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Title: Leviathan

Author: Thomas Hobbes

Release date: May 1, 2002 [eBook #3207]
Most recently updated: September 17, 2025

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LEVIATHAN
***

L E V I AT H A N

By Thomas Hobbes

1651
LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER,
FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL

Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury

Printed for Andrew Crooke,
at the Green Dragon
in St. Paul’s Churchyard,
1651.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES ON THE E-TEXT:
This E-text was prepared from the Pelican
Classics edition of Leviathan, which in turn was

prepared from the first edition. I have tried to follow
as closely as possible the original, and to give the
flavour of the text that Hobbes himself proof-read,
but the following differences were unavoidable.
Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively,
for emphasis, for proper names, for quotations, and
sometimes, it seems, just because.
The original has very extensive margin notes,
which are used to show where he introduces the
definitions of words and concepts, to give in short
the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing
with, and to give references to his quotations, largely
but not exclusively biblical. To some degree, these
margin notes seem to have been intended to serve
in place of an index, the original having none. They
are all in italics.
He also used italics for words in other languages
than English, and there are a number of Greek
words, in the Greek alphabet, in the text.
To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla
ASCII, I have done the following in this E-text.
I have restricted my use of full capitalization to
those places where Hobbes used it, except in the
chapter headings, which I have fully capitalized,
where Hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization
and italics.
Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the
text is quoting, I have introduced quotation marks.
Within quotation marks I have retained the
capitalization that Hobbes used.
Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for
proper names, or just because, I have capitalized
the initial letter of the words. This has the
disadvantage that they are not then distinguished
from those that Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but

the extent of his italics would make the text very ugly
if I was to use an underscore or slash.
Where the margin notes are either to introduce the
paragraph subject, or to show where he introduces
word definitions, I have included them as headers to
the paragraph, again with all words having initial
capitals, and on a shortened line.
For margin references to quotes, I have included
them in the text, in brackets immediately next to the
quotation. Where Hobbes included references in the
main text, I have left them as he put them, except to
change his square brackets to round.
For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted
the nearest ordinary letters that I can, and I have
used initial capitals for foreign language words.
Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem
to have had many inhibitions about spelling and
punctuation. I have tried to reproduce both exactly,
with the exception of the introduction of quotation
marks.
In preparing the text, I have found that it has much
more meaning if I read it with sub-vocalization, or
aloud, rather than trying to read silently. Hobbes’ use
of emphasis and his eccentric punctuation and
construction seem then to work.

TO MY MOST HONOR’D FRIEND Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN of
GODOLPHIN
HONOR’D SIR.
Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived,
was pleas’d to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as
you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves,
and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue
that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his
Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly
appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon
occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.
Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, I
humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth. I know
not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall
seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend on one side for
too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, ’tis hard to
passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the
endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power
condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that
Power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the
Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman
Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they
were they, but there) offending none, I think, but those without, or such
within (if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most
offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose
than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due
submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are the
Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power. If
notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be
pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that I am a man that love my own
opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour
you, and have presum’d on that, to assume the Title (without your
knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,
Your most humble, and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes.
Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.

Contents

THE INTRODUCTION

PART I. OF MAN
CHAPTER I. OF SENSE

CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION
Memory
Dreams
Apparitions Or Visions
Understanding

CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF
IMAGINATIONS
Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
Remembrance
Prudence
Signes
Conjecture Of The Time Past

CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH
Originall Of Speech
The Use Of Speech
Abuses Of Speech
Names Proper & Common Universall
Subject To Names

Use Of Names Positive
Negative Names With Their Uses
Words Insignificant
Understanding
Inconstant Names

CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.
Reason What It Is
Reason Defined
Right Reason Where
The Use Of Reason
Of Error And Absurdity
Causes Of Absurditie
Science
Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
Signes Of Science

CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY
MOTIONS COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS, AND THE
SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.
Motion Vitall And Animal
Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst; Aversion
Contempt
Good Evill
Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant Unprofitable
Delight Displeasure
Pleasure Offence
Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe
The Will
Formes Of Speech, In Passion
Good And Evill Apparent
Felicity

Praise Magnification

CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE
Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt
Science Opinion Conscience
Beliefe Faith

CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED
INTELLECTUAL, AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS
Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion
Prudence
Craft
Acquired Wit
Giddinesse Madnesse
Rage
Melancholy
Insignificant Speech

CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND
WORTHINESS
Power
Worth
Dignity
To Honour and Dishonour
Titles of Honour
Worthinesse Fitnesse

CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
What Is Here Meant By Manners

A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
Love Of Contention From Competition
Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
And From Love Of Arts
Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters
And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes
And From Want Of Understanding
Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time
Naturall Religion, From The Same

CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION
Religion, In Man Onely
First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things
From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things
Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things
And Suppose Them Incorporeall
But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything
But Honour Them As They Honour Men
And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events
Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
Made Different By Culture
The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme

The Causes Of Change In Religion
Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles

CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND, AS
CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY
From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From Diffidence Warre
Out Of Civil States,
The Incommodities Of Such A War
In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
The Passions That Incline Men To Peace

CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES,
AND OF CONTRACTS
Right Of Nature What
Liberty What
A Law Of Nature What
Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
The Fundamental Law Of Nature
The Second Law Of Nature
What it is to lay down a Right
Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation Duty Injustice
Not All Rights Are Alienable
Contract What
Covenant What
Free-gift
Signes Of Contract Expresse
Signes Of Contract By Inference
Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past
Merit What

Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid
Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means
No Covenant With Beasts
Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation
No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future
Covenants How Made Voyd
Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide
The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another
A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd
No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe
The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath
No Oath, But By God
An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE
The Third Law Of Nature, Justice
Justice And Injustice What
Justice Not Contrary To Reason
Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made
Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What
Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions
Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury
Justice Commutative, And Distributive
The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude
The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance
The Sixth, Facility To Pardon
The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good
The Eighth, Against Contumely
The Ninth, Against Pride
The Tenth Against Arrogance
The Eleventh Equity
The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common

The Thirteenth, Of Lot
The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising
The Fifteenth, Of Mediators
The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement
The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of
Partiality
The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse
A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined
The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,
The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;
And Yet Easie
The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS
PERSONATED
Person Naturall, And Artificiall
The Word Person, Whence
Actor, Author; Authority
Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
But Not The Actor
The Authority Is To Be Shewne
Things Personated, Inanimate
Irrational
False Gods
The True God
A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
Every One Is Author
An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces
Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable
Negative Voyce

PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND
DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:
Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes
Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement
And That Continually
Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,
Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power
The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The Definition Of A Common-wealth
Soveraigne, And Subject, What

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY
INSTITUTION
The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
The Consequences To Such Institution, Are
1. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government
2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The Institution Of The
Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part.
4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject
5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject
6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace And
Defence Of His Subjects
And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them
7. The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subject may every man know
what is so his owne, as no other Subject can without injustice take it from
him
8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature And Decision Of
Controversies:
9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers, Both Of Peace,
And Warre:
11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No Former Law
hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:
12. And Of Honour And Order
These Rights Are Indivisible
And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct Renouncing Of The
Soveraign Power
The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence Of The
Power Soveraign
Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It, And The Hurt Proceeds
For The Greatest Part From Not Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH
BY INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE
POWER
The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three
Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And
Aristocracy
Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes
Of The Right Of Succession
Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;
Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;
Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection
To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation, Not
Unlawfull

CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL
Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution
The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both
Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract
Or Education;

Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other
The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of
Possession
Despoticall Dominion, How Attained
Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished
Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom
The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture
Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS
Liberty What
What It Is To Be Free
Feare And Liberty Consistent
Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants
Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The
Soveraign
The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns; Not Of
Private Men
Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies, Even Against Them
That Lawfully Invade Them
Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It
The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law
In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign
In Case Of Captivity
In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And
Heyrs
In Case Of Banishment
In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another

CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND
PRIVATE
The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People
In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative Is Limited
By Letters Patents
And The Lawes
When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted Acts His Own
Onely
When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That Assented Onely
When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable That Have Assented
If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body Onely Is Obliged
Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique
Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province, Colony, Or Town
Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The Soveraign
A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family
Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull
Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues
Secret Cabals
Feuds Of Private Families
Factions For Government

CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN
POWER
Publique Minister Who
Ministers For The Generall Administration
For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy
For Instruction Of The People
For Judicature
For Execution

Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To Advise Are Not Publique
Ministers

CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH
And The Right Of Distribution Of Them
All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally From The Arbitrary
Distribution Of The Soveraign
Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign,
But Onely Of Another Subject
The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted
The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As Their Distribution, On Th
Soveraign
The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Soveraign
Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth
The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use
The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies

CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL
Counsell What
Differences Between Command And Counsell
Exhortation And Dehortation What
Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours

CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES
Civill Law what
The Soveraign Is Legislator
And Not Subject To Civill Law
Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of The Soveraigns Consent
The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other
Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome, But By The Soveraign
Power
Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning The Making Of Lawes

Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law
Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of Nature
Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be Known
Difference Between Verifying And Authorising
The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge
By The Publique Registers
By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale
The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth On The Soveraign Power
All Lawes Need Interpretation
The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not That Of Writers
The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving Sentence Vivâ Voce In
Every Particular Case
The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or Another Judge To Give
Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After
The Difference Between The Letter And Sentence Of The Law
The Abilities Required In A Judge
Divisions Of Law
Another Division Of Law
Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law
Another Division Of Lawes
A Fundamentall Law What
Difference Between Law And Right
And Between A Law And A Charter

CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS
A Crime What
Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime
Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No Man
Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes
Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not
Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not

Punishments Declared Before The Fact, Excuse From Greater Punishments
After It
Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By A Law Made After The Fact
False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of Crime
False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of Nature Secondly, by false
And False Inferences From True Principles, By Teachers
By Their Passions;
Presumption Of Riches
And Friends
Wisedome
Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of Crime
Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The Danger Is Neither Present,
Nor Corporeall
Crimes Not Equall
Totall Excuses
Excuses Against The Author
Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth
Evill Teachers, Extenuate
Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate
Praemeditation, Aggravateth
Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates
Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects
Laesae Majestas
Bribery And False Testimony
Depeculation
Counterfeiting Authority
Crimes Against Private Men Compared
Publique Crimes What

CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS
The Definition Of Punishment
Right To Punish Whence Derived

Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments
Nor Denyall Of Preferment
Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing
Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power
Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good
Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments
Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of Transgressing, Is Not
Punishment
Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law, A Greater Hurt Is Not
Punishment, But Hostility
Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law, No Punishment
The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable
Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not By Way Of
Punishment
Punishments Corporall
Capitall
Ignominy
Imprisonment
Exile
The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature
But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So
Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace
Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards
Salaries Certain And Casuall

CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO
THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
Want Of Absolute Power
Private Judgement Of Good and Evill
Erroneous Conscience
Pretence Of Inspiration
Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes

Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects
Dividing Of The Soveraign Power
Imitation Of Neighbour Nations
Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans
Mixt Government
Want Of Mony
Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans
Popular Men
Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations
Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
Dissolution Of The Common-wealth

CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN
REPRESENTATIVE
The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
By Instruction & Lawes
Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right of
Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them
Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For
Absolute Soveraignty
Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men
And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty
And To Honour Their Parents
And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
The Use Of Universities
Equall Taxes
Publique Charity
Prevention Of Idlenesse
Good Lawes What

Such As Are Necessary
Such As Are Perspicuous
Punishments
Rewards
Counsellours
Commanders

CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
The Scope Of The Following Chapters
Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God
A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy
Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction
Divine Lawes
Honour And Worship What
Severall Signes Of Honour
Worship Naturall And Arbitrary
Worship Commanded And Free
Worship Publique And Private
The End Of Worship
Attributes Of Divine Honour
Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour
Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill
Not All Actions
Naturall Punishments
The Conclusion Of The Second Part

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN
POLITIQUES
What It Is To Captivate The Understanding
How God Speaketh To Men

By What Marks Prophets Are Known
The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law, Miracles, And Doctrine
Conformable To The Law
Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease, The Scripture Supplies Their Place

CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE,
AUTHORITY, AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY
SCRIPTURE
Of The Books Of Holy Scripture
Their Antiquity
The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses
The Book of Joshua Written After His Time
The Booke Of Judges And Ruth Written Long After The Captivity
The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel
The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles
Ezra And Nehemiah
Esther
Job
The Psalter
The Proverbs
Ecclesiastes And The Canticles
The Prophets
The New Testament
Their Scope
The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures Stated.
Their Authority And Interpretation

CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL,
AND INSPIRATION IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE
Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture
Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture Sometimes For A Wind, Or Breath
Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The Understanding

Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections
Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction By Dreams And Visions
Fiftly, For Life
Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority
Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies
Angel What
Inspiration What

CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF
KINGDOME OF GOD, OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT
Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines Metaphorically But In The Scriptures
Properly
The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God
That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly His Civill Soveraignty Over A
Peculiar People By Pact
Sacred What
Degrees of Sanctity
Sacrament

CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS
Word What
The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God, Both Are Called Gods
Word In Scripture
Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word
Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity
Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet
Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies Prophecy
The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The Prophets
To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old Testament He Spake By
Dreams, Or Visions
God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots
Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability Of A Pretended Prophets
Calling

All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet Is To Be Examined By Every
Subject

CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE
A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration
And Must Therefore Be Rare, Whereof There Is No Naturall Cause Known
That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man, May Seem Otherwise To
Another
The End Of Miracles
The Definition Of A Miracle
That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False Miracles
Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles

CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF
ETERNALL LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND
REDEMPTION
Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned, The Terrestrial Paradise
Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall For Beleevers
Ascension Into Heaven
The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were Never In The Kingdome
Of God, Or Having Been In, Are Cast Out
The Congregation Of Giants
Lake Of Fire
Utter Darknesse
Gehenna, And Tophet
Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture Concerning Hell
Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives
Torments Of Hell
The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation The Same Thing, Salvation
From Sin, And From Misery, All One
The Place Of Eternall Salvation
Redemption

CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE
WORD CHURCH
Church The Lords House
Ecclesia Properly What
In What Sense The Church Is One Person Church Defined
A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All One

CHAPTER XL OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN
ABRAHAM, MOSES, HIGH PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH
The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham
Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering The Religion Of His Own
People
No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against The Religion Of Abraham
Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What God Spake
The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded
Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews, All His Own Time,
Though Aaron Had The Priesthood
All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of Moses
After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High Priest
Of The Soveraign Power Between The Time Of Joshua And Of Saul
Of The Rights Of The Kings Of Israel
The Practice Of Supremacy In Religion, Was Not In The Time Of The
Kings, According To The Right Thereof
After The Captivity The Jews Had No Setled Common-wealth

CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR
Three Parts Of The Office Of Christ
His Office As A Redeemer
Christs Kingdome Not Of This World
The End Of Christs Comming Was To Renew The Covenant Of The
Kingdome Of God, And To Perswade The Elect To Imbrace It, Which Was
The Second Part Of His Office

The Preaching Of Christ Not Contrary To The Then Law Of The Jews, Nor
Of Caesar
The Third Part Of His Office Was To Be King (Under His Father) Of The
Elect
Christs Authority In The Kingdome Of God Subordinate To His Father
One And The Same God Is The Person Represented By Moses, And By
Christ

CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL
Of The Holy Spirit That Fel On The Apostles
Of The Trinity
The Power Ecclesiasticall Is But The Power To Teach
An Argument Thereof, The Power Of Christ Himself
From The Name Of Regeneration
From The Comparison Of It, With Fishing, Leaven, Seed
From The Nature Of Faith:
From The Authority Christ Hath Left To Civill Princes
What Christians May Do To Avoid Persecution
Of Martyrs
Argument From The Points Of Their Commission
To Preach
And Teach
To Baptize;
And To Forgive, And Retain Sinnes
Of Excommunication
The Use Of Excommunication Without Civill Power.
Of No Effect Upon An Apostate
But Upon The Faithfull Only
For What Fault Lyeth Excommunication
Of Persons Liable To Excommunication
Of The Interpreter Of The Scriptures Before Civill Soveraigns Became
Christians

Of The Power To Make Scripture Law
Of The Ten Commandements
Of The Judicial, And Leviticall Law
The Second Law
The Old Testament, When Made Canonicall
Of The Power Of Councells To Make The Scripture Law
Of The Right Of Constituting Ecclesiasticall Officers In The Time Of The
Apostles
Matthias Made Apostle By The Congregation.
Paul And Barnabas Made Apostles By The Church Of Antioch
What Offices In The Church Are Magisteriall
Ordination Of Teachers
Ministers Of The Church What
And How Chosen What
Of Ecclesiasticall Revenue, Under The Law Of Moses
In Our Saviours Time, And After
The Civill Soveraign Being A Christian Hath The Right Of Appointing
Pastors
The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only Is De Jure Divino, That Of
Other Pastors Is Jure Civili
Christian Kings Have Power To Execute All Manner Of Pastoral Function
The Civill Soveraigne If A Christian, Is Head Of The Church In His Own
Dominions
Cardinal Bellarmines Books De Summo Pontifice Considered
The First Book
The Second Book
The Third Book
The Fourth Book
Texts For The Infallibility Of The Popes Judgement In Points Of Faith
Texts For The Same In Point Of Manners
Of The Popes Temporall Power

CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MANS
RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOME OF HEAVEN
The Difficulty Of Obeying God And Man Both At Once
Is None To Them That Distinguish Between What Is, And What Is Not
Necessary To Salvation
All That Is Necessary To Salvation Is Contained In Faith And Obedience
What Obedience Is Necessary;
And To What Laws
In The Faith Of A Christian, Who Is The Person Beleeved
The Causes Of Christian Faith
Faith Comes By Hearing
Proved From The Scope Of The Evangelists
From The Sermons Of The Apostles:
From The Easinesse Of The Doctrine:
From Formall And Cleer Texts
From That It Is The Foundation Of All Other Articles
In What Sense Other Articles May Be Called Necessary
That Faith, And Obedience Are Both Of Them Necessary To Salvation
What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto
Obedience To God And To The Civill Soveraign Not Inconsistent
Or Infidel

PART IV. OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE
CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM
MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE
The Kingdome Of Darknesse What
The Church Not Yet Fully Freed Of Darknesse
Four Causes Of Spirituall Darknesse
Errors From Misinterpreting The Scriptures, Concerning The Kingdome Of
God
As That The Kingdome Of God Is The Present Church
And That The Pope Is His Vicar Generall

And That The Pastors Are The Clergy
Error From Mistaking Consecration For Conjuration
Incantation In The Ceremonies Of Baptisme
In Marriage, In Visitation Of The Sick, And In Consecration Of Places
Errors From Mistaking Eternall Life, And Everlasting Death
As The Doctrine Of Purgatory, And Exorcismes, And Invocation Of Saints
The Texts Alledged For The Doctrines Aforementioned Have Been
Answered Before
Answer To The Text On Which Beza Infereth
Explication Of The Place In Mark 9.1
Abuse Of Some Other Texts In Defence Of The Power Of The Pope
The Manner Of Consecrations In The Scripture, Was Without Exorcisms
The Immortality Of Mans Soule, Not Proved By Scripture To Be Of
Nature, But Of Grace
Eternall Torments What
Answer Of The Texts Alledged For Purgatory
Places Of The New Testament For Purgatory Answered
Baptisme For The Dead, How Understood

CHAPTER XLV. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF
THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES
The Originall Of Daemonology
What Were The Daemons Of The Ancients
How That Doctrine Was Spread
Why Our Saviour Controlled It Not
The Scriptures Doe Not Teach That Spirits Are Incorporeall
The Power Of Casting Out Devills, Not The Same It Was In The Primitive
Church
Another Relique Of Gentilisme, Worshipping Images, Left In The Church,
Not Brought Into It
Answer To Certain Seeming Texts For Images
What Is Worship

Distinction Between Divine And Civill Worship
An Image What Phantasmes
Fictions; Materiall Images
Idolatry What
Scandalous Worship Of Images
Answer To The Argument From The Cherubins, And Brazen Serpent
Painting Of Fancies No Idolatry: Abusing Them To Religious Worship Is
How Idolatry Was Left In The Church
Canonizing Of Saints
The Name Of Pontifex
Procession Of Images
Wax Candles, And Torches Lighted

CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND
FABULOUS TRADITIONS
What Philosophy Is
Prudence No Part Of Philosophy
No False Doctrine Is Part Of Philosophy
Nor Learning Taken Upon Credit Of Authors
Of The Beginnings And Progresse Of Philosophy
Of The Schools Of Philosophy Amongst The Athenians
Of The Schools Of The Jews
The Schoole Of Graecians Unprofitable
The Schools Of The Jews Unprofitable
University What It Is
Errors Brought Into Religion From Aristotles Metaphysiques
Errors Concerning Abstract Essences
Nunc-stans
One Body In Many Places, And Many Bodies In One Place At Once
Absurdities In Naturall Philosophy, As Gravity The Cause Of Heavinesse
Quantity Put Into Body Already Made
Powring In Of Soules

Ubiquity Of Apparition
Will, The Cause Of Willing
Ignorance An Occult Cause
One Makes The Things Incongruent, Another The Incongruity
Private Appetite The Rule Of Publique Good:
And That Lawfull Marriage Is Unchastity
And That All Government But Popular, Is Tyranny
That Not Men, But Law Governs
Laws Over The Conscience
Private Interpretation Of Law
Language Of Schoole-Divines
Errors From Tradition
Suppression Of Reason

CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM
SUCH DARKNESSE, AND TO WHOM IT ACCREWETH
He That Receiveth Benefit By A Fact, Is Presumed To Be The Author
That The Church Militant Is The Kingdome Of God, Was First Taught By
The Church Of Rome
And Maintained Also By The Presbytery
Infallibility
Subjection Of Bishops
Exemptions Of The Clergy
The Names Of Sacerdotes, And Sacrifices
The Sacramentation Of Marriage
The Single Life Of Priests
Auricular Confession
Canonization Of Saints, And Declaring Of Martyrs
Transubstantiation, Penance, Absolution
Purgatory, Indulgences, Externall Works
Daemonology And Exorcism
School-Divinity

The Authors Of Spirituall Darknesse, Who They Be
Comparison Of The Papacy With The Kingdome Of Fayries

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION

THE INTRODUCTION

Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by the
art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make
an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining
whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all
Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a
watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the
Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving
motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes
yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature,
Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-
WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man;
though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an
Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall
Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the
Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are
the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches
of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the Peoples
Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to
know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an
artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill
War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this
Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that
Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider
First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights
and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth

and Dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.
Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That
Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently
whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of
being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in
men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there
is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to
read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum,
Read Thy Self: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance,
either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to
encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters;
But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one
man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into
himselfe, and considereth what he doth, when he does Think, Opine,
Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and
know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like
occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men,
Desire, Feare, Hope, &c; not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions,
which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution
individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be
kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and
confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and
erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And
though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes; yet to
do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all
circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher
without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by
too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himselfe a good or evill man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves
him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a
whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that particular man; but
Man-kind; which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any
Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading
orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider,

if he also find not the same in himselfe. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth
no other Demonstration.

PART I.
OF MAN

CHAPTER I.
OF SENSE

Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and
afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are
every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other
Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which
Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by
diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.
The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no
conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been
begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.
To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business
now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at large.
Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver
the same in this place.
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the
organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or
mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the
mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body,
continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or
counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which
endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this
Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the
Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,
in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest of the
body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we
discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that
causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it
presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they
anything els, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but

motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that
dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a
light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we
see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action,
For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause
them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes
by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one
place; the apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the
reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still
the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all
cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the
pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares,
and other organs thereunto ordained.
But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of
Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another
doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth
on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition, or
Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And
for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible
Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen; which entring at
the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding also, they
say the thing Understood sendeth forth Intelligible Species, that is, an
Intelligible Being Seen; which comming into the Understanding, makes us
Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but
because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must
let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in
them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

CHAPTER II.
OF IMAGINATION

That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still
for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion,
it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason
be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily
assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by
themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain,
and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks
repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other
motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From
hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an
appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most
proper for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for
their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate
absurdly.
When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder
it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time,
and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the
wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it
happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man,
then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye
shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than
when we see it. And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image
made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other
senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as
proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but
Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as
well sleeping, as waking.

Memory
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made
in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun
obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their
vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because
amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from
externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the
Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs.
And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it
made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working
on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce
of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the
longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the
Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the
parts which in sense were moved: So that the distance of time, and of place,
hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a distance of place, that which
wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts;
and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of
time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of
Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many
particular Circumstances. This Decaying Sense, when wee would express
the thing it self, (I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said
before; But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is
fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory,
are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe,
Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived
by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which
is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is
Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath
seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at
one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So
when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of
the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or
an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with

reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a
Fiction of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men,
(though waking) from the great impression made in sense; As from gazing
upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a
long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon
Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the
Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no
particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens
discourse.

Dreams
The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these
also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by
parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which
are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily
to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep,
no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the
agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the
connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be
distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there
formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of
Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master
and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs
be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And
hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought
impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my
part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think
of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor
remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other
times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but
never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied,
that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my
selfe awake.
And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.

And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the
thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the
inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that
as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so
when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and
raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as
naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat
in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts,
while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness
shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations;
The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we
Dream, at another.

Apparitions Or Visions
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking
thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept:
which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose
conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances,
of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre.
For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case
any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it
other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given
him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding
murthered him,) how at Phillipi, the night before he gave battell to
Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related
by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may
easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive
and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him,
slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which
feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the
Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he
could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this
is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be
timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the
dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead

mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely,
or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare,
to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong
Fancies, from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of
the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs, and the
like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts,
and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not
that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly
punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe,
joyned with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being neerer to a
new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking
Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or
not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy
Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no
doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so
often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or
change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no
point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any
thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they
think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than
right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious
fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams,
false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which,
crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much
more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what
they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves,
and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and
that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and evill
thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a
man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the
Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common
Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and
the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another,
with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with
the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we
generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a
dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and
so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is
the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by
the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations,
Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding
I shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER III.
OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF
IMAGINATIONS

By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of
one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in
words) Mentall Discourse.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is
not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every
Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof
we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no
Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like
before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions
within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that
immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together
after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be
praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, is
such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part
of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing
perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to
passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what
we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that
succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first
is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is no
Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the

end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts
are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream.
Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without
company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their
Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound
which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that
could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-
times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon
another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem
more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman
Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of
the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his
Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up
of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price
of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all
this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire, and
designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is
strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong
it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the
Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we
ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean;
and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power.
And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to
mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced
into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give
men this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say, in
all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that
directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is
common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing
whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced;
that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of
which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a
curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no
other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In
summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is
nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call
Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present
or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause, sometimes a man
seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses
it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where,
and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and
place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his
thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other
occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to
mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning of our
former actions.
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse
whereof his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a
Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the
alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence
Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another;
supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil
become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime
before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the
Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and
Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture,
through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But

this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past,
than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the
seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past
have a being in the Memory onely, but things To Come have no being at all;
the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions
Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by
him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it
be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its
own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come,
which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come.
From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet
naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and
studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

Signes
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the
Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been
observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse
uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any
kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time,
and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he
that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage
of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the
contrary.
Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is
for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the
Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from
other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses
and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civill warre, and then to

ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like
warre, and the like courses have been there also. But his conjecture, has the
same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being
grounded onely upon Experience.
There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be
born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties,
of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are
acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by
instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and
Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the
mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and
Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to
distinguish men from all other living Creatures.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or
conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an
Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing
named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And
therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is
Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but
that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we
conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a
man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No
man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some
place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be
divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another
place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the
same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to
Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification
at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving
Schoolemen.

CHAPTER IV.
OF SPEECH

Originall Of Speech
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the
use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men
say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable
Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of
mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with
all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers
motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to
make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most
noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of
Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their
Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to
another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been
amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor
Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of
Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such
creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in
this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the
experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn
them in such manner by degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by
succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use
for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do
not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence
can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers,
Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of

Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative,
Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of
Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And
being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world,
it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by
degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions)
taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The Use Of Speech
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for
two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of
our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a
new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by.
So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of
remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by
their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of
each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for,
and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these;
First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing,
present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or
effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others
that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach
one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that
we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and
delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when
men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of
their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they
never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for;
and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be
their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another:
for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with
horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of
Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are
obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the
Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common Universall
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man,
Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name
of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an
Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the
things named, are every one of them Individual and Singular.
One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to
mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.
And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent;
the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is
of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the
names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually
one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes
understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by
circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In His
Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name,
equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined
in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For
example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and
remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and
by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may
by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are
equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be
shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a
new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But
he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was
consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing
in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles
three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly
conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles
whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every
Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the
consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred,
as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and
place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and
makes that which was found true Here, and Now, to be true in All Times
and Places.
But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident
as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order
of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe every stroak of
the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what
houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of
number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or
both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence
it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in
some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he
recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has
done: Much lesse will he be able to add, and substract, and performe all
other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no
possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of
Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are
necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or
Affirmation; as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man,
He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that
the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is
True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of
things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour
there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what
has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.
Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what
every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will
find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he
struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely
Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin
at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations,
they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to
correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them
himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as
the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they
see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in
which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that
they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a
greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast
up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their
first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in
fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and
finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse
window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the
right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the
Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions’ lyes the first
abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those
men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from
their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as
men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and
erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and

imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as
men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or
more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to
become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease,
or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens
counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that
value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any
other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject To Names
Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one
from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony
Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books
of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it
seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of
Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for
both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without
Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they
called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one
saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for
divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested,
and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall
heads.
First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the
word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being So
Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a
little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we
consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot,
Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are the names of
the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is

distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because
Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we
reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the
fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the Hearing, or
Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such
are names of fancies.
Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall,
Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation,
Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other
such, are names of Speeches.

Use Of Names Positive
And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as
Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that
are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names With Their Uses
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing,
No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like; which are
nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to
mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because
they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words Insignificant
All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition;

whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled
Philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or
(which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more. For
whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is
composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example
if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round, the word Round
Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be
false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words
In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a
Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselesse
and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names.
A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but
by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that
one is Latin, the other French.

Understanding
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which
the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and
constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding
being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if
Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding
peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case
they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many think they
understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in
their mind.
What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of
mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of
the Passions.

Inconstant Names

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease
us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same
man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of Inconstant
signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions;
and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same
things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For
though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our
reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices
of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And
therefore in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the
signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of
the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man
calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another
Justice; one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what
another Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds
of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but
these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.

CHAPTER V.
OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.

Reason What It Is
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe
totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from
Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is
conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of
the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the
other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and
Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet
they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things
equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can.
These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of
things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as
Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers; so the
Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and superficiall,)
Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the
like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding
together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to
make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and
from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one
Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions,
to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what is Right
and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever
there is place for Addition and Substraction, there also is place for Reason;
and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Reason Defined
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is,
which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the
Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning
(that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names
agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking
them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate,
or approve our reckonings to other men.

Right Reason Where
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors
themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of
Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive
themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is
always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art:
But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes
the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a
great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there
is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up
for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose
sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to
blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature;
so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think
themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for
judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other
mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is
in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite
whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will
have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken
for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want
of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use Of Reason

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of
one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled
significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one
consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last
Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on
which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in
taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one
sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them
in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more,
than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants
skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up
conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first
Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by
definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely
beleeveth.

Of Error And Absurdity
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in
particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture
what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that
which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought
likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to
which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in
Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is
false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or
senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat
is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet
there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall
assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And
words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call
Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to
me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or
Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but
free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an
Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other
Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he
was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with
it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by
words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called
Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in
number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or
substracted from another.
But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of
Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of
men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is
most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so
absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is
manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the
Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method
that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby
been made indisputable.

Causes Of Absurditie
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in
that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled
significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing
the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.
And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and
unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore
The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names
of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say,
Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed into
any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are
Spirits, &c.
The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies
Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the
Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches;
as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living Creature
Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.
The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and
Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition; A
Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.
The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures,
in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in
common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither, The
Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs
speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be
admitted.
The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned
by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate,
Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.
To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any
absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps
forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when
they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in
Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Science
By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with
us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by
Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to
Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we
come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the
subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and
Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable;
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact
upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to
do something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when we
see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner;

when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce
the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the
most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in
numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in
which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their
differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to
severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors
of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are
so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought
Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the
beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be
acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no
thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers
and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.
But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with
their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting
them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For
ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way,
as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those
that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.
To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the
Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End.
And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are
like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or
contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For
though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the
Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing

the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference
appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent
naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added
to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be
offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability
of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience;
both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the
authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the
false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an
adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

Signes Of Science
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the
same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another:
Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and
upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence
are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all
circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any
businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to
forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences
read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and
generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men
themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their
reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique
affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence
enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the
reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

CHAPTER VI.
OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF
VOLUNTARY MOTIONS COMMONLY CALLED
THE PASSIONS, AND THE SPEECHES BY
WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.

Motion Vitall And Animal
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called
Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through
their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the
Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions
there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion, otherwise
called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in
such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the
organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things
we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion,
remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second
Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like Voluntary motions,
depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and
What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all
Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any
motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it
is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder,
but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is
moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be
moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of

Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible
actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst;
Aversion
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other,
oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and
Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the
Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the
other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme
and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths,
which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they
stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no
actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge,
they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech; for though
Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.
That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those
things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the
same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the
object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by
Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.
Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of
food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more
properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;)
and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon
themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not
to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee
have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do
not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt
Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to
Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy
of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from
that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or
from want of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it
is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same
Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of
almost any one and the same Object.

Good Evill
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it,
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and
Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these
words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the
person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor
any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the
objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no
Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that
representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall
by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant
Unprofitable
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to
those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are
Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some
apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill.
But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But
for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or

Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for
Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject
shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els,
but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill. So that of
Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in
Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good
as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and as many of evill: For
evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is
Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile,
Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Delight Displeasure
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before)
onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to
the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c:
so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares,
and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or
Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object
moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call
DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure Offence
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a
help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not
improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the
contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion
vitall.
Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and
Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And
consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some
Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse
Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy
Paine Griefe
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present;
And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall, as it is
used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be
Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as
also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others
arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or
Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or
Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of him that draweth those
consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner,
Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the
Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.
These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy,
and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first,
when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion
men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the
object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them
together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.
Hope— For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
Despaire— The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.
Feare— Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.
Courage— The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance,
COURAGE.
Anger— Sudden Courage, ANGER.
Confidence— Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.
Diffidence— Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.
Indignation— Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive
the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.
Benevolence— Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD
WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse— Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used
alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are
displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be
to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are
sought.
Ambition— Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used
also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
Pusillanimity— Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And
fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
Magnanimity— Contempt of little helps, and hindrances,
MAGNANIMITY.
Valour— Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR,
FORTITUDE.
Liberality— Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY
Miserablenesse— Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE,
MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.
Kindnesse— Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.
Naturall Lust— Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely,
NATURAL LUST.
Luxury— Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is
Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.
The Passion Of Love; Jealousie— Love of one singularly, with desire to
be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that
the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.
Revengefulnesse— Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him
condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.
Curiosity— Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no
living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the
appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take
away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a
perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of
Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion— Feare of power invisible, feigned
by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not
allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we
imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
Panique Terrour— Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what,
PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of
them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some
apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one
supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to
none but in a throng, or multitude of people.
Admiration— Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper
to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
Glory Vaine-glory— Joy, arising from imagination of a man’s own power
and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING:
which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the
same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely
supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called
VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded
Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not,
and is therefore rightly called Vaine.
Dejection— Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of
mind.
The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities
in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and
nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected
often times by Age, and Employment.
Sudden Glory Laughter— Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh
those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden
act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud
themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest
abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own
favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much
Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great
minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and
compare themselves onely with the most able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping— On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the
passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and
they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as
are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends;
Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their
thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter and
Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man
Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.
Shame Blushing— Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is
SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and
consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young
men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old
men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not
commendable.
Impudence— The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
Pitty— Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the
imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is
called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a
FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from great
wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity,
those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
Cruelty— Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that
which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens’ great harmes, without
other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
Emulation Envy— Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth,
honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own
abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with
Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.
Deliberation— When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions,
Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and
divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to
be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum

of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be either
done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought
so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of things
impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is
in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to
the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or
Aversion.
This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is no
less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.
Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or
Aversion.

The Will
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to
the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act,
(not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must
necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by
the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then
could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that,
which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall
Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation,
then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The
Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a
man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet
that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary;
because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite.
For if the intervenient Appetites make any action Voluntary, then by the
same reason all intervenient Aversions should make the same action
Involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both Voluntary &
Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning
from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or
Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary
Actions.

Formes Of Speech, In Passion
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts.
And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I
Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them have
particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not
affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides
that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed
Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their
consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and differs not
from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words,
but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire,
and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the
party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els
Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and
Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar
expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It, When Shall It, How Is It
Done, and Why So? Other language of the Passions I find none: for
Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as
the actions of a tongue accustomed.
These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations
of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used
arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best
signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the
body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to
have.

Good And Evill Apparent

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those
consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which
Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill
exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who
hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of
Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give
the best counsel unto others.

Felicity
Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as
perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but
Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than
without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that
devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys,
that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical
Vision, is unintelligible.

Praise Magnification
The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatness
of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion
they have of a man’s felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which
we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present
purpose to have been said of the passions.

CHAPTER VII.
OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF
DISCOURSE

Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an
End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse,
wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans
Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not
Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that which
is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is
alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the
last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so the last Opinion in search
of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and
Final Sentence of him that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites
alternate, in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the
whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False is called
DOUBT.
No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past,
or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and
ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man
can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to
know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That

has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and
that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a
thing, to another name of the same thing.

Science Opinion Conscience
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with
the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into
general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last
sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is
that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words,
which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of such Discourse
be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into
Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the
truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words,
without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of
one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another;
which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest
witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be
reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to
corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has
been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men
made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own
secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that the
Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in
love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately
bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name
of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most
but that they think so.

Beliefe Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion;
Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the

truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the
Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the
Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe,
both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are
two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have
Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an
opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth
onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this
Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno
Eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other
writings are put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and
in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this
singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes
about the right object of the Christian Faith.
But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not
onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all
for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all
the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they
do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.
From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying
whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it
selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and
good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our
Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And
consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and
Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And
they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God,
take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and
believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a
false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not
believe all that is written By Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander,
or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just
cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the
Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God

therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no
other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their
writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED
INTELLECTUAL, AND THEIR CONTRARY
DEFECTS

Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for
eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all
men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are
always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and
desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a
Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one
certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I
mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but
Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts,
as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is
gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or
Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things;
Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;)
and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow
Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly
called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie
slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore
some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and
observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And
whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in
the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in
what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such
A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are
but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in
this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their
differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and
Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning
be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and particularly in matter
of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be
discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy,
without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later
which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the
help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons,
necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his
thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This
done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will
please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new
and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without
Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of
Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched
from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so
many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose
themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the
cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a
man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by
which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and
whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes
a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets,
Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But
the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy;
but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.
In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely
in adorning the stile.
In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done
by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what
circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.
In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be
opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But
for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly
professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest
folly.
And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent,
how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for
a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest,
though the Fancy be never so ordinary.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean,
obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse
cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and
Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of
unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to
write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from
being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good
company. And ’tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again,
in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with
the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words; and that many times
with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or
before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no

Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is
onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not
Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is
Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

Prudence
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what
designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie,
or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on much
Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in
their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in
age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions;
every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a
kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of
businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater
then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more
Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the affaires
of another man.

Craft
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as
usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked
Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For
Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the
Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off
of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a
man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia,
from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present
payment of interest.

Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there
is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and
produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken
in the fifth and sixth Chapters.
The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the
difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of
the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference
proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either
exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight,
Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds
therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the
difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes,
and education.
The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally,
the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of
Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For
Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

Giddinesse Madnesse
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as
to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great
Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts,
and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All
Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding
from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak
Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing,
GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement
Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men
call MADNESSE.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the
evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the

vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the
Madnesse is of one and the same nature.
The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either
great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt; or
great Dejection of mind.

Rage
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire
of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes
Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive
opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning,
forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: the same, joyned
with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted
by others, Rage.

Melancholy
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in
haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing
some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that
produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of
Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the
paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is
no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees
of the same.
(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many
of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible
enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to
clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat
lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and

destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected,
and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the
same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man
perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured,
that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of
the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in
one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions,
are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were
nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such
inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam
should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave,
to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and
he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no
extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.
This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very
often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and
not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to
so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they
light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of
God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his
Spirit.
Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those
of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men
that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them
Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to
their severall domineering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but
remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of
their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone
without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity
and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen:
which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere
Madnesse.
The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the
cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions;
some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought

might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange,
and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore,
called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes
Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that
is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not
onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks,
at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day:
whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this
accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they did
nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and
Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on
of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion
imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in
another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of
the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might
proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not
contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such
as so hang’d themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes
cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often
ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and
sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to
Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and generally to call
them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the
Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they calle mad-men Prophets, or
(according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some
of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called
the same man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, ’tis no
wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many
naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So
that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as
a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For
neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a
Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any
thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there
was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb.

11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70.
Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided.
The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to
Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) “Whom I have filled with
the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron,” is not meant a spirit put
into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in
that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth
unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits,
though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is
extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old
Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by
Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession,
but Command. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of
possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men;
namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing
Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the
things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange,
and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall,
from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and
if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it
be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the
Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels;
as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some
said, “He hath a Divell, and is mad;” whereas others holding him for a
Prophet, sayd, “These are not the words of one that hath a Divell.” So in the
old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet;
but some of the company asked Jehu, “What came that mad-man for?” So
that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in
extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with
a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the
other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very
neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to
terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they
were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other

kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in
like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture
was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their
mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the
Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their
naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and
night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or
from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience,
and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture
was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person;
it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and
Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not
Christ also said (Math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also
(Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a
Divel. And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is
not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men
confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an
unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places,
seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven
other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a
man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the
strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see
nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks
were any other thing but Mad-men.

Insignificant Speech
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also
be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words,
whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of
Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in
them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through
misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by
others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none
but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the
Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of

men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other
Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without
any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some
Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his
hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult
point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation;
Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same
intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted
withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning
of these words. “The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into
the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by
which it may help it to worke?” They are the Translation of the Title of the
sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help
Of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad,
or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of
Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the
White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which
are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed
Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many
spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that
being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another.
So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many
sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their
worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals.
And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

CHAPTER IX.
OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF
KNOWLEDGE

There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of
Fact: the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To
Another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is
Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done:
And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called
Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that, If The Figure Showne
Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through The Centre Shall Divide It
Into Two Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher;
that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.
The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts, or
Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the
Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is
Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in
Common-wealths.
The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity
of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in
the following Table.
I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY

A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY

1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.

a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined

a) By Figure, By Number

1] Mathematiques,

GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE

2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
Speciall

a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,

1] Cosmography

ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,

1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight

Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION

2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities

a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

METEOROLOGY

b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent

1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres

a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
Science of

SCIOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,

ASTROLOGY

2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the

Ayre, or substance aetherial.

3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
without Sense,

1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
. 2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals

1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
Generall

a] Consequences from Vision,

OPTIQUES

b] Consequences from Sounds,

MUSIQUE

c] Consequences from the rest of the senses

2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall

a] Consequences from Passions of Men,

ETHIQUES

b] Consequences from Speech,

i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.

POETRY

ii) In Persuading,

RHETORIQUE

iii) In Reasoning,

LOGIQUE

iv) In Contracting,

The Science of
JUST and UNJUST

B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY

1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
the Subjects.

CHAPTER X.
OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND
WORTHINESS

Power
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to
obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall.
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as
extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality,
Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by
fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation,
Friends, and the Secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For
the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds;
or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the
more hast.
The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the
Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill,
that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the
Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;
such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to
have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for they are strengths
united.
Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends,
and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend
not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.
Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance
of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the
same Reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the
assistance, and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or
good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it
gaineth love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power;
because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more
willingly than to others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.
Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men
to the favour of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a
few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be,
but such as in a good measure have attayned it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are
Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the
Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of
the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the
Mother,) as his issue.

Worth
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is
to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is
not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another.
An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or

imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much
Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so
in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as
most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true
Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high
rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and
low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each
man setteth on himselfe.

Dignity
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this
Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of
Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles,
introduced for distinction of such Value.

To Honour and Dishonour
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe
we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is,
the more is the Honour.
To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to
Dishonour.
To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because ’tis buying of
Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to
Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of
small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to
Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to
Dishonour.
To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being
a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to
love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare then he
expects, is to Dishonour; for ’tis undervaluing.
To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but
goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to
Dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To
speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion
of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.
To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go
forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.
To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or
which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving
the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.
To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his
judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of
errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.
To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones
Enemy, is to Dishonour.
To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.
To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe
of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the
same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.
All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without
Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the
supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of
Honour, there be other Honours.
A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or
Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his

will to Honour him.
The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should
be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the
Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, “Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour.” And
yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded
for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so
to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and
then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour; such as are Magistracy,
Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted: and men
Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the
Common-wealth; which favour is Power.
Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.
And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.
Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill
fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are
Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage,
Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of
Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And
Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little
impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as
long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but
little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is
Pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are
Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly,
Dishonourable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power.
But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a

Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship
ballasted with Sand, and other trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great
Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for
which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as
signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the
contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and
difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for
Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient
Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods,
when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and
other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much
celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and
Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that
being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before
night, stolen away the Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it
was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a
lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other
Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in
this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable,
though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them
that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also
are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes
Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects
of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the
Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd
disgrace.
Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent
Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either
in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured

in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been
derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing
known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any
where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek
Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such
Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of
Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance
of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were
the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia,
Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The
Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into
England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded
the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the
world.
For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings,
divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families,
that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords,
principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be
known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their
Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other
thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their
Helmets. And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by
inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some
note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt
thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater
Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a
private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient
Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage,
and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and
other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.
Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers
manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it,
for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an
observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek and
Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their
times.

Titles of Honour
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne Power
of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and
Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and
French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites,
such as bare the Generall company out of friendship; and were left to
govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones,
were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which
titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of
Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron,
seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as
were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their
persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified
the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to
Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones;
and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the
originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens
most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of
Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable
government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to
distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-
wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of
Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles
also, were devised to the same end.

Worthinesse Fitnesse
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man;
and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or
ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is
usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well
discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most

requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent,
one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else.
Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that
neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore
cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and
that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more
hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

CHAPTER XI.
OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

What Is Here Meant By Manners
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his
teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those
qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity.
To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not
in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost
ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books
of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose
Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a
stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to
another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The
cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely,
and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future
desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men,
tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life;
and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of
passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or
opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a
perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in
Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more

intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be
content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and
means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their
endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and
when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from
new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of
admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of
the mind.

Love Of Contention From Competition
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other.
Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity.
For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more
than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common
Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might
be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.

From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same
reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their
present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command,
are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and
sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to
mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

And From Love Of Arts
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a
common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and
consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them
whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we
contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And
though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as
being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of
Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such
Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight
of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which
though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in
the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater
benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but
really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that
in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he
might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome;
which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits from one,
whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the
obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call
Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for
retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as
long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of
the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence
proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble

and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his
victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and
liberty.

And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better
disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For
these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first.
And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold
together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that
can proceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined
onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty
appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of
other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground
of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash
engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can:

because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour,
which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is
sufficient.

Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost.
And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence
seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others

Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small
Matters
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the
occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in
deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what
is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and
the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion
by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.
Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve
such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth
their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.
Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and
Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that
have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming
Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to
adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two
former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives
them caution against danger from others.

And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all
men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on
the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see
not why he should deceive them.

And From Want Of Understanding
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding,
disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also
the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither
Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be
detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and
the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that
approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie:
and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a
greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without
study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many
actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the
Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of
Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action
of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of
men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.
Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And
Wrong Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity,
Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule
of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the
custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof
they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false
measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that
have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they
receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to
their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn,
they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it

serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and
setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is
the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed,
both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures,
is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that
crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been
a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men
that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall
To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed,
yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he
whom it concerned was able.
Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the
causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they
perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are
grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the
Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the
publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike
Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond
hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of
punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to
believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary,
but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And
Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth
them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a
man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent
them.

Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of
things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order
the present to their best advantage.

Naturall Religion, From The Same
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that
cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is
some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it
men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into
naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God
Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable
to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming
themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same,
may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which
men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine
what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see
it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a
man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet
not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things,
yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that
hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and
feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in
awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as
also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making
the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come
to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in
the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is
the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and
in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do,
Superstition.
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those
that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and
forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of

the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able
to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their
Powers.

CHAPTER XII.
OF RELIGION

Religion, In Man Onely
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely; there
is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man; and
consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree
thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the
Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much,
as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill
fortune.

From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of
Things
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also
it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather
than sooner or later.

From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of
their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the
time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order,
consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how
one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them
Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the
true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most
part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy
suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be
his friends, and wiser than himselfe.
The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come The
two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things
that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a
man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he
feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude
of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over
provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus,
(which interpreted, is, The Prudent Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a
place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in
the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too
far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long,
gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose,
nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible
Things
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance
of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse,
either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In
which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods
were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to
say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging
of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived,

from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their
severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall
them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe,
should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to
the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of
causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen
Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall
cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And
all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both
enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other
things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be
men that feigne them.

And Suppose Them Incorporeall
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed; they
could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was
the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of
the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that
sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not
knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy,
think to be reall, and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts;
as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits,
that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to
bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the
opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never
enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put
together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet
they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And
therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement
of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he
is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his
Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and then Confesse their definition to be
unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with
intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him

with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse
of Bodies Visible.

But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought
their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing
things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call Causing, (that is,
almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and
remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other
time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and
subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from
the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good
or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the
causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another
Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their warre in Afrique, another Scipio;
and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they
attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words
spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and
Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have
power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any
thing.

But Honour Them As They Honour Men
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they
would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body,
Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing
(that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond
that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for
further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than
themselves.

And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things
which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or
evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular
undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of
the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take
casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like
encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other
men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for
Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of
the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown
up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are
for the most part ridiculous to another.

Made Different By Culture
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort
have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their
own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and
direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men
that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and
civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane
Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of
their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and
containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the
Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all the Founders of Common-
wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were
Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived
unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.

The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning
the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that
has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God,
or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or
possessed by some Spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.
The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were
so many Gods.
Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a
Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called
Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods, with
Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every
River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every
house, with it Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with
Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in
the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased,
and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed
Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are
Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour,
Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against,
they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their
heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against
which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of
Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the
name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy
members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi,
and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could
introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or
a Divel.
The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second
ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their
aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no
dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in
stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing
the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty
and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other

effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost
as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.
And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their
Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is
to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for
whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were
housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And
endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart
from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those
their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and
have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts,
some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts;
as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one
with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men,
and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as
Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other
passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as
Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an
effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men
are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.
Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but
Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine
Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon
pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added
innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men believe
they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse
answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles;
which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both
wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very
frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of
whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments
now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books
in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique: Sometimes in the
insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine
Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme; and these kinds of

foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy; Sometimes in
the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and
esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and
feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of
Witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called
Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and
confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds;
called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was
Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or
chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was
called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall
words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as
Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births,
and the like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought
them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in
meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses
in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie
are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten
credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their
fear, and ignorance.
The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And
therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst
the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and
peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a
beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not
be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some
God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature
than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So
Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst
the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the
Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the
Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have
conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove. Secondly, they have
had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the
Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe
Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by which they were
to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in

War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private
Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect
of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the
Ceremonies required. And though amongst the antient Romans, men were
not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and
pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that
state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies
more cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their
end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people
in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their
Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to
mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and
pastime of Festivalls, and publike Gomes, made in honour of the Gods,
needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring,
and commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had
conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of
tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it
had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; nor
do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes;
who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to
acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus
you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.
The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But
where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he
also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of
behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in
the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion;
and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath
there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be
King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity
therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army,
should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. God is
King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by
Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of God, both by
Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other
place.

The Causes Of Change In Religion
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes
of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are
only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can
never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may
againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for
such purpose are in reputation.
For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a
multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise
man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to
whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It
followeth necessarily, when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall
come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love
suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine
Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be
suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted
and rejected.

Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth
a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a
beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly
be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them, is an argument of
ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things
else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a
man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall
reason.

Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or
saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other
men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings

are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that
make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse,
Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such
actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such
Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser
faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or
seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or
secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap
benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not
for love of others

Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no
other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a
Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of
Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those
that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain
no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in
which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in naturall things,
men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments; so in
supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,)
before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in
the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of
Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by
Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40
dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by
him; and setting up (Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed
into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately
delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which
had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2 11) were dead; another
generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles fayling, Faith also
failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted by their
father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people
of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner
than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to
choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice Fayling,
Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over
them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in
all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased
wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles,
and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed,
to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had
brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between
Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same
cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome;
insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the
People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of
Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence there arose so
many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a
reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined
people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as
in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for
Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of
his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes,
that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might
without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, as easily as it has
been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose
benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority
from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest,
cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not,
must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from
their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an
Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a
Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his
Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be
exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does

not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of
Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most
lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more
sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity
of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the
world, to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those
not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed
most of Reformation.

CHAPTER XIII.
OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF
MANKIND, AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY,
AND MISERY

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in
body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together,
the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one
man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not
pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon
words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible
rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being
not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we
look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than
that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally
bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain
conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a
greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a
few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they
approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may
acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more
learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves:
For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this
proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is

not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than
that every man is contented with his share.

From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of
our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way
to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes
their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And
from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare,
than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a
convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with
forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his
labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like
danger of another.

From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power
great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own
conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be
some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others,
that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not
by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by
standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such
augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans
conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them
all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the
same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or

undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them
that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make
them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by
dommage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel.
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the
third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of
other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them;
the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their
Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out Of Civil States, There Is Alwayes Warre Of
Every One Against Every One
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called
Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For
WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract
of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and
therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it
is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a
showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together:
So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
All other time is PEACE.

The Incommodities Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men
live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own
invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for

Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture
of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be
imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and
removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of
the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is
worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of
man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and
destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference,
made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by
Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a
journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going
to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and
this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to
revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow
subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his
dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he
not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But
neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of
man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from
those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Lawes be
made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed
upon the Person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor
condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all
the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the
savage people in many places of America, except the government of small
Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no
government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said
before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be,
where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which
men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to
degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were
in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and

persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in
continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts,
Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall
Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they
uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it,
that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no
Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two
Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of
the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in
the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that
relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same
condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine
distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as
he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer
Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it,
consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their
Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are
they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak
more particularly, in the two following Chapters.

CHAPTER XIV.
OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL
LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS

Right Of Nature What
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is
the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason,
hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty What
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason
shall dictate to him.

A Law Of Nature What
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and
to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though
they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and
Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in

liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one
of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty;
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the
precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one;
in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is
nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving
his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every
man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore,
as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there
can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living
out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.

The Fundamental Law Of Nature
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, “That every
man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and
advantages of Warre.” The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first,
and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, “To seek Peace, and follow it.”
The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, “By all means we
can, to defend our selves.”

The Second Law Of Nature
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to
endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; “That a man be willing, when
others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he
shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himselfe.” For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any
thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other

men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for
any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey,
(which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is
that Law of the Gospell; “Whatsoever you require that others should do to
you, that do ye to them.” And that Law of all men, “Quod tibi feiri non vis,
alteri ne feceris.”

What it is to lay down a Right
To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the
Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For
he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a
Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man
had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may
enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without
hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by
another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to
the use of his own Right originall.

Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation
Duty Injustice
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it
to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the
benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in
either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be
OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted,
or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his DUTY,
not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is
INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being before
renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of
the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is
called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what
one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and

Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had
voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or
Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary
and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or
hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And
these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth
most often) both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by
which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not
from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans
word,) but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.

Not All Rights Are Alienable
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in
consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for
some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the
voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To Himselfe. And
therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any
words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man
cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to
take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any
Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and
Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience;
as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or
imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed
against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the
motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or Right is
introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and
in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if
a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for
which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant
it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and
actions were to be interpreted.

Contract What

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.
There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing
may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying
and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be
delivered some time after.

Covenant What
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time
after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is
called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe
hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being
trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and the
fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.

Free-gift
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or
from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or
Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in
hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT,
GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.

Signes Of Contract Expresse
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are
words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words are
either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have Given, I Have
Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future; as, I Will Give, I Will
Grant; which words of the future, are called Promise.

Signes Of Contract By Inference
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words;
sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of
Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally
a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the
will of the Contractor.

Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if
they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they are a signe I
have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but
remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the
time Present, or Past, as, “I have given, or do give to be delivered to
morrow,” then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the
vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And
there is a great difference in the signification of these words, Volos Hoc
Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo; that is between “I will that this be thine to
morrow,” and, “I will give it to thee to morrow:” For the word I Will, in the
former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the
later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the
former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that
be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will
to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may
the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man
propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is
Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he
would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them
runne.
Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In
Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time
Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all Contract
is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth
onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth,

is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he
had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have
performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other
acts of Contract, A Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore
obligatory.

Merit What
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that
which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as
Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him
onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by
them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch,
is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the
Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not
determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is
between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit
by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of
Free Gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In
Contract, I merit at The Contractors hand that hee should depart with his
right; In this case of gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his
right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than
anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the
Schooles, between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God
Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall
desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and
Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit
Paradise Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his
own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace
of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say,
I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree
upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their
turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a
gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth
Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.

Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently,
but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition
of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it
is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set over them bothe, with right
and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that
performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the
bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and
other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the
condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the
justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he
which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to
the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.
But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that
would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for
that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.
The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be
alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or
other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the Covenant
Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to
be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means
He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as
farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to
transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that
sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man
The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the
right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates
for the administration of Justice.

No Covenant With Beasts

To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation
of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and without mutuall
acceptation, there is no Covenant.

Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation
To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as
God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants
that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we know not
whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow
any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing
unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of
Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future
The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth
under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an
act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to
be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that
Covenanteth, to performe.
And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no
Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was
thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the
thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the
unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no
man can be obliged.

Covenants How Made Voyd
Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being
Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and
Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that
Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide
Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my
life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one
receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it;
and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature)
forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of
warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it;
And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for
feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth
some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-
wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him
mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For
whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully
Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot
lawfully break.

The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The
Later To Another
A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away
his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and
therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right
to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding
whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,) and therefore the
promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is
obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, “Unlesse I do so, or so, kill
me;” he cannot Covenant thus “Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you,

when you come to kill me.” For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill,
which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is
certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by
all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed
men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by
which they are condemned.

No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe
A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is
likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge,
there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is
followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to
resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose
Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor.
For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is
praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and
where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, his not bound to give it. Also
Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture
is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further
examination, and search of truth; and what is in that case confessed, tendeth
to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and
therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether
he deliver himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of
preserving his own life.

The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath
The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold
men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but
two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the
consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to
need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed
on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure;
which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is
Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits

Invisible; the other, the Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of
these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later
is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his
own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society.
The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their
promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power
is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the time of Civill
Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can
strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of
Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that
Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a
Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men
not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he
feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of Speech, Added To A
Promise; By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That Unlesse He
Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To Him For
Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, “Let Jupiter kill me
else, as I kill this Beast.” So is our Forme, “I shall do thus, and thus, so help
me God.” And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth
in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater.

No Oath, But By God
By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or
Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no
Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men
have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they
would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour.
And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name:
and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not
Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of
talking.

An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much
as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an
Oath.

CHAPTER XV.
OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

The Third Law Of Nature, Justice
From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to
another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there
followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their Covenants
Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the
Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of
Warre.

Justice And Injustice What
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no
action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is
Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not
Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.
Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are
invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet
Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken
away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be
done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there
must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance
of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the

benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that
Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the
universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the
erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the
ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that “Justice is
the constant Will of giving to every man his own.” And therefore where
there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there
is no coerceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth,
there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where
there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of
Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of
Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient
to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

Justice Not Contrary To Reason
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep
Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He
does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes
broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called
Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether
Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his
heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which
dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it
conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not
onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The
Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by
unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to
receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or
else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that in
all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it,

when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen that believed,
that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same
Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in
Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the
Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and Eo
Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From which instances a man will be very
prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him
that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what
other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the
voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those
actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious
reasoning is nevertheless false.
For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of
performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over
the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where
one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make
him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is,
against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not
against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that
when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen,
and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident
which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such
events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a
condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common
Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by
his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the
help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the
Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he
thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other
means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He
therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he
thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that
unite themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour of them that
receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the
danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon
as the means of his security; and therefore if he be left, or cast out of
Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other

men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently
against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not
to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for
themselves.
As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of
Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.
And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be
expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are
taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason.
Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason,
by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and
consequently a Law of Nature.
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature,
to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth;
but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the
breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable;
(such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell
against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.)
But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much
lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a
beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally,
or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it
supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or
Nature.

Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The
Person To Whom Made
Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do
neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as
use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against
reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant

made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the
making of it.

Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What
The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie
one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are
attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to
Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the
Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life,
but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care
he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that
neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the
names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the
meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title,
by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or
mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his
character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares to do, for feare: because
his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he
is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a
certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a
man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or
breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant,
where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.
But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse; and
the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the
name of Guilty.

Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any
individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say
Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the
Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by

one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when The Master
commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the
Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but
the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation;
and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Common-wealths,
private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other
violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is
an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the
Person of the Common-wealth.

Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can
Be Injury
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to
the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away
his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant,
there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he
have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that
Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice Commutative, And Distributive
Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and
Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall;
the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in
the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the
distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice
to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The
value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the
Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to
give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance
on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under
Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is
rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense
wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly,

Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance
of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending,
and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.
And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act
of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him
Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his
own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though
improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a
Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.

The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude
As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend
on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the fourth
Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, “That a man which
receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which
giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will.” For no
man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is
Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own
Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no
beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of
reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still
in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law
of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace. The breach of this Law,
is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath
to Obligation by Covenant.

The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance
A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, “That every
man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest.” For the understanding
whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a
diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to
that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as
that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room

from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made
plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as
unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature,
will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to
others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be
corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For
seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is
supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his
conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things
superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore
doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which
commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called
SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn,
Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

The Sixth, Facility To Pardon
A sixth Law of Nature is this, “That upon caution of the Future time, a
man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it.” For
PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them
that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to
them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace;
and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely
The Future Good
A seventh is, “That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) Men
look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to
follow.” Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other
designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this
Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon
security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the
Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of
another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and

glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without
reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of
Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

The Eighth, Against Contumely
And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be
revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this
Precept, “That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare
Hatred, or Contempt of another.” The breach of which Law, is commonly
called Contumely.

The Ninth, Against Pride
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer
Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The
inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that
Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine,
maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser
sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve,
(meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as
if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by
difference of Wit; which is not only against reason; but also against
experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe
themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own
conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do
they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature
therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if
Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves
equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such
equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put
this, “That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature.” The
breach of this Precept is Pride.

The Tenth Against Arrogance
On this law, dependeth another, “That at the entrance into conditions of
Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not
content should be reserved to every one of the rest.” As it is necessary for
all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to
say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to
retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water,
motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a
man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace,
men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to
others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the
acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of
Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the
breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia;
that is, a desire of more than their share.

The Eleventh Equity
Also “If a man be trusted to judge between man and man,” it is a precept
of the Law of Nature, “that he deale Equally between them.” For without
that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He
therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men
from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the
fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.
The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of
that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have
sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons,
Prosopolepsia.

The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common
And from this followeth another law, “That such things as cannot be
divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing
permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that

have Right.” For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to
Equitie.

The Thirteenth, Of Lot
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in
common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth,
“That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First
Possession, be determined by Lot.” For equall distribution, is of the Law of
Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising
Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that
which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture,
(which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or First
Seisure.
And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor
divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to
the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

The Fifteenth, Of Mediators
It is also a Law of Nature, “That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed
safe Conduct.” For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End,
commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is
safe Conduct.

The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,
there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First,
whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the
Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of

Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the
question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as
farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is
called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, “That
they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an
Arbitrator.”

The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so
fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be
Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the
cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In
Him Cause Of Partiality
For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for
Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth
out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though
an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him.
And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth,
contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse
And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to
one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a
third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided,
and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.
These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of
Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular

men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may
therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature
hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent
enough to this place.

A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily
Be Examined
And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of
Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie
in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men
unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even
to the meanest capacity; and that is, “Do not that to another, which thou
wouldest not have done to thy selfe;” which sheweth him, that he has no
more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions
of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other
part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and
selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these
Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,
But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature
oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take
place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes.
For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises,
in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make
himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the
ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And
again, he that shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not
himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his
Nature by Violence.
And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely
by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a

man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the
Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.

The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;
The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest,
can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve
life, and Peace destroy it.

And Yet Easie
The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I
mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in
that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall
Philosophy
And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and
Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are
names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different
tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men,
differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and
unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is
conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay,
the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth,
that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil:
From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore
so long as man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of
War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and
consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also

the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice,
Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are
good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now
the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true
Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the
Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues
and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they
come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable
living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the
Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a
gift, made Liberality.
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but
improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law,
properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But
yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God,
that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

CHAPTER XVI.
OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS
PERSONATED

A Person What
A PERSON, is he “whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.”

Person Naturall, And Artificiall
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall
Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

The Word Person, Whence
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or
Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes
more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or
Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of
speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the
same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and
to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth
another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence
Cicero useth it where he saies, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei,
Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and

the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer,
or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a
Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Actor, Author; Authority
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that
owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor
acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is
called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of
Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called
Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So
that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and Done
By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is.

Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by
Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it
himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.
And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of
Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also
when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have
authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.
And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is
obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a
Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

But Not The Actor
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of
the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the
Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the

Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against
the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.

The Authority Is To Be Shewne
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the
Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in
case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no
longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid,
without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before
hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the
Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author.
And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the
Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the
Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Things Personated, Inanimate
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by
a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor
therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority
to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or
Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be
Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.

Irrational
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason,
may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors
(during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall
recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during
the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the
Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before
such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

False Gods
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were
Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State:
and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the
Heathen could not be Personated.

The True God
The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who
governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own
name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus.
Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ,
that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of
his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by
the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles:
which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was
sent, and proceeded from them both.

A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of
that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the
Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the
Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot
otherwise be understood in Multitude.

Every One Is Author
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot
be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their

Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common
Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the
actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint:
Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent
them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.

An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality
Of Voyces
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the
Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the
Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

Representatives, When The Number Is Even,
Unprofitable
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not
great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore
oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory
voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or
absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve;
but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a
Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say
that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation
of executing presently, or deferring till another time; For when the voyces
are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

Negative Voyce

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no
Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men,
it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute
Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of a
Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The
second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally;
that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a
certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called
SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for
Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

PART II.
OF COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XVII.
OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND
DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby;
that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of
Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall
Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and
tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and
observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and
fifteenth Chapters.

Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves,
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are
contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge,
and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of
Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them,
when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough
for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength
and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have

lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade,
and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater
spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no
other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from
cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as
small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but
greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all
pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to
Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their
neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly;
and are remembred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or
Familyes
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or
the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry
the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The
Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any
certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then
sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous
moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By
One Judgement
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed
according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can
expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in
opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do
not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall
opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very

few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they
make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could
suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice,
and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in
awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there
neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth
at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

And That Continually
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the
time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for
a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a
Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part
is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by
the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst
themselves.

Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,

Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any
Coercive Power
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably
one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst
Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular
judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to
another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore
some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.
To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth

on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not
so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure
thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing
himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do
not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common
businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and
these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and
thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they
want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that
which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good;
and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill;
discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended
with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is
most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and controule
the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by
Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be
somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement
constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and
to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by
the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly;

is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one
Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly
of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge
himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall
Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common
Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will,
and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or
Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made
by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man
should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing
my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that
thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner.” This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a
COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that
great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall
God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.
For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-
Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him,
that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace
at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.

The Definition Of A Common-wealth
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to
define it,) is “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,
to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”

Soveraigne, And Subject, What
And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to
have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by
Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves,
and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they
refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives
on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to
submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be
protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall
Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a
Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-
wealth by Institution.

CHAPTER XVIII.
OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY
INSTITUTION

The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present
the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one,
as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall Authorise all
the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same
manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst
themselves, and be protected against other men.

The Consequences To Such Institution, Are

1. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of
Government
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by
the consent of the People assembled.
First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged
by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently
they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by

Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully
make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in
any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are
subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and
return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person
from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for
they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of
all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be
done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their
Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every
man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if
they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it
is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed,
or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as
being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it
is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his
own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men
have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant,
made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no
Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods
Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty
under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye,
even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an
unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to
him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of
him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of
the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of
forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made
Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest;
because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the
Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the
whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person:

and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those
Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever
can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of
himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of
every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them,
pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution;
and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there
was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the
controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man
recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to
the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant
Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch
receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth
from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but
words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any
man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed
hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and
whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of
them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne;
then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution;
for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a
Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are
kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The
Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The
Major Part.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a
Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be
contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by

the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of
their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And
whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be
asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the
condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be
destroyed by any man whatsoever.

4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused
By The Subject
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he
to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by
authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he
acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is
Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of
injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is
Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor
himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is
true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not
Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is
Unpunishable By The Subject
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by
his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the actions of
his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by
himselfe.

6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For
The Peace And Defence Of His Subjects
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them
all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth
of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be
Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances,
and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary
to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by
prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace
and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught
Them
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and
Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on
what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in
speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of
all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from
their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well
governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And
though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth;
yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine
Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be
against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by
the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false
Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be
generally offensive; Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new
Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake
the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take
up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their
condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another;
and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth

therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all
Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to
prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

7. The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subject
may every man know what is so his owne, as no
other Subject can without injustice take it from him
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing
the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and
what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow
Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before constitution of
Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all
things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being
necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of the
Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum
and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull in the actions of
subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the lawes of each
Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now
restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the
head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts
the Civill Law.

8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All
Judicature And Decision Of Controversies:
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to
say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning
Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision
of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries
of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to
every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own
conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which

is the condition of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-
wealth is instituted.

9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall
Think Best:
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging
when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled,
armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray
the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended,
consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their
strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted,
therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other
Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is
made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes
Generallissimo.

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And
Ministers, Both Of Peace, And Warre:
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours,
Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War. For seeing the
Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and
Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall
think most fit for his discharge.

11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That
(Where No Former Law hath Determined The
Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with
riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

12. And Of Honour And Order
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and
diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that
there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as
have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that
there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in
execution. But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole Militia,
or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all
Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it
belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place,
and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or
private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These Rights Are Indivisible
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of
men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and
all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet
the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if he transferre the Militia,
he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes; Or if
he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he
give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion

with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights,
we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said,
“A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:” For unlesse this division
precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not
first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these
Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of
Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill
Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between
the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men
in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do
not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally
acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their
miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than
they have hetherto been.

And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct
Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted away,
yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and
the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants
them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant
back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In
The Presence Of The Power Soveraign
This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse power

than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective
body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same;
and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as
one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all
together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is
absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in
an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the
power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the
fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his
Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and
without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the
Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are
out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in
presence of the Sun.

Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,
And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From
Not Submitting Readily, To A Lesse
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of
him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly
they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that
live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly,
attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas
the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the
same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some
incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of
Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce
sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany
a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without
subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine,

and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign
Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in
the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it
necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of
Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden
need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by
nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and
Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance;
but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill
Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot
without such payments be avoyded.

CHAPTER XIX.
OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-
WEALTH BY INSTITUTION, AND OF
SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER

The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But
Three
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest;
it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the
Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the
Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One man,
then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-
wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an
ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for
either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have
shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of
Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are
discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased
with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves
grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of
Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is
any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe,
that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when
they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.

Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please,
give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as well as give
such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may
subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to
any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a
Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people,
but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that were
to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by
two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power,
which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible, and thereby reduce the
Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which all
Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a
Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their
Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should
therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute
Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a
Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so
little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a
descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty
from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for
their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative;
that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at
his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give

him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for
those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct
men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any
other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean
to discharge the truth committed to them.

Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign
Assemblyes
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth
not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or
Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of
that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person. And
though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common
interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of
himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the
publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the
Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From
whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most
closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the
private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and
honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of
his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose
Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or
dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a
Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many
times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.
Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where
he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as
long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But
when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but

such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are
of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of
Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and
do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the
Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled:
Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell
with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.
Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of
Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a
few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which
may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent
appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was
concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a
Civill Warre.
Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by
the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be
deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable
inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne
Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as
subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by
Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers
Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an
Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any
Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well
succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say,
Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt,
have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans
Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles
Justice.
Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and
Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand
of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his

right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and
Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the
Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say
that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill
Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from
the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit,
may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience,
proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to
consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the
Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly,
by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such
inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to
the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of
Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the
Rights of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not
at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath
provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by
Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and
to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing
every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an
Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his
destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient
provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under
a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it
is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of
Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great
Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is
not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the
same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants
the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby
necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed:
So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the
major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or
Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-
wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have
need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their
Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time,

they may commit the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of
that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their
Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.
Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where the
generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an
Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from
the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that
have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to
three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising
from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where
Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; of
Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments,
are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular,
or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and
govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may
seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall
Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but
Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers
of them that have the Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are
in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth,
Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.
And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his
life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine
Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have
Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if
he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or
Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the
Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the
condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the
Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in
them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to
possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none
that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first
elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to
provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him

with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill
warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.
Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not
supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was
alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by
consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to
lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of
Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a
Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which,
any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by
an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, ’tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of The Right Of Succession
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an
Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of
life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return
into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One
man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that
which men call the Right of Succession.
There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be

assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in
himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is
the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it;
contrary to the intention of them that did institute the Common-wealth, for
their perpetuall, and not temporary security.
In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.
In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as
Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others, to
elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority,
that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall
require it) be recalled.
The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The
greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to
appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed.
For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than
every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the
Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say,
(for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety,
but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has
right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved
Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety,
leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any
Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any
one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new
Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he
thinks best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne
sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of
every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had
its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution of

Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment
and Will of the present Possessor.
And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of
his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by
other tacite signes sufficient.

Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;
By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply
the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any
way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a
Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by
Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his
Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;
But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for
that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might
easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the
Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the
right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason.
And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever
Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe
he would have that Custome stand.

Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be
understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain
Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe.
Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any
other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance
their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather
a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for
actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a
Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more
remote, because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer
in affection; and ’tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the
most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.

To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King
Of Another Nation, Not Unlawfull
But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because
strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, not
speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may
turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great
inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a
strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours,
ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when
they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were
wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by
giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of
every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of
Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge,
even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James,
aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and
Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented
the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this present,
miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to
dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it

hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also
is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a
Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as
the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is
accounted lawfull.

CHAPTER XX.
OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND
DESPOTICALL

A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many
together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all
the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his
Power.

Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By
Institution
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty
by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for
fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case,
they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it
for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as
proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man,
in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true,
that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding
from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the
thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it
was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the
thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is
not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of
the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he
unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth

him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author
of such absolution.

The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury:
He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace;
and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of
Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him
it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all
other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and
punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which
are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and
Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.

Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By
Generation, But By Contract
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his
Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because
he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other
sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained
to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the
Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he
be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two
Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely,
as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not
always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the
woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-
wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for the most
part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for

the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the
Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature;
where there are supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the
Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination
of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer
Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over
the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose
thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that
the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to
whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back,
but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the
Females was in the Mother.

Or Education;
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot
be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and
therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is
consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the
Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth
its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any
other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose
it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth
it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation
of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every
man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save,
or destroy him.

Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To
The Other
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power:
and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen

marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because
the Father also is her subject.
If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a
Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the
Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the
Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the
Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their
Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man,
hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a
Title, without the effect.

The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of
The Rights Of Possession
The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Despoticall Dominion, How Attained
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some
Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or
Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd the
present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other
sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his
body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure.
And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not
before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to
Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute)
is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of
him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do
with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at

all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive
their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty
allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his
Master, is trusted by him.

Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The
Vanquished
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the
Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he
commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an
enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this
his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his
own discretion hee shall think fit.
And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which
the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the
Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or
Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but
deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of
life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service
due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves
that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of
their task-masters.
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and
of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his
Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising
whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill
him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience,
he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.
In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall
Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and
for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter.
So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one

the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by
Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or
bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of
Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights
of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there
is no Soveraignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if
he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom
By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some Common-
wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy;
whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his
servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the
Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a
Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other
opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a
number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every
one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either
by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same
manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may
cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put
to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by
speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and
designes of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves
under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their
protection.

The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) “Speak thou to us, and
we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye.” This is
absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself
by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) “This shall be the
Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He shall take your sons,

and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before
his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and
Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make
perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your
vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall
take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber,
and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-
servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his businesse.
He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants.” This is
absolute power, and summed up in the last words, “you shall be his
servants.” Againe, when the people heard what power their King was to
have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) “We will be
as all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us,
to conduct our wars.” Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have,
both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute
power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of
King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) “Give to thy servant
understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and
Evill.” It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and to
praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are Lawes;
and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life of David;
yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would have done
it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9) “God forbid I should do such
an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God.” For obedience of servants St.
Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) “Servants obey your masters in All things,” and,
(Verse. 22) “Children obey your Parents in All things.” There is simple
obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion.
Again, (Math. 23. 2,3) “The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and
therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do.” There
again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) “Warn them that they
subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey
them.” This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,
where he sayes, “Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;” and payed such
taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from
any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For
he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to take the

Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat. 21. 2,3)
“Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed,
and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask
you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let
them go.” They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor
whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.
To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) “You shall
be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill.” and verse 11. “Who told thee that
thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee
thou shouldest not eat?” For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good and
Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as
a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the Ambition of the
woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by
tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon
having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is
Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish
between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they saw
they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had
formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was
then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create
them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure God
himselfe. And thereupon God saith, “Hast thou eaten, &c.” as if he should
say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my
Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified,
that the Commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their
Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To
Be Absolute
So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.
And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill

consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall
warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition
of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there
happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and
when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask
them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects
never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument for
the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact
reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily
those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For
though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their
houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be.
The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in
certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on
Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men
that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to
find out.

CHAPTER XXI.
OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Liberty What
Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be
applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall.
For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a
certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some
externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living
creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns;
and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise
would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at
Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments
they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of
the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to
move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by
sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is “he, that in those things, which by his strength and
wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to.” But when
the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are
abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to
Impediment: And therefore, when ’tis said (for example) The way is free,
no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.

And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Guift,
but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So
when we Speak Freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of
the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly,
from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will,
desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this,
that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to
doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent
Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of
one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of
Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the
action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in
Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers had
Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only
Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the
Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from their
will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and
every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in a
continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes)
proceed from Necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of
those causes, the Necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare
manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also
that the Liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the
Necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though
men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore
Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of
which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the

Necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will
dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to
the omnipotence and Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter
in hand) of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of
that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but
weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the
difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From
Covenants
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, for
the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing
impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws
praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall
suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the
proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and
prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty
they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from
Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by
which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is,
this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to
protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those
laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in
those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath
praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract

with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade
of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited
Power Of The Soveraign
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has
been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a
Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury;
because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he
never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the
Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And
therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject
may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet
neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be
sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe
the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And
the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an
Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as
being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was
not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe
what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because
David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature.
Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently
confirmed, saying, “To thee only have I sinned.” In the same manner, the
people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-
wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they
never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay
they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen
bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him
he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes
banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a
scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot
say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an
Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of
Soveraigns; Not Of Private Men
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the
writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their
learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the
Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every
man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at
all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men,
there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance,
to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods,
or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular
man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another,
every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe
what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that
representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall,
they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of
battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their
neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is,
free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist
their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to
resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of
Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can
thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from
the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a
Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the
same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of
Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their
Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only.
And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in
reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce
sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world,
we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights
of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and

Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from
the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the
Practice of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the
Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the
time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And
because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing
their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under
Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques,
(lib.6.cap.2) “In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for ’tis commonly
held, that no man is Free in any other Government.” And as Aristotle; so
Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the
opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by
them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the
Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading
of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a
habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious
controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those
controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say,
there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have
bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to
say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he
may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what
Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all
one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without
exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act
of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which
must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no
Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all
men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either
be drawn from the expresse words, “I Authorise all his Actions,” or from
the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention
is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation,

and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or
others equivalent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty;
namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence
against a common Enemy.

Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,
Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every
one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the
Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every
Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by
Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that
Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to
abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without
which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a
crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to
confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be
obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.
Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these
words, “I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;” in which there is no
restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to
Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when he commands me. “’Tis one
thing to say ‘Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;’ another thing to say, ‘I
will kill my selfe, or my fellow.’” It followeth therefore, that
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any
other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or

dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but
on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty
was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake
It
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against
the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall
with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as
when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he
deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to
be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such
dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When
Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they
do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but
dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but
Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest
mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not
onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines
leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the
help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because
otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the
purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.
To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away
from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive
of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together,
have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some
Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have
they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one
another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the
guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in
the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though

it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be
onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon
taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and
maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The
Silence Of The Law
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the
liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore
such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times
more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall
think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England
a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully
possessed it) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was
taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some
places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places,
such Liberty is not allowed.
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or of right
of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his
hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a
precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were
against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the
Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law,
and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no
more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not
contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath the
Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that
Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there
lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of
his Power, is done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he
that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.
If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his
Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety,

the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the
Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,)
and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be
understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance
of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power; and
therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those
Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the
Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and
Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their
Obedience To Their Soveraign
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long,
and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.
For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can
protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the
Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the
members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is
Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in
anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to
maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it,
be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by
forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in
it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine
Discord.

In Case Of Captivity
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life
be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie
given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to
accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took
him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe. The case is the
same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a

man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his
bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and
therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government
From Himself And Heyrs
If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his
heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because,
though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his
Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent
chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is
no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without
known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no
Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

In Case Of Banishment
If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still
Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the
covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is
Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of
the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To
Another
If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to
the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own
Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie;
and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates

formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right
remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the
Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is
supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

CHAPTER XXII.
OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND
PRIVATE

The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People
Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-
wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of
Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall.
By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest,
or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular
are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted
Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.
Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but
their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have
spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent; that
is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one, as also
their Representative is Subject.
Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall
(otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,) are those, which
are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth.
Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or
by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power,
within the Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.
And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull,
are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are
Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative,
consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the

Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People
to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when
the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are
Unlawfull.

In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The
Representative Is Limited
In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited:
And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For
Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every
Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects; and
therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far
forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body Politique of
Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes,
were to abandon the Government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to
divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the
Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly,
and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words,
are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the
contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all
mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a
Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their
Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-
wealth.

By Letters Patents
For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which
is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the
Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the
unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and
places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of,

unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall
sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the
Authority Soveraign.

And The Lawes
And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to
be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must
determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the
Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

When The Representative Is One Man, His
Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely
In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he
does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by
the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other
Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the
Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he does
according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign
every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the
act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of
the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That
Assented Onely
But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly
shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the
Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the
Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the
contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration. It is the
act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime,

the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by
dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall, and
fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock,
wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary
Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies
Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because
the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their
Letters, and consequently are not involved in their Votes.
When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It,
By Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the
Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one
that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it
is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the
Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make
the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the
Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as
proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an
unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then
is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question,
which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to
pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he that
lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the
Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and
seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely
for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there
be any), or (if there be none) out of his own estate.
If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable
That Have Assented
But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to
the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for
which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did

engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is
obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any
one, he be discharged.

If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body
Onely Is Obliged
But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged
to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having
liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be
payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in
lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is
obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and
consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from
the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor
complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the
Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse
through his own folly lend his mony.

Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique
Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by
this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power,
it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to
make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly,
and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because
otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible
for crimes committed by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that
liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their
Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Soveraign
Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God)
justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject is the
Author.

Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province,
Colony, Or Town
The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely
distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted,
wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and
numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are
ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be
committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on
the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and
their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge,
or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another
man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one
Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes distinct
one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration of the
Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the
Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces.
But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the
Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who had the
Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents,
and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome,
and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent
from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the
government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did
those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any
Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour; For though
every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of
government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also
enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a
Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in
those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to
take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose
rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or
servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government
of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that
which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that

Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act
onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent,
for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the
bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute
any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on
them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as
having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie,
which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have
right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the
Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to
execute the same. And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly,
for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an
Assembly for the Government of a Town, or University, or a College, or a
Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.
And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member conceive
himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth
to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such
causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self.
For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign
Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in
his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the
most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is
to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present
at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will
themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men
that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their
Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind
themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that
with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or
with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn
together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the
gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own; and

sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is
no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them
to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End
of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two
wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that
to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique,
is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers;
another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any
particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in
that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at
home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is
gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and
sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign
Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are
gainfull to the adventurers.
Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they
set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the people;
and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign
commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On
the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole
buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of
those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For
where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one
buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then
Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if
being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at
home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.
The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit
to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is
deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling
and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is
reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that
is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the
same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the
Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member
of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act
of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for
the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but
considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole
payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt
be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself,
and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if
there be any.
If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to
be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in
the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is
made of their particular adventures.
If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are
lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was
executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the
Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority
of the Common-wealth,) is not his.
If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the
Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the
authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if
they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give
judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own
Cause.

A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The
Soveraign
These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either
perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also
whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. For
example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit
to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to
send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities
of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or for
any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Country, such

Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and
at that time, a Body Politique, representing every Subject of that Dominion;
but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that
Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when
it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by
them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of
the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two
Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which
cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a
Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by
it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole
People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the
People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing
directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.

A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted
without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all
other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative,
they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or
Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and
Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of
them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath
forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under
domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to
their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the
Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families,
they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the
Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull
Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves
into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such
as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order

their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by
Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers
Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party,
against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues
Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer
concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills
and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the
lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein: And
his designe is to be understood by the occasion.
The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for
mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League
of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of
unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by
the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of
men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly,
(as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so
long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore
Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power
established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also
profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the
same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of
the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and
Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the
Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if
for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique,
and unjustly concealed.

Secret Cabals
If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men,
part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the

guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a
fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he,
whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make
as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is
no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony,
(unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For
sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony;
and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

Feuds Of Private Families
In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the
government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires,
it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-
wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations
not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall
hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident
enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-
wealth.

Factions For Government
And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of
Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and
Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls
of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety
of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.
Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or
unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the
Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a
publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily
great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a
particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged
conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a

thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or
Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous
Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such
cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull,
but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, and
bring to Justice.
When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they
accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver
their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the
case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other
men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with
one Voyce, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians;” which was their way of
demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as
was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the
Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull,
and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words,(Acts 19. 40) “If
Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing, there
be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any
other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully
called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because,
there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this
Concourse of People.” Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can
give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And
this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People,
which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such
as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and
Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.

CHAPTER XXIII.
OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF
SOVERAIGN POWER

In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Common-
wealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique
Ministers.

Publique Minister Who
A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a
Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And
whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth two
Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one
Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not onely of
the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the
Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly); they
that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique
Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the
Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other
Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the
commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor
Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold of
a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.

Ministers For The Generall Administration

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general
Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the
whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor
of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole Administration of his
Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as
the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the
Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or
Province; as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give
the generall charge thereof to a Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-
Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he
shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the
Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no
other right, but what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission
that can be given them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to
transferre the Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that
purpose. And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and
Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall.

For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy
Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some
speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the
Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the
Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are
Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person
Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his
Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.
Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the
custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or to
provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea,
are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he fight
for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it;
because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command,
represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

For Instruction Of The People
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the
people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to
live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the publique
enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their
own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or
should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign. The Monarch, or
the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach
and instruct the people; and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power
Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other,
receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns;
as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia & Regis; or Dei Providentia & Voluntate
Regis.

For Judicature
They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in
their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their
Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature
is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges are
but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as
Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are
judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same
controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.
And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between
the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the
Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of
both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is
already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare
the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall
both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between
them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against
such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the
Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he

excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he
appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his
choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself,
or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that
Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to
say, by himself.
These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot
forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice,
established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By
Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant
are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown)
those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there were two
orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had
this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords;
and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged
as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had
themselves desired. And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civill
controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country where the
matter in controversie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till
at last Twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by
those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be nothing
alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall, These publique
persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or
Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be
compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.

For Execution
Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the
Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the
Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For
every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth; and
their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.
Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their
own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers,

Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique
Businesse.
But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a
troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private
Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the
Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince,
to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though Authority be
Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his
naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if a man be sent into another
Country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the
Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is none to take
notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but
yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in
the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or
other informations of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are
Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.

Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To
Advise Are Not Publique Ministers
Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no
Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the
Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a
Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose
person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a
Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of
Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they
represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique
Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result of
their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint
Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the
quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of
State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but
themselves.

CHAPTER XXIV.
OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH

The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth In The Commodities
Of Sea And Land
The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and
Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation;
and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to
the Publique use.
As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those
commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land,
and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.
For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and
Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the
Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving
them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the
labour and industry of men.
This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly
Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the
Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And
because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth,
(except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the
maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not
something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just
Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable

for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been Common-
wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation,
have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their Power,
partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by
selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other
places.

And The Right Of Distribution Of Them
The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution
of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word Propriety; and
belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power. For
where there is no Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been already shewn) a
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every
thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety
nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a
passionate defender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all
Propriety to the Law Civil, “Let the Civill Law,” saith he, “be once
abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is
nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to
his Children.” And again; “Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows
what is his own, and what another mans.” Seeing therefore the Introduction
of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by
the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and
consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign
Power. And this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to
say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing
to every man his own.

All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally From
The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign
In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe:
wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he,
and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge

agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a
Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the
Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was
divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of
Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve
Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made
neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of
Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which
division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a People comming into
possession of a land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient
Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them
their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors
distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the
Conquerour.

Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion
Of The Soveraign, But Onely Of Another Subject
From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in
his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of
them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch.
For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person
he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common
Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in
order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make
in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed
his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the
will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign
Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing
of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own
consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is
not enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much
as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign;
because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the
Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands

of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be
considered hereafter in another place.

The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their
Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine
the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required:
Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free
from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is,
the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any certaine Revenue for the
Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government,
and to the condition of meere Nature, and War, assoon as ever the
Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly,
that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging the
publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common-wealths can endure no
Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by
externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique
Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent
occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the
Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and
Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers
services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were
not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall
capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on
all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those publique
Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the
Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it
appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the
late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is
therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may
sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their
Representative.

The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As
Their Distribution, On Th Soveraign
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places,
and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to
the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own
discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish
the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves,
by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse
noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the
Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove
both of the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.

The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To
The Soveraign
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth,
that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few
commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in
the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of
every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can
spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by
exchange, and mutuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-
wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all
kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging,
borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by
what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the
Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the
Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is
sufficient.

Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are
not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to
some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder the
motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what
place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing
else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being (as it
happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a
commodious measure for the value of all things else between Nations; and
Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-
wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the
Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all
commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man,
to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary
residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-
wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof;
In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the
Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of
the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the
Body of Man.
And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by
the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common
measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be
enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to make Common-
wealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign
Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole
Armies with provision. But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the
Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of
ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of
Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many
times of those that have it.

The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique
Use

The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use,
are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other,
that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are
Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers
againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or
private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his
resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the
severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall,
the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for
motion all the Members of the same.

The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call
Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the
Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign
Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre.
And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of
themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them,
(as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in which
case the Common-wealth from which they went was called their
Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require
of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their
domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they
remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of
Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces,
and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of
Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth
wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised
them to Plant.

CHAPTER XXV.
OF COUNSELL

Counsell What
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and
inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of
Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking
in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words “Doe
this,” are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that
giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that
see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish
between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the
Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in
mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a
consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of
Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command; and sometimes the
contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would
inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to
those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and
distinct significations, I define them thus.

Differences Between Command And Counsell
COMMAND is, where a man saith, “Doe this,” or “Doe this not,”
without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this
it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his
own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and the
proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, “Doe” or “Doe not this,” and
deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to
whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell,
pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he
giveth it.
Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that
Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of
another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be
obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey:
But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not
following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the
Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between
them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell;
because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to
Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other
Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper
object.
This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he
that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of
another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And
consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch,
or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it,
whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be
to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken
notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any
further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the
Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth
Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the
Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to
another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell
proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by
the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse,
where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is
subject.

Exhortation And Dehortation What

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with
signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say
it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye
himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And
therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and
opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes,
Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their
Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.
From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is
directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh
it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of
Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom he adviseth.
And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough,
by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which
being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own
occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to
the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.
Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where
a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to
one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than
can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and
Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. Thirdly,
that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell,
are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For
though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no
more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward,
is a just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his
Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not
onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more
Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure
labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be
sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of
Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may
take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. “Have
no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods
name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale
not,” &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey
them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to
obey. But these words, “Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow
me,” are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn
from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have “Treasure in
Heaven.” These words, “Go into the village over against you, and you shall
find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me,” are a
Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their
Master: but these words, “Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus,”
are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any
benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we
rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the
punishment hanging over us for our sins.

Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced
from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt
that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable
consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences
between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same. For
Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly
observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made
known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with
the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-
wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall
Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall
man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a
naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense,
which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas
they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth,
may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render