishments
were reduced or broken up.

67. The period which elapsed between Waterloo and the Crimean War is marked by a number of Indian and
colonial wars, but by no organic changes in the army, with perhaps the single exception of the Limited Service Act
of 1847, by which enlistment for ten or twelve years, with power to re-engage to complete twenty-one, was
substituted for the life enlistments hitherto in force. The army went to sleep on the laurels and recollections of the
Peninsula. The duke of Wellington, for many years commander-in-chief, was too anxious to hide it away in the
colonies in order to save it from further reductions or utter extinction, to attempt any great administrative reforms.
The force which was sent to the Crimea in 1854 was an agglomeration of battalions, individually of the finest
quality, but unused to work together, without trained staff, administrative departments or army organization of any
kind. The lesson of the winter before Sevastopol was dearly bought, but was not thrown away. From that time
successive war ministers and commanders-in-chief have laboured perseveringly at the difficult task of army
organization and administration. Foremost in the work was Sidney Herbert (Lord Herbert of Lea), the soldier’s
friend, who fell a sacrifice to his labours (1861), but not before he had done much for the army. The whole system
of administration was revised. In 1854 it was inconceivably complicated and cumbersome. The “secretary of state
for war and colonies,” sitting at the Colonial Office, had a general but vague control, practically limited to times of
war. The “secretary at war” was the parliamentary representative of the army, and exercised a certain financial
control, not extending, however, to the ordnance corps. The commander-in-chief was responsible to the sovereign
alone in all matters connected with the discipline, command or patronage of the army, but to the secretary at war in
financial matters. The master-general and board of ordnance were responsible for the supply of material on
requisition, but were otherwise independent, and had the artillery and engineers under them. The commissariat
department had its headquarters at the treasury, and until 1852 the militia were under the home secretary. A number
of minor subdepartments, more or less independent, also existed, causing endless confusion, correspondence and
frequent collision. In 1854 the business of the colonies was separated from that of war, and the then secretary of
state, the duke of Newcastle, assumed control over all the other administrative officers. In the following year the
secretary of state was appointed secretary at war also, and the duties of the two offices amalgamated. The same
year the commissariat office was transferred to the war department, and the Board of Ordnance abolished, its
functions being divided between the commander-in-chief and the secretary of state. The minor departments were
gradually absorbed, and the whole administration divided under two great chiefs, sitting at the war office and
Horse Guards respectively. In 1870 these two were welded into one, and the war office now existing was
constituted.

Corresponding improvements were effected in every branch. The system of clothing the soldiers was altered, the
contracts being taken from the colonels of regiments, who received a money allowance instead, and the clothing
supplied from government manufactories. The pay, food and general condition of the soldier were improved;
reading and recreation rooms, libraries, gymnasia and facilities for games of all kinds being provided. Barracks
(q.v.) were built on improved principles, and a large permanent camp was formed at Aldershot, where considerable
forces were collected and manœuvred together. Various educational establishments were opened, a staff college
was established for the instruction of officers wishing to qualify for the staff, and regimental schools were
improved.

68. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, followed by the transference of the government of India, led to important
changes. The East India Company’s white troops were amalgamated with the Queen’s army, and the whole
reorganized (see Indian Army below).

The fact that such difficulties as those of 1854 and 1857, not to speak of the disorders of 1848, had been
surmounted by the weak army which remained over from the reductions of forty years, coupled with the
instantaneous and effective rejoinder to the threats of the French colonels in 1859—the creation of the Volunteer
Force—certainly lulled the nation and its representatives into a false sense of security. Thus the two obvious

lessons of the German successes of 1866 and 1870—the power of a national army for offensive invasion, and the
rapidity with which such an army when thoroughly organized could be moved—created the greatest sensation in
England. The year 1870 is, therefore, of prime importance in the history of the regular forces of the crown. The
strength of the home forces at different times between 1815 and 1870 is given as follows (Biddulph, Lord
Cardwell at the War Office):—

Regulars. Auxiliaries. Field Guns.
1820 64,426 60,740 22
1830 50,876 34,614 30
1840 53,379 20,791 30
1850 68,538 29,868 70
1860 100,701 229,301 180
1870 89,051 281,692 180
(later 109,000)

69. The period of reform commences therefore with 1870, and is connected indissolubly with the name of
Edward, Lord Cardwell, secretary of state for war 1869-1874. In the matter of organization the result of his labours
was seen in the perfectly arranged expedition to Ashanti (1874); as for recruiting, the introduction of short service
and reserve enlistment together with many rearrangements of pay, &c., proved so far popular that the number of
men annually enlisted was more than trebled (11,742 in 1869; 39,971 in 1885; 40,729 in 1898), and so far efficient
that “Lord Cardwell’s ... system, with but small modification, gave us during the Boer War 80,000 reservists, of
whom 96 or 97% were found efficient, and has enabled us to keep an army of 150,000 regulars in the field for 15
months” (Rt. Hon. St John Brodrick, House of Commons, 8th of March 1901). The localization of the army,
subsequently completed by the territorial system of 1882, was commenced under Cardwell’s régime, and a
measure which encountered much powerful opposition at the time, the abolition of the purchase of commissions,
was also effected by him (1871). The machinery of administration was improved, and autumn manœuvres were
practised on a scale hitherto unknown in England. In 1871 certain powers over the militia, formerly held by lords-
lieutenant, were transferred to the crown, and the auxiliary forces were placed directly under the generals
commanding districts. In 1881 came an important change in the infantry of the line, which was entirely remodelled
in two-battalion regiments bearing territorial titles. This measure (the “linked battalion” system) aroused great
opposition; it was dictated chiefly by the necessity of maintaining the Indian and colonial garrisons at full strength,
and was begun during Lord Cardwell’s tenure of office, the principle being that each regiment should have one
battalion at home and one abroad, the latter being fed by the former, which in its turn drew upon the reserve to
complete it for war. The working of the system is to be considered as belonging to present practice rather than to
history, and the reader is therefore referred to the article United Kingdom. On these general lines the army
progressed up to 1899, when the Boer War called into the field on a distant theatre of war all the resources of the
regular army, and in addition drew largely upon the existing auxiliary forces, and even upon wholly untrained
civilians, for the numbers required to make war in an area which comprised nearly all Africa south of the Zambezi.
As the result of this war (see Transvaal) successive schemes of reform were undertaken by the various war
ministers, leading up to Mr Haldane’s “territorial” scheme (1908), which put the organization of the forces in the
United Kingdom (q.v.) on a new basis.

Innovations had not been unknown in the period immediately preceding the war; as a single example we may
take the development of the mounted infantry (q.v.). It was natural that the war itself, and especially a war of so
peculiar a character, should intensify the spirit of innovation. The corresponding period in the German army lasted
from 1871 to 1888, and such a period of unsettlement is indeed the common, practically the universal, result of a

war on a large scale. Much that was of value in the Prussian methods, faithfully and even slavishly copied by Great
Britain as by others after 1870, was temporarily forgotten, but the pendulum swung back again, and the Russo-
Japanese War led to the disappearance, so far as Europe was concerned, of many products of the period of doubt
and controversy which followed the struggle in South Africa. Side by side with continuous discussions of the
greater questions of military policy, amongst these being many well-reasoned proposals for universal service, the
technical and administrative efficiency of the service has undergone great improvement, and this appears to be of
more real and permanent value than the greater part of the solutions given for the larger problems. The changes in
the organization of the artillery afford the best evidence of this spirit of practical and technical reform. In the first
place the old “royal regiment” was divided into two branches. The officers for the field and horse artillery stand
now on one seniority list for promotion, the garrison, heavy and mountain batteries on another. In each branch
important changes of organization have been also made. In the field branch, both for Royal Field and Royal Horse
Artillery, the battery is no longer the one unit for all purposes. A lieutenant-colonel’s command, the “brigade,” has
been created. It consists of a group, in the horse artillery of two, in the field artillery of three batteries. For the
practical training of the horse and field artillery a large area of ground on the wild open country of Dartmoor, near
Okehampton, has for some years been utilized. A similar school has been started at Glen Imaal in Ireland, and a
new training ground has been opened on Salisbury Plain. Similarly, with the Royal Garrison Artillery a more
perfect system has been devised for the regulation and practice of the fire of each fortress, in accordance with the
varying circumstances of its position, &c. A practice school for the garrison artillery has been established at Lydd,
but the various coast fortresses themselves carry out regular practice with service ammunition.

Indian Army

70. Historically, the Indian army grew up in three distinct divisions, the Bengal, Madras and Bombay armies.
This separation was the natural result of the original foundation of separate settlements and factories in India; and
each retains to the present day much of its old identity.

Bengal.—The English traders in Bengal were long restricted by the native princes to a military
establishment of an ensign and 30 men; and this force may be taken as the germ of the Indian army. In 1681
Bengal received the first reinforcement from Madras, and two years later a company was sent from Madras,
raising the little Bengal army to a strength of 250 Europeans. In 1695 native soldiers were first enlisted. In
1701-1702 the garrison of Calcutta consisted of 120 soldiers and seamen gunners. In 1756 occurred the
defence of Calcutta against Suraj-ud-Dowlah, and the terrible tragedy of the Black Hole. The work of
reconquest and punishment was carried out by an expedition from Madras, and in the little force with which
Clive gained the great victory of Plassey the Bengal army was represented by a few hundred men only (the
British 39th, now Dorsetshire regiment, which was also present, was the first King’s regiment sent to India,
and bears the motto Primus in Indis); but from this date the military power of the Company rapidly
increased. A company of artillery had been organized in 1748; and in 1757, shortly before Plassey, the 1st
regiment of Bengal native infantry was raised. Next, in 1759 the native infantry was augmented, in 1760
dragoons were raised, and in 1763 the total forces amounted to 1500 Europeans and 12 battalions of native
infantry (11,500 men). In 1765 the European infantry was divided into 3 regiments, and the whole force was
organized in 3 brigades, each consisting of 1 company of artillery, 1 regiment European infantry, 1 troop of
native cavalry, and 7 battalions of sepoys. In 1766, on the reduction of some money allowances, a number
of officers of the Bengal army agreed to resign their commissions simultaneously. This dangerous
combination was promptly put down by Clive, to whom the Bengal army may be said to owe its existence.

The constant wars and extensions of dominion of the next thirty years led to further augmentations; the
number of brigades and of European regiments was increased to 6; and in 1794 the Bengal army numbered
about 3500 Europeans and 24,000 natives.

71. Madras.—The first armed force in the Madras presidency was the little garrison of Armegon on the
Coromandel coast, consisting of 28 soldiers. In 1644 Fort St George was built and garrisoned, and in 1653
Madras became a presidency. In 1745 the garrison of Fort St George consisted of 200 Europeans, while a
similar number, with the addition of 200 “Topasses” (descendants of the Portuguese), garrisoned Fort St
David. In 1748 the various independent companies on the Coromandel coast and other places were
consolidated into the Madras European regiment. From this time the military history of the Madras army
was full of incident, and it bore the principal part in Clive’s victories of Arcot, Kavaripak and Plassey. In
1754 the 39th regiment of the Royal army was sent to Madras. In 1758 three others followed. In 1772 the
Madras army numbered 3000 European infantry and 16,000 natives, and in 1784 the number of native
troops had risen to 34,000.

72. Bombay.—The island of Bombay formed part of the marriage portion received by Charles II. with the
infanta of Portugal, and in 1662 the Bombay regiment of Europeans was raised to defend it. In 1668 the
island was granted to the Company, and the regiment at the same time transferred to them. In 1708 Bombay
became a presidency, but it did not play so important a part as the others in the early extension of British
power, and its forces were not so rapidly developed. It is said, however, to have been the first to discipline
native troops, and Bombay sepoys were sent to Madras in 1747, and took part in the battle of Plassey in
1757. In 1772 the Bombay army consisted of 2500 Europeans and 3500 sepoys, but in 1794, in
consequence of the struggles with the Mahratta power, the native troops had been increased to 24,000.

73. Consolidation of the Army.—In 1796 a general reorganization took place. Hitherto the officers in each
presidency had been borne on general “lists,” according to branches of the service. These lists were now
broken up and cadres of regiments formed. The colonels and lieutenant-colonels remained on separate lists,
and an establishment of general officers was created, while the divisional commands were distributed
between the royal and Company’s officers. Further augmentations took place, consequent on the great
extension of British supremacy. In 1798 the native infantry in India numbered 122 battalions. In 1808 the
total force in India amounted to 24,500 Europeans and 154,500 natives.

The first half of the 19th century was filled with wars and annexations and the army was steadily
increased. Horse artillery was formed, and the artillery in general greatly augmented. “Irregular cavalry”
was raised in Bengal and Bombay, and recruited from a better class of troopers, who received high pay and
found their own horses and equipment. “Local forces” were raised in various parts from time to time, the
most important being the Punjab irregular force (raised after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849),
consisting of 3 field batteries, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 5 of infantry, and the Nagpur and Oudh irregular
forces. Another kind of force, which had been gradually formed, was that called “contingents”—troops
raised by the protected native states. The strongest of these was that of Hyderabad, originally known as the
nizam’s army. Changes were also made in the organization of the army. Sanitary improvements were
effected, manufacturing establishments instituted or increased, and the administration generally improved.

74. The Army before the Mutiny.—The officering and recruiting of the three armies were in all essentials
similar. The officers were mainly supplied by the Company’s military college at Addiscombe in Surrey
(established in 1809), and by direct appointments. The Bengal army was recruited from Hindustan, the
infantry being mostly drawn from Oudh and the great Gangetic plains. The soldiers were chiefly high-caste
Hindus, a sixth being Mahommedans. The cavalry was composed mainly of Mahommedans, recruited from

Rohilkhand and the Gangetic Doab. The only other elements in the army were four Gurkha regiments,
enlisted from Nepal, and the local Punjab irregular force. The Madras army was chiefly recruited from that
presidency, or the native states connected with it, and consisted of Mahommedans, Brahmans, and of the
Mahratta, Tamil and Telugu peoples. The Bombay army was recruited from its own presidency, with some
Hindustanis, but chiefly formed of Mahrattas and Mahommedans; the Bombay light cavalry mainly from
Hindustan proper.

Including the local and irregular troops (about 100,000 strong), the total strength amounted to 38,000
Europeans of all arms, with 276 field guns, and 348,000 native troops, with 248 field guns,—truly a
magnificent establishment, and, outwardly, worthy of the great empire which England had created for
herself in the East, but inwardly unsound, and on the very verge of the great mutiny of 1857.

In 1856 the establishment in the several presidencies was a follows:—

Bengal. Madras. Bombay. Total.
British Cavalry Regiments 2 1 1 4
British Infantry Battalions 15 3 4 22
Company’s European Battalions 3 3 3 9
European and Native Artillery Battalions 12 7 5 24
Native Infantry Battalions 74 52 29 155
Native Cavalry Regiments 28 8 3 39

An account of the events of 1857-58 will be found under Indian Mutiny. After the catastrophe the
reorganization of the military forces on different lines was of course unavoidable. Fortunately, the armies of
Madras and Bombay had been almost wholly untouched by the spirit of disaffection, and in the darkest days
the Sikhs, though formerly enemies of the British, had not only remained faithful to them, but had rendered
them powerful assistance.

75. The Reorganization.—By the autumn of 1858 the mutiny was virtually crushed, and the task of
reorganization commenced. On the 1st of September 1858 the East India Company ceased to rule, and Her
Majesty’s government took up the reins of power. On the important question of the army, the opinions and
advice of the most distinguished soldiers and civilians were invited. Masses of reports and evidence were
collected in India, and by a royal commission in England. On the report of this commission the new system
was based. The local European army was abolished, and its personnel amalgamated with the royal army.
The artillery became wholly British, with the exception of a few native mountain batteries. The total
strength of the British troops, all of the royal army, was largely increased, while that of the native troops
was largely diminished. Three distinct native armies—those of Bengal, Madras and Bombay—were still
maintained. The reduced Indian armies consisted of cavalry and infantry only, with a very few artillery,
distributed as follows:—

Battalions Regiments
Infantry. Cavalry.
Bengal 49 19
Madras 40 4
Bombay 30 7
Punjab Force 12 6
— —

Total 131 36

There were also three sapper battalions, one to each army.

The Punjab force, which had 5 batteries of native artillery attached to it, continued under the Punjab
government. In addition, the Hyderabad contingent of 4 cavalry, 6 infantry regiments and 4 batteries, and a
local force in central India of 2 regiments cavalry and 6 infantry, were retained under the government of
India. After all the arrangements had been completed the army of India consisted of 62,000 British and
125,000 native troops.

76. The Modern Army.—The college at Addiscombe was closed in 1860, and the direct appointment of
British officers to the Indian local forces ceased in 1861. In that year a staff corps was formed by royal
warrant in each presidency “to supply a body of officers for service in India, by whom various offices and
appointments hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several corps in the Indian forces shall in
future be held.” Special roles were laid down. The corps was at first recruited partly from officers of the
Company’s service and partly from the royal army, holding staff appointments (the new regimental
employment being considered as staff duty) and all kinds of political and civil posts; for the system
established later see India: Army. The native artillery and sappers and miners were to be officered from the
Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. The only English warrant and non-commissioned officers now to be
employed in the native army were to be those of the Royal Engineers with the sappers and miners.

A radical change in the regimental organization of all the native armies was effected in 1863. The Punjab
Frontier Force was from the first organized on the irregular system, which was there seen at its best, as also
were the new regiments raised during the Mutiny. This system was now applied to the whole army, each
regiment and battalion having seven British officers attached to it for command and administrative duties,
the immediate command of troops and companies being left to the native officers. Thus was the system
reverted to, which was initiated by Clive, of a few British officers only being attached to each corps for the
higher regimental duties of command and control. Time had shown that this was more effective than the
regular system instituted in 1796 of British officers commanding troops and companies.

A new spirit was breathed into the army. The supremacy of the commandant was the main principle. He
was less hampered by the unbending regulations enjoined upon the old regular regiments, had greater
powers of reward and punishment, was in a position to assume larger responsibility and greater freedom of
action, and was supported in the full exercise of his authority. The system made the officers.

Up to 1881 the native army underwent little change, but in that year 18 regiments of infantry and 4 of
cavalry were broken up, almost the same total number of men being maintained in fewer and stronger
regiments. The only reduction made in the British troops was in the Royal Artillery, which was diminished
by 11 batteries. The events of 1885, however, on the Russo-Afghan frontier, led to augmentations. The 11
batteries Royal Artillery were brought back from England; each of the 9 British cavalry regiments in India
received a fourth squadron; each of the British infantry battalions was increased by 100 men, and 3
battalions were added. The native cavalry had a fourth squadron added to each regiment; three of the four
regiments broken up in 1881 were re-raised, while the native infantry was increased in regimental strength,
and 9 new battalions raised composed of Gurkhas, Sikhs and Punjabis. The addition in all amounted to
10,600 British and 21,200 native troops. In 1890 the strength of the army of India was 73,000 British and,
including irregulars, 147,500 native troops. For the Indian volunteers, see Volunteers.

Many important changes took place between 1885 and 1904. Seven Madras infantry regiments were
converted into regiments for service in Burma, composed of Gurkhas and hardy races from northern India;

six Bengal and Bombay regiments were similarly converted into regiments of Punjabis, Pathans and
Gurkhas; the native mountain batteries have been increased to ten; a system of linked battalions has been
introduced with the formation of regimental centres for mobilization; and reserves for infantry and
mountain artillery have been formed. The number of British officers with each regiment has been increased
to nine, and the two wing commands in battalions have been converted into 4 double-company commands
of 250 men each, under a British commander, who is responsible to the commandant for their training and
efficiency, the command of the companies being left to the native officers. This system, which is analogous
to the squadron command in the cavalry, admits of closer individual attention to training, and distributes
among the senior British regimental officers effective responsibility of a personal kind.

An addition (at the imperial expense) of five battalions of Sikhs, Punjabi Mahommedans, Jats and
hillmen in northern India was made in 1900, as the result of India being called upon to furnish garrisons for
Mauritius and other stations overseas.

The unification of the triplicate army departments in the different presidential armies was completed in
1891, all being brought directly under the supreme government; and the three separate staff corps of Bengal,
Madras and Bombay were fused into one in 1891 as the Indian Staff Corps. The term “Indian Staff Corps”
was in turn replaced by that of “Indian Army” in 1903. These measures prepared the way for the new
system of army organization which, by authority of parliament, abolished divided control and placed the
whole army of India under the governor-general and the commander-in-chief in India.

Canadian Forces

77. In the earliest European settlements in Canada, the necessity of protection against Indians caused the
formation of a militia, and in 1665 companies were raised in every parish. The military history of the
Canadian forces under French rule is full of incident, and they served not only against Indian raiders but
also against the troops of Great Britain and of her North American colonies. Six militia battalions took part
in the defence of Quebec in 1759, and even the transfer of Canada from the French to the British crown did
not cause the disbandment of the existing forces. The French Canadians distinguished themselves not less
than the British settlers in the War of American Independence, and in particular in the defence of Quebec
against Montgomery and Arnold. In 1787 an ordinance was made whereby three battalions of the militia
were permanently embodied, each contingent serving for two years, at the end of which time a fresh
contingent relieved it, and after this a succession of laws and regulations were made with a view to
complete organization of the force. The brunt of the fighting on the American frontier in the war of 1812
was borne very largely by the permanent force of three battalions and the fresh units called out, all these
being militia corps. Up to 1828 a distinction had been made between the British and the French regiments:
this was then abolished. The militia was again employed on active service during the disturbances of 1837,
and the “Active Militia” in 1863 had grown to a strength of 25,000 men. The Fenian troubles of 1864 and
1866 caused the embodiment of the Canadian forces once more. In 1867 took place the unification of
Canada, after which the whole force was completely organized on the basis of a militia act (1868). A
department of Militia and Defence with a responsible minister was established, and the strength of the
active militia of all arms was fixed at 40,000 rank and file. Two years later the militia furnished 6000 men
to deal with the Fenian Raid of 1870, and took part in Colonel (Lord) Wolseley’s Red River expedition. In
1871 a permanent force, serving the double purpose of a regular nucleus and an instructional cadre, was
organized in two troops of cavalry, two batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry, and in 1876 the
Royal Military College of Canada was founded at Kingston. In 1885 the Riel rebellion was dealt with, and

the important action of Batoche won, by the militia, without assistance from regular troops. In the same
year Canada contributed a force of voyageurs to the Nile expedition of Lord Wolseley; the experience of
these men was admittedly of great assistance in navigating the Rapids. The militia sent contingents of all
arms to serve in the South African War, 1899-1902, including “Strathcona’s Horse,” a special corps,
recruited almost entirely from the Active Militia and the North-west Mounted Police. The latter, a
permanent constabulary of mounted riflemen, was formed in 1873.

After the South African War an extensive scheme of reorganization was taken in hand, the command
being exercised for two years (1902-1904) by Major-General Lord Dundonald, and subsequently by a
militia council (Militia Act 1904), similar in constitution to the home Army Council. For details of the
present military strength of Canada, see the article Canada.

Austrian Army

78. The Landsknecht infantry constituted the mainstay of the imperial armies in the 16th century. Maximilian I.
and Charles V. are recorded to have marched and carried the “long pike” in their ranks. Maximilian also formed a
corps of Kyrisser, who were the origin of the modern cuirassiers. It was not, however, until much later that the
Austrian army came into existence as a permanent force. Rudolph II. formed a small standing force about 1600,
but relied upon the “enlistment” system, like other sovereigns of the time, for the bulk of his armies. The Thirty
Years’ War produced the permanence of service which led in all the states of Europe to the rise of standing armies.
In the Empire it was Wallenstein who first raised a distinctly imperial army of soldiers owing no duty but to the
sovereign; and it was the suspicion that he intended to use this army, which was raised largely at his own expense,
to further his own ends, that led to his assassination. From that time the regiments belonged no longer to their
colonels, but to the emperor; and the oldest regiments in the present Austrian army date from the Thirty Years’
War, at the close of which Austria had 19 infantry, 6 cuirassier and 1 dragoon regiments. The almost continuous
wars of Austria against France and the Turks (from 1495 to 1895 Austrian troops took part in 7000 actions of all
sorts) led to a continuous increase in her establishments. The wars of the time of Montecucculi and of Eugene were
followed by that of the Polish Succession, the two Turkish wars, and the three great struggles against Frederick the
Great. Thus in 1763 the army had been almost continuously on active service for more than 100 years, in the
course of which its organization had been modified in accordance with the lessons of each war. This, in
conjunction with the fact that Austria took part in other Turkish campaigns subsequently, rendered this army the
most formidable opponent of the forces of the French Revolution (1792). But the superior leading, organization
and numbers of the emperor’s forces were totally inadequate to the magnitude of the task of suppressing the
Revolutionary forces, and though such victories as Neerwinden were sufficient proof of the efficiency and valour
of the Austrians, they made no headway. In later campaigns, in which the enemy had acquired war experience, and
the best of their officers had come to the front, the tide turned against the Imperialists even on the field of battle.
The archduke Charles’s victories of 1796 were more than counterbalanced by Bonaparte’s Italian campaign, and
the temporary success of 1799 ended at Marengo and Hohenlinden.

79. The Austrians, during the short peace which preceded the war of 1805, suffered, in consequence of all this,
from a feeling of distrust, not merely in their leaders, but also in the whole system upon which the army was
raised, organized and trained. This was substantially the same as that of the Seven Years’ War time. Enlistment
being voluntary and for long service, the numbers necessary to cope with the output of the French conscription
could not be raised, and the inner history of the Austrian headquarters in the Ulm campaign shows that the
dissensions and mutual distrust of the general officers had gone far towards the disintegration of an army which at
that time had the most esprit de corps and the highest military qualities of any army in Europe. But the disasters of

1805 swept away good and bad alike in the abolition of the old system. Already the archduke Charles had designed
a “nation in arms” after the French model, and on this basis the reconstruction was begun. The conscription was
put in force and the necessary numbers thus obtained; the administration was at the same time reformed and the
organization and supply services brought into line with modern requirements. The war of 1809 surprised Austria in
the midst of her reorganization, yet the new army fought with the greatest spirit. The invasion of Bavaria was by
no means so leisurely as it had been in 1805, and the archduke Charles obtained one signal victory over Napoleon
in person. Aspern and Wagram were most desperately contested, and though the archduke ceased to take part in the
administration after 1809 the work went on steadily until, in 1813, the Austrian armies worthily represented the
combination of discipline with the “nation in arms” principle. Their intervention in the War of Liberation was
decisive, and Austria, in spite of her territorial losses of the past years, put into the field well-drilled armies far
exceeding in numbers those which had appeared in the wars of the Revolution. After the fall of Napoleon,
Austria’s hold on Italy necessitated the maintenance of a large army of occupation. This army, and in particular its
cavalry, was admittedly the best in Europe, and, having to be ready to march at a few days’ notice, it was saved
from the deadening influence of undisturbed peace which affected every other service in Europe from 1815 to
1850.

80. The Austrian system has conserved much of the peculiar tone of the army of 1848, of which English readers
may obtain a good idea from George Meredith’s Vittoria. It was, however, a natural result of this that the army lost
to some considerable extent the spirit of the “nation in arms” of 1809 and 1813. It was employed in dynastic wars,
and the conscription was of course modified by substitution; thus, when the war of 1859 resulted unfavourably to
the Austrians, the army began to lose confidence, precisely as had been the case in 1805. Once more, in 1866, an
army animated by the purely professional spirit, which was itself weakened by distrust, met a “nation in arms,” and
in this case a nation well trained in peace and armed with a breechloader. Bad staff work, and tactics which can
only be described as those of pique, precipitated the disaster, and in seven weeks the victorious Prussians were
almost at the gates of Vienna.

The result of the war, and of the constitutional changes about this time, was the re-adoption of the principles of
1806-1813, the abolition of conscription and long service in favour of universal service for a short term, and a
thorough reform in the methods of command and staff work. It has been said of the Prussian army that “discipline
is—the officers.” This is more true of the “K.K.” army1 than of any other in Europe; the great bond of union
between the heterogeneous levies of recruits of many races is the spirit of the corps of officers, which retains the
personal and professional characteristics of the old army of Italy.

French Army

81. The French army (see for further details France: Law and Institutions) dates from the middle of the 15th
century, at which time Charles VII. formed, from mercenaries who had served him in the Hundred Years’ War, the
compagnies d’ordonnance, and thus laid the foundation of a national standing army. But the armies that followed
the kings in their wars still consisted mainly of mercenaries, hired for the occasion; and the work of Charles and
his successors was completely undone in the confusion of the religious wars. Louvois, who was minister of Louis
XIV., was the true creator of the French royal army. The organization of the first standing army is here given in
some detail, as it served as a model for all armies for more than a century, and is also followed to some extent in
our own times. Before the advent of Louvois, the forces were royal only in name. The army was a fortuitous
concourse of regiments of horse and foot, each of which was the property of its colonel. The companies similarly
belonged to their captains, and, the state being then in no condition to buy out these vested interests, superior
control was almost illusory. Indeed, all the well-known devices for eluding such control, for instance, showing

imaginary men on the pay lists, can be traced to the French army of the 16th century. A further difficulty lay in the
existence of the offices called Colonel-General, Marshal-General and Grand Master of Artillery, between whom no
common administration was possible. The grand master survived until 1743, but Louvois managed to suppress the
other offices, and even to put one of his own subordinates into the office of grand master. Thus was assured direct
royal control, exercised through the war minister. Louvois was unable indeed to overthrow the proprietary system,
but he made stringent regulations against abuses, and confined it to the colonels (mestre de camp in the cavalry)
and the captains. Henceforward the colonel was a wealthy noble, with few duties beyond that of spending money
freely and of exercising his court influence on behalf of his regiment. The real work of the service was done by the
lieutenant-colonels and lieutenants, and the king and the minister recognized this on all occasions. Thus Vauban
was given, as a reward for good service, a company in the “Picardie” regiment without purchase. Promotions from
the ranks were very rare but not unknown, and all promotions were awarded according to merit except those to
captain or colonel. One of the captains in a regiment was styled major, and acted as adjutant. This post was of
course filled by selection and not by purchase. The grades of general officers were newly fixed by Louvois—the
brigadier, maréchal de camp, lieutenant-general and marshal of France. The general principle was to give
command, but not promotion, according to merit. The rank and file were recruited by voluntary enlistment for four
years’ service. The infantry company was maintained in peace at an effective of 60, except in the guards and the
numerous foreign corps, in which the company was always at the war strength of 100 to 200 men. This arm was
composed, in 1678, of the Gardes françaises, the Swiss guards, the old (vieux and petits vieux) regiments of the
line, of which the senior, “Picardie,” claimed to be the oldest regiment in Europe, and the regiments raised under
the new system. The régiment du roi, which was deliberately made the model of all others and was commanded by
the celebrated Martinet, was the senior of these latter. The whole infantry arm in 1678 numbered 320,000 field and
garrison troops. The cavalry consisted of the Maison du Roi (which Louvois converted from a “show” corps to one
of the highest discipline and valour), divided into the Gardes du Corps and the Mousquetaires, the Gendarmerie
(descended from the old feudal cavalry and the ordonnance companies) and the line cavalry, the whole being about
55,000 strong. There were also 10,000 dragoons. In addition to the regular army, the king could call out, in case of
need, the ancient arrière-ban or levy, as was in fact done in 1674. On that occasion, however, it behaved badly, and
it was not again employed. In 1688 Louvois organized a militia raised by ballot. This numbered 25,000 men and
proved to be better, at any rate, than the arrière-ban. Many infantry regiments of the line were, as has been said,
foreign, and in 1678 the foreigners numbered 30,000, the greater part of these being Swiss.

82. The artillery had been an industrial concern rather than an arm of the service. In sieges a sum of money was
paid for each piece put in battery, and the grand master was not subordinated to the war office. A nominee of
Louvois, as has been said, filled the post at this time, and eventually Louvois formed companies of artillerymen,
and finally the regiment of “Fusiliers” which Vauban described as the “finest regiment in the world.” The engineer
service, as organized by Vauban, was composed of engineers “in ordinary,” and of line officers especially
employed in war. Louvois further introduced the system of magazines. To ensure the regular working of supply
and transport, he instituted direct control by the central executive, and stored great quantities of food in the
fortresses, thereby securing for the French armies a precision and certainty in military operations which had
hitherto been wanting. The higher administration of the army, under the minister of war, fell into two branches,
that of the commissaries and that of the inspecting officers. The duties of the former resembled those of a modern
“routine” staff—issue of equipment, checking of returns, &c. The latter exercised functions analogous to those of a
general staff, supervising the training and general efficiency of the troops. Louvois also created an excellent
hospital service, mobile and stationary, founded the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris for the maintenance of old
soldiers, established cadet schools for the training of young officers, and stimulated bravery and good conduct by
reviving and creating military orders of merit.

83. The last half of the 17th century is a brilliant period in the annals of the French armies. Thoroughly
organized, animated by the presence of the king, and led by such generals as Condé, Turenne, Luxembourg,
Catinat and Vendôme, they made head against coalitions which embraced nearly all the powers of Europe, and
made France the first military nation of Europe. The reverses of the later part of Louis XIV.’s reign were not of
course without result upon the tone of the French army, and the campaigns of Marlborough and Eugene for a time
diminished the repute in which the troops of Louis were held by other powers. Nevertheless the War of the Spanish
Succession closed with French victories, and generals of the calibre of Villars and Berwick were not to be found in
the service of every prince. The war of the Polish Succession in Germany and Italy reflected no discredit upon the
French arms; and the German general staff, in its history of the wars of Frederick the Great, states that “in 1740 the
French army was still regarded as the first in Europe.” Since the death of Louvois very little had changed. The
army was still governed as it had been by the great war minister, and something had been done to reduce evils
against which even he had been powerless. A royal regiment of artillery had come into existence, and the engineers
were justly regarded as the most skilful in Europe. Certain alterations had been made in the organization of both
the guard and the line, and the total strength of the French in peace was somewhat less than 200,000. Relatively to
the numbers maintained in other states, it was thus as powerful as before. Indeed, only one feature of importance
differentiated the French army from its contemporaries—the proportion of officers to men, which was one to
eleven. In view of this, the spirit of the army was necessarily that of its officers, and these were by no means the
equals of their predecessors of the time of Turenne or Luxembourg. Louvois’ principle of employing professional
soldiers for command and wealthy men for colonelcies and captaincies was not deliberately adopted, but inevitably
grew out of the circumstances of the time. The system answered fairly whilst continual wars gave the professional
soldiers opportunities for distinction and advancement. But in a long peace the captains of eighteen and colonels of
twenty-three blocked all promotion, and there was no work save that of routine to be done. Under these conditions
the best soldiers sought service in other countries, the remainder lived only for pleasure, whilst the titular chiefs of
regiments and companies rarely appeared on parade. Madame de Genlis relates how, when young courtiers
departed to join their regiments for a few weeks’ duty, the ladies of the court decked them with favours, as if
proceeding on a distant and perilous expedition.

On the other hand, the fact that the French armies required large drafts of militia to bring up their regular forces
to war strength gave them a vitality which was unusual in armies of the time. Even in the time of Louis XIV. the
military spirit of the country had arisen at the threat of invasion, and the French armies of 1709 fought far more
desperately, as the casualty lists of the allies at Malplaquet showed, than those of 1703 or 1704. In the time of the
Revolution the national spirit of the French army formed a rallying-point for the forces of order, whereas Prussia,
whose army was completely independent of the people, lost all power of defending herself after a defeat in the
field. It is difficult to summarize the conduct of the royal armies in the wars of 1740-63. With a few exceptions the
superior leaders proved themselves incompetent, and in three great battles, at least, the troops suffered ignominious
defeat (Dettingen 1743, Rossbach 1757, Minden 1759). On the other hand, Marshal Saxe and others of the younger
generals were excellent commanders, and Fontenoy was a victory of the first magnitude. The administration,
however, was corrupt and inefficient, and the general reputation of the French armies fell so low that Frederick the
Great once refused an important command to one of his generals on the ground that his experience had been
gained only against French troops.

Under Louis XVI. things improved somewhat; the American War and the successes of Lafayette and
Rochambeau revived a more warlike spirit. Instruction was more carefully attended to, and a good system of drill
and tactics was elaborated at the camp of St Omer. Attempts were made to reform the administration. Artillery and
engineer schools had come into existence, and the intellectual activity of the best officers was remarkable (see Max
Jähns, Gesch. der Kriegswissenschaften, vol. iii. passim). But the Revolution soon broke over France, and the

history of the royal army was henceforward carried on by that revolutionary army, which, under a new flag, was
destined to raise the military fame of France to its greatest height.

84. If Louis was the creator of the royal army, Carnot was so of the revolutionary army. At the outbreak of the
Revolution the royal army consisted of 224 infantry battalions, 7 regiments of artillery, and 62 regiments of
cavalry, numbering about 173,000 in all, but capable of augmentation on war strength to 210,000. To this might be
added about 60,000 militia (see Chuquet, Première invasion prussienne).

The first step of the Constituent Assembly was the abrogation of an edict of 1781 whereby men of non-noble
birth had been denied commissioned rank (1790). Thus, when many of the officers emigrated along with their
fellows of the noblesse, trained non-commissioned officers, who would already have been officers save for this
edict, were available to fill their places. The general scheme of reform (see Conscription) was less satisfactory, but
the formation of a National Guard, comprising in theory the whole military population, was a step of the highest
importance. At this time the titles of regiments were abandoned in favour of numbers, and the costly and
dangerous Maison du Roi abolished. But voluntary enlistment soon failed; the old corps, which kept up their
discipline, were depleted, and the men went to the volunteers, where work was less exacting and promotion more
rapid. ”Aussi fut-on,” says a French writer, ”réduit bientôt à forcer l’engagement volontaire et à imposer le choix
du corps.” The “first invasion” (July 1792) put an end to half-measures, and the country was declared “in danger.”
Even these measures, however, were purely designed to meet the emergency, and, after Valmy, enthusiasm waned
to such a degree that, of a paper strength of 800,000 men (December 1792), only 112,000 of the line and 290,000
volunteers were actually present. The disasters of the following spring once more called for extreme energy, and
300,000 national guards were sent to the line, a step which was followed by a compulsory levée en masse; one
million men were thus assembled to deal with the manifold dangers of civil and foreign war. France was saved by
mere numbers and the driving energy of the Terrorists, not by discipline and organization. The latter was chaotic,
and almost every element of success was wanting to the tumultuary levies of the year 1793 save a ferocious energy
born of liberty and the guillotine. But under the Terrorist régime the army became the rallying-point of the nation,
and when Lazare Carnot (q.v.) became minister of war a better organization and discipline began to appear. The
amalgamation of the old army and the volunteers, which had been commenced but imperfectly carried out, was
effected on a different and more thorough principle. The infantry was organized in demi-brigades of three
battalions (usually one of the old army to two of volunteers). A permanent organization in divisions of all arms was
introduced, and the ablest officers selected for the commands. Arsenals and manufactories of warlike stores were
created, schools of instruction were re-established; the republican forces were transformed from hordes to armies,
well disciplined, organized and equipped. Later measures followed the same lines, and the artillery and engineers,
which in 1790 were admittedly the best in Europe and which owing to the roturier element in their officer cadres
had not been disorganized by the emigration, steadily improved. The infantry, and in a less degree the cavalry,
became good and trustworthy soldiers, and the glorious campaigns of 1794, 1795 and 1796, which were the direct
result of Carnot’s administration, bore witness to the potentialities of the essentially modern system. But, great as
was the triumph of 1796-97, the exhaustion of years of continuous warfare had made itself felt: the armies were
reduced to mere skeletons, and no sufficient means existed of replenishing them, till in 1798 the conscription was
introduced. From that time the whole male population of France was practically at her ruler’s disposal; and
Napoleon had full scope for his genius in organizing these masses. His principal improvements were effected in
the interval between the peace of Amiens and the war with the third coalition, while threatening the invasion of
England. His armies were collected in large camps on the coasts of the Channel, and there received that
organization which, with minor variations, they retained during all his campaigns, and which has since been copied
by all European nations. The divisions had already given place to the army corps, and Napoleon completed the
work of his predecessors. He withdrew the whole of the cavalry and a portion of the artillery from the divisions,
and thus formed “corps troops” and cavalry and artillery reserves for the whole army. The grade of marshal of

France was revived at Napoleon’s coronation. At the same time, the operation of Jourdan’s law, acquiesced in
during times of national danger and even during peace, soon found opposition when the conscripts realized that
long foreign wars were to be their lot. It was not the actual losses of the field armies, great as these undoubtedly
were, which led Napoleon in the full tide of his career to adopt the fatal practice of “anticipating” the conscription,
but the steady increase in the number of réfractaires, men who refused to come up for service. To hunt these men
down, no less than forty thousand picked soldiers were engaged within the borders of France, and the actual
French element in the armies of Napoleon grew less and less with every extension of the empire. Thus, in the
Grand Army of 1809, about one-third of the corps of all arms were purely German, and in 1812 the army which
invaded Russia, 467,000 strong, included 280,000 foreigners. In other words, the million of men produced by the
original conscription of 1793 had dwindled to about half that number (counting the various subsidiary armies in
Spain, &c.), and one hundred thousand of the best and sturdiest Frenchmen were engaged in a sort of civil war in
France itself. The conscription was “anticipated” even in 1806, the conscripts for 1807 being called up before their
time. As the later wars of the Empire closed one by one the foreign sources of recruiting, the conscription became
more terrible every year, with the result that more réfractaires and more trusted soldiers to hunt them down were
kept in non-effective employment. Finally the capacity for resistance was exhausted, and the army, from the
marshals downward, showed that it had had enough.

85. One of the first acts of the Restoration was to abolish the conscription, but it had again to be resorted to
within three years. In 1818 the annual contingent was fixed at 40,000, and the period of service at six years; in
1824 the contingent was increased to 60,000, and in 1832 to 80,000. Of this, however, a part only, according to the
requirements of the service, were enrolled; the remainder were sent home on leave or furlough. Up to 1855 certain
exemptions were authorized, and substitution or exchange of lots amongst young men who had drawn was
permitted, but the individual drawn was obliged either to serve personally or find a substitute. The long series of
Algerian wars produced further changes, and in 1855 the law of “dotation” or exemption by payment was passed,
and put an end to personal substitution. The state now undertook to provide substitutes for all who paid a fixed
sum, and did so by high bounties to volunteers or to soldiers for re-engaging. Although the price of exemption was
fixed as high as £92, on an average 23,000 were claimed annually, and in 1859 as many as 42,000 were granted.
Thus gradually the conscription became rather subsidiary to voluntary enlistment, and in 1866, out of a total
establishment of 400,000, only 120,000 were conscripts. Changes had also taken place in the constitution of the
army. On the Restoration its numbers were reduced to 150,000, the old regiments broken up and recast, and a royal
guard created in place of the old imperial one. When the revolution of July 1830 had driven Charles X. from his
throne, the royal guard, which had made itself peculiarly obnoxious, was dissolved; and during Louis Philippe’s
reign the army was augmented to about 240,000 with the colours. Under the Provisional Government of 1848 it
was further increased, and in 1854, when France allied herself with England against Russia, the army was raised to
500,000 men. The imperial guard was re-created, and every effort made to revive the old Napoleonic traditions in
the army. In 1859 Napoleon III. took the field as the champion and ally of Italy, and the victories of Montebello,
Magenta and Solferino raised the reputation of the army to the highest pitch, and for a time made France the arbiter
of Europe. But the campaign of 1866 suddenly made the world aware that a rival military power had arisen, which
was prepared to dispute that supremacy.

Marshal Niel (q.v.), the then war minister, saw clearly that the organization which had with difficulty maintained
150,000 men in Italy, was no match for that which had within a month thrown 250,000 into the very heart of
Austria, while waging a successful war on the Main against Bavaria and her allies. In 1867, therefore, he brought
forward a measure for the reorganization of the army. This was to have been a true “nation in arms” based on
universal service, and Niel calculated upon producing a first-line army 800,000 strong—half with the colours, half
in reserve—with a separate army of the second line. But many years must elapse before the full effect of this
principle of recruiting can be produced, as the army is incomplete in some degree until the oldest reservist is a man

who has been through the line training. Niel himself died within a year, and 1870 witnessed the complete ruin of
the French army. The law of 1868 remained therefore no more than an expression of principle.

86. At the outbreak of the Franco-German War (q.v.) the French field troops consisted of 368 battalions, 252
squadrons, and 984 guns. The strength of the entire army on peace footing was 393,000 men; on war footing,
567,000. Disasters followed one another in rapid succession, and the bulk of this war-trained long-service army
was captive in Germany within three months of the opening battle. But the spirit of the nation rose to the occasion
as it had done in 1793. The next year’s contingent of recruits was called out and hastily trained. Fourth battalions
were formed from the depot cadres, and organized into régiments de marche. The gardes mobiles (Niel’s creation)
were mobilized, and by successive decrees and under various names nearly all the manhood of the country called
to arms.

The regular troops raised as régiments de marche, &c., amounted to 213,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and
10,000 artillery. The garde mobile exceeded 300,000, and the mobilized national guard exceeded 1,100,000—of
whom about 180,000 were actually in the field and 250,000 in Paris; the remainder preparing themselves in camps
or depots for active work. Altogether the new formations amounted to nearly 1,700,000. Though, in the face of the
now war-experienced well-led and disciplined Germans, their efforts failed, this cannot detract from the admiration
which must be felt by every soldier for the patriotism of the people and the creative energy of their leaders, of
whom Gambetta and Freycinet were the chief. After the war every Frenchman set himself to solve the army
problem not less seriously than had every Prussian after Jena, and the reformed French army (see France) was the
product of the period of national reconstruction. The adoption of the “universal service” principle of active army,
reserves and second-line troops, the essential feature of which is the line training of every man, was almost as a
matter of course the basis of the reorganization, for the want of a trained reserve was the most obvious cause of the
disasters of “the terrible year.”

German Army

87. The German army, strictly speaking, dates only from 1871, or at earliest 1866. Before the unification of the
German empire or confederation, the several states possessed distinct armies, federal armies when required being
formed from the contingents which the members of the union, like those of an ordinary alliance, engaged to
furnish. The armies of the Holy Roman Empire were similarly formed from “single,” “double,” or “treble”
contingents under the supreme command of specially appointed field marshals of the Empire. In the troubles of
1848 there was witnessed the curious spectacle of half of a victorious army being unable to pursue the enemy; this,
being composed of “Prussian” as distinct from “federal contingent” troops, had to stop at the frontier of another
state. The events of 1866 and 1870 put an end to all this, and to a very great extent to the separate armies of the old
confederation, all being now remodelled on Prussian lines. The Prussian army therefore is at once the most
important and historically the most interesting of the forces of the German empire. Its début (about 1630) was not
satisfactory, and in the Thirty Years’ War troops of Sweden, of the Emperor, of the League, &c., plundered
Brandenburg unharmed. The elector, when appealed to for protection, could but answer, “Que faire? Ils ont des
canons.” The humiliations of this time, were, however, avenged by the troops of the next ruler of Brandenburg,
called the Great Elector. The supposed invincibility of the Swedes did not prevent him from inflicting upon them a
severe defeat at Fehrbellin, and thereafter the Prussian contingents which took part in the many European wars of
the time acquitted themselves creditably. One of their generals was the famous Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and the
reckless gallantry of this leader was conspicuous on many fields, from Blenheim to Malplaquet. But Leopold’s
greatest work was done in the years of peace (1715-40), during which Prussia was preparing the army with which
Frederick the Great won his battles. He had introduced (about 1700) iron ramrods into the infantry service, and for

over twenty years the Prussian infantry was drilled to a perfection which gave it a superiority of five to three over
the best-drilled troops of the Austrian service, and still greater predominance over the French, which was then
accounted the best in Europe. Frederick William I., king of Prussia, directed and supervised the creation of the new
Prussian army, and Leopold was his principal assistant. In organization and methods of recruiting, as well as in
tactical efficiency, the army of 1740 was equally pre-eminent. Then came the wars of Frederick the Great. It is not
too much to say that the infantry won his earlier battles; the cavalry had been neglected both by Frederick William
and by Leopold, and Frederick wrote that “it was not worth the devil’s while to fetch it away.” But the
predominance of the infantry was so far indisputable that Frederick was able to devote himself to the
reorganization of the mounted arm, with results which appeared in the splendid victories of Hohenfriedberg,
Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf. But long before the close of the Seven Years’ War the incomparable infantry of
the old army had disappeared, to be replaced by foreigners, deserters and vagabonds of all kinds, not to mention
the unwilling Saxon and other recruits forced into the king’s service. The army of 200,000 men which Frederick
bequeathed to his successor was indeed superb, and deserved to be the model of Europe. But with Frederick’s
death the genius which had animated it, and which alone gave value to such heterogeneous materials, was gone.
The long peace had the customary effect of sapping the efficiency of the long-service troops. They still retained
their imposing appearance and precision of movement, and overweening self-confidence. But in 1806, after two
crushing defeats and a series of humiliating surrenders, Prussia found herself at the feet of the conqueror, shorn of
half her territory, obliged to receive French troops in all her towns and fortresses, and only existing on sufferance.
But in these very disasters were laid the seeds of her future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was
limited to 43,000 men. This limitation suggested to Scharnhorst “universal service” on the Krümper2 system
already described (see § 36 above).

88. The bitter humiliation and suffering endured under the French yoke aroused a national spirit which was
capable of any sacrifices. The civilian became eager to be trained to fight against the oppressor of his country; and
when Prussia rose in 1813, the armies she poured into the field were no longer professional, but national armies,
imperfectly trained and organized, but animated by a spirit which more than compensated for these defects. At the
close of the war her rulers, with far-seeing sagacity, at once devoted themselves to organize on a permanent footing
the system which had sprung up under the necessities and enthusiasm of the moment. Universal compulsory
service, and a three years’ term in the ranks, with further periods in the reserve and Landwehr, were then
introduced; and though variations have subsequently been made in the distribution of time, the principles were
substantially the same as those now in force. By the law of 1814 the periods of service were fixed at three years in
the army, two in the reserve and fourteen in the Landwehr, and the annual contingent at 40,000 men. As the
population increased, it was felt that the service was unequally distributed, pressing unnecessarily heavily on
some, while others escaped altogether. Further, the experiences of Bronnzell and Olmütz in 1850, and of 1859,
when Prussia armed in anticipation of a war with France, aroused great doubts as to the efficiency of the
Landwehr, which then formed the bulk of Prussia’s forces, and of whom many had been as long as ten years away
from the colours. At this time the French remark that the Prussian army was “a sort of militia” was by no means
untrue. Accordingly, by the law of 1860 the annual contingent was fixed at 63,000, the period in the reserve was
increased from two to four years, and that in the Landwehr reduced from fourteen to five. The total armed force
thus remained nearly the same (12 contingents of 63,000, in place of 19 of 40,000), but the army and its reserves
were more than doubled (increased from 5 × 40,000 to 7 × 63,000) while the Landwehr was proportionately
reduced.

This change was not effected without great opposition, and led to a prolonged struggle between the king, guided
by Bismarck, and the parliament. It required the victories of 1866 and 1870, and the position thereby won for
Prussia, to reconcile the nation to the new law. The military alliance (1866) of Prussia with the other German states
gave place in 1871 to the union of all the armies into the German army as it is to-day. Some retained their old

peculiarities of uniform, and even more than this was allowed to Bavaria and to Saxony, but the whole army,
which has been increased year by year to its present strength, is modelled on the Prussian part of it. The Prussian
army corps are the Guard, and the line numbered I. to XI., and XV. to XVIII.

89. The Saxon Army formerly played a prominent part in all the wars of northern Europe, chiefly in connexion
with Poland. In the War of the Austrian Succession the Saxon army played a prominent part, but in the end it
suffered a heavy defeat in the battle of Kesselsdorf (1745). In the Seven Years’ War Saxony was overrun by the
Prussians almost without resistance, and the military forces of the country under Field Marshal Rutowski were
forced to surrender en masse at Pirna (1756); the men were compelled by Frederick the Great to join the Prussian
army, and fought, though most unwillingly, through the remainder of the war as Prussian soldiers. A few outlying
regiments which had not been involved in the catastrophe served with the Austrians, and on one occasion at least,
at Kolin, inflicted a severe blow on the Prussians. At the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution the Saxon
army was over 30,000 strong. It took part in the campaign of Jena on the side of the Prussians, and during the
Napoleonic domination in Germany Saxony furnished strong contingents to the armies of Napoleon, who in return
recognized her elector as king, and largely increased his territories. The newly made king remained faithful to
Napoleon even in his reverses; but the army was too German in feeling to fight willingly under the French flag.
Their defection at Leipzig contributed not a little to the results of that bloody day. After the peace the king was
shorn of a great part of his dominions, and the army was reconstituted on a smaller scale. In 1866 Saxony sided
with Austria, and her army shared in the disasters of the brief campaign and the crowning defeat at Königgrätz.
Under the crown prince’s leadership, however, the Saxons distinguished themselves by their courage and
steadiness wherever they were engaged. After the war Saxony became part of the North German Confederation,
and in 1870-1871 her troops, under the command of the crown prince, formed the XII. corps of the great German
army. They were assigned to the II. army of Prince Frederick Charles, and delivered the decisive attack on the
French right at Gravelotte. Subsequently a IV. army was formed under the command of the crown prince, in which
the XII. corps, now under Prince George of Saxony, served with unvarying credit in the campaign of Sedan and the
siege of Paris. The Saxon army is now organized in every respect on Prussian lines, and forms two army corps
(XII. at Dresden and XIX. at Leipzig) of the German army. The German emperor, in concert with the king of
Saxony, names the officers for the higher commands. Saxony retains, however, her separate war ministry, budget,
&c.; and appointments and promotion to all but the highest commands are made by the king. The colours of the
older Saxon forces, and especially the green of the tunics, are retained in many of the uniforms of the present day.

90. The Bavarian Army has perhaps the most continuous record of
good service in the field of any of the minor German armies. The oldest
regiments date from the Thirty Years’ War, in which the veteran army
of the Catholic league, commanded by Count Tilly and formed on the
nucleus of the Bavarian army, played a conspicuous part. Later in the
war the Bavarian general, Count Mercy, proved himself a worthy
opponent of Turenne and Condé. Henceforward the Bavarians were
engaged in almost every war between France and Austria, taking part
successively in the wars of the Grand Alliance, the Spanish Succession
(in which they came into conflict with the English), and the Polish and
Austrian Succession wars. In pursuance of the traditional anti-Austrian
policy, the troops of Bavaria, led by a distinguished Bavarian, Marshal
(Prince) Wrede, served in the campaigns of 1805 to 1813 side by side
with the French, and Napoleon made the electorate into a kingdom. But
in 1813 Bavaria joined the Alliance, and Wrede tried to intercept the
French on their retreat from Leipzig. Napoleon, however, inflicted a
severe defeat on his old general at Hanau, and opened his road to
France. In 1866 the Bavarians took part against Prussia, but owing to
their dilatoriness in taking the field, the Prussians were able to beat
them in detail. In 1870, reorganized to some extent on Prussian lines,
they joined their former enemy in the war against France, and bore
their full share in the glories and losses of the campaign, the II.
Bavarian corps having suffered more heavily than any but the III.
Prussian corps. The I. Bavarian corps distinguished itself very greatly
at Sedan and on the Loire. Bavaria still retains her separate war office
and special organization, and the troops have been less affected by the
Prussian influence than those of the other states. The Bavarian corps
are numbered separately (I. Bav., Münich; II. Bav., Würzburg; III. Bav.,
Nuremberg), and the old light blue uniforms and other distinctive
peculiarities of detail are still maintained.

91. Württemberg furnishes one army corps (XIII.; headquarters,
Stuttgart), organized, clothed and equipped in all respects like the
Prussian army. Like the Bavarians, the Württembergers fought against
the Prussians in 1866, but in 1870 made common cause with them
against the French, and by the convention entered into the following
year placed their army permanently under the command of the Prussian
king as emperor. The emperor nominates to the highest commands, but
the king of Württemberg retains the nomination and appointment of
officers in the lower grades.

92. The old Hanoverian Army disappeared, of course, with the
annexation of Hanover to Prussia in 1866, but it is still represented
officially by certain regiments of the X. army corps, and, in one case at
least, battle honours won by the King’s German Legion in the British
service are borne on German colours of to-day. The Hessian Army is
now represented by the XXV. (Grand-ducal Hessian) division, which
forms part of the XVIII. army corps.

Italian Army

93. The old conscription law of the kingdom of Sardinia is the basis of
the military organization of Italy, as its constitution is of that of the modern
Italian kingdom. The Piedmontese have long borne a high reputation for
their military qualities, a reputation shared by the rulers of the house of
Savoy (q.v.), many of whom showed special ability in preserving the
independence of their small kingdom between two such powerful
neighbours as France and Austria. During the wars of the French
Revolution Piedmont was temporarily absorbed into the French republic
and empire. The Italian troops who fought under Napoleon proved
themselves, in many if not most cases, the best of the French allies, and

Italy contributed large numbers of excellent general officers to the Grande
Armée.

After 1815 various causes combined to place Piedmont (Sardinia) at
the head of the national movement which agitated Italy during the
ensuing thirty years, and bring her in direct antagonism to Austria.
Charles Albert, her then ruler, had paid great attention to the army, and
when Italy rose against Austria in 1848 he took the field with an
excellent force of nearly 70,000 men. At the outset fortune favoured the
arms of Italy; but the genius and energy of Radetzky, the veteran
Austrian commander, turned the tide, and in the summer of 1849 after
many battles the Piedmontese army was decisively defeated at Novara,
and her king compelled to sue for peace. Charles Albert abdicated in
favour of his son Victor Emanuel, a prince who had already
distinguished himself by his personal gallantry in the field. Under his
care the army soon recovered its efficiency, and the force which joined
the allied armies in the Crimea attracted general admiration from the
excellence of its organization, equipment and discipline. In 1859
Piedmont again took up arms against Austria for the liberation of Italy;
but this time she had the powerful assistance of France, and played but
a subordinate part herself. In this campaign the Sardinian army was
composed of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and numbered
about 60,000 combatants. By the peace of Villafranca, Italy, with the
exception of Venetia, was freed from the Austrians, and Lombardy was
added to Piedmont. The revolutionary campaign of Garibaldi in the
following year united the whole peninsula under the rule of Victor
Emanuel, and in 1866, when Italy for the third time took up arms
against Austria—this time as the ally of Prussia—her forces had risen
to nearly 450,000, of whom about 270,000 actually took the field. But
in quality these were far from being equal to the old Piedmontese

army; and the northern army, under the personal command of the king,
was decisively defeated at Custozza by the archduke Albert of Austria.

The existing organization of the Italian army is determined by the
laws of 1873, which made universal liability to service the basis of
recruiting. The territorial system has not, however, been adopted at the
same time, the materials of which the Italian army is composed varying
so much that it was decided to blend the different types of soldiers so
far as possible by causing them to serve together. The colonial wars in
which Italian troops have taken part have been marked with great
disasters, but relieved by the gallantry of the officers and the rank and
file.

Russian Army

94. The history of the Russian army begins with the abolition of the
Strelitz (q.v.) by Peter the Great in 1698, the nucleus of the new forces
being four regiments of foot, two of which are well known to-day under
their old titles of Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. Throughout the 18th
century Russian military progress obeyed successive dynasties of western
European models—first those of Prussia, then those of France. In the earlier
part of the 19th century the army, used chiefly in wars against the
revolutionary spirit, became, like others of that time, a dynastic force;
subsequently the “nation in arms” principle reasserted itself, and on this
basis has been carried out the reorganization of Russia’s military power.
The enormous development of this since 1874 is one of the most striking
phenomena in recent military history. In 1892, in expectation of a general
European war, whole armies were massed in the districts of Warsaw and
Vilna, three-fifths of the entire forces being in position on the German and
Austrian frontiers.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 is generally held to have proved
that the fighting power of the Russian has in no way diminished in
intrinsic value from that of the days of Zorndorf, Borodino and
Sevastopol. The proverbial stubbornness of the rank and file is the
distinctive quality of the armies of the tsar, and in view of the general
adoption of two-years’ service in other countries it is a matter for grave
consideration whether, against European forces and in defence of their
own homes, the Russians would not prove more than formidable
antagonists to the men of more highly individualized races who are
their probable opponents. Equally remarkable is the new power of
redistribution possessed by Russia. Formerly it was usual to count upon
one campaign at least elapsing before Russia could intervene
effectively in European wars; much, in fact the greater part, of her
losses in the Crimean War was due to the enormous distances which
had to be traversed on foot. Nowadays the original equal distribution of
the army over the country has been modified in accordance with the
political needs of each moment. In 1892 the centre of gravity was
shifted to Poland and Kiev, in 1904 the performances of the trans-
Siberian railway in transporting troops to the seat of war in Manchuria
excited the admiration of military Europe. The attitude of the army in
the troubles which followed upon the Japanese War belongs to the
history of Russia, not to that of military organization, and it will be
sufficient to say that the conduct of the “nation in arms” at times of
political unrest may vary between the extremes of unquestioning
obedience to authority and the most dangerous form of licence,
examples of both being frequent in the history of nearly all national
armies. A remarkable innovation in the modern history of this army is
the conversion of the whole of the cavalry, except a few élite
regiments, into dragoons of the old type. After the war of 1904-5,
however, this policy was reversed and the cavalry reformed on the

usual model. The Cossacks still retain to a large extent the peculiarities
of the light troops of the 18th century.

Spanish Army

95. The feudal sovereignties of medieval Spain differed but little, in their
military organization, from other feudal states. As usual, mercenaries were
the only forces on which reliance was placed for foreign wars. These troops
called almugávares (Arabic=scouts) won a great reputation on Italian and
Greek battlefields of the 13th century, and with many transformations in
name and character appeared from time to time up to the Peninsular War.
Castile, however, had a military system very different from the rest. The
forces of the kingdom were composed of local contingents similar to the
English fyrd, professional soldiers who were paid followers of the great
lords, and the heavy cavalry of the military orders. The groups of cities
called Hermandades, while they existed, also had permanent forces in their
pay. At the union of Castile and Aragon the Castilian methods received a
more general application. The new Hermandad was partly a light cavalry,
partly a police, and was organized in the ratio of one soldier to every
hundred families. In the conquest of Grenada (1482-92) mesnadas or
contingents were furnished by the crown, the nobles and the cities, and
permanently kept in the field. The Hermandad served throughout the war as
a matter of course. From the veterans of this war was drawn the army which
in the Italian wars won its reputation as the first army in Europe.

In 1596 the home defence of Spain was reorganized and the ordenanza,
or militia, which was then formed of all men not belonging to the still
extant feudal contingents, was generally analogous to the system of “assizes
at arms” in England. This ordenanza served in the Peninsular War.

96. With the Italian wars of the early 16th century came the
development of the regular army; a brief account of its place in the
evolution of armies has been given above. Discipline, the feeling of
comradeship and soldierly honour were the qualities which marked out
the Spanish army as the model for others to follow, and for more than a
century the Spanish army maintained its prestige as the first in Europe.
The oldest regiments of the present Spanish army claiming descent
from the tercios date from 1535. An officer whose regiment was
reduced commonly took a pike in some other corps (e.g. Tilly), the
señor soldado was counted as a gentleman, and his wife and family
received state allowances. Nor was this army open only to Spaniards.
Walloons, Italians, Burgundians and other nationalities ruled over by
the Habsburgs all contributed their quotas. But the career of the old
army came to an end at Rocroi (1643), and after this the forces of the
monarchy began more and more to conform to the French model.

97. The military history of Spain from 1650 to 1700 is full of
incident, and in the long war of the Spanish Succession both the army
and the ordenanza found almost continuous employment. They were
now organized, as were most other armies of Europe, on the lines of
the French army, and in 1714 the old tercios, which had served in the
Spanish Netherlands under Marlborough, were brought to Spain. The
king’s regiment “Zamora” of the present army descends from one of
these which, as the tercio of Bovadilla, had been raised in 1580. The
army underwent few changes of importance during the 18th century,
and it is interesting to note that there were never less than three Irish
regiments in the service. In 1808 the Irlanda, Ultonia (= Ulster) and
Hibernia regiments had come to consist (as had similar corps in the
French service before the Revolution) largely of native soldiers. At that
time the Spanish army consisted of 119 Spanish and foreign (Swiss,
Walloon and Irish) battalions, with 24 cavalry regiments and about

8000 artillery and engineers. There were further 51 battalions of
militia, and the total forces numbered actually 137,000. The part played
by the Spanish standing army in the Peninsular War was certainly
wholly insignificant relatively to these figures. It must be borne in
mind, however, that only continued wars can give real value to long-
service troops of the old style, and this advantage the Spanish regulars
did not possess. Further, the general decadence of administration
reacted in the usual way, the appointment of court favourites to high
command was a flagrant evil, and all that can be urged is that the best
elements of the army behaved as well as did the Prussians of 1806, that
the higher leading and the administration of the army in the field were
both sufficiently weak to have ruined most armies, and that the men
were drawn from the same country and the same classes which
furnished the guerrilleros whom it became fashionable to exalt at the
expense of the soldiers. In the later campaigns of Wellington, Spanish
divisions did good service, and the corps of La Romaña (a picked
contingent of troops which had been sent before the war to Denmark at
Napoleon’s instance), though often defeated, always retained some
cohesion and discipline. But the result of this war, the second French
invasion, and the continued civil wars of the 19th century was the
destruction of the old army, and the present army of Spain still bears
traces of the confusion out of which it arose.

The most important changes were in 1870, when conscription was
introduced, and in 1872, when universal service was proposed in its
place. The military virtues of the rank and file and the devotion of the
officers were conspicuously displayed in the Spanish-American War of
1898, and it cannot be claimed even for the Germans of 1870 that they
fired so coolly and accurately as did the defenders of S. Juan and El
Caney.

Turkish Army

98. The writers who have left the most complete and trustworthy
contemporary accounts of the Turkish army in the 14th and 15th centuries,
when it reached the height of its most characteristic development, are
Bertrandon de la Brocquière, equerry to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy,
and Francesco Filelfo of Tolentino. Bertrandon, a professional soldier,
visited Palestine in 1432, and returned overland in 1433, traversing the
Balkan Peninsula by the main trade-route from Constantinople to Belgrade.
He wrote an account of his journey for Philip: see Early Travels in
Palestine, translated and edited by T. Wright (London, 1848). Filelfo served
as secretary to the Venetian baylo at Constantinople, and recorded his
observations in a series of letters (see Filelfo). Both ascribe the military
superiority of the Turks over the nations of western Europe to two facts—
firstly to their possession of a well-organized standing army, an institution
unknown elsewhere, and secondly to their far stricter discipline, itself a
result of their military organization and of the moral training afforded by
Islam.

The regular troops comprised the Janissaries (q.v.), a corps of
infantry recruited from captured sons of Christians, and trained to form
a privileged caste of scientific soldiers and religious fanatics; and the
Spahis, a body of cavalry similarly recruited, and armed with scimitar,
mace and bow. Celibacy was one of the rules of this standing army,
which, in its semi-monastic ideals and constitution, resembled the
knightly orders of the West in their prime. The Janissaries numbered
about 12,000, the Spahis about 8000. A second army of some 40,000
men, mostly mounted and armed like the Spahis, was feudal in
character, and consisted chiefly of the personal followers of the
Moslem nobility; more than half its numbers were recruited in Europe.

This force of 60,000 trained soldiers was accompanied by a horde of
irregulars, levied chiefly among the barbarous mountaineers of the
Balkans and Asia Minor, and very ill-armed and ill-disciplined. Their
numbers may be estimated at 140,000, for Bertrandon gives 200,000 as
the total of the Turkish forces. Many 15th and 16th century writers give
a smaller total, but refer only to the standing and feudal armies. Others
place the total higher. Laonicus Chalcocondylas in his Turcica Historia
states that at the siege of Constantinople in 1453 the sultan commanded
400,000 troops, but most other eye-witnesses of the siege give a total
varying from 150,000 to 300,000. Many Christian soldiers of fortune
enlisted with the Turks as artillerists or engineers, and supplied them at
Constantinople with the most powerful cannon of the age. Other
Christians were compelled to serve as engineers or in the ranks. As late
as 1683 a corps of Wallachians was forced to join the Turkish army
before Vienna, and entrusted with the task of bridging the Danube. But
in the 18th and early 19th centuries the introduction of Christians
tended to weaken the moral of the army already sapped by defeat; it
was found impossible to maintain the discipline of the Janissaries,
whose privileges had become a source of danger; and the feudal
nobility became more and more independent of the sultan’s authority.
These three causes contributed to make reorganization inevitable.

The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 marked the close of the
history of the old Turkish army; already the re-creation of the service
on the accepted models of western Europe had been commenced. This
was still incomplete when the new force was called upon to meet the
Russians in 1828, and though the army displayed its accustomed
bravery, its defective organization and other causes led to its defeat.
Since then the army has been almost as constantly on active service as
the British; the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the
Greco-Turkish War of 1897 witnessed the employment of a large

proportion of the sultan’s available forces, while innumerable local
revolts in different parts of the empire called for great exertions, and
often for fierce fighting on the part of the troops locally in garrison and
those sent up from the nearest provinces.

United States Army

99. The regular army of the United States has always been small. From
the first it has been a voluntary force, and until 1898 its chief work in peace
was to furnish numerous small posts on the frontier and amongst the
Indians, and to act as a reserve to the civil power in the great cities. In war-
time the regular army, if, as was usually the case, it was insufficient in
numbers for the task of subduing the enemy, formed the nucleus of large
armies raised “for the war.” In 1790 the rank and file of the army, as fixed
by act of Congress, amounted to 1216 men; and in 1814 an English
expedition of only 3500 men was able to seize and burn Washington, the
capital of a country which even then numbered eight millions of
inhabitants. In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, the whole regular
force amounted to about 15,300 men. In April of that year the president
called out 75,000 volunteers for three months; and in May a further call for
42,000 was made. In July a call for 500,000 men was authorized by
Congress, and as even this vast force proved insufficient it was found
necessary to use a system of drafts. In October 1863 a levy of 300,000 men
was ordered, and in February 1864 a further call of 500,000 was made.
Finally, in the beginning of 1865 two further levies, amounting in all to
500,000 men, were ordered, but were only partially carried out in
consequence of the cessation of hostilities. The total number of men called
under arms by the government of the United States, between April 1861 and
April 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually
embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied

by the South during the same time, the total armed forces reach the
enormous amount of nearly four millions, drawn from a population of only
32 millions—figures before which the celebrated uprising of the French
nation in 1793, or the efforts of France and Germany in the Franco-German
War, sink into insignificance. These 2,700,000 Federals were organized into
volunteer regiments bearing state designations. The officers, except general
and staff officers, were appointed by the governors of the respective states.
The maximum authorized strength of the regular army never, during the
war, exceeded 40,000 men; and the number in the field, especially towards
the close of the war, was very much less. The states, in order to obtain men
to fill their quotas, offered liberal bounties to induce men to enlist, and it
therefore became very difficult to obtain recruits for the regular army, for
which no bounties were given. The regular regiments accordingly dwindled
away to skeletons. The number of officers present was also much reduced,
since many of them, while retaining their regular commissions, held higher
rank in the volunteer army. After the close of the Civil War the volunteers
were mustered out; and by the act of Congress of the 28th of July 1866 the
line of the army was made to consist of 10 regiments of cavalry of 12 troops
each, 5 regiments of artillery of 12 batteries each and 45 regiments of
infantry of 10 companies. The actual strength in August 1867 was 53,962.
The act of the 3rd of March 1869 reduced the number of infantry regiments
to 25 and the enlisted strength of the army to 35,036. The numbers were
further reduced, without change in organization, to 32,788 in 1870 and to
25,000 in 1874. The latter number remained the maximum for twenty-four
years.

In March 1898, in view of hostilities with Spain, the artillery was
increased by 2 regiments, and, in April, 2 companies were added to each
infantry regiment, giving it 3 battalions of 4 companies each. The strength
of batteries, troops and companies was increased, the maximum enlisted
strength reached during 1898 being over 63,000. A volunteer army was also

organized. Of this army, 3 regiments of engineer troops, 3 of cavalry and 10
of infantry were United States volunteers, all the officers being
commissioned by the president. The other organizations came from the
states, the officers being appointed by the respective governors. As fast as
they were organized and filled up, they were mustered into the service of
the United States. The total number furnished for the war with Spain was
10,017 officers and 213,218 enlisted men. All general and staff officers
were appointed by the president. Three hundred and eighty-seven officers
of the regular army received volunteer commissions. After the conclusion of
hostilities with Spain, the mustering out of the volunteers was begun, and
by June 1899 all the volunteers, except those in the Philippines, were out of
the service. The latter, as well as those serving elsewhere, having enlisted
only for the war, were brought home and mustered out as soon as
practicable.

The act of the 2nd of March 1899 added 2 batteries to each regiment of
artillery. On the 2nd of February 1901 Congress passed an important bill
providing for the reorganization and augmentation (max. 100,000) of the
regular army, and other measures followed in the next years. (See United
States.)

Minor Armies

100. Dutch and Belgian Armies.—The military power of the “United
Provinces” dates its rise from the middle of the 16th century, when,
after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating
themselves from the yoke of Spain; and in the following century it
received considerable development in consequence of the wars they
had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay
upwards of 100,000 men, including many English and Scottish

regiments, besides 30,000 in the service of the Dutch East India
Company. But the slaughter of Malplaquet deprived the republic of the
flower of the army. Its part in the War of the Austrian Succession was
far from being as creditable as its earlier deeds, a Prussian army
overran Holland in 1787 almost without opposition, and at the
beginning of the wars of the French Revolution the army had fallen to
36,000 men. In 1795 Holland was conquered by the French under
Pichegru, and in the course of the changes which ensued the army was
entirely reorganized, and under French direction bore its share in the
great wars of the empire.

With the fall of Napoleon and the reconstitution of the Netherlands,
the Dutch-Belgian army, formed of the troops of the now united
countries, came into existence. The army fought at Waterloo, but was
not destined to a long career, for the revolution of 1830 brought about
the separation of Belgium. A Dutch garrison under Baron Chassé, a
distinguished veteran of the Napoleonic wars, defended Antwerp
against the French under Marshal Gérard, and the Netherlands have
been engaged in many arduous colonial wars in the East Indies. The
Belgian army similarly has contributed officers and non-commissioned
officers to the service of the Congo Free State.

101. Swiss Army.—The inhabitants of Switzerland were always a
hardy and independent race, but their high military reputation dates
from the middle of the 15th century, when the comparatively ill-armed
and untrained mountaineers signally defeated Charles the Bold of
Burgundy and the flower of the chivalry of Europe in the battles of
Granson, Morat and Nancy. The Swabian war, towards the end of that
century, and the Milanese war, at the beginning of the following one,
added to the fame of the Swiss infantry, and made it the model on
which that arm was formed all over Europe. The wealthier countries

vied with each other in hiring them as mercenaries, and the poor but
warlike Swiss found the profession of arms a lucrative one.

A brief account of the Swiss mercenaries will be found earlier in this
article. Their fall was due in the end to their own indiscipline in the
first place, and the rise of the Spanish standing army and its musketeers
in the second. Yet it does not seem that the military reputation of the
Swiss was discredited, even by reverses such as Marignan. On the
contrary, they continued all through the 17th and 18th centuries to
furnish whole regiments for the service of other countries, notably of
France, and individuals, like Jomini in a later age, followed the career
of the soldier of fortune everywhere. The most notable incident in the
later military history of the Swiss, the heroic faithfulness of Louis
XVI.’s Swiss guard, is proverbial, and has been commemorated with
just pride by their countrymen. The French Revolutionary armies
overran Switzerland, as they did all the small neighbouring states, and
during Napoleon’s career she had to submit to his rule, and furnish her
contingent to his armies. On the fall of Napoleon she regained her
independence, and returned to her old trade of furnishing soldiers to the
sovereigns and powers of Europe. Charles X. of France had at one time
as many as 17,000 Swiss in his pay; Naples and Rome had each four
regiments. The recruiting for these foreign services was openly
acknowledged and encouraged by the government. The young Swiss
engaged usually for a period of four or six years; they were formed in
separate regiments, officered by countrymen of their own, and received
a higher rate of pay than the national regiments; and at the close of
their engagement returned with their earnings to settle down on their
paternal holdings. A series of revolutions, however, expelled them from
France and Italy, and recently the advance of liberal ideas, and the
creation of great national armies based on the principle of personal
service, has destroyed their occupation. Switzerland is now remarkable

in a military sense as being the only country that maintains no standing
army (see Militia).

102. The Swedish Army can look back with pride to the days of
Gustavus Adolphus and of Charles XII. The contributions made by it to
the military science of the 17th century have been noticed above. The
triumphs of the small and highly disciplined army of Charles were
often such as to recall the similar victories of the Greeks under
Alexander. The then nebulous armies of Russia and Poland resembled
indeed the forces of Darius in the 4th century b.c., but Peter the Great
succeeded at last in producing a true army, and the resistance of the
Swedes collapsed under the weight of the vastly superior numbers then
brought against them.

The Danish Army has a long and meritorious record of good service
dating from the Thirty Years’ War.

103. The existing Army of Portugal dates from the Peninsular War,
when a considerable force of Portuguese, at one time exceeding 60,000
men, was organized under Marshal Beresford. Trained and partly
officered by English officers, it proved itself not unworthy of its allies,
and bore its full share in the series of campaigns and battles by which
the French were ultimately expelled from Spain. At the peace the army
numbered about 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, formed on the
English model, and all in the highest state of efficiency. This force was
reduced in 1821, under the new constitutional government, to about
one-half.

104. The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Servian armies are the youngest
in Europe. The conduct of the Rumanians before Plevna in 1877 earned
for them the respect of soldiers of all countries. Servia and Bulgaria
came to war in 1885, and the Bulgarian soldiers, under the most

adverse conditions, achieved splendid victories under the leadership of
their own officers. In the crisis following the Austrian annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-9), it seemed likely that the Servian forces
might play an unexpectedly active part in war even with a strong
power.

Bibliography.—Below are the titles of some of the more important
works on the subject of armies. See also under biographical headings
and articles dealing with the several arms, &c. A large proportion of the
works mentioned below are concerned mainly with the development of
strategy and tactics.

V. der Goltz, Das Volk in Waffen (1883, new ed., 1898, English
translation, P.A. Ashworth, Nation in Arms, London, 1887, new ed.,
1907, French, Nation armée, Paris, 1889); Jähns, Heeresverfassung
und Völkerleben (Berlin, 1885); Berndt, Die Zahl im Kriege (Vienna,
1895); F.N. Maude, Evolution of Modern Strategy (1903), Voluntary
versus Compulsory Service (1897), and War and the World’s Life
(1907); Pierron, Méthodes de guerre, vol. i.; Jähns, Geschichte der
Kriegswissenschaften (an exhaustive bibliography, with critical notes);
Troschke, Mil. Litteratur seit den Befreiungskriegen (Berlin, 1870);
T.A. Dodge, Great Captains (Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus,
Napoleon); Bronsart v. Schellendorf (Eng. trans., War Office, 1905)
Duties of the General Staff; Favé, Histoire et tactique des trois armes
(Liége, 1850); Maynert, Gesch. des Kriegswesens u. der
Heeresverfassungen in Europa (Vienna, 1869); Jähns, Handbuch für
eine Geschichte des Kriegswesens v. der Urzeit bis zur Renaissance
(Leipzig, 1880); de la Barre Duparcq, Histoire de l’art de la guerre
avant l’usage de poudre (Paris, 1860); Rüstow and Köchly, Geschichte
des griechischen Kriegswesens (Aarau, 1852); Köchly and Rüstow,
Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller (Leipzig, 1855); Förster, in Hermes,

xii. (1877); D.G. Hogarth, Philip and Alexander (London, 1897);
Macdougall, Campaigns of Hannibal (London, 1858); Rüstow,
Heerwesen, &c., Julius Casars (Nordhausen, 1855); Organ der M.
Wissensch. Verein of 1877 (Vienna); Polybius literature of the 17th and
18th centuries; supplement to M.W.B., 1883; the works of Xenophon,
Aelian, Arrian, Vegetius, Polybius, Caesar, &c. (see Köchly and
Rüstow: a collection was made in the 15th century, under the title
Veteres de re militari scriptores, 1487); Oman, A History of the Art of
War: Middle Ages (London, 1898); Delpech, La Tactique au XIIIe
siècle (Paris, 1886); Kohler, Die Entwickelung des Kriegswesens v. 11.
Jahrhdt. bis zu den Hussitenkriegen (Breslau, 1886-1893); Ricotti,
Storia delle Compagnie di Ventura (Turin, 1846); Steger, Gesch.
Francesco Sforzas und d. ital. Condottieri (Leipzig, 1865); J.A.
Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy and The Age of the Despots; A
Brandenburg Mobilization of 1477 (German General Staff Monograph,
No. 3); Palacky, “Kriegskunst der Böhmen,” Zeitschrift bohmisch.
Museums (Prague, 1828); George, Battles of English History (London,
1895); Biottot, Les Grands inspirés devant la science: Jeanne d’Arc
(Paris, 1907); V. Ellger, Kriegswesen, &c., der Eidgenossen, 14., 15.,
16. Jahrhdt. (1873); de la Chauvelays, Les Armées de Charles le
Téméraire (Paris, 1879); Guillaume, Hist. des bandes d’ordonnance
dans les Pays-Bas (Brussels, 1873); the works of Froissart, de
Brantôme, Machiavelli, Lienhard Frönsperger (Kriegsbuch, 1570), de
la Noue, du Bellay, &c.; Villari, Life and Times of Machiavelli (English
version); “Die frommen Landsknechte” (M. W. B., supplement, 1880);
Kriegsbilder aus der Zeit der Landsknechte (Stuttgart, 1883); C.H.
Firth, Cromwell’s Army (London, 1902); Heilmann, Das Kriegswesen
der Kaiserlichen und Schweden (Leipzig, 1850); C. Walton, History of
the British Standing Army, 1660-1700 (London, 1894); E.A. Altnam in
United Service Magazine, February 1907; Austrian official history of

Prince Eugene’s campaigns, &c.; de la Barre Duparcq, Hist, milit. de la
Prusse avant 1756 (Paris, 1857); Marsigli, L’État militaire de l’emp.
ottoman (1732); Prussian Staff History of the Silesian wars; C. von
B(inder)-K(rieglstein), Geist und Stoff im Kriege (Vienna, 1895); E.
d’Hauterive, L’Armée sous la Révolution (Paris, 1894); C. Rousset, Les
Volontaires de 1791-1794; Michelet, Les Soldats de la Révolution
(Paris, 1878); publications of the French general staff on the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; H. Bonnal, Esprit de la guerre
moderne (a series of studies in military history, 1805-1870); Paimblant
du Rouil, La Division Durutte, les Réfractaires, also supplement,
M.W.B., 1890; “The French Conscription” (suppl. M.W.B., 1892); C. v.
der Goltz, Von Rossbach bis Jena und Auerstädt (a new edition of the
original Rossbach und Jena, Berlin, 1883); German General Staff
Monograph, No. 10; M.W.B. supplements of 1845, 1846, 1847, 1854,
1855, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1862, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1887; v. Duncker,
Preussen während der franz. Okkupation (1872); Archives of Prussian
war ministry, publications of 1892 and 1896; histories of the wars of
1866 and 1870; V. Chareton, Comme la Prusse a préparé sa revanche,
1806-1813; Reports of Col. Baron Stoffel, French attaché at Berlin
(translation into English, War Office, London); Haxthausen, Les Forces
militaires de la Prusse (Paris, 1853); de la Barre Duparcq, Études
historiques générales et militaires sur la Prusse (Paris, 1854);
Paixhans, Constitution militaire de la France (Paris, 1849); Duc
d’Aumale, Les Institutions militaires de la France (Paris, 1867); C. v.
Decker, Über die Persönlichkeit des preussischen Soldaten (Berlin,
1842); War Office, Army Book of the British Empire (London, 1893);
M. Jähns, Das französische Heer von der grossen Revolution bis zur
Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1873); Baron Kaulbars, The German Army (in
Russian) [St Petersburg, 1890]; Die Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert (Berne
and Lausanne, 1899); Heimann, L’Armée allemande (Paris, 1895); R.

de l’Homme de Courbière, Grundzüge der deutschen
Militarverwaltung (Berlin, 1882); G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of
War (London, 1905); J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army
(London, 1899- ——); R. de l’Homme de Courbière, Gesch. der
brandenburg-preussisch. Heeresverfassung (Berlin, 1852);
Krippentagel and Küstel, Die preuss. Armee von der ältesten Zeit bis
zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1883); Gansauge, Das brandenbg.-preuss.
Kriegswesen, 1440, 1640, 1740 (Berlin, 1839); A. v. Boguslawksi, Die
Landwehr, 1813-1893 (1893); A.R. v. Sichart, Gesch. d. k. hannover.
Armee (Hanover, 1866); v. Reitzenstein, Die k. hannover. Kavallerie,
1631-1866 (1892); Schlee, Zur Gesch. des hessischen Kriegswesens
(Kassel, 1867); Leichtlen, Badens Kriegsverfassung (Carlsruhe, 1815);
v. Stadlinger, Gesch. des württembergischen Kriegswesens (Stuttgart,
1858); Münich, Entwickelung der bayerischen Armee (Münich, 1864);
official Gesch. d. k. bayer. Armee (Münich, 1901 onward); Würdinger,
Kriegsgeschichte v. Bayern (Münich, 1868); H. Meynert, Gesch. des
österr. Kriegswesens (Vienna, 1852), Kriegswesen Ungarns (Vienna,
1876); Anger, Gesch. der K.-K. Armee (Vienna, 1886); Beitrage zur
Gesch. des österr. Heerwesens, 1754-1814 (Vienna, 1872); R. v.
Ottenfeld and Teuber, Die österr. Armee, 1700-1867 (Vienna, 1895); v.
Wrede, Gesch. d. K. u. K. Wehrmacht (Vienna, 1902); May de
Rainmoter, Histoire militaire de la Suisse (Lausanne, 1788); Cusachs y
Barado, La Vida Militar en España (Barcelona, 1888); Guillaume, Hist.
de l’infanterie wallonne sous la maison d’Espagne (Brussels, 1876); A.
Vitu, Histoire civile de l’armée (Paris, 1868); A. Pascal, Hist. de
l’armée (Paris, 1847); L. Jablonski, L’Armée française à travers les
âges; C. Romagny, Hist. générale de l’armée nationale (Paris, 1893);
E. Simond, Hist. mil. de la France; Susane, Hist. de l’infanterie,
cavalerie, artillerie françaises (Paris, 1874); Père Daniel, Hist. des
milices françaises (1721); the official Historique des corps de troupe

(Paris, 1900- ——); Cahu, Le Soldat français (Paris, 1876); J. Molard,
Cent ans de l’armée française, 1780-1889 (Paris, 1890); v. Stein, Lehre
vom Heerwesen (Stuttgart, 1872); du Verger de S. Thomas, L’Italie et
son armée, 1865 (Paris, 1866); “C. Martel,” Military Italy (London,
1884); Sir R. Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office (London,
1904); Willoughby Verner, Military Life of the Duke of Cambridge
(London, 1905); W.H. Daniel, The Military Forces of the Crown
(London, 1902); War Office, Annual Report of the British Army;
Broome, Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army (Calcutta, 1850); W.J.
Wilson, Hist. of the Madras Army (London, 1882-1885); C.M. Clode,
Military Forces of the Crown; Blume, Die Grundlage unserer
Wehrkraft (Berlin, 1899); Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army
(London, 1890 and 1895); v. Olberg, Die französische Armee im
Exerzirplatz und im Felde (Berlin, 1861); Die Heere und Flotte der
Gegenwart, ed. Zepelin (Berlin, 1896); Molard, Puissances militaires
de l’Europe (Paris, 1895); works of Montecucculi, Puységur, Vauban,
Feuquières, Guibert, Folard, Guichard, Joly de Maizeroy, Frederick the
Great, Marshal Saxe, the prince de Ligne, Napoleon, Carnot,
Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Napoleon III., Moltke, Hamley, &c.

The principal general military periodicals are:—English, Journal of
the R. United Service Institution; United States, Journal of the Military
Service Institution; French, Revue d’histoire and Revue des armées
étrangères (general staff); Rau and Lauth, L’État militaire des
puissances (about every 4 years); Revue militaire générale, founded in
1907 by General Langlois; Almanach du drapeau (a popular aide-
mémoire published annually); German, the Vierteljahrsheft of the
general staff; Militär-Wochenblatt (referred to above as M.W.B.—the
supplements are of great value); von Löbell’s Jahresberichte (annual
detailed reports on the state, &c., of all armies—an English précis
appears annually in the Journal of the R.U.S. Institution); Austrian,

Streffleurs öst. Militär-Zeitschrift, with which was amalgamated (1907)
the Organ d. militärwissenschaft. Vereins. The British War Office
issues from time to time handbooks dealing with foreign armies, and,
quarterly since April 1907, a critical review and bibliography of recent
military literature in the principal languages, under the name of Recent
Publications of Military Interest. (C. F. A.)

1 The phrase “K. und K.” (Kaiserlich und Königlich) is applied to all services common
to the Austrian and Hungarian armies. “K.-K.” (Kaiserlich-Königlich) refers strictly only to
the troops of Austria, the Hungarian army being known as the “K. Ung.” (Royal
Hungarian) service.

2 From Krümperpferde (cast horses attached to batteries, &c., for odd jobs), applied to
the recruits in jest.

ARNAL, ÉTIENNE (1794-1872), French actor, was born at Meulan,
Seine-et-Oise, on the 1st of February 1794. After serving in the army, and
working in a button factory, he took to the stage. His first appearance
(1815) was in tragedy, and for some time he was unsuccessful; it was not
until 1827 that he showed his real ability in comedy parts, especially in
plays by Félix August Duvert (1795-1876) and Augustin Théodore
Lauzanne (1805-1877), whose Cabinets particuliers (1832), Le Mari de la
dame de chœurs (1837), Passé minuit, L’Homme blasé (1843), La Clef dans
le dos (1848), &c., contained parts written for him. He was twenty years at
the Vaudeville, and completed at the various Parisian theatres a stage career
of nearly half a century. Arnal was the author of Epître à bouffé (1840),
which is reprinted in his volume of poetry, Boutades en vers (1861).

ARNALDUS DE VILLA NOVA, also called Arnaldus de Villanueva,
Arnaldus Villanovanus or Arnaud de Villeneuve (c. 1235-1313),
alchemist, astrologer and physician, appears to have been of Spanish origin,
and to have studied chemistry, medicine, physics, and also Arabian
philosophy. After having lived at the court of Aragon, he went to Paris,
where he gained a considerable reputation; but he incurred the enmity of the
ecclesiastics and was forced to flee, finally finding an asylum in Sicily.
About 1313 he was summoned to Avignon by Pope Clement V., who was
ill, but he died on the voyage. Many alchemical writings, including
Thesaurus Thesaurorum or Rosarius Philosophorum, Novum Lumen, Flos
Florum, and Speculum Alchimiae, are ascribed to him, but they are of very
doubtful authenticity. Collected editions of them were published at Lyons in
1504 and 1532 (with a biography by Symphorianus Campegius), at Basel in
1585, at Frankfort in 1603, and at Lyons in 1686. He is also the reputed
author of various medical works, including Breviarium Practicae.

See J.B. Hauréau in the Histoire littéraire de la France (1881), vol.
28; E. Lalande, Arnaud de Villeneuve, sa vie et ses œuvres (Paris,
1896). A list of writings is given by J. Ferguson in his Bibliotheca
Chemica (1906). See also U. Chevalier, Repertoire des sources hist.,
&c., Bio-bibliographie (Paris, 1903).

ARNAUD, HENRI (1641-1721), pastor and general of the Vaudois or
Waldensians of Piedmont, was born at Embrun. About 1650 his family
returned to their native valley of Luserna, where Arnaud was educated at La
Tour (the chief village), later visiting the college at Basel (1662 and 1668)
and the Academy at Geneva (1666). He then returned home, and seems to
have been pastor in several of the Vaudois valleys before attaining that
position at La Tour (1685). He was thus the natural leader of his co-
religionists after Victor Amadeus expelled them (1686) from their valleys,
and most probably visited Holland, the ruler of which, William of Orange,
certainly gave him help and money. Arnaud occupied himself with
organizing his 3000 countrymen who had taken refuge in Switzerland, and
who twice (1687-1688) attempted to regain their homes. The English
revolution of 1688, and the election of William to the throne, encouraged
the Vaudois to make yet another attempt. Furnished with detailed
instructions from the veteran Josué Janavel (prevented by age from taking
part in the expedition) Arnaud, with about 1000 followers, started (August
17, 1689) from near Nyon on the Lake of Geneva for the glorieuse rentrée.
On the 27th of August, the valiant band, after many hardships and dangers,
reached the Valley of St Martin, having passed by Sallanches and crossed
the Col de Very (6506 ft.), the Enclave de la Fenêtre (7425 ft.), the Col du
Bonhomme (8147 ft.), the Col du Mont Iseran (9085 ft.), the Grand Mont
Cenis (6893 ft.), the Petit Mont Cenis (7166 ft.), the Col de Clapier (8173
ft.), the Col de Côteplane (7589 ft.), and the Col du Piz (8550 ft.). They
soon took refuge in the lofty and secure rocky citadel of the Balsille, where
they were besieged (October 24, 1689 to May 14, 1690) by the troops
(about 4000 in number) of the king of France and the duke of Savoy. They
maintained this natural fortress against many fierce attacks and during the
whole of a winter. In particular, on the 2nd of May, one assault was defeated
without the loss of a single man of Arnaud’s small band. But another attack
(May 14) was not so successful, so that Arnaud withdrew his force, under

cover of a thick mist, and led them over the hills to the valley of Angrogna,
above La Tour. A month later the Vaudois were received into favour by the
duke of Savoy, who had then abandoned his alliance with France for one
with Great Britain and Holland. Hence for the next six years the Vaudois
helped Savoy against France, though suffering much from the repeated
attacks of the French troops. But by a clause in the treaty of peace of 1696,
made public in 1698, Victor Amadeus again became hostile to the Vaudois,
about 3000 of whom, with Arnaud, found a shelter in Protestant countries,
mainly in Württemberg, where Arnaud became the pastor of Dürrmenz-
Schönenberg, N.W. of Stuttgart (1699). Once again (1704-1706) the
Vaudois aided the duke against France. Arnaud, however, took no part in the
military operations, though he visited England (1707) to obtain pecuniary
aid from Queen Anne. He died at Schönenberg (which was the church
hamlet of the parish of Dürrmenz) in 1721. It was during his retirement that
he compiled from various documents by other hands his Histoire de la
glorieuse rentrée des Vaudois dans leurs vallées, which was published
(probably at Cassel) in 1710, with a dedication to Queen Anne. It was
translated into English (1827) by H. Dyke Acland, and has also appeared in
German and Dutch versions. A part of the original MS. is preserved in the
Royal Library in Berlin.

See K.H. Klaiber, Henri Arnaud, ein Lebensbild (Stuttgart, 1880); A.
de Rochas d’Aiglun, Les Vallées vaudoises (Paris, 1881); various
chapters in the Bulletin du bicentenaire de la glorieuse rentrée (Turin,
1889).
(W. A. B. C.)

ARNAULD, the surname of a family of prominent French lawyers,
chiefly remembered in connexion with the Jansenist troubles of the 17th
century. At their head was Antoine Arnauld (1560-1619), a leader of the
Paris bar; in this capacity he delivered a famous philippic against the Jesuits
in 1594, accusing them of gross disloyalty to the newly converted Henry IV.
This speech was afterwards known as the original sin of the Arnaulds.

Of his twenty children several grew up to fight the Jesuits on more
important matters. Five gave themselves up wholly to the church. Henri
Arnauld (1597-1692), the second son, became bishop of Angers in 1649,
and represented Jansenism on the episcopal Bench for as long as forty-three
years. The youngest son, Antoine (1612-1694), was the most famous of
Jansenist theologians (see below). The second daughter, Angélique (1591-
1661), was abbess and reformer of Port Royal; here she was presently
joined by her sister Agnes (1593-1671) and two younger sisters, both of
whom died early.

Only two of Antoine’s children married—Robert Arnauld d’Andilly
(1588-1674), the eldest son, and Catherine Lemaistre (1590-1651), the
eldest daughter. But both of these ended their lives under the shadow of the
abbey. Andilly’s five daughters all took the veil there; the second,
Angélique de St Jean Arnauld d’Andilly (1624-1684) rose to be abbess,
was a writer of no mean repute, and one of the most remarkable figures of
the second generation of Jansenism. One of Andilly’s sons became a hermit
at Port Royal; the eldest, Antoine (1615-1699), was first a soldier,
afterwards a priest. As the Abbé Arnauld, he survives as author of some
interesting Memoirs of his time. The second son, Simon Arnauld de
Pomponne (1616-1699), early entered public life. After holding various
embassies, he rose to be foreign secretary to Louis XIV., and was created
marquis de Pomponne. Lastly Madame Lemaistre and two of her sons
became identified with Port Royal. On her husband’s death she took the veil

there. Her eldest son, Antoine Lemaistre (1608-1658), became the first of
the solitaires, or hermits of Port Royal. There he was joined by his younger
brother, Isaac Lemaistre de Saci (1613-1684), who presently took holy
orders, and became confessor to the hermits.

The Arnaulds’ connexion with Port Royal (q.v.)—a convent of Cistercian
nuns in the neighbourhood of Versailles—dated back to 1599, when the
original Antoine secured the abbess’s chair for his daughter Angélique, then
a child of eight. About 1608 she started to reform her convent in the
direction of its original Rule; but about 1623 she made the acquaintance of
du Vergier (q.v.) and thenceforward began to move in a Jansenist direction.
Her later history is entirely bound up with the fortunes of that revival.
Angélique’s strength lay chiefly in her character. Her sister and
collaborator, Agnes, was also a graceful writer; and her Letters, edited by
Prosper Feugère (2 vols., Paris, 1858), throw most valuable light on the
inner aims and aspirations of the Jansenist movement. The first relative to
join their projects of reform was their nephew, Antoine Lemaistre, who
threw up brilliant prospects at the bar to settle down at the Abbey gates
(1638). Here he was presently joined by his brother, de Saci, and other
hermits, who led an austere semi-monastic existence, though without taking
any formal vow. In 1646 they were joined by their uncle, Arnauld
d’Andilly, hitherto a personage of some importance at court and in the
world; he was a special favourite of the queen regent, Anne of Austria, and
had held various offices of dignity in the government. Uncle and nephews
passed their time partly in ascetic exercises—though Andilly never
pretended to vie in austerity with the younger men—partly in managing the
convent estates, and partly in translating religious classics. Andilly put
Josephus, St Augustine’s Confessions, and many other works, into
singularly delicate French. Lemaistre attacked the lives of the saints; in
1654 Saci set to work on a translation of the Bible. His labours were
interrupted by the outbreak of persecution. In 1661 he was forced to go into

hiding; in 1666 he was arrested, thrown into the Bastille, and kept there
more than two years. Meanwhile his friends printed his translation of the
New Testament—really in Holland, nominally at Mons in the Spanish
Netherlands (1667). Hence it is usually known as the Nouveau Testament de
Mons. It found enthusiastic friends and violent detractors. Bossuet approved
its orthodoxy, but not its over-elaborate style; and it was destructively
criticized by Richard Simon, the founder of Biblical criticism in France. On
the other hand it undoubtedly did much to popularize the Bible, and was
bitterly attacked by the Jesuits on that ground.

By far the most distinguished of the family, however, was Antoine—le
grand Arnauld, as contemporaries called him—the twentieth and youngest
child of the original Antoine. Born in 1612, he was originally intended for
the bar; but decided instead to study theology at the
Le grand Arnauld. Sorbonne. Here he was brilliantly successful, and was on
the high-road to preferment, when he came under the
influence of du Vergier, and was drawn in the direction of Jansenism. His
book, De la fréquente Communion (1643), did more than anything else to
make the aims and ideals of this movement intelligible to the general
public. Its appearance raised a violent storm, and Arnauld eventually
withdrew into hiding; for more than twenty years he dared not make a
public appearance in Paris. During all this time his pen was busy with
innumerable Jansenist pamphlets. In 1655 two very outspoken Lettres à un
duc et pair on Jesuit methods in the confessional brought on a motion to
expel him from the Sorbonne. This motion was the immediate cause of
Pascal’s Provincial Letters. Pascal, however, failed to save his friend; in
February 1656 Arnauld was solemnly degraded. Twelve years later the tide
of fortune turned. The so-called peace of Clement IX. put an end to
persecution. Arnauld emerged from his retirement, was most graciously
received by Louis XIV., and treated almost as a popular hero. He now set to
work with Nicole (q.v.) on a great work against the Calvinists: La

Perpétuité de la foi catholique touchant l’eucharistie. Ten years later,
however, another storm of persecution burst. Arnauld was compelled to fly
from France, and take refuge in the Netherlands, finally settling down at
Brussels. Here the last sixteen years of his life were spent in incessant
controversy with Jesuits, Calvinists and misbelievers of all kinds; here he
died on the 8th of August 1694. His inexhaustible energy is best expressed
by his famous reply to Nicole, who complained of feeling tired. “Tired!”
echoed Arnauld, “when you have all eternity to rest in?” Nor was this
energy by any means absorbed by purely theological questions. He was one
of the first to adopt the philosophy of Descartes, though with certain
orthodox reservations; and between 1683 and 1685 he had a long battle
with Malebranche on the relation of theology to metaphysics. On the whole,
public opinion leant to Arnauld’s side. When Malebranche complained that
his adversary had misunderstood him, Boileau silenced him with the
question: “My dear sir, whom do you expect to understand you, if M.
Arnauld does not?” And popular regard for Arnauld’s penetration was much
increased by his Art de penser, commonly known as the Port-Royal Logic,
which has kept its place as an elementary text-book until quite modern
times. Lastly a considerable place has quite lately been claimed for Arnauld
among the mathematicians of his age; a recent critic even describes him as
the Euclid of the 17th century. In general, however, since his death his
reputation has been steadily on the wane. Contemporaries admired him
chiefly as a master of close and serried reasoning; herein Bossuet, the
greatest theologian of the age, was quite at one with d’Aguesseau, the
greatest lawyer. But a purely controversial writer is seldom attractive to
posterity. Anxiety to drive home every possible point, and cut his adversary
off from every possible line of retreat, makes him seem intolerably prolix.
“In spite of myself,” Arnauld once said regretfully, “my books are seldom
very short.” And even lucidity may prove a snare to those who trust to it
alone, and scornfully refuse to appeal to the imagination or the feelings. It is

to be feared that, but for his connexion with Pascal, Arnauld’s name would
be almost forgotten—or, at most, live only in the famous epitaph Boileau
consecrated to his memory—

“Au pied de cet autel de structure grossière
Gît sans pompe, enfermé dans une vile bière
Le plus savant mortel qui jamais ait écrit.”

Full details as to the lives and writings of the Arnaulds will be found
in the various books mentioned at the close of the article on Port Royal.
The most interesting account of Angélique will be found in Mémoires
pour servir a l’histoire de Port-Royal (3 vols., Utrecht 1742). Three
volumes of her correspondence were also published at the same time
and place. There are excellent modern lives of her in English by Miss
Frances Martin (Angélique Arnauld, 1873) and by A. K. H. (Angélique
of Port Royal, 1905). Antoine Arnauld’s complete works—thirty-seven
volumes in forty-two parts—were published in Paris, 1775-1781. No
modern biography of him exists; but there is a study of his philosophy
in Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne (Paris, 1868); and
his mathematical achievements are discussed by Dr Bopp in the 14th
volume of the Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der mathematischen
Wissenschaften (Leipzig, 1902). The memoirs of Arnauld d’Andilly
and of his son, the abbé Arnauld, are reprinted both in Petitot’s and
Poujoulat’s collections of memoirs illustrative of the 17th century.
(St. C.)

ARNAULT, ANTOINE VINCENT (1766-1834), French dramatist, was
born in Paris in January 1766. His first play, Marius à Minturnes (1791),
immediately established his reputation. A year later he followed up his first
success with a second republican tragedy, Lucrèce. He left France during
the Terror and on his return was arrested by the revolutionary authorities,
but was liberated through the intervention of Fabre d’Eglantine and others.
He was commissioned by Bonaparte in 1797 with the reorganization of the
Ionian Islands, and was nominated to the Institute and made secretary
general of the university. He was faithful to his patron through his
misfortunes, and after the Hundred Days remained in exile until 1819. In
1829 he was re-elected to the Academy and became perpetual secretary in
1833. Others of his plays are Blanche et Montcassin, ou les Vénitiens
(1798); and Germanicus (1816), the performance of which was the occasion
of a disturbance in the parterre which threatened serious political
complications. His tragedies are perhaps less known now than his Fables
(1813, 1815 and 1826), which are written in very graceful verse. Arnault
collaborated in a Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon (1822), and wrote
some very interesting Souvenirs d’un sexagénaire (1833), which contain
much out-of-the-way information about the history of the years previous to
1804. Arnault died at Goderville on the 16th of September 1834.

His eldest son, Émilien Lucien (1787-1863), wrote several tragedies, the
leading rôles in which were interpreted by Talma.

See Sainte-Beuve, Causeries du lundi, vol. 7. Arnault’s Œuvres
complètes (4 vols.) were published at the Hague and Paris in 1818-
1819 and again (8 vols.) at Paris in 1824.

ARNDT, ERNST MORITZ (1769-1860), German poet and patriot, was
born on the 26th of December 1769 at Schoritz in the island of Rügen,
which at that time belonged to Sweden. He was the son of a prosperous
farmer, and emancipated serf of the lord of the district, Count Putbus; his
mother came of well-to-do German yeoman stock. In 1787 the family
removed into the neighbourhood of Stralsund, where Arndt was enabled to
attend the academy. After an interval of private study he went in 1791 to the
university of Greifswald as a student of theology and history, and in 1793
removed to Jena, where he fell under the influence of Fichte. On the
completion of his university course he returned home, was for two years a
private tutor in the family of Ludwig Kosegarten (1758-1818), pastor of
Wittow and poet, and having qualified for the ministry as a “candidate of
theology,” assisted in the church services. At the age of twenty-eight he
renounced the ministry, and for eighteen months he led a wandering life,
visiting Austria, Hungary, Italy, France and Belgium. Returning homewards
up the Rhine, he was moved by the sight of the ruined castles along its
banks to intense bitterness against France. The impressions of this journey
he later described in Reisen durch einen Theil Teutschlands, Ungarns,
Italiens und Frankreichs in den Jahren 1798 und 1799 (1802-1804). In
1800 he settled in Greifswald as privat-docent in history, and the same year
published Über die Freiheit der alien Republiken. In 1803 appeared
Germanien und Europa,” a fragmentary ebullition,” as be himself called it,
of his views on the French aggression. This was followed by one of the
most remarkable of his books, Versuch einer Geschichte der
Leibeigenschaft in Pommern und Rügen (Berlin, 1803), a history of
serfdom in Pomerania and Rügen, which was so convincing an indictment
that King Gustavus Adolphus IV. in 1806 abolished the evil. Arndt had
meanwhile risen from privat-docent to extraordinary professor, and in 1806
was appointed to the chair of history at the university. In this year he
published the first part of his Geist der Zeit, in which he flung down the

gauntlet to Napoleon and called on his countrymen to rise and shake off the
French yoke. So great was the excitement it produced that Arndt was
compelled to take refuge in Sweden to escape the vengeance of Napoleon.
Settling in Stockholm, he obtained government employment, but devoted
himself to the great cause which was nearest his heart, and in pamphlets,
poems and songs communicated his enthusiasm to his countrymen. Schill’s
heroic death at Stralsund impelled him to return to Germany and, under the
disguise of “Almann, teacher of languages,” he reached Berlin in December
1809. In 1810 he returned to Greifswald, but only for a few months. He
again set out on his adventurous travels, lived in close contact with the first
men of his time, such as Blücher, Gneisenau and Stein, and in 1812 was
summoned by the last named to St Petersburg to assist in the organization
of the final struggle against France. Meanwhile, pamphlet after pamphlet,
full of bitter hatred of the French oppressor, came from his pen, and his
stirring patriotic songs, such as Was ist das deutsche Vaterland? Der Gott,
der Eisen wachsen liess, and Was blasen die Trompeten? were on all lips.
When, after the peace, the university of Bonn was founded in 1818, Arndt
was appointed to the chair of modern history. In this year appeared the
fourth part of his Geist der Zeit, in which he criticized the reactionary
policy of the German powers. The boldness of his demands for reform
offended the Prussian government, and in the summer of 1819 he was
arrested and his papers confiscated. Although speedily liberated, he was in
the following year, at the instance of the Central Commission of
Investigation at Mainz, established in accordance with the Carlsbad
Decrees, arraigned before a specially constituted tribunal. Although not
found guilty, he was forbidden to exercise the functions of his
professorship, but was allowed to retain the stipend. The next twenty years
he passed in retirement and literary activity. In 1840 he was reinstated in his
professorship, and in 1841 was chosen rector of the university. The
revolutionary outbreak of 1848 rekindled in the venerable patriot his old

hopes and energies, and he took his seat as one of the deputies to the
National Assembly at Frankfort. He formed one of the deputation that
offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV., and indignant at the
king’s refusal to accept it, he retired with the majority of von Gagern’s
adherents from public life. He continued to lecture and to write with
freshness and vigour, and on his 90th birthday received from all parts of
Germany good wishes and tokens of affection. He died at Bonn on the 29th
of January 1860. Arndt was twice married, first in 1800, his wife dying in
the following year; a second time in 1817.

Arndt’s untiring labour for his country rightly won for him the title
of “the most German of all Germans.” His lyric poems are not,
however, all confined to politics. Many among the Gedichte (1803-
1818; complete edition, 1860) are religious pieces of great beauty.
Among his other works are Reise durch Schweden (1797);
Nebenstunden, eine Beschreibung und Geschichte der schottländischen
Inseln und der Orkaden (1820); Die Frage über die Niederlande
(1831); Erinnerungen aus dem äusseren Leben (an autobiography, and
the most valuable source of information for Arndt’s life, 1840); Rhein-
und Ahrwanderungen (1846), Wanderungen und Wandlungen mit dem
Reichsfreiherrn von Stein (1858), and Pro populo Germanico (1854),
which was originally intended to form the fifth part of the Geist der
Zeit. Arndt’s Werke have been edited by H. Rösch and H. Meisner in 8
vols. (not complete) (1892-1898). Biographies have been written by E.
Langenberg (1869) and Wilhelm Baur (5th ed., 1882); see also H.
Meisner and R. Geerds, E.M. Arndt, ein Lebensbild in Briefen (1898),
and R. Thiele, E.M. Arndt (1894). There are monuments to his memory
at Schoritz, his birthplace, and at Bonn, where he is buried.

ARNDT, JOHANN (1555-1621), German Lutheran theologian, was
born at Ballenstedt, in Anhalt, and studied in several universities. He was at
Helmstadt in 1576; at Wittenberg in 1577. At Wittenberg the crypto-
Calvinist controversy was then at its height, and he took the side of
Melanchthon and the crypto-Calvinists. He continued his studies in
Strassburg, under the professor of Hebrew, Johannes Pappus (1549-1610), a
zealous Lutheran, the crown of whose life’s work was the forcible
suppression of Calvinistic preaching and worship in the city, and who had
great influence over him. In Basel, again, he studied theology under Simon
Sulzer (1508-1585), a broad-minded divine of Lutheran sympathies, whose
aim was to reconcile the churches of the Helvetic and Wittenberg
confessions. In 1581 he went back to Ballenstedt, but was soon recalled to
active life by his appointment to the pastorate at Badeborn in 1583. After
some time his Lutheran tendencies exposed him to the anger of the
authorities, who were of the Reformed Church. Consequently, in 1590 he
was deposed for refusing to remove the pictures from his church and
discontinue the use of exorcism in baptism. He found an asylum in
Quedlinburg (1590), and afterwards was transferred to St Martin’s church at
Brunswick (1599). Arndt’s fame rests on his writings. These were mainly of
a mystical and devotional kind, and were inspired by St Bernard, J. Tauler
and Thomas à Kempis. His principal work, Wahres Christentum (1606-
1609), which has been translated into most European languages, has served
as the foundation of many books of devotion, both Roman Catholic and
Protestant. Arndt here dwells upon the mystical union between the believer
and Christ, and endeavours, by drawing attention to Christ’s life in His
people, to correct the purely forensic side of the Reformation theology,
which paid almost exclusive attention to Christ’s death for His people. Like
Luther, Arndt was very fond of the little anonymous book, Deutsche
Theologie. He published an edition of it and called attention to its merits in
a special preface. After Wahres Christentum, his best-known work is

Paradiesgärtlein aller christlichen Tugenden, which was published in 1612.
Both these books have been translated into English; Paradiesgärtlein with
the title the Garden of Paradise. Several of his sermons are published in R.
Nesselmann’s Buch der Predigten (1858). Arndt has always been held in
very high repute by the German Pietists. The founder of Pietism, Philipp
Jacob Spener, repeatedly called attention to him and his writings, and even
went so far as to compare him with Plato (cf. Karl Scheele, Plato und
Johann Arndt, Ein Vortrag, &c., 1857).

A collected edition of his works was published in Leipzig and
Görlitz in 1734. A valuable account of Arndt is to be found in C.
Aschmann’s Essai sur la vie, &c., de J. Arndt. See further, Herzog-
Hauck, Realencyklopadie.

ARNE, THOMAS AUGUSTINE (1710-1778), English musical
composer, was born in London on the 12th of March 1710, his father being
an upholsterer. Intended for the legal profession, he was educated at Eton,
and afterwards apprenticed to an attorney for three years. His natural
inclination for music, however, proved irresistible, and his father, finding
from his performance at an amateur musical party that he was already a
skilful violinist, furnished him with the means of educating himself in his
favourite art. On the 7th of March 1733 he produced his first work at
Lincoln’s Inn Fields theatre, a setting of Addison’s Rosamond, the heroine’s
part being performed by his sister, Susanna Maria, who afterwards became
celebrated as Mrs Gibber. This proving a success was immediately followed
by a burletta, entitled The Opera of Operas, based on Fielding’s Tragedy of

Tragedies. The part of Tom Thumb was played by Arne’s young brother,
and the opera was produced at the Haymarket theatre. On the 19th of
December 1733 Arne produced at the same theatre the masque Dido and
Aeneas, a subject of which the musical conception had been immortalized
for Englishmen more than half a century earlier by Henry Purcell. Arne’s
individuality of style first distinctly asserted itself in the music to Dr
Dalton’s adaptation of Milton’s Comus, which was performed at Drury
Lane in 1738, and speedily established his reputation. In 1740 he wrote the
music for Thomson and Mallet’s Masque of Alfred, which is noteworthy as
containing the most popular of all his airs—“Rule, Britannia!” In 1740 he
also wrote his beautiful settings of the songs, “Under the greenwood tree,”
“Blow, blow, thou winter wind” and “When daisies pied,” for a
performance of Shakespeare’s As You Like It. Four years before this, in
1736, he had married Cecilia, the eldest daughter of Charles Young,
organist of All Hallows Barking. She was considered the finest English
singer of the day and was frequently engaged by Handel in the performance
of his music. In 1742 Arne went with his wife to Dublin, where he remained
two years and produced his oratorio Abel, containing the beautiful melody
known as the Hymn of Eve, the operas Britannia, Eliza and Comus, and
where he also gave a number of successful concerts. On his return to
London he was engaged as leader of the band at Drury Lane theatre (1744),
and as composer at Vauxhall (1745). In this latter year he composed his
successful pastoral dialogue, Colin and Phoebe, and in 1746 the song,
“Where the bee sucks.” In 1759 he received the degree of doctor of music
from Oxford. In 1760 he transferred his services to Covent Garden theatre,
where on the 28th of November he produced his Thomas and Sally. Here,
too, on the 2nd of February 1762 he produced his Artaxerxes, an opera in
the Italian style with recitative instead of spoken dialogue, the popularity of
which is attested by the fact that it continued to be performed at intervals
for upwards of eighty years. The libretto, by Arne himself, was a very poor

translation of Metastasio’s Artaserse. In 1762 also was produced the ballad-
opera Love in a Cottage. His oratorio Judith, of which the first performance
was on the 27th of February 1761 at Drury Lane, was revived at the chapel
of the Lock hospital, Pimlico, on the 29th of February 1764, in which year
was also performed his setting of Metastasio’s Olimpiade in the original
language at the King’s theatre in the Haymarket. At a later performance of
Judith at Covent Garden theatre on the 26th of February 1773 Arne for the
first time introduced female voices into oratorio choruses. In 1769 he wrote
the musical parts for Garrick’s ode for the Shakespeare jubilee at Stratford-
on-Avon, and in 1770 he gave a mutilated version of Purcell’s King Arthur.
One of his last dramatic works was the music to Mason’s Caractacus,
published in 1775. Though inferior to Purcell in intensity of feeling, Arne
has not been surpassed as a composer of graceful and attractive melody.
There is true genius in such airs as “Rule, Britannia!” and “Where the bee
sucks,” which still retain their original freshness and popularity. As a writer
of glees he does not take such high rank, though he deserves notice as the
leader in the revival of that peculiarly English form of composition. He was
author as well as composer of The Guardian outwitted, The Rose, The
Contest of Beauty and Virtue, and Phoebe at Court. Dr Arne died on the 5th
of March 1778, and was buried at St Paul’s, Covent Garden.

See also the article in Grove’s Dictionary (new ed.); and two
interesting papers in the Musical Times, November and December
1901.

ARNETH, ALFRED, Ritter von (1819-1897), Austrian historian, born
at Vienna on the both of July 1819, was the son of Joseph Calasanza von
Arneth (1791-1863), a well-known historian and archaeologist, who wrote a
history of the Austrian empire (Vienna, 1827) and several works on
numismatics. Alfred Arneth studied law, and became an official of the
Austrian state archives, of which in 1868 he was appointed keeper. He was
a moderate liberal in politics and a supporter of the ideal of German unity.
As such he was elected to the Frankfort parliament in 1848. In 1861 he
became a member of the Lower Austrian diet and in 1869 was nominated to
the Upper House of the Austrian Reichsrath. In 1879 he was appointed
president of the Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Academy of
Sciences) at Vienna, and in 1896 succeeded von Sybel as chairman of the
historical commission at Münich. He died on the 30th of July 1897.

Arneth was an indefatigable worker, and, as director of the archives, his
broad-minded willingness to listen to the advice of experts, as well as his
own sound sense, did much to promote the more scientific treatment and
use of public records in most of the archives of Europe. His scientific
temper and the special facilities which he enjoyed for drawing from original
sources give to his numerous historical works a very special value.

Among his publications may be mentioned: Leben des Feld-
marschalls Grafen Guido Starhemberg (Vienna, 1863); Prinz Eueen
von Savoyen (3 vols., ib. 1864); Gesch. der Maria Theresa (10 vols.,
ib. 1863-1879); Maria Theresa u. Marie Antoinette, ihr Briefwechsel
(ib. 1866); Marie Antoinette, Joseph II. und Leopold II., ihr
Briefwechsel (1866); Maria Theresa und Joseph II., ihre
Korrespondenz samt Briefen Josephs an seinen Bruder Leopold (3
vols., 1867); Beaumarchais und Sonnenfels (1868); Joseph II. und
Katharina von Russland, ihr Briefwechsel (1869); Johann Christian
Barthenstein und seine Zeit (1871); Joseph II. und Leopold von

Toskana, ihr Briefwechsel (2 vols., 1872); Briefe der Kaiserin Maria
Theresa an ihre Kinder und Freunde (4 vols., 1881); Marie Antoinette:
Correspondance secrète entre Marie-Thérèse et le comte de Mercy-
Argenteau (3 vols., Paris, 1875), in collaboration with Auguste
Geffroy; Graf Philipp Cobenzl und seine Memoiren (1885);
Correspondance secrete du comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec
l’empereur Joseph II. et Kaunitz (2 vols., 1889-1891), in collaboration
with Jules Flammermont; Anton Ritter von Schmerling. Episoden aus
seinem Leben 1835, 1848-1849 (1895); Johann Freiherr von
Wessenberg, ein österreichischer Staatsmann des 19. Jahrh. (2 vols.,
1898). Arneth also published in 1893 two volumes of early
reminiscences under the title of Aus meinem Leben.

ARNHEM, or Arnheim, the capital of the province of Gelderland,
Holland, on the right bank of the Rhine (here crossed by a pontoon bridge),
and a junction station 35 m. by rail E.S.E. of Utrecht. Pop. (1900) 57,240. It
is connected by tramway with Zutphen and Utrecht, and there is a regular
service of steamers to Cologne, Amsterdam, Nijmwegen, Tiel, ’s
Hertogenbosch and Rotterdam. Arnhem is a gay and fashionable town
prettily situated at the foot of the Veluwe hills, and enjoys a special
reputation for beauty on account of its wooded and hilly surroundings,
which have attracted many wealthy people to its neighbourhood. The
Groote Kerk of St Eusebius, built in the third quarter of the 15th century,
contains the marble monument to Charles (d. 1538), the last duke of
Gelderland of the Egmont dynasty. High up against the wall is an effigy of

the same duke in his armour. The fine lofty tower contains a chime of forty-
five bells. The Roman Catholic church of St Walburgis is of earlier date,
and a new Roman Catholic church dates from 1894. The town hall was built
as a palace by Maarten van Rossum, Duke Charles’s general, at the end of
the 15th century, and was only converted to its present use in 1830. Its
grotesque external ornamentation earned for it the name of Duivelshuis, or
devil’s house. The provincial government house occupies the site of the
former palace of the dukes of Gelderland. Other buildings are the court-
house, a public library containing many old works, a theatre, a large
concert-hall, a museum of antiquities (as well as a separate collection of
Spanish antiquities), a gymnasium, a teachers’ and art school, a building
(1880) to contain the provincial archives, a hospital (1889) and barracks.
On account of its proximity to the fertile Betuwe district and its situation
near the confluence of the Rhine and Ysel, the markets and shipping of
Arnhem are in a flourishing condition. A wharf for building and repairing
iron steamers was constructed in 1889. The manufactures include woollen
and cotton goods, paper, earthenware, soap, carriages, furniture and
tobacco, which is cultivated in the neighbourhood. Wool-combing and
dyeing are also carried on, and there are oil and timber mills.

The environs of Arnhem are much admired. Following either the Zutphen
or the Utrecht road, numerous pleasing views of the Rhine valley present
themselves, and country houses and villas appear among the woods on
every side. At Bronbeek, a short distance east of the town, is a hospital
endowed by King William III. for soldiers of the colonial army. Beyond is
the popular summer resort of Velp, with the castle of Biljoen built by
Charles, duke of Gelderland, in 1530, and the beautiful park of the ancient
castle of Rozendaal in the vicinity. The origin of the castle of Rozendaal is
unknown. The first account of it is in connexion with a tournament given
there by Reinald I., count of Gelderland, in the beginning of the 14th
century, and it ever after remained the favourite residence of the counts and

dukes of Gelderland. About the beginning of the 18th century fountains and
lanes in the style of those at Versailles were laid out in the park, and soon
after the castle itself, of which only the round tower remained (and is still
standing), was rebuilt. The park is open to the public, and is famous for the
beauty of the beech avenues and fir woods. Beyond this is De Steeg,
another popular resort, whence stretches the famous Middachten Allee of
beech trees to Dieren. On the Apeldoorn road is Sonsbeek, with a wooded
park and small lakes, formerly a private seat and now belonging to the
municipality. On the west of Arnhem is another pleasure ground, called the
Reeberg, with a casino, and the woods of Heienoord. Close by is the ancient
and well-preserved castle of Doornwerth with its own chapel. It was the
seat of an independent lordship until 1402, after which time it was held in
fief from the dukes of Gelderland. Beyond Doornwerth, at Renkum, is the
royal country seat called Oranje-Nassau’s Oord, which was bought by the
crown in 1881.

History.—Arnhem, called Arnoldi Villa in the middle ages, is, according
to some, the Arenacum of the Romans, and is first mentioned in a document
in 893. In 1233 Otto II., count of Gelderland, chose this spot as his
residence, conferred municipal rights on the town, and fortified it. At a later
period it entered the Hanseatic League. In 1473 it was captured by Charles
the Bold of Burgundy. In 1505 it received the right of coining from Philip,
son of the emperor Maximilian I. In 1514 Charles of Egmont, duke of
Gelderland, took it from the Spaniards; but in 1543 it fell to the emperor
Charles V., who made it the seat of the council of Gelderland. It joined the
union of Utrecht in 1579, and came finally under the effective government
of the states-general in 1585, all the later attacks of the Spaniards being
repulsed. In 1586 Sir Philip Sidney died in the town from the effects of his
wound received before Zutphen. The French took the town in 1672, but left
it dismantled in 1674. It was refortified by the celebrated Dutch general of
engineers, Coehoorn, in the beginning of the 18th century. In 1795 it was

again stormed by the French, and in 1813 it was taken from them by the
Prussians under Büllow. Gardens and promenades have now taken the place
of the old ramparts, the last of which was levelled in 1853.

ARNICA, a genus of plants belonging to the natural order Compositae,
and containing 18 species, mostly north-west American. The most
important species is Arnica montana (mountain tobacco), a perennial herb
found in upland meadows in northern and central Europe (but not extending
to Britain), and on the mountains of western and central Europe. A closely
allied species (A. angustifolia), with very narrow leaves, is met with in
Arctic Asia and America. The heads of flowers are large, 2 to 2½ in. across,
orange-yellow in colour, and borne on the summit of the stem or branches;
the outer ray-flowers are an inch in length. The achenes (fruits) are brown
and hairy, and are crowned by a tuft of stiffish hairs (pappus). The root-
stock of A. montana is tough, slender, of a dark brown colour and an inch or
two in length. It gives off numerous simple roots from its under side, and
shows on its upper side the remains of rosettes of leaves. It yields an
essential oil in small quantity, and a resinous matter called arnicin,
C12H22O2, a yellow crystalline substance with an acrid taste. The tincture
prepared from it is an old remedy which has a popular reputation in the
treatment of bruises and sprains. The plant was introduced into English
gardens about the middle of the 18th century, but is not often grown; it is a
handsome plant for a rockery.

ARNIM, ELISABETH (Bettina) von (1785-1859), German authoress,
sister of Klemens Brentano, was born at Frankfort-On-Main on the 4th of
April 1785. After being educated at a convent school in Fritzlar, she lived
for a while with her grandmother, the novelist, Sophie Laroche (1731-
1807), at Offenbach, and from 1803 to 1806 with her brother-in-law,
Friedrich von Savigny, the famous jurist, at Marburg. In 1807 she made at
Weimar the acquaintance of Goethe, for whom she entertained a violent
passion, which the poet, although entering into correspondence with her,
did not requite, but only regarded as a harmless fancy. Their friendship
came to an abrupt end in 1811, owing to “Bettina’s” insolent behaviour to
Goethe’s wife. In this year she married Ludwig Achim von Arnim (q.v.), by
whom she had seven children. After her husband’s death in 1831, her
passion for Goethe revived, and in 1835 she published her remarkable book,
Goethes Briefwechsel mit einem Kinde, which purported to be a
correspondence between herself and the poet. Regarded at first as genuine,
it was afterwards for many years looked upon as wholly fictitious, until the
publication in 1879 of G. von Loeper’s Briefe Goethes an Sophie Laroche
und Bettina Brentano, nebst dichterischen Beilagen, which proved it to be
based on authentic material, though treated with the greatest poetical
licence. Equally fantastic is her correspondence Die Gunderode (1840),
with her unhappy friend, the poet, Karoline von Gunderode (1780-1806),
who committed suicide, and that with her brother Klemens Brentano, under
the title Klemens Brentanos Fruhlingskranz (1844). She also published Dies
Buck gehort dem König (1843), in which she advocated the emancipation of
the Jews, and the abolition of capital punishment. Among her other works
may be mentioned Ilius Pamphilius und die Ambrosia (1848), also a
supposititious correspondence. In all her writings she showed real poetical
genius, combined with evidence of an unbalanced mind and a mannerism
which becomes tiresome. She died at Berlin on the 20th of January 1859.

Part of a design by her for a colossal statue of Goethe, executed in marble
by the sculptor Karl Steinhauser (1813-1878), is in the museum at Weimar.

Her collected works (Samtliche Schriften) were published in Berlin
in 11 vols., 1853. Goethe’s Briefwechsel mit einem Kinde has been
edited by H. Grimm (4th ed., Berlin, 1890). See also C. Alberti, B. von
Arnim (Leipzig, 1885); Moritz Carriere, Bettina von Arnim (Breslau,
1887), and the literature cited under Ludwig von Arnim.

ARNIM, HARRY KARL KURT EDUARD VON, Count (1824-1881),
German diplomatist, was a member of one of the most numerous and most
widely spread families of the Prussian nobility. He was born in Pomerania
on the 3rd of October 1824, and brought up by his uncle Heinrich von
Arnim, who was Prussian ambassador at Paris and foreign minister from
March to June 1848, while Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, whose daughter
Harry von Arnim afterwards married, was minister-president. It is
noticeable that the uncle was brought before a court of justice and fined for
publishing a pamphlet directed against the ministry of Manteuffel. After
holding other posts in the diplomatic service Arnim was in 1864 appointed
Prussian envoy (and in 1867 envoy of the North German Confederation) at
the papal court. In 1869 he proposed that the governments should appoint
representatives to be present at the Vatican council, a suggestion which was
rejected by Bismarck, and foretold that the promulgation of papal
infallibility would bring serious political difficulties. After the recall of the
French troops from Rome he attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between
the pope and the Italian government. He was appointed in 1871 German

commissioner to arrange the final treaty with France, a task which he
carried out with such success that in 1871 he was appointed German envoy
at Paris, and in 1872 received his definite appointment as ambassador, a
post of the greatest difficulty and responsibility. Differences soon arose
between him and Bismarck; he wished to support the monarchical party
which was trying to overthrow Thiers, while Bismarck ordered him to stand
aloof from all French parties; he did not give that implicit obedience to his
instructions which Bismarck required. Bismarck, however, was unable to
recall him because of the great influence which he enjoyed at court and the
confidence which the emperor placed in him. He was looked upon by the
Conservative party, who were trying to overthrow Bismarck, as his
successor, and it is said that he was closely connected with the court
intrigues against the chancellor. In the beginning of 1874 he was recalled
and appointed to the embassy at Constantinople, but this appointment was
immediately revoked. A Vienna newspaper published some correspondence
on the Vatican council, including confidential despatches of Arnim’s, with
the object of showing that he had shown greater foresight than Bismarck. It
was then found that a considerable number of papers were missing from the
Paris embassy, and on the 4th of October Arnim was arrested on the charge
of embezzling state papers. This recourse to the criminal law against a man
of his rank, who had held one of the most important diplomatic posts,
caused great astonishment. His defence was that the papers were not
official, and he was acquitted on the charge of embezzlement, but convicted
of undue delay in restoring official papers and condemned to three months’
imprisonment. On appeal the sentence was increased to nine months. Arnim
avoided imprisonment by leaving the country, and in 1875 published
anonymously at Zurich a pamphlet entitled “Pro nihilo,” in which he
attempted to show that the attack on him was caused by Bismarck’s
personal jealousy. For this he was accused of treason, insult to the emperor,
and libelling Bismarck, and in his absence condemned to five years’ penal

servitude. From his exile in Austria he published two more pamphlets on
the ecclesiastical policy of Prussia, “Der Nunzius kommt!” (Vienna, 1878),
and “Quid faciamus nos?” (ib. 1879). He made repeated attempts, which
were supported by his family, to be allowed to return to Germany in order
to take his trial afresh on the charge of treason; his request had just been
granted when he died on the 19th of May 1881.

In 1876 Bismarck carried an amendment to the criminal code making it
an offence punishable with imprisonment or a fine up to £250 for an official
of the foreign office to communicate to others official documents, or for an
envoy to act contrary to his instructions. These clauses are commonly
spoken of in Germany as the “Arnim paragraphs.”
(J. W. He.)

ARNIM, LUDWIG ACHIM (JOACHIM) VON (1781-1831), German
poet and novelist, was born at Berlin on the 26th of January 1781. He
studied natural science at Halle and Göttingen, and published one or two
essays on scientific subjects; but his bent was from the first towards
literature. From the earlier writings of Goethe and Herder he learned to
appreciate the beauties of German traditional legends and folk-songs; and,
forming a collection of these, published the result (1806-1808), in
collaboration with Klemens Brentano (q.v.) under the title Des Knaben
Wunderhorn. From 1810 onward he lived with his wife Bettina, Brentano’s
sister, alternately at Berlin and on his estate at Wiepersdorf, near Dahme in
Brandenburg, where he died on the 21st of January 1831. Arnim was a
prolific and versatile writer, gifted with a sense of humour and a refined

imagination—qualities shown in the best-known of his works, Des Knaben
Wunderhorn, deficient as this is in the philological accuracy and
faithfulness to original sources which would now be expected of such a
compilation. In general, however, his writings, full as they are of the
exaggerated sentiment and affectations of the romantic school, make but
little appeal to modern taste. There are possible exceptions, such as the
short stories Furst Ganzgott und Sanger Halbgott and Der tolle Invalide auf
dem Fort Ratonneau and the unfinished romance Die Kronenwachter
(1817), which promised to develop into one of the finest historical
romances of the 19th century. Among Arnim’s other works may be
mentioned Hollins Liebesleben (1802), Der Wintergarten (1809), a
collection of tales; Armut, Reichtum Schuld, und Busse der Grafin Dolores
(1810), a novel; Halle und Jerusalem (1811), a dramatic romance; and one
or two smaller novels, such as Isabella von Ägypten (1812).

Arnim’s Samtliche Werke were edited by his widow and published in
Berlin in 1839-1840; second edition in 22 vols., 1853-1856. Selections
have been edited by J. Dohmke (1892); M. Koch, Arnim, Klemens und
Bettina Brentano, Gorres (1893). Des Knaben Wunderhorn has been
frequently republished, the best edition being that of A. Birlinger and
W. Crecelius (2 vols., 1872-1876). See R. Steig, Achim von Arnim und
Klemens Brentano (1894).

ARNIM-BOYTZENBURG, HANS GEORG VON (1581-1641),
German general and diplomatist, was born in 1581 at Boytzenburg in
Brandenburg. From 1613 to 1617 he served in the Swedish army under

Gustavus Adolphus, took part in the Russian War, and afterwards fought
against the Turks in the service of the king of Poland. In 1626, though a
Protestant, he was induced by Wallenstein to join the new imperial army, in
which he quickly rose to the rank of field marshal, and won the esteem of
his soldiers as well as that of his commander, whose close friend and
faithful ally he became. This attachment to Wallenstein, and a spirit of
religious toleration, were the leading motives of a strange career of military
and political inconstancy. Thus the dismissal of Wallenstein and the perilous
condition of German Protestantism after the edict of Restitution combined
to induce Arnim to quit the imperial service for that of the elector of
Saxony. He had served under Gustavus many years before, and later he had
defeated him in the field, when in command of a Polish army; the fortune of
war now placed Arnim at the head of the Saxon army which fought by the
side of the Swedes at Breitenfeld (1631), and indeed the alliance of these
two Protestant powers in the cause of their common religion was largely his
work. The reappearances of Wallenstein, however, caused him to hesitate
and open negotiations, though he did not attempt to conceal his proceedings
from the elector and Gustavus. During the Lützen campaign, Arnim was
operating with success at the head of an allied army in Silesia. In the
following year he was under the hard necessity of opposing his old friend in
the field, but little was done by either; the complicated political situation
which followed the death of Gustavus at Lützen led him into a renewal of
the private negotiations of the previous year, though he did nothing actually
treasonable in his relations with Wallenstein. In 1634 Wallenstein was
assassinated, and Arnim began at once more active operations. He won an
important victory at Liegnitz in May 1634, but from this time he became
more and more estranged from the Swedes. The peace of Prague followed,
in which Arnim’s part, though considerable, was not all-important (1635).
Soon after this event he refused an offer of high command in the French
army and retired from active life. From 1637 to 1638 he was imprisoned in

Stockholm, having been seized at Boytzenburg by the Swedes on suspicion
of being concerned in various intrigues. He made his escape ultimately, and
returned to Saxony. Arnim died suddenly at Dresden in 1641, whilst
engaged in raising an army to free German soil from foreign armies of all
kinds. (See Thirty Years’ War.)

See K.G. Helbig, “Wallenstein und Arnim” (1850) and “Der Prager
Friede,” in Raumer’s Historisches Taschenbuch (1858); also E.D.M.
Kirchner, Das Schloss Boytzenburg, &c. (1860) and Archiv für die
sachsische Geschichte, vol. viii. (1870).

ARNO, Arn or Aquila (c. 750-821), bishop and afterwards archbishop
of Salzburg, entered the church at an early age, and after passing some time
at Freising became abbot of Elnon, or St Amand as it was afterwards called,
where he made the acquaintance of Alcuin. In 785 he was made bishop of
Salzburg and in 787 was employed by Tassilo III., duke of the Bavarians, as
an envoy to Charlemagne at Rome. He appears to have attracted the notice
of the Frankish king, through whose influence in 798 Salzburg was made
the seat of an archbishopric; and Arno, as the first holder of this office,
became metropolitan of Bavaria and received the pallium from Pope Leo
III. The area of his authority was extended to the east by the conquests of
Charlemagne over the Avars, and he began to take a prominent part in the
government of Bavaria. He acted as one of the missi dominici, and spent
some time at the court of Charlemagne, where he was known by the
assembled scholars as Aquila, and his name appears as one of the
signatories to the emperor’s will. He established a library at Salzburg,

furthered in other ways the interests of learning, and presided over several
synods called to improve the condition of the church in Bavaria. Soon after
the death of Charlemagne in 814, Arno appears to have withdrawn from
active life, although he retained his archbishopric until his death on the 24th
of January 821. Aided by a deacon named Benedict, Arno drew up about
788 a catalogue of lands and proprietary rights belonging to the church in
Bavaria, under the title of Indiculus or Congestum Arnonis. An edition of
this work, which is of considerable value to historical students, was
published at Münich in 1869 with notes by F. Keinz. Many other works
were produced under the protection of Arno, among them a Salzburg
consuetudinary, an edition of which appears in Quellen und Erorterungen
zur bayrischen und deutschen Geschichte, Band vii., edited by L. Rockinger
(Münich, 1856). It has been suggested by W. von Giesebrecht that Arno was
the author of an early section of Annales Laurissenses majores, which deals
with the history of the Frankish kings from 741 to 829, and of which an
edition appears in Monumenta Germaniae historica. Scriptores, Band i. pp.
128-131, edited by G.H. Pertz (Hanover, 1826). If this supposition be
correct, Arno was the first extant writer to apply the name Deutsch
(theodisca) to the German language.

ARNO (anc. Arnus), a river of Italy which rises from the Monte
Falterona, about 25 m. E.N.E. of Florence, 4265 ft. above the sea. It first
runs S.S.E. through a beautiful valley, the Casentino; near Arezzo it turns
W., and at Montevarchi N.N.W.; 10 m. below it forces its way through the
limestone rock at Incisa and 10 m. farther on, at Pontassieve, it is joined by

the Sieve. Thence it runs westward to Florence and through the gorge of
Golfolina onwards to Empoli and Pisa, receiving various tributaries in its
course, and falls into the sea 7½ m. west of Pisa, after a total course of 155
m. In prehistoric times the river ran straight on along the valley of the
Chiana and joined the Tiber near Orvieto; and there was a great lake, the
north end of which was at Incisa and the south at the lake of Chiusi. The
distance from Pisa to the mouth in the time of Strabo was only 2½ m. The
Serchio (anc. Auser), which joined the Arno at Pisa in ancient times, now
flows into the sea independently. The Arno is navigable for barges as far as
Florence; but it is liable to sudden floods, and brings down with it large
quantities of earth and stones, so that it requires careful regulation. The
most remarkable inundations were those of 1537 and 1740; in the former
year the water rose to 8 ft. in the streets of Florence. The valley between
Incisa and Arezzo contains accumulations of fossil bones of the deer,
elephant, rhinoceros, mastodon, hippopotamus, bear, tiger, &c.

ARNOBIUS (called Afer, and sometimes “the Elder”), early Christian
writer, was a teacher of rhetoric at Sicca Venerea in proconsular Africa
during the reign of Diocletian. His conversion to Christianity is said by
Jerome to have been occasioned by a dream; and the same writer adds that
the bishop to whom Arnobius applied distrusted his professions, and asked
some proof of them, and that the treatise Adversus Gentes was composed
for this purpose. But this story seems rather improbable; for Arnobius
speaks contemptuously of dreams, and besides, his work bears no traces of
having been written in a short time, or of having been revised by a Christian

bishop. From internal evidence (bk. iv. 36) the time of composition may be
fixed at about a.d. 303. Nothing further is known of the life of Arnobius. He
is said to have been the author of a work on rhetoric, which, however, has
not been preserved. His great treatise, in seven books, Adversus Gentes (or
Nationes), on account of which he takes rank as a Christian apologist,
appears to have been occasioned by a desire to answer the complaint then
brought against the Christians, that the prevalent calamities and disasters
were due to their impiety and had come upon men since the establishment
of their religion. In the first book Arnobius carefully discusses this
complaint; he shows that the allegation of greater calamities having come
upon men since the Christian era is false; and that, even if it were true, it
could by no means be attributed to the Christians. He skilfully contends that
Christians who worship the self-existent God cannot justly be called less
religious than those who worship subordinate deities, and concludes by
vindicating the Godhead of Christ. In the second book Arnobius digresses
into a long discussion on the soul, which he does not think is of divine
origin, and which he scarcely believes to be immortal. He even says that a
belief in the soul’s immortality would tend to remove moral restraint, and
have a prejudicial effect on human life. In the concluding chapters he
answers the objections drawn from the recent origin of Christianity. Books
iii., iv. and v. contain a violent attack on the heathen mythology, in which he
narrates with powerful sarcasm the scandalous chronicles of the gods, and
contrasts with their grossness and immorality the pure and holy worship of
the Christian. These books are valuable as a repertory of mythological
stories. Books vi. and vii. ably handle the questions of sacrifices and
worship of images. The confusion of the final chapter points to some
interruption. The work of Arnobius appears to have been written when he
was a recent convert, for he does not possess a very extensive knowledge of
Scripture. He knows nothing of the Old Testament, and only the life of
Christ in the New, while he does not quote directly from the Gospels. He is

also at fault in regard to the Jewish sects. He was much influenced by
Lucretius and had read Plato. His statements concerning Greek and Roman
mythology are based respectively on the Protrepticus of Clement of
Alexandria, and on Antistius Labeo, who belonged to the preceding
generation and attempted to restore Neoplatonism. There are some pleasing
passages in Arnobius, but on the whole he is a tumid and a tedious author.

Editions.—Migne, Patr. Lat. iv. 349; A. Reifferscheich in the Vienna
Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat. (1875).

Translations.—A.H. Bryce and H. Campbell in Ante-Nicene
Fathers, vi.

Literature.—H.C.G. Moule in Dict. Chr. Biog. i.; Herzog-Hauck,
Realencyklopädie; and G. Kruger, Early Chr. Lit. p. 304 (where full
bibliographies are given).

ARNOBIUS (“the younger”), Christian priest or bishop in Gaul,
flourished about 460. He is the author of a mystical and allegorical
commentary on the Psalms, first published by Erasmus in 1522, and by him
attributed to the elder Arnobius. It has been frequently reprinted, and in the
edition of De la Barre, 1580, is accompanied by some notes on the Gospels
by the same author. To him has sometimes been ascribed the anonymous
treatise, Arnobii catholici et Serapionis conflictus de Deo trino et uno ... de
gratiae liberi arbitrii concordia, which was probably written by a follower
of Augustine. The opinions of Arnobius, as appears from the commentary,
are semi-Pelagian.

ARNOLD, known as “Arnold of Brescia” (d. 1155), one of the most
ardent adversaries of the temporal power of the popes. He belonged to a
family of importance, if not noble, and was born probably at Brescia, in
Italy, towards the end of the 11th century. He distinguished himself in his
monastic studies, and went to France about 1115. He studied theology in
Paris, but there is no proof that he was a pupil of Abelard. Returning to Italy
he became a canon regular. His life was rigidly austere, St Bernard calling
him “homo neque manducans neque bibens.” He at once directed his efforts
against the corruption of the clergy, and especially against the temporal
ambitions of the high dignitaries of the church. During the schism of
Anacletus (1131-1137) the town of Brescia was torn by the struggles
between the partisans of Pope Innocent II. and the adherents of the anti-
pope, and Arnold gave effect to his abhorrence of the political episcopate by
inciting the people to rise against their bishop, and, exiled by Innocent II.,
went to France. St Bernard accused him of sharing the doctrines of Abelard
(see Ep. 189, 195), and procured his condemnation by the council of Sens
(1140) at the same time as that of the great scholastic. This was perhaps no
more than the outcome of the fierce polemical spirit of the abbot of
Clairvaux, which led him to include all his adversaries under a single
anathema. It seems certain that Arnold professed moral theology in Paris,
and several times reprimanded St Bernard, whom he accused of pride and
jealousy. St Bernard, as a last resort, begged King Louis VII. to take severe
measures against Arnold, who had to leave France and take refuge at
Zurich. There he soon became popular, especially with the lay nobility; but,
denounced anew by St Bernard to the ecclesiastical authorities, he returned
to Italy, and turned his steps towards Rome (1145). It was two years since,

in 1143, the Romans had rejected the temporal power of the pope. The
urban nobles had set up a republic, which, under forms ostensibly modelled
on antiquity (e.g. patriciate, senatus populusque romanus, &c.), concealed
but clumsily a purely oligarchical government. Pope Eugenius III. and his
adherents had been forced after a feeble resistance to resign themselves to
exile at Viterbo. Arnold, after returning to Rome, immediately began a
campaign of virulent denunciation against the Roman clergy, and, in
particular, against the Curia, which he stigmatized as a “house of
merchandise and den of thieves.” His enemies have attributed to him certain
doctrinal heresies, but their accusations do not bear examination. According
to Otto of Freising (Lib. de gestis Friderici, bk. ii. chap. xx.) the whole of
his teaching, outside the preaching of penitence, was summed up in these
maxims:—“Clerks who have estates, bishops who hold fiefs, monks who
possess property, cannot be saved.” His eloquence gained him a hearing and
a numerous following, including many laymen, but consisting principally of
poor ecclesiastics, who formed around him a party characterized by a rigid
morality and not unlike the Lombard Patarenes of the 11th century. But his
purely political action was very restricted, and not to be compared with that
of a Rienzi or a Savonarola. The Roman revolution availed itself of
Arnold’s popularity, and of his theories, but was carried out without his aid.
His name was associated with this political reform solely because his was
the only vigorous personality which stood out from the mass of rebels, and
because he was the principal victim of the repression that ensued. On the
15th of July 1148 Eugenius III. anathematized Arnold and his adherents; but
when, a short time afterwards, the pope, through the support of the king of
Naples and the king of France, succeeded in entering Rome, Arnold
remained in the town unmolested, under the protection of the senate. But in
1152 the German king Conrad III., whom the papal party and the Roman
republic had in vain begged to intervene, was succeeded by Frederick I.
Barbarossa. Frederick, whose authoritative temper was at once offended by

the independent tone of the Arnoldist party, concluded with the pope a
treaty of alliance (October 16, 1152) of such a nature that the Arnoldists
were at once put in a minority in the Roman government; and when the
second successor of Eugenius III., the energetic and austere Adrian IV. (the
Englishman, Nicholas Breakspear), placed Rome under an interdict, the
senate, already rudely shaken, submitted, and Arnold was forced to fly into
Campania (1155). At the request of the pope he was seized by order of the
emperor Frederick, then in Italy, and delivered to the prefect of Rome, by
whom he was condemned to death. In June 1155 Arnold was hanged, his
body burnt, and the ashes were thrown into the Tiber. His death produced
but a feeble sensation in Rome, which was already pacified, and passed
almost unnoticed in Italy. The adherents of Arnold do not appear actually to
have formed, either before or after his death, a heretical sect. It is probable
that his adherents became merged in the communities of the Lombard
Waldenses, who shared their ideas on the corruption of the clergy. Legend,
poetry, drama and politics have from time to time been much occupied with
the personality of Arnold of Brescia, and not seldom have distorted it,
through the desire to see in him a hero of Italian independence and a
modern democrat. He was before everything an ascetic, who denied to the
church the right of holding property, and who occupied himself only as an
accessory with the political and social consequences of his religious
principles.

The bibliography of Arnold of Brescia is very vast and of very
unequal value. The following works will be found useful: W. von
Giesebrecht, Arnold van Brescia (Münich, 1873); G. Gaggia, Arnaldo
da Brescia (Brescia, 1882); and notices by Vacandard in the Revue des
questions historiques (Paris, 1884), pp. 52-114, by R. Breyer in the
Histor. Taschenbuch (Leipzig, 1889), vol. viii. pp. 123-178, and by A.
Hausrath in Neue Heidelberg. Jahrb. (1891), Band i. pp. 72-144.
(P. A.)

ARNOLD, BENEDICT (1741-1801), American soldier, born in
Norwich, Connecticut, on the 14th of January 1741. He was the great-
grandson of Benedict Arnold (1615-1678), thrice colonial governor of
Rhode Island between 1663 and 1678; and was the fourth in direct descent
to bear the name. He received a fair education but was not studious, and his
youth was marked by the same waywardness which characterized his whole
career. At fifteen he ran away from home and took part in an expedition
against the French, but, restless under restraint, he soon deserted and
returned home. In 1762 he settled in New Haven, where he became the
proprietor of a drug and book shop; and he subsequently engaged
successfully in trade with the West Indies. Immediately after the battle of
Lexington Arnold led the local militia company, of which he was captain,
and additional volunteers to Cambridge, and on the 29th of April 1775 he
proposed to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety an expedition against
Crown Point and Ticonderoga. After a delay of four days the offer was
accepted, and as a colonel of Massachusetts militia he was directed to enlist
in the west part of Massachusetts and in the neighbouring colonies the men
necessary for the undertaking. He was forestalled, however, by Ethan Allen
(q.v.), acting on behalf of some members of the Connecticut Assembly.
Under him, reluctantly waiving his own claim to command, Arnold served
as a volunteer; and soon afterwards, Massachusetts having yielded to
Connecticut, and having angered Arnold by sending a committee to make
an inquiry into his conduct, he resigned and returned to Cambridge. He was
then ordered to co-operate with General Richard Montgomery in the
invasion of Canada, which he had been one of the first to suggest to the
Continental Congress. Starting with 1100 men from Cambridge on the 17th

of September 1775, he reached Gardiner, Maine, on the 20th, advanced
through the Maine woods, and after suffering terrible privations and
hardships, his little force, depleted by death and desertion, reached Quebec
on the 13th of November. The garrison had been forewarned, and Arnold
was compelled to await the coming of Montgomery from Montreal. The
combined attack on the 31st of December 1775 failed; Montgomery was
killed, and Arnold was severely wounded. Arnold, who had been
commissioned a brigadier-general in January 1776, remained in Canada
until the following June, being after April in command at Montreal.

Some time after the retreat from Canada, charges of misconduct and
dishonesty, growing chiefly out of his seizure from merchants in Montreal
of goods for the use of his troops, were brought against him; these charges
were tardily investigated by the Board of War, which in a report made on
the 23rd of May 1777, and confirmed by Congress, declared that his
“character and conduct” had been “cruelly and groundlessly aspersed.”
Having constructed a flotilla on Lake Champlain, Arnold engaged a greatly
superior British fleet near Valcour Island (October 11, 1776), and after
inflicting severe loss on the enemy, made his escape under cover of night.
Two days later he was overtaken by the British fleet, which however he,
with only one war-vessel, and that crippled, delayed long enough to enable
his other vessels to make good their escape, fighting with desperate valour
and finally running his own ship aground and escaping to Crown Point. The
engagement of the 11th was the first between British and American fleets.
Arnold’s brilliant exploits had drawn attention to him as one of the most
promising of the Continental officers, and had won for him the friendship of
Washington. Nevertheless, when in February 1777 Congress created five
new major-generals, Arnold, although the ranking brigadier, was passed
over, partly at least for sectional reasons—Connecticut had already two
major-generals—in favour of his juniors. At this time it was only
Washington’s urgent persuasion that prevented Arnold from leaving the

service. Two months later while he was at New Haven, Governor Tryon’s
descent on Danbury took place; and Arnold, who took command of the
militia after the death of General Wooster, attacked the British with such
vigour at Ridgefield (April 27, 1777) that they escaped to their ships with
difficulty.

In recognition of this service Arnold was now commissioned major-
general (his commission dating from 17th February) but without his former
relative rank. After serving in New Jersey with Washington, he joined
General Philip Schuyler in the Northern Department, and in August 1777
proceeded up the Mohawk Valley against Colonel St Leger, and raised the
siege of Fort Stanwix (or Schuyler). Subsequently, after Gates had
superseded Schuyler (August 19), Arnold commanded the American left
wing in the first battle of Saratoga (September 19, 1777). His ill-treatment
at the hands of General Gates, whose jealousy had been aroused, led to a
quarrel which terminated in Arnold being relieved of command. He
remained with the army, however, at the urgent request of his brother
officers, and although nominally without command served brilliantly in the
second battle of Saratoga (October 7, 1777), during which he was seriously
wounded. For his services he was thanked by Congress, and received a new
commission giving him at last his proper relative rank.

In June 1778 Washington placed him in command of Philadelphia. Here
he soon came into conflict with the state authorities, jealous of any outside
control. In the social life of Philadelphia, largely dominated by families of
Loyalist sympathies, Arnold was the most conspicuous figure; he lived
extravagantly, entertained lavishly, and in April 1779 took for his second
wife, Margaret Shippen (1760-1804), the daughter of Edward Shippen
(1729-1806), a moderate Loyalist, who eventually became reconciled to the
new order and was in 1799-1805 chief-justice of the state. Early in February
1779 the executive council of Pennsylvania, presided over by Joseph Reed,

one of his most persistent enemies, presented to Congress eight charges of
misconduct against Arnold, none of which was of any great importance.
Arnold at once demanded an investigation, and in March a committee of
Congress made a report exonerating him; but Reed obtained a
reconsideration, and in April 1779 Congress, though throwing out four
charges, referred the other four to a court-martial. Despite Arnold’s demand
for a speedy trial, it was December before the court was convened. It was
probably during this period of vexatious delay that Arnold, always sensitive
and now incited by a keen sense of injustice, entered into a secret
correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton with a view to joining the British
service. On the 26th of January 1780 the court, before which Arnold had
ably argued his own case, rendered its verdict, practically acquitting him of
all intentional wrong, but, apparently in deference to the Pennsylvania
authorities, directing Washington to reprimand him for two trivial and very
venial offences. Arnold, who had confidently expected absolute acquittal,
was inflamed with a burning anger that even Washington’s kindly
reprimand, couched almost in words of praise, could not subdue.

It was now apparently that he first conceived the plan of betraying some
important post to the British. With this in view he sought and obtained from
Washington (August 1780) command of West Point, the key to the Hudson
River Valley. Arnold’s offers now became more explicit, and, in order to
perfect the details of the plot, Clinton’s adjutant-general, Major John André,
met him near Stony Point on the night of the 21st of September. On the
23rd, while returning by land, André with incriminating papers was
captured, and the officer to whom he was entrusted unsuspectingly sent
information of his capture to Arnold, who was thus enabled to escape to the
British lines. Arnold, commissioned a brigadier-general in the British army,
received £6315 in compensation for his property losses, and was employed
in leading an expedition into Virginia which burned Richmond, and in an
attack upon New London (q.v.) in September 1781. In December 1781 he

removed to London and was consulted on American affairs by the king and
ministry, but could obtain no further employment in the active service.
Disappointed at the failure of his plans and embittered by the neglect and
scorn which he met in England, he spent the years 1787-1791 at St John,
New Brunswick, once more engaging in the West India trade, but in 1791
he returned to London, and after war had broken out between Great Britain
and France, was active in fitting out privateers. Gradually sinking into
melancholia, worn down by depression, and suffering from a nervous
disease, he died at London on the 14th of June 1801.

Arnold had three sons—Benedict, Richard and Henry—by his first wife,
and four sons—Edward Shippen, James Robertson, George and William
Fitch—by his second wife; five of them, and one grandson, served in the
British army. Benedict (1768-1795) was an officer of the artillery and was
mortally wounded in the West Indies. Edward Shippen (1780-1813) became
lieutenant of the Sixth Bengal Cavalry and later paymaster at Muttra, India.
James Robertson (1781-1854) entered the corps of Royal Engineers in
1798, served in the Napoleonic wars, in Egypt and in the West Indies, and
rose to the rank of lieutenant-general, was an aide-de-camp to William IV.,
and was created a knight of the Hanoverian Guelphic order and a knight of
the Crescent. George (1787-1828) was a lieutenant-colonel in the Second
Bengal Cavalry at the time of his death. William Fitch (1794-1828) became
a captain in the Nineteenth Royal Lancers; his son, William Trail (1826-
1855) served in the Crimean War as captain of the Fourth Regiment of Foot
and was killed during the siege of Sevastopol.

Bibliography.—Jared Sparks’ Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold
(Boston, 1835), in his “Library of American Biography,” is biassed and
unfair. The best general account is Isaac Newton Arnold’s Life of
Benedict Arnold (Chicago, 1880), which, while offering no apologies
or defence of his treason, lays perhaps too great emphasis on his

provocations. Charles Burr Todd’s The Real Benedict Arnold (New
York, 1903) is a curious attempt to make Arnold’s wife wholly
responsible for his defection. François de Barbé-Marbois’s Complot
d’Arnold et de Sir H. Clinton contre les États-Unis (Paris, 1816)
contains much interesting material, but is inaccurate. Two good
accounts of the Canadian Expedition are Justin H. Smith’s Arnold’s
March from Cambridge to Quebec (New York, 1903), which contains a
reprint of Arnold’s journal of the expedition; and John Codman’s
Arnold’s Expedition to Quebec (New York, 1901). Arnold’s Letters on
the Expedition to Canada were printed in the Maine Historical
Society’s Collections for 1831 (repr. 1865). See also William Abbatt,
The Crisis of the Revolution (New York, 1899); The Northern Invasion
of 1780 (Bradford Club Series, No. 6, New York, 1866); “The Treason
of Benedict Arnold” (letters of Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George
Germaine) in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol.
xxii. (Philadelphia, 1898); and Proceedings of a General Court Martial
for the Trial of Major-General Arnold (Philadelphia, 1780; reprinted
with introduction and notes, New York, 1865).

ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN (1832-1904), British poet and journalist, was
born on the 10th of June 1832, and was educated at the King’s school,
Rochester; King’s College, London; and University College, Oxford, where
in 1852 he gained the Newdigate prize for a poem on Belshazzar’s feast. On
leaving Oxford he became a schoolmaster, and went to India as principal of
the government Sanskrit College at Poona, a post which he held during the

mutiny of 1857, when he was able to render services for which he was
publicly thanked by Lord Elphinstone in the Bombay council. Returning to
England in 1861 he worked as a journalist on the staff of the Daily
Telegraph, a newspaper with which he continued to be associated for more
than forty years. It was he who, on behalf of the proprietors of the Daily
Telegraph in conjunction with the New York Herald, arranged for the
journey of H.M. Stanley to Africa to discover the course of the Congo, and
Stanley named after him a mountain to the north-east of Albert Edward
Nyanza. Arnold must also be credited with the first idea of a great trunk line
traversing the entire African continent, for in 1874 he first employed the
phrase “a Cape to Cairo railway” subsequently popularized by Cecil
Rhodes. It was, however, as a poet that he was best known to his
contemporaries. The Light of Asia appeared in 1879 and won an immediate
success, going through numerous editions both in England and America. It
is an Indian epic, dealing with the life and teaching of Buddha, which are
expounded with much wealth of local colour and not a little felicity of
versification. The poem contains many lines of unquestionable beauty; and
its immediate popularity was rather increased than diminished by the
twofold criticism to which it was subjected. On the one hand it was held by
Oriental scholars to give a false impression of Buddhist doctrine; while, on
the other, the suggested analogy between Sakyamuni and Christ offended
the taste of some devout Christians. The latter criticism probably suggested
to Arnold the idea of attempting a second narrative poem of which the
central figure should be the founder of Christianity, as the founder of
Buddhism had been that of the first. But though The Light of the World
(1891), in which this idea took shape, had considerable poetic merit, it
lacked the novelty of theme and setting which had given the earlier poem
much of its attractiveness; and it failed to repeat the success attained by The
Light of Asia. Arnold’s other principal volumes of poetry were Indian Song
of Songs (1875), Pearls of the Faith (1883), The Song Celestial (1885),

With Sadi in the Garden (1888), Potiphar’s Wife (1892) and Adzuma (1893).
In his later years Arnold resided for some time in Japan, and his third wife
was a Japanese lady. In Seas and Lands (1891) and Japonica (1892) he
gives an interesting study of Japanese life. He received the order of C.S.I.
on the occasion of the proclamation of Queen Victoria as empress of India
in 1877, and in 1888 was created K.C.I.E. He also possessed decorations
conferred by the rulers of Japan, Persia, Turkey and Siam. Sir Edwin Arnold
died on the 24th of March 1904.

ARNOLD, GOTTFRIED (1666-1714), German Protestant divine, was
born at Annaberg, in Saxony, where his father was a schoolmaster. In 1682
he went to the Gymnasium at Gera, and three years later to the university of
Wittenberg. Here he made a special study of theology and history, and
afterwards, through the influence of P.J. Spener, “the father of pietism,” he
became tutor in Quedlinburg. His first work, Die Erste Liebe zu Christo, to
which in modern times attention was again directed by Leo Tolstoy,
appeared in 1696. It went through five editions before 1728, and gained the
author much reputation. In the year after its publication he was invited to
Giessen as professor of church history. The life and work here, however,
proved so distasteful to him that he resigned in 1698, and returned to
Quedlinburg. In 1699 he began to publish his largest work, described by
Tolstoy (The Kingdom of God is within You, chap, iii.) as “remarkable,
although little known,” Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie, in
which he has been thought by some to show more impartiality towards
heresy than towards the Church (cp. Otto Pfleiderer, Development of

Theology, p. 277). His next work, Geheimniss der göttlichen Sophia,
published in 1700, seemed to indicate that he had developed a form of
mysticism. Soon afterwards, however, his acceptance of a pastorate marked
a change, and he produced a number of noteworthy works on practical
theology. He was also known as the author of sacred poems. Gottfried
Arnold has rightly been classed with the pietistic section of Protestant
historians (Bibliotheca Sacra, 1850).

See Calwer-Zeller, Theologisches Handwörterbuch, and the account
of him in Albert Knapp’s new edition of Die erste Liebe zu Christo
(1845).

ARNOLD, MATTHEW (1822-1888), English poet, literary critic and
inspector of schools, was born at Laleham, near Staines, on the 24th of
December 1822. When it is said that he was the son of the famous Dr
Arnold of Rugby, and that Winchester, Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford,
contributed their best towards his education, it seems superfluous to add
that, in estimating Matthew Arnold and his work, training no less than
original endowment has to be considered. A full academic training has its
disadvantages as well as its gains. In the individual no less than in the
species the history of man’s development is the history of the struggle
between the impulse to express original personal force and the impulse to
make that force bow to the authority of custom. Where in any individual the
first of these impulses is stronger than usual, a complete academic training
is a gain; but where the second of these impulses is the dominant one, the
effect of the academic habit upon the mind at its most sensitive and most

plastic period is apt to be crippling. In regard to Matthew Arnold, it would
be a bold critic of his life and his writings who should attempt to say what
his work would have been if his training had been different. In his
judgments on Goethe, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley and Hugo, it may be
seen how strong was his impulse to bow to authority. On the other hand, in
Arnold’s ingenious reasoning away the conception of Providence to “a
stream of tendency not ourselves which makes for righteousness,” we see
how strong was his natural impulse for taking original views. The fact that
the very air Arnold breathed during the whole of the impressionable period
of his life was academic is therefore a very important fact to bear in mind.

In one of his own most charming critical essays he contrasts the poetry of
Homer, which consists of “natural thoughts in natural words,” with the
poetry of Tennyson, which consists of “distilled thoughts in distilled
words.” “Distilled” is one of the happiest words to be found in poetical
criticism, and may be used with equal aptitude in the criticism of life. To
most people the waters of life come with all their natural qualities—sweet
or bitter—undistilled. Only the ordinary conditions of civilization, common
to all, flavoured the waters of life to Shakespeare, to Cervantes, to Burns, to
Scott, to Dumas, and those other great creators whose minds were mirrors
—broad and clear—for reflecting the rich drama of life around them. To
Arnold the waters of life came distilled so carefully that the wonder is that
he had any originality left. A member of the upper stratum of that “middle
class” which he despised, or pretended to despise—the eldest son of one of
the most accomplished as well as one of the most noble-tempered men of
his time—Arnold from the moment of his birth drank the finest distilled
waters that can be drunk even in these days. Perhaps, on the whole, the
surprising thing is how little he suffered thereby. Indeed those who had
formed an idea of Arnold’s personality from their knowledge of his
“culture,” and especially those who had been delighted by the fastidious
and feminine delicacy of his prose style, used to be quite bewildered when

for the first time they met him at a dinner-table or in a friend’s smoking-
room. His prose was so self-conscious that what people expected to find in
the writer was the Arnold as he was conceived by certain “young lions” of
journalism whom he satirized—a somewhat over-cultured petit-maître—
almost, indeed, a coxcomb of letters. On the other hand, those who had
been captured by his poetry expected to find a man whose sensitive
organism responded nervously to every uttered word as an aeolian harp
answers to the faintest breeze. What they found was a broad-shouldered,
manly—almost burly—Englishman with a fine countenance, bronzed by the
open air of England, wrinkled apparently by the sun, wind-worn as an
English skipper’s, open and frank as a fox-hunting squire’s—and yet a
countenance whose finely chiselled features were as high-bred and as
commanding as Wellington’s or Sir Charles Napier’s. The voice they heard
was deep-toned, fearless, rich and frank, and yet modulated to express
every nuance of thought, every movement of emotion and humour. In his
prose essays the humour he showed was of a somewhat thin-lipped kind; in
his more important poems he showed none at all. It was here, in this matter
of humour, that Arnold’s writings were specially misleading as to the
personality of the man. Judged from his poems, it was not with a poet like
the writer of “The Northern Farmer,” or a poet like the writer of “Ned
Bratts,” that any student of poetry would have dreamed of classing him.
Such a student would actually have been more likely to class him with two
of his contemporaries between whom and himself there were but few points
in common, the “humourless” William Morris and the “humourless”
Rossetti. For, singularly enough, between him and them there was this one
point of resemblance: while all three were richly endowed with humour,
while all three were the very lights of the sets in which they moved, the
moment they took pen in hand to write poetry they became sad. It would
almost seem as if, like Rossetti, Arnold actually held that poetry was not the
proper medium for humour. No wonder, then, if the absence of humour in

his poetry did much to mislead the student of his work as to the real
character of the man.

After a year at Winchester, Matthew Arnold entered Rugby school in
1837. He early began to write and print verses. His first publication was a
Rugby prize poem, Alaric at Rome, in 1840. This was followed in 1843,
after he had gone up to Oxford in 1840 as a scholar of Balliol, by his poem
Cromwell, which won the Newdigate prize. In 1844 he graduated with
second-class honours, and in 1845 was elected a fellow of Oriel College,
where among his colleagues was A.H. Clough, his friendship with whom is
commemorated in that exquisite elegy Thyrsis. From 1847 to 1851 he acted
as private secretary to Lord Lansdowne; and in the latter year, after acting
for a short time as assistant-master at Rugby, he was appointed to an
inspectorship of schools, a post which he retained until two years before his
death. He married, in June 1851, the daughter of Mr Justice Wightman,
Meanwhile, in 1849, appeared The Strayed Reveller, and other Poems, by A,
a volume which gained a considerable esoteric reputation. In 1852 he
published another volume under the same initial, Empedocles on Etna, and
other Poems. Empedocles is as undramatic a poem perhaps as was ever
written in dramatic form, but studded with lyrical beauties of a very high
order. In 1853 Arnold published a volume of Poems under his own name.
This consisted partially of poems selected from the two previous volumes.
A second series of poems, which contained, however, only two new ones,
was published in 1855. So great was the impression made by these in
academic circles, that in 1857 Arnold was elected professor of poetry at
Oxford, and he held the chair for ten years. In 1858 he published his
classical tragedy, Merope. Nine years afterwards his New Poems (1867)
were published. While he held the Oxford professorship he published
several series of lectures, which gave him a high place as a scholar and
critic. The essays1 On Translating Homer: Three Lectures given at Oxford,
published in 1861, supplemented in 1862 by On Translating Homer: Last

Words, a fourth lecture given in reply to F.W. Newman’s Homeric
Translation in Theory and Practice (1861), and On the Study of Celtic
Literature, published in 1867, were full of subtle and brilliant if not of
profound criticism. So were the two series of Essays in Criticism, the first
of which, consisting of articles reprinted from various reviews, appeared in
1865. The essay on “A Persian Passion Play” was added in the editions of
1875; and a second series, edited by Lord Coleridge, appeared in 1888.

Arnold’s poetic activity almost ceased after he left the chair of poetry at
Oxford. He was several times sent by government to make inquiries into the
state of education in France, Germany, Holland and other countries; and his
reports, with their thorough-going and searching criticism of continental
methods, as contrasted with English methods, showed how conscientiously
he had devoted some of his best energies to the work. His fame as a poet
and a literary critic has somewhat overshadowed the fact that he was during
thirty-five years of his life—from 1851 to 1836—employed in the
Education Department as one of H.M. inspectors of schools, while his
literary work was achieved in such intervals of leisure as could be spared
from the public service. At the time of his appointment the government, by
arrangement with the religious bodies, entrusted the inspection of schools
connected with the Church of England to clergymen, and agreed also to
send Roman Catholic inspectors to schools managed by members of that
communion. Other schools—those of the British and Foreign Society, the
Wesleyans, and undenominational schools generally—were inspected by
laymen, of whom Arnold was one. There were only three or four of these
officers at first, and their districts were necessarily large. It is to the
experience gained in intercourse with Nonconformist school managers that
we may attribute the curiously intimate knowledge of religious sects which
furnished the material for some of his keen though good-humoured
sarcasms. The Education Act of 1870, which simplified the administrative
system, abolished denominational inspection, and thus greatly reduced the

area assigned to a single inspector. Arnold took charge of the district of
Westminster, and remained in that office until his resignation, taking also an
occasional share in the inspection of training colleges for teachers, and in
conferences at the central office. His letters, passim, show that some of the
routine which devolved upon him was distasteful, and that he was glad to
entrust to a skilled assistant much of the duty of individual examination and
the making up of schedules and returns. But the influence he exerted on
schools, on the department, and on the primary education of the whole
country, was indirectly far greater than is generally supposed. His annual
reports, of which more than twenty were collected into a volume by his
friend and official chief, Sir Francis (afterwards Lord) Sandford, attracted,
by reason of their freshness of style and thought, much more of public
attention than is usually accorded to blue-book literature; and his high aims,
and his sympathetic appreciation of the efforts and difficulties of the
teachers, had a remarkable effect in raising the tone of elementary
education, and in indicating the way to improvement. In particular, he
insisted on the formative elements of school education, on literature and the
“humanities,” as distinguished from the collection of scraps of information
and “useful knowledge”; and he sought to impress all the young teachers
with the necessity of broader mental cultivation than was absolutely
required to obtain the government certificate. In his reports also he dwelt
often and forcibly on the place which the study of the Bible, not the
distinctive formularies of the churches, ought to hold in English schools. He
urged that besides the religious and moral purposes of Scriptural teaching, it
had a literary value of its own, and was the best instrument in the hands
even of the elementary teacher for uplifting the soul and refining and
enlarging the thoughts of young children.

On three occasions Arnold was asked to assist the government by making
special inquiries into the state of education in foreign countries. These
duties were especially welcome to him, serving as they did as a relief from

the monotony of school inspection at home, and as opportunities for taking
a wider survey of the whole subject of education, and for expressing his
views on principles and national aims as well as administrative details. In
1859, as foreign assistant commissioner, he prepared for the duke of
Newcastle’s commission to inquire into the subject of elementary education
a report (printed 1860) which was afterwards reprinted (1861) in a volume
entitled The Popular Education of France, with Notices of that of Holland
and Switzerland. In 1865 he was again employed as assistant-commissioner
by the Schools Inquiry Commission under Lord Taunton; and his report on
this subject, On Secondary Education in Foreign Countries (1866), was
subsequently reprinted under the title Schools and Universities on the
Continent (1868). Twenty years later he was sent by the Education
Department to make special inquiries on certain specified points, e.g. free
education, the status and training of teachers, and compulsory attendance at
schools. The result of this investigation appeared as a parliamentary paper,
Special Report on certain points connected with Elementary Education in
Germany, Switzerland and France, in 1886. He also contributed the chapter
on “Schools” (1837-1887) to the second volume of Mr Humphry Ward’s
Reign of Queen Victoria. Part of his official writings may be studied in
Reports for Elementary Schools (1852-1882), edited by Sir F. Sandford in
1889.

All these reports form substantial contributions to the history and
literature of education in the Victorian age. They have been quoted often,
and have exercised marked influence on subsequent changes and
controversies. One great purpose underlies them all. It is to bring home to
the English people a conviction that education ought to be a national
concern, that it should not be left entirely to local, or private, or
irresponsible initiative, that the watchful jealousy so long shown by
Liberals, and especially by Nonconformists, in regard to state action was a
grave practical mistake, and that in an enlightened democracy, animated by

a progressive spirit and noble and generous ideals, it was the part of
wisdom to invoke the collective power of the state to give effect to those
ideals. To this theme he constantly recurred in his essays, articles and
official reports. “Porro unum est necessarium. One thing is needful;
organize your secondary education.”

In 1883 a pension of £250 was conferred on Arnold in recognition of his
literary merits. In the same year he went to the United States on a lecturing
tour, and again in 1886, his subjects being “Emerson” and the “Principles
and Value of Numbers.” The success of these lectures, though they were
admirable in matter and form, was marred by the lecturer’s lack of
experience in delivery. It is sufficient, further, to say that Culture and
Anarchy: an Essay in Political and Social Criticism, appeared in 1869; St
Paul and Protestantism, with an Introduction on Puritanism and the Church
of England (1870); Friendship’s Garland: being the Conversations, Letters
and Opinions of the late Arminius Baron van Thunder-ten-Tronckh (1871);
Literature and Dogma: an Essay towards a Better Apprehension of the
Bible (1873); God and the Bible: a Review of Objections to Literature and
Dogma (1875); Last Essays on Church and Religion (1877); Mixed Essays
(1879); Irish Essays and Others (1882); Discourses in America (1885).
Such essays as the first of these, embodying as they did Arnold’s views of
theological and polemical subjects, attracted much attention at the time of
their publication, owing to the state of the intellectual atmosphere at the
moment; but it is doubtful, perhaps, whether they will be greatly considered
in the near future. Many severe things have been said, and will be said,
concerning the inadequacy of poets like Coleridge and Wordsworth when
confronting subjects of a theological or philosophical kind. Wordsworth’s
High Church Pantheism and Coleridge’s disquisitions on the Logos seem
farther removed from the speculations of to-day than do the dreams of
Lucretius. But these two great writers lived before the days of modern
science. Arnold, living only a few years later, came at a transition period

when the winds of tyrannous knowledge had blown off the protecting roof
that had covered the centuries before, but when time and much labour were
needed to build another roof of new materials—a period when it was
impossible for the poet to enjoy either the quietism of High Church
Pantheism in which Wordsworth had basked, or the sheltering protection of
German metaphysics under which Coleridge had preached—a period,
nevertheless, when the wonderful revelations of science were still too raw,
too cold and hard, to satisfy the yearnings of the poetic soul. Objectionable
as Arnold’s rationalizing criticism was to contemporary orthodoxy, and
questionable as was his equipment in point of theological learning, his
spirituality of outlook and ethical purpose were not to be denied. Yet it is
not Arnold’s views that have become current coin so much as his literary
phrases—his craving for “culture” and “sweetness and light,” his contempt
for “the dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant
religion,” his “stream of tendency not ourselves making for righteousness,”
his classification of “Philistines and barbarians”—and so forth. His death at
Liverpool, of heart failure on the 15th of April 1888, was sudden and quite
unexpected.

Arnold was a prominent figure in that great galaxy of Victorian poets
who were working simultaneously—Tennyson, Browning, Rossetti,
William Morris and Swinburne—poets between whom there was at least
this connecting link, that the quest of all of them was the old-fashioned
poetical quest of the beautiful. Beauty was their watchword, as it had been
the watchword of their immediate predecessors—Wordsworth, Coleridge,
Keats, Shelley and Byron. That this group of early 19th-century poets might
be divided into two—those whose primary quest was physical beauty, and
those whose primary quest was moral beauty-is no doubt true. Still, in so far
as beauty was their quest they were all akin. And so with the Victorian
group to which Arnold belonged. As to the position which he takes among
them opinions must necessarily vary. On the whole, his place in the group

will be below all the others. The question as to whether he was primarily a
poet or a prosateur has been often asked. If we were to try to answer that
question here, we should have to examine his poetry in detail—we should
have to inquire whether his primary impulse of expression was to seize
upon the innate suggestive power of words, or whether his primary impulse
was to rely upon the logical power of the sentence. In nobility of temper, in
clearness of statement, and especially in descriptive power, he is beyond
praise. But intellect, judgment, culture and study of great poets may do
much towards enabling a prose-writer to write what must needs be called
good poetry. What they cannot enable him to do is to produce those magical
effects which poets of the rarer kind can achieve by seizing that mysterious,
suggestive power of words which is far beyond all mere statement.
Notwithstanding the exquisite work that Arnold has left behind him, some
critics have come to the conclusion that his primary impulse in expression
was that of the poetically-minded prosateur rather than that of the born
poet. And this has been said by some who nevertheless deeply admire
poems like “The Scholar Gypsy,” “Thyrsis,” “The Forsaken Merman,”
“Dover Beach,” “Heine’s Grave,” “Rugby Chapel,” “The Grande
Chartreuse,” “Sohrab and Rustum,” “The Sick King in Bokhara,” “Tristram
and Iseult,” &c. It would seem that a man may show all the endowments of
a poet save one, and that one the most essential—the instinctive mastery
over metrical effects.

In all literary expression there are two kinds of emphasis, the emphasis of
sound and the emphasis of sense. Indeed the difference between those who
have and those who have not the true rhythmic instinct is that, while the
former have the innate faculty of making the emphasis of sound and the
emphasis of sense meet and strengthen each other, the latter are without that
faculty. But so imperfect is the human mind that it can rarely apprehend or
grasp simultaneously these two kinds of emphasis. While to the born
prosateur the emphasis of sense comes first, and refuses to be more than

partially conditioned by the emphasis of sound, to the born poet the
emphasis of sound comes first, and sometimes will, even as in the case of
Shelley, revolt against the tyranny of the emphasis of sense. Perhaps the
very origin of the old quantitative metres was the desire to make these two
kinds of emphasis meet in the same syllable. In manipulating their
quantitative metrical system the Greeks had facilities for bringing one kind
of emphasis into harmony with the other such as are unknown to writers in
accentuated metres. This accounts for the measureless superiority of Greek
poetry in verbal melody as well as in general harmonic scheme to all the
poetry of the modern world. In writers so diverse in many ways as Homer,
Æschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, Sappho, the harmony between the emphasis
of sound and the emphasis of sense is so complete that each of these kinds
of emphasis seems always begetting, yet always born of the other. When in
Europe the quantitative measures were superseded by the accentuated
measures a reminiscence was naturally and inevitably left behind of the old
system; and the result has been, in the English language at least, that no
really great line can be written in which the emphasis of accent, the
emphasis of quantity and the emphasis of sense do not meet on the same
syllable. Whenever this junction does not take place the weaker line, or
lines, are always introduced, not for makeshift purposes, but for variety, as
in the finest lines of Milton and Wordsworth. Wordsworth no doubt seems
to have had a theory that the accent of certain words, such as “without,”
“within,” &c., could be disturbed in an iambic line; but in his best work he
does not act upon his theory, and endeavours most successfully to make the
emphasis of accent, of quantity and of sense meet. It might not be well for a
poem to contain an entire sequence of such perfect lines as

“I thought of Chatterton, the marvellous boy,”

or

“Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart,”

for then the metricist’s art would declare itself too loudly and weaken the
imaginative strength of the picture. But such lines should no doubt form the
basis of the poem, and weaker lines—lines in which there is no such
combination of the three kinds of emphasis—should be sparingly used, and
never used for makeshift purposes. Now, neither by instinct nor by critical
study was Arnold ever able to apprehend this law of prosody. If he does
write a line of the first order, metrically speaking, he seems to do so by
accident. Such weak lines as these are constantly occurring—

“The poet, to whose mighty heart
Heaven doth a quicker pulse impart,
Subdues that energy to scan
Not his own course, but that of man.”

Much has been said about what is called the “Greek temper” of Matthew
Arnold’s muse. A good deal depends upon what it meant by the Hellenic
spirit. But if the Greek temper expresses itself, as is generally supposed, in
the sweet acceptance and melodious utterance of the beauty of the world as
it is, accepting that beauty without inquiring as to what it means and as to
whither it goes, it is difficult to see where in Arnold’s poetry this temper
declares itself. Surely it is not in Empedocles on Etna, and surely it is not in
Merope. If there is a poem of his in which one would expect to find the
joyous acceptance of life apart from questionings about the civilization in
which the poet finds himself environed (its hopes, its fears, its aspirations
and its failures)—such questionings, in short, as were for ever Vexing
Arnold’s soul—it would be in “The Scholar Gypsy,” a poem in which the
poet tries to throw himself into the mood of a “Romany Rye.” The great
attraction of the gypsies to Englishmen of a certain temperament is that they
alone seem to feel the joyous acceptance of life which is supposed to be
specially Greek. Hence it would have been but reasonable to look, if

anywhere, for the expression of Arnold’s Greek temper in a poem which
sets out to describe the feelings of the student who, according to Glanville’s
story, left Oxford to wander over England with the Romanies. But instead
of this we got the old fretting about the unsatisfactoriness of modern
civilization. Glanville’s Oxford student, whose story is glanced at now and
again in the poem, flits about in the scenery like a cloud-shadow on the
grass; but the way in which Arnold contrives to avoid giving us the faintest
idea either dramatic or pictorial of the student about whom he talks so
much, and the gypsies with whom the student lived, is one of the most
singular feats in poetry. The reflections which come to a young Oxonian
lying on the grass and longing to escape life’s fitful fever without shuffling
off this mortal coil, are, no doubt, beautiful reflections beautifully
expressed, but the temper they show is the very opposite of the Greek. To
say this is not in the least to disparage Arnold. “A man is more like the age
in which he lives,” says the Chinese aphorism, “than he is like his own
father and mother,” and Arnold’s polemical writings alone are sufficient to
show that the waters of life he drank were from fountains distilled, seven
times distilled, at the topmost slope of 19th-century civilization. Mr George
Meredith’s “Old Chartist” exhibits far more of the temper of acceptance
than does any poem by Matthew Arnold.

His most famous critical dictum is that poetry is a “criticism of life.”
What he seems to have meant is that poetry is the crowning fruit of a
criticism of life; that just as the poet’s metrical effects are and must be the
result of a thousand semiconscious generalizations upon the laws of cause
and effect in metric art, so the beautiful things he says about life and the
beautiful pictures he paints of life are the result of his generalizations upon
life as he passes through it, and consequently that the value of his poetry
consists in the beauty and the truth of his generalizations. But this is saying
no more than is said in the line—

“Rien n’est beau que le vrai; le vrai seul est aimable”—

or in the still more famous lines—

“‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty,’—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.”

To suppose that Arnold confounded the poet with the writer of pensées
would be absurd. Yet having decided that poetry consists of generalizations
on human life, in reading poetry he kept on the watch for those
generalizations, and at last seemed to think that the less and not the more
they are hidden behind the dramatic action, and the more unmistakably they
are intruded as generalizations, the better. For instance, in one of his essays
he quotes those lines from the “Chanson de Roland” of Turoldus, where
Roland, mortally wounded, lays himself down under a pine-tree with his
face turned towards Spain and the enemy, and begins to “call many things
to remembrance; all the lands which his valour conquered, and pleasant
France, and the men of his lineage, and Charlemagne, his liege lord, who
nourished him”—

“De plusurs choses à remembrer li prist,
De tames teres cume li bers cunquist,
De dulce France, des humes de sun ligu,
De Carlemagne sun seignor ki l’nurrit.”

“That,” says Arnold, “is primitive work, I repeat, with an undeniable
poetic quality of its own. It deserves such praise, and such praise is
sufficient for it.” Then he contrasts it with a famous passage in Homer—
that same passage which is quoted in the article Poetry, for the very

opposite purpose to that of Arnold’s, quoted indeed to show how the epic
poet, leaving the dramatic action to act as chorus, weakens the ἀπάτη of the
picture—the passage in the Iliad (iii 243-244) where the poet, after Helen’s
pathetic mention of her brother’s comments on the causes of their absence,
“criticizes life” and generalizes upon the impotence of human intelligence,
the impotence even of human love, to pierce the darkness in which the web
of human fate is woven. He appends Dr Hawtrey’s translation:—

Ὤς φάτο τοὐς δ᾽ ἤδη κάτεχεν φυσίζοος αἶα
ἐν Λακεδαίμονι αὖθι, φἰλῃ ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ.

“So said she; they long since in Earth’s soft arms were reposing
There, in their own dear land, their fatherland, Lacedaemon.”

“We are here,” says Arnold, “in another world, another order of poetry
altogether; here is rightly due such supreme praise as that which M. Vitel
gives to the Chanson de Roland. If our words are to have any meaning, if
our judgments are to have any solidity, we must not heap that supreme
praise upon poetry of an order immeasurably inferior.” He does not see that
the two passages cannot properly be compared at all. In the one case the
poet gives us a dramatic picture; in the other; a comment on a dramatic
picture.

Perhaps, indeed, the place Arnold held and still holds as a critic is due
more to his exquisite felicity in expressing his views than to the penetration
of his criticism. Nothing can exceed the easy grace of his prose at the best.
It is conversational and yet absolutely exact in the structure of the
sentences; and in spite of every vagary, his distinguishing note is urbanity.
Keen-edged as his satire could be, his writing for the most part is as urbane
as Addison’s own. His influence on contemporary criticism and

contemporary ideals was considerable, and generally wholesome. His
insistence on the necessity of looking at “the thing in itself,” and the need
for acquainting oneself with “the best that has been thought and said in the
world,” gave a new stimulus alike to originality and industry in criticism;
and in his own selection of subjects—such as Joubert, or the de Guérins—
he opened a new world to a larger class of the better sort of readers,
exercising in this respect an awakening influence in his own time akin to
that of Walter Pater a few years afterwards. The comparison with Pater
might indeed be pressed further, and yet too far. Both were essentially
products of Oxford. But Arnold, whose description of that “home of lost
causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible
loyalties,” is in itself almost a poem, had a classical austerity in his style
that savoured more intimately of Oxford tradition, and an ethical
earnestness even in his most flippant moments which kept him notably
aloof from the more sensuous school of aesthetics.

The first collected edition of Arnold’s poems was published in 1869
in two volumes, the first consisting of Narrative and Elegiac Poems,
and the second of Dramatic and Lyric Poems. Other editions appeared
in 1877, 1881; a library edition (3 vols., 1885); a one-volume reprint of
the poems printed in the library edition with one or two additions
(1890). Publications by Matthew Arnold not mentioned in the
foregoing article include: England and the Italian Question (1859), a
pamphlet; A French Eton; or, Middle Class Education and the State
(1864); Higher Schools and Universities in Germany (1874), a partial
reprint from Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868); A Bible
Reading for Schools; The Great Prophecy of Israel’s Restoration, an
arrangement of Isaiah, chs. xl.-lxvi. (1872), republished with additions
and varying titles in 1875 and 1883; an edition of the Six Chief Lives
from Johnson’s Lives of the Poets (1878); editions of the Poems of
Wordsworth (1879), and the Poetry of Byron (1881), for the Golden
Treasury Series, with prefatory essays reprinted in the second series of
Essays in Criticism; an edition of Letters, Speeches and Tracts on Irish
Affairs by Edmund Burke (1881); and many contributions to periodical
literature. The Letters of Matthew Arnold (1848-1888) were collected
and arranged by George W.E. Russell in 1895, reprinted 1901. Matthew
Arnold’s Note Books, with a Preface by the Hon. Mrs Wodehouse,
appeared in 1902. A complete and uniform edition of The Works of
Matthew Arnold (15 vols., 1904-1905) includes the letters as edited by
Mr Russell. Vol. iii. contains a complete bibliography of his works,
many of the early editions of which are very valuable, by Mr T.B.
Smart, who published a separate bibliography in 1892. A valuable note
on the rather complicated subject of Arnold’s bibliography is given by
Mr H. Buxton Forman in Arnold’s Poems, Narrative, Elegiac and Lyric
(Temple Classics, 1900).

It was Arnold’s expressed desire that his biography should not be
written, and before his letters were published they underwent
considerable editing at the hands of his family. There are, however,
monographs on Matthew Arnold (1899) in Modern English Writers by
Prof. Saintsbury, and by Mr H.W. Paul (1902), in the English Men of
Letters Series. These two works are supplemented by Mr G.W.E.
Russell, who, as the editor of Arnold’s letters, is in a sense the official
biographer, in Matthew Arnold (1904, Literary Lives Series). There are
also studies of Arnold in Mr J.M. Robertson’s Modern Humanists
(1891), and in W.H. Hudson’s Studies in Interpretation (1896), in Sir
J.G. Fitch’s Thomas and Matthew Arnold (1897), and a review of some
of the works above mentioned in the Quarterly for January 1905 by
T.H. Warren. (T. W.-D.; J. G. F.)

1 These essays were edited in 1905 with an introduction by W.H.D. Rouse.

ARNOLD, SAMUEL (1740-1802), English composer, was born at
London on the both of August 1740. He received a thorough musical
education at the Chapel Royal, and when little more than twenty years of
age was appointed composer at Covent Garden theatre. Here, in 1765, he
produced his popular opera, The Maid of the Mill, many of the songs in
which were selected from the works of Italian composers. In 1776 he
transferred his services to the Haymarket theatre. In 1783 he was made
composer to George III. Between 1765 and 1802 he wrote as many as forty-
three operas, after-pieces and pantomimes, of which the best were The Maid

of the Mill, Rosamond, Inkle and Yarico, The Battle of Hexham, The
Mountaineers. His oratorios included The Cure of Saul (1767), Abimelech
(1768), The Resurrection (1773), The Prodigal Son (1777) and Elisha
(1795). In 1783 he became organist to the Chapel Royal. In 1786 he began
an edition of Handel’s works, which extended to 40 volumes, but was never
completed. In 1793 he became organist of Westminster Abbey, where he
was buried after his death on the 22nd of October 1802. Arnold is chiefly
remembered now for the publication of his Cathedral Music, being a
collection in score of the most valuable and useful compositions for that
service by the several English masters of the last 200 years (1790).

ARNOLD, THOMAS (1705-1842), English clergyman and headmaster
of Rugby school, was born at West Cowes, in the Isle of Wight, on the 13th
of June 1795. He was the son of William and Martha Arnold, the former of
whom occupied the situation of collector of customs at Cowes. His father
died suddenly of spasm in the heart in 1801, and his early education was
confided by his mother to her sister, Miss Delafield. From her tuition he
passed to that of Dr Griffiths, at Warminster, in Wiltshire, in 1803; and in
1807 he was removed to Winchester, where he remained until 1811, having
entered as a commoner, and afterwards become a scholar of the college. In
after life he retained a lively feeling of interest in Winchester school, and
remembered with admiration and profit the regulative tact of Dr Goddard
and the preceptorial ability of Dr Gabell, who were successively head-
masters during his stay there.

From Winchester he removed to Oxford in 1811, where he became a
scholar at Corpus Christi College; in 1815 he was elected fellow of Oriel
College, and there he continued to reside until 1819. This interval was
diligently devoted to the pursuit of classical and historical studies, to
preparing himself for ordination, and to searching investigations, under the
stimulus of continued discussion with a band of talented and congenial
associates, of the profoundest questions in theology, ecclesiastical polity
and social philosophy. The authors he most carefully studied at this period
were Thucydides and Aristotle, and for their writings he formed an
attachment which remained to the close of his life, and exerted a powerful
influence upon his mode of thought and opinions, as well as upon his
literary occupations in subsequent years. Herodotus also came in for a
considerable share of his regard, but more, apparently, for recreation than
for work. Accustomed freely and fearlessly to investigate whatever came
before him, and swayed by a scrupulous dread of insincerity, he was
doomed to long and anxious hesitation concerning some of the fundamental
points of theology before arriving at a firm conviction of the truth of
Christianity. Once satisfied, however, his faith remained clear and firm; and
thenceforward his life became that of a supremely religious man.

To the name of Christ he was prepared to “surrender his whole soul,” and
to render before it “obedience, reverence without measure, intense humility,
most unreserved adoration” (Serm. ns. vol. iv. p. 210). He did not often talk
about religion; he had not much of the accredited phraseology of piety even
when he discoursed on spiritual topics; but more than most men he was
directed by religious principle and feeling in all his conduct. He left Oxford
in 1819, and settled at Laleham, near Staines, where he took pupils for the
university. His spare time was devoted to the prosecution of studies in
philology and history, more particularly to the study of Thucydides, and of
the new light which had been cast upon Roman history and upon historical
method in general by the researches of Niebuhr. He was also occasionally

engaged in preaching, and it was whilst here that he published the first
volume of his sermons. Shortly after he settled at Laleham, he married
Mary, youngest daughter of the Rev. John Penrose, rector of Fledborough,
Nottinghamshire. After nine years spent at Laleham he was induced to offer
himself as a candidate for the vacant head-mastership of Rugby; and though
he entered somewhat late upon the contest, and though none of the electors
was personally known to him, he was elected in December 1827. In June
1828 he received priest’s orders; in April end November of the same year he
took his degrees of B.D. and D.D., and in August entered on his new office.

In one of the testimonials which accompanied his application to the
trustees of Rugby, the writer stated it as his conviction that “if Mr Arnold
were elected, he would change the face of education all through the public
schools of England.” This somewhat hazardous pledge was nobly
redeemed. Under Arnold’s superintendence the school became not merely a
place where a certain amount of classical or general learning was to be
obtained, but a sphere of intellectual, moral and religious discipline, where
healthy characters were formed, and men were trained for the duties, and
struggles and responsibilities of life. His energies were chiefly devoted to
the business of the school; but he found time also for much literary work, as
well as for an extensive correspondence. Five volumes of sermons, an
edition of Thucydides, with English notes and dissertations, a History of
Rome in three vols. 8vo, beside numerous articles in reviews, journals,
newspapers and encyclopædias, are extant to attest the untiring activity of
his mind, and his patient diligence during this period. His interest also in
public matters was incessant, especially ecclesiastical questions, and such
as bore upon the social welfare and moral improvement of the masses.

In 1841, after fourteen years at Rugby, Dr Arnold was appointed by Lord
Melbourne, then prime minister, to the chair of modern history at Oxford.
On the 2nd of December 1841 he delivered his inaugural lecture. Seven

other lectures were delivered during the first three weeks of the Lent term
of 1842. When the midsummer vacation arrived, he was preparing to set out
with his family to Fox How in Westmoreland, where he had purchased
some property and built a house. But he was suddenly attacked by angina
pectoris, and died on Sunday, the 12th of June 1842. His remains were
interred on the following Friday in the chancel of Rugby chapel,
immediately under the communion table.

The great peculiarity and charm of Dr Arnold’s nature seemed to lie in
the supremacy of the moral and the spiritual element over his whole being.
He was not a notable scholar, and he had not much of what is usually called
tact in his dealings either with the juvenile or the adult mind. What gave
him his power, and secured for him so deeply the respect and veneration of
his pupils and acquaintances, was the intensely religious character of his
whole life. He seemed ever to act from a severe and lofty estimate of duty.
To be just, honest and truthful, he ever held to be the first aim of his being.

His Life was written by Dean Stanley (1845).

ARNOTT, NEIL (1788-1874), Scottish physician, was born at Arbroath
on the 15th of May 1788. He studied medicine first at Aberdeen, and
subsequently in London under Sir Everard Home (1756-1832), through
whom he obtained, while yet in his nineteenth year, the appointment of full
surgeon to an East Indiaman. After making two voyages to China he settled
in 1811 to practise in London, and speedily acquired high reputation in his
profession. Within a few years he was made physician to the French and

Spanish embassies, and in 1837 he became a physician extraordinary to the
queen. From his earliest youth Arnott had an intense love of natural
philosophy, and to this was added an inventiveness which served him in
good stead in his profession and yielded the “Arnott water-bed,” the “Arnott
ventilator,” the “Arnott stove,” &c. He was the author of several works
bearing on physical science or its applications, the most important being his
Elements of Physics (1827), which went through six editions in his lifetime.
In 1838 he published a treatise on Warming and Ventilating, and, in 1855,
one on the Smokeless Fireplace. He was a strong advocate of scientific, as
opposed to purely classical, education; and he manifested his interest in
natural philosophy by the gift of £2000 to each of the four universities of
Scotland and to the university of London, to promote its study in the
experimental and practical form. He died in London on the 2nd of March
1874.

ARNOULD-PLESSY, JEANNE SYLVANIE (1819-1897), French
actress, was born in Metz on the 7th of September 1819, the daughter of a
local actor named Plessy. She was a pupil of Samson at the Conservatoire in
1829, and made her début as Emma at the Comédie Française in 1834 in
Alexandre Duval’s La Fille d’honneur. She had an immense success, and
Mlle Mars, to whom the public already compared her, took her up. Until
1845 she had prominent parts in all the plays, new and old, at the Théâtre
Français, when suddenly at the height of her success, she left Paris and went
to London, marrying the dramatic author, J.F. Arnould (d. 1854), a man
much older than herself. The Comédie Française, after having tried in vain

to bring her back, brought a suit against her, and obtained heavy damages.
In the meantime Madame Arnould-Plessy accepted an engagement at the
French theatre at St Petersburg, where she played for nine years. In 1855
she returned to Paris and was re-admitted to the Comédie Française, as
pensionnaire with an engagement for eight years. This second part of her
career was even more brilliant than the first. She revived some of her old
rôles, but began to abandon the jeunes premières for the “lead,” in which
she had a success unequalled since the retirement of Mlle Mars. Her later
triumphs were especially associated with new plays by Émile Augier, Le
Fils de Giboyer and Maître Guerin. Her last appearance was in Edouard
Cadol’s La Grand-maman; she retired in 1876, and died in 1897.

ARNSBERG, a town of Germany, in the Prussian province of
Westphalia, romantically situated on an eminence almost surrounded by the
river Ruhr, 44 m. S.E. of Münster and 58 m. E.N.E. of Düsseldorf by rail.
Pop. (1900) 8490. It is the seat of the provincial authorities, and has three
churches, a court of appeal, a Roman Catholic gymnasium, which was
formerly the Benedictine abbey of Weddinghausen, a library, a normal
school and a chamber of commerce. Weaving, brewing and distilling are
carried on, and there are manufactories of white lead, shot and paper, works
for the production of railway plant, and saw-mills. Near the town are the
ruins of the castle of the counts of Arnsberg, the last of whom, Gottfried,
sold his countship, in 1368, to the archbishop of Cologne. The countship
was incorporated by the archbishops in their duchy of Westphalia, which in
1802 was assigned to Hesse-Darmstadt and in 1815 to Prussia. The town,

which had received its first charter in 1237 and later joined the Hanseatic
League, became the capital of the duchy.

ARNSTADT, a town in the principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen,
Germany, on the river Gera, 11 m. S. of Erfurt, with which it is connected
by rail. Pop. (1900) 14,413. There are five churches, four Protestant and one
Catholic. The Evangelical Liebfrauenkirche, a Romanesque building
(mainly 12th-century), has two octagonal towers and a 10th-century porch.
The palace contains collections of pictures and porcelain, and attached to it
is a magnificent tower, all that remains of the castle built in 1560. The town
hall dates from 1561. The industries of Arnstadt include iron and other
metal founding, the manufacture of leather, cloth, tobacco, weighing-
machines, paper, playing-cards, chairs, gloves, shoes, iron safes, and beer,
and market-gardening and trade in grain and wood are carried on. There are
copper-mines in the neighbourhood, as well as tepid saline springs, the
waters of which are used for bathing, and are much frequented in summer.
Arnstadt dates back to the 8th century. It was bought in 1306 by the counts
of Schwarzburg, who lived here till 1716.

ARNSWALDE, a town of Germany, in the kingdom of Prussia, in a
marshy district between four lakes, 20 m. S.W. of Stargard and on the main

line between that place and Posen. Besides the Gothic church there are no
noteworthy public buildings. Its industries include iron founding,
machinery, and manufactures of cloth, matches and starch. Pop. (1900)
8665.

ARNULF (c. 850-899), Roman emperor, illegitimate son of Carloman,
king of Bavaria and Italy, was made margrave of Carinthia about 876, and
on his father’s death in 880 his dignity and possessions were confirmed by
the new king of the east Franks, Louis III. The failure of legitimate male
issue of the later Carolingians gave Arnulf a more important position than
otherwise he would have occupied; but he did homage to the emperor
Charles the Fat in 882, and spent the next few years in constant warfare
with the Slavs and the Northmen. In 887, however, Arnulf identified
himself with the disgust felt by the Bavarians and others at the incapacity of
Charles the Fat. Gathering a large army, he marched to Tribur; Charles
abdicated and the Germans recognized Arnulf as their king, a proceeding
which L. von Ranke describes as “the first independent action of the
German secular world.” Arnulf’s real authority did not extend far beyond
the confines of Bavaria, and he contented himself with a nominal
recognition of his supremacy by the kings who sprang up in various parts of
the Empire. Having made peace with the Moravians, he gained a great and
splendid victory over the Northmen near Louvain in October 891, and in
spite of some opposition succeeded in establishing his illegitimate son,
Zwentibold, as king of the district afterwards called Lorraine. Invited by
Pope Formosus to deliver him from the power of Guido III., duke of

Spoleto, who had been crowned emperor, Arnulf went to Italy in 894, but
after storming Bergamo and receiving the homage of some of the nobles at
Pavia, he was compelled by desertions from his army to return. The
restoration of peace with the Moravians and the death of Guido prepared
the way for a more successful expedition in 895 when Rome was stormed
by his troops; and Arnulf was crowned emperor by Formosus in February
896. He then set out to establish his authority in Spoleto, but on the way
was seized with paralysis. He returned to Bavaria, where he died on the 8th
of December 899, and was buried at Regensburg. He left, by his wife Ota, a
son Louis surnamed the Child. Arnulf possessed the qualities of a soldier,
and was a loyal supporter of the church.

See “Annales Fuldenses” in the Monumenta Germaniae historica.
Scriptores, Band i. (Hanover and Berlin, 1826); E. Dümmler,
Geschichte des ostfränkischen Reichs (Leipzig, 1887-1888); M.J.L. de
Gagern, Arnulfi imperatoris vita (Bonn, 1837); E. Dümmler, De
Arnulfo Francorum rege (Berlin, 1852); W.B. Wenck, Die Erhebung
Arnulfs und der Zerfall des karolingischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1852); O.
Dietrich, Beitrâge zur Geschichte Arnolfs von Karnthen und Ludwigs
des Kindes (Berlin, 1890); E. Mühlbacher, Die Regesten des
Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern (Innsbruck, 1881).

AROIDEAE (Arum family), a large and wide-spread botanical order of
Monocotyledons containing about 1000 species in 105 genera. It is
generally distributed in temperate and tropical regions, but especially
developed in warm countries. The common British representative of the